Nimrod Information
Guest
Posts: n/a
OK Mrpoint what in your view should have the RAF done to prevent this.
I can say what happened in the XV227 incident had no bearing on what happened on 230. Yes I do agree if the system was LIMed then there would be a probable no ignition source. I dont think anyone had any idea that this would have happened and its unfair to put blame for that, if this could have been prevented then it would have been. The TWA 747 incident many years back if people could have spotted that as a danger then things may have been so different today.
Please feel free to correct me if im wrong and Im sure I will be told I drink too much cider and bullied by a bunch of people who have no idea how we work and how Nimrods operate,but as we speak every single aircraft in the world has an apparent danger that nobody can predict or what if situation. 737 was a good one on that aicraft investigation program on Sky, 2 were lost due to freeze up of a servo valve in the rudder actuator, Nobody could predict that would happen yet it did. If we lived in a perfect world we would not be here chatting right now.
I can say what happened in the XV227 incident had no bearing on what happened on 230. Yes I do agree if the system was LIMed then there would be a probable no ignition source. I dont think anyone had any idea that this would have happened and its unfair to put blame for that, if this could have been prevented then it would have been. The TWA 747 incident many years back if people could have spotted that as a danger then things may have been so different today.
Please feel free to correct me if im wrong and Im sure I will be told I drink too much cider and bullied by a bunch of people who have no idea how we work and how Nimrods operate,but as we speak every single aircraft in the world has an apparent danger that nobody can predict or what if situation. 737 was a good one on that aicraft investigation program on Sky, 2 were lost due to freeze up of a servo valve in the rudder actuator, Nobody could predict that would happen yet it did. If we lived in a perfect world we would not be here chatting right now.
Last edited by Magnersdrinker; 9th Dec 2007 at 00:30.
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Back in Geordie Land
Posts: 492
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Magners,
If what you are now saying is to be believed, then it would appear that the Nimrod fleet have even more problems than we thought.
But you let yourself down somewhat with your conclusion of the 737 incident and the rudder actuator servo valve. What do you think happened AFTER the servo valve was identified? Do you think that the NTSB said 'OK, we know what the problem was, but what the heck?' Do you think they ignored the problem? or maybe they informed all operators of the problem and enforced them into a replacement? Which one do you think they went for?
TWA flight 500 was brought down by an explosion in a fuel tank that was empty of fuel but not fumes. A single hot-air/ignition source caused the explosion and the loss olf all on board. So what did the authorities do? Did they ignore that maybe? Of course not.
I agree that both of the problems you highlight were not spotted earlier, but the fact remains that when they WERE identified, they were acted upon immediately. You have to say that if the RAF/MOD had acted, would 230/227 have happened?
Maybe, be I doubt it.
The Winco
If what you are now saying is to be believed, then it would appear that the Nimrod fleet have even more problems than we thought.
But you let yourself down somewhat with your conclusion of the 737 incident and the rudder actuator servo valve. What do you think happened AFTER the servo valve was identified? Do you think that the NTSB said 'OK, we know what the problem was, but what the heck?' Do you think they ignored the problem? or maybe they informed all operators of the problem and enforced them into a replacement? Which one do you think they went for?
TWA flight 500 was brought down by an explosion in a fuel tank that was empty of fuel but not fumes. A single hot-air/ignition source caused the explosion and the loss olf all on board. So what did the authorities do? Did they ignore that maybe? Of course not.
I agree that both of the problems you highlight were not spotted earlier, but the fact remains that when they WERE identified, they were acted upon immediately. You have to say that if the RAF/MOD had acted, would 230/227 have happened?
Maybe, be I doubt it.
The Winco
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: Shadow
Posts: 57
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: North of Hadrians Wall
Posts: 129
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Magners, Winco
Please do a little more research re the 737 rudder 'hard overs' and the TWA 800 fuel tank explosion.
Neither resulted in the grounding of the fleets, both occured several times over a period of years before corrective action was initiated, and there are many who are not fully convinced that they have been fully resolved.
No system/legislation/procedures is/are perfect.
edited to add; that said, ours was better than it is now.
Please do a little more research re the 737 rudder 'hard overs' and the TWA 800 fuel tank explosion.
Neither resulted in the grounding of the fleets, both occured several times over a period of years before corrective action was initiated, and there are many who are not fully convinced that they have been fully resolved.
No system/legislation/procedures is/are perfect.
edited to add; that said, ours was better than it is now.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Winco
Over 150 posts! About time I clicked here and ordered a Personal Title.
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Back in Geordie Land
Age: 52
Posts: 162
Magners,
If what you are now saying is to be believed, then it would appear that the Nimrod fleet have even more problems than we thought.
But you let yourself down somewhat with your conclusion of the 737 incident and the rudder actuator servo valve. What do you think happened AFTER the servo valve was identified? Do you think that the NTSB said 'OK, we know what the problem was, but what the heck?' Do you think they ignored the problem? or maybe they informed all operators of the problem and enforced them into a replacement? Which one do you think they went for?
TWA flight 500 was brought down by an explosion in a fuel tank that was empty of fuel but not fumes. A single hot-air/ignition source caused the explosion and the loss olf all on board. So what did the authorities do? Did they ignore that maybe? Of course not.
Winco
To start I did not in any way say there was a problem with the fleet, I am on about the 27 incident where the pipe failed which was duly replaced, the SCP in the 30 accident was noted as an ignition source, 2 different things completely.
Yes the 737 incident after it took a few losses and 1 lucky escape they found the fault. My only point im trying to make in these situations as well as many other type accidents, is the fact that nobody could see these things happeing. As for remedial action on both the accidents was carried out i cant answer that, but what im highlighting as I will repeat once more, nobody could have predicted this would happen. I think thats why they call them accidents.
Over 150 posts! About time I clicked here and ordered a Personal Title.
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Back in Geordie Land
Age: 52
Posts: 162
Magners,
If what you are now saying is to be believed, then it would appear that the Nimrod fleet have even more problems than we thought.
But you let yourself down somewhat with your conclusion of the 737 incident and the rudder actuator servo valve. What do you think happened AFTER the servo valve was identified? Do you think that the NTSB said 'OK, we know what the problem was, but what the heck?' Do you think they ignored the problem? or maybe they informed all operators of the problem and enforced them into a replacement? Which one do you think they went for?
TWA flight 500 was brought down by an explosion in a fuel tank that was empty of fuel but not fumes. A single hot-air/ignition source caused the explosion and the loss olf all on board. So what did the authorities do? Did they ignore that maybe? Of course not.
Winco
To start I did not in any way say there was a problem with the fleet, I am on about the 27 incident where the pipe failed which was duly replaced, the SCP in the 30 accident was noted as an ignition source, 2 different things completely.
Yes the 737 incident after it took a few losses and 1 lucky escape they found the fault. My only point im trying to make in these situations as well as many other type accidents, is the fact that nobody could see these things happeing. As for remedial action on both the accidents was carried out i cant answer that, but what im highlighting as I will repeat once more, nobody could have predicted this would happen. I think thats why they call them accidents.
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
XV227
RECOMMENDATIONS
39. It is recommended that:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
XV230
(6) Conclusions
b Thus the board was of the opinion that the hot air system's maintainence policy was a contributary factor in the loss of XV230
I don't think so
RECOMMENDATIONS
39. It is recommended that:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
XV230
(6) Conclusions
b Thus the board was of the opinion that the hot air system's maintainence policy was a contributary factor in the loss of XV230
Magnersdrinker..... 2 different things completely.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Well said TD, let us get back to the basics. We are still waiting for the results of the BAE SCP duct survey and subsequent maintenance recommendations, some 3 years after the incident.
DV
DV
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: scotland
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Mr Point,
No, no, no, that is not correct. The fault with 227 was a duct failure. Mr Point you must check your facts before you come out with bold statements like that.
Following 227's incident, the only logical action, in addition to those carried out, that could also have been taken, if it was believed that the duct would leak again, was to fit hot gas leak detectors next to the duct in the most likely places that it would leak (ie by joints). It took 20 years of low level (salty) air erosion to burst its way through from the inside. Another failure of that nature will not happen again in the lifetime of the MR2. If a joint leaks, well, that could only be due to human factors.
Unless you wish to challenge the BOI's findings, the SCP duct on 230 was not leaking. The SCP duct was simply extremely hot. Oh, just to put closure on this side issue, the crossfeed duct in the 7 Tank dry bay is surrounded by leak detectors which are connected to a big red light, right next to the AAR panel, so please do not even think it was leaking.
Regards
Ed Sett
There is little doubt that had action been taken by the RAF following the SCP hot pipe damage to XV227, Ben and the rest of Crew 3 would still be here.
Following 227's incident, the only logical action, in addition to those carried out, that could also have been taken, if it was believed that the duct would leak again, was to fit hot gas leak detectors next to the duct in the most likely places that it would leak (ie by joints). It took 20 years of low level (salty) air erosion to burst its way through from the inside. Another failure of that nature will not happen again in the lifetime of the MR2. If a joint leaks, well, that could only be due to human factors.
Unless you wish to challenge the BOI's findings, the SCP duct on 230 was not leaking. The SCP duct was simply extremely hot. Oh, just to put closure on this side issue, the crossfeed duct in the 7 Tank dry bay is surrounded by leak detectors which are connected to a big red light, right next to the AAR panel, so please do not even think it was leaking.
Regards
Ed Sett
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Lincs
Posts: 695
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Magners drinker
What you are failing to understand is that when the problems on the TWA flight and the 737 aircraft were identified, then action was taken immediately.
That was NOT the case with the Nimrod fuel tank/leak problems. You say that the incidents were not related, but I would have to disagree with you. The evidence strongly suggests that there was a link. I suppose there is a likelihood that they were exactly the same fault/failing. But to say that 227 had no bearing on 230 is not correct, because you don't know that!
Either way, the MOD chose to do nothing, and we all know the rest don't we.
TSM
What you are failing to understand is that when the problems on the TWA flight and the 737 aircraft were identified, then action was taken immediately.
That was NOT the case with the Nimrod fuel tank/leak problems. You say that the incidents were not related, but I would have to disagree with you. The evidence strongly suggests that there was a link. I suppose there is a likelihood that they were exactly the same fault/failing. But to say that 227 had no bearing on 230 is not correct, because you don't know that!
Either way, the MOD chose to do nothing, and we all know the rest don't we.
TSM
Guest
Posts: n/a
thanks for explaining it a bit better Edset , he said exactley what point im trying to put across. maybe we on diffrent wavelengths here and reading this wrong.
As im trying to say the 737 incident and the TWA , all im trying to get across is nobody could have forseen what happened. The case with 30 I dont think IMO we could have seen that happening. Thats the whole point im trying to get over. There has never been a reported incident like this because the XV227 incident was down to a ruptured pipe which may I add had no fuel involved. According to the board the SCP was a contributary factor yes as the fuel touched it and it was a possible source of ignition. that is the reason they have put it as a factor.
You guys have to stop comparing the two incidents, they are totally different, or maybe I am not explaining it well in an engineering point of view. Either way draw your own conclusions. It just seems that people who dont work on the aircraft have sentenced the Nimrod to the grave without anyone actually defending it.
as they say
crack on .....
As im trying to say the 737 incident and the TWA , all im trying to get across is nobody could have forseen what happened. The case with 30 I dont think IMO we could have seen that happening. Thats the whole point im trying to get over. There has never been a reported incident like this because the XV227 incident was down to a ruptured pipe which may I add had no fuel involved. According to the board the SCP was a contributary factor yes as the fuel touched it and it was a possible source of ignition. that is the reason they have put it as a factor.
You guys have to stop comparing the two incidents, they are totally different, or maybe I am not explaining it well in an engineering point of view. Either way draw your own conclusions. It just seems that people who dont work on the aircraft have sentenced the Nimrod to the grave without anyone actually defending it.
as they say
crack on .....
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Henley, Oxfordshire
Posts: 165
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Now I am confused EdSet. While the board certainly ruled out a repeat of the XV227 incident, the talk of the absence of a hot air leak seems very firm given that the board rests its findings on a series of probabilities and said on Para 38, pages 2-27 and 2-28:
It went on to say:
Did they not know about the leak warning system or would it just not have detected a small leak?
"Nonetheless, the board concluded that while a large hot air leak was unlikely, a small leak could have caused the necessary disruption [to a part of the fuel system] but would have needed a considerable time to do so."
"The Board concluded that a leak of engine bleed air could have caused disruption to the fuel system, either to a fuel coupling on the refuel pipe work or to a seal on the front face of No 7 tank, leading to a fuel leak when AAR pressurised the system, thus, such a fault is a possible cause of XV230's fire and, thus, of the loss of the aircraft."
Last edited by Mick Smith; 9th Dec 2007 at 19:19. Reason: correction of page number
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: N/A
Posts: 143
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To add to the good stuff that Magnersdrinker is trying to explain, I think one subtlety that was lost in the quotes above are the fact that the XV230 BoI's comments were related to the insulation of the hot air system's ducts, and not the ducts themselves. The few sentences before the bit quoted above were:
The Board believes that a lack of guidance on the allowable condition for hot air pipe insulation contributed to its gradual deterioration in some areas and that gaps between different types of insulation provided points of weakness in the system, making it possible for fuel to touch bare pipe metal at operating temperatures in excess of 400C. Thus, the Board was of the opinion that the hot air system's maintenance policy was a Contributory Factor in the loss of XV230.
So, they're not suggesting that there was a problem with ducts rupturing to allow hot air leaks there -- their point is that problems with insulation around the healthy, intact pipes could allow fuel to touch bare pipe metal. This is different from the quote about XV227:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
since that is talking about problems with the ducts themselves rupturing and allowing hot air leaks.
Had the accidents happened the other way round and both BoIs commented on the maintenance of the hot air system, there would have been a link since a hot air leak would also be an ignition source that could start a fire if fuel had leaked nearby. But they didn't and, as with Magners, I therefore can't relate the recent comment about insulation allowing the intact bare pipes to be an ignition source with the older comment about the pipes failing, and allowing hot air to leak.
The Board believes that a lack of guidance on the allowable condition for hot air pipe insulation contributed to its gradual deterioration in some areas and that gaps between different types of insulation provided points of weakness in the system, making it possible for fuel to touch bare pipe metal at operating temperatures in excess of 400C. Thus, the Board was of the opinion that the hot air system's maintenance policy was a Contributory Factor in the loss of XV230.
So, they're not suggesting that there was a problem with ducts rupturing to allow hot air leaks there -- their point is that problems with insulation around the healthy, intact pipes could allow fuel to touch bare pipe metal. This is different from the quote about XV227:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
since that is talking about problems with the ducts themselves rupturing and allowing hot air leaks.
Had the accidents happened the other way round and both BoIs commented on the maintenance of the hot air system, there would have been a link since a hot air leak would also be an ignition source that could start a fire if fuel had leaked nearby. But they didn't and, as with Magners, I therefore can't relate the recent comment about insulation allowing the intact bare pipes to be an ignition source with the older comment about the pipes failing, and allowing hot air to leak.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: scotland
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Did they not know about the leak warning system or would it just not have detected a small leak?
Its all in the report.
Someone asked "what leak detectors?". I was referring to 5 hot gas leak detectors as descriptive terms for non Nimrod folk, to describe the Centre Section Overheat detectors, in that zone, set at 230 degrees.
Regards
Ed Sett
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: scotland
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Further to my last message, the thrust of my comment to Mr Point was that no action by the RAF in respect to the SCP failure on 227 would have avoided the events on 230, and I still stand by that remark. If the brand new SCP pipe leaked, it would have been through human error, not policy failure. Besides, the SCP pipe is at the bottom of the bay and IMHO a leak from it would not reach up to the fuel pipes with sufficient energy to damage seals inside couplings. It is my opinion that the possible small hot gas leak referred to in the BOI would be from the crossfeed pipe, which is very close to the fuel pipes.
Ed Sett
Ed Sett
My reading of this is that MoD admitted liability because of Sir Clive Loader’s comment in the report that the MoD’s airworthiness regulations were not applied properly.
Instead of arguing over the finer design points of the fuel and other systems – a line which the MoD would gladly see their detractors tie themselves up in knots over - would it not be better to concentrate on the area where MoD is known to have weaknesses?
I, for one, am concerned that the BoI seemingly had such a narrow remit that it did not explore this area. Browne’s statement to the House would, I believe, have been very different had Sir Clive not said what he did.
This is not the only BoI report by any means which has alluded to such dereliction of duty. But it is the first to spell it out. Sea King ASaC. Tornado / Patriot. Both reports share one thing in common. They are particularly damning about aircraft systems, both safety related, which have clearly not been tested, installed, trialed, evaluated or introduced properly. On Sea King, it was a strobe light which the pilot had to switch off in darkness because he couldn’t see, leaving him with no forward anti collision light. (The aircraft collided almost head on). On Tornado, the IFF failure warnings were not integrated properly so the crew did not have the proper indication of system failure. (They were shot down due to misidentification). In both cases, one would expect the BoI to explore this further. They didn’t, yet the issues jump out at you. Note – they condemned a system as “unfit for purpose” but didn’t explore the evidence as to why it was fitted, removed (why?), and fitted again (why?). Nor did the Coroner. Why?? So many obvious questions but it would seem the political imperative was to prevent probing questions.
Different systems to Nimrod, but the root cause is the same. Poor application of mandated airworthiness regulations. Other similarities? Well, look at the people in MoD who ruled airworthiness, risk management, configuration control and safety were, effectively, optional. And that’s just accidents since 2003. The most casual examination of Chinook / Mull reveals precisely the same problems. So, that’s a 14 year period of neglect, at least.
Finally, I think it vitally important that the Review announced by Browne is not staffed by the people I mention, or their bagmen. It must be seen to be truly independent. The starting point is Sir Clive’s statement – the airworthiness process as not been applied properly. They must look back to understand why not, and must not confine themselves to Nimrod, as the processes apply to all aircraft and equipment. They must not be allowed to trot out the old “water under the bridge” rubbish. They were told long ago that there was a dam further downstream that was about to be breached. It was.
Instead of arguing over the finer design points of the fuel and other systems – a line which the MoD would gladly see their detractors tie themselves up in knots over - would it not be better to concentrate on the area where MoD is known to have weaknesses?
I, for one, am concerned that the BoI seemingly had such a narrow remit that it did not explore this area. Browne’s statement to the House would, I believe, have been very different had Sir Clive not said what he did.
This is not the only BoI report by any means which has alluded to such dereliction of duty. But it is the first to spell it out. Sea King ASaC. Tornado / Patriot. Both reports share one thing in common. They are particularly damning about aircraft systems, both safety related, which have clearly not been tested, installed, trialed, evaluated or introduced properly. On Sea King, it was a strobe light which the pilot had to switch off in darkness because he couldn’t see, leaving him with no forward anti collision light. (The aircraft collided almost head on). On Tornado, the IFF failure warnings were not integrated properly so the crew did not have the proper indication of system failure. (They were shot down due to misidentification). In both cases, one would expect the BoI to explore this further. They didn’t, yet the issues jump out at you. Note – they condemned a system as “unfit for purpose” but didn’t explore the evidence as to why it was fitted, removed (why?), and fitted again (why?). Nor did the Coroner. Why?? So many obvious questions but it would seem the political imperative was to prevent probing questions.
Different systems to Nimrod, but the root cause is the same. Poor application of mandated airworthiness regulations. Other similarities? Well, look at the people in MoD who ruled airworthiness, risk management, configuration control and safety were, effectively, optional. And that’s just accidents since 2003. The most casual examination of Chinook / Mull reveals precisely the same problems. So, that’s a 14 year period of neglect, at least.
Finally, I think it vitally important that the Review announced by Browne is not staffed by the people I mention, or their bagmen. It must be seen to be truly independent. The starting point is Sir Clive’s statement – the airworthiness process as not been applied properly. They must look back to understand why not, and must not confine themselves to Nimrod, as the processes apply to all aircraft and equipment. They must not be allowed to trot out the old “water under the bridge” rubbish. They were told long ago that there was a dam further downstream that was about to be breached. It was.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Washington, DC
Age: 78
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
EU Maritime Surveillance Task
Excuse my lack of understanding here, maybe I am completely wrong, but if the maritime surveillance of Europe is so important to the EU, as many reports indicate, shouldn't there be EU funding to bring these aircraft up to the relevant safety standard?
As the RAF is protecting NATO, and the EU could MoD request EU funds to cover all the modifications mentioned during this thread. Or are these funds only for Parks, Palaces and Monuments.
As the RAF is protecting NATO, and the EU could MoD request EU funds to cover all the modifications mentioned during this thread. Or are these funds only for Parks, Palaces and Monuments.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Over the sea and far away
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
EdSet,
I am fully aware that the XV227 incident was as a result of duct failure. My point is that the first recommendation of the XV227 incident reports was:
Had a comprehensive maintenance policy been adopted following the 2004 incident involving ducting failure, it is likely that the insulation condition would have been included in the review.
This is NOT a challenge to the BoI findings, merely an echo:
XV230 BoI:
I appreciate that hindsight is always 20/20, but risk assessments must be thorough.
I am fully aware that the XV227 incident was as a result of duct failure. My point is that the first recommendation of the XV227 incident reports was:
RECOMMENDATIONS
39. It is recommended that:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
39. It is recommended that:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
This is NOT a challenge to the BoI findings, merely an echo:
XV230 BoI:
65 Recommendations
a. Policy.
(1) The Nimrod Maintenance Policy is reviewed to ensure that maintenance procedures reflect the increasing age of the aircraft.
a. Policy.
(1) The Nimrod Maintenance Policy is reviewed to ensure that maintenance procedures reflect the increasing age of the aircraft.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: The Shed
Posts: 195
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
tucumseh - your analysis of the root cause of this tragic incident, and indeed the systemic weakness inherent in the military regulatory and procurement organisations, has been spot on throughout the life of this thread. Your insight into these arcane bodies is such that I'm surprised you don't have a fleet of black omegas parked outside your door.
To clarify a point in your previous post:
As I understand it, the remit of any BoI is to find out the causal factors behind an accident, but post Mull / Chinook, not to apportion blame. This BoI, which could well be the watershed for future inquiries, has taken 15 months of painstaking analysis to come up with a highly credible explanantion for the loss of 30. I believe that SoS has announced a further review, conducted by a QC, to seek answers and apportion blame where necessary for the failings that you have already highlighted to the Prune community.
While I welcome this review wholeheartedly, I understand the QC has been given a very tight timeline (3 months) to report. I may not be seeing the big picture, but that seems a mighty short time to conduct a holistic review of the systems and personnel that you have articulated to us over the last few months, tuc? What do you think?
To clarify a point in your previous post:
Instead of arguing over the finer design points of the fuel and other systems – a line which the MoD would gladly see their detractors tie themselves up in knots over - would it not be better to concentrate on the area where MoD is known to have weaknesses?
I, for one, am concerned that the BoI seemingly had such a narrow remit that it did not explore this area.
I, for one, am concerned that the BoI seemingly had such a narrow remit that it did not explore this area.
While I welcome this review wholeheartedly, I understand the QC has been given a very tight timeline (3 months) to report. I may not be seeing the big picture, but that seems a mighty short time to conduct a holistic review of the systems and personnel that you have articulated to us over the last few months, tuc? What do you think?