Nimrod Information
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Operational task
del mode, you said;
On behalf of the guys on the ground doing the shooting and getting shot at, I'm speechless.
I would ask the critics on here to clarify what is the difference between an operational task and a civil sector. Both require the aircraft to depart at the planned time. In fact as the civil sector will have financial implications to the owner, and they do not have spare frames, I would suggest the pressure to acheive the "operational task" is greater.
On behalf of the guys on the ground doing the shooting and getting shot at, I'm speechless.
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A shame that such an erudite publication as 'Flight International' should ask such a 'Sun' -esq question.
Perhaps a suitable supplementary question should be;
"Do you?;"
a) Know nothing
b) Know a little
c) Know a lot
"Should the RAF ground its remaining Nimrods?"
"Do you?;"
a) Know nothing
b) Know a little
c) Know a lot
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Oil Can
Point is you cannot answer the question.
Both parties require the air asset to be in the right place at the right time.
Civil achieves this requirement safely, military fails to (statistics prove that).
Until this argument is accepted, the military will not move forward.
Additionally I would suggest that it cannot be argued that civil airframes are less complex than military due to modern avionics systems and fly by wire systems, and the need to satisfy an independant auditor.
The key difference is that civil pay for safety and reliability.
Please do not beleive for one minute that I do not accept the criticallity of air assets to those on the ground, however I suspect that the value of the RAF engineering organisation within this equation is being pushed out.
If I hire a car from Hertz, I do not worry about the service history or maintenance of the vehicle it is a given, that is what I pay the contractor to do.
Generating trully servicable assets can be acheived without blue suits. If you do not beleive that, or recognise the need for change, I would suggest that it will be imposed on you.
Both parties require the air asset to be in the right place at the right time.
Civil achieves this requirement safely, military fails to (statistics prove that).
Until this argument is accepted, the military will not move forward.
Additionally I would suggest that it cannot be argued that civil airframes are less complex than military due to modern avionics systems and fly by wire systems, and the need to satisfy an independant auditor.
The key difference is that civil pay for safety and reliability.
Please do not beleive for one minute that I do not accept the criticallity of air assets to those on the ground, however I suspect that the value of the RAF engineering organisation within this equation is being pushed out.
If I hire a car from Hertz, I do not worry about the service history or maintenance of the vehicle it is a given, that is what I pay the contractor to do.
Generating trully servicable assets can be acheived without blue suits. If you do not beleive that, or recognise the need for change, I would suggest that it will be imposed on you.
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RAF Techie101: I must say I had to laugh when you said JJ's knowledge was 30 years out of date. I have read the BoI report with all the systems explained in some detail, and nothing has changed to the basic system in 38 years. As an example, the BoI reports explains how max fuel loading is achieved on the ground, by reducing bowser pressure towards the end of the fuelling. Gosh, is this something new, or has it been going on for 38 years. We use to get 84k doing this.
The fuel system on Nimrod is not rocket science.
DV
The fuel system on Nimrod is not rocket science.
DV
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tristran23: You claim that the 2006 QinetiQ report "sought to improve the way fuel tank repairs were carried out at Kinloss". Sorry, but this is just the cover story. QinetiQ were called in by IPT because the situation at Kinloss had gone critical and there was a risk that Gulf operations would be seriously effected. Their report, when it was issued was very critical, not of the enginers at Kinloss, but of the system they work under. It also issued several observation/recommendations regading the serious conditions of wing tanks. For more details, see Mick Smith's posting #1546, dated 14th Nov 2007
I can not understand why this report was never considered by the BoI. Also, I can not understand how Des Browne, the CAS and the Stn Cmdr can claim that a new report has been issued by QinetiQ stating that the fuel system is safe. Nothing that has been done recently can negate the recommendations of the 2006 report. Furthermore, any new report by QinetiQ claiming that all is well, has lost its credibility with the events of 5th Nov involving XV235.
By the way, I have it on good authority that the 2006 QinetiQ report was uncovered by the man himself; Jimmy Jones. Not bad for a none current old-timer. I guess if you put your head obove the parapet, you may get shot at, but you do get a clearer picture of what is happening in the world around you.
DV
I can not understand why this report was never considered by the BoI. Also, I can not understand how Des Browne, the CAS and the Stn Cmdr can claim that a new report has been issued by QinetiQ stating that the fuel system is safe. Nothing that has been done recently can negate the recommendations of the 2006 report. Furthermore, any new report by QinetiQ claiming that all is well, has lost its credibility with the events of 5th Nov involving XV235.
By the way, I have it on good authority that the 2006 QinetiQ report was uncovered by the man himself; Jimmy Jones. Not bad for a none current old-timer. I guess if you put your head obove the parapet, you may get shot at, but you do get a clearer picture of what is happening in the world around you.
DV
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mileandhalf: You have lost me. (your last posting was changed for me). What part of the QinetiQ report is "ill-founded and incorrect/incomplete information"? The trouble is you are afraid to accept the truth. Go ahead "Charge for the guns".
DV
DV
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Del Mode
Point is you cannot answer the question.
Generating trully servicable assets can be acheived without blue suits.
....and just as susceptible to errors/oversights. I'd be interested to know what 'statistics' you refer to?
- and please don't give me that "880 fires" crap.
Lets be clear, it is the fractionalisation of the RAFs Engineering support and the corresponding disolution of responsibility that is the real issue here.
Contracted or not, ye get what ye pay for.
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You may not like it, but the facts are the RAF and MOD have accepted responsibility for the loss of XV230 and with it the death of my son and 13 other brave men.
As I said on 3rd March 2007, 08:16 Post
"All it takes is a "FEW GOOD MEN" to stand up and say NO enough is enough as they have with the Herc crash and the TRUTH will come out about the Nimrod XV 230 explosion ."
Jimmy Jones is one of those few good men to stand up and be counted, so is Nigel Gilbert, so is Mick Smith, and there are many on here that have supported me and provided me with vital information.
To all these 'good men', myself and Ben's mum are extremely grateful for their support and thank them immensely.
I am at a loss to understand those of you that want to keep defending the RAF and MOD regarding the tragic loss of XV230 and all those good men, when those at the top have admitted responsibility and liability!
As I said on 3rd March 2007, 08:16 Post
"All it takes is a "FEW GOOD MEN" to stand up and say NO enough is enough as they have with the Herc crash and the TRUTH will come out about the Nimrod XV 230 explosion ."
Jimmy Jones is one of those few good men to stand up and be counted, so is Nigel Gilbert, so is Mick Smith, and there are many on here that have supported me and provided me with vital information.
To all these 'good men', myself and Ben's mum are extremely grateful for their support and thank them immensely.
I am at a loss to understand those of you that want to keep defending the RAF and MOD regarding the tragic loss of XV230 and all those good men, when those at the top have admitted responsibility and liability!
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Sorry Safeware - I stand corrected on my earlier post and have edited to suit.
I see no further value posting on a thread where the only basis for sound airworthiness management is whether the RAF can find aircrew willing to fly the aircraft.
The MoD have won the argument.
I see no further value posting on a thread where the only basis for sound airworthiness management is whether the RAF can find aircrew willing to fly the aircraft.
The MoD have won the argument.
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TD thanks. There is no-one on this thread who is not desperately sorry for your loss and for the loss of the other 13 good men.
To the rest of you: Jesus can you guys not stop bickering. Everyone wants the best out of this sorry mess. Why keep sniping at each other?
For what its worth, IMHO as an obvious and self-admitted non engineer current or otherwise, the point Oilcan makes is one of the most important things to come out of the QinetiQ report and one I hammered earlier in the thread posting mentioned by DV.
Spot on. This is the most worrying thing in the supposedly irrelevant QinetiQ report. Does anyone here seriously doubt that if the Nimrod Support Group had been an RAF engineering team there would not have been any question of the IPT not knowing the full extent of the leak problem, and the RAMS not being told that their APs were out of date? You dont have to be an engineer current or otherwise to work that one out.
To the rest of you: Jesus can you guys not stop bickering. Everyone wants the best out of this sorry mess. Why keep sniping at each other?
For what its worth, IMHO as an obvious and self-admitted non engineer current or otherwise, the point Oilcan makes is one of the most important things to come out of the QinetiQ report and one I hammered earlier in the thread posting mentioned by DV.
Lets be clear, it is the fractionalisation of the RAFs Engineering support and the corresponding disolution of responsibility that is the real issue here.
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Del Mode also said;
...and neither do they care for the purpose and/or success of your venture....as long as they get it back. 
If I hire a car from Hertz, I do not worry about the service history or maintenance of the vehicle it is a given, that is what I pay the contractor to do.
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Distant Voice:
You mean apart from the AAR system!
I don't believe that anyone is having a go at Jimmy Jones for being concerned with the safety of the Nimrod; in fact this is to be highly commended. But I strongly disagree with his absolute comments such as, "If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today".
If you appear in the media as an expert, you need to be an expert. Having left the RAF before the AAR system was fitted to the Nimrod, in my opinion, leaves huge holes in Jimmy's technical knowledge and experience.
nothing has changed to the basic system in 38 years
I don't believe that anyone is having a go at Jimmy Jones for being concerned with the safety of the Nimrod; in fact this is to be highly commended. But I strongly disagree with his absolute comments such as, "If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today".
If you appear in the media as an expert, you need to be an expert. Having left the RAF before the AAR system was fitted to the Nimrod, in my opinion, leaves huge holes in Jimmy's technical knowledge and experience.
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Mick
it will remain conjecture as to whether this thread had any bearing on the final outcome - yet to be determined.
What I am certain of, through personal knowledge, is the integrity and professionalism of the members of the BoI, and that their findings would have been just as thorough and comprehensive. Further, I am also certain that the response from the knowledgable and experienced crews (air & ground), as well as the families, would have been just as questioning and ultimatley would have forced equally far reaching consequences.
It may have taken longer, but we would have started with the known facts rather than some of the wild and inaccurate speculation we've been subjected to.
What is debatable, is whether we needed to go through such public damning, mud slinging and ridicule which has caused so much pain and anguish to so many people, especially to those who still have a job to do - obvious perhaps, but we have always had a vested interest.
Make no mistake, the fall out from this will be wide ranging, and will not be Nimrod specific, but it will not guarantee such accidents will not occur in the future, - only hindsight can do that.
Cheers
OilCan
it will remain conjecture as to whether this thread had any bearing on the final outcome - yet to be determined.
What I am certain of, through personal knowledge, is the integrity and professionalism of the members of the BoI, and that their findings would have been just as thorough and comprehensive. Further, I am also certain that the response from the knowledgable and experienced crews (air & ground), as well as the families, would have been just as questioning and ultimatley would have forced equally far reaching consequences.
It may have taken longer, but we would have started with the known facts rather than some of the wild and inaccurate speculation we've been subjected to.
What is debatable, is whether we needed to go through such public damning, mud slinging and ridicule which has caused so much pain and anguish to so many people, especially to those who still have a job to do - obvious perhaps, but we have always had a vested interest.
Make no mistake, the fall out from this will be wide ranging, and will not be Nimrod specific, but it will not guarantee such accidents will not occur in the future, - only hindsight can do that.
Cheers
OilCan
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Oilcan
I am not at all sure I would even want to suggest that anything on this thread or indeed published in the media had an effect on the BOI. To be honest, I would hope it did not, and I have no reason to think it did. Indeed the strange lack of any mention of the serious leaks that occurred in theatre in October, November and December 2006, even if only somehow to discount them as a possible source of the fuel for the fire, and the complete dismissal of the QinetiQ report of March 2006 suggests that it had no effect at all. What I am sure is that much of what was described as speculation was merely reporting of fact, as in this leaked report says that, or this report obtained under Freedom of Information legislation says this. I am also certain that no-one involved in the various arguments on either side of this debate had anything but the best of intentions in what they did or didn't do.
I am not at all sure I would even want to suggest that anything on this thread or indeed published in the media had an effect on the BOI. To be honest, I would hope it did not, and I have no reason to think it did. Indeed the strange lack of any mention of the serious leaks that occurred in theatre in October, November and December 2006, even if only somehow to discount them as a possible source of the fuel for the fire, and the complete dismissal of the QinetiQ report of March 2006 suggests that it had no effect at all. What I am sure is that much of what was described as speculation was merely reporting of fact, as in this leaked report says that, or this report obtained under Freedom of Information legislation says this. I am also certain that no-one involved in the various arguments on either side of this debate had anything but the best of intentions in what they did or didn't do.
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The SCP damage to Nimrod XV??? has been assessed as Category One. The damage to the starboard spar has not been formally assessed.
This damage (Enclosure 1) to XV??? comprised of heat damage to:
a. The starboard rear spar at the fuselage joint post attachment point.
b. The starboard mainplane lower skin.
c. The forward face of No 7 Fuel Tank starboard and leaking FRS couplings due to seal damage.
d. The SCP duct, duct fairing and associated assemblies.
e. The aileron output cables and associated pulley.
f. The flap interconnecting cables.
g. Various wiring looms adjacent to the failed duct.
The lack of a maintenance policy allowed the corrosion within the duct to go undetected until failure occurred. The lack of a maintenance policy was a contributory factor.
However, the possible implications of a failure in some other sections of the bleed air system are mitigated by the presence of hot air leak warning systems.
There is no hot airleak warning system for the ruptured duct or the cross-bleed air duct as it passes through the bomb bay.
40. It was noted that:
a. The unreliability of the Mission System Recorder may have led to valuable evidence being lost.
This incident also highlights that it is particularly important that all who are involved in operating ageing aircraft be aware of the potential for failure in areas not previously subject to inspection regimes.
If you have read the BOI report this may all sound familar No its not XV230 its the report on XV227 22 November 2004,
This damage (Enclosure 1) to XV??? comprised of heat damage to:
a. The starboard rear spar at the fuselage joint post attachment point.
b. The starboard mainplane lower skin.
c. The forward face of No 7 Fuel Tank starboard and leaking FRS couplings due to seal damage.
d. The SCP duct, duct fairing and associated assemblies.
e. The aileron output cables and associated pulley.
f. The flap interconnecting cables.
g. Various wiring looms adjacent to the failed duct.
The lack of a maintenance policy allowed the corrosion within the duct to go undetected until failure occurred. The lack of a maintenance policy was a contributory factor.
However, the possible implications of a failure in some other sections of the bleed air system are mitigated by the presence of hot air leak warning systems.
There is no hot airleak warning system for the ruptured duct or the cross-bleed air duct as it passes through the bomb bay.
40. It was noted that:
a. The unreliability of the Mission System Recorder may have led to valuable evidence being lost.
This incident also highlights that it is particularly important that all who are involved in operating ageing aircraft be aware of the potential for failure in areas not previously subject to inspection regimes.
If you have read the BOI report this may all sound familar No its not XV230 its the report on XV227 22 November 2004,
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Graham and Mick,
There is little doubt that had action been taken by the RAF following the SCP hot pipe damage to XV227, Ben and the rest of Crew 3 would still be here. My point is that, as far as I am aware, BAe did not recommend isolating the SCP, they recommended bomb bay fire suppression be considered. If their recommendation had been implemented the outcome would, sadly, have been the same.
Jimmy Jones asserted that if BAe's advice had been heeded by the RAF the accident would not have happened. Unless BAe also recommended fire protection for the No. 7 tank dry bay, or isolation of the SCP, the accident would still have happened.
Nevertheless, the RAF could have prevented the accident and are guilty of negligence.
There is little doubt that had action been taken by the RAF following the SCP hot pipe damage to XV227, Ben and the rest of Crew 3 would still be here. My point is that, as far as I am aware, BAe did not recommend isolating the SCP, they recommended bomb bay fire suppression be considered. If their recommendation had been implemented the outcome would, sadly, have been the same.
Jimmy Jones asserted that if BAe's advice had been heeded by the RAF the accident would not have happened. Unless BAe also recommended fire protection for the No. 7 tank dry bay, or isolation of the SCP, the accident would still have happened.
Nevertheless, the RAF could have prevented the accident and are guilty of negligence.
I hesitate to enter this thread but to give me some street cred I am a Halton graduate servicing Victor B1, Canberra B(I)8 and Whirlwind Mk10 helicopters during my 12 years RAF service. I then spent 30 years in civvy street on helicopters, but most importantly an aircraft is an aircraft and the same principles apply to each machine. During my career I was a Flight Safety Engineer working closely with the AAIB at Farnborough and I know that those gifted guys do not dofferntiate between types of aircraft, airworthiness is airworthiness, they usually refer to expericenced licensed engineers if they require specialised knowledged of the type should this arise during their investigations. The civilian engineering system (used) to rely on Licensed Engineers to maintain standards laid down by the CAA, this meant that in practical terms that there was no higher authority to determine an aircraft's airworthiness except the manufacturer, I am not aware of anyone going to the manufacurer to overturn a decision of a LAE.
The loss of XV230 appears to be a techical disaster.
TD, sloppy maintenance was not the problem, it would appear that sloppy engineering was at fault. A maintenance engineer/fitter is only concerned with keeping the aircraft to a standard laid down by their superiors the engineering branch, in accordance with their maintenance procedures. A fuel leak was reported to be not being able to be reproduced on the ground, this suggests that the fault only happened in the air with all the expected flexing of the aircraft distorting the fuel couplings alloowing fuel to escape. If this happened in a civil aircraft the AAR system would be filled with a dye and flown for a post flight inspection to determine which seal leaked. As this was not apparently carried out it suggests that it was not possible to blank off the system to enable the test.
I understand that the AAR was devised to cater for aircraft flying to the Falklands some 25 years ago, a major modification in CAA parlance. Any aircraft modification that is to be installed should have a maintenencde policy, devised by the design engineers which should cate foe troubleshooting of the system. This should have ben sorted out post-Falklands.
AS for inspecting FRS seals by dismantling the couplings, the RAF were right injudging that this would cause more problems when they were reassembled, in my experience. We used to use the chalk spray from the Ardrox 996 crack test kit to determine between to likely faulty seals. If this not feasible because of so many leaks being the norm is incredible.
The loss of XV230 appears to be a techical disaster.
TD, sloppy maintenance was not the problem, it would appear that sloppy engineering was at fault. A maintenance engineer/fitter is only concerned with keeping the aircraft to a standard laid down by their superiors the engineering branch, in accordance with their maintenance procedures. A fuel leak was reported to be not being able to be reproduced on the ground, this suggests that the fault only happened in the air with all the expected flexing of the aircraft distorting the fuel couplings alloowing fuel to escape. If this happened in a civil aircraft the AAR system would be filled with a dye and flown for a post flight inspection to determine which seal leaked. As this was not apparently carried out it suggests that it was not possible to blank off the system to enable the test.
I understand that the AAR was devised to cater for aircraft flying to the Falklands some 25 years ago, a major modification in CAA parlance. Any aircraft modification that is to be installed should have a maintenencde policy, devised by the design engineers which should cate foe troubleshooting of the system. This should have ben sorted out post-Falklands.
AS for inspecting FRS seals by dismantling the couplings, the RAF were right injudging that this would cause more problems when they were reassembled, in my experience. We used to use the chalk spray from the Ardrox 996 crack test kit to determine between to likely faulty seals. If this not feasible because of so many leaks being the norm is incredible.