Nimrod Information
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Single-skinned fuel pipes
AC Ovee, before he disappeared out of sight posted this;
"Well, I have conducted AAR on different aircraft throughout the years; tanking and receiving. While different aircraft types route the pipes differently, the same principles and materials are generally used. But, I have heard that there are some types that have double-skinned pipework. The MR2 has the same where the pipe passes through the crew compartment. I agree that the Nimrod is far from the the latest design in AAR, but that doesn't make it unsafe just because of that. What makes it safe, if safe means that it will not suffer a fire, is answered below."
I have already outlined recent civilian airworthiness directives and I was under the impression that Nimrod was part AAR pipe double-skinned. Not according to this.
"The AAR pipeline ran from the former escape hatch just above / inboard from the Air Eng. Station and was routed to the rear of the Capt and then into the bomb bay area. There was a solid connection at the point of entry into the flight deck, thereafter, it was a conventional refuelling pipe as seen on a refuelling vehicle. The pipe was covered with a protective skin, but was not "double skinned" in the context we are discussing. It was then routed underfloor below the toilet with a series of tubes, for want of a better description, where the flexible pipe passed through frames and stringers (to prevent fretting and chafing ) en-route to the pipes in the bomb bay and the No1 tank (I think). The confusion may have arisen re the protective rubber coating over the main pipeline...but it was not, and never could be a second skin as such. It would have contained a leak I suppose, but not for long."
OK, so we have had several major fuel leaks in the AAR pipework, engineers have not been able to re-create these leaks on the ground and the RAF refuses to comply with engineering fuel pipe best practice. Crews have been sent up time and time again on AAR missions, just waiting for yet another dangerous fuel leak.
Someone is playing with the lives of aircrew. Tri-Jet has double skin, MRA4 does not. Why is that then, money??
"Well, I have conducted AAR on different aircraft throughout the years; tanking and receiving. While different aircraft types route the pipes differently, the same principles and materials are generally used. But, I have heard that there are some types that have double-skinned pipework. The MR2 has the same where the pipe passes through the crew compartment. I agree that the Nimrod is far from the the latest design in AAR, but that doesn't make it unsafe just because of that. What makes it safe, if safe means that it will not suffer a fire, is answered below."
I have already outlined recent civilian airworthiness directives and I was under the impression that Nimrod was part AAR pipe double-skinned. Not according to this.
"The AAR pipeline ran from the former escape hatch just above / inboard from the Air Eng. Station and was routed to the rear of the Capt and then into the bomb bay area. There was a solid connection at the point of entry into the flight deck, thereafter, it was a conventional refuelling pipe as seen on a refuelling vehicle. The pipe was covered with a protective skin, but was not "double skinned" in the context we are discussing. It was then routed underfloor below the toilet with a series of tubes, for want of a better description, where the flexible pipe passed through frames and stringers (to prevent fretting and chafing ) en-route to the pipes in the bomb bay and the No1 tank (I think). The confusion may have arisen re the protective rubber coating over the main pipeline...but it was not, and never could be a second skin as such. It would have contained a leak I suppose, but not for long."
OK, so we have had several major fuel leaks in the AAR pipework, engineers have not been able to re-create these leaks on the ground and the RAF refuses to comply with engineering fuel pipe best practice. Crews have been sent up time and time again on AAR missions, just waiting for yet another dangerous fuel leak.
Someone is playing with the lives of aircrew. Tri-Jet has double skin, MRA4 does not. Why is that then, money??
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Techie, if you don't mind I would rather not say. My point of issue is the fact that the MRA4 pipework is no safer than the pipework in the aircraft that it replaces. Airliners as little as 3 or 4 years old are undergoing retro-work to bring them up to the latest standards decreed in airworthiness directives.
To say I am not happy with the lack of protection and combat survivability in MRA4 is an understatement.
By all means point out any inaccuracy in my previous post, I don't pretend to be a specialist on the Nimrod, but I do believe in common sense.
To say I am not happy with the lack of protection and combat survivability in MRA4 is an understatement.
By all means point out any inaccuracy in my previous post, I don't pretend to be a specialist on the Nimrod, but I do believe in common sense.
Last edited by nigegilb; 24th Nov 2007 at 18:42.
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DV said
Airworthiness is defined as the ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown. Airworthiness is not only concerned with engineering aspects, but also with the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated.
FOI reply
2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorised as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..
The Times Nov 4th
The MoD said the safety of all personnel "has been and will remain of paramount importance"
Perhaps they have forgotten the 2496 incidents.
Airworthiness is defined as the ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown. Airworthiness is not only concerned with engineering aspects, but also with the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated.
FOI reply
2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorised as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..
The Times Nov 4th
The MoD said the safety of all personnel "has been and will remain of paramount importance"
Perhaps they have forgotten the 2496 incidents.
TD, as has been said before you have to put these into context, 20 years of incidents, 2496 IRs = 125 a year = 10 a month and this spread over the whole fleet all over different parts of the country and the world. Additionally IRs are raised for air and ground incidents (allthough most are flying related), so bird strikes, near misses, taxy accidents, maintenance/line personnel accidents, instrument failure, hydraulic failure from component failure, bodging the AAR and damaging the probe etc and the fuel leaks when noticed by the aircrew when flying to name a few that may or may not generate an IR and this is dependent on the personnel involved and severity of the issue in their minds. A lot of these cannot be avoided no matter how many safety measures and procedures you put in place, the only way to avoid most of these is to wrap the aircraft in bubble wrap, not fly them and keep all personnel/birds away from them. Try finding out how many IRs are raised across the Tornado fleet and compare the figures against the amount of Tornados there are in their fleet, you will probably find the comparison will be the same percentage wise and the IRs will be for similar things as well, including fuel leaks.
Last edited by Exrigger; 24th Nov 2007 at 20:04. Reason: Minor corrections
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Exrigger
That sounds like a typical MOD answer to me. Tomorrow I will be able to give you another MOD statement that shows how they put a spin on statistics.
Note the FOI said RAF Nimrods, and how many are there ? 24
So you say there are 10 a month, 10 occurrences involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage, person receiving an injury, discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard.
Well my son and 13 other men were killed because of one of those occurrences.
That sounds like a typical MOD answer to me. Tomorrow I will be able to give you another MOD statement that shows how they put a spin on statistics.
Note the FOI said RAF Nimrods, and how many are there ? 24
So you say there are 10 a month, 10 occurrences involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage, person receiving an injury, discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard.
Well my son and 13 other men were killed because of one of those occurrences.
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TD,
I think what Exrigger was trying to say was that not all IRs are raised because of serious problems. Often we will raise an IR to highlight potential problems - we may have noticed something before it became a problem and IR it to prompt the system into addressing it - and so that others can learn from our experience.
Everything from a lightning strike to a cut finger on a sharp bit of metal could prompt an IR.
Nobody from the aircrew side here is saying that we know what caused the loss of our friends, and your son. It is in our interests also to get to the bottom of things but, and it's a big but, lots of the posts on here are simply not accurate.
Keep strong
Kindest Regards,
Vage
I think what Exrigger was trying to say was that not all IRs are raised because of serious problems. Often we will raise an IR to highlight potential problems - we may have noticed something before it became a problem and IR it to prompt the system into addressing it - and so that others can learn from our experience.
Everything from a lightning strike to a cut finger on a sharp bit of metal could prompt an IR.
Nobody from the aircrew side here is saying that we know what caused the loss of our friends, and your son. It is in our interests also to get to the bottom of things but, and it's a big but, lots of the posts on here are simply not accurate.
Keep strong
Kindest Regards,
Vage
TD thanks for the response and reminding me of your loss, though I had not forgotten. I have tried to help with technical information in answer to your requests throughout this thread to help you get the answers you are looking for, without hopefully being dis-respectfull of your and other families loss. I have explained before that I am an ex Nimrod airframe tradesman who worked both on the NMSU (as it was) and two Nimrod squadrons after that.
I am fully aware that the it only took one incident to cause the loss of the aircraft and crew, I do not need you to remind me of that. Additionally I am fully aware that the figures are for RAF Nimrods and I am also fully aware of the spin that is and can be put on figures and by who. I was mearly trying to put into context what the figures for IRs mean despite looking extremely alarming, in the same way as people have tried, and obviously failed, when trying to put the fuel leaks into context.
I am fully aware that the it only took one incident to cause the loss of the aircraft and crew, I do not need you to remind me of that. Additionally I am fully aware that the figures are for RAF Nimrods and I am also fully aware of the spin that is and can be put on figures and by who. I was mearly trying to put into context what the figures for IRs mean despite looking extremely alarming, in the same way as people have tried, and obviously failed, when trying to put the fuel leaks into context.
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I can only say that techie is 100% correct. IR or OR as they call them now can be raised for any reason , we had a Nimrod hit a deer last month on landing , yes a bizzare thing but an OR highlights things at a higher level. The bird spotting man probaly has to check for deer now wandering near the runway as a result of that. (i dont know for sure) but it brings into practise things that can avoid that in future.
Nice to see some old school NMSU about exrigger , I thought we were a dying breed !!!
Just on a note about the AAR system, the refuelling probes that were fitted to Nimrod were I belive ex Vulcan probes !! I only know that as we used to keep a big pile of them on the NMSU many moons back. I rememeber the fit with the huge rubber pipe down the inside of the jet till the mod was done to hide it underfloor. It was one big bulky pipe
Nice to see some old school NMSU about exrigger , I thought we were a dying breed !!!
Just on a note about the AAR system, the refuelling probes that were fitted to Nimrod were I belive ex Vulcan probes !! I only know that as we used to keep a big pile of them on the NMSU many moons back. I rememeber the fit with the huge rubber pipe down the inside of the jet till the mod was done to hide it underfloor. It was one big bulky pipe
Exrigger - I commend your patience.
TD - As exrigger said, we are aware of your loss, I was on detachment with Ben and went flying with him several times. But as exrigger and yourself pointed out statistics can be made to prove anything. Yes, there were up till a couple of years ago 24 Nimrods. How many were there in 1987? 32 I believe were upgraded to MR2 standard in 1982, plus the 3 R1's.
Beware statistics and numbers.
TD - As exrigger said, we are aware of your loss, I was on detachment with Ben and went flying with him several times. But as exrigger and yourself pointed out statistics can be made to prove anything. Yes, there were up till a couple of years ago 24 Nimrods. How many were there in 1987? 32 I believe were upgraded to MR2 standard in 1982, plus the 3 R1's.
Beware statistics and numbers.
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Vage Rot,
Whllst we know that 'Everything from a lightning strike to a cut finger on a sharp bit of metal could prompt an IR', in reality we all know that they don't, and raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays. As for your comment 'Often we will raise an IR to highlight potential problems - we may have noticed something before it became a problem and IR it to prompt the system into addressing it - and so that others can learn from our experience' I only wish someone had taken a little more notice of the IRs that would have been raised prior to the loss of 230 concerning fuel leaks and AAR. Perhaps we wouldn't then have this thread?
Exrigger,
The point is, that 10 IRs a month for, what is a pitifully small fleet of aircraft, is abnormally high wouldn't you agree? If we go back 20 or 30 years, when we had dozens of frames and were flying in excess of 8 - 10 missions a day (from ISK alone) then I would agree. But I understand that there are very, very few flights at all at the moment, so the numbers of IR's is worrying. It is also of no value at all comparing them to Tornado IRs either. How many Tornados we we currently have compared to Nimrods?
TD, Stay strong my friend
The Winco
Whllst we know that 'Everything from a lightning strike to a cut finger on a sharp bit of metal could prompt an IR', in reality we all know that they don't, and raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays. As for your comment 'Often we will raise an IR to highlight potential problems - we may have noticed something before it became a problem and IR it to prompt the system into addressing it - and so that others can learn from our experience' I only wish someone had taken a little more notice of the IRs that would have been raised prior to the loss of 230 concerning fuel leaks and AAR. Perhaps we wouldn't then have this thread?
Exrigger,
The point is, that 10 IRs a month for, what is a pitifully small fleet of aircraft, is abnormally high wouldn't you agree? If we go back 20 or 30 years, when we had dozens of frames and were flying in excess of 8 - 10 missions a day (from ISK alone) then I would agree. But I understand that there are very, very few flights at all at the moment, so the numbers of IR's is worrying. It is also of no value at all comparing them to Tornado IRs either. How many Tornados we we currently have compared to Nimrods?
TD, Stay strong my friend
The Winco
Winco, thanks for the response, but again, as I have said that those figures average 10 a month over 20 years, and the fleet was a lot larger and sorties more frequent a fact that you concur with, additionally how do you know that over the last 3 years say that the average amount has been a lot less a month due to less aircraft and less sorties (by the way I don't know that figure either).
Additionally the comparison with Tornado IRs over the last 20 years would produce a larger figure (i.e. more aircraft and more sorties), but as I said that percentage wise it would probably be no less or worse than those for the Nimrod fleet or any other fleet for that matter.
Magnersdrinker, thanks, I think that most from the old NMSU, like me have retired, despite WO A it was not a bad time.
Additionally the comparison with Tornado IRs over the last 20 years would produce a larger figure (i.e. more aircraft and more sorties), but as I said that percentage wise it would probably be no less or worse than those for the Nimrod fleet or any other fleet for that matter.
Magnersdrinker, thanks, I think that most from the old NMSU, like me have retired, despite WO A it was not a bad time.
Quote:
"raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays"
Winco, you are wrong."
"raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays"
Winco, you are wrong."
TD, the IR is the messenger, and if they had started in on shooting that then the whole system would then be shot from top to bottom! But if I know anything of the professionalism of the RAF, both aircrew and ground crew, then that part of the system that is in their hands will be conducted with utter punctiliousness. The answers that you are seeking are, I suspect, not in their domain but that of the staff levels to which their IRs are sent. Lots of messages, b...er all action! As a squadron FSO I encouraged as many IRs (SORs then) to be submitted as possible. One of our training captains obliged me to the letter, and far exceeded anyone else. He was grounded by the Station Commander as being 'Accident Prone'! Bemeddled Buffoons was Tony Hancock's description. I can think of none better.
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Observer reporting that BoI will be published in 10 days time;
880 'fires' on RAF Nimrods before fatal mid-air explosion
Mark Townsend, defence correspondent
Sunday November 25, 2007
The Observer
Almost 900 fire-related incidents on Nimrod spy planes were reported in the two decades before one of the aircraft exploded above Afghanistan in September last year, killing 14 men.
A report by BAE Systems, the plane's manufacturer, describes the number of blazes or smoke coming from the aircraft as 'frequent', raising fresh concerns that defence officials sent planes to Iraq and Afghanistan that were not airworthy.
The research details 880 incidents during which crews reported fire, smoke, burning or fumes on board between 1982 to 2004, when the report was completed. They include cases in which RAF personnel were burned or were forced to fight flames with hand-held extinguishers.
The revelations come 10 days before an RAF board of inquiry publishes its findings into the explosion of a Nimrod MR2 above Kandahar province in September 2006.
The inquiry is expected to identify a fuel leak in the aircraft as the cause. Last night relatives of those who died said that defence officials had ignored warnings concerning the risk of fire on Nimrods. Graham Knight, whose 25-year-old son, Sgt Ben Knight, was killed in the crash, said: 'It is a disturbing figure and proves that officials knew the Nimrod had a fire risk [for] longer than previously thought. Still they decided to send my son and others to fight in an aircraft that was dangerous.'
Ministry of Defence documents confirm that incidents continued after the BAE report was completed. An MoD spokesman said the high number of reported incidents was due to the meticulous nature of recording such incidents. He said: 'The number of signals generated is a reflection of the RAF's comprehensive reporting system which covers any indication, however minor, of fire, smoke, burning, fumes or smell-related occurrences. This would include, for example, incidents as minor as an overheated resistor.'
880 'fires' on RAF Nimrods before fatal mid-air explosion
Mark Townsend, defence correspondent
Sunday November 25, 2007
The Observer
Almost 900 fire-related incidents on Nimrod spy planes were reported in the two decades before one of the aircraft exploded above Afghanistan in September last year, killing 14 men.
A report by BAE Systems, the plane's manufacturer, describes the number of blazes or smoke coming from the aircraft as 'frequent', raising fresh concerns that defence officials sent planes to Iraq and Afghanistan that were not airworthy.
The research details 880 incidents during which crews reported fire, smoke, burning or fumes on board between 1982 to 2004, when the report was completed. They include cases in which RAF personnel were burned or were forced to fight flames with hand-held extinguishers.
The revelations come 10 days before an RAF board of inquiry publishes its findings into the explosion of a Nimrod MR2 above Kandahar province in September 2006.
The inquiry is expected to identify a fuel leak in the aircraft as the cause. Last night relatives of those who died said that defence officials had ignored warnings concerning the risk of fire on Nimrods. Graham Knight, whose 25-year-old son, Sgt Ben Knight, was killed in the crash, said: 'It is a disturbing figure and proves that officials knew the Nimrod had a fire risk [for] longer than previously thought. Still they decided to send my son and others to fight in an aircraft that was dangerous.'
Ministry of Defence documents confirm that incidents continued after the BAE report was completed. An MoD spokesman said the high number of reported incidents was due to the meticulous nature of recording such incidents. He said: 'The number of signals generated is a reflection of the RAF's comprehensive reporting system which covers any indication, however minor, of fire, smoke, burning, fumes or smell-related occurrences. This would include, for example, incidents as minor as an overheated resistor.'
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880 fires . I think thats blown out of context , most that read that think that fire has actually broken out in the airframe ,im afraid thats complete and utter bull**** reporting. 90% of that i guess is fumes in the cockpit which most of the time is down tot he air conditioning side throwing oily crap into the pressure shell. Also electrical burning which is common to all aircraft with many systems on board , if you look at the stats of the E3 i bet you will get the same.
Yet again publishing things to make it sound like a major problem , these things happen, its the nature of flying an aircraft packed with computers and wiggly amp things.
How many times at home have you smelled the tv or pc and thought mmmm thats not right many times im sure, but how many times can you say its went on fire ? not many i guess .So to say 880 fires onboard is complete and utter horse mince sorry i dont buy that one bit !!
Yet again publishing things to make it sound like a major problem , these things happen, its the nature of flying an aircraft packed with computers and wiggly amp things.
How many times at home have you smelled the tv or pc and thought mmmm thats not right many times im sure, but how many times can you say its went on fire ? not many i guess .So to say 880 fires onboard is complete and utter horse mince sorry i dont buy that one bit !!
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Just reading ex techies note on the number of frames in 1982, well the other day I just read that there were 49 nimrods built (not including r1s). I dont think all made it to the front line but was just happening to look at a comparison chart for all interchangability of components and it logs many aircraft that i never knew existed !!
Sorry i just thought id add that !! irrelevant im sure
Sorry i just thought id add that !! irrelevant im sure
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Nimrod Fires
Magnesdrinker,
The Sunday Times today carries a similar report regarding the number of incidents (fire and smoke related) that the BAES Fire and Explosive Hazard Report of March 2004 identified. One has to assume that in all cases there must have been some paperwork raised ranging, I assume, from an IR if fire extinguishers were used to a defect report and an engineering investigation. Having been involved in a similar incident in a Shackleton many years ago the smoke/fumes emanating from one of the avionic bays were taken very seriously indeed and following a Pan call we landed with the fire crews deployed so I don't accept that such incidents should be (or are) taken as lightly as you suggest.
Presumably the IPT paid good money to have this report done as they had some concerns about keeping the aircraft in service for at least another 6 years, and, as we now know, somewhat longer! The report covered both the Mk 2 and the RMk1, and was 125 pages long - I have only seen the ES (2 pages) released under FOI, and I have not seen the full analysis of the 880 "incidents".
However, what is a fact is that in the ES, amongst a pile of other findings and recommendations, BAES recommended that "MOD consider utilising the extended range tankage role fit fire detection suppression system in normal operations" (their emphasis not mine). I know others have said that this would not work. I would not know, but BAES are design authority so presumably they had a good idea that this would work, or could be made to work. Although, as is so often the case, the wording is somewhat "fudged" there is little doubt that the BAES assessment that fire/explosion risks could be reduced to the ALARP level was based on the IPT not just reviewing but also actioning their (BAES') recommendations. I also wonder if such protection is now fitted in the MR4 - perhaps someone knows.
I hope the the BOI will look at what happened to the BAES report and its recommendations and comment on why, as appears to be the case, they were never actioned - money being my guess. If it does not then I would start to look at this with the same jaundiced view that I have of the engineering aspects of the Chinook Mull Inquiry - so I hope that this will not be the case.
JB
The Sunday Times today carries a similar report regarding the number of incidents (fire and smoke related) that the BAES Fire and Explosive Hazard Report of March 2004 identified. One has to assume that in all cases there must have been some paperwork raised ranging, I assume, from an IR if fire extinguishers were used to a defect report and an engineering investigation. Having been involved in a similar incident in a Shackleton many years ago the smoke/fumes emanating from one of the avionic bays were taken very seriously indeed and following a Pan call we landed with the fire crews deployed so I don't accept that such incidents should be (or are) taken as lightly as you suggest.
Presumably the IPT paid good money to have this report done as they had some concerns about keeping the aircraft in service for at least another 6 years, and, as we now know, somewhat longer! The report covered both the Mk 2 and the RMk1, and was 125 pages long - I have only seen the ES (2 pages) released under FOI, and I have not seen the full analysis of the 880 "incidents".
However, what is a fact is that in the ES, amongst a pile of other findings and recommendations, BAES recommended that "MOD consider utilising the extended range tankage role fit fire detection suppression system in normal operations" (their emphasis not mine). I know others have said that this would not work. I would not know, but BAES are design authority so presumably they had a good idea that this would work, or could be made to work. Although, as is so often the case, the wording is somewhat "fudged" there is little doubt that the BAES assessment that fire/explosion risks could be reduced to the ALARP level was based on the IPT not just reviewing but also actioning their (BAES') recommendations. I also wonder if such protection is now fitted in the MR4 - perhaps someone knows.
I hope the the BOI will look at what happened to the BAES report and its recommendations and comment on why, as appears to be the case, they were never actioned - money being my guess. If it does not then I would start to look at this with the same jaundiced view that I have of the engineering aspects of the Chinook Mull Inquiry - so I hope that this will not be the case.
JB
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Observer reporting that BoI will be published in 10 days time
Noting concerns about the 880 fires figure and putting it into context perhaps we should put it into context with the number of fuel leaks over the same period. I believe if that's done most would consider that it was luck rather than judgment that has prevented other incidents like 230 from being fatal.