Nimrod MRA.4
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It seems that the MRA4 project was bludgeoned forward long past the point when it should have been very critically reviewed, and perhaps curtailed altogether. This would be a very difficult decision in any organisation, public sector or commercial. That the people responsible are still in decision making positions is worrying. We can only hope that lessons were learned.
The point about Risk Management in industry and commerce is that it is viewed from a slightly different perspective. Negativity is not well received but risk is viewed as a potential differentiator that, properly identified and managed, it may allow your company to achieve something that your competitors cannot. So as well as identifying the red lines, it is also seen as an opportunity for competitive advantage. The systems are not perfect - there can still be check-box mentality, where the completion of the risk form is more important than managing and addressing the issues identified. And not always are the issues the same as those inherent in military scenarios. However, risk is specifically discussed by the boards of major corporations at the strategic level, informed by the risk management assessments and their own knowledge.
This does not mean that all risk is avoided or mitigated, and some marginal decisions are driven through by MD or Board decisions. If no risks are taken, nothing is ever achieved, but the final decision is taken at executive level.
But HH may have a point here in that where there is no competition, and you have just one shot, it is a bit different. If the MPA updating project had been competitively bid, the risks and costs of the alternatives might just have resulted in a better procurement. It is probably a good example of why supporting a home market with the best of intentions or political reasons, can sometimes result in the worst of all worlds.
LF
The point about Risk Management in industry and commerce is that it is viewed from a slightly different perspective. Negativity is not well received but risk is viewed as a potential differentiator that, properly identified and managed, it may allow your company to achieve something that your competitors cannot. So as well as identifying the red lines, it is also seen as an opportunity for competitive advantage. The systems are not perfect - there can still be check-box mentality, where the completion of the risk form is more important than managing and addressing the issues identified. And not always are the issues the same as those inherent in military scenarios. However, risk is specifically discussed by the boards of major corporations at the strategic level, informed by the risk management assessments and their own knowledge.
This does not mean that all risk is avoided or mitigated, and some marginal decisions are driven through by MD or Board decisions. If no risks are taken, nothing is ever achieved, but the final decision is taken at executive level.
But HH may have a point here in that where there is no competition, and you have just one shot, it is a bit different. If the MPA updating project had been competitively bid, the risks and costs of the alternatives might just have resulted in a better procurement. It is probably a good example of why supporting a home market with the best of intentions or political reasons, can sometimes result in the worst of all worlds.
LF
Last edited by Lowe Flieger; 13th Dec 2012 at 14:57.
I think the argument that there was only one supplier only holds good after the decision was made to upgrade Nimrod. Clearly, the original programme permitted, but perhaps didn't encourage, the concept of a replacement aircraft (hence, "RMPA").
What I'd want to know is this. Were the decision makers (presumably including the Equipment Approvals Committee) made aware of the primary technical risks mentioned above? I know exactly what routinely happened in that MoD(PE) area. A Financier would be wheeled out and he'd assure the Gods that he "knew of no technical obstacle". While strictly speaking a true statement, it would still be a serious offence (misleading by omission and/or commission). The engineers would be left seething. For example, in March 1999 I was actively prevented from briefing CDP before he went in front of the PAC. I was the manager of one of seven programmes warranting their attention, but a non-engineeer who knew nothing about the programme and had never worked on it was told to conduct the briefing; without being briefed himself. (I found this out after the event and asked for the PAC to be given a clarification paper. Request denied. I submitted it anyway, but believe it was blocked). The result was CDP's evidence was complete balls. I was told there was no way I would be allowed to tell him the truth.
BTW, this was the same PAC session at which CDP agreed the Chinook Mk2 remained in the same (unairworthy) state described in the 1992 CHART report. He admitted that, so you can imagine what was omitted!
The single source argument only holds good after this decision on procurement strategy is made. Fine, I can understand the MRA4 PM's position. There comes a time when, assuming the decision is based on true and complete facts, you have to accept the Gods have made a decision - but that decision should be explained to you. It seldom is. For example, at the same time RMPA was being decided, I was informed a 2 year competitive tendering exercise was to be cast aside and a major contract awarded to a company who had never bid in the first place. From that day forth, the entire focus of Risk Reduction was aimed at compensating for having an incompetent prime contractor foisted on me. Not entirely incompetent, but they concentrated resources on 30% of the programme, completely ignoring the rest, largely because they had no track record and no understanding of such a programme (which is why they didn't bid in the first place). The programme was successful, but despite the prime, not because of him. So I understand the dilemmas the Nimrod team faced.
But having that decision imposed on you doesn't mean you just blindly dig deeper holes for the next 15 years. You follow the rules, conduct the periodic Reviews, report honestly and offer your best advice when seeking decisions. I'd want to know when the PM advised the 2 Star that the procurement strategy, indeed the entire programme, was no longer viable. The answer should be - no later than publication of the NART report in 1998. It contained enough evidence to stop the programme in its tracks. It may or may not be coincidence that the major slippages commenced around that time - certainly, anyone reading NART would twitch violently and seek a long hiatus while he reassessed every part of the programme. I sincerely doubt if NART was ever mentioned to the EAC, in the same way CHART was withheld from all concerned with Chinook. But there were previous reports from 1994 and 1996 directly relating to mainplane construction. Were these considered by, or even show to, the MRA4 team? It needs and warrants an inquiry. Too much money has been wasted and capability lost.
What I'd want to know is this. Were the decision makers (presumably including the Equipment Approvals Committee) made aware of the primary technical risks mentioned above? I know exactly what routinely happened in that MoD(PE) area. A Financier would be wheeled out and he'd assure the Gods that he "knew of no technical obstacle". While strictly speaking a true statement, it would still be a serious offence (misleading by omission and/or commission). The engineers would be left seething. For example, in March 1999 I was actively prevented from briefing CDP before he went in front of the PAC. I was the manager of one of seven programmes warranting their attention, but a non-engineeer who knew nothing about the programme and had never worked on it was told to conduct the briefing; without being briefed himself. (I found this out after the event and asked for the PAC to be given a clarification paper. Request denied. I submitted it anyway, but believe it was blocked). The result was CDP's evidence was complete balls. I was told there was no way I would be allowed to tell him the truth.
BTW, this was the same PAC session at which CDP agreed the Chinook Mk2 remained in the same (unairworthy) state described in the 1992 CHART report. He admitted that, so you can imagine what was omitted!
The single source argument only holds good after this decision on procurement strategy is made. Fine, I can understand the MRA4 PM's position. There comes a time when, assuming the decision is based on true and complete facts, you have to accept the Gods have made a decision - but that decision should be explained to you. It seldom is. For example, at the same time RMPA was being decided, I was informed a 2 year competitive tendering exercise was to be cast aside and a major contract awarded to a company who had never bid in the first place. From that day forth, the entire focus of Risk Reduction was aimed at compensating for having an incompetent prime contractor foisted on me. Not entirely incompetent, but they concentrated resources on 30% of the programme, completely ignoring the rest, largely because they had no track record and no understanding of such a programme (which is why they didn't bid in the first place). The programme was successful, but despite the prime, not because of him. So I understand the dilemmas the Nimrod team faced.
But having that decision imposed on you doesn't mean you just blindly dig deeper holes for the next 15 years. You follow the rules, conduct the periodic Reviews, report honestly and offer your best advice when seeking decisions. I'd want to know when the PM advised the 2 Star that the procurement strategy, indeed the entire programme, was no longer viable. The answer should be - no later than publication of the NART report in 1998. It contained enough evidence to stop the programme in its tracks. It may or may not be coincidence that the major slippages commenced around that time - certainly, anyone reading NART would twitch violently and seek a long hiatus while he reassessed every part of the programme. I sincerely doubt if NART was ever mentioned to the EAC, in the same way CHART was withheld from all concerned with Chinook. But there were previous reports from 1994 and 1996 directly relating to mainplane construction. Were these considered by, or even show to, the MRA4 team? It needs and warrants an inquiry. Too much money has been wasted and capability lost.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
I think my point about 21 or 9 aircraft may have been a clue as well.
When the program appeared to have a good chance of success a full fleet update would seem reasonable. AFAIK there has been no sudden change in threat that would justify a reduction of more than 50% (shades of Nott). To suddenly drop from 21 to 9 is clearly either an economic case or cutting our loses as it was too high a risk.
When the program appeared to have a good chance of success a full fleet update would seem reasonable. AFAIK there has been no sudden change in threat that would justify a reduction of more than 50% (shades of Nott). To suddenly drop from 21 to 9 is clearly either an economic case or cutting our loses as it was too high a risk.
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PN,
My understanding was that Sir Dick Evans (then BAE Chief Executive) threatened to pull out of the contract at 9 (or possibly 13) aircraft because they weren't going to make any (by which he presumably meant "enough") money if the were forced to go to 21 (or 24) aircraft.
HMG / MoD rolled over. It will be very interesting to see the files from MoD and HM Treasury from a decade ago idc when this fiasco was playing out.
I have always favoured the MoD buying the best kit available for the task in hand, irrespective of manufacture. If we then have to compromise and buy British for "industrial policy" considerations, then the difference in cost and capability should be paid for by BIS (nee DTI). I strongly suspect that if they had to pay the bill (for what is after all a privatised industry) then the number of "critical" cases would decline rapidly.
S41
My understanding was that Sir Dick Evans (then BAE Chief Executive) threatened to pull out of the contract at 9 (or possibly 13) aircraft because they weren't going to make any (by which he presumably meant "enough") money if the were forced to go to 21 (or 24) aircraft.
HMG / MoD rolled over. It will be very interesting to see the files from MoD and HM Treasury from a decade ago idc when this fiasco was playing out.
I have always favoured the MoD buying the best kit available for the task in hand, irrespective of manufacture. If we then have to compromise and buy British for "industrial policy" considerations, then the difference in cost and capability should be paid for by BIS (nee DTI). I strongly suspect that if they had to pay the bill (for what is after all a privatised industry) then the number of "critical" cases would decline rapidly.
S41
Last edited by Squirrel 41; 13th Dec 2012 at 18:42. Reason: For greater clarity
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When on the project, and within 5 months of supposed first flight (which didn't happen for 2 years), I was asked by an aerodynamics / CofG engineer whether if they loaded the bomb bay with torpedoes in the forward rack positions, there would be the possibility of actually landing with them, at the end of the sortie.
When the answer was yes, and it was unlikely we would jettison hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of torpedo, because we hadn't found anything to drop them on, it seemed to cause a fair amount of concern.
There isn't a lot of fuel to shift around in the tanks to rectify the CofG issues after an 8 hour sortie!!
That was one of many concerning issues at that time, and points to possible lack of understanding of the whole mainplane problem. Or more likely perhaps they were just trying to make the best of a bad job by then.
When the answer was yes, and it was unlikely we would jettison hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of torpedo, because we hadn't found anything to drop them on, it seemed to cause a fair amount of concern.
There isn't a lot of fuel to shift around in the tanks to rectify the CofG issues after an 8 hour sortie!!
That was one of many concerning issues at that time, and points to possible lack of understanding of the whole mainplane problem. Or more likely perhaps they were just trying to make the best of a bad job by then.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
SS, quite. Mind you the Nimrod would not have been the first aircraft where jettison was a pre-landing requirement.
The old bomber ethos of course had been drop your bombs on target or jettison come-what-may.
I changed the Nimrod re-arm ethos for the aircraft to only reload a carrier when all torpedoes on that carrier had been expended, ie if a standard load out had been 6 or 9 torpedoes then a minimum load out could be 4 or 7 thus obviating the need to download a partially expended carrier, returning it to the dump and replacing it with a fully loaded one.
I don't know if that plan was continued in to the 80s.
The old bomber ethos of course had been drop your bombs on target or jettison come-what-may.
I changed the Nimrod re-arm ethos for the aircraft to only reload a carrier when all torpedoes on that carrier had been expended, ie if a standard load out had been 6 or 9 torpedoes then a minimum load out could be 4 or 7 thus obviating the need to download a partially expended carrier, returning it to the dump and replacing it with a fully loaded one.
I don't know if that plan was continued in to the 80s.
SS
Your example perfectly illustrates my point about design reviews. To be chasing design shadows so late in the day is a very bad sign and indicative of little or no understanding, or the customer (MoD) making late changes. Often both! If proper Design Reviews had been held, the first thing you do is regress a couple of months to a time when everyone agreed the design was correct, then establish what has changed. This also helps the company, as it establishes liability. Not always that simple, but you get the idea.
Squirrel41
Excellent observation about the DTI. I’d add the Home Office, as many technical differences between our kit and that of others countries are dictated by them; which in turn means you can’t buy Off the Shelf as no-one else makes it, as no-one else knows the spec. Hence the need for certain indigenous capabilities. For obvious reasons I can’t discuss details, but this is little understood in MoD and there are currently many aircraft with equipment at the wrong design standard because they have refused to pay to upgrade to new HO standards, not realising it isn’t optional. If the HO had to pay, I’m sure the mods would be approved without question. But the HO doesn’t bother about money, and MoD is simply told to cut something else to pay. Merlin Mk1 was one of them. Nimrod MR2 was another, although they then compounded the matter by deciding not to fit the kit at all, having spent tens of ŁM buying it! Not even unpackaged, and thrown in a skip. Lynx. Chinook. The knock-on effects are immense. Ultimately, you can’t verify repairs because the build standards of the kit, the test equipment and the Tech Pubs can’t be reconciled. Last time I looked, 66 HO mandated mods were entirely missing from the pubs suite of just one equipment on these aircraft.
It helps to understand MoD's problem here. As the senior staffs don't want to know (replace them!), the decision to comply with the HO is down to the individual aircraft PTs and what funding they have. If just one PT does comply, he must amend the (common) suite of pubs. That could render them unusable by every other aircraft as their kit isn't reflected in the pubs. This immediately raises configuration control issues, which is one of the fundamentals of airworthiness. Does he buy another Sample, Reference and Integration Rig, just because other PTs don't comply? Does he buy new Test Equipment? Do the ships have enough room to host two standards, when there should only be one? This is all cost escalation through no fault of the PT. And, as I always say, the mandated process to manage such issues has been in abeyance and unfunded for 21 years, meaning no-one has been trained in its use.
Your example perfectly illustrates my point about design reviews. To be chasing design shadows so late in the day is a very bad sign and indicative of little or no understanding, or the customer (MoD) making late changes. Often both! If proper Design Reviews had been held, the first thing you do is regress a couple of months to a time when everyone agreed the design was correct, then establish what has changed. This also helps the company, as it establishes liability. Not always that simple, but you get the idea.
Squirrel41
Excellent observation about the DTI. I’d add the Home Office, as many technical differences between our kit and that of others countries are dictated by them; which in turn means you can’t buy Off the Shelf as no-one else makes it, as no-one else knows the spec. Hence the need for certain indigenous capabilities. For obvious reasons I can’t discuss details, but this is little understood in MoD and there are currently many aircraft with equipment at the wrong design standard because they have refused to pay to upgrade to new HO standards, not realising it isn’t optional. If the HO had to pay, I’m sure the mods would be approved without question. But the HO doesn’t bother about money, and MoD is simply told to cut something else to pay. Merlin Mk1 was one of them. Nimrod MR2 was another, although they then compounded the matter by deciding not to fit the kit at all, having spent tens of ŁM buying it! Not even unpackaged, and thrown in a skip. Lynx. Chinook. The knock-on effects are immense. Ultimately, you can’t verify repairs because the build standards of the kit, the test equipment and the Tech Pubs can’t be reconciled. Last time I looked, 66 HO mandated mods were entirely missing from the pubs suite of just one equipment on these aircraft.
It helps to understand MoD's problem here. As the senior staffs don't want to know (replace them!), the decision to comply with the HO is down to the individual aircraft PTs and what funding they have. If just one PT does comply, he must amend the (common) suite of pubs. That could render them unusable by every other aircraft as their kit isn't reflected in the pubs. This immediately raises configuration control issues, which is one of the fundamentals of airworthiness. Does he buy another Sample, Reference and Integration Rig, just because other PTs don't comply? Does he buy new Test Equipment? Do the ships have enough room to host two standards, when there should only be one? This is all cost escalation through no fault of the PT. And, as I always say, the mandated process to manage such issues has been in abeyance and unfunded for 21 years, meaning no-one has been trained in its use.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Just how we plan to keep the new CVS for 50 years beats me; I won't be around to say I told you so (well I might just
)
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Lockheed in Talks With 3 Countries To Sell 'Sea Hercs'
PARIS — Lockheed Martin is in talks with the UK, Canada and a Nordic nation to sell its new maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) version of the C-130J, and is due to enter talks to sell a coast guard version of the aircraft to Algeria.
“We will invite them to enter a dialogue for common requirements,” said Jack Crisler, Lockheed Martin’s vice president of new business on C-130 programs, during a presentation at the Paris Air Show on the SC-130J “Sea Herc.” The UK is one of the parties, and although Lockheed Martin has not named them, Canada and a Nordic nation are understood to be the other two.
Lockheed Martin envisions launching the Sea Herc in a basic, coast guard format, a second version adding air-to-surface warfare capabilities and a third version that adds ASW capabilities. The three interested nations would take the third version, Crisler said.
Crisler said he foresaw a market of 50-60 aircraft, based on a calculation of nations that operate the P-3 Orion but had yet to order mid-life upgrades for their aircraft, as Australia and New Zealand have............
PARIS — Lockheed Martin is in talks with the UK, Canada and a Nordic nation to sell its new maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) version of the C-130J, and is due to enter talks to sell a coast guard version of the aircraft to Algeria.
“We will invite them to enter a dialogue for common requirements,” said Jack Crisler, Lockheed Martin’s vice president of new business on C-130 programs, during a presentation at the Paris Air Show on the SC-130J “Sea Herc.” The UK is one of the parties, and although Lockheed Martin has not named them, Canada and a Nordic nation are understood to be the other two.
Lockheed Martin envisions launching the Sea Herc in a basic, coast guard format, a second version adding air-to-surface warfare capabilities and a third version that adds ASW capabilities. The three interested nations would take the third version, Crisler said.
Crisler said he foresaw a market of 50-60 aircraft, based on a calculation of nations that operate the P-3 Orion but had yet to order mid-life upgrades for their aircraft, as Australia and New Zealand have............
Interesting option though if we could convert our 'J' models to whatever their ASW capable option would look like.
That is of course if there will be any life left in our 'J' airframes in 10 years time?
So I make it, UK plc now have 4 potential MPA/MMA options - P8, CN 295, C130J or leased/old P3's. Could be a good game if ever the bidding starts...
That is of course if there will be any life left in our 'J' airframes in 10 years time?
So I make it, UK plc now have 4 potential MPA/MMA options - P8, CN 295, C130J or leased/old P3's. Could be a good game if ever the bidding starts...
Strange how Canada is 'mentioned/leaked' when they have just delayed Fincastle in order to carry out Block 3 CP-140 upgrade program. Sounds like a bit of sales-waffle to me. Coastguard Herc for big countries who can afford/need a civvy MPA? - fair enough. Mil ASW MPA Herc? - can't see it here personally.
Who said the UK is in "talks" regarding an ASW version of the C-130J - Lockheed Martin?
Sounds like an unsolicited bid from the company to me. I thought if MOD was intending to by something, such as an MPA, then the process included writing a requirement, inviting numerous companies to tender, examining the bids, etc..... Not just having talks with one single company.
That's not even mentioning the fact that we haven't got money in the MOD budget (to the best of my limited knowledge) allocated to the purchase of an MPA!
Sounds like an unsolicited bid from the company to me. I thought if MOD was intending to by something, such as an MPA, then the process included writing a requirement, inviting numerous companies to tender, examining the bids, etc..... Not just having talks with one single company.
That's not even mentioning the fact that we haven't got money in the MOD budget (to the best of my limited knowledge) allocated to the purchase of an MPA!
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MPA is a dirty word for the Government/MOD, we will never have another LRMPA, we may, however, think about getting a new MMA. ( Joe Public will be fooled into thinking that the new aircraft is not a Nimrod replacement 
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N****d?
Last edited by Chugalug2; 20th Jun 2013 at 11:51.
Indeed Chug.
What would be funny if not so serious is that for 12 years, almost to the day, the rules and procedures governing the safety of such systems used by soldiers have been based ENTIRELY on MoD's mandated airworthiness regulations.
I've often wondered if MoD realised this when the said regulations were cancelled, without replacement, about 4 years ago. I think not. We are now in the ludicrous situation that Land Systems unwittingly (because they got rid of everyone who knew the background) call up a defunct Def Stan and, unwittingly, await an MAA decision on what to replace it with. The MAA has no clue that their Land colleagues are reliant on this Standard. The MAA has issued what they think is a replacement, but it is laughable simplistic and doesn't actually say anything relevant - so cannot be used to update the Land contracts.
Just one example of how these issues are very closely linked. Ironic that Land does more to try to implement airworthiness than Air! If only they knew.
What would be funny if not so serious is that for 12 years, almost to the day, the rules and procedures governing the safety of such systems used by soldiers have been based ENTIRELY on MoD's mandated airworthiness regulations.
I've often wondered if MoD realised this when the said regulations were cancelled, without replacement, about 4 years ago. I think not. We are now in the ludicrous situation that Land Systems unwittingly (because they got rid of everyone who knew the background) call up a defunct Def Stan and, unwittingly, await an MAA decision on what to replace it with. The MAA has no clue that their Land colleagues are reliant on this Standard. The MAA has issued what they think is a replacement, but it is laughable simplistic and doesn't actually say anything relevant - so cannot be used to update the Land contracts.
Just one example of how these issues are very closely linked. Ironic that Land does more to try to implement airworthiness than Air! If only they knew.
Duncs
No, and apologies if you got that impression.
The airworthiness failings are systemic, the main reason being core elements were centralised services within MoD, meaning that if a given element was cancelled to save money, then all aircraft/equipments suffered, not just one. This is not a case of putting all eggs in one basket. Specially trained staffs managed these core services and their funding was ring-fenced.
It was the 1991 policy by AMSO (RAF Chief Engineer), the final part implemented in June 1993, that (a) un-ring-fenced this funding and (b) made airworthiness subject to proportional cuts when most of the services are not volume related. For example, regardless of aircraft numbers, you need a Safety Case. Three consecutive 28% cuts in direct airworthiness funding says it all.
Put another way, the Nimrod Integrated Project Team was not wholly responsible for the poor Safety Case; and nor is any aircraft office. That it was in such a poor state was actually mandated policy. Not an unforeseen result of a poor policy, but predicted and ignored, with disciplinary action taken against those who insisted on the aircraft being safe. The dead giveaway is that Gp Capt George Baber, NIPTL, had to let a Safety Case task. Haddon-Cave criticised the way the task was conducted, but conveniently ignored the fact that Baber should not have had to let the task – he should have inherited a seamless contract and a robust Safety Case.
This formed (or didn’t, as the case may be) a crucial part of the MRA4 audit trail. Having accepted Haddon-Cave’s confirmation of the root problem (savings at the expense of safety), MoD had little choice but to insist on implementing the regs on MRA4 – something that had not been policy since 1991. Regression became too difficult, not least because Haddon-Cave had protected the perpetrators by saying the problems only commenced in 1998. This suited certain VSOs as it was used to blame General Cowan and others, but it meant that the MRA4 IPTL would (a) have to admit he taken his eye off the airworthiness ball and (b) have to seek funding to regress to, at least, 1991; if not the 1968 baseline set by the Coroner. Doing so would expose Haddon-Cave and the VSOs.
The above is what links almost every accident discussed here.
Are you insinuating that it is only MPA that had airworthiness 'bypassed', and that all other fleets are squeaky clean?
The airworthiness failings are systemic, the main reason being core elements were centralised services within MoD, meaning that if a given element was cancelled to save money, then all aircraft/equipments suffered, not just one. This is not a case of putting all eggs in one basket. Specially trained staffs managed these core services and their funding was ring-fenced.
It was the 1991 policy by AMSO (RAF Chief Engineer), the final part implemented in June 1993, that (a) un-ring-fenced this funding and (b) made airworthiness subject to proportional cuts when most of the services are not volume related. For example, regardless of aircraft numbers, you need a Safety Case. Three consecutive 28% cuts in direct airworthiness funding says it all.
Put another way, the Nimrod Integrated Project Team was not wholly responsible for the poor Safety Case; and nor is any aircraft office. That it was in such a poor state was actually mandated policy. Not an unforeseen result of a poor policy, but predicted and ignored, with disciplinary action taken against those who insisted on the aircraft being safe. The dead giveaway is that Gp Capt George Baber, NIPTL, had to let a Safety Case task. Haddon-Cave criticised the way the task was conducted, but conveniently ignored the fact that Baber should not have had to let the task – he should have inherited a seamless contract and a robust Safety Case.
This formed (or didn’t, as the case may be) a crucial part of the MRA4 audit trail. Having accepted Haddon-Cave’s confirmation of the root problem (savings at the expense of safety), MoD had little choice but to insist on implementing the regs on MRA4 – something that had not been policy since 1991. Regression became too difficult, not least because Haddon-Cave had protected the perpetrators by saying the problems only commenced in 1998. This suited certain VSOs as it was used to blame General Cowan and others, but it meant that the MRA4 IPTL would (a) have to admit he taken his eye off the airworthiness ball and (b) have to seek funding to regress to, at least, 1991; if not the 1968 baseline set by the Coroner. Doing so would expose Haddon-Cave and the VSOs.
The above is what links almost every accident discussed here.