Nimrod MRA.4
Finally, did H-C criticise DE&S? He actually criticised DLO (Baber and Eagles from the IPT, and Cowan and Pledger as CDL) and that criticism has been revealed as utterly vindictive and designed to protect VSOs. To get to the truth, follow the lies. Who lied? (See above).
The fourth major problem is that DE&S faces the wrong way: DE&S Support organisations such as IPTs do not face and serve those who are in fact responsible for Airworthiness, namely the Operators, but are inclined rather to face towards those that hold the financial purse-strings. For instance, IPTs negotiate maintenance contractual arrangements with approved organisations on behalf of the staff in the Commands who have the money to pay for the service, rather than for the Duty Holders at the Operating bases who use the equipment and who have a duty of care to their people.
The sixth major problem is that the DE&S is introspective and self-regarding to a degree: DE&S organisations which have Airworthiness and Safety roles are inclined to serve their own needs, based on what they perceive to be their own accountability as (self-appointed) Duty Holders. Operating authorities are increasingly regarded as no more than an incidental part of the overall process. Authority as to the operation of platforms properly lies with those charged with operating them on a daily basis. Operators are the true Duty Holders. They own the risks. They suffer the consequences. Support organisations are there to support Operators, not vice-versa.
The net result of all of the above is confusion and distortion in the provision of support services and the potential jeopardising of the management of Airworthiness. The simple aim is the safe maintenance and operation of equipment. The raison d’etre of DE&S IPTs is supporting those who carry this out at the Units. A fundamental shift in focus is required to ensure the needs of the AOAs and Duty Holders are properly met by the IPTs in DE&S. Such a construct would require a switch in the direction faced by the Support organisations towards the Operators who are the Duty Holders. This poses a significant challenge to the current culture, behaviour and remit of DE&S.
In summary, therefore, the current position is manifestly unsatisfactory. There is no clearly recognisable Duty Holder structure within which those that hold responsibility understand their responsibilities and the risks that they hold. Those who are accountable do not necessarily have the authority they need properly to exercise their duties and to mitigate the risks that they own. Support organisations are not actually facing the Duty Holders at Unit level, who are actually responsible for the safe operation and maintenance of the equipment in question and the lives of their people.
You need to direct your repetitive question to your Airworthiness Authority ATG. That is presently the Military Aviation Authority. You will get lots of blah blah blah from them, because they will have little or no more idea than anyone else, but are probably trying to desperately get a feel for where the next "N****d" is or isn't. Politics come in here of course because they would have to explain why they are grounding yet another fleet. If they say that it is because it is unairworthy then they will have to explain why.
That is when the truth will emerge and the Star Chamber will have to surrender those that it has protected so long. It would be better for the Royal Air Force if it takes the initiative first before its honour is further sullied by the actions of these men. In other words we look to the leadership to provide....leadership.
That is when the truth will emerge and the Star Chamber will have to surrender those that it has protected so long. It would be better for the Royal Air Force if it takes the initiative first before its honour is further sullied by the actions of these men. In other words we look to the leadership to provide....leadership.
JTO
Sorry, yes I'm familiar with what H-C wrote. My point was that, while he uses current terminology (DE&S), most of his criticism is actually aimed at failings that occurred just after AMSO took over certain MoD(PE) roles when it was reorganised in the early 90s. That coincided with AMSO being double hatted as RAF Chief Engineer. The following 3 years saw a conscious run-down of the airworthiness system. DE&S inherited those systemic and organisational failures. As the same people, or their acolytes, remain in charge, I don't see DE&S improving matters. But the important thing is that by dating the failures at 1998, and talking of DE&S, H-C knowingly diverted attention from the guilty
I would never claim MoD(PE) was perfect, but the record does show that PE railed against the CE's actions and were the only organisation to actively disregard his worst excesses. PE's most obvious act was to have commissioned a Director Internal Audit report into AMSO/CE's deliberate waste, which prompted his policy of “savings at the expense of safety”. That independent audit crucified every part of AMSO bar one – Tornado engines. It reported in June 1996, after 3.5 years deliberation, which makes a mockery of H-C's 1998 baseline. Unsurprisingly, H-C conveniently forgot to mention this report, among others.
This is why it is difficult to answer Alfred's question. Some aircraft and equipments were well-served in this period, due entirely to project managers completely ignoring the instruction to disregard major components of maintaining airworthiness.
By now, I think most people who read my posts will understand the direct link between Maintaining the Build Standard > a viable Safety Case > a compliant Release to Service. Under the CE (1991-96), the first was more or less scrapped (management oversight finished in June 1993), rendering the second and third PROGRESSIVELY invalid. To answer your question, to determine if a fleet should be grounded one has to assess that progress toward unairworthiness and whether it can be managed while maintaining some form of Operational Capability. Clearly, some can still fly, with extra limitations or restrictions; while others will be too far gone.
It follows that the MAA has to fist accept this timeframe before any decision can be validated. To date, they have not, as they blindly follow H-C. Regression to H-C's 1998 is meaningless. In effect, they have not changed AMSO/CE's risk management policy. Don't mitigate, and cross your fingers that nothing happens before the ISD. Unfortunately, when something does happen, people die. The MAA have actually addressed this question in a formal reply to a Minister. They say it matters not if the baseline is 1998 or 1986 (first promulgation of AMSO's policy to waste money) because there is no financial impact. I'm afraid that answer says it all.
Sorry, yes I'm familiar with what H-C wrote. My point was that, while he uses current terminology (DE&S), most of his criticism is actually aimed at failings that occurred just after AMSO took over certain MoD(PE) roles when it was reorganised in the early 90s. That coincided with AMSO being double hatted as RAF Chief Engineer. The following 3 years saw a conscious run-down of the airworthiness system. DE&S inherited those systemic and organisational failures. As the same people, or their acolytes, remain in charge, I don't see DE&S improving matters. But the important thing is that by dating the failures at 1998, and talking of DE&S, H-C knowingly diverted attention from the guilty
I would never claim MoD(PE) was perfect, but the record does show that PE railed against the CE's actions and were the only organisation to actively disregard his worst excesses. PE's most obvious act was to have commissioned a Director Internal Audit report into AMSO/CE's deliberate waste, which prompted his policy of “savings at the expense of safety”. That independent audit crucified every part of AMSO bar one – Tornado engines. It reported in June 1996, after 3.5 years deliberation, which makes a mockery of H-C's 1998 baseline. Unsurprisingly, H-C conveniently forgot to mention this report, among others.
This is why it is difficult to answer Alfred's question. Some aircraft and equipments were well-served in this period, due entirely to project managers completely ignoring the instruction to disregard major components of maintaining airworthiness.
By now, I think most people who read my posts will understand the direct link between Maintaining the Build Standard > a viable Safety Case > a compliant Release to Service. Under the CE (1991-96), the first was more or less scrapped (management oversight finished in June 1993), rendering the second and third PROGRESSIVELY invalid. To answer your question, to determine if a fleet should be grounded one has to assess that progress toward unairworthiness and whether it can be managed while maintaining some form of Operational Capability. Clearly, some can still fly, with extra limitations or restrictions; while others will be too far gone.
It follows that the MAA has to fist accept this timeframe before any decision can be validated. To date, they have not, as they blindly follow H-C. Regression to H-C's 1998 is meaningless. In effect, they have not changed AMSO/CE's risk management policy. Don't mitigate, and cross your fingers that nothing happens before the ISD. Unfortunately, when something does happen, people die. The MAA have actually addressed this question in a formal reply to a Minister. They say it matters not if the baseline is 1998 or 1986 (first promulgation of AMSO's policy to waste money) because there is no financial impact. I'm afraid that answer says it all.
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I think ATG and I (and a few others) feel all the passages and pages re process seems to miss the point of the question -that every aircraft currently flying with the RAF is safe by military standards
Everything I read in these posts is about process, paperwork and box ticking on a vast scale and even the box-tickers don't seem to think that it does much good
and the answer? Seems to be more box ticking, more "authorities" ...............
Everything I read in these posts is about process, paperwork and box ticking on a vast scale and even the box-tickers don't seem to think that it does much good
and the answer? Seems to be more box ticking, more "authorities" ...............
HH,
Very well put.
The positive side of the post H-C era is that we have had some objective DH reviews of the platforms 'as flown' and the safety cases 'as assumed'. This has led to some informed judgements that some of our platforms are excellent, in no small part to the PTs that have been looking after them for many years.
What it has also revealed is that some platforms are close to being the next Nimrod. The net result of this discovery is for DE&S VSOs to point at all the box-ticking that has been done and for the MAA to double-check that all the box-ticking has indeed been done.
Not quite the change we were looking for and the DHs are fearful that it would be career endex to ground a platform that has all the box-ticking complete, but appears to fall short of anything they would survive scrutiny post-accident.
The MAA needs to regulate based on the facts, not the optimistic box-ticking, and put clear water between the PTs that have done an outstanding job and those that have failed.
Very well put.
The positive side of the post H-C era is that we have had some objective DH reviews of the platforms 'as flown' and the safety cases 'as assumed'. This has led to some informed judgements that some of our platforms are excellent, in no small part to the PTs that have been looking after them for many years.
What it has also revealed is that some platforms are close to being the next Nimrod. The net result of this discovery is for DE&S VSOs to point at all the box-ticking that has been done and for the MAA to double-check that all the box-ticking has indeed been done.
Not quite the change we were looking for and the DHs are fearful that it would be career endex to ground a platform that has all the box-ticking complete, but appears to fall short of anything they would survive scrutiny post-accident.
The MAA needs to regulate based on the facts, not the optimistic box-ticking, and put clear water between the PTs that have done an outstanding job and those that have failed.
HH, the "process" and "box ticking" that you so disdainfully dismiss as immaterial to "Military Standards" are to avoid having aircraft spontaneously explode in mid air (14 killed), be capable of being brought down by as little as a single AK47 round (despite being used in a tactical environment) (10 killed), fitted with untested HISLs that were routinely switched off because they blinded their own pilots (7 killed), that had "positively dangerous" FADECs that caused uncommanded power ups, downs, and shutdowns, (29 killed), fitted with IFFs that did not warn pilots of failure in a tactical environment (2 killed), all subject to accident threads in this forum.
If "Military Standards" had applied to those aircraft, many if not all those lives might not have been so needlessly lost. It is to avoid yet more lives being needlessly lost that the "Military Standards" that were not applied to those cases should be applied in future. That may well require the grounding of yet more fleets, but that could only really be done by an independent "authority" and we know what you think about them...
If "Military Standards" had applied to those aircraft, many if not all those lives might not have been so needlessly lost. It is to avoid yet more lives being needlessly lost that the "Military Standards" that were not applied to those cases should be applied in future. That may well require the grounding of yet more fleets, but that could only really be done by an independent "authority" and we know what you think about them...
Heathrow Harry
Please let us know which "box ticking" regulations you think we should do away with. I'm quite happy to agree some are superfluous.
For example, do you agree with the Nimrod MRA4 2 Star (DGAS2/XD1) that Functional Safety is superfluous and should be waived if it means meeting time and cost? (e.g. Tornado/Patriot shootdown, Sea King ASaC, Nimrod).
Should we maintain a Safety Case? The RAF Chief Engineer thought not, and that is the primary reason why MoD cannot demonstrate airworthiness in many fleets. And why Gp Capt Baber (MR2 IPTL) inherited a poor Safety Case with no means of maintaining it.
The expertise/corporate knowledge to resurrect it and make it viable is a mandated requirement. Do you agree with the policy to denude MoD of this expertise? (RAF Chief Engineer 1991, Chief of Defence Procurement 1996).
Do you agree with ACAS's November 1993 decision that an aircraft with Nav and Comms systems that the aircrew are not permitted to rely upon "in any way whatsoever" is fit for purpose? (Chinook HC Mk2 Release to Service, confirmed by Lord Philip). I'm not a pilot, but please show me one who agrees with ACAS.
Yes, "box-ticking" goes on. For example, when compiling the Master Airworthiness Reference there is a mandated list of regulations to comply with. On Chinook, the evidence to Lord Philip listed 65 of the more important ones. You know, risk of death or injury if non-compliant. All but TWO were non-compliant. The Compliance Matrix makes sad reading, not least because there aren't very many left in MoD who could begin to compile it. In my opinion, and that of those who lost close friends and relatives, a box-ticking exercise that, in retrospect, would have been worthwhile. But wait. It WAS carried out, and Boscombe Down categorically stated the aircraft was not airworthy. So the process worked up to that point, but disintegrated as soon as it reached ACAS and CAS. I hope that one example tells you where I think the problem lies.
I could go on, but you hopefully get my point. I actually agree with much of what you and JTO say - but it is one thing to criticise the regulations and quite another to have to sign to say you've complied with them. The former costs you nothing when someone else has to do the latter. When someone is under a legal obligation to conform, and has to make a written declaration he has done so, then one shouldn't criticise him if he does his job properly.
The regulations are very robust. It is the implementation that is lacking. Or do you agree with aforesaid DGAS2/XD1, Chief of Defence Procurement and RAF Chief Engineer when they ruled that staff with this responsibility should be disciplined for refusing to obey an order to make a false written declaration and declare the regulations have been met, when they have not? Had we not stood up, even more would have died.
That is practical airworthiness (mis)management in MoD. I know the MAA's view on the last point. They side with their MoD masters.
Best wishes
Please let us know which "box ticking" regulations you think we should do away with. I'm quite happy to agree some are superfluous.
For example, do you agree with the Nimrod MRA4 2 Star (DGAS2/XD1) that Functional Safety is superfluous and should be waived if it means meeting time and cost? (e.g. Tornado/Patriot shootdown, Sea King ASaC, Nimrod).
Should we maintain a Safety Case? The RAF Chief Engineer thought not, and that is the primary reason why MoD cannot demonstrate airworthiness in many fleets. And why Gp Capt Baber (MR2 IPTL) inherited a poor Safety Case with no means of maintaining it.
The expertise/corporate knowledge to resurrect it and make it viable is a mandated requirement. Do you agree with the policy to denude MoD of this expertise? (RAF Chief Engineer 1991, Chief of Defence Procurement 1996).
Do you agree with ACAS's November 1993 decision that an aircraft with Nav and Comms systems that the aircrew are not permitted to rely upon "in any way whatsoever" is fit for purpose? (Chinook HC Mk2 Release to Service, confirmed by Lord Philip). I'm not a pilot, but please show me one who agrees with ACAS.
Yes, "box-ticking" goes on. For example, when compiling the Master Airworthiness Reference there is a mandated list of regulations to comply with. On Chinook, the evidence to Lord Philip listed 65 of the more important ones. You know, risk of death or injury if non-compliant. All but TWO were non-compliant. The Compliance Matrix makes sad reading, not least because there aren't very many left in MoD who could begin to compile it. In my opinion, and that of those who lost close friends and relatives, a box-ticking exercise that, in retrospect, would have been worthwhile. But wait. It WAS carried out, and Boscombe Down categorically stated the aircraft was not airworthy. So the process worked up to that point, but disintegrated as soon as it reached ACAS and CAS. I hope that one example tells you where I think the problem lies.
I could go on, but you hopefully get my point. I actually agree with much of what you and JTO say - but it is one thing to criticise the regulations and quite another to have to sign to say you've complied with them. The former costs you nothing when someone else has to do the latter. When someone is under a legal obligation to conform, and has to make a written declaration he has done so, then one shouldn't criticise him if he does his job properly.
The regulations are very robust. It is the implementation that is lacking. Or do you agree with aforesaid DGAS2/XD1, Chief of Defence Procurement and RAF Chief Engineer when they ruled that staff with this responsibility should be disciplined for refusing to obey an order to make a false written declaration and declare the regulations have been met, when they have not? Had we not stood up, even more would have died.
That is practical airworthiness (mis)management in MoD. I know the MAA's view on the last point. They side with their MoD masters.
Best wishes
Last edited by tucumseh; 23rd Jun 2013 at 11:24.
Tuc
I thought your excellent post and questions deserved a reply, as none seem forthcoming from your detractors.
No, I don't agree with the policy decisions made by your 2, 3 and 4 stars. And having read your submissions to Hadden-Cave and Phillip I know you submitted copies of the actual papers proving what you say. IIRC you asked these questions a long time ago of Ingram or perhaps Ainsworth and were told "too difficult." I hope the MoD people who told the Minister this don't work in MAA.
MC
I thought your excellent post and questions deserved a reply, as none seem forthcoming from your detractors.
No, I don't agree with the policy decisions made by your 2, 3 and 4 stars. And having read your submissions to Hadden-Cave and Phillip I know you submitted copies of the actual papers proving what you say. IIRC you asked these questions a long time ago of Ingram or perhaps Ainsworth and were told "too difficult." I hope the MoD people who told the Minister this don't work in MAA.
MC
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One thing that strikes me is that the whole system resembles the oil business pre-Piper Alpha (I lost a colleague there) - loads of paperwork , committees, guidelines etc. etc but missing the main point which was to manage things safely and ensure a clear LINE responsibility for safety
Presentations - Oil & Gas UK
has a lot from last weeks conference in ABZ
slide 10 of Haddon-Cave's paper is a shocker................
Presentations - Oil & Gas UK
has a lot from last weeks conference in ABZ
slide 10 of Haddon-Cave's paper is a shocker................
The line of responsibility is clearly set out in the regulations, HH. An RTS into RAF Service could only be issued by ACAS upon receipt of a Controller Aircraft clearance that the aircraft is airworthy. In the case of the Chinook Mk2 that clearance was qualified as "Switch On" clearance only, meaning that Nav and Comms were not to be used in flight, essentially making the aircraft inoperable other than for ground training purposes. The RTS was issued anyway, but crews were not made aware of the "switch on only" restriction.
Can you see the flaw in your demand for a "Clear Line"? No one has been interviewed, let alone charged for dereliction of duty, either by the Service or the Civilian Police.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation it Kills.
Can you see the flaw in your demand for a "Clear Line"? No one has been interviewed, let alone charged for dereliction of duty, either by the Service or the Civilian Police.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation it Kills.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 24th Jun 2013 at 14:51.
Surely what is a "shocker" is his slide that says "2002-2005 Safety Case drawn up"
Why doesn't H-C ask why the safety case was only drawn up in 2002-5? I think I prefer tuc's way, pointing out there is a question to ask and providing the answer. H-C was given the answer and refused to publish it.
HH, still no answer to tuc's simple question he asked you?
Why doesn't H-C ask why the safety case was only drawn up in 2002-5? I think I prefer tuc's way, pointing out there is a question to ask and providing the answer. H-C was given the answer and refused to publish it.
HH, still no answer to tuc's simple question he asked you?
Here's one of Haddon-Cave's slides from HH's link. Anyone spot the problem?
See "DGSM"? In 1991-3 that was a supplier and hence didn't have airworthiness delegation. Haddon-Cave was supplied with the evidence the chain was 3 Star > 1 Star. In December 1992 DGSM came down to London to threaten civilian staffs with dismissal if they refused to stop highlighting serial waste of money and savings being made at the cost of safety. He would not have done that without top cover from the Chief Engineer (Alcock).
Who issued these policies? The guy above him in the chain - Chief Engineer.
In 2001 the guy above that, CDP (missing from the diagram), upheld disciplinary action against civilians who refused to commit the very same "offences" - that is, it was (and remains) a disciplinary offence to refuse to obey an order to make a false declaration on financial probity or airworthiness, but it is not an offence to issue that order.
Nor does Haddon-Cave point out that these remains serious offences in MoD, confirmed in writing over the past 6 months by AbbeyWood (under MAA advisement), Minister for the Armed Forces and the Head of the Civil Service.
What, I ask, is the greater problem? A few boxes to tick, or this management culture? The committees you complain of comprised these people. What is the problem? The committee itself, or the people?
Dervish - Thanks. What MoD found "too difficult" (it was Ingram in 2005) was a simple question about maintaining airworthiness. He didn't write to me but to my MP. Part of my letter to him was to advise him of "systemic failures" to implement airworthiness regulations. This, over a year before XV230 crashed. Haddon-Cave did not mention this either, but it is where he got the term "savings at the expense of safety".
However, it has to be said MoD were at least being consistent, because 2 years earlier, in April 2003, they had briefed Minister that I was the only person in MoD who believed the regulations should be implemented. I have a copy of that briefing. It was written by the same Director of Personnel, Resources and Development who, the previous year, had advised CDP to uphold his earlier decision that what I describe were offences.
If, in 2003, I was the only one, and Minister (Robothan) has in the last few months again referenced this briefing thus showing his continued support for the claim, then I'm entitled to ask what on earth the MAA think of this. And yes, the MAA DG knows what is being said in his name.
Back again to the Swiss Cheese slices. Organisational Fault, Preconditions, Line Management Failures.
See "DGSM"? In 1991-3 that was a supplier and hence didn't have airworthiness delegation. Haddon-Cave was supplied with the evidence the chain was 3 Star > 1 Star. In December 1992 DGSM came down to London to threaten civilian staffs with dismissal if they refused to stop highlighting serial waste of money and savings being made at the cost of safety. He would not have done that without top cover from the Chief Engineer (Alcock).
Who issued these policies? The guy above him in the chain - Chief Engineer.
In 2001 the guy above that, CDP (missing from the diagram), upheld disciplinary action against civilians who refused to commit the very same "offences" - that is, it was (and remains) a disciplinary offence to refuse to obey an order to make a false declaration on financial probity or airworthiness, but it is not an offence to issue that order.
Nor does Haddon-Cave point out that these remains serious offences in MoD, confirmed in writing over the past 6 months by AbbeyWood (under MAA advisement), Minister for the Armed Forces and the Head of the Civil Service.
What, I ask, is the greater problem? A few boxes to tick, or this management culture? The committees you complain of comprised these people. What is the problem? The committee itself, or the people?
Dervish - Thanks. What MoD found "too difficult" (it was Ingram in 2005) was a simple question about maintaining airworthiness. He didn't write to me but to my MP. Part of my letter to him was to advise him of "systemic failures" to implement airworthiness regulations. This, over a year before XV230 crashed. Haddon-Cave did not mention this either, but it is where he got the term "savings at the expense of safety".
However, it has to be said MoD were at least being consistent, because 2 years earlier, in April 2003, they had briefed Minister that I was the only person in MoD who believed the regulations should be implemented. I have a copy of that briefing. It was written by the same Director of Personnel, Resources and Development who, the previous year, had advised CDP to uphold his earlier decision that what I describe were offences.
If, in 2003, I was the only one, and Minister (Robothan) has in the last few months again referenced this briefing thus showing his continued support for the claim, then I'm entitled to ask what on earth the MAA think of this. And yes, the MAA DG knows what is being said in his name.
Back again to the Swiss Cheese slices. Organisational Fault, Preconditions, Line Management Failures.
Last edited by tucumseh; 24th Jun 2013 at 14:43.
Well that tops and tails things clear enough for me, tuc. Thank you.
So what do you say, Heathrow Harry? Is the problem really endless Regulations and bureaucratic Committees? Or is it the issuing of illegal orders by VSOs to subvert the Regulations, to persecute those who would not comply, and to maintain a cover up of that alleged illegality over three decades?
Is the problem in short that Airworthiness is not safe in the hands of the MOD, or its subsidiaries, and that its provision should be Regulated from without? What clues does Aberdeen come up with for that?
So what do you say, Heathrow Harry? Is the problem really endless Regulations and bureaucratic Committees? Or is it the issuing of illegal orders by VSOs to subvert the Regulations, to persecute those who would not comply, and to maintain a cover up of that alleged illegality over three decades?
Is the problem in short that Airworthiness is not safe in the hands of the MOD, or its subsidiaries, and that its provision should be Regulated from without? What clues does Aberdeen come up with for that?
Last edited by Chugalug2; 24th Jun 2013 at 19:04. Reason: poor use of words
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"Or is it the issuing of illegal orders by VSOs to subvert the Regulations, to persecute those who would not comply, and to maintain a cover up of that alleged illegality over three decades?"
this is beginning to sound like the Black helicopters/Masons/Jewish conspiracy argument......................
this is beginning to sound like the Black helicopters/Masons/Jewish conspiracy argument......................
HH
You may not like it, but it is demonstrably true and the evidence was submitted to H-C and Lord Philip (among others).
If you submitted evidence to the contrary I'm quite happy to debate it. But at the moment you haven't answered straight forward questions.
Do you think for one moment I would say what I do without rock solid evidence? Or do we take this "rumour" forum too literally and only publish hearsay?
You may not like it, but it is demonstrably true and the evidence was submitted to H-C and Lord Philip (among others).
If you submitted evidence to the contrary I'm quite happy to debate it. But at the moment you haven't answered straight forward questions.
Do you think for one moment I would say what I do without rock solid evidence? Or do we take this "rumour" forum too literally and only publish hearsay?
HH:-
I'm afraid that just isn't good enough. This is supposed to be a forum for professionals who are, or have been, in Military Aviation. You have been asked questions that you don't answer, you have been directed to airworthiness related UK Military Air Accidents accounting for 62 deaths, you have been shown the major flaws in the Haddon Cave report on which the RAF hangs the future of its Flight Safety, and all you can come up with is that pathetic jibe? For shame.
Argue your corner by all means, but play the ball, Sir, play the ball!
this is beginning to sound like the Black helicopters/Masons/Jewish conspiracy argument......................
Argue your corner by all means, but play the ball, Sir, play the ball!
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[quote]...and all you can come up with is that pathetic jibe?[QUOTE]
Maybe because in the end that is all you are worth. OK you can string together a coherent sentence, but do you give due regard to the thoughts and persuasions of others? Many of whom are, or have been "professional military aircrew" with thousands of hours in the types you profess to have definitive knowledge of.
Case in point...
It has been pointed out to you before that of the "62" deaths you refer to...
Some are probably related to airworthiness issues
Some are possibly related to airworthiness issues
and some are **** all to do with airworthiness issues.
The actual numbers and proportions are known only to god, as born out by the findings of a myriad of accident boards both military and civil. May I remind you that the long running saga of the Chinook accident was not about discovering the probable cause of the accident - most professional aircrew long since put that one to bed. It was purely about removing an unjustified verdict from the Board of Enquiry report.
Maybe it's time to freshen up your own arguments and stop trotting out the same paragraphs ad nauseam. And maybe you could acknowledge that is not illegal, immoral or unprofessional for an aviator to hold differing views to your own.
JMO
Maybe because in the end that is all you are worth. OK you can string together a coherent sentence, but do you give due regard to the thoughts and persuasions of others? Many of whom are, or have been "professional military aircrew" with thousands of hours in the types you profess to have definitive knowledge of.
Case in point...
...you have been directed to airworthiness related UK Military Air Accidents accounting for 62 deaths...
Some are probably related to airworthiness issues
Some are possibly related to airworthiness issues
and some are **** all to do with airworthiness issues.
The actual numbers and proportions are known only to god, as born out by the findings of a myriad of accident boards both military and civil. May I remind you that the long running saga of the Chinook accident was not about discovering the probable cause of the accident - most professional aircrew long since put that one to bed. It was purely about removing an unjustified verdict from the Board of Enquiry report.
Maybe it's time to freshen up your own arguments and stop trotting out the same paragraphs ad nauseam. And maybe you could acknowledge that is not illegal, immoral or unprofessional for an aviator to hold differing views to your own.
JMO