Nimrod Information
tucumseh wrote:
This is the second time that there has been reference to a restriction placed on Incident Reporting, eg Winco's:
The more that emerges from this thread the sorrier the saga and the more rotten the core. When did this change to the RAF Flight Safety system occur, did it only prevent engineering based IRs being submitted, or all? Who was supposed to stock pile these IRs before bouncing up 'omnibus editions' to higher echelon. Just as the admin side of the service has been unpeeling for years, so it seems has the provision of Airworthiness. What we see now are the flocks of chickens, too numerous almost to be counted, coming home to roost. As others have said elsewhere the service needs another Trenchard to save it from disappearing up its own tail pipe. One thing is for sure it has been made incapable of assuring the Airworthiness of its own fleets and an MAA must be instituted without delay to take on that role.
following the instruction placed on engineering authorities many years ago to reduce the number of requests for fault investigations, how many incidents now go unreported to the proper authority responsible for maintaining airworthiness?
and raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays
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Magnersdrinker,
My recollection of the shuttle foam issue is that the engineers and risk
analysts took the issue very seriously, but the higher management
took the view that it had always been alright in the past so it would be
alright again. I'm sure there is a report of a few thousand pages
saying that (maybe in such a way as to protect the guilty and punish
the innocent). Also a lot on nonsense about 'nothing to be done to fix it',
but after the Columbia tragedy indeed something could be done.
regards, john
My recollection of the shuttle foam issue is that the engineers and risk
analysts took the issue very seriously, but the higher management
took the view that it had always been alright in the past so it would be
alright again. I'm sure there is a report of a few thousand pages
saying that (maybe in such a way as to protect the guilty and punish
the innocent). Also a lot on nonsense about 'nothing to be done to fix it',
but after the Columbia tragedy indeed something could be done.
regards, john
Chug
"When did this change to the RAF Flight Safety system occur, did it only prevent engineering based IRs being submitted, or all? Who was supposed to stock pile these IRs before bouncing up 'omnibus editions' to higher echelon".
Not just RAF, but MoD as a whole. In fact, the RAF didn't suffer as much as the RN, as the former held the funds.
The decision not to release funding for fault investigations was entirely made by supply managers, in the years following their rise to power in the 90s.
Engineering Authorities were "discouraged" from raising 760As (Fault Investigation Requests) following receipt of Narrative Fault Reports. The direction was that, an investigation cost £xx, invariably the MoD were held liable and so had to pay for rectification (for good reasons - another issue), so there was no mileage in conducting investigations in the first place.
Non-technical staffs were routinely making engineering / safety / airworthiness related decisions. You can see the obvious conflict with Airworthiness Regulations. This Suppliers' policy was enforced by their 2* ordering disciplinary action against those who complained. (My annual reports are quite entertaining, in a masochistic way). A simple matter of record, which is why I feel comfortable discussing it. If MoD don't like me repeating it, they should be more careful when trying to justify their actions in response to FoI and DPA requests.
"When did this change to the RAF Flight Safety system occur, did it only prevent engineering based IRs being submitted, or all? Who was supposed to stock pile these IRs before bouncing up 'omnibus editions' to higher echelon".
Not just RAF, but MoD as a whole. In fact, the RAF didn't suffer as much as the RN, as the former held the funds.
The decision not to release funding for fault investigations was entirely made by supply managers, in the years following their rise to power in the 90s.
Engineering Authorities were "discouraged" from raising 760As (Fault Investigation Requests) following receipt of Narrative Fault Reports. The direction was that, an investigation cost £xx, invariably the MoD were held liable and so had to pay for rectification (for good reasons - another issue), so there was no mileage in conducting investigations in the first place.
Non-technical staffs were routinely making engineering / safety / airworthiness related decisions. You can see the obvious conflict with Airworthiness Regulations. This Suppliers' policy was enforced by their 2* ordering disciplinary action against those who complained. (My annual reports are quite entertaining, in a masochistic way). A simple matter of record, which is why I feel comfortable discussing it. If MoD don't like me repeating it, they should be more careful when trying to justify their actions in response to FoI and DPA requests.
The direction was that, an investigation cost £xx, invariably the MoD were held liable and so had to pay for rectification (for good reasons - another issue), so there was no mileage in conducting investigations in the first place.
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Lack of TCAS on MR2 highlighted
Another example of corner cutting that could compromise safety:
http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/news...861167.0.0.php
http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/news...861167.0.0.php
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Re above:
Poor guys at the MoD are getting a hard time of it aren't they!
See the comments at the end of the article, this one in particular:
If it wasn't such a serious subject it would be funny!
The MoD last night declined to comment on the four alleged incidents.
See the comments at the end of the article, this one in particular:
It's a SPY PLANE THAT CAN PICK OUT A FLY AT THOUSANDS OF FEET. HOW THE HELL COULD IT NOT SEE A BIG BLOODY PLANE COMING!!!!!!!!
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What is worse, much worse, is the lack of NVG compatibility. I was saved literally a second or so from a mid-air collision by my Air Engineer spotting the confliction on the flight deck and by my Co Pilot reacting instinctively and immediately to the call. We were operating lights out over Pakistan, complete with IR strobes. We did not have TCAS (Hercs do now), but we had an NVG compatible flight deck.. I understand MR2 has no IR strobes, an aircraft radar which is not a no go item and does not have an NVG compatible flight deck. Very poor radar service over Afg, this aircraft is quite literally, a mid-air collision waiting to happen.
Most astonishingly of all, we were receiving a radar service at the time, by a Brit AWACS. We were being controlled by an IDRO a non-qualified fighter controller.
Why is the Nimrod MR2 the only large multi-engine aircraft without TCAS?
Why does this aircraft not have IR strobes?
More cost saving measures?
The lack of TCAS almost killed us, but the NVG and quite possibly IR strobes on the conflicting aircraft saved us.
When is the MoD and Nimrod IPT going to stop playing around with peoples' lives?
Most astonishingly of all, we were receiving a radar service at the time, by a Brit AWACS. We were being controlled by an IDRO a non-qualified fighter controller.
Why is the Nimrod MR2 the only large multi-engine aircraft without TCAS?
Why does this aircraft not have IR strobes?
More cost saving measures?
The lack of TCAS almost killed us, but the NVG and quite possibly IR strobes on the conflicting aircraft saved us.
When is the MoD and Nimrod IPT going to stop playing around with peoples' lives?
Last edited by nigegilb; 27th Nov 2007 at 15:10.
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Nige,
It's pretty clear that the Nimrod fleet is being nursed into retirement at minimum expense and maximum risk.
If the MoD are not willing to comment on the latest issue perhaps someone could put some batteries in Des and trouble him for a reaction!
It's been said before on this thread but the bottom line is there is no accountability.
It's pretty clear that the Nimrod fleet is being nursed into retirement at minimum expense and maximum risk.
If the MoD are not willing to comment on the latest issue perhaps someone could put some batteries in Des and trouble him for a reaction!
It's been said before on this thread but the bottom line is there is no accountability.
Excuse some questions from a non-multi type.
How many aircraft fly around at Nimrod heights over Afghanistan on NVGs? Would IR strobes actually be of any benefit? How long would a multi flight deck crew be expected to wear NVGs?
Is the aircraft not protected in the airspace by other procedural means?
Would TCAS be used in these types of ops by surveillance aircraft? If so, why can other aircraft not operate white light (and hence negate the need for NVGs)?
Whilst I agree that the airframes probably do have their issues, I think it unfair to label every lack of capability as a major flight safety problem. To do so (in my opinion) just makes the campaigners appear as whingers and scaremongerers and the real issues risk being ignored.
I cannot find any threads begging for Nimrod TCAS or Nimrod NVG, were they not a problem until now?
How many aircraft fly around at Nimrod heights over Afghanistan on NVGs? Would IR strobes actually be of any benefit? How long would a multi flight deck crew be expected to wear NVGs?
Is the aircraft not protected in the airspace by other procedural means?
Would TCAS be used in these types of ops by surveillance aircraft? If so, why can other aircraft not operate white light (and hence negate the need for NVGs)?
Whilst I agree that the airframes probably do have their issues, I think it unfair to label every lack of capability as a major flight safety problem. To do so (in my opinion) just makes the campaigners appear as whingers and scaremongerers and the real issues risk being ignored.
I cannot find any threads begging for Nimrod TCAS or Nimrod NVG, were they not a problem until now?
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SAR Bloke, the requirement for TCAS, or rather the desperate need for it came directly from the front line.
I also believe a UOR for IR strobes was denied.
This is not a whinge, this is a statement, a litany of issues, of how UKAF are being sent to war on a shoe string.
Our SOP 5 years ago was lights out at all times. Check out the topography of Afg, a SAM exploded close to my ac and we were at 17000! You would be mad to light up your ac like a christmas tree. I am trying to get some actual figures on the amount of RAs in theatre. It is not pretty. The situation regarding TCAS has been described to me as "absolutely disgusting." With reference to wearing of NVGs, at the time of my near mid-air I had taken off my gogs because wearing them for up to 7 hours a night was painful. I thought we were fairly safe up at height, I was wrong. Thankfully, the AE strapped his gogs on, this was strictly not allowed, but thank God he did.
Because of a lack of TCAS, Nimrod crews are making do with ad hoc procedures, NVG look outs, use of aircraft radar etc.
It needs fixing quick. It has been described to me as the most pressing safety problem, even allowing for the fuel leak issues.
I also believe a UOR for IR strobes was denied.
This is not a whinge, this is a statement, a litany of issues, of how UKAF are being sent to war on a shoe string.
Our SOP 5 years ago was lights out at all times. Check out the topography of Afg, a SAM exploded close to my ac and we were at 17000! You would be mad to light up your ac like a christmas tree. I am trying to get some actual figures on the amount of RAs in theatre. It is not pretty. The situation regarding TCAS has been described to me as "absolutely disgusting." With reference to wearing of NVGs, at the time of my near mid-air I had taken off my gogs because wearing them for up to 7 hours a night was painful. I thought we were fairly safe up at height, I was wrong. Thankfully, the AE strapped his gogs on, this was strictly not allowed, but thank God he did.
Because of a lack of TCAS, Nimrod crews are making do with ad hoc procedures, NVG look outs, use of aircraft radar etc.
It needs fixing quick. It has been described to me as the most pressing safety problem, even allowing for the fuel leak issues.
Last edited by nigegilb; 27th Nov 2007 at 17:02.
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Just a quickie on that Tcas, the rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above, The Nimrod does not carry that therefore its no requirement to have it fitted. I guess its handy and they would love it but I think the money is going to other things more important. there is only so much butter that can be spread about.
"The rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above, The Nimrod does not carry that therefore its no requirement to have it fitted."
Which would infer that the R1 would have to have it......
Which would infer that the R1 would have to have it......
Magnersdrinker stated:- "The rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above, The Nimrod does not carry that therefore its no requirement to have it fitted."
The R1 is not civilian!
The R1 is not civilian!
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Nigegilb,
Yes, it would be if we selected the A/P on and fell asleeep. Your statement is an affront to the Nimrod crews.
Use of an aircraft radar, which is one of the best, and manned by a specialist is not "ad hoc".
Get back in your box.
this aircraft is quite literally, a mid-air collision waiting to happen.
Because of a lack of TCAS, Nimrod crews are making do with ad hoc procedures, NVG look outs, use of aircraft radar etc.
Get back in your box.
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The system is mandatory under International Civil Aviation Organisation rules for all aircraft weighing more than 5700 kilos or authorised to carry more than 19 crew and passengers
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The rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above
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Magners,
You wrote.....
'I think the money is going to other things more important'
Perhaps you could tell us where the money is going and what is more important than flight safety and human life please?
Thanks
The Winco
You wrote.....
'I think the money is going to other things more important'
Perhaps you could tell us where the money is going and what is more important than flight safety and human life please?
Thanks
The Winco
All this talk of the R1 makes me reflect on the enormous changes the advent of global communication and freedom of information has brought, and how we deal with the outdated Official Secrets Act and officialdom in general. 20 years ago the R1 was deemed not to exist. 9 years ago I mentioned it at a meeting in the context of a design issue and a Gp Capt refused to answer, saying there was no such aircraft. Now it’s openly discussed. (Of course, the picture on the front of the Torygraph during GW1 was a dead giveaway. Rumour has it MB were apoplectic).
Five years ago it would have been inconceivable that such a damning report as QinetiQ’s (discussed here) was even known to exist, never mind released for public consumption. Even more astonishing, the only redaction has been removal of individuals’ names. That is, a deliberate decision has been made to release what most would regard as highly sensitive information, and not just commercially sensitive. As usual, the MoD were too quick to sell off their research arm and create QQ, but didn’t consider for one moment how to manage the simple fact that QQ inherited a vast history of such reports and information whose ownership was now blurred.
My goodness, the MoD doesn’t half dig holes for itself. Hoisted and petard come to mind. They need to wake up and get with the programme. The world and his dog know what is wrong and how to fix it, so get to it!
Five years ago it would have been inconceivable that such a damning report as QinetiQ’s (discussed here) was even known to exist, never mind released for public consumption. Even more astonishing, the only redaction has been removal of individuals’ names. That is, a deliberate decision has been made to release what most would regard as highly sensitive information, and not just commercially sensitive. As usual, the MoD were too quick to sell off their research arm and create QQ, but didn’t consider for one moment how to manage the simple fact that QQ inherited a vast history of such reports and information whose ownership was now blurred.
My goodness, the MoD doesn’t half dig holes for itself. Hoisted and petard come to mind. They need to wake up and get with the programme. The world and his dog know what is wrong and how to fix it, so get to it!