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Safety Helmut,
Yes, good point. I can understand why the families would want to see the BOI recommendations implemented. I suppose it could be of some comfort to them to know that unsafe systems are made safe and that other families, in the future, will not suffer losses due to another similar accident.
Regards
Ed Sett
Yes, good point. I can understand why the families would want to see the BOI recommendations implemented. I suppose it could be of some comfort to them to know that unsafe systems are made safe and that other families, in the future, will not suffer losses due to another similar accident.
Regards
Ed Sett
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DV,
I'm not trying to score points, but your reply is worth further discussion:
If I gave you that impression then, sorry, it was not my intention. What I was trying to indicate was that the BOI inspected the damage to the airframe at the crash site and noted the lack of any evidence of fire in the bomb bay (which was confirmed by specialists). Therefore, there was no purpose in investigating or analysing fault trends associated with any components (hot air ducts, hydraulic pipes and electrical wiring) in the bomb bay. It was outside their terms of reference to expand their analysis of the airframe beyond the location of the fire and the possible causes in that location.
The only reference to the duct study in the BOI report (that I could find) is in their review of XV227's incident, where they state that when the study is complete, it will be used to derive a lifing policy. They probably didn't have any significant interest in 227's incident because 230's SCP duct had been replaced (we must assume it didn't fail). The only outstanding business from 227's report was the checking of similar ducts (ie the crosfeed duct), but the lack of evidence of a fire in the bomb bay or the lack of a red light to indicate an air leak in the 7 tank dry bay, meant that no similar duct suffered a large failure. So, it didn't matter what the duct report would say; it wouldn't add to the evidence. However, the BOI team recognised that, regardless of the duct report, a small leak below the threshold for a warning was a possibility. A report is not needed in order to take that view. So, I can only speculate that they were on the dist list for the duct report but they chose not to take it into evidence, for the reasons I have just given. You speculate that they were misled, I speculate that they weren't. I think we should leave it at that.
DV, you are interested in Nimrod safety post-accident, so the duct report has some value in its own right. Even if the report had said that the crossfeed duct is riddled with holes, we actually stopped pressurizing it after engine start on the ground on the 4 Sep 07. It has not been charged with air in flight since the accident. It will never again be charged with air in flight unless we make a major mod to the jet. Therefore, belated as it was, the duct report is only of academic interest today. Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident. Its a sobering thought.
I'm not trying to score points, but your reply is worth further discussion:
You imply that prior to the BOI being set up, it was already established that there had been no fire in the bomb.
Also, if you read my postings #2246 and 2247 you will be reminded of what the BOI said about hot air leaks in the bomb bay area. They make reference to the BAE duct study, but appear to be under the impression that no report was available. Whoever, gave them this impression mislead them.
DV, you are interested in Nimrod safety post-accident, so the duct report has some value in its own right. Even if the report had said that the crossfeed duct is riddled with holes, we actually stopped pressurizing it after engine start on the ground on the 4 Sep 07. It has not been charged with air in flight since the accident. It will never again be charged with air in flight unless we make a major mod to the jet. Therefore, belated as it was, the duct report is only of academic interest today. Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident. Its a sobering thought.
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Nigegilb,
This crutiny is caused by a number of factors, least significant is the fuel leak itself. Firstly, a high value asset made an unplanned landing in a dodgy place. That fact alone is not very signifant, either. However, the 2 events combined to produce a unique incident that should never have reached the eyes and ears of the public, regardless of why it happened. Consequently, the adverse publicity brought politicians into the arena and the RAF effectively lost control of the situation. We now have a comprehensive report about to be completed. I believe it will make interesting reading. Based on the BOI report, the limitations on air system use and the revised AAR procedures, I believe the Nimrod design and age will not be factors and this might be key to the decision to do AAR in the future. But, it seems it will be a political decision to continue, or not, with AAR, anyway.
Thanks for taking the time. It is curious that AAR has not been re-instated. Maybe CAS has blown his credibility among the wider audience. Maybe it is not as safe as we have been led to believe. I struggle to understand what the difference is between this serious leak and the ones that have preceded it that didn't warrant this scrutiny.
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Ed,
Can I just ask you one simple question please?.......
Why oh why, in the light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, do you still keep defending this government, RAF, MOD whoever about this accident?
The facts are pretty conclusive as far as I'm concerned.
I, and many of my mates, lost a lot of bloody good friends in 230. We nearly lost a load more friends in 235. At what point do you put your hands up and say 'you know what? The RAF/MOD whoever screwed up big time, and are doing their utmost to cover their ar$es'
Please take a look at the big picture and stop all this rubbish about niff-naff. An aircraft crashed and the crew were killed. Should it have crashed? NO. Could it have been prevented? YES Were the problems know about? YES. Has there been an attempted cover up? YOU BET YOUR LIFE THERE HAS.
You are clearly a knowledgeable guy, but I think that you have now become obsessed with trying to defend an incident which is indefencible.
TSM
Can I just ask you one simple question please?.......
Why oh why, in the light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, do you still keep defending this government, RAF, MOD whoever about this accident?
The facts are pretty conclusive as far as I'm concerned.
I, and many of my mates, lost a lot of bloody good friends in 230. We nearly lost a load more friends in 235. At what point do you put your hands up and say 'you know what? The RAF/MOD whoever screwed up big time, and are doing their utmost to cover their ar$es'
Please take a look at the big picture and stop all this rubbish about niff-naff. An aircraft crashed and the crew were killed. Should it have crashed? NO. Could it have been prevented? YES Were the problems know about? YES. Has there been an attempted cover up? YOU BET YOUR LIFE THERE HAS.
You are clearly a knowledgeable guy, but I think that you have now become obsessed with trying to defend an incident which is indefencible.
TSM
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EdSet100
"Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident."
When do you think they started this report ? The week before?
NO The incident happened 22nd November 2004 and it took them almost three years to get around to coming out with this report, a fact that I will personally make clear to the Coroner.
"Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident."
When do you think they started this report ? The week before?
NO The incident happened 22nd November 2004 and it took them almost three years to get around to coming out with this report, a fact that I will personally make clear to the Coroner.
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TD:
It is very important that you do so. One of the Stn Cdr's very intuitive recommendations in the XV227 flight safety report was that all other pipes similar to the SCP burst duct should be analysed for internal corrosion, etc, and a maintenance policy implemented. You should ask your lawyer to ask the IPTL, at the inquest, on what date did the IPT formally request/commission the recommended study. If it was after the 2 Sep 06, it could be reasonably argued, by some (you and your lawyer?), that the IPT never intended to act on the recommendation, but that the crash forced them to do so....and...why did it take so long to produce the report...and.... if they had received the report before 2 Sep 06, what actions would they have taken as a consequence of the report? We have clearly proven that we can fly with all similar ducts in the crossfeed system shut off, so it would not have been operationally impossible for us to do so, in light of that report alone while they fixed the problems. I would be very interested, as I'm sure you would be, how the IPTL would respond to these questions.
Although you and I have some common ground in this particular aspect, I have to stress that the report, in respect to crossfeed and SCP duct leaks, is now somewhat irrelevant to Nimrod safety today. All of those pipes are now shut down, and have been since 4 Sep 06, which was probably the first date that the Nimrod MR2 ever conducted AAR, safely.
Good luck.
Regards
Ed Sett
EdSet100
"Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident."
When do you think they started this report ? The week before?
NO The incident happened 22nd November 2004 and it took them almost three years to get around to coming out with this report, a fact that I will personally make clear to the Coroner.
"Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident."
When do you think they started this report ? The week before?
NO The incident happened 22nd November 2004 and it took them almost three years to get around to coming out with this report, a fact that I will personally make clear to the Coroner.
Although you and I have some common ground in this particular aspect, I have to stress that the report, in respect to crossfeed and SCP duct leaks, is now somewhat irrelevant to Nimrod safety today. All of those pipes are now shut down, and have been since 4 Sep 06, which was probably the first date that the Nimrod MR2 ever conducted AAR, safely.
Good luck.
Regards
Ed Sett
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TSM:
Presumably you have read the CinC's remarks in the BOI Report. He was careful not to attribute blame to any organisation that contributed to the Safety Case, which he lambasted as follows:
"Most critically, this accident indicates that the NSC was wrong in its assessment.....that the hazard was ...improbable. This flawed NSC was further compounded by...."
"most critically" means that the NSC is pivotal to what happened. He wrote that, knowing who the contibutors to the NSC are. The documents are in evidence. Earlier in the BOI report we are informed that the NSC, as a living document, lies in the joint "ownership" of the RAF and BAe, with an independant check carried out by a third organistion. All 3 organisations were very active in the process. Therefore, the SoS owes it to the RAF, BAe and the 3rd party, to ask a QC to unravel the workings of the NSC and apportion blame where it lies. You have to ask yourself, if you have any interest, why would the SoS for Defence ask a QC to do this, if all the blame rests within his own department. You might not like him, but he ain't stupid. He has been well briefed.
I'm not defending the RAF against reasoned and accurate criticism. In some aspects, we have made some huge blunders: not checking the accuracy of a safety case, using a corrective maintenance policy without an appropriate trend analysis system to enable a quality review of the policy, not acting quickly to a Stn Cdr's recommendation to check hot air pipes (see above) and, finally, leaders slavishly adhering to BOI protocol, such that crucial information, that would later assist a crew faced with a fuel leak, was not released earlier.
Regards
Ed Sett
Can I just ask you one simple question please?.......
Why oh why, in the light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, do you still keep defending this government, RAF, MOD whoever about this accident?
The facts are pretty conclusive as far as I'm concerned.
Why oh why, in the light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, do you still keep defending this government, RAF, MOD whoever about this accident?
The facts are pretty conclusive as far as I'm concerned.
"Most critically, this accident indicates that the NSC was wrong in its assessment.....that the hazard was ...improbable. This flawed NSC was further compounded by...."
"most critically" means that the NSC is pivotal to what happened. He wrote that, knowing who the contibutors to the NSC are. The documents are in evidence. Earlier in the BOI report we are informed that the NSC, as a living document, lies in the joint "ownership" of the RAF and BAe, with an independant check carried out by a third organistion. All 3 organisations were very active in the process. Therefore, the SoS owes it to the RAF, BAe and the 3rd party, to ask a QC to unravel the workings of the NSC and apportion blame where it lies. You have to ask yourself, if you have any interest, why would the SoS for Defence ask a QC to do this, if all the blame rests within his own department. You might not like him, but he ain't stupid. He has been well briefed.
I'm not defending the RAF against reasoned and accurate criticism. In some aspects, we have made some huge blunders: not checking the accuracy of a safety case, using a corrective maintenance policy without an appropriate trend analysis system to enable a quality review of the policy, not acting quickly to a Stn Cdr's recommendation to check hot air pipes (see above) and, finally, leaders slavishly adhering to BOI protocol, such that crucial information, that would later assist a crew faced with a fuel leak, was not released earlier.
Regards
Ed Sett
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I'm not defending the RAF against reasoned and accurate criticism. In some aspects, we have made some huge blunders... and, finally, leaders slavishly adhering to BOI protocol, such that crucial information, that would later assist a crew faced with a fuel leak, was not released earlier.
The big hole in the post-accident reporting here is that 235 incident and the reaction to it.
The board had already made its conclusions on the source of fuel before that incident occurred. But the board admited it wasn't actually sure, and couldnt be sure, that the fuel that caught fire overflowed from the Number One tank and passed along the the outside of the aircraft. It says this is what it sees as the most likely option, but not the only possibility.
The supposedly irrelevant QinetiQ report of March 2006 was tasked to look at the wing tank leaks (which everyone accepts were irrelevant). But it cast its net much wider and said that there were a number of leaks happening over Afghanistan that could not be recreated on the ground.
I was at the press briefing in December when CAS said AAR had been suspended following the 235 incident because the leak which happened then couldnt be recreated on the ground, yet we have a supposedly irrelevant QQ report 20 months earlier saying just that and no suspension of AAR. You had to be there to see the look of consternation on CAS's face when I pointed this out to CAS. He was clearly unaware of this.
You also in one of your recent posts said you couldnt understand why relatives were still so concerned following the SoS apology. (I dont subscribe to your view that he was calling in a QC because he knew the MoD is not to blame, I'm afraid it cannot escape its blame. Inquiries have been New Labour's standing way of sidestepping blame, as in Hutton, Butler etc.)
But leaving that aside, the reason so many people, not just relatives, are still so concerned, is because they fear that the true lessons havent been learned and therefore at some point something could go badly wrong again. For the relatives, it's too late to stop their own grief, they just don't want it to happen to anyone else.
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Ed,
As always, thank you for your explanation.
At the end of the day however, we must never lose sight of the fact that an aircraft was lost uneccessarily IMHO and the opinion of many others, and that is not only a tragedy, but a disgrace to the RAF, MOD and this nation.
The problem(s) were well known about by a great many people at the top, and they all chose to ignore them, and the warning signs which were as clear as a bell. After all, who in their right mind would simply choose to ignore a QiQ report and a BAe report?
Why did they choose to do nothing? Well, I can think of no other reason whatsoever, other than money, or rather lack of it. From the very top down, as we all know, everyone is doing their level best to shield the person above them from bad news (it might affect their next promotion after all!) They don't want to be the bearer of bad news, and so it goes on. Sadly, in this case, the unthinkable happened and the likes of TD and many others are left to pick up the pieces and face the consequences.
You say 'why would the SoS for Defence ask a QC to do this, if all the blame rests within his own department' well, I should have thought that was obvious really Ed. The further and wider you can spread the smelly stuff, then the less and less of it falls on your lap! I am not suggesting for a moment that the QC appointed by the government (hmmm!) will not do a thorough job, but after the Hutton inquiry, I doubt if many have much faith.
And lets face it, if 100% of the blame currently lies with you, then initiating one of these fancy inquiries can only make it better for you can't it? If this government (MOD) can offload any of the blame, then they will gladly do so, and drag as many others into the frame with them as possible
We shall wait and see.
TSM
As always, thank you for your explanation.
At the end of the day however, we must never lose sight of the fact that an aircraft was lost uneccessarily IMHO and the opinion of many others, and that is not only a tragedy, but a disgrace to the RAF, MOD and this nation.
The problem(s) were well known about by a great many people at the top, and they all chose to ignore them, and the warning signs which were as clear as a bell. After all, who in their right mind would simply choose to ignore a QiQ report and a BAe report?
Why did they choose to do nothing? Well, I can think of no other reason whatsoever, other than money, or rather lack of it. From the very top down, as we all know, everyone is doing their level best to shield the person above them from bad news (it might affect their next promotion after all!) They don't want to be the bearer of bad news, and so it goes on. Sadly, in this case, the unthinkable happened and the likes of TD and many others are left to pick up the pieces and face the consequences.
You say 'why would the SoS for Defence ask a QC to do this, if all the blame rests within his own department' well, I should have thought that was obvious really Ed. The further and wider you can spread the smelly stuff, then the less and less of it falls on your lap! I am not suggesting for a moment that the QC appointed by the government (hmmm!) will not do a thorough job, but after the Hutton inquiry, I doubt if many have much faith.
And lets face it, if 100% of the blame currently lies with you, then initiating one of these fancy inquiries can only make it better for you can't it? If this government (MOD) can offload any of the blame, then they will gladly do so, and drag as many others into the frame with them as possible
We shall wait and see.
TSM
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Well why dont we ground the Nimrod tommorow if that makes people feel any better, that is what people want is it not. Close the airbase at Kinloss, make redundent the couple of thousand aircrew and ground staff or post them on.a few hundred civvy staff will become redundent but no matter the area is the poorest county in the whole UK, a few hundred jobs wont matter the main thing is a few people will be happy with this.
SAR can be handed over to the herc fleet they can easily provide the UKs cover which is one of the largest areas in the whole world, many fishermen will be happy at least they have an aircraft designed to carry cargo looking for them on a bleak winters night and some guy can lob out a dingy out the back.
Other aircraft can provide counter terrorism survelliance and coordination and a lot more other things that people do not know. God forbid if London attacks were to happen again, who is going to fly overhead and coordinate things. I guess we would have to buy some new aircraft to provide survelliance and eavsdropping to prevent any home attacks that may happen.
Or does the military fly what it has got , make it as safe as possible spend some cash to keep it going on till a replacement is available. I guess there will be a risk like all fleet ac that another accident can happen.
2 options open to the MOD, remove it now or fly it.
SAR can be handed over to the herc fleet they can easily provide the UKs cover which is one of the largest areas in the whole world, many fishermen will be happy at least they have an aircraft designed to carry cargo looking for them on a bleak winters night and some guy can lob out a dingy out the back.
Other aircraft can provide counter terrorism survelliance and coordination and a lot more other things that people do not know. God forbid if London attacks were to happen again, who is going to fly overhead and coordinate things. I guess we would have to buy some new aircraft to provide survelliance and eavsdropping to prevent any home attacks that may happen.
Or does the military fly what it has got , make it as safe as possible spend some cash to keep it going on till a replacement is available. I guess there will be a risk like all fleet ac that another accident can happen.
2 options open to the MOD, remove it now or fly it.
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Magners,
I think you have had a bit too much of your tipple!
"Well why dont we ground the Nimrod tommorow if that makes people feel any better, that is what people want is it not."
NO, that is not what we are saying ultimately.
"Other aircraft can provide counter terrorism survelliance and coordination and a lot more other things that people do not know. God forbid if London attacks were to happen again, who is going to fly overhead and coordinate things. I guess we would have to buy some new aircraft to provide survelliance and eavsdropping to prevent any home attacks that may happen." YES, other aircraft can! but lack of £££ will force us to keep Nimrod
"Or does the military fly what it has got , make it as safe as possible spend some cash to keep it going on till a replacement is available."
YES, that is what we MUST do, MAKE IT AS SAFE AS POSSIBLE! (NOT as safe as necessary as CAS said)
TSM
I think you have had a bit too much of your tipple!
"Well why dont we ground the Nimrod tommorow if that makes people feel any better, that is what people want is it not."
NO, that is not what we are saying ultimately.
"Other aircraft can provide counter terrorism survelliance and coordination and a lot more other things that people do not know. God forbid if London attacks were to happen again, who is going to fly overhead and coordinate things. I guess we would have to buy some new aircraft to provide survelliance and eavsdropping to prevent any home attacks that may happen." YES, other aircraft can! but lack of £££ will force us to keep Nimrod
"Or does the military fly what it has got , make it as safe as possible spend some cash to keep it going on till a replacement is available."
YES, that is what we MUST do, MAKE IT AS SAFE AS POSSIBLE! (NOT as safe as necessary as CAS said)
TSM
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FWIW,
Actually, Ninrod is bloody good at the many roles it performs, and for a significant period of time it performed a wide variety of tasks without AAR capability - sorties in excess of 10 hrs unrefulled have proved quite long enough for most tasks over the decades. I doubt the RAF could do any better than (pipe dream) having a couple of dozen brand new Nimrods handed over as a birthday present at 120's upcoming bash, so 'force us to keep Nimrod' seems rather harsh.
Unfortunately some of the mods to the aircraft haven't been properly thought out...a bit of an understatement, of course. Nobody seems to have looked at how changes to the original design might age or interact with each other.
Good men died as a result, I'll happily attend the public floggings when it's decided who was responsible.
Personally I also think Edsett has done quite a good job of passing details along, for which I'd like to thank him, I think it's unfair to suggest he's an apologist for the RAF. Tucumseh has also provided an insight I didn't previously have, similar thanks to that gent.
YES, other aircraft can! but lack of £££ will force us to keep Nimrod
Unfortunately some of the mods to the aircraft haven't been properly thought out...a bit of an understatement, of course. Nobody seems to have looked at how changes to the original design might age or interact with each other.
Good men died as a result, I'll happily attend the public floggings when it's decided who was responsible.
Personally I also think Edsett has done quite a good job of passing details along, for which I'd like to thank him, I think it's unfair to suggest he's an apologist for the RAF. Tucumseh has also provided an insight I didn't previously have, similar thanks to that gent.
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Well say what you want TSM i can actually say I said them words a sober judge.
Ill say my last words then leave as I have had enough of trying to explain my thoughts to no avail, like many fellow engineers they have tried to give there bit but like most have said to me its like banging a brick head off a wall and I will do the same now and hang my typing fingers up in this thread.
Like a few posts before somebody said this thread is now laborious pointless and why we still go on about it, The BOI has happened and the answers for those concerned have been given, the MOD has apoligised , the families involved have been given a financial reward which in no way will bring back what they have lost but if we were given that chance to turn back the clock im sure the MOD would be the first to take that offer up.
What now, what else are people pushing for, that I cannot understand, since the accident the measures put in place now make the jet impossible to fly because of the maint checks that are required before flight, never in my career have i seen so many checks/inspections required, so in my view the MOD is doing its duty to ensure safety to its best. Many dont see that but as an engineer I like 100 others have the task of ensuring this every time an aircraft gets airborne.
I just wish to say after XV230 accident , many of us never had the option to speak about what happened, to this day people dealed with it in different ways but for many like myself coming on here and trying to find an answer is all that was available, the only way to discuss it and maybe try and find some reason why. Now i just see this as thread for us all to come on and think we know things more than others ,a way to try and think we know it all (im guilty of that and ive now realised I dont) , so much bickering and how one person knows more than others its getting boring and the same old, but I guess as a UK citizen we are known now for just moaning about life and how rubbish everything is , its what we do best.
I just want to wish all the want more info good luck on there quest, I for one am giving the magners a miss and moving on to strongbow.
God bless all
MD signing off ...............
Ill say my last words then leave as I have had enough of trying to explain my thoughts to no avail, like many fellow engineers they have tried to give there bit but like most have said to me its like banging a brick head off a wall and I will do the same now and hang my typing fingers up in this thread.
Like a few posts before somebody said this thread is now laborious pointless and why we still go on about it, The BOI has happened and the answers for those concerned have been given, the MOD has apoligised , the families involved have been given a financial reward which in no way will bring back what they have lost but if we were given that chance to turn back the clock im sure the MOD would be the first to take that offer up.
What now, what else are people pushing for, that I cannot understand, since the accident the measures put in place now make the jet impossible to fly because of the maint checks that are required before flight, never in my career have i seen so many checks/inspections required, so in my view the MOD is doing its duty to ensure safety to its best. Many dont see that but as an engineer I like 100 others have the task of ensuring this every time an aircraft gets airborne.
I just wish to say after XV230 accident , many of us never had the option to speak about what happened, to this day people dealed with it in different ways but for many like myself coming on here and trying to find an answer is all that was available, the only way to discuss it and maybe try and find some reason why. Now i just see this as thread for us all to come on and think we know things more than others ,a way to try and think we know it all (im guilty of that and ive now realised I dont) , so much bickering and how one person knows more than others its getting boring and the same old, but I guess as a UK citizen we are known now for just moaning about life and how rubbish everything is , its what we do best.
I just want to wish all the want more info good luck on there quest, I for one am giving the magners a miss and moving on to strongbow.
God bless all
MD signing off ...............
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davejb
Perhaps saying 'force to keep Nimrod' was the wrong way of putting it, I should have said 'forced to keep MR2s'
Without doubt, Nimrod has been an outstanding success, and like many others, I have several thousand flying hours in them. But that is not a reason to try and keep them forever. A new Nimrod? Yes, I am sure that it would be just as successful as the first ones, but it must encompass modern, up-to-date safety systems, and that is my biggest gripe.
Magners, you shouldn't take things too much to heart. You are as entitled to post on here as much as anyone. The fact that some of us don't agree with some of what you said is part and parcel to being a 'PPuner!' Some will always be more experienced than others, but they are still entitled to speak up. So, please don't go forever, and certainly don't swap over to that Strongbow! Then I'll know you have had too much of the 'other stuff'
TSM
Perhaps saying 'force to keep Nimrod' was the wrong way of putting it, I should have said 'forced to keep MR2s'
Without doubt, Nimrod has been an outstanding success, and like many others, I have several thousand flying hours in them. But that is not a reason to try and keep them forever. A new Nimrod? Yes, I am sure that it would be just as successful as the first ones, but it must encompass modern, up-to-date safety systems, and that is my biggest gripe.
Magners, you shouldn't take things too much to heart. You are as entitled to post on here as much as anyone. The fact that some of us don't agree with some of what you said is part and parcel to being a 'PPuner!' Some will always be more experienced than others, but they are still entitled to speak up. So, please don't go forever, and certainly don't swap over to that Strongbow! Then I'll know you have had too much of the 'other stuff'
TSM
Davejb
Good post. You said;
“Unfortunately some of the mods to the aircraft haven't been properly thought out...a bit of an understatement, of course. Nobody seems to have looked at how changes to the original design might age or interact with each other.
Good men died as a result, I'll happily attend the public floggings when it's decided who was responsible”.
This is precisely what we talk about when discussing PHYSICAL and FUNCTIONAL safety. A system may be safe in isolation, but unsafe when integrated (or not, as the case may be) into the aircraft. When integrated, it may be safe in one aircraft type, but not another. It may be safe in one aircraft tail number, but not another in the same fleet (partly because of ill conceived SEMs, especially Role Mods). This is why Configuration Control is so important. And, as Safeware says, very often the Safety Case doesn’t reflect the in-use configurations.
However, this is just my opinion (supported by ALL the MoD’s mandated procedures and regulations). It was NOT, however, the opinion of the various 2 Stars and above I mention, who were happy with an attitude “It works on the bench, so we’ll just stick it in the aircraft and walk away without testing/trialling”. I do hope this comes out at the inquest and during the review. All they have to do is read Public Accounts Committee reports and ask what action was taken.
Good post. You said;
“Unfortunately some of the mods to the aircraft haven't been properly thought out...a bit of an understatement, of course. Nobody seems to have looked at how changes to the original design might age or interact with each other.
Good men died as a result, I'll happily attend the public floggings when it's decided who was responsible”.
This is precisely what we talk about when discussing PHYSICAL and FUNCTIONAL safety. A system may be safe in isolation, but unsafe when integrated (or not, as the case may be) into the aircraft. When integrated, it may be safe in one aircraft type, but not another. It may be safe in one aircraft tail number, but not another in the same fleet (partly because of ill conceived SEMs, especially Role Mods). This is why Configuration Control is so important. And, as Safeware says, very often the Safety Case doesn’t reflect the in-use configurations.
However, this is just my opinion (supported by ALL the MoD’s mandated procedures and regulations). It was NOT, however, the opinion of the various 2 Stars and above I mention, who were happy with an attitude “It works on the bench, so we’ll just stick it in the aircraft and walk away without testing/trialling”. I do hope this comes out at the inquest and during the review. All they have to do is read Public Accounts Committee reports and ask what action was taken.
Nimrod Inquiry
I've finally found out the contact details for the Nimrod Inquiry, under the independent counsel, Charles Haddon-Cave QC. Actually it's called the Nimrod Review, not Inquiry. It's being set up at the MoD, and its Secretary is an MoD civil servant, Darren Beck.
The website is there, but there's nothing on it yet. Darren Beck tells me it will be
The Nimrod Review
Level 1, Zone C,
St. Georges Court
2-12 Bloomsbury Way
London
WC1A 2HB
Telephone: 020 7305 2130
Fax: 020 7305 4031
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.nimrod-review.org.uk
airsound
The website is there, but there's nothing on it yet. Darren Beck tells me it will be
up and running within the next week or so.
Level 1, Zone C,
St. Georges Court
2-12 Bloomsbury Way
London
WC1A 2HB
Telephone: 020 7305 2130
Fax: 020 7305 4031
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.nimrod-review.org.uk
airsound
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Des Browne Report on 4th Dec 2007
It is now over 14 weeks since the families requested a copy of the QinetiQ report which, it is claimed, gives the Nimrod fuel system the "all clear". But MoD still dance around trying to find reasons why it can not be released. Come on MoD, if you read this, what sort of message does that send out? Perhaps it does not exist, or its conclusions do not support the Des Browne claim.
DV
DV
I clicked on the link, on post #2347 by Airsound, to the Nimrod Review website. A few weeks ago it just had "Awaiting Content" on all the sections on the page, but when I checked today it comes up with some random 1-2-3 Register page?! WTFO?! Could it be that the MOD/Govt is willing to pay to register the web-page...imagine my surprise at the incompetence!
Anyone with any ideas??
Anyone with any ideas??
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Somewhere in a whitehall file it will say..... The Government has a duty of care to it's RAF by providing the necessary finance, equipment, people, and most importantly health & safety.
And in my book if all these procedures were adhered to then we would not have lost that Nimrod??
The Government is not producing this.
And in my book if all these procedures were adhered to then we would not have lost that Nimrod??
The Government is not producing this.
I’m slightly cynical about this review.
It’s 14 weeks since I contacted the QC. No reply. I know others have had a little more success. We’ll see.
I’ve said this before, but I don’t like his remit. It’s very narrow. It talks in terms of “RAF” and “Nimrod IPT”. The well known problems with APPLYING the airworthiness regulations are pan-MoD. In fact, they have long since been elevated above MoD and notified to Ministers. Ingram specifically denied there was a problem, in writing, before the crash. MoD need only point to this approval and support. PUS was told 12 years ago (in a report which has been destroyed by the authors, but luckily retained by the sponsor). The QC needs a wider remit, as it would be possible for him to satisfy it by speaking to very few people, most of whom could just say “isolated case” or “happened under a different regime”. The usual, in fact.
WHO will speak to him, and HOW will he find those who know the truth? I don’t like an AVM being attached to his team. I suspect he may be the filter, to stop those who actually know the background getting to the QC. This is common practice. And the chosen few are of course “briefed” to make sure they are aware of the party line (and career path). The “risks” are actively prevented from coming forward, and if they try to submit a written report it seldom reaches the intended recipient. This applies to BoIs as well. We continually see the odium faced by those who step forward. Sqn Ldr Burke is the classic example.
Browne has reassured us that staff will be immune from disciplinary action, unless guilty of “gross misconduct”. But what is “gross misconduct”? MoD won’t say. I don’t know, and the issue is blurred by the long standing rulings by Browne’s junior Ministers, CDP, a DG who was in charge of Nimrod MRA4, an AVM charged with maintaining safety and airworthiness; and others. Their consistent ruling, over at least 16 years, is that it is an offence to refuse to lie about components of airworthiness, but not an offence to instruct one to lie. The only difference in opinion was over punishment. Some said sacking, others formal warning. Do I know of people who have, knowing they will be punished, ignored these or similar issues and abrogated their responsibility by lying or walking away; or advised colleagues to lie, to avoid punishment? Yes. And then people died. Need I say more?
I sincerely hope Mr Hadden-Cave is his own man. I hope he jumps all over the first attempt to “guide” him. And I can’t wait to see what he recommends on MRA4.
It’s 14 weeks since I contacted the QC. No reply. I know others have had a little more success. We’ll see.
I’ve said this before, but I don’t like his remit. It’s very narrow. It talks in terms of “RAF” and “Nimrod IPT”. The well known problems with APPLYING the airworthiness regulations are pan-MoD. In fact, they have long since been elevated above MoD and notified to Ministers. Ingram specifically denied there was a problem, in writing, before the crash. MoD need only point to this approval and support. PUS was told 12 years ago (in a report which has been destroyed by the authors, but luckily retained by the sponsor). The QC needs a wider remit, as it would be possible for him to satisfy it by speaking to very few people, most of whom could just say “isolated case” or “happened under a different regime”. The usual, in fact.
WHO will speak to him, and HOW will he find those who know the truth? I don’t like an AVM being attached to his team. I suspect he may be the filter, to stop those who actually know the background getting to the QC. This is common practice. And the chosen few are of course “briefed” to make sure they are aware of the party line (and career path). The “risks” are actively prevented from coming forward, and if they try to submit a written report it seldom reaches the intended recipient. This applies to BoIs as well. We continually see the odium faced by those who step forward. Sqn Ldr Burke is the classic example.
Browne has reassured us that staff will be immune from disciplinary action, unless guilty of “gross misconduct”. But what is “gross misconduct”? MoD won’t say. I don’t know, and the issue is blurred by the long standing rulings by Browne’s junior Ministers, CDP, a DG who was in charge of Nimrod MRA4, an AVM charged with maintaining safety and airworthiness; and others. Their consistent ruling, over at least 16 years, is that it is an offence to refuse to lie about components of airworthiness, but not an offence to instruct one to lie. The only difference in opinion was over punishment. Some said sacking, others formal warning. Do I know of people who have, knowing they will be punished, ignored these or similar issues and abrogated their responsibility by lying or walking away; or advised colleagues to lie, to avoid punishment? Yes. And then people died. Need I say more?
I sincerely hope Mr Hadden-Cave is his own man. I hope he jumps all over the first attempt to “guide” him. And I can’t wait to see what he recommends on MRA4.