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Ed Set,
I think you have taken my comments out of context. They were directed in response to RAF_Techie101's comments that the No 7 tank dry bay has fire wire.
As a Nimrod crew member I am fully aware of the drills and the significance of the fire spreading to the underfloor bays and bomb bay. I was stating that firewire in the No 7 tank dry bay is NOT sufficient. This WAS clearly indicated in the BoI report.
I think you have taken my comments out of context. They were directed in response to RAF_Techie101's comments that the No 7 tank dry bay has fire wire.
As a Nimrod crew member I am fully aware of the drills and the significance of the fire spreading to the underfloor bays and bomb bay. I was stating that firewire in the No 7 tank dry bay is NOT sufficient. This WAS clearly indicated in the BoI report.
-re shoddy maintenace
To those who are asking, nay demanding, that Tapper’s Dad explain himself over his use of the term “maintenance”;
1. I suspect he is feeling quite worn out by the events of the past year, which have culminated in a singularly successful campaign despite the odium he has occasionally faced. A year ago he buried a son, which is life’s greatest tragedy. He has, or should have, earned the everlasting respect of everyone remotely concerned with Defence aviation for taking on the might of the MoD and bringing it to its knees. The admission that the MoD’s airworthiness processes, procedures and regulations are not IMPLEMENTED properly is a triumph. While this has been known for nearly 20 years, and was denied as recently as last week, the lies have been exposed.
2. As to the maintenance issue, by now it should be clear to anyone who reads and understands this thread that the term in this context refers to ALL technical, administrative, managerial and supervisory actions supporting the objective to retain or restore an item so that it is fit for purpose. You may argue semantics, but this holistic view is the one you should take. The BAeS and QinetiQ reports make it crystal clear that the MoD has failed in this DUTY at all levels. The Board of Inquiry report and especially the reviewing officers (with the notable exception of a former Director/Maritime and Nimrod MRA4 IPT Leader – I wonder why) have agreed.
In short, Tapper’s Dad is absolutely correct, and has been all along. Leave him in peace to recharge batteries for the next ordeal; the inquest. And be grateful that this momentous first step has been taken and Military Airworthiness is on the way to a resurrection. But there is still a lot to do.
1. I suspect he is feeling quite worn out by the events of the past year, which have culminated in a singularly successful campaign despite the odium he has occasionally faced. A year ago he buried a son, which is life’s greatest tragedy. He has, or should have, earned the everlasting respect of everyone remotely concerned with Defence aviation for taking on the might of the MoD and bringing it to its knees. The admission that the MoD’s airworthiness processes, procedures and regulations are not IMPLEMENTED properly is a triumph. While this has been known for nearly 20 years, and was denied as recently as last week, the lies have been exposed.
2. As to the maintenance issue, by now it should be clear to anyone who reads and understands this thread that the term in this context refers to ALL technical, administrative, managerial and supervisory actions supporting the objective to retain or restore an item so that it is fit for purpose. You may argue semantics, but this holistic view is the one you should take. The BAeS and QinetiQ reports make it crystal clear that the MoD has failed in this DUTY at all levels. The Board of Inquiry report and especially the reviewing officers (with the notable exception of a former Director/Maritime and Nimrod MRA4 IPT Leader – I wonder why) have agreed.
In short, Tapper’s Dad is absolutely correct, and has been all along. Leave him in peace to recharge batteries for the next ordeal; the inquest. And be grateful that this momentous first step has been taken and Military Airworthiness is on the way to a resurrection. But there is still a lot to do.
Tuc..
Well said..
To others, a bit of latitude may I suggest. TD is not an engineer, but some-one who has struggled with the language of our world/industry since that fateful day in 2006.
To others, a bit of latitude may I suggest. TD is not an engineer, but some-one who has struggled with the language of our world/industry since that fateful day in 2006.
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Back in the late 70's/(very) early 80's I seem to recall being told that there'd been some handling problems on the soon to arrive MR2. The little winglet doodads on the tail were, I think, the answer to that issue - at the time the infamous 'somebody' told me that the trials crew had been provided with parachutes while that got sorted out....dunno if there's any truth to that, quite possibly just a silly story at the time.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Initially Nimrod used to wander around the longitudinal axis by almost 2 deg during an astro shot. Compared with the 0.1 degree wander in a Vulcan the Nimrod was a pig.
I believe the initial mod to increase the stability was to fit VHF aerials on the tail. Later, when the mod was formalised, the larger purpose designed strakes were fitted.
As for timinng, the strakes were fitted well after it was introduced into service and only as part of the Op Corporate AAR Mods in 1982.
I believe the initial mod to increase the stability was to fit VHF aerials on the tail. Later, when the mod was formalised, the larger purpose designed strakes were fitted.
As for timinng, the strakes were fitted well after it was introduced into service and only as part of the Op Corporate AAR Mods in 1982.
Well said tuc, I can only say "here, here" to your praise of TD. Despite the findings of the BOI, despite the admissions of the CinC, despite the SoS apologising for the MOD AND THE RAF in their failure to ensure the Airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet, some still see fit to snipe at him as an interfering civilian who knows little or nothing. Shame on them and well done TD for you have done a great service to your country, which is more than can be said for the higher echelons of the RAF and the MOD. The CAS is responsible for the scandal that is the RAF's aircraft airworthiness state. He could, and should, have resigned in protest at the savage cuts that undermined this central core of RAF effectiveness. He chose to stay, now he must go in ignominy.
EdSet100, you say that I have missed the point. With respect it is you who seem to have done so. The arrangement whereby many agencies with many acronyms share out responsibilities so that everyone is responsible, but in effect no-one is, is the very reason it must be scrapped. You say that the situation would be the same under a unity authority. When did the CAA last preside over a failure of this magnitude? It's game over I'm glad to say for MOD and chums, and time for the professionals to take over.
EdSet100, you say that I have missed the point. With respect it is you who seem to have done so. The arrangement whereby many agencies with many acronyms share out responsibilities so that everyone is responsible, but in effect no-one is, is the very reason it must be scrapped. You say that the situation would be the same under a unity authority. When did the CAA last preside over a failure of this magnitude? It's game over I'm glad to say for MOD and chums, and time for the professionals to take over.
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Just to pick up on Chug's point. I have spoken with serving Nimrod crew tonight and concern is being expressed by the fact that many of the really tough issues unearthed by the Nimrod BoI have merely been booted into the long grass. The crew I talked with are still very concerned about the airworthiness of this aircraft. In particular the use of Tank 7.
The argument for bringing Tank 7 back into use and the way it will be used has been far from convincing.
What has actually been achieved here? Missions continue. Problems concerned with not being able to use SCP continue. The BoI was far from definite about the source of the fuel leak, and the single wall pipework is still there.
The one thing that was clear from my conversations was the complete absence of leadership in the RAF, but an awful lot of arrse covering.
Here is a link to how Airbus have approached Tank Safety in in order to comply with JAR directives.
http://www.content.airbusworld.com/S...33igintion.pdf
Unlike Dreamliner, A380 is not using Inerting equipment but has gone for even more built in design safety.
"Airbus will demonstrate that the ignition source prevention features are sufficient, in and of themselves, to meet the aircraft safety objectives considering a permanent flammable fuel tank environment," EASA declares. "Airbus will further demonstrate through its flammability assessment that it has further upgraded its safety level by implementing design features, which minimize heat transfers to the fuel tanks, avoiding unnecessary increases in the fuel tank flammability."
There is no center wing tank on the A380, although one could be fitted on subsequent models of the aircraft (e.g., the 800-passenger version). Moreover, the air conditioning packs on the A380 are located on the forward side of the front wing spars, with insulation. Thus located, they are not directly under any fuel tanks, which is the case on the B747 and the B737; these models have experienced three fuel tank explosions in recent years - TWA 800 involving a B747, a Philippine Air Lines (PAL) B737 at Manila, and a Thai International Airways (THA) B737 at Bangkok. All three sustained explosions of the center wing tanks.
"The A380 air conditioning packs are in the 'shoulder' of the wing," the NTSB official conceded, but on a hot day on the ground, as was the case in the Philippine Air Lines and Thai Airways explosions, the airplanes didn't have the benefit of airflow to dissipate the heat of the packs, and this also would be the case with the A380 on a hot day.
The safety board registered its objections to EASA, which rebuffed the complaints. The Europeans seem bent on issuing special conditions for the A380 that focus on three sources of ignition, and the need to minimize them: electrical arcs, friction sparks resulting from mechanical contact of rotating equipment in the fuel tank, and hot surface ignition. "The applicant should perform a Safety Assessment of the fuel system showing that the presence of an ignition source within the fuel system is Extremely Improbable [that is, 1 x 10- 9, or one in a billion flight hours] and does not result from a single failure," the EASA said.
Airbus must account for a variety of fuel pump failure modes that can cause ignition (e.g., debris lodged inside pumps, poor bonding of components to structure, etc.). It's generally conceded that a pump immersed in fuel cannot cause ignition due to any failures. Indeed, that is why so many airworthiness directives (ADs) have been issued limiting the running of in-tank pumps to a certain minimum fuel level. This ensures that fuel levels in heated tanks (those with air conditioning packs located below) with flammable ullage would never drop to a level where fuel pumps would not be immersed - no matter what the aircraft's pitch, roll or yaw attitude. Yet, knowing this, Airbus apparently is not being required to locate fuel pumps outside the fuel tanks, where they would never be "not immersed" nor exposed to in-tank heated ullage. This logical avoidance step would also allow high voltage/high current pump wiring to remain outside of the tank.
Regarding specific FAA and NTSB objections to its special conditions, EASA was pretty clear in its view:
FAA: "Flammable conditions within the [Thai and Philippines jets] would have been reached in flight after these airplanes began to climb, even if the tank had not been heated."
The argument for bringing Tank 7 back into use and the way it will be used has been far from convincing.
What has actually been achieved here? Missions continue. Problems concerned with not being able to use SCP continue. The BoI was far from definite about the source of the fuel leak, and the single wall pipework is still there.
The one thing that was clear from my conversations was the complete absence of leadership in the RAF, but an awful lot of arrse covering.
Here is a link to how Airbus have approached Tank Safety in in order to comply with JAR directives.
http://www.content.airbusworld.com/S...33igintion.pdf
Unlike Dreamliner, A380 is not using Inerting equipment but has gone for even more built in design safety.
"Airbus will demonstrate that the ignition source prevention features are sufficient, in and of themselves, to meet the aircraft safety objectives considering a permanent flammable fuel tank environment," EASA declares. "Airbus will further demonstrate through its flammability assessment that it has further upgraded its safety level by implementing design features, which minimize heat transfers to the fuel tanks, avoiding unnecessary increases in the fuel tank flammability."
There is no center wing tank on the A380, although one could be fitted on subsequent models of the aircraft (e.g., the 800-passenger version). Moreover, the air conditioning packs on the A380 are located on the forward side of the front wing spars, with insulation. Thus located, they are not directly under any fuel tanks, which is the case on the B747 and the B737; these models have experienced three fuel tank explosions in recent years - TWA 800 involving a B747, a Philippine Air Lines (PAL) B737 at Manila, and a Thai International Airways (THA) B737 at Bangkok. All three sustained explosions of the center wing tanks.
"The A380 air conditioning packs are in the 'shoulder' of the wing," the NTSB official conceded, but on a hot day on the ground, as was the case in the Philippine Air Lines and Thai Airways explosions, the airplanes didn't have the benefit of airflow to dissipate the heat of the packs, and this also would be the case with the A380 on a hot day.
The safety board registered its objections to EASA, which rebuffed the complaints. The Europeans seem bent on issuing special conditions for the A380 that focus on three sources of ignition, and the need to minimize them: electrical arcs, friction sparks resulting from mechanical contact of rotating equipment in the fuel tank, and hot surface ignition. "The applicant should perform a Safety Assessment of the fuel system showing that the presence of an ignition source within the fuel system is Extremely Improbable [that is, 1 x 10- 9, or one in a billion flight hours] and does not result from a single failure," the EASA said.
Airbus must account for a variety of fuel pump failure modes that can cause ignition (e.g., debris lodged inside pumps, poor bonding of components to structure, etc.). It's generally conceded that a pump immersed in fuel cannot cause ignition due to any failures. Indeed, that is why so many airworthiness directives (ADs) have been issued limiting the running of in-tank pumps to a certain minimum fuel level. This ensures that fuel levels in heated tanks (those with air conditioning packs located below) with flammable ullage would never drop to a level where fuel pumps would not be immersed - no matter what the aircraft's pitch, roll or yaw attitude. Yet, knowing this, Airbus apparently is not being required to locate fuel pumps outside the fuel tanks, where they would never be "not immersed" nor exposed to in-tank heated ullage. This logical avoidance step would also allow high voltage/high current pump wiring to remain outside of the tank.
Regarding specific FAA and NTSB objections to its special conditions, EASA was pretty clear in its view:
FAA: "Flammable conditions within the [Thai and Philippines jets] would have been reached in flight after these airplanes began to climb, even if the tank had not been heated."
Last edited by nigegilb; 5th Dec 2007 at 20:11.
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Strakes copied - actually found a scrapbook with a photo I took of a pre-AAR MR2 on the Wideawake pan sans strakes, and a news cutting about the new AAR mod ... increased fin area and yaw damper mod also mentioned. I'd still vote for anything that might increase the survival options for the crews, the aircraft was never designed to operate in a high threat environment - stay safe guys.
nigeglib, I was at an Airbus meeting earlier this year; the fuel system specialists were discussing potential modifications to a system - and they raised the topic of the Nimrod's single wall AAR plumbing.
They were aghast that such a lash up introduced 25 years ago was still flying in this hard-worked aircraft. It would never be accepted in any Airbus aircraft, they commented.
Tuc - I totally agree with all you have said and echo your sentiments regarding the painstaking efforts of Tapper'sDad.
They were aghast that such a lash up introduced 25 years ago was still flying in this hard-worked aircraft. It would never be accepted in any Airbus aircraft, they commented.
Tuc - I totally agree with all you have said and echo your sentiments regarding the painstaking efforts of Tapper'sDad.
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MoD line on dual wall pipework is that it is more difficult to replace seals and more difficult to find the source of leaks.
SFAR 88
Airworthiness Notice 55 issued by the CAA and EASA
Bottom line (one of them)is that on modified fuel systems a lot of work / rework needs to be carried out with regards to reducing risk of fire / explosion. This is not only on old Aircraft, 4 year old BBJ are being modified IAW the directive. Operators that do not comply will have to have the Aux fuel system made inoperable.
Part of this mod is to install "dual wall" fuel pipes. At present, it is
allowable to shroud a standard rigid pipe with a larger flexible hose
type assembly, with a gland drain that can indentify the source of a
leak to within a certain distance. The hose will go.
Lord knows what the CAA would do with AAR capable airliners.
Beags do you have any gen on the AAR pipework on FSTA?
SFAR 88
Airworthiness Notice 55 issued by the CAA and EASA
Bottom line (one of them)is that on modified fuel systems a lot of work / rework needs to be carried out with regards to reducing risk of fire / explosion. This is not only on old Aircraft, 4 year old BBJ are being modified IAW the directive. Operators that do not comply will have to have the Aux fuel system made inoperable.
Part of this mod is to install "dual wall" fuel pipes. At present, it is
allowable to shroud a standard rigid pipe with a larger flexible hose
type assembly, with a gland drain that can indentify the source of a
leak to within a certain distance. The hose will go.
Lord knows what the CAA would do with AAR capable airliners.
Beags do you have any gen on the AAR pipework on FSTA?
nigeglib - I know little about FSTA; however, I understand that it will have neither a probe nor a 'receptacle'.
The fuel system needs little, if any, modification and the pods are fitted on the A340 engine hardpoints, with associated fuel supply.
The fuel system needs little, if any, modification and the pods are fitted on the A340 engine hardpoints, with associated fuel supply.
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Angus Robertson
Nigeglib
I don't know how u got the questions from Mr Robertson, but I'm not sure if u or he is aware that his Q12 is factually incorrect, therefore unlikely to be answered.
Project PHOENIX has nothing to do with the Nimrod R1. I shall not comment further on this.
Regards
M7
I don't know how u got the questions from Mr Robertson, but I'm not sure if u or he is aware that his Q12 is factually incorrect, therefore unlikely to be answered.
Project PHOENIX has nothing to do with the Nimrod R1. I shall not comment further on this.
Regards
M7
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Chug,
No, I don't think I miss the point. Firstly, the MOD is not obliged, under law, to promulgate Safety Cases. However, because it is a good idea, we have done so. Unfortunately, the individuals involved this catalogue of errors, got it so wrong in the case of Zone 617. It doesn't matter how you dress it up, but human error in any single organisation (CAA?) is still human error. That same person would make the same mistake if he/she was working for RAF/MOD/QQ/BAe/CAA or Fred Carnos Flying Circus.
The creation of a single MAA does not stop human errors.
The NSC was not flawed in its structure which, I am confident, would mirror any structure imposed by any suggested MAA. The NSC was flawed in its judgement, which was based on poor information supplied to it. So, if the supplier of the information (BAe or IPT) is going to be the same organisation, regardless of the who does the analysis, the judgement is doomed to fail.
You say that the situation would be the same under a unity authority.
The creation of a single MAA does not stop human errors.
The NSC was not flawed in its structure which, I am confident, would mirror any structure imposed by any suggested MAA. The NSC was flawed in its judgement, which was based on poor information supplied to it. So, if the supplier of the information (BAe or IPT) is going to be the same organisation, regardless of the who does the analysis, the judgement is doomed to fail.
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Well said DeepGE, I totally 100% agree, People who have no idea how to operate the Nimrod are the ones that are informing the press how things are done yet nobody from the users of this aircraft can defend the aircraft, it would be nice of a few of the senior non commisioned engineers had the chance to answer some of the questions that people are concerened about rather than speculative conjuncture that appears on the net from so called ex groundcrew,serving senior officers etc etc. For many that are going to the press especially as of late saying this and that , its just pissing off the people who have to maintain Nimrod but most importantly the Guys Who Fly. They are the ones that need our 100% confidence and only crap posted in the Times about shoddy maintenance is not going to help one bit.
Magnersdrinker,
from day 1 of this thread, people (experts??, maybe 20 years ago!) have been speculating about the cause of the tragic loss of 30 (Bomb bay fire suppression, fuel seeps on wings etc).
We know that aircrew/groundcrew have much respect for each other and that we are all 100% confident that every thing we do, is done 100% correctly!
from day 1 of this thread, people (experts??, maybe 20 years ago!) have been speculating about the cause of the tragic loss of 30 (Bomb bay fire suppression, fuel seeps on wings etc).
We know that aircrew/groundcrew have much respect for each other and that we are all 100% confident that every thing we do, is done 100% correctly!
Last edited by spanners123; 5th Dec 2007 at 23:18. Reason: strongbow
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DeepGE,
If it makes you feel any better, as aircrew my eyes roll uncontrollably when the name "Jimmy Jones" is mentioned. To have any credibility I believe you need to be current, or very recently current, on type as aircrew or groundcrew when commenting on aircraft specific technical issues.
That said, if flight safety is everyone's responsibility, then anyone should be free to say their piece.
If it makes you feel any better, as aircrew my eyes roll uncontrollably when the name "Jimmy Jones" is mentioned. To have any credibility I believe you need to be current, or very recently current, on type as aircrew or groundcrew when commenting on aircraft specific technical issues.
That said, if flight safety is everyone's responsibility, then anyone should be free to say their piece.