Nimrod Information
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When an organisation with a good safety management system, properly managed and resourced, goes through a period where the rationale for setting up the safety management system is forgotten about, it sees "safety" as having no added value. If the safety culture is then cut to save costs, it isn't the suits doing the cutting that pay the price. As they say, if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident.
This is an organisation that has wilfully and systematically gone down the route of underfunding safety and airworthiness. This is an organisation that has not been able to achieve that SofS safety objective for many years.
As for your previous claims that the MoD's processes are adequate, and that it is only the implementation that is failing. Sorry mate, have to disagree, it's an effing shambles. It needs taking apart and rebuilding, the people, the processes, everything. Nothing less is now acceptable.
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S_H,
Ok, maybe the use of the words "culture" and "cut" together wasn't quite right, but if you take the parallels of NASA and the MOD, I would say that in both cases, the underfunding that you correctly refer to had /has had (delete as appropriate) a negative on all aspects - competence, prioritisation, process improvement, oversight etc etc. As a result, I would say that the culture would certainly be lost. This would also produce the "wilful and systematic" effect you refer to.
As for things being an "effing shambles", maybe that is how you see it. But I think that if the processes and procedures in place were followed, then the situation with Chinook, Herc and Nimrod (at least, as I'm sure we both could cite other examples) would not have arisen. It is pretty clear what should be done, and obvious what hasn't. Whether or not the process needs improving is slightly different from not bothering with the process at all.
As a starting point, I'd be happier if people read, understood and implemented the existing systems, but do share how you think it should be rebuilt?
sw
ps, As for the SofS statement, he may make it, but do you think he knows how it should be achieved, or if those acting on his immediate behalf really take on board what it means, or how they are to be held accountable? The MOD "targets" for safety are meaningless (and I don't mean probability targets).
Ok, maybe the use of the words "culture" and "cut" together wasn't quite right, but if you take the parallels of NASA and the MOD, I would say that in both cases, the underfunding that you correctly refer to had /has had (delete as appropriate) a negative on all aspects - competence, prioritisation, process improvement, oversight etc etc. As a result, I would say that the culture would certainly be lost. This would also produce the "wilful and systematic" effect you refer to.
As for things being an "effing shambles", maybe that is how you see it. But I think that if the processes and procedures in place were followed, then the situation with Chinook, Herc and Nimrod (at least, as I'm sure we both could cite other examples) would not have arisen. It is pretty clear what should be done, and obvious what hasn't. Whether or not the process needs improving is slightly different from not bothering with the process at all.
As a starting point, I'd be happier if people read, understood and implemented the existing systems, but do share how you think it should be rebuilt?
sw
ps, As for the SofS statement, he may make it, but do you think he knows how it should be achieved, or if those acting on his immediate behalf really take on board what it means, or how they are to be held accountable? The MOD "targets" for safety are meaningless (and I don't mean probability targets).
Last edited by Safeware; 23rd Dec 2007 at 23:07.
S-H & Safeware
I don’t think you’re too far apart, despite emotive words.
“Safety Culture is not something you can talk about cutting, it can be lost or broken, but you can't decide to cut your safety culture safety culture by say 50%”.
Funny you mention 50%. That is precisely the financial cut our Director demanded to the annual spend on maintaining safety and airworthiness. He was argued down to 28% but we took that hit 3 years running. I would say that if you slash funding like that, on processes and procedures which are mostly not volume related (i.e. they cost the same regardless of how many aircraft you have) then (a) you are way past your level of competence, and (b) you are encouraging a culture whereby safety and airworthiness are seen as optional.
Couple that with his oft-stated assertion that people who worked in this field were “the rump end of MoD(PE)”, and you have a recipe for disaster. Effectively he is saying, “Take that career path and you’re going nowhere”. Anyone who understands the application of these processes and procedures knows that the effect is not immediately apparent – it takes years. Time for him, and those like him, to move onwards and upwards.
I happen to think the processes and procedures are robust. They work if funded and applied properly. What is lacking is a process whereby the application is verified. It no longer exists because of the above cuts.
I don’t think you’re too far apart, despite emotive words.
“Safety Culture is not something you can talk about cutting, it can be lost or broken, but you can't decide to cut your safety culture safety culture by say 50%”.
Funny you mention 50%. That is precisely the financial cut our Director demanded to the annual spend on maintaining safety and airworthiness. He was argued down to 28% but we took that hit 3 years running. I would say that if you slash funding like that, on processes and procedures which are mostly not volume related (i.e. they cost the same regardless of how many aircraft you have) then (a) you are way past your level of competence, and (b) you are encouraging a culture whereby safety and airworthiness are seen as optional.
Couple that with his oft-stated assertion that people who worked in this field were “the rump end of MoD(PE)”, and you have a recipe for disaster. Effectively he is saying, “Take that career path and you’re going nowhere”. Anyone who understands the application of these processes and procedures knows that the effect is not immediately apparent – it takes years. Time for him, and those like him, to move onwards and upwards.
I happen to think the processes and procedures are robust. They work if funded and applied properly. What is lacking is a process whereby the application is verified. It no longer exists because of the above cuts.
Sorry, perhaps what I said didn’t quite come across as intended.
I don’t believe a simple injection of funding can correct all that is wrong. We passed that point in about 1993. There are so many other things that are encouraged, condoned and applied that are fundamental breaches of the airworthiness regulations. Among them;
The delegation process. There is a basic lack of audit trail when people who themselves are unqualified and inexperienced are permitted to delegate airworthiness responsibility.
As above, the people who are delegated are often untrained and have a very simplistic view of safety and airworthiness. It used to be more or less impossible to have delegation without having previously worked your way back through the procurement cycle. That is, repaired/maintained the aircraft or equipment, been a line supervisor, QA, an Engineering Authority or similar, a project manager and so on. Not necessarily all of them, but you get the idea. Now it’s a two day seminar, if that (which is, of course, half their c.v.).
Non-engineers are permitted to make technical decisions, and over-rule design decisions.
Configuration milestones (Critical Design Reviews, Functional Audits and the like) are waived, especially by non-engineers. These serve a number of purposes, the common denominator being safety.
Contracts can be paid off before completion, bearing in mind that very often the final (waived) milestone is verification of safety and/or airworthiness.
And, of course, it has been ruled that attempting to apply the main process whose aim is to prevent all the above through robust scrutiny, is a disciplinary offence.
All confirmed under FoI. The people in MoD who make these self serving decisions refuse to change their minds, and must be over-ruled from on high. I hope the QC’s review digs this deep, but on the face of it his remit will have to change somewhat.
I don’t believe a simple injection of funding can correct all that is wrong. We passed that point in about 1993. There are so many other things that are encouraged, condoned and applied that are fundamental breaches of the airworthiness regulations. Among them;
The delegation process. There is a basic lack of audit trail when people who themselves are unqualified and inexperienced are permitted to delegate airworthiness responsibility.
As above, the people who are delegated are often untrained and have a very simplistic view of safety and airworthiness. It used to be more or less impossible to have delegation without having previously worked your way back through the procurement cycle. That is, repaired/maintained the aircraft or equipment, been a line supervisor, QA, an Engineering Authority or similar, a project manager and so on. Not necessarily all of them, but you get the idea. Now it’s a two day seminar, if that (which is, of course, half their c.v.).
Non-engineers are permitted to make technical decisions, and over-rule design decisions.
Configuration milestones (Critical Design Reviews, Functional Audits and the like) are waived, especially by non-engineers. These serve a number of purposes, the common denominator being safety.
Contracts can be paid off before completion, bearing in mind that very often the final (waived) milestone is verification of safety and/or airworthiness.
And, of course, it has been ruled that attempting to apply the main process whose aim is to prevent all the above through robust scrutiny, is a disciplinary offence.
All confirmed under FoI. The people in MoD who make these self serving decisions refuse to change their minds, and must be over-ruled from on high. I hope the QC’s review digs this deep, but on the face of it his remit will have to change somewhat.
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Dv,
Not sure on that point.
I do have more FOI information, as soon as it becomes available on the MOD disclosure log I will place a link to it. Not a great deal of interest really other than an SFS relating to XV250 on or around 31.10.06:
Interestingly it goes on to state:
Not sure on that point.
I do have more FOI information, as soon as it becomes available on the MOD disclosure log I will place a link to it. Not a great deal of interest really other than an SFS relating to XV250 on or around 31.10.06:
Post AAR sortie, evidence of fuel leak in area of 6 tank during after flight servicing, on investigation fuel found puddled in the rear hinge fairing. During refuel, fuel was evident in the 6 tank inter-space drains, suspect 6 tank 3 cell leak, further invest required.
This is the third AC with fuel leak issues post AAR sorties.
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Tuc/SW
My negative views on the safety and airworthiness process are based on many years of seeing people and organisations make unjustified assumptions. The processes we are talking about, eg Def Stan 00-56 and JSP553, have for many years been maintained and updated by people who are quite frankly, incompetent. Now, if we accept that they haven't been properly applied by IPTs etc, then they haven't been proven.
There are numerous examples of where the guidance is either poor, misleading, ambiguous or non-existent. I go back to my statement, that it is a shambles. Nothing less than a complete dismantling of the current system and rebuilding an appropriate system is acceptable.
Merry Christmas
Safety_Helmut
My negative views on the safety and airworthiness process are based on many years of seeing people and organisations make unjustified assumptions. The processes we are talking about, eg Def Stan 00-56 and JSP553, have for many years been maintained and updated by people who are quite frankly, incompetent. Now, if we accept that they haven't been properly applied by IPTs etc, then they haven't been proven.
There are numerous examples of where the guidance is either poor, misleading, ambiguous or non-existent. I go back to my statement, that it is a shambles. Nothing less than a complete dismantling of the current system and rebuilding an appropriate system is acceptable.
Merry Christmas
Safety_Helmut
S-H
I take your point. My own experience is that, whatever the state of said standards – and I accept some are awful - the difficulty is getting people to apply them in the first place. I don’t know what half-baked half-day seminar they’re taught at, but in the late 90s I suddenly heard a lot of people saying “They’re not mandatory, so we don’t have to bother” (with safety, airworthiness, configuration control etc). Like I said, it’s been ruled a disciplinary offence to insist on applying what are mandated regulations. When this is the case, it’s perhaps little wonder the people who know the answers aren’t drawn to the job of maintaining these standards.
Have a peaceful Xmas and my thoughts will be with all the Servicemen and their families.
I take your point. My own experience is that, whatever the state of said standards – and I accept some are awful - the difficulty is getting people to apply them in the first place. I don’t know what half-baked half-day seminar they’re taught at, but in the late 90s I suddenly heard a lot of people saying “They’re not mandatory, so we don’t have to bother” (with safety, airworthiness, configuration control etc). Like I said, it’s been ruled a disciplinary offence to insist on applying what are mandated regulations. When this is the case, it’s perhaps little wonder the people who know the answers aren’t drawn to the job of maintaining these standards.
Have a peaceful Xmas and my thoughts will be with all the Servicemen and their families.
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Hi chaps, hopefully not drifting too far does anyone know if BAE ever submitted a tender for a new build Nimrod airframe rather than rebuilding the current ones.
The reason I ask is that looking at this photo, the aircraft really looks like a very worn out airframe.
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/1308890/L/
Surely to God, it has become prohibitively expensive doing this rebuild rehash and a proper 21st century built structure would have actually been cheaper?
Reminds of the VC10 K4 that was built from the ground up after 17 years in the rain and lasted in service for under 6 years......
The reason I ask is that looking at this photo, the aircraft really looks like a very worn out airframe.
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/1308890/L/
Surely to God, it has become prohibitively expensive doing this rebuild rehash and a proper 21st century built structure would have actually been cheaper?
Reminds of the VC10 K4 that was built from the ground up after 17 years in the rain and lasted in service for under 6 years......
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All of the old MR2 fuselages are extensively examined for corrosion and fatigue, etc. There are areas of it that were expected, at the outset, to need replacing. There have been few big surprises. I believe that the pre-transformation condition of the fuselage shells are one of the (few?) success stories in the MRA4 air vehicle programme. Although the Nimrod fleet might be 35 years old the aircraft have each only flown an average of 17,000 hours, which is less than 10 hours per week, which is a ridiculously low flying rate. Even then, its pressurized for less than half its flying time (although lately, the shell has been pressurized more often).
Regards
Ed Set
Regards
Ed Set
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Christmas… that magic blanket that wraps itself about us, that something so intangible that it is like a fragrance. It may weave a spell of nostalgia. Christmas may be a day of feasting, or of prayer, but always it will be a day of remembrance -- a day in which we think of everything we have ever loved.
RIP boys
Augusta E. Rundel
RIP boys
Augusta E. Rundel
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Ed,
XV246 came down from Kinloss to Waddington several months ago, and was taken to Woodford last week. I am surprised that there have not been any pictures posted of it leaving Waddington as there were a load of spotters around to watch the Antonov arrive/depart.
Y_G
XV246 came down from Kinloss to Waddington several months ago, and was taken to Woodford last week. I am surprised that there have not been any pictures posted of it leaving Waddington as there were a load of spotters around to watch the Antonov arrive/depart.
Y_G
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My trained eye can't tell if it is worn out but I'm fairly certain a new build fuselage would be a safer option than taking apart a heavily modified Comet 4 structure and trying to fly it for another thirty years......
However if BAE says that's a good idea then great. I used to work for them when they had great ideas like the Jetstream 41 and the world beating engineering joke that was the ATP. Let's not forget the world class 146 program and er......yes that's about it really.
However if BAE says that's a good idea then great. I used to work for them when they had great ideas like the Jetstream 41 and the world beating engineering joke that was the ATP. Let's not forget the world class 146 program and er......yes that's about it really.
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Slightly off topic here but this is the AN124 landing and departing @Woodford on the 19/12/2007
Simon Lowe shot the landing ( from the side) , unloading and takeoff. I shot the head on landing from the Poynton end of the runway and together we present
http://www.flightlevel350.com/Aircra...ideo-9755.html
Hope you enjoy.
Merry Christmas
Ian
Simon Lowe shot the landing ( from the side) , unloading and takeoff. I shot the head on landing from the Poynton end of the runway and together we present
http://www.flightlevel350.com/Aircra...ideo-9755.html
Hope you enjoy.
Merry Christmas
Ian
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Skipness One Echo, your post seems to suggest that the current MR2 is a heavily modified Comet-4 airframe...... All MR2's currently in service were built new from modified Comet jigs, none are original Comet fuselages. There were 2 test and development Nimrods back in the early days that were indeed converted Comets, but they have long, long since gone. One of them didn't even have the bomb-bay pannier added.
As for new-build MR4's.... I was told a story that when the Nimrod 2000 project (as it was originally known - shows just how much it's really slipped, eh?) was in the early stages and a number was finally decided upon for aircraft, that had the MOD taken another 3 aircraft they could have had brand new build airframes at the same unit cost per 'frame! Now, I don't remember the numbers but I think it was 21 ordered but 24 was the magic number for BAe to make new ones. That would have potentially opened the doors for export orders........
The current fuselages entering the MR4 conversion programme are undergoing extensive NDT testing within all the fuselage skin joints and so far all is as expected. Not perfect, but ok, was the quote I was given by one of the NDT inspectors.
As for new-build MR4's.... I was told a story that when the Nimrod 2000 project (as it was originally known - shows just how much it's really slipped, eh?) was in the early stages and a number was finally decided upon for aircraft, that had the MOD taken another 3 aircraft they could have had brand new build airframes at the same unit cost per 'frame! Now, I don't remember the numbers but I think it was 21 ordered but 24 was the magic number for BAe to make new ones. That would have potentially opened the doors for export orders........
The current fuselages entering the MR4 conversion programme are undergoing extensive NDT testing within all the fuselage skin joints and so far all is as expected. Not perfect, but ok, was the quote I was given by one of the NDT inspectors.