Nimrod Information
Nige
Please don't try to make something out of this. I know everyone at Kinloss is doing their best to get next week right, but dealing with over 14 different families/relatives/fiancees etc isnt easy. As far as I know, all the families are being briefed first (on the 4th and before the press) and were given a choice of location, one of which included CAS and the BOI President in London. Everyone at Kinloss is also being briefed on the 4th.
CLA
Please don't try to make something out of this. I know everyone at Kinloss is doing their best to get next week right, but dealing with over 14 different families/relatives/fiancees etc isnt easy. As far as I know, all the families are being briefed first (on the 4th and before the press) and were given a choice of location, one of which included CAS and the BOI President in London. Everyone at Kinloss is also being briefed on the 4th.
CLA
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I wouldn't have made anything of it, until I found out about the cancelled BoI presentation. I will now withdraw in response to your request and in the light of the re-instatement of the briefing.
Entirely accepting, that this is a difficult time.
Regards,
Nige
Entirely accepting, that this is a difficult time.
Regards,
Nige
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defenceheadquarters
Robin, thank you for the explanation but with respect, when has the MOD ever gone to such lengths over releasing the results of a BoI? have never heard of such a thing, ever; and whilst things such as the Chinook loss certainly got to Parliament, I cannot ever remember such things as a 'lock in' at the MOD or a statement in the House of Commons on such a thing. If I am wrong, then I apologise unreservedly, but I would be grateful if you would enlighten us as to when this has ever occurred before please?
One thing is for sure, it has never been the case where PPrune has been used as the media for the MOD to announce things, I'm certain of that.
Clearly, some of those who stated earlier on that PPrune had no 'say' on things (or something along those lines) must now surely be feeling a little bit silly. Likewise, I think that the likes of AC Ovee, Magners Drinker, SFO and all the others that have knocked and ridiculed the rest of us on this thread for persueing the truth should come on here and say sorry.
Does anyone think for a second that we would have got this far without the likes of TD, and those of us on this forum? I think not. Does anyone think the SoS would be making a statement on the loss of an aircraft without all this public debate? Hardly.
To everyone who has fought on PPrune and elsewhere to get to the bottom of this tragedy, and to keep it in the public eye with questions, comments and sceptisism, you should all be, rightly, very proud of yourselves.
To TD and all the families. Our thoughts and prayers will be with you all next week, and I hope you find the answers to what you are looking for. I hope that someone will, at last, have the courage to stand up and be counted.
To CAS, ACAS and AOC, I hope you all find the courage to do the honourable thing gentlemen.
The Winco
Robin, thank you for the explanation but with respect, when has the MOD ever gone to such lengths over releasing the results of a BoI? have never heard of such a thing, ever; and whilst things such as the Chinook loss certainly got to Parliament, I cannot ever remember such things as a 'lock in' at the MOD or a statement in the House of Commons on such a thing. If I am wrong, then I apologise unreservedly, but I would be grateful if you would enlighten us as to when this has ever occurred before please?
One thing is for sure, it has never been the case where PPrune has been used as the media for the MOD to announce things, I'm certain of that.
Clearly, some of those who stated earlier on that PPrune had no 'say' on things (or something along those lines) must now surely be feeling a little bit silly. Likewise, I think that the likes of AC Ovee, Magners Drinker, SFO and all the others that have knocked and ridiculed the rest of us on this thread for persueing the truth should come on here and say sorry.
Does anyone think for a second that we would have got this far without the likes of TD, and those of us on this forum? I think not. Does anyone think the SoS would be making a statement on the loss of an aircraft without all this public debate? Hardly.
To everyone who has fought on PPrune and elsewhere to get to the bottom of this tragedy, and to keep it in the public eye with questions, comments and sceptisism, you should all be, rightly, very proud of yourselves.
To TD and all the families. Our thoughts and prayers will be with you all next week, and I hope you find the answers to what you are looking for. I hope that someone will, at last, have the courage to stand up and be counted.
To CAS, ACAS and AOC, I hope you all find the courage to do the honourable thing gentlemen.
The Winco
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Winco, the line regularly pushed out by the MoD to the great and the good of the media, is not to take pprune or arrse seriously. Anyone who knows anything about VC Pun, Headley Court, Herc XV179 ESF, Nimrod XV230 and the rest, knows different.
I take it, the MoD has now changed it's tune, and I welcome that.
I take it, the MoD has now changed it's tune, and I welcome that.
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Winco
Wise words but we must temper our anticipation a little, Tuesday may be the MoD making a big song and dance because they are going to report that nothing could have been done to foresee the crash or prevent it (commonly know as a white wash). I doubt that we will see that bearing in mind the actions that you refer to by TD and many ppruners in raising the profile of this incident and the fact that there is clear irrefutable evidence that the MoD could have prevented the crash.
I’m worried about Tuesday, very worried, I see no way that the Mod are going to hold their hands up and accept responsibility for what happened. They may find a low ranking RAF to take the can or god forbid blame the crew (wouldn’t be the first time).
Whatever happens Tuesday will be a long day for everyone concerned.
Oh and forget the BoI circus being unprecedented, the MOD officially posting on a rumour network that they refused to acknowledge a few months ago, that's unprecedented!
Wise words but we must temper our anticipation a little, Tuesday may be the MoD making a big song and dance because they are going to report that nothing could have been done to foresee the crash or prevent it (commonly know as a white wash). I doubt that we will see that bearing in mind the actions that you refer to by TD and many ppruners in raising the profile of this incident and the fact that there is clear irrefutable evidence that the MoD could have prevented the crash.
I’m worried about Tuesday, very worried, I see no way that the Mod are going to hold their hands up and accept responsibility for what happened. They may find a low ranking RAF to take the can or god forbid blame the crew (wouldn’t be the first time).
Whatever happens Tuesday will be a long day for everyone concerned.
Oh and forget the BoI circus being unprecedented, the MOD officially posting on a rumour network that they refused to acknowledge a few months ago, that's unprecedented!
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BOI announcement and lock-in
MoD journalist lock-ins are not uncommon, unfortunately, and are usually put in place when ministers intend to make an important announcement to parliament and dont want it to leak out beforehand.
The families are being told first, which is of course the proper course, and that was always going to be the case, so there is in fact no way of stopping this leaking out.
The families were also given the date of the board of inquiry before the media, again quite properly. If you are suggesting otherwise NigeGilb pm me to let me know the details.
Frankly I wouldn't call a lock-in the red carpet treatment Nige but it is designed of course to ensure the MoD's viewpoint is put across. I am not aware of any other government ministry that acts in this Stalinist fashion.
The families are being told first, which is of course the proper course, and that was always going to be the case, so there is in fact no way of stopping this leaking out.
The families were also given the date of the board of inquiry before the media, again quite properly. If you are suggesting otherwise NigeGilb pm me to let me know the details.
Frankly I wouldn't call a lock-in the red carpet treatment Nige but it is designed of course to ensure the MoD's viewpoint is put across. I am not aware of any other government ministry that acts in this Stalinist fashion.
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Mick, my question concerned the announced date of the 2nd BoI presentation on the 5th of December. I am aware that the families were informed of the date of the BoI on the 4th, in good time. Last I heard yesterday, the 2nd presentation had not been programmed. The families will be told first. The option being a trip to London or an individual briefing. I merely questioned why the initial BoI presentation was not taking place at Kinloss. Once again, it appears that TD has had to make his presence felt. There is an enormous advantage having the full BoI team in the same room presenting their findings. The AAIB rep also has a very big part to play. I am relieved that the BoI team and CAS will now be going to Kinloss. There are likely to be many questions people will want to ask after the presentation. It is not the same to have an individual briefing by an officer from the RAF, with the option of submitting a written question and waiting for a written reply in the post. For a while, it looked as though the families, friends and former colleagues would not be able to ask searching questions up at Kinloss, where the crew were based.
As regards the press. I have spoken to several former colleagues in recent days, who are taking the view that this looks like a damage limitation operation, from the outside.
As regards the press. I have spoken to several former colleagues in recent days, who are taking the view that this looks like a damage limitation operation, from the outside.
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TD Yes it is normal for BOI reports to go on the web on the day they are announced. But the full lock-in treatment for a BOI is rare and as I say the intention of these things is to get the MoD's version into the media. I object to the things and I do wonder about their history and who decided it should happen on the first occasion. I suspect it was that wonderful man Geoff Hoon. It will not work this time with most I suspect - or at least I hope - since the truth is well and truly out there.
Nige I was aware of the arbitrary decision to cancel the briefing at Kinloss which is now thankfully back on, due to protests from a number of relatives.
My concern was the suggestion that the date of the report being published had been passed to the press before it was passed to the relatives. I certainly heard from relatives not the MoD. I just wondered if you knew of a case of a media organisation learning before the relatives. It's small beer now any way, but would have been quite wrong.
Nige I was aware of the arbitrary decision to cancel the briefing at Kinloss which is now thankfully back on, due to protests from a number of relatives.
My concern was the suggestion that the date of the report being published had been passed to the press before it was passed to the relatives. I certainly heard from relatives not the MoD. I just wondered if you knew of a case of a media organisation learning before the relatives. It's small beer now any way, but would have been quite wrong.
Mick - why do you object to the "lock-in" as such?
What does it mean anyway, just that you can't leave half way through the briefing (motive being to try and be first to break the news perhaps)? Sounds like simple good manners not to do this anyway and stay and glean the whole story from the MoD perspective.
Plus it maybe just a sensible way of controlling a large group of visitors in Main Building?
What does it mean anyway, just that you can't leave half way through the briefing (motive being to try and be first to break the news perhaps)? Sounds like simple good manners not to do this anyway and stay and glean the whole story from the MoD perspective.
Plus it maybe just a sensible way of controlling a large group of visitors in Main Building?
From today's Sunday Times:
December 2, 2007
Nimrod crash puts No 10 on spot
Michael Smith
GOVERNMENT culpability in risking servicemen’s lives will be thrust to centre stage this week by the inquiry into the causes of the RAF Nimrod explosion over Afghanistan that killed all 14 on board.
There is intense government concern over Tuesday’s RAF board of inquiry report, which is likely to raise new doubts over Gordon Brown’s support for the armed services. The aircraft, which dates from the 1960s, was flying only because its replacement was delayed until 2010 to save money and a number of warnings about the risks were ignored.
The aircraft had a history of fuel leaks in the bomb bay, caused by pressure spikes in the air-to-air refuelling system.
The inquiry believes that the catastrophic explosion, west of Kandahar, was brought about by fuel leaking into the bomb bay, where it was ignited by hot air from a fractured pipe. That led the No 7 fuel tank at the base of the starboard wing to explode.
Senior RAF officers are also implicated, because the hot air pipe was known to be a danger and could have been put out of action at no cost.
Nimrod XV230 was gathering intelligence in support of a Nato operation against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan on September 2 last year. The pilot reported a fire in the bomb bay and sent out a “pan, pan, pan” signal, the distress call one step below Mayday, before trying to land at Kandahar. He took the aircraft down 20,000ft in 90 seconds, but at 3,000ft the starboard wing exploded, followed by the rest of the aircraft.
“The really sad thing is that, from the moment the fire started, the crew were doomed,” said Nigel Gilbert, a former RAF pilot. “They had no chance of making it to Kandahar.
“The lack of safety equipment is a direct result of a culture of poor risk management that is endemic among senior officers and MoD officials and is largely driven by lack of funding.”
The MoD and senior RAF officers ignored repeated warnings of fuel leaks and fires on board the aircraft.
In August 2004 BAE Systems, the manufacturer, was asked to check to see if it would be safe to delay its replacement. BAE’s report warned that there had been 880 fires or “smoke-related incidents” on Nimrods in the past 22 years and that hot air pipes in the bomb bay were too close to the key elements of the fuel system. If a fire broke out in the bomb bay, there was no way of extinguishing it.
The report urged the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to fit a fire suppression system in the bomb bay, but the warning was ignored.
Jimmy Jones, a former RAF engineering officer who worked on the Nimrod trials, said: “If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today.”
In November 2004 a hot air pipe in the bomb bay of a Nimrod fractured as the craft came in to land at RAF Kinloss, Morayshire, blasting hot air onto the No 7 tank. An inquiry into that incident found the hot air would have been at least 50C above the spontaneous ignition point of the Nimrod’s Avtur fuel, which had begun to boil in the tank.
Disaster was averted only because the aircraft was on its way back to base. In his report on the incident, the station commander at Kinloss warned of more “unexpected failures” due to the aircraft’s age.
XV230 was one of a small number of Nimrods used to feed crucial live video of the battlefield direct to commanders in Afghanistan.
Nimrod’s air-to-air refuelling system was fitted as a quick fix in the 1982 Falklands conflict.
In March 2006 a report by QinetiQ, the defence consultants, blamed the Nimrod’s age and the “intense” way in which the aircraft were flown for what it described as a “critical” structural problem. The warning was ignored – with fatal results.
Warning signs
- August 2004 BAE Systems warns of bomb bay fires
- November 2004 Burst pipe pours hot air on fuel tank
- March 2006 QinetiQ reports fuel pipe going unfixed, situation “critical”
- September 2006 XV230 explodes over Afghanistan killing 14
December 2, 2007
Nimrod crash puts No 10 on spot
Michael Smith
GOVERNMENT culpability in risking servicemen’s lives will be thrust to centre stage this week by the inquiry into the causes of the RAF Nimrod explosion over Afghanistan that killed all 14 on board.
There is intense government concern over Tuesday’s RAF board of inquiry report, which is likely to raise new doubts over Gordon Brown’s support for the armed services. The aircraft, which dates from the 1960s, was flying only because its replacement was delayed until 2010 to save money and a number of warnings about the risks were ignored.
The aircraft had a history of fuel leaks in the bomb bay, caused by pressure spikes in the air-to-air refuelling system.
The inquiry believes that the catastrophic explosion, west of Kandahar, was brought about by fuel leaking into the bomb bay, where it was ignited by hot air from a fractured pipe. That led the No 7 fuel tank at the base of the starboard wing to explode.
Senior RAF officers are also implicated, because the hot air pipe was known to be a danger and could have been put out of action at no cost.
Nimrod XV230 was gathering intelligence in support of a Nato operation against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan on September 2 last year. The pilot reported a fire in the bomb bay and sent out a “pan, pan, pan” signal, the distress call one step below Mayday, before trying to land at Kandahar. He took the aircraft down 20,000ft in 90 seconds, but at 3,000ft the starboard wing exploded, followed by the rest of the aircraft.
“The really sad thing is that, from the moment the fire started, the crew were doomed,” said Nigel Gilbert, a former RAF pilot. “They had no chance of making it to Kandahar.
“The lack of safety equipment is a direct result of a culture of poor risk management that is endemic among senior officers and MoD officials and is largely driven by lack of funding.”
The MoD and senior RAF officers ignored repeated warnings of fuel leaks and fires on board the aircraft.
In August 2004 BAE Systems, the manufacturer, was asked to check to see if it would be safe to delay its replacement. BAE’s report warned that there had been 880 fires or “smoke-related incidents” on Nimrods in the past 22 years and that hot air pipes in the bomb bay were too close to the key elements of the fuel system. If a fire broke out in the bomb bay, there was no way of extinguishing it.
The report urged the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to fit a fire suppression system in the bomb bay, but the warning was ignored.
Jimmy Jones, a former RAF engineering officer who worked on the Nimrod trials, said: “If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today.”
In November 2004 a hot air pipe in the bomb bay of a Nimrod fractured as the craft came in to land at RAF Kinloss, Morayshire, blasting hot air onto the No 7 tank. An inquiry into that incident found the hot air would have been at least 50C above the spontaneous ignition point of the Nimrod’s Avtur fuel, which had begun to boil in the tank.
Disaster was averted only because the aircraft was on its way back to base. In his report on the incident, the station commander at Kinloss warned of more “unexpected failures” due to the aircraft’s age.
XV230 was one of a small number of Nimrods used to feed crucial live video of the battlefield direct to commanders in Afghanistan.
Nimrod’s air-to-air refuelling system was fitted as a quick fix in the 1982 Falklands conflict.
In March 2006 a report by QinetiQ, the defence consultants, blamed the Nimrod’s age and the “intense” way in which the aircraft were flown for what it described as a “critical” structural problem. The warning was ignored – with fatal results.
Warning signs
- August 2004 BAE Systems warns of bomb bay fires
- November 2004 Burst pipe pours hot air on fuel tank
- March 2006 QinetiQ reports fuel pipe going unfixed, situation “critical”
- September 2006 XV230 explodes over Afghanistan killing 14
The evidence is overwhelming that the MoD’s “robust airworthiness regulatory framework” isn’t actually implemented. Good processes and procedures, but then……… Part of this process is Risk Management. It’s treated the same way. You create a Risk Register, develop mitigation plans, but…….. The same attitude seeps throughout MoD. As long as you have a robust process, it’s tick tick tick in the box. There is absolutely nothing to gain from being able to actually implement the process, even if you are granted resources in the first place. Those who can do it are cast aside and are, in the words of one aircraft Director, “an embarrassment to the Department”.
I’d like to see an examination of the Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 programme here. Clearly, an obvious risk in such a programme is slippage/delay. This can be for any number of reasons, and to be fair to that team much of this can be political, or driven by changes in industry. However, and I may have mentioned this before, it is vital to consider “affected” programmes and contractors. This is the basic discipline which underpins integration, be it systems or programmatic. (And its greatest enemy is stovepiped IPTs).
If RMPA had a risk associated with slippage, the mitigation plan MUST have included what actions were necessary to keep MR2 in service. The MR2 team (not the same as RMPA, and still isn’t) would have a “wish list” of what needed doing to the MR2 to keep it in service for x years, and each individual component would have an associated timescale. This wish list would be developed with BAeS – some of their safety related recommendations have been noted here. Critically, some of these are entirely related to the airframe and/or materiel being life-ex in certain areas – the BAeS and QQ reports support this. And remember, the QQ report may be dated 2006, but it emphasises the problems have been known since at least 1995 and were the subject of previous reports. In fact, in many ways the 2006 report reads as if it was merely a confirmatory visit to Kinloss to check what, if anything, had improved in 10 years or so. Mid-90s? That’s when RMPA kicked off. Perhaps that’s what prompted the report?? If RMPA announced slippage a few months at a time, the MR2 team would, perhaps reluctantly, have to concede that little could be done and no benefit gained. But, if one huge block of slippage was suddenly announced, say 3 years, then they would have ample time to implement any changes – and those changes would have a useful life and be more easily justified. I know, in theory safety related changes shouldn’t have to worry about this, but remember the process of maintaining safety and airworthiness has been grossly underfunded for over 15 years and is considered by many to be a “waste of money”. See above comment by the Director – same attitude.
This is not being wise after the event. What I describe is routine stuff you learn to plan and implement, before being promoted into procurement, and I have no doubt the respective (unsanitised) Risk Registers (RPMA and MR2) fully record the plans and decisions. (Sanitised Registers are created to hide unpalatable risks). It is the recommendations and the decisions I’d like to examine. And precisely when slippage was (a) discovered and (b) notified. As the Sqn Ldr said to the XD, “Ah, so you haven’t been told about the 3 year slip”.
I’d like to see an examination of the Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 programme here. Clearly, an obvious risk in such a programme is slippage/delay. This can be for any number of reasons, and to be fair to that team much of this can be political, or driven by changes in industry. However, and I may have mentioned this before, it is vital to consider “affected” programmes and contractors. This is the basic discipline which underpins integration, be it systems or programmatic. (And its greatest enemy is stovepiped IPTs).
If RMPA had a risk associated with slippage, the mitigation plan MUST have included what actions were necessary to keep MR2 in service. The MR2 team (not the same as RMPA, and still isn’t) would have a “wish list” of what needed doing to the MR2 to keep it in service for x years, and each individual component would have an associated timescale. This wish list would be developed with BAeS – some of their safety related recommendations have been noted here. Critically, some of these are entirely related to the airframe and/or materiel being life-ex in certain areas – the BAeS and QQ reports support this. And remember, the QQ report may be dated 2006, but it emphasises the problems have been known since at least 1995 and were the subject of previous reports. In fact, in many ways the 2006 report reads as if it was merely a confirmatory visit to Kinloss to check what, if anything, had improved in 10 years or so. Mid-90s? That’s when RMPA kicked off. Perhaps that’s what prompted the report?? If RMPA announced slippage a few months at a time, the MR2 team would, perhaps reluctantly, have to concede that little could be done and no benefit gained. But, if one huge block of slippage was suddenly announced, say 3 years, then they would have ample time to implement any changes – and those changes would have a useful life and be more easily justified. I know, in theory safety related changes shouldn’t have to worry about this, but remember the process of maintaining safety and airworthiness has been grossly underfunded for over 15 years and is considered by many to be a “waste of money”. See above comment by the Director – same attitude.
This is not being wise after the event. What I describe is routine stuff you learn to plan and implement, before being promoted into procurement, and I have no doubt the respective (unsanitised) Risk Registers (RPMA and MR2) fully record the plans and decisions. (Sanitised Registers are created to hide unpalatable risks). It is the recommendations and the decisions I’d like to examine. And precisely when slippage was (a) discovered and (b) notified. As the Sqn Ldr said to the XD, “Ah, so you haven’t been told about the 3 year slip”.
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Interesting points Tuc. As ever, I had to read your post twice to understand it.
The two reasons I have heard time and again for not introducing MRA4 with adequate safety equipment are lack of time and lack of money. Much the same as your well crafted argument for XV230 being sent up there on that fateful day, without bomb bay fire protection and fuel tank protection and with no measures taken to reduce the risk of fire or fuel tank explosion.
The hole in which the RAF finds itself has resulted in life-exed aircraft being forced to carry on doing mission critical tasks. The need for the replacement aircraft is obvious. But that aircaft is also lacking basic fire protection and does not have built-in combat survivability.
If there is any redemption possible here, it will be in the findings and recommendations of the BoI on Tuesday.
Changing attitudes among serving chiefs of staff will be altogether different. For too long, they have seen it their only duty to get the mission done at any cost. I hope those days are coming to an end.
The two reasons I have heard time and again for not introducing MRA4 with adequate safety equipment are lack of time and lack of money. Much the same as your well crafted argument for XV230 being sent up there on that fateful day, without bomb bay fire protection and fuel tank protection and with no measures taken to reduce the risk of fire or fuel tank explosion.
The hole in which the RAF finds itself has resulted in life-exed aircraft being forced to carry on doing mission critical tasks. The need for the replacement aircraft is obvious. But that aircaft is also lacking basic fire protection and does not have built-in combat survivability.
If there is any redemption possible here, it will be in the findings and recommendations of the BoI on Tuesday.
Changing attitudes among serving chiefs of staff will be altogether different. For too long, they have seen it their only duty to get the mission done at any cost. I hope those days are coming to an end.
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Mick,
In a report of startling clarity you have described a litany of failings by this Government that has degraded the UK military to within breaking point and left its’ personnel with no confidence in their Secretary of State and Prime Minister.
Gordon Brown has shown utter contempt for UK armed forces both as Prime Minister and as Chancellor, too many chances to change direction have been missed, too many of our heroes have died at the hands of their own Government, and too many mothers grieve.
In a report of startling clarity you have described a litany of failings by this Government that has degraded the UK military to within breaking point and left its’ personnel with no confidence in their Secretary of State and Prime Minister.
Gordon Brown has shown utter contempt for UK armed forces both as Prime Minister and as Chancellor, too many chances to change direction have been missed, too many of our heroes have died at the hands of their own Government, and too many mothers grieve.
Nigel
"The two reasons I have heard time and again for not introducing MRA4 with adequate safety equipment are lack of time and lack of money".
I know this is the official line, but given the MRA4 programme kicked off when all these problems/requirements were known about, I'd say there was adequate time and opportunity to put it in the spec in the first place. (Note - MRA4 would have been specified, not subject to a URD where DEC isn't allowed to actually specify what he wants). This timeline, and the issues being known and understood, is becoming more clear with the release of the QQ report.
Sorry you needed to read my post twice, but you did understand it and agreed with me? Makes a change from my PE 2*. He understood every word when I put the same to him, but he showed me the door and slammed it behind me. Oddly enough, same day the Sqn Ldr mentioned the slippage.
"The two reasons I have heard time and again for not introducing MRA4 with adequate safety equipment are lack of time and lack of money".
I know this is the official line, but given the MRA4 programme kicked off when all these problems/requirements were known about, I'd say there was adequate time and opportunity to put it in the spec in the first place. (Note - MRA4 would have been specified, not subject to a URD where DEC isn't allowed to actually specify what he wants). This timeline, and the issues being known and understood, is becoming more clear with the release of the QQ report.
Sorry you needed to read my post twice, but you did understand it and agreed with me? Makes a change from my PE 2*. He understood every word when I put the same to him, but he showed me the door and slammed it behind me. Oddly enough, same day the Sqn Ldr mentioned the slippage.
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Tuc,
I think we would all benefit if you occasionally used less acronyms
!
I agreed with your post entirely, and your latest. I have been trying to change attitudes ever since I was sent to Afg in a slick. The advice not to send the slick from Herc OEU being overturned by a very senior officer at Group. He allegedly briefed the Minister something different. I tried the CoC and flagged up a host of urgent kit requirements, the Chiefs in the RAF were not interested and my Flight Commander was threatened with the sack.
Then XV179 was shot down by a bullet.
The initial response to fit a handful of ac with foam some time down the track; the rest is history.
Large ac self-protection has simply been ignored until very recently.
Ignored by people who have never been to war, or whose only experience is life in a fast jet. Tuc you are suggesting that combat survivability and ac self-protection should be at the core of the design. I could not agree more. We lost XV230 even though we learnt the hard way on the Herc fleet that fuel tanks explode. We await the BoI for the Herc that was destroyed on a strip in Iraq. I believe that too was a fuel tank explosion.
So to the future. The word from military officers in MoD is that MRA4 is an old design, procured a long time ago. Well, the design was only frozen last December. I have been told that large aircraft safety and combat survivability is now taken very seriously. So seriously that A400M OBIGGS has not been funded yet. The plan for MRA4 is to introduce it into service without FDA, OBIGGS, BBay Fire protection, under floor fire protection, probe inerting protection, dual skin AAR pipework.
I am sorry, but that is simply not good enough.
In the mean time, the MR2 boys and girls soldier on. AOC ordered them to continue AAR under his specific authority after XV230. But they have no B Bay or fuel tank protection and they take their chances of a mid air collision with no TCAS.
Someone explain to me how the MoD can claim they are learning lessons here?
I will not stop until attitudes change, and that comes from the very top.
I think we would all benefit if you occasionally used less acronyms
!I agreed with your post entirely, and your latest. I have been trying to change attitudes ever since I was sent to Afg in a slick. The advice not to send the slick from Herc OEU being overturned by a very senior officer at Group. He allegedly briefed the Minister something different. I tried the CoC and flagged up a host of urgent kit requirements, the Chiefs in the RAF were not interested and my Flight Commander was threatened with the sack.
Then XV179 was shot down by a bullet.
The initial response to fit a handful of ac with foam some time down the track; the rest is history.
Large ac self-protection has simply been ignored until very recently.
Ignored by people who have never been to war, or whose only experience is life in a fast jet. Tuc you are suggesting that combat survivability and ac self-protection should be at the core of the design. I could not agree more. We lost XV230 even though we learnt the hard way on the Herc fleet that fuel tanks explode. We await the BoI for the Herc that was destroyed on a strip in Iraq. I believe that too was a fuel tank explosion.
So to the future. The word from military officers in MoD is that MRA4 is an old design, procured a long time ago. Well, the design was only frozen last December. I have been told that large aircraft safety and combat survivability is now taken very seriously. So seriously that A400M OBIGGS has not been funded yet. The plan for MRA4 is to introduce it into service without FDA, OBIGGS, BBay Fire protection, under floor fire protection, probe inerting protection, dual skin AAR pipework.
I am sorry, but that is simply not good enough.
In the mean time, the MR2 boys and girls soldier on. AOC ordered them to continue AAR under his specific authority after XV230. But they have no B Bay or fuel tank protection and they take their chances of a mid air collision with no TCAS.
Someone explain to me how the MoD can claim they are learning lessons here?
I will not stop until attitudes change, and that comes from the very top.
Last edited by nigegilb; 2nd Dec 2007 at 12:05.
tuc, like Nige I struggle to understand your posts, no reflection on you, for this is all far too familiar territory for you but unfamiliar to the rest of us. All the more reason you should persevere until we all get it into out thick skulls that 'they' have failed us all, consistently and continuously, in their duty to provide airworthy aircraft to HM Armed Forces. In truth it is all in your opening line:
That one simple sentence is overwhelming and devastating in its indictment of the MOD. Never mind all the acronyms (like Nige I try and fail to put words to them, whatever they stand for they have one thing in common they do not do what it says on the tin!). The only solution is to make all of them subject to external regulation by an MAA. If they fail in their statutory obligations they are brought to book, publicly and painfully. Self regulation has served us badly over the years in Law Enforcement, the Legal and Medical Professions and Financial Services. But for sheer lethal effect nothing matches aviation for devastation when it goes wrong (well OK other than Nuclear Power). Military Aviation Airworthiness Regulation in the UK has gone wrong. It needs fixing, not patching, not papering over, but root and branch fixing without delay.
The evidence is overwhelming that the MoD’s “robust airworthiness regulatory framework” isn’t actually implemented.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 2nd Dec 2007 at 12:21.