Nimrod Information

[nigegilb]

It has been suggesed to me that Nimrod pilots would dearly love to have TCAS in theatre. I ask the qestion again, has anyone entered a UOR for TCAS? Has it been looked at? There is a very big pot of money outside of the Defence Budget for essential in theatre equipment. Please answer via PM if you prefer.

[Winco]

BEagle or Hey Beegull Man!

I is clearly out of de loop man, and I is sarry about dat! Innit man? (my grandson helped me that that - sorry BEags)

Thanks for 'hedgyoucayting' me dood - cooooell man!

The Winco

[BEagle]

Radical!

.

[nigegilb]

In case anyone wondered, i am going to bat this up to parliamentary level, but I want to be sure of my facts first,

Cheers,

Nige

[tucumseh]

S-H

“One new IPT leader at Wyton started a Safety Working Group meeting by announcing that technical/engineering language would not be tolerated. This IPT leader you see, was not an engineer”.

All too typical, I'm afraid.

[chappie]

oh dear!!!

fair enough if it was me running it but an IPT leader?!

[tucumseh]

Chappie

There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with having a non-engineer as an IPTL. Many IPTs don’t really get involved in engineering and airworthiness matters. (Among them, some aircraft IPTs). I suppose credit should be given to the said IPTL for permitting a Safety Working Group in the first place. Many would have pointed to precedent and not bothered. If, as it seems, he chaired it, then it would seem he has little confidence in his Safety Manager – if he has one. I’m trying to be fair to him, but on balance I’d say he’s a prat. This is the perfect attribute for further promotion so I hope his replacement is better.


Of equal import, S-H’s comment on FRCs drew no comment.

“There was a point last year when it was announced that there was no more money to maintain Flight Reference Cards, how on earth can this be allowed to happen?”


I’ve seen this happen on and off for 16 years. I can be very precise as it commenced when RAF suppliers gained control of the necessary funding. Their attitude was, “if it doesn’t generate a “due-in” on the stock computer, it’s a waste of money”. So, no fault investigations. No AP amendments. No training. Do not address obsolescence. Safety? You must be joking. Yes, the “system” has changed over the years, but the damage was done. The MoD no longer has the corporate knowledge to manage the necessary processes and procedures.

I say on and off, because some learned to bury these critical components of airworthiness in catch-all contract clauses, which would slip under the beancounting adolfs’ radar. But this was firefighting - the fragmented approach irreversibly fragmented the airworthiness audit trails. For example, major mods would be schemed, embodied by contractors, but the APs wouldn’t be amended. Maintainers and aircrew would look at the new kit and say “WTF”. The effect is the same on aircrew if the FRCs aren’t maintained. (And in both cases, how do know the pubs haven’t been maintained? Answer – you must wait for something to go wrong). It is further evidence of the MoD’s increasing incompetence and culpability. It must be totally beyond anyone at an air station how this attitude can prevail, but it does, and very senior staffs simply roll over and let it happen.

Again, I commend…..

http://www.publications.parliament.u.../300/30005.htm

Nothings changed.

[Chugalug2]

In case anyone wondered, i am going to bat this up to parliamentary level, but I want to be sure of my facts first,

Nige, I assume by 'this' you mean TCAS. If so good luck, for it is a scandal (along with the myriad others) that this excellent kit is not as standard on military fleets as on civilian ones. But it also points up the sad situation that is under discussion currently on the thread. I cannot believe that TCAS would not have been required by an MAA, in just the same way that it has been by the CAA. Indeed all the military airworthiness aspects of recent or current threads, such as ESF, FADEC problems, FR systems, TCAS, Flight Recorders, etc, etc amount to so many trees, whereas the better solution is surely to tackle the woods, i.e. Airworthiness Regulation. Unless and until that nettle is seized then that list is doomed to grow ever longer. Perhaps that is what needs to be batted up to parliamentary level?

[Safety_Helmut]

Tuc

On a positive note. All in-service aircraft and commodity IPTs hold regular Safety Working Groups, usually chaired by the IPTL.

Safety Manager usually acts as secretary for the meeting, not an ideal responsibility for the IPTs SME at such meetings.

S_H

[Distant Voice]

General Question

Are there many NITRILE seals in the AAR fueling system?

DV

[enginesuck]

Yes Loads And Most Are Also Made Of Lox, Also Did You Know That Nimrods Wings Are Made Of Cheese ?

**** Off

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco wrote
There is a distinct lack of input at the moment from some of the so-called 'specialists' and 'current' Nimrod air and groundcrew. Where have you all gone?

Maybe those so called 'specialists' and 'current' Nimrod air and groundcrew are actually getting on with the job in hand, flying and maintaining the Mighty Hunter.

Maybe they are waiting for something 'original' to be added to the thread and are letting the 'non-specialist' and 'used-to-be current' Nimrod air and ground crew 'speculate' instead of waiting for the BOI findings.

Maybe?.....

Just a thought............

[Vage Rot]

Maybe they are waiting for something 'original' to be added to the thread and are letting the 'non-specialist' and 'used-to-be current' Nimrod air and ground crew 'speculate' instead of waiting for the BOI findings.

[Winco]

MightyHunter AGE

Thank you for that. I simply made the point that people such as yourself and many others appear to have 'deep and silent' and I wondered why???

I'm pleased you are getting on with the job in hand, but we do value your input and have been waiting for you to comment on the various reprts that have surfaced, such as the BAes one and the QinetiQ one??

No comments on them??

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco

I (and probably many others at Kinloss) have some concern over the gravity that the QinetiQ report is being held in.

As with all these reports they have recommendations, whether they have been taken up or not I have no idea as i do not work in NSG. RAMS has however now been disbanded and amalgamated into NLS.

Having worked on NLS for 6 years I have never seen QintetiQ or BAe come round our section and report on us.

This is probably because we have our own QA on the Sqn and an internal QA system and section on RAF Kinloss the same as any other RAF station. IF they had any concerns about our working practices and procedures/APs etc then we would know about it in no uncertain terms.

Perhaps the officers who negotiated the new contract for maint in NSG should explain why they didn't include any 'extra' work e.g ADF and LIM work?

I however, cannot comment on a report on another section on station that I do not work in or have no influence over.

[nigegilb]

Airworthiness issues.

One specific area of Continued Airworthiness that is beginning to impact the world’s airlines is SFAR 88. This is an FAA Special Requirement which, as a result of the TWA 800 accident investigation, requires a review of fuel tank safety.

This exercise comprises a safety assessment of the basic fuel tank and system design (normally carried out by the manufacturer) and an operator review of their fleet to identify any modifications that affect the fuel systems. Once identified these modifications must be assessed by an approved design organisation to determine any unsafe conditions.

The JAA and UKCAA have produced harmonised requirements that reflect the content of SFAR 88 and it is worth noting that the FAA will recognise compliance with either of these.

In the UK, Airworthiness Notice 55 is the mandatory vehicle being used and is applicable to UK industry.

More;

One of the bottom lines is that on modified fuel systems a lot of work / rework needs to be carried out with regards to reducing risk of fire / explosion. Operators that do not comply will have to have the Aux fuel system made inoperable.

[B]Part of this mod is to install "dual wall" fuel pipes. At present, it is
allowable to shroud a standard rigid pipe with a larger flexible hose
type assembly, with a gland drain that can indentify the source of a
leak to within a certain distance. The hose will go.

This is a description I received of the AAR piping in Nimrod bomb bay.

"The fuel pipes you mentioned are all single skins. The AAR system, whilst being a lash up, has no double skin, simply a flexible pipe routed from the former escape hatch into the bomb bay via sleeves in the frames."

So not only does Nimrod MR2 and MRA4 lack fuel tank protection and bomb bay fire protection, it now looks as though it is coming up well short on more JAR/UKCAA/FAA commercial directives.

Military Airworthiness?

[The Swinging Monkey]

Nig,

Given what you have just written, can you advise us as to whether or not the MOD are allowed to ignore these rulings?

Are they simply immune from the mandatory implementation of flight safety issues (the Airworthiness Notice) because they are 'military' or what?

Even if they were allowed to ignore the rulings, there is clearly a possible danger of an aircraft (like TWA 800) exploding over a built-up area, which I would have felt made it an absolute 'No No' to ignore the Airworthiness Notice?

And how on earth can the MR4 project have got away with ignoring the notice?

Thanks for the info

TSM

[Chugalug2]

Military Airworthiness?

You pose the question Nige, rhetorical though it may be, and my reply is why should it be any different? Those in the know, yourself, tuc, JB, SH, etc might well reply that military aviation airworthiness is different because military aviation is different. That is true but only up to the point where civil standards are not practical, ie system redundancy, landing and take off performance, munitions carriage and fit, etc. In short civil standards should apply as a default, and alternative standards only applicable where such conflict is unavoidable. For military airworthiness standards not only protect the military crews and passengers, but civilian ones too (eg where TCAS applies), and populations over which they fly. The MODs failure to meet a duty of care applies to those people as well. That duty needs to be urgently transferred to an MAA so that protection is assured.

[nigegilb]

I try not to post rumour, I am sourcing these posts on engineering concerns from people I trust. Will get back to you on the points you raise. What concerns me is that we lost XV179 due to a fuel tank explosion. It remains to be seen what finally brought down XV230, but a lot of attention has been paid to tank 7. I would have thought that following the tragic loss of life in both XV230 and XV179 the RAF would be at the forefront of fuel tank safety. Well after XV179 for a while the UK was still the only nation in Europe not to have demanded fuel tank protection on A400M. That changed 2 days after yours truly appeared on C4 News and pointed this out.

Why on earth hasn't someone gripped Nimrod safety. I am very very sorry that all this has to play out in public, but I can guarantee you that as we speak, the RAF has not insisted on any of this increased safety on MRA4.

You could argue that the RAF is breaching health and safety law, in the same way that the Met was taken to court over danger to the public in the Menezes case.

[South Bound]

My understanding is that Military Airworthiness standards are directed by SofS and along the lines of:

'At least as safe as the civilian equivalent...'