Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety
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The snivelling excuse for a minister Reid was ambushed on C4 news tonight.
I think he was expecting to spout some pre-election propaganda, but Krishnan Guru-Murthy managed to squeeze in a 5 minute grilling.
During this grilling, Reid claimed that:
- More knowledgable people than he made the decision not to fit the £50K system.
- The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
- The fact the RAF didn't develop the system was because they didn't have the US experience of anti-aircraft small arms fire in Vietnam.
- The system was being currently fitted to airframes.
- Airframes that were not fitted were still perfectly safe.
Is there anyone out there that can contradict this oxygen thief waste of space? He appears not to understand that learning from experience does not have to be first hand, and has no grasp of elementary logic - if something is safe then why does it need to be made safe?
Yet another attempt to spin corner-cutting and penny pinching, shifting the buck elsewhere and pretending that something is being done about it. If there was any justice, his mallet-impacted head would be adorning an Afghan polo field. I have great respect for those who can campaign dispassionately about this issue, it is something beyond me!
I think he was expecting to spout some pre-election propaganda, but Krishnan Guru-Murthy managed to squeeze in a 5 minute grilling.
During this grilling, Reid claimed that:
- More knowledgable people than he made the decision not to fit the £50K system.
- The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
- The fact the RAF didn't develop the system was because they didn't have the US experience of anti-aircraft small arms fire in Vietnam.
- The system was being currently fitted to airframes.
- Airframes that were not fitted were still perfectly safe.
Is there anyone out there that can contradict this oxygen thief waste of space? He appears not to understand that learning from experience does not have to be first hand, and has no grasp of elementary logic - if something is safe then why does it need to be made safe?
Yet another attempt to spin corner-cutting and penny pinching, shifting the buck elsewhere and pretending that something is being done about it. If there was any justice, his mallet-impacted head would be adorning an Afghan polo field. I have great respect for those who can campaign dispassionately about this issue, it is something beyond me!
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Fantaman,
You have beaten me to it! My blood is still boiling about watching that spout his rot.
The false economy of penny pinching and corner cutting to save a few bucks in the short term is now a well established practice inside the MOD. As the "Airships" pat themselves on the back by saving money as they remove the next safety measure, it is mugs like us left to fly the under protected aircraft around the cr@pholes of this world providing target practice for anyone with an AK47.
The whole issue is rotten to the core.
You have beaten me to it! My blood is still boiling about watching that
spout his rot. The false economy of penny pinching and corner cutting to save a few bucks in the short term is now a well established practice inside the MOD. As the "Airships" pat themselves on the back by saving money as they remove the next safety measure, it is mugs like us left to fly the under protected aircraft around the cr@pholes of this world providing target practice for anyone with an AK47.
The whole issue is rotten to the core.
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Just watched C4 news too.
And he had been talking clap trap about how it was OK when you admitted culpability but should be given a chance to put it right. No need for accountability and LOSING YOUR JOB FOR INCOMPERTENCE! That for the Home Secretary but for him no no no... The boys at the front end were in the wrong for not requesting this (more than twice apparently)...
Sorry blood just coming down below point it can return to liquid state...
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I am surprised he does not blame my father whilst he is at it. Unfortunately for politicians the buck stops with them. 2 politicians are named on the notice of corporate manslaughter. Guess one of them. I understand C4 are interested in following up my interview. I am very much looking forward to getting the chance to go head to head with Mr Reid or Mr Ingram.
It can be very difficult to get things up the chain of command. I tried and failed which is why my father wrote to the Govt direct. I was simply told that there was no money available. The notice given to Ministers gives them some foresight for a change. Hopefully they will use it.
It can be very difficult to get things up the chain of command. I tried and failed which is why my father wrote to the Govt direct. I was simply told that there was no money available. The notice given to Ministers gives them some foresight for a change. Hopefully they will use it.
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Absolute piffle Dr Reid! IIRC the request for input on Lessons Identified on Op Veritas actually came from HQ 2 Gp, in turn, from an HQSTC mandate, so it couldn't have reamined on the Sqn as the Stn Cdr wanted it asap!
But that's not the point, as someone has already said, "why should the worker bees do the queen's thinking for her"? There was work being done on this at HQ 2 Gp, the AWC and MOD so to blame the sqn is farcical. Its probably not even a Gp or Command responsibility, even though some errors certainly happened all through the chain of command. Ultimately, however, the responsibility lies at the feet of the MOD and the Minister - fact.
If they have any honour or integrity, ministers should now meet those responsibilities head on as outlined above.
But that's not the point, as someone has already said, "why should the worker bees do the queen's thinking for her"? There was work being done on this at HQ 2 Gp, the AWC and MOD so to blame the sqn is farcical. Its probably not even a Gp or Command responsibility, even though some errors certainly happened all through the chain of command. Ultimately, however, the responsibility lies at the feet of the MOD and the Minister - fact.
If they have any honour or integrity, ministers should now meet those responsibilities head on as outlined above.
Last edited by flipster; 3rd May 2006 at 21:13.
Jess….
“The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
During this grilling, Reid claimed that:
- More knowledgable people than he made the decision not to fit the £50K system.
- The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
- The fact the RAF didn't develop the system was because they didn't have the US experience of anti-aircraft small arms fire in Vietnam.
- The system was being currently fitted to airframes.
- Airframes that were not fitted were still perfectly safe.
Is there anyone out there that can contradict this oxygen thief waste of space? He appears not to understand that learning from experience does not have to be first hand, and has no grasp of elementary logic - if something is safe then why does it need to be made safe?”
I concur.
The point he seems not to understand (presumably in common with those who feed him these answers) is that it is not for the user community to specify an engineering solution; but to identify the problem, and assist DEC and HQSTC (?) categorise it as a Limitation (in which case they develop a work around) or an Operational Constraint (in which case DEC is more or less duty bound to take it forward – although this is subject to deeper categorisations such as Critical, Major, Minor). The trick here is to tag it (legitimately of course) as a Safety Constraint and cry Duty of Care. That way, it hits DEC post haste. Terminology may change, but the basic process stands.
DEC, having successfully bid or identified funding through offsets etc, “task” the IPT. And oversee the work through their Requirements Manager. It is for these people to develop an engineering solution and progress it to delivery. It is therefore ALWAYS disingenuous to say aircrew never said they wanted this or that system.
Why would the RAF need to “develop” the system if it was already fitted to the same aircraft in other countries. Assuming the basic system was approved by Lockheed Martin for other variants, it is a relatively simple job to do this on the RAF’s. Unless, of course, the LM design was unsuitable in some way and, say, could not get through our MAR process.
Given the practice that the aircraft is deemed safe (through the MAR process) at the “as built” build standard (in this case, excluding the foam system / DAS) then this is another disingenuous and meaningless statement. Did he say “airframes”? I’m sure they are safe, but I’d want the whole aircraft to be safe as well. A typical misunderstanding as to safety audit trail. One hopes they have a Whole Aircraft Safety Case which reflects the In Use build standard, not just the As Built one.
I imagine some pointed questions based on the above would make them squirm.
“The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
During this grilling, Reid claimed that:
- More knowledgable people than he made the decision not to fit the £50K system.
- The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
- The fact the RAF didn't develop the system was because they didn't have the US experience of anti-aircraft small arms fire in Vietnam.
- The system was being currently fitted to airframes.
- Airframes that were not fitted were still perfectly safe.
Is there anyone out there that can contradict this oxygen thief waste of space? He appears not to understand that learning from experience does not have to be first hand, and has no grasp of elementary logic - if something is safe then why does it need to be made safe?”
I concur.
The point he seems not to understand (presumably in common with those who feed him these answers) is that it is not for the user community to specify an engineering solution; but to identify the problem, and assist DEC and HQSTC (?) categorise it as a Limitation (in which case they develop a work around) or an Operational Constraint (in which case DEC is more or less duty bound to take it forward – although this is subject to deeper categorisations such as Critical, Major, Minor). The trick here is to tag it (legitimately of course) as a Safety Constraint and cry Duty of Care. That way, it hits DEC post haste. Terminology may change, but the basic process stands.
DEC, having successfully bid or identified funding through offsets etc, “task” the IPT. And oversee the work through their Requirements Manager. It is for these people to develop an engineering solution and progress it to delivery. It is therefore ALWAYS disingenuous to say aircrew never said they wanted this or that system.
Why would the RAF need to “develop” the system if it was already fitted to the same aircraft in other countries. Assuming the basic system was approved by Lockheed Martin for other variants, it is a relatively simple job to do this on the RAF’s. Unless, of course, the LM design was unsuitable in some way and, say, could not get through our MAR process.
Given the practice that the aircraft is deemed safe (through the MAR process) at the “as built” build standard (in this case, excluding the foam system / DAS) then this is another disingenuous and meaningless statement. Did he say “airframes”? I’m sure they are safe, but I’d want the whole aircraft to be safe as well. A typical misunderstanding as to safety audit trail. One hopes they have a Whole Aircraft Safety Case which reflects the In Use build standard, not just the As Built one.
I imagine some pointed questions based on the above would make them squirm.
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The Minister has thrown down the gauntlet to the Sqn. Please contact me if you have info on PXR 1981 requesting foam. Everything you have got gentlemen. I need confirmation of Gatow incident. I would like every exchange officer who served in USAF to contact me if he verbally or otherwise requested foam. Thanks NG
Tucumseh as always thanks I am who you think I am!
Tucumseh as always thanks I am who you think I am!
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I have been keeping up to date with this thread - though as yet have not posted any comments. As a relative of a member of XV179 I give full support to the efforts of Nige and Sarah to have foam and all possible safety measures fitted to to ALL RAF aircraft. Not withstanding the evasive answers of our politicians should not these measures have been implemented YEARS AGO! We the families are still grieving, it will be a long time - if ever- when the sight of 10 coffins being unloaded from the C17 will recede in my memory. ALL possible measures should be taken to prevent any other family members going through what we have/are going through. For goodness sake - when I think of money wasted on other matters what is £50,000 per airframe. How much does an aircraft cost - what price is put on the lives of those who fly and travel in them. Keep battling Nige and Sarah.
Wise words,
However, to play devil's advocate there are a couple of points to note. Firstly, when we spec a DAS for an ac where do you stop? How much is enough, and how much does it cost (esp whole life costs)? Secondly, the decision not to fit the tank inertion system would have been taken years ago and mitigated under "military risk". A succession of military pers would have endorsed this decision over the years; note the deafening silence of anybody stepping forward, admitting they were wrong and falling on their sword....
50K a pop, sounds like small change. However in this time of EP bow-waves somebody else will lose out to fund it. Maybe we could scrap the JPA cocktail party and cull a few 3 & 4*s, we'll soon have enough then. An old QFI once told me that his measure of sending an abo solo was to consider if he would let them fly his kids; perhaps our airships should start thinking about this when they send inappropriately equipped frames into theatres where the threat is tangible.
However, to play devil's advocate there are a couple of points to note. Firstly, when we spec a DAS for an ac where do you stop? How much is enough, and how much does it cost (esp whole life costs)? Secondly, the decision not to fit the tank inertion system would have been taken years ago and mitigated under "military risk". A succession of military pers would have endorsed this decision over the years; note the deafening silence of anybody stepping forward, admitting they were wrong and falling on their sword....
50K a pop, sounds like small change. However in this time of EP bow-waves somebody else will lose out to fund it. Maybe we could scrap the JPA cocktail party and cull a few 3 & 4*s, we'll soon have enough then. An old QFI once told me that his measure of sending an abo solo was to consider if he would let them fly his kids; perhaps our airships should start thinking about this when they send inappropriately equipped frames into theatres where the threat is tangible.
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Airframes that were not fitted were still perfectly safe.
So, as regards tuc's "One hopes they have a Whole Aircraft Safety Case which reflects the In Use build standard, not just the As Built one." there is also a requirement to reflect the 'as operated' situation.
sw
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A valid point!
I have always said that when the politicial pressure to fly day LL become too great, the threat changed, as did and our kit requirements. All of a sudden, we needed fire suppresants and FDA and damn quickly - which was highlighted to those above. What they did with that info, only they can tell, I would like to ask the Lyneham Stn Cdr what he wrote and why along with AOC 2 Gp. Nonetheless, the stuff had been asked for before - going back to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe - so it can't have come as a suprise to MOD, for goodness sake? So don't blame group captains or even AVMs - its much higher than that!
Having said that, Reid is quite keen to accept that his dept made mistakes but doesn't quite go as far as accepting the responsibility himself. Yes, progress on foam is apparent (not enough and too late in my book) but where is the apology and recompense to the families?
The Gov't can even make themselves look human if they pluck enough courage to do that.
I have always said that when the politicial pressure to fly day LL become too great, the threat changed, as did and our kit requirements. All of a sudden, we needed fire suppresants and FDA and damn quickly - which was highlighted to those above. What they did with that info, only they can tell, I would like to ask the Lyneham Stn Cdr what he wrote and why along with AOC 2 Gp. Nonetheless, the stuff had been asked for before - going back to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe - so it can't have come as a suprise to MOD, for goodness sake? So don't blame group captains or even AVMs - its much higher than that!
Having said that, Reid is quite keen to accept that his dept made mistakes but doesn't quite go as far as accepting the responsibility himself. Yes, progress on foam is apparent (not enough and too late in my book) but where is the apology and recompense to the families?
The Gov't can even make themselves look human if they pluck enough courage to do that.
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All 3 above - Gents (and Ladies) you are right to criticise Reid for his poorly constructed arguments. But are you aware of the Herc thread that normally sits near the top of the thread board? I suugest your posts would sit well there, rather than start another? Mods, perhaps a 'merge' might be in order?
Flipster
Flipster
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Brought over from the C130 Explosive-Suppressant Foam thread
Just been listening to that John Reid on the Channel 4 news talking about the above. He stated that the C130's that were serving on 47 Squadron are already being fitted with the explosive-suppressant foam devices, is that true as I've not heard of them being done?
He's also quoted a figure of £50,000 per aircraft for the mod, if it costs that little it should have been done a long time ago! How can you put a price on life? Don't suppose he's bothered though, he's looking forward to a crack at home secretary soon!
Makes your blood boil!
Just been listening to that
John Reid on the Channel 4 news talking about the above. He stated that the C130's that were serving on 47 Squadron are already being fitted with the explosive-suppressant foam devices, is that true as I've not heard of them being done?He's also quoted a figure of £50,000 per aircraft for the mod, if it costs that little it should have been done a long time ago! How can you put a price on life? Don't suppose he's bothered though, he's looking forward to a crack at home secretary soon!
Makes your blood boil!
Safeware
As always, well said.
I can’t find the precise quote, but the old argument of “there’s always risk” was rolled out on this one. The inference being there were times one could deploy operationally knowing safety was compromised. I accept this, but within limits. I’ve come across this in PE/DPA/DLO where on many occasions a safety problem has been ignored as it was not applicable in peacetime. I know those at Boscombe who conduct testing disagree, as do I, but when their recommendations move up the chain they are often mysteriously downgraded or removed. The upshot is that DPA/DLO will deliver kit which, while meeting the contractual requirement cannot be put to its intended use (e.g. warfighting). (The previous) CDP deemed this acceptable and, it must be said, the Services sometimes don’t help themselves by accepting what they are offered. (Chinook Mk3 is a good example of them not accepting it – I wish they would do this more often).
I’ve never got to the bottom of this (as, unsurprisingly, no-one wants to speak about it) but in conversations I’ve surmised the theory is that, upon carrying out a threat assessment for a given theatre/deployment, a UOR can be raised. I’ve argued, unsuccessfully, that when an aircraft mod is required this rather assumes at least 18-24 months notice of deployment. (It’s ok when you want to buy more ammunition, but even then “lean” extends the production lead time). Also, if you don’t put it in the MAR recommendations, then the Customer (HQSTC for example) cannot make a balanced judgement when considering acceptance into Service. As the saying goes “One mans UOR is another mans total incompetence and lack of foresight”.
I don’t know what happened on this aircraft type, but I do know for certain that what I describe is a weakness in the airworthiness/safety chain.
As always, well said.
I can’t find the precise quote, but the old argument of “there’s always risk” was rolled out on this one. The inference being there were times one could deploy operationally knowing safety was compromised. I accept this, but within limits. I’ve come across this in PE/DPA/DLO where on many occasions a safety problem has been ignored as it was not applicable in peacetime. I know those at Boscombe who conduct testing disagree, as do I, but when their recommendations move up the chain they are often mysteriously downgraded or removed. The upshot is that DPA/DLO will deliver kit which, while meeting the contractual requirement cannot be put to its intended use (e.g. warfighting). (The previous) CDP deemed this acceptable and, it must be said, the Services sometimes don’t help themselves by accepting what they are offered. (Chinook Mk3 is a good example of them not accepting it – I wish they would do this more often).
I’ve never got to the bottom of this (as, unsurprisingly, no-one wants to speak about it) but in conversations I’ve surmised the theory is that, upon carrying out a threat assessment for a given theatre/deployment, a UOR can be raised. I’ve argued, unsuccessfully, that when an aircraft mod is required this rather assumes at least 18-24 months notice of deployment. (It’s ok when you want to buy more ammunition, but even then “lean” extends the production lead time). Also, if you don’t put it in the MAR recommendations, then the Customer (HQSTC for example) cannot make a balanced judgement when considering acceptance into Service. As the saying goes “One mans UOR is another mans total incompetence and lack of foresight”.
I don’t know what happened on this aircraft type, but I do know for certain that what I describe is a weakness in the airworthiness/safety chain.
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The procurement chain can't take the full blame for this - though they have made equipment programmes (EPs)more prolonged and painful in peacetime. I war time they can be very effective if Urgent Operational Req'ts (UORs) are needed. In GW1, for example, I saw Jaguars get RWR and Sidewinders overnight in the hangar. If we need something quickly enough, it can be done.
The problem is getting the higher echelons of 2 Gp to say we need UORs and EPs and then let go of the ac, as they don't have enough of them. For them, losing an ac off the line, seriously screws their op capability and essential training, which, understandably, they are reluctant to do. Nonetheless, they could just call 'Stop Stop Stop' or 'Terminate', (I think is more modern) and 'pull' the ac until the problem is sorted. Sadly, everyone at Lyneham knows that the culture 'higher up' in 2 Gp was that there was no money available, so there was no point asking. A point that AOC Gp should take on board - I am sure Nige will be pressing this point home. the AOC would be well advised to ask questions of his staff (past and present) and shake this culture out of High Wycombe.
But whatever could have been done, people at Gp, MOD and AWC have been going around this buoy for years and years and for Reid to say that the chain of command was not aware, or that our inexperience in Vietnam was to blame, is absolutely infantile. It is principally a cost thing, followed by op output and 'risk acceptance' by higher 2 Gp, Strike Command and MOD. But it doesn't matter that they didn't tell the ministers - but its is the ministers' ultimate responsibility - end of story.
That is why the ministers are on notice for corporate manslaughter, not 2 Gp!
The problem is getting the higher echelons of 2 Gp to say we need UORs and EPs and then let go of the ac, as they don't have enough of them. For them, losing an ac off the line, seriously screws their op capability and essential training, which, understandably, they are reluctant to do. Nonetheless, they could just call 'Stop Stop Stop' or 'Terminate', (I think is more modern) and 'pull' the ac until the problem is sorted. Sadly, everyone at Lyneham knows that the culture 'higher up' in 2 Gp was that there was no money available, so there was no point asking. A point that AOC Gp should take on board - I am sure Nige will be pressing this point home. the AOC would be well advised to ask questions of his staff (past and present) and shake this culture out of High Wycombe.
But whatever could have been done, people at Gp, MOD and AWC have been going around this buoy for years and years and for Reid to say that the chain of command was not aware, or that our inexperience in Vietnam was to blame, is absolutely infantile. It is principally a cost thing, followed by op output and 'risk acceptance' by higher 2 Gp, Strike Command and MOD. But it doesn't matter that they didn't tell the ministers - but its is the ministers' ultimate responsibility - end of story.
That is why the ministers are on notice for corporate manslaughter, not 2 Gp!
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For info the following is from Defence Net:
MOD responds to Hercules C-130 crash allegations
03/05/2006
On 30 January 2005, a Hercules C130K crashed in Iraq with the loss of all personnel on board. In December 2005 the Board of Inquiry concluded that the aircraft crashed after it became uncontrollable after hostile ground-to-air fire caused the explosive separation of the outboard right hand wing.
One of the contributing factors identified by the Board was the lack of a fuel-tank inerting system. Whilst such a system may have prevented an explosion in the wing, the Board concluded that it would not necessarily have prevented a fire.
Although such a system would have increased the probability of the aircraft’s survival, neither the Board of Inquiry nor the Independent Senior Air Accident Investigator, concluded that it would definitely have changed the tragic outcome. Defensive aides are only part of the protection for the aircraft, which is why the RAF invests heavily in developing the best tactics, force protection measures and flight deck armour.
Since 2001, the defensive aides for C-130s have been upgraded several times. New Directional Infra Red Counter Measures, Missile Approach Warning Systems, Radar Warning Receivers, Countermeasures Dispensing Systems and additional flight deck armour have all been added. Prior to the C-130 crash in Iraq, it was judged that there was a low risk of a fuel tank explosion.
The emphasis was therefore on fitting other higher priority defensive systems. As a result of the recommendations made by the 2005 Board of Inquiry, Explosion Suppressant Foam will be fitted to some C-130 aircraft, concentrating on the aircraft that operate in the highest threat environment.
03/05/2006
On 30 January 2005, a Hercules C130K crashed in Iraq with the loss of all personnel on board. In December 2005 the Board of Inquiry concluded that the aircraft crashed after it became uncontrollable after hostile ground-to-air fire caused the explosive separation of the outboard right hand wing.
One of the contributing factors identified by the Board was the lack of a fuel-tank inerting system. Whilst such a system may have prevented an explosion in the wing, the Board concluded that it would not necessarily have prevented a fire.
Although such a system would have increased the probability of the aircraft’s survival, neither the Board of Inquiry nor the Independent Senior Air Accident Investigator, concluded that it would definitely have changed the tragic outcome. Defensive aides are only part of the protection for the aircraft, which is why the RAF invests heavily in developing the best tactics, force protection measures and flight deck armour.
Since 2001, the defensive aides for C-130s have been upgraded several times. New Directional Infra Red Counter Measures, Missile Approach Warning Systems, Radar Warning Receivers, Countermeasures Dispensing Systems and additional flight deck armour have all been added. Prior to the C-130 crash in Iraq, it was judged that there was a low risk of a fuel tank explosion.
The emphasis was therefore on fitting other higher priority defensive systems. As a result of the recommendations made by the 2005 Board of Inquiry, Explosion Suppressant Foam will be fitted to some C-130 aircraft, concentrating on the aircraft that operate in the highest threat environment.
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Brought over from the C130 Explosive-Suppressant Foam thread
Fantaman,
You have beaten me to it! My blood is still boiling about watching that spout his rot.
The false economy of penny pinching and corner cutting to save a few bucks in the short term is now a well established practice inside the MOD. As the "Airships" pat themselves on the back when they save money by removing the next safety measure, it is mugs like us left to fly the under protected aircraft around the cr@pholes of this world providing target practice for anyone with an AK47.
The whole issue is rotten to the core.
Fantaman,
You have beaten me to it! My blood is still boiling about watching that
spout his rot. The false economy of penny pinching and corner cutting to save a few bucks in the short term is now a well established practice inside the MOD. As the "Airships" pat themselves on the back when they save money by removing the next safety measure, it is mugs like us left to fly the under protected aircraft around the cr@pholes of this world providing target practice for anyone with an AK47.
The whole issue is rotten to the core.
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Bluntend thanks
Nothing new there, however.
Yes, the threat changed when the tactics changed, even when those changes were forced upon us. We knew the theat and perhaps the risk was adjudged lower for small arms fire - by all levels of 'the chain', even. Nonetheless, it was not up to the sqns to find solutions. People in 2 Gp had found possible protective measures BUT there was no funding from MOD who were, mostly certainly, aware of the risks.
Also, who knows which is a high threat environment and which ac are at most risk from small arms fire? How is that defined? (Bearing in mind Afghans, Iraqis, Africans and, in fact, any where other than N America and Europe treat AK47s as we treat mobiles - ie everybody's got one!).
This is why we should have foam/suppressants in all AT and all SH ac (not just the Hercs - what about VC 10/Tri*etc).
Yes, these protective measures are not a panacea for all ills - but they would have improved our chances of keeping alive one of our best (and most expensive) crews, along with their most valuable ac. Who is to say that won't be case next time?
Not to fit ESF just because it is not 'guaranteed' is reverse logic. In that case, we shouldn't fit any DAS as we can't be 100% sure of perfect reliability - but we have fitted some pretty good stuff of late, which undermines his argument totally.
Furthermore, there are loads of other threats out there that need consideration and funding - and yes, 2 Gp, AWC and MOD DO know all about these as they did small arms fire. In fact, this is another banana-skin for the Sec Def in the future.... unless he sorts it out now. Perhaps he would like it if we started asking questions about what has been done to counter these threats? Perhaps the circumstances in which he will face corporate manslaughter charges could be widened?
In my opinion, Dr Reid is running a bit scared - but all he has to do to end his nightmare is to act like a man, put out his chin and accept full responsibility for the genuine mistakes of his deptartment. Then he should apologise, recompense the families and make sure all our ac have better protection than at present - for as many threats as possible (present and future). It will cost money and, yes, it will hurt him a bit but he will, at least, be able to look himself in the eye in the mirror of a morning. We could even admire him for taking a moral stance and not hiding behind political spin?
Lastly, Dr Reid can take some comfort from the fact that he is only sorting out problems left to him by his ingnoble predecessors. Mr Reid does seem like an honourable man and I am sure he has some conscience left, despite him being in politics for a long time. The door is open for him and it is his move.
Nothing new there, however.
Yes, the threat changed when the tactics changed, even when those changes were forced upon us. We knew the theat and perhaps the risk was adjudged lower for small arms fire - by all levels of 'the chain', even. Nonetheless, it was not up to the sqns to find solutions. People in 2 Gp had found possible protective measures BUT there was no funding from MOD who were, mostly certainly, aware of the risks.
Also, who knows which is a high threat environment and which ac are at most risk from small arms fire? How is that defined? (Bearing in mind Afghans, Iraqis, Africans and, in fact, any where other than N America and Europe treat AK47s as we treat mobiles - ie everybody's got one!).
This is why we should have foam/suppressants in all AT and all SH ac (not just the Hercs - what about VC 10/Tri*etc).
Yes, these protective measures are not a panacea for all ills - but they would have improved our chances of keeping alive one of our best (and most expensive) crews, along with their most valuable ac. Who is to say that won't be case next time?
Not to fit ESF just because it is not 'guaranteed' is reverse logic. In that case, we shouldn't fit any DAS as we can't be 100% sure of perfect reliability - but we have fitted some pretty good stuff of late, which undermines his argument totally.
Furthermore, there are loads of other threats out there that need consideration and funding - and yes, 2 Gp, AWC and MOD DO know all about these as they did small arms fire. In fact, this is another banana-skin for the Sec Def in the future.... unless he sorts it out now. Perhaps he would like it if we started asking questions about what has been done to counter these threats? Perhaps the circumstances in which he will face corporate manslaughter charges could be widened?
In my opinion, Dr Reid is running a bit scared - but all he has to do to end his nightmare is to act like a man, put out his chin and accept full responsibility for the genuine mistakes of his deptartment. Then he should apologise, recompense the families and make sure all our ac have better protection than at present - for as many threats as possible (present and future). It will cost money and, yes, it will hurt him a bit but he will, at least, be able to look himself in the eye in the mirror of a morning. We could even admire him for taking a moral stance and not hiding behind political spin?
Lastly, Dr Reid can take some comfort from the fact that he is only sorting out problems left to him by his ingnoble predecessors. Mr Reid does seem like an honourable man and I am sure he has some conscience left, despite him being in politics for a long time. The door is open for him and it is his move.