Whilst you and tuc have been fantastic in explaining how we got here, the pair of you are pretty poor at explaining what happens next,
Can YOU explain how we got here?
If you can be bothered to read what I think should be done, posted here often (too often for some it seems, as they want it out of sight and mind, preferring to rely on luck) then give us the benefit of your proposals. There are many ways to skin a cat, but implementing perfectly good regulations is a good starting point. In my opinion.
Beware perfect being the enemy of good enough.
This has been said before and I asked the question - what regulations should be ditched? And what should they be replaced with?
We're not talking about things like accepting 300 miles range on a radar when the spec says 320. Many aspects of attaining airworthiness are absolutes. For example, on Safety Critical Software there MUST be an independent signature on the Certificate of Design before the software is allowed near a Service aircraft. In June 1994 there was no such Certificate of Design for FADEC software in Chinook. Yet a false statement was made (when signing the RTS) that this mandated regulation had been complied with. Does anyone here agree with that action?
We know what the VSOs have ruled (and what you presumably agree with, because you are arguing against me).
For example, they say one should strive for Physical Safety but it isn't mandatory; but Functional Safety can be ignored altogether without even trying.
That one philosophy applies to each and every accident mentioned above, to a greater or lesser degree. Mostly greater. That ruling remains extant to this day, and MoD is quite content stating this to Ministers.
Can we agree on our opinion of that policy? I don't agree with it. Do you? I'd rather agree with you, because seeing so many people, many of them aircrew, arguing vehemently against aviation safety is more than a bit disheartening.