Nimrod Information
JB, I was asking about;
Cases is plural and I cannot see how this can be construed as meaning that I am saying that NigeGib is wrong in the one item he mentioned some posts back, I was asking if you knew what had or had not been incorporated since this report.
I was not aware that Mike Smith was the author of the news report, but I have acknowledged his post in my last post.
namely that the IPT commissioned a Design Authority (BAES) Report back in 2004 which came up with some significant recommendations to bring the chances of fire/explosion down to what BAES considered an ALARP level (although even here they hedged their bets by saying the sample investigated was small) and that few, if any, of these recommendations were taken up. Worse, in some cases the recommendations have not been actioned for the MR4.
I was not aware that Mike Smith was the author of the news report, but I have acknowledged his post in my last post.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: scotland
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TD,
Are you able to tell us where you got the above stats from?
You quoted specific numbers, therefore the stats must be based on a structured analysis. Is it possible that someone has a done a simple word search for "fire" in all the incident reports. This will cause "hits" in routine sentences such as "the crew suspected fire", or "the crew carried out the Fire or Fumes in the Cabin drill"..."
There have not been 78 fires on the Nimrod aircraft. That kind of record on a relatively small fleet, would never have been allowed to build up.
Regards
Ed Set
78 incidents of Fires were recorded
355 incidents of Fumes/Smoke
355 incidents of Fumes/Smoke
You quoted specific numbers, therefore the stats must be based on a structured analysis. Is it possible that someone has a done a simple word search for "fire" in all the incident reports. This will cause "hits" in routine sentences such as "the crew suspected fire", or "the crew carried out the Fire or Fumes in the Cabin drill"..."
There have not been 78 fires on the Nimrod aircraft. That kind of record on a relatively small fleet, would never have been allowed to build up.
Regards
Ed Set
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ex-Rigger, as of last week, the customer has not asked for FDA, OBIGGS, Bomb Bay FP, Probe inerting and under-floor FP on MRA4. Of that I can guarantee you. Design for AAR pipework, essentially the same in MRA4.
We await the recs from BoI.
In the case of XV179, UORs hit the desk the day after the BoI was published.
Fingers crossed for the Nimrod fleet.
We await the recs from BoI.
In the case of XV179, UORs hit the desk the day after the BoI was published.
Fingers crossed for the Nimrod fleet.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I just think its unfair to judge an aircraft through stats. everyone is quick to find the bad points and use it as some leverage to try and persuade the government they are not fit to fly. Maybe im picking it up wrong.
The Nimrod has one of the best safety records of all aircraft , until recent events.
The BOI is with us soon and they will tell us what happened that day. Maybe once this report is out all that operate the Nimrod can carry on doing what we do with the knowledge we aint going to be splashed across the front page of every newspaper in the land.
If they find something wrong I can assure you they will do every single thing required to make these aircraft fit to use, that im 100% certain of and have solid faith in the Military to provide this.
The Nimrod has one of the best safety records of all aircraft , until recent events.
The BOI is with us soon and they will tell us what happened that day. Maybe once this report is out all that operate the Nimrod can carry on doing what we do with the knowledge we aint going to be splashed across the front page of every newspaper in the land.
If they find something wrong I can assure you they will do every single thing required to make these aircraft fit to use, that im 100% certain of and have solid faith in the Military to provide this.
tucumseh can I be the first to guess, no on second thoughts I would probably get it wrong as it seems to easy. I would hazard a guess though that the MOD think it is still on the bottom line between the middle and the start of the curve upwards at the right
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: Wiltshire
Age: 49
Posts: 34
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ye olde bath tub
Exactly, it's hard to determine as there are no defined scales, I'd guess it's in the same region as the Boeing 747 (similar vintage). It's a simple chart and doesn't lend itself to detailed analysis.
Thank you ExRigger.
I must be honest and say I don’t know what the MoD think. However, it will be patently obvious that, as one creeps toward the right hand side and upwards, more funding is required to maintain the build standard. It will be equally obvious that an increasing majority of our kit is accelerating toward that point – some has already shot off the scale at the top right corner.
I do know that there are very few sponsors indeed who now monitor this curve with a view to making the correct materiel and financial provision. In effect, MoD policy assumes the bottom line extends indefinitely, and has done for many years now.
Turning to recent discussions on fire/smoke/fumes. As someone holding delegated airworthiness authority, I’ve been fortunate to come across only three serious cases – all on the same a/c type within days of each other. The same people who assumed the “elongated” X axis instructed me not to do anything about the smoke in the cockpit, and denied me funding to fix it. (They were neither engineers nor aircrew). When faced with such crass incompetence and failure of duty of care, you have a choice. Do the right thing, or do what you’re told. I lied, transferred the money from another project and made the aircraft safe. What I did would be almost impossible nowadays because of IPT stovepiping. Because of examples like this, and there are scores, I don’t have the blind faith others do in the MoD’s ability to get it right.
I must be honest and say I don’t know what the MoD think. However, it will be patently obvious that, as one creeps toward the right hand side and upwards, more funding is required to maintain the build standard. It will be equally obvious that an increasing majority of our kit is accelerating toward that point – some has already shot off the scale at the top right corner.
I do know that there are very few sponsors indeed who now monitor this curve with a view to making the correct materiel and financial provision. In effect, MoD policy assumes the bottom line extends indefinitely, and has done for many years now.
Turning to recent discussions on fire/smoke/fumes. As someone holding delegated airworthiness authority, I’ve been fortunate to come across only three serious cases – all on the same a/c type within days of each other. The same people who assumed the “elongated” X axis instructed me not to do anything about the smoke in the cockpit, and denied me funding to fix it. (They were neither engineers nor aircrew). When faced with such crass incompetence and failure of duty of care, you have a choice. Do the right thing, or do what you’re told. I lied, transferred the money from another project and made the aircraft safe. What I did would be almost impossible nowadays because of IPT stovepiping. Because of examples like this, and there are scores, I don’t have the blind faith others do in the MoD’s ability to get it right.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Scotland
Age: 49
Posts: 134
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The question as I understand it is:
Was the 2nd September loss of XV230 preventable, if so could reasonable steps have been taken to prevent the incident?
We don't have the full picture yet, we have lots of small pieces mainly in the form of FoI documents and reports, significantly the Qinetiq report and the BAE systems report. They may not make for pleasent reading for relatives, ground or air crew, but in the absence of the BoI and coroners inquest I would suggest that anyone who has seen these documents would be very hard pushed to argue that the 230 incident was not preventable.
The BoI but more importantly the coroners inquest are the missing pieces of the puzzle, the coroner must establish whether reasonable steps could have been taken to prevent the loss of XV230 and if they were not taken why not.
Was the 2nd September loss of XV230 preventable, if so could reasonable steps have been taken to prevent the incident?
We don't have the full picture yet, we have lots of small pieces mainly in the form of FoI documents and reports, significantly the Qinetiq report and the BAE systems report. They may not make for pleasent reading for relatives, ground or air crew, but in the absence of the BoI and coroners inquest I would suggest that anyone who has seen these documents would be very hard pushed to argue that the 230 incident was not preventable.
The BoI but more importantly the coroners inquest are the missing pieces of the puzzle, the coroner must establish whether reasonable steps could have been taken to prevent the loss of XV230 and if they were not taken why not.
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Henley, Oxfordshire
Posts: 165
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just for the record ExRigger, and not said in anger at all, merely for clarification. You said:
If you read
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle2937248.ece
you will see that the first two paragraphs read:
It was of course 22 years not 20. But that appears to have been a typing error at some point in the editing process. It was not an attempt to deceive and the average of 40 a years is accurate for 880 over 22 years.
The Observer meanwhile made it clear that the period of the 880 incidents covered the period between 1982 and 2004.
Thanks MS, I would rather take credence from that report than from a newspaper, even though in this case they seem to have actually got their facts right. Allthough I will add the newspaper did not appear to have the timescales, so the comments about making things look worse than they are still stands, why use the full facts when missing some out makes a better story and actually makes things look worse than they are.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle2937248.ece
you will see that the first two paragraphs read:
THE manufacturer of the RAF’s Nimrod spy planes had warned of “frequent” fires on board the aircraft 18 months before one exploded over Afghanistan last September, killing all 14 men on board.
The BAE Systems report said there had been 880 fires or “smoke-related incidents” on the aircraft over the preceding 20 years, an average of 40 a year.
The BAE Systems report said there had been 880 fires or “smoke-related incidents” on the aircraft over the preceding 20 years, an average of 40 a year.
The Observer meanwhile made it clear that the period of the 880 incidents covered the period between 1982 and 2004.
Last edited by Mick Smith; 25th Nov 2007 at 18:21. Reason: Admission of error and including Observer piece
MS my profuse apologies for my comments, I fell into the trap of not fully reading what was posted and just saw what I wanted to see in line with other posters comments, but I am not afraid to admit when I have c****d up 
.
.
Last edited by Exrigger; 25th Nov 2007 at 18:36. Reason: Forgot to add poster
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: SWAPS Inner
Posts: 567
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fer ferks sake! How many retro fires are in those numbers! How many ****ty recirc fans!How many rib2 overheats How many ****ty aircon fumes (have a chat to RJ and 757 pilots for some long term health issues) . Lives were lost which we all regret but... you don't join the mob without accepting some risk.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: UK
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This is my first post after watching and reading with interest for many years and covers a few of the issues within this complex thread. It is therefore a bit rambling so sorry.
As someone who flew Nimrods for 6 years, I was lucky to be involved in only one minor Smoke and Fumes incident. There seem to be quite a few people on this thread who think that recent problems are to do with the age of the Nimrod. It is an old aircraft but IMO that is not the major problem The problem is the Government's lack of financing for the aircraft and insufficient time and servicing personnel to do anything other than patch problems not fully repair them. The ground crew do an excellent job under trying circumstances but are fighting a losing battle.
Attitudes that you joined the Services and risk is part of flying do not help. It is a statement of fact but when the risk is unfairly increased due to funding issues then that is another matter. Most people on here have nothing but admiration for the people who fly the aircraft and the excellent and important job that the aircraft does in all the theatres it operates in, but without proper funds to keep her going, the amount of snags, problems and risk is going to do nothing but increase.
This problem is not isolated to the Nimrod. Serviceability at both Lyneham and Waddington are reported to be shocking and the E3 is not an old aircraft and does not fly at low level or consistently in massive temperature changes, so explain that to me if it is not funding and manpower related.
This is all MY opinion and it is how I perceive the current problem. It is a view shared by many of my current and past crew mates but not all of them. We do not trust our lords and masters and we do not trust our Government. Give us the money and the manning to fix the problems and watch the discontent go back to it's usual low level. I like many of my colleagues want a return to the Forces that we joined, a place that was a career and a way of life. This government is rapidly taking that away and turning it into just another job, so stop having a go at people for leaving and/or moaning. Loyalty only stretches so far and is not a one way street as some seem to think.
As someone who flew Nimrods for 6 years, I was lucky to be involved in only one minor Smoke and Fumes incident. There seem to be quite a few people on this thread who think that recent problems are to do with the age of the Nimrod. It is an old aircraft but IMO that is not the major problem The problem is the Government's lack of financing for the aircraft and insufficient time and servicing personnel to do anything other than patch problems not fully repair them. The ground crew do an excellent job under trying circumstances but are fighting a losing battle.
Attitudes that you joined the Services and risk is part of flying do not help. It is a statement of fact but when the risk is unfairly increased due to funding issues then that is another matter. Most people on here have nothing but admiration for the people who fly the aircraft and the excellent and important job that the aircraft does in all the theatres it operates in, but without proper funds to keep her going, the amount of snags, problems and risk is going to do nothing but increase.
This problem is not isolated to the Nimrod. Serviceability at both Lyneham and Waddington are reported to be shocking and the E3 is not an old aircraft and does not fly at low level or consistently in massive temperature changes, so explain that to me if it is not funding and manpower related.
This is all MY opinion and it is how I perceive the current problem. It is a view shared by many of my current and past crew mates but not all of them. We do not trust our lords and masters and we do not trust our Government. Give us the money and the manning to fix the problems and watch the discontent go back to it's usual low level. I like many of my colleagues want a return to the Forces that we joined, a place that was a career and a way of life. This government is rapidly taking that away and turning it into just another job, so stop having a go at people for leaving and/or moaning. Loyalty only stretches so far and is not a one way street as some seem to think.
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Back in Geordie Land
Posts: 492
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
HoB
I would agree with a lot of what you have written but would not agree about the fact the aircraft is old. The very fact that it is old is what is making it a less reliable aircraft (airframe wise) and that, coupled with what you rightly say is a lack of funds, is the main cause of the problems.
I'm also not sure the groundcrew will agree with you that they are just 'patching things up' but you may well be correct. The fact is that they are doing the very best they can with what they have.
Likewise, the problem is not unique to the Nimrod fleet. The E-3 fleet is in an appalling state, with many of the frames 'long term' u/s. Perhaps the only mitigating factor there is the fact that we flew about 20 years worth of life out of the jets in the first 8 or so years service at Aviano covering the Balkans wars.
Your point about the government and lack of funding is spot on I'm afraid, and this rate, we will be lucky to even have an Air Force soon! (apart from a nice fleet of Typhoons of course, that will save the world for us I'm certain!)
I would agree with a lot of what you have written but would not agree about the fact the aircraft is old. The very fact that it is old is what is making it a less reliable aircraft (airframe wise) and that, coupled with what you rightly say is a lack of funds, is the main cause of the problems.
I'm also not sure the groundcrew will agree with you that they are just 'patching things up' but you may well be correct. The fact is that they are doing the very best they can with what they have.
Likewise, the problem is not unique to the Nimrod fleet. The E-3 fleet is in an appalling state, with many of the frames 'long term' u/s. Perhaps the only mitigating factor there is the fact that we flew about 20 years worth of life out of the jets in the first 8 or so years service at Aviano covering the Balkans wars.
Your point about the government and lack of funding is spot on I'm afraid, and this rate, we will be lucky to even have an Air Force soon! (apart from a nice fleet of Typhoons of course, that will save the world for us I'm certain!)
Registered User **
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Cambridge
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Nimrod has one of the best safety records of all aircraft , until recent events.
Bomb bay flare fire - Aircraft landed at St Mawgan, (tail number ?). Accepted that had this happened further from base it would have resulted in disaster.
XW666 - Ditched in Moray Firth - had this happened on a normal Op sortie, with full crew and kit installed and more than a few miles from shore, this too would have resulted in disaster.
So, two total losses averted by luck ! Of course you could argue that the crews were unlcuky in the first place. The bomb bay fire incident I know little about. But XW666 could and should have been avoided. The failure mode had been identified through previous incidents about 10 years previous. Recommendations were made, and not completely followed up. Those responsible for that...............what happened to them ? Please, do not come on here talking about the Nimrod's excellent safety record. As for the bathtub curve. First consider the indiividual critical systems before considering the whole aircraft. Most of them certainly are in the "end of life/wear out phase". It is patently obviosu that not enough is being spent to maintain them. Collectively this is a very worrying situation ! I don't imagine for one moment that it is any better on the other fleets either.
As for this MD:
If they find something wrong I can assure you they will do every single thing required to make these aircraft fit to use, that im 100% certain of and have solid faith in the Military to provide this.
S_H
I agree with the argument that many reported incidents of smoke, fumes etc may have benign origins; for example from the galley. To simply quote the number of incidents never gives the full picture. When presented with such statistics one of the questions I always ask is; following the instruction placed on engineering authorities many years ago to reduce the number of requests for fault investigations, how many incidents now go unreported to the proper authority responsible for maintaining airworthiness? At a stroke, this instruction saw a large reduction in investigations, but a huge increase in omnibus 760s. I have asked before – does an omnibus count as one incident, hiding a bigger problem?
The other effects of this policy are obvious. The act of delaying reporting and saving up incidents for an omnibus wastes time if there is an underlying or secondary problem to address. (I suspect there is an element of this behind the QQ and BAeS reports mentioned here). The policy of course had the desired effect; it reduced expenditure in the short term. In the long term it stored up problems and made full recovery action almost impossible. Note – What I describe is almost entirely hidden from front line. You know what it’s like, you report the incident and the great machine takes over. I doubt if many at air stations know of this “savings measure”.
At post #1718 an MoD spokesman is reported as saying;
The final sentence is appalling; a typically ignorant dismissal of the potential hazards an overheating resistor may cause. I assume the spokesman is reading from a brief and doesn’t understand. Equally, the intended audience (the press presumably) will swallow this as evidence MoD has everything under control. The simple fact is that overheating resistors (especially wire wound varieties) reach quite high temperatures. 600 degrees F is typical if the heat is not dissipating properly through heatsink design, or perhaps proximity to other resistors. The smell/fumes may “only” be the enamel burning, but common sense tells you to investigate why it overheated and what effect it has had on the associated circuitry, wiring, equipment etc. Different resistor types have different failure modes. Open circuit, short circuit, high/low resistance. If the heat isn’t dissipated properly, the practical rating becomes a fraction of that specified. A beancounter may think such an occurrence is minor and not worth investigating; to an engineer it’s potential ignition source.
It may seem that many here have opposing views, and the debate is good. But the catalyst for bringing the “sides” closer together is understanding this simple fact - serviceability and airworthiness are two different things. I guess there are very few here who have maintained aircraft & equipment, and then had the soul destroying experience of trying to maintain airworthiness in the face of intense opposition. When I was head down in an aircraft it never crossed my mind that people above me were actively trying to prevent me doing my job. Yes, I moaned about no spares, faults, APs that weren’t quite right, and all the rest. I was lucky that in “my day” I simply demanded the spare or filled in a 760 or 765; and more often than not I got what I wanted. The support infrastructure was centralised and highly trained specialists were adequately funded to provide that key component of airworthiness – support. Now it’s fragmented and grossly underfunded. Those who (mis)manage it aren’t specialists, except in the sense they specialise in being obstructive and hostile to what we are trying to achieve.
The other effects of this policy are obvious. The act of delaying reporting and saving up incidents for an omnibus wastes time if there is an underlying or secondary problem to address. (I suspect there is an element of this behind the QQ and BAeS reports mentioned here). The policy of course had the desired effect; it reduced expenditure in the short term. In the long term it stored up problems and made full recovery action almost impossible. Note – What I describe is almost entirely hidden from front line. You know what it’s like, you report the incident and the great machine takes over. I doubt if many at air stations know of this “savings measure”.
At post #1718 an MoD spokesman is reported as saying;
'The number of signals generated is a reflection of the RAF's comprehensive reporting system which covers any indication, however minor, of fire, smoke, burning, fumes or smell-related occurrences. This would include, for example, incidents as minor as an overheated resistor.'
As usual, my response is; yes, the RAF (and the RN and Army) have a comprehensive reporting system. However, the MoD does not adequately fund full implementation of the complementary investigative and corrective action system. It’s precisely the same as their “We have a robust airworthiness framework” argument. They do, but they don’t implement it. The final sentence is appalling; a typically ignorant dismissal of the potential hazards an overheating resistor may cause. I assume the spokesman is reading from a brief and doesn’t understand. Equally, the intended audience (the press presumably) will swallow this as evidence MoD has everything under control. The simple fact is that overheating resistors (especially wire wound varieties) reach quite high temperatures. 600 degrees F is typical if the heat is not dissipating properly through heatsink design, or perhaps proximity to other resistors. The smell/fumes may “only” be the enamel burning, but common sense tells you to investigate why it overheated and what effect it has had on the associated circuitry, wiring, equipment etc. Different resistor types have different failure modes. Open circuit, short circuit, high/low resistance. If the heat isn’t dissipated properly, the practical rating becomes a fraction of that specified. A beancounter may think such an occurrence is minor and not worth investigating; to an engineer it’s potential ignition source.
It may seem that many here have opposing views, and the debate is good. But the catalyst for bringing the “sides” closer together is understanding this simple fact - serviceability and airworthiness are two different things. I guess there are very few here who have maintained aircraft & equipment, and then had the soul destroying experience of trying to maintain airworthiness in the face of intense opposition. When I was head down in an aircraft it never crossed my mind that people above me were actively trying to prevent me doing my job. Yes, I moaned about no spares, faults, APs that weren’t quite right, and all the rest. I was lucky that in “my day” I simply demanded the spare or filled in a 760 or 765; and more often than not I got what I wanted. The support infrastructure was centralised and highly trained specialists were adequately funded to provide that key component of airworthiness – support. Now it’s fragmented and grossly underfunded. Those who (mis)manage it aren’t specialists, except in the sense they specialise in being obstructive and hostile to what we are trying to achieve.
Guest
Posts: n/a
SH
66 was an unfortunate accident and if you say could have been prevented, If I rememeber rightly it was an ASV that stayed on due to an electrical shorting in the cable loom eventually letting go. It was an error in the fitment of this loom (not the guys fault) but yes maybe wrong laid down procedures I do not know without having the BOI at hand then I cant comment but I know for sure that the ASV problem has been rectified and as far as the last 12 years Ive been on the fleet an Overrun of the ASV has never happened again, so yes it has been resolved but I will agree if they had problems up to that point yes you could say negligence or whatever words you want and something should have been done. Concorde had previous scares with tyre failure at high speeds before yet nothing was done then. The Space Shuttle had previous issues with foam coming off and striking the frame.Was anything done. No, its all weighed against Cost and Risk.
Either way you are right and I am wrong, im not going to get involved in a squable. I only work on them so I guess my views mean nothing at all.
66 was an unfortunate accident and if you say could have been prevented, If I rememeber rightly it was an ASV that stayed on due to an electrical shorting in the cable loom eventually letting go. It was an error in the fitment of this loom (not the guys fault) but yes maybe wrong laid down procedures I do not know without having the BOI at hand then I cant comment but I know for sure that the ASV problem has been rectified and as far as the last 12 years Ive been on the fleet an Overrun of the ASV has never happened again, so yes it has been resolved but I will agree if they had problems up to that point yes you could say negligence or whatever words you want and something should have been done. Concorde had previous scares with tyre failure at high speeds before yet nothing was done then. The Space Shuttle had previous issues with foam coming off and striking the frame.Was anything done. No, its all weighed against Cost and Risk.
Either way you are right and I am wrong, im not going to get involved in a squable. I only work on them so I guess my views mean nothing at all.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Scotland
Age: 49
Posts: 134
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Safety_Helmut
A third 'avoided by luck' potential loss for your list.
XV227 -22.11.04 - Supplementry Cooling Pack failure causing significant damage to aircraft systems.
A third 'avoided by luck' potential loss for your list.
XV227 -22.11.04 - Supplementry Cooling Pack failure causing significant damage to aircraft systems.
Last edited by Da4orce; 26th Nov 2007 at 16:52. Reason: Typo on tail number corrected, thanks Camelspyyder.