Nimrod Information
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TD
An average of 9 AAR sorties for the fleet between 1993-2005.Then in 2006 18 AAR sorties, 9 of which XV230 did, 7 of which were in Aug 2006 why XV230 and not any of the other ac in theatre ????
Just because ISK had more than 1 frame in theatre, it is not neccessarily true that all are mission capable on any given day
Also the other(s) may well have been at a different location where AAR support was not required.
CS
Last edited by camelspyyder; 11th Dec 2007 at 17:12. Reason: change to detail
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why XV230 and not any of the other ac in theatre ????
XV230 probably had more AAR sorties clocked up than the other jets purely because it was serviceable more than those other jets in theatre, and therefore available for more sorties than those other jets. Also, as CS said above, the other jets in theatre may have been elsewhere doing other jobs that did not require AAR.
MadMark!!!
BOI Timings
Sorry, I fully admit I haven't read every comment since page 92, so this might already have been mentioned, but.........
Has nobody else noticed the contents of Annex A to the BOI report - Diary of Action.
According to this diary the final report was presented to the AOC on Fri 20 April, but it was only released on 3 December. So it took the BOI 7.5 months to complete its analysis, and it then took another 7.5 months for the report to go through the Stn Cdr, AOC, AMM and CinC. Is it just me, or does this seem excessive. Nearly 2 months per senior officer?
Given the high profile nature of the report, the speculation taking place before its publication, and the desire of the families involved to achieve closure, I would have thought there would have been a degree of urgency involved, indeed as there should be in any BOI. Or am I being totally naive about what is actually involved in the process?
Has nobody else noticed the contents of Annex A to the BOI report - Diary of Action.
According to this diary the final report was presented to the AOC on Fri 20 April, but it was only released on 3 December. So it took the BOI 7.5 months to complete its analysis, and it then took another 7.5 months for the report to go through the Stn Cdr, AOC, AMM and CinC. Is it just me, or does this seem excessive. Nearly 2 months per senior officer?
Given the high profile nature of the report, the speculation taking place before its publication, and the desire of the families involved to achieve closure, I would have thought there would have been a degree of urgency involved, indeed as there should be in any BOI. Or am I being totally naive about what is actually involved in the process?
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Biggus, worse still, there have been 4 major fuel leaks since the crash and they were not mentioned, (not considered?) by the BoI.
Worse, I understand that the crew who Maydayed into Kandahar were not aware of the contents of the BoI either. So, Sir Glenn had the info all that time but the crews didn't.
I guess he was only following protocol but christ, we are at war!
Worse, I understand that the crew who Maydayed into Kandahar were not aware of the contents of the BoI either. So, Sir Glenn had the info all that time but the crews didn't.
I guess he was only following protocol but christ, we are at war!
Last edited by nigegilb; 12th Dec 2007 at 07:49.
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BOI Timeline
Biggus,
I do not know why MOD stopped the timeline on 20 Apr, but if you look at Part 2A to the BOI which follows from the main BOI page 2-51 the AOC 2 Group re-convened the Board on 24 May for further work - there is, confusingly, a second set of pages 2-1 to 2-6 and a further Annex A dealing with fuel leak statistics. No date is given for the end of this additional work, but they quote a date of June for one of their references.
Hope this helps.
JB
I do not know why MOD stopped the timeline on 20 Apr, but if you look at Part 2A to the BOI which follows from the main BOI page 2-51 the AOC 2 Group re-convened the Board on 24 May for further work - there is, confusingly, a second set of pages 2-1 to 2-6 and a further Annex A dealing with fuel leak statistics. No date is given for the end of this additional work, but they quote a date of June for one of their references.
Hope this helps.
JB
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EdSet100 you stated, earlier
Actually the report states "One experiment conducted by the board on an area of compressed [damaged implied] insulation indicated only a 16 degree difference between an exposed section of hot air pipe and the exterior of the insulated blanket"
What the board should have done was measure the temperture difference on an undamaged section of piping, as well, so that a comparison could be made.
DV
The existing insulation has been recorded to drop the temperature by 16 degrees C
What the board should have done was measure the temperture difference on an undamaged section of piping, as well, so that a comparison could be made.
DV
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Point B. Nim IPT are also doing their best,
Did you have any dealings with them on safety and airworthiness prior to the loss of XV230 ?
S_H
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Fuel Paths
EdSet, when fuel 'blows off' during AAR, the quantity of fuel can be considerable - depends upon how quickly aircrew notice and stop receiving. This fuel can track all over the aircraft and get into panels and compartments. Since 30, 'blow offs' have been reported and this event is better understood; hence, the revised AAR procedures post 30. Before 30, there were no incident reports to highlight that 'blow off' was happening.
NB: Routine AAR was suspended after 30. Authority given for operationally essential AAR under Service Deviation. Since 35, operational AAR also suspended - until they figure out why, what looks like a perfectly serviceable coupling, leaked during airborne AAR but does not leak during AAR behind a Tristar on the ground.
NB: Routine AAR was suspended after 30. Authority given for operationally essential AAR under Service Deviation. Since 35, operational AAR also suspended - until they figure out why, what looks like a perfectly serviceable coupling, leaked during airborne AAR but does not leak during AAR behind a Tristar on the ground.
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We have been given the 14th January 2008 for the Pre-Inquest into the loss of XV230. Considering how long it takes usually to get an Inquest started its good news.
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Nimrod Inquiry chairman and terms of reference
Written statement by Des Browne today.
I told the House on 4 December that, following the board of inquiry’s report about the loss of Nimrod XV230, I would establish an independent review by a senior Queen’s counsel into a range of broader issues which were outside the scope of the BOI’s investigation. I am now able to set out the details of that review.
The review will be conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC. Mr. Haddon-Cave has wide experience of aviation and safety matters, having been instructed in all the major aviation and marine inquiries in England in the last 20 years. His report will be published in fall [sic], subject to considerations of operational security, together with my response to it.
The terms of reference for the review are as follows:
In the light of the board of inquiry report:
to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.
Appropriate technical expertise will be made available to the reviewer. The reviewer will be able to recommend a public inquiry if he considers this necessary.
The review will have the full support of the Ministry of Defence. All relevant papers will be made available and everyone who can assist the review will be instructed to do so. In order to encourage openness, evidence given during the course of the review will not be used in disciplinary proceedings against the individual who gave it unless there is evidence of gross misconduct. The MOD will also provide Mr. Haddon-Cave, at his request, with a secretariat for the review.
BAE Systems and QinetiQ have confirmed that Mr. Haddon-Cave will have their full co-operation. The MOD and the companies are committed to ensuring that the review has available to it all the technical expertise that it will require. I would expect any other companies whose assistance may be required to follow suit.
Mr. Haddon-Cave will ensure that the families are kept informed of the progress of the review.
It is of the utmost importance that an authoritative and independent analysis is conducted of the background circumstances to the loss of Nimrod XV230. The task which Mr. Haddon-Cave has undertaken will be complex but I have asked him to ensure that information that would assist our understanding of this tragic loss is published without undue delay.
The review will be conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC. Mr. Haddon-Cave has wide experience of aviation and safety matters, having been instructed in all the major aviation and marine inquiries in England in the last 20 years. His report will be published in fall [sic], subject to considerations of operational security, together with my response to it.
The terms of reference for the review are as follows:
In the light of the board of inquiry report:
to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.
Appropriate technical expertise will be made available to the reviewer. The reviewer will be able to recommend a public inquiry if he considers this necessary.
The review will have the full support of the Ministry of Defence. All relevant papers will be made available and everyone who can assist the review will be instructed to do so. In order to encourage openness, evidence given during the course of the review will not be used in disciplinary proceedings against the individual who gave it unless there is evidence of gross misconduct. The MOD will also provide Mr. Haddon-Cave, at his request, with a secretariat for the review.
BAE Systems and QinetiQ have confirmed that Mr. Haddon-Cave will have their full co-operation. The MOD and the companies are committed to ensuring that the review has available to it all the technical expertise that it will require. I would expect any other companies whose assistance may be required to follow suit.
Mr. Haddon-Cave will ensure that the families are kept informed of the progress of the review.
It is of the utmost importance that an authoritative and independent analysis is conducted of the background circumstances to the loss of Nimrod XV230. The task which Mr. Haddon-Cave has undertaken will be complex but I have asked him to ensure that information that would assist our understanding of this tragic loss is published without undue delay.
tristan23
So what is 'routine AAR', as opposed to 'operationally essential AAR'?
Depending on how you define it, it is possible that no Nimrod AAR was suspended after 230 and it all continued, albeit under Service Deviation!
So what is 'routine AAR', as opposed to 'operationally essential AAR'?
Depending on how you define it, it is possible that no Nimrod AAR was suspended after 230 and it all continued, albeit under Service Deviation!
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Biggus
Yes they did AAR on the 4th Sept 2006 just two days after the crash and continued to get fuel leaks following AAR. I have a number of SFS stating this.
It is possible that no Nimrod AAR was suspended after 230 and it all continued, albeit under Service Deviation!
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Operational Requirement
As stated (no speculation) - AAR carried out since 30 has been authorised by the Theatre Commander under Service Deviation for missions deemed operationally essential. Only other person able to specifically authorise AAR is AOC 2 Gp. Those with access can read the SD.
The terms of reference for the review are as follows:
In the light of the board of inquiry report:
to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.
Safeware is right. The processes exist and are robust. It’s implementation that’s lacking. And the processes, procedures and regulations apply to all aircraft, not just Nimrod.
I hope Mr Haddon-Cave has already seen through this and sought clarification……………
Forgive me, but the cynic in me says;
It has already been established, in the QQ report and elsewhere, that little historical documentation can be found in MoD’s Nimrod records. This could because (a) they have been destroyed, (b) lost or (c) hidden. Another ploy is to deny their existence in the first place. This worked on another accident mentioned here (or at least the claim doesn’t seem to have been challenged even though someone else produced the evidence that “didn’t exist”).
Who will the QC ask? The two Nimrod IPTs? They were only formed relatively recently. Who will he ask about records from 1979 to 1999? The last Director/Maritime in MoD(PE)? At least he is available – he made his position clear in the BoI report – most, if not all, his predecessors and their immediate superiors are retired which, apparently, precludes them from being interviewed.
DPA? Safety and airworthiness are optional. Disagree? Disciplinary action. Simple matter of record.
What about AMSO / AML? (DLO’s predecessors in the Air domain, 1991 to establishment of DLO). Well, their policy was clear. Thou shalt not address safety issues, or maintain the build standard in general, which includes safety / airworthiness. (Read the QQ report, it spells out the evidence). But I’m sure retired Directors General Support Management will offer to explain decisions. (If there is anyone left who remembers names. Try the boards in Bazelgette Pavilion foyer).
DLO? Oh Dear.
DE&S? They simply agree with previous rulings and have “nothing more to add”.
Minister for the Armed Forces? He’s advised by all the above to agree with previous decisions and also has “nothing more to add”.
(Well I hope Mr Haddon-Cave invites them to “add”).
And all the while the Corporate Memory (a requirement for airworthiness) is being eroded; nay, actively ditched.
One positive is that personnel records should remain. The people who were disciplined for refusing to ignore safety and airworthiness are well known. What, those records disappeared as well? Hopefully someone kept their own.
Conjecture? Yes, some of it. The rest is in writing.
Here’s my suggested starter for ten (as it’s always the starting point for any requirement – and airworthiness and safety should be requirements). When was the last time a sponsor or user ASKED for airworthiness or safety to be maintained? You think that’s a silly question? If you don’t ask, you don’t get. (And even if you ask, there’s no guarantee the BCs will give). If, one year, you don’t get, you create an immediate gap in the airworthiness and safety audit trails. And the next year, the BCs say “You didn’t need it last year, so you’re not getting it this year or next”. A manageable “gap” becomes an unbridgeable chasm. Now, that’s absolutely nothing to do with the Nimrod IPTs directly (although their embedded Requirement Managers should be interested) and I doubt very much if there is anyone in the IPTs who remember. The process I describe is mandated by PUS (but rejected by just about everyone else in authority). It’s called “making materiel and financial provision”. Wait a minute, just checking my dairies. Ah, here we are. 29th Jan 1998. “Of no concern to MoD(PE)”. (Nimrod 2 Star). What?
In the light of the board of inquiry report:
to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.
Safeware is right. The processes exist and are robust. It’s implementation that’s lacking. And the processes, procedures and regulations apply to all aircraft, not just Nimrod.
I hope Mr Haddon-Cave has already seen through this and sought clarification……………
Forgive me, but the cynic in me says;
It has already been established, in the QQ report and elsewhere, that little historical documentation can be found in MoD’s Nimrod records. This could because (a) they have been destroyed, (b) lost or (c) hidden. Another ploy is to deny their existence in the first place. This worked on another accident mentioned here (or at least the claim doesn’t seem to have been challenged even though someone else produced the evidence that “didn’t exist”).
Who will the QC ask? The two Nimrod IPTs? They were only formed relatively recently. Who will he ask about records from 1979 to 1999? The last Director/Maritime in MoD(PE)? At least he is available – he made his position clear in the BoI report – most, if not all, his predecessors and their immediate superiors are retired which, apparently, precludes them from being interviewed.
DPA? Safety and airworthiness are optional. Disagree? Disciplinary action. Simple matter of record.
What about AMSO / AML? (DLO’s predecessors in the Air domain, 1991 to establishment of DLO). Well, their policy was clear. Thou shalt not address safety issues, or maintain the build standard in general, which includes safety / airworthiness. (Read the QQ report, it spells out the evidence). But I’m sure retired Directors General Support Management will offer to explain decisions. (If there is anyone left who remembers names. Try the boards in Bazelgette Pavilion foyer).
DLO? Oh Dear.
DE&S? They simply agree with previous rulings and have “nothing more to add”.
Minister for the Armed Forces? He’s advised by all the above to agree with previous decisions and also has “nothing more to add”.
(Well I hope Mr Haddon-Cave invites them to “add”).
And all the while the Corporate Memory (a requirement for airworthiness) is being eroded; nay, actively ditched.
One positive is that personnel records should remain. The people who were disciplined for refusing to ignore safety and airworthiness are well known. What, those records disappeared as well? Hopefully someone kept their own.
Conjecture? Yes, some of it. The rest is in writing.
Here’s my suggested starter for ten (as it’s always the starting point for any requirement – and airworthiness and safety should be requirements). When was the last time a sponsor or user ASKED for airworthiness or safety to be maintained? You think that’s a silly question? If you don’t ask, you don’t get. (And even if you ask, there’s no guarantee the BCs will give). If, one year, you don’t get, you create an immediate gap in the airworthiness and safety audit trails. And the next year, the BCs say “You didn’t need it last year, so you’re not getting it this year or next”. A manageable “gap” becomes an unbridgeable chasm. Now, that’s absolutely nothing to do with the Nimrod IPTs directly (although their embedded Requirement Managers should be interested) and I doubt very much if there is anyone in the IPTs who remember. The process I describe is mandated by PUS (but rejected by just about everyone else in authority). It’s called “making materiel and financial provision”. Wait a minute, just checking my dairies. Ah, here we are. 29th Jan 1998. “Of no concern to MoD(PE)”. (Nimrod 2 Star). What?