Nimrod Information
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If you were a captain of an aircraft, after a terrible accident and seen freinds and comrades that aint with you anymore, what would you do as a captain with the right to say no or yes we fly.He is given all the information thats available from both ground and air and in this instance from people further up the chain that kind of knew what had happened. Its a big call but as a captain of an aircraft im sure he/she has taken all things into consideration and opted to take the aircraft. People that here not in military this is not a sweet comfy chair we all live in sometimes people make a call cause lives depend on it. Its what you do in the military and im sure if the Captains of each flight after 30 did not want to take the jet then they have that option of saying no as a collective.
On the flip side I have seen 2 pilots say no and stick up for there rights, they have effectively lost there career.fear to talk is a bad thing when you have the prospect of loosing what may be an important promotion. I guess thats what makes a good pilot , that i will never know
On the flip side I have seen 2 pilots say no and stick up for there rights, they have effectively lost there career.fear to talk is a bad thing when you have the prospect of loosing what may be an important promotion. I guess thats what makes a good pilot , that i will never know
Magners,
too many people offer an opinion (often with no knowledge), but the guys who operate the mighty hunter know what is sh
e and what is to be valued.
Rememeber, opinions are like arsles, every one has one!!
too many people offer an opinion (often with no knowledge), but the guys who operate the mighty hunter know what is sh
e and what is to be valued.Rememeber, opinions are like ars
les, every one has one!!
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DaveyBoy
XV255 had fuel leak problems post AAR on 3rd Sept 2006. So I am afraid
you are wrong DaveyBoy.
Magnersdrinker & spanners123
The RAF & MOD threw in the towel and said it was their fault, so why are you still trying to defend their actions.
Just to clarify, the flight on 4 Sep 06 did not involve AAR.
you are wrong DaveyBoy.
Magnersdrinker & spanners123
The RAF & MOD threw in the towel and said it was their fault, so why are you still trying to defend their actions.
mileandahalf
First of all I see that nobody actually answered my question as to what is routine AAR, as opposed to what is operationally essential!
I was not attempting to speculate, but if no Nimrod AAR is deemed routine then none was suspended post 230. I know, please don't attempt to deny it, that Nimrod AAR has taken place more than once in the UK FIR since the loss of 230.
No doubt this was deemed 'operationally essential' in terms of training up crews pre deployment. Were other options considered for the short term post 230, like keeping a small pool of pilots/engs AAR current by in theatre flying who then regularly rotate and fly with standard crews to supplement them for AAR missions, thus avoiding the need for AAR training flights in the UK FIR - hard on the small pool of individuals, but reducing uneccessary risk. Or deploying an AARI to the Gulf. Both of these options were probably possible, albeit a pain. Or was it just a case of doing things as they have always been done?
I can fully accept that it is 'operationally essential' that a Nimrod crew about to deploy needs to be capable of carrying out missions involving AAR. However, is it operationally essential for the pilot and eng of that particular crew to be AAR capable, or simply that they carry an AAR qualified/current pilot and eng for such missions? If the latter is feasible how can it be achieved while minimising the need for currency/qualification AAR sorties in the UK.
Writing that only 'operationally essential' AAR be conducted is fairly easy, how this was then implimented will say much of the mindset of the organisations involved.
First of all I see that nobody actually answered my question as to what is routine AAR, as opposed to what is operationally essential!
I was not attempting to speculate, but if no Nimrod AAR is deemed routine then none was suspended post 230. I know, please don't attempt to deny it, that Nimrod AAR has taken place more than once in the UK FIR since the loss of 230.
No doubt this was deemed 'operationally essential' in terms of training up crews pre deployment. Were other options considered for the short term post 230, like keeping a small pool of pilots/engs AAR current by in theatre flying who then regularly rotate and fly with standard crews to supplement them for AAR missions, thus avoiding the need for AAR training flights in the UK FIR - hard on the small pool of individuals, but reducing uneccessary risk. Or deploying an AARI to the Gulf. Both of these options were probably possible, albeit a pain. Or was it just a case of doing things as they have always been done?
I can fully accept that it is 'operationally essential' that a Nimrod crew about to deploy needs to be capable of carrying out missions involving AAR. However, is it operationally essential for the pilot and eng of that particular crew to be AAR capable, or simply that they carry an AAR qualified/current pilot and eng for such missions? If the latter is feasible how can it be achieved while minimising the need for currency/qualification AAR sorties in the UK.
Writing that only 'operationally essential' AAR be conducted is fairly easy, how this was then implimented will say much of the mindset of the organisations involved.
Last edited by Biggus; 15th Dec 2007 at 09:05.
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As Chugulug said a few posts ago
This whole sorry episode is entering a new phase, and, although tucumseh has already posted the upcoming review's ToR's, here is the whole statement from Des Browne as reported in Hansard 13th Dec - it may answer a few questions or promote further discussion.
Your honour, I call Mr Tucumseh as first witness.
He deals with the MOD woods, rather than contentious RAF trees. It seems to me that is where the thread should be concentrating, especially given, as tuc reminds us, the CinC's comments on the BOI's findings.
I told the House on 4 December that, following the board of inquiry's report about the loss of Nimrod XV230, I would establish an independent review by a senior Queen's counsel into a range of broader issues which were outside the scope of the BOI's investigation. I am now able to set out the details of that review.
The review will be conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC. Mr. Haddon-Cave has wide experience of aviation and safety matters, having been instructed in all the major aviation and marine inquiries in England in the last 20 years. His report will be published in fall, subject to considerations of operational security, together with my response to it.
The terms of reference for the review are as follows:
In the light of the board of inquiry report:
to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.
Appropriate technical expertise will be made available to the reviewer. The reviewer will be able to recommend a public inquiry if he considers this necessary.
The review will have the full support of the Ministry of Defence. All relevant papers will be made available and everyone who can assist the review will be instructed to do so. In order to encourage openness, evidence given during the course of the review will not be used in disciplinary proceedings against the individual who gave it unless there is evidence of gross misconduct. The MOD will also provide Mr. Haddon-Cave, at his request, with a secretariat for the review.
BAE Systems and QinetiQ have confirmed that Mr. Haddon-Cave will have their full co-operation. The MOD and the companies are committed to ensuring that the review has available to it all the technical expertise that it will require. I would expect any other companies whose assistance may be required to follow suit.
Mr. Haddon-Cave will ensure that the families are kept informed of the progress of the review.
It is of the utmost importance that an authoritative and independent analysis is conducted of the background circumstances to the loss of Nimrod XV230. The task which Mr. Haddon-Cave has undertaken will be complex but I have asked him to ensure that information that would assist our understanding of this tragic loss is published without undue delay.
The review will be conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC. Mr. Haddon-Cave has wide experience of aviation and safety matters, having been instructed in all the major aviation and marine inquiries in England in the last 20 years. His report will be published in fall, subject to considerations of operational security, together with my response to it.
The terms of reference for the review are as follows:
In the light of the board of inquiry report:
to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.
Appropriate technical expertise will be made available to the reviewer. The reviewer will be able to recommend a public inquiry if he considers this necessary.
The review will have the full support of the Ministry of Defence. All relevant papers will be made available and everyone who can assist the review will be instructed to do so. In order to encourage openness, evidence given during the course of the review will not be used in disciplinary proceedings against the individual who gave it unless there is evidence of gross misconduct. The MOD will also provide Mr. Haddon-Cave, at his request, with a secretariat for the review.
BAE Systems and QinetiQ have confirmed that Mr. Haddon-Cave will have their full co-operation. The MOD and the companies are committed to ensuring that the review has available to it all the technical expertise that it will require. I would expect any other companies whose assistance may be required to follow suit.
Mr. Haddon-Cave will ensure that the families are kept informed of the progress of the review.
It is of the utmost importance that an authoritative and independent analysis is conducted of the background circumstances to the loss of Nimrod XV230. The task which Mr. Haddon-Cave has undertaken will be complex but I have asked him to ensure that information that would assist our understanding of this tragic loss is published without undue delay.
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I not defending the MOD TD, I just try and defend the people that work on them and have to fly them. So much has been said and I only here to try and clarify the engineering points and correct peoples thoughts. I know way have any problems with your determination and will to find what you need to know .
mileandahalf
I do not wish to get into a slanging match, or 'defend' my post, and I appreciate your staying within security caveats.
However,.......you said some of what I said is 'incorrect', well I feel I should point out that the only "fact" I stated was that Nimrod AAR had taken place in the UK FIR since the loss of XV230. Everything else I said was a mixture of questions and suggestions for how things could have been conducted. I'm not sure how questions and suggestions can be 'incorrect', inappropriate, impractical, irrelevant are possible ways of describing them, but incorrect?
I do not wish to get into a slanging match, or 'defend' my post, and I appreciate your staying within security caveats.
However,.......you said some of what I said is 'incorrect', well I feel I should point out that the only "fact" I stated was that Nimrod AAR had taken place in the UK FIR since the loss of XV230. Everything else I said was a mixture of questions and suggestions for how things could have been conducted. I'm not sure how questions and suggestions can be 'incorrect', inappropriate, impractical, irrelevant are possible ways of describing them, but incorrect?
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A question has been asked about routine and operational AAR. By its very nature all AAR is operational, except where it is for training only. So, there is no such thing as "routine" AAR. AAR training does not need fuel transfer to occur, thus all aircrew can be trained without actually refuelling, per sec. Mandatory "minimum time in contact" requirements are achievable with dry prods, although some fuel does travel down the hose and into the receiver. However, once the receiver's pipes are full, the volume of which which will vary from type to type, no more fuel transfer will occur unless the receiver opens a refuel valve. This is standard knowledge among aircrew familiar with AAR.
A question has been asked about how the blown-off fuel can travel up to the 7 Tank dry bay. The answer is this: the dry bay boundaries, for the want of a better term, are arranged like this: the front wall is the rear spar. The rear wall is the front wall of the 7 tank. The top is the wing fillet panel and the bottom is the panel that is mainly flat but is curved at its inner rear corner to provide a fairing for the front portion of the SCP pipe. The BOI suspects that fuel would probably have travelled along the bomb bay skirt from the No 1 tank blow off outlet and run into the gap between the front edge of the dry bay lower panel and come into contact with the hot SCP pipe and auto-ignited. The non-drained panel's ribbed sections can hold approx 300ml of fluid (in this case fuel). Once a small amount of the fuel has ignited the remaining portion of the 300ml then also ignites and creates a very strong fire which rises straight up inside the bay and plays onto the 7 tank pipework and the 7 tank wall as well. The pipe seals would have been the first components to fail and then we have more fuel to keep the fire self-propagating.
It doesn't take a lot of blow-off in this scenario.
Blow-off occurs when the tank over-pressures (not necessarily overfills), but if it is fuel that pushes the blow-off valve open, the size of the blow-off valve plate increases in diameter when open and it therefore requires a lower pressure to keep it open, thus ensuring that the valve does not cycle open/shut/open/shut, etc. It simply remains open until it is no longer covered by the fuel in the tank. The valve sits on the top of a stack pipe in the tank, so the blown off fuel exits at the bottom of the tank. This is usually achieved only by stopping the refuel of the tank.
The BOI has determined that the design of the No 1 tank is not compatible with the flow rates that can be achieved during AAR, thus blow-off is very likely and a lot of fuel will escape towards the SCP fairing, which only serves to make the auto-ignition easier.
Regards
Ed Sett
A question has been asked about how the blown-off fuel can travel up to the 7 Tank dry bay. The answer is this: the dry bay boundaries, for the want of a better term, are arranged like this: the front wall is the rear spar. The rear wall is the front wall of the 7 tank. The top is the wing fillet panel and the bottom is the panel that is mainly flat but is curved at its inner rear corner to provide a fairing for the front portion of the SCP pipe. The BOI suspects that fuel would probably have travelled along the bomb bay skirt from the No 1 tank blow off outlet and run into the gap between the front edge of the dry bay lower panel and come into contact with the hot SCP pipe and auto-ignited. The non-drained panel's ribbed sections can hold approx 300ml of fluid (in this case fuel). Once a small amount of the fuel has ignited the remaining portion of the 300ml then also ignites and creates a very strong fire which rises straight up inside the bay and plays onto the 7 tank pipework and the 7 tank wall as well. The pipe seals would have been the first components to fail and then we have more fuel to keep the fire self-propagating.
It doesn't take a lot of blow-off in this scenario.
Blow-off occurs when the tank over-pressures (not necessarily overfills), but if it is fuel that pushes the blow-off valve open, the size of the blow-off valve plate increases in diameter when open and it therefore requires a lower pressure to keep it open, thus ensuring that the valve does not cycle open/shut/open/shut, etc. It simply remains open until it is no longer covered by the fuel in the tank. The valve sits on the top of a stack pipe in the tank, so the blown off fuel exits at the bottom of the tank. This is usually achieved only by stopping the refuel of the tank.
The BOI has determined that the design of the No 1 tank is not compatible with the flow rates that can be achieved during AAR, thus blow-off is very likely and a lot of fuel will escape towards the SCP fairing, which only serves to make the auto-ignition easier.
Regards
Ed Sett
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TD - With the greatest of respect, I was on that flight on 4 Sep 06 and I would have noticed if we'd refuelled in the air!
You'll probably find that the fault on 255 was only reported on 3 Sep either because that's when a thorough check was carried out on all the aircraft following the events of the previous day, or it occurred during ground refuelling, and it was merely noted that the airframe had been carrying out AAR a few days before.
You'll probably find that the fault on 255 was only reported on 3 Sep either because that's when a thorough check was carried out on all the aircraft following the events of the previous day, or it occurred during ground refuelling, and it was merely noted that the airframe had been carrying out AAR a few days before.
So let me get this straight, and I am not trying to put words in anyone's mouth!
Post 230 Nimrod AAR was suspended, apart from 'operationally essential' AAR which continued under Service Deviation. However, EdSet100 says all AAR is operational by definition. Which implies to me that phrases such as '....non operationally AAR is suspended....' are actually pretty meaningless and little more than a token effort to be seen to be doing something.
Have I got that wrong, and I must point out that this is my personal interpretation of what has been said by a variety of people. I may adding up 2 and 2 and getting 5!
Post 230 Nimrod AAR was suspended, apart from 'operationally essential' AAR which continued under Service Deviation. However, EdSet100 says all AAR is operational by definition. Which implies to me that phrases such as '....non operationally AAR is suspended....' are actually pretty meaningless and little more than a token effort to be seen to be doing something.
Have I got that wrong, and I must point out that this is my personal interpretation of what has been said by a variety of people. I may adding up 2 and 2 and getting 5!
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As mileandahalf said, you won't get full explanations on a public forum such as this, but the phrase is not meaningless and less tanking has been carried out in the last 15 months than would have been were it not for 230.
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XV255 had fuel leak problems post AAR on 3rd Sept 2006. So I am afraid
you are wrong DaveyBoy.
Magnersdrinker & spanners123
The RAF & MOD threw in the towel and said it was their fault, so why are you still trying to defend their actions
TD.
Just to clarify, the fracture of the 5 tank refuel pipe was definately found during a ground refuel. This I know as FACT as I found it. Also the date on the bottom right of the form you scanned in seems a bit suspect, surely it should read march 2007.
RIP CXX/3.
DS
you are wrong DaveyBoy.
Magnersdrinker & spanners123
The RAF & MOD threw in the towel and said it was their fault, so why are you still trying to defend their actions
TD.
Just to clarify, the fracture of the 5 tank refuel pipe was definately found during a ground refuel. This I know as FACT as I found it. Also the date on the bottom right of the form you scanned in seems a bit suspect, surely it should read march 2007.
RIP CXX/3.
DS
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DS
As i posted further up the thread matey im not defending the MOD Im just defending the people that work with the Nimrod and try to give a realistic point of view.
BTW im not sitting across from you tonight at the Xmas doo , your red wine habits cost me a lot of money lol
As i posted further up the thread matey im not defending the MOD Im just defending the people that work with the Nimrod and try to give a realistic point of view.
BTW im not sitting across from you tonight at the Xmas doo , your red wine habits cost me a lot of money lol
Tucumseh wrote about the forthcoming review:
Well you know that tuc, safeware obviously does, and now that you have spelled it out so do I, the MOD does for it composed it, The Smiter does:
And as tuc says:
Which leaves just about every one else, with a few honourable exceptions, that post on this thread. As tuc tells us, the processes that are to be reviewed are robust and have worked well enough in the past. The implementation, which may well not be reviewed, almost certainly not fully, has proved to be lacking any robustness whatsoever. The result has been needless accidents that needlessly cost lives. This is not the clever script of ‘Yes Minister’, with Sir Humphrey running rings around a hapless stooge, but the total failure of the UK Military Airworthiness provision system. That has been tacitly admitted by the MOD and the RAF. We are fortunate to have someone as experienced and knowledgeable as tucumseh to tell us how this has happened, how long for, and what must be done to regain this protection for our aircrew and aircraft. The reaction from those who post here has been in the main compete indifference, with a preference for indulging in “Yes you did, no I didn’t” yahboo instead. This review, and hopefully a subsequent Public Inquiry, may be the only hope to right this glaring deficiency in the UK military air fleets. If the individuals who identify themselves as being professionally concerned, by posting here, with the causes and implications of the tragedy that is the subject of this thread have nothing to say on this issue, then who should have?
If you support tuc’s testimony, then say so. If you disagree with him then say so, for at least therein lies dialogue. If you do not understand fully what he says, then say so, for the labyrinthine beast that is the MOD is complex and devious, often by design, and he will no doubt try to make the explanation ‘pilot proof’ in his patient way. Flight Safety concerns you! That means not turning your back on what you do not wish to hear. Get angry with me, get angry with tuc, better still support what he says, but say something for God’s sake!
“to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;…”
Safeware is right. The processes exist and are robust. It’s implementation that’s lacking. And the processes, procedures and regulations apply to all aircraft, not just Nimrod.
Safeware is right. The processes exist and are robust. It’s implementation that’s lacking. And the processes, procedures and regulations apply to all aircraft, not just Nimrod.
This whole sorry episode is entering a new phase, and, although tucumseh has already posted the upcoming review's ToR'
I hope Mr Haddon-Cave has already seen through this and sought clarification……………
If you support tuc’s testimony, then say so. If you disagree with him then say so, for at least therein lies dialogue. If you do not understand fully what he says, then say so, for the labyrinthine beast that is the MOD is complex and devious, often by design, and he will no doubt try to make the explanation ‘pilot proof’ in his patient way. Flight Safety concerns you! That means not turning your back on what you do not wish to hear. Get angry with me, get angry with tuc, better still support what he says, but say something for God’s sake!
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As always Tucumseh has shown and understanding and knowledge of the wider issues at play here.
Everyone in the RAF should have a vested interest in ensuring that this QC inquiry and the more imminent Coroners Inquest is robust and transparent. Also that they are able to establish exactly how and where the process of airworthiness has been degraded and that it is made a matter of public record how, where and why these failures have occurred.
Charles Haddon-Cave QC is clearly very experienced in his field and I’m sure will see beyond the façade of MoD policy on airworthiness. The foundation of any investigation of this nature is establishing what should happen. Are there are policies/procedures? How are these disseminated/updated, are they implemented properly? If not why not? Are the people responsible for the policies and procedures aware that they are not been implemented? Etc etc…
On a slightly different point and without wishing to re-open old wounds here the BoI documentation is very clear that the problem is 'maintenance policy' not 'maintenance implementation'.
Everyone in the RAF should have a vested interest in ensuring that this QC inquiry and the more imminent Coroners Inquest is robust and transparent. Also that they are able to establish exactly how and where the process of airworthiness has been degraded and that it is made a matter of public record how, where and why these failures have occurred.
Charles Haddon-Cave QC is clearly very experienced in his field and I’m sure will see beyond the façade of MoD policy on airworthiness. The foundation of any investigation of this nature is establishing what should happen. Are there are policies/procedures? How are these disseminated/updated, are they implemented properly? If not why not? Are the people responsible for the policies and procedures aware that they are not been implemented? Etc etc…
On a slightly different point and without wishing to re-open old wounds here the BoI documentation is very clear that the problem is 'maintenance policy' not 'maintenance implementation'.
As always Tucumseh has shown and understanding and knowledge of the wider issues at play here.
Thank you for your positive response, Da4orce, for where you lead others will hopefully follow. Your last point is salutary for I feel that too much energy has been expended here on that non-contentious issue.
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Da4orce; The Air Member for Materiel (the RAF's most senior engineer) stated in his comments regarding deteriorated insolation "The correct procedure on finding damage would therefore be for a concession to be sought; clearly this has not been happening. In this respect this was a maintenance, rather than a maintenance policy shortcoming"
DV
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 16th Dec 2007 at 19:17.
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"The correct procedure on finding damage would therefore be for a concession to be sought
However, we know from a previous Flight Safety Report that there is no maintenance policy for the SCP ducts, so I guess there is no examination policy for the insulation either, but I'm just guessing.