Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety
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I thought that Haddon-Crave was clearly very focussed on air failings and in particular with the RAF (almost as if he hadn't realised the RN & AAC flew aircraft).
Shell
You are right. Very often he said "RAF" when it should have been "MoD". The same applies daily in the press and here on pprune. The RAF fly, RN sail and Army march. But his meaning was clear as witnessed by the MAA being pan-MoD, not just RAF or Nimrod.
However, the evidence presented to him did show that the systemic problems (as opposed to isolated cases) commenced in anger with RAF decisions, mainly by suppliers, when they took over the world in the late 80s. That makes his 1998 baseline all the more bizarre and, lacking any other evidence, I have always thought this a "deal" whereby MoD knew they had to take a hit, and agreeing to 1998 protected many retired officers. His reasoning was so ludicrously flawed it took about 30 seconds to find the written evidence that proved him wrong (which had been submitted to him anyway).
As I've said elsewhere, his naming of General Sam Cowan (Ret'd) was particularly unwarranted as senior RAF officers before him (1987 - 1994 in particular) had deliberately wasted vast amounts which knowingly targetted airworthiness; whereas the "cuts" Cowan was accused of making were miniscule by comparison (5% per year for four years, against almost 30% a year for 3) and had little effect. And, having met the man, I know he was particularly concerned about these fundamental Duty of Care issues. H-C was a force for good, but a lot of very senior people breathed a sigh of relief when they read his report.
You are right. Very often he said "RAF" when it should have been "MoD". The same applies daily in the press and here on pprune. The RAF fly, RN sail and Army march. But his meaning was clear as witnessed by the MAA being pan-MoD, not just RAF or Nimrod.
However, the evidence presented to him did show that the systemic problems (as opposed to isolated cases) commenced in anger with RAF decisions, mainly by suppliers, when they took over the world in the late 80s. That makes his 1998 baseline all the more bizarre and, lacking any other evidence, I have always thought this a "deal" whereby MoD knew they had to take a hit, and agreeing to 1998 protected many retired officers. His reasoning was so ludicrously flawed it took about 30 seconds to find the written evidence that proved him wrong (which had been submitted to him anyway).
As I've said elsewhere, his naming of General Sam Cowan (Ret'd) was particularly unwarranted as senior RAF officers before him (1987 - 1994 in particular) had deliberately wasted vast amounts which knowingly targetted airworthiness; whereas the "cuts" Cowan was accused of making were miniscule by comparison (5% per year for four years, against almost 30% a year for 3) and had little effect. And, having met the man, I know he was particularly concerned about these fundamental Duty of Care issues. H-C was a force for good, but a lot of very senior people breathed a sigh of relief when they read his report.
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Nige
The request for foam originated from the Sqn, so the Sqn was well aware of the increased risk, so how can you justify your comment above?
HPT
WRT XV179. The risk to the fuel tanks was known at Group level but not passed down to Sqn level. If the Sqns had been informed in the correct manner tactics, in this case day low level, could have been changed to mitigate the threat.
HPT
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HPT the request did not originate from the Sqn. There was no trace of any paperwork ever having left Lyneham. Foam was mentioned in a post op report but amongst other things, the Stn Cdr had no recall of ever having done anything with it. Mind you he also failed to recall the conversation I had with him about being targetted by a MANPAD in Afg!
Similarly an American pilot on "the flight" gave a fully funded presentation pack-up, including a manufacturers rep for foam for the MK1 fleet, to his Flight Commander. But when giving evidence at the Inquest, the Flight Commander who was given the pack up in his in tray could not recall ever having seen the report and promptly said it wouldn't have made any difference anyway, he wouldn't have pressed for it. This was a rough account at the Inquest, I stress not word for word;
His documents included the Crest stuff (not produced by FC) - Cooper would you have read it?
EA No.
Cooper So you wouldn’t have taken any notice of it?
EA No
Cooper Without reading it?
EA Correct.
Cooper But wd you have stopped the task if you’d read it?
EA No - same answer re......
Coooper He had put your nose out of joint.
EA no sir.
Cooper Anything he had given you, you would have ignored.
EA probably.
Cooper Then what did you do with the doc?
EA Don’t know.
Cooper For anyone interested in ESF, they cd have read about it.
EA Yes. But I had a job to do and was busy. I had decided that other methods were higher priority.
I know this is old ground for many people, but during the recess the Inquest investigator discovered that there had been TAT meetings held in the run up to both Afg and Iraq that identified the Herc fuel tanks as an extremely weak area to small arms attack and subsequently highlighted the pressing need for wing tank foam for operations in both theatres. The conclusion reached at these meetings (which included int staff and DEFRA experts) was passed on directly to 2 Gp. The TS request for foam never originated from Lyneham, but sadly, never reached the ears of DEC or IPTL. It all stopped at 2 Gp, hence my comments..And it goes without saying that the Sqns were not informed of the threat either. Sadly the two grass roots attempts failed at the first hurdle. BTW I read a redacted version of the TAT reports, it was sickening, God only knows why they were ignored twice. The video that has been widely shown of a round exploding a fuel tank was included in the pack-up presented by the US pilot.
Similarly an American pilot on "the flight" gave a fully funded presentation pack-up, including a manufacturers rep for foam for the MK1 fleet, to his Flight Commander. But when giving evidence at the Inquest, the Flight Commander who was given the pack up in his in tray could not recall ever having seen the report and promptly said it wouldn't have made any difference anyway, he wouldn't have pressed for it. This was a rough account at the Inquest, I stress not word for word;
His documents included the Crest stuff (not produced by FC) - Cooper would you have read it?
EA No.
Cooper So you wouldn’t have taken any notice of it?
EA No
Cooper Without reading it?
EA Correct.
Cooper But wd you have stopped the task if you’d read it?
EA No - same answer re......
Coooper He had put your nose out of joint.
EA no sir.
Cooper Anything he had given you, you would have ignored.
EA probably.
Cooper Then what did you do with the doc?
EA Don’t know.
Cooper For anyone interested in ESF, they cd have read about it.
EA Yes. But I had a job to do and was busy. I had decided that other methods were higher priority.
I know this is old ground for many people, but during the recess the Inquest investigator discovered that there had been TAT meetings held in the run up to both Afg and Iraq that identified the Herc fuel tanks as an extremely weak area to small arms attack and subsequently highlighted the pressing need for wing tank foam for operations in both theatres. The conclusion reached at these meetings (which included int staff and DEFRA experts) was passed on directly to 2 Gp. The TS request for foam never originated from Lyneham, but sadly, never reached the ears of DEC or IPTL. It all stopped at 2 Gp, hence my comments..And it goes without saying that the Sqns were not informed of the threat either. Sadly the two grass roots attempts failed at the first hurdle. BTW I read a redacted version of the TAT reports, it was sickening, God only knows why they were ignored twice. The video that has been widely shown of a round exploding a fuel tank was included in the pack-up presented by the US pilot.
Last edited by nigegilb; 3rd Oct 2010 at 21:58.
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PORs are written by the Sqn usually; so who wrote the POR that mentioned foam?
I recall somewhere in th thread it was stated (possibly by you) that the request was sent from the Sqn to Gp, but nothing came of it.
HPT
I recall somewhere in th thread it was stated (possibly by you) that the request was sent from the Sqn to Gp, but nothing came of it.
HPT
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Flip was responsible for the POR, but despite a concerted attempt to see what happened to the paper trail nothing was ever found. It was a big deal at the time,if you remember Defence Ministers were even trying to blame 47 Sqn. However when the existence of the TAT meeting was discovered the trail went all the way to the MoD and the game was over.
In reality very few people were aware of the vulnerability of herc fuel tanks or even the existence of foam to mitigate the threat.
The Stn Cdr was most unhelpful at this time. And as you can see from the exchange with the Flt Cdr I posted, the momentum to continue day low level was all powerful. The laudable attempt by the exchange officer to highlight the weakness was simply doomed to fail in this atmosphere.
What was desperately needed was clear leadership and guidance from Group. It never materialized.
In reality very few people were aware of the vulnerability of herc fuel tanks or even the existence of foam to mitigate the threat.
The Stn Cdr was most unhelpful at this time. And as you can see from the exchange with the Flt Cdr I posted, the momentum to continue day low level was all powerful. The laudable attempt by the exchange officer to highlight the weakness was simply doomed to fail in this atmosphere.
What was desperately needed was clear leadership and guidance from Group. It never materialized.
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Two years (!) after my post on the subject, Shell Management asked:
I forget the exact details but some very very senior MoD person (head of old DPA?) signed the letter saying it was mandatory for all MoD (Integrated) Project Teams.
I didn't say POSMS was more important than Def Stan 00-56. Do you want to rephrase your question?
About Hobbs testimony, Shell Management wrote:
(It's certainly true that an aircraft can be airworthy but vulnerable to enemy action.) Hobbs seems to show, just as the Nimrod TL did at his inquest, a poor understanding of his responsibilities (though, to be fair, there may be some context missing from the testimony nigegilb quotes).
1. Hobbs was responsible for the safety of the aircraft, not just its airworthiness. However, responsibility for certain aspects of that safety, it is true, may be vested elsewhere.
2. Hobbs is responsible for many aspects of "fitness for purpose". Perhaps the context of his claim regarding "fitness for purpose" was hostile enemy action.
3. I believe what Hobbs was trying to express is that he was not responsible for aspects of safety directly associated with hostile enemy action. In this, I have some sympathy for Hobbs as an individual but only frustration and anger for the MoD as a whole because this subject seems to fall between the cracks between different MoD organisations for just about every aircraft I've ever been involved with. And I don't particularly see it getting better post XV179, Haddon-Cave, etc.
by what power do you think is POSMS made mandatory
and/or is more important that a Defence Standard
About Hobbs testimony, Shell Management wrote:
Is he perhaps trying to make a point that an aircraft can be airworthy but still vulnerable to enemy action?
1. Hobbs was responsible for the safety of the aircraft, not just its airworthiness. However, responsibility for certain aspects of that safety, it is true, may be vested elsewhere.
2. Hobbs is responsible for many aspects of "fitness for purpose". Perhaps the context of his claim regarding "fitness for purpose" was hostile enemy action.
3. I believe what Hobbs was trying to express is that he was not responsible for aspects of safety directly associated with hostile enemy action. In this, I have some sympathy for Hobbs as an individual but only frustration and anger for the MoD as a whole because this subject seems to fall between the cracks between different MoD organisations for just about every aircraft I've ever been involved with. And I don't particularly see it getting better post XV179, Haddon-Cave, etc.
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500days2do
Its not a last line of defence; its a fact. The crew had a choice, they made the wrong one. Sad but true.
HPT
really, sometimes I find this last line of defence a bit hard to fathom.....
HPT
Squidlord
Well said.
(It's certainly true that an aircraft can be airworthy but vulnerable to enemy action.) Hobbs seems to show, just as the Nimrod TL did at his inquest, a poor understanding of his responsibilities (though, to be fair, there may be some context missing from the testimony nigegilb quotes).
1. Hobbs was responsible for the safety of the aircraft, not just its airworthiness. However, responsibility for certain aspects of that safety, it is true, may be vested elsewhere.
2. Hobbs is responsible for many aspects of "fitness for purpose". Perhaps the context of his claim regarding "fitness for purpose" was hostile enemy action.
3. I believe what Hobbs was trying to express is that he was not responsible for aspects of safety directly associated with hostile enemy action. In this, I have some sympathy for Hobbs as an individual but only frustration and anger for the MoD as a whole because this subject seems to fall between the cracks between different MoD organisations for just about every aircraft I've ever been involved with. And I don't particularly see it getting better post XV179, Haddon-Cave, etc.
1. Hobbs was responsible for the safety of the aircraft, not just its airworthiness. However, responsibility for certain aspects of that safety, it is true, may be vested elsewhere.
2. Hobbs is responsible for many aspects of "fitness for purpose". Perhaps the context of his claim regarding "fitness for purpose" was hostile enemy action.
3. I believe what Hobbs was trying to express is that he was not responsible for aspects of safety directly associated with hostile enemy action. In this, I have some sympathy for Hobbs as an individual but only frustration and anger for the MoD as a whole because this subject seems to fall between the cracks between different MoD organisations for just about every aircraft I've ever been involved with. And I don't particularly see it getting better post XV179, Haddon-Cave, etc.
Well said.
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Hpt, the same flt cdr explained why crews were flying day low level in Afghanistan the explanation he gave at the inquest did not even acknowledge the risk to the fuel tanks. It was to do with the danger of flying into the terrain at night. I doubt he even understood the risk. The video was never shown on the flight and he admitted he couldn't even recall seeing the pack up. It might interest you to know that at one stage the flight were the only outfit in afg willing to fly low level ops in the day time. And I include US spec ops hercules aircraft fitted with foam. Some of the flight air engineers submitted evidence that they were not aware of the need for foam. How much of the Inquest did you actually listen to?
How much day operational low level has been done since the crash?
I doubt, reading your posts that you have read the vulnerability analysis report carried out by TAT before ops in Afg kicked off. I am not aware of ANY serving members of the flight having seen those reports at this time or the time of the crash. The only guy who understood the risk left shortly after his attempt to raise the issue. I understand your point, but the routine day low level ops all started in afg. I am not sure the leadership was ever on receive.
How much day operational low level has been done since the crash?
I doubt, reading your posts that you have read the vulnerability analysis report carried out by TAT before ops in Afg kicked off. I am not aware of ANY serving members of the flight having seen those reports at this time or the time of the crash. The only guy who understood the risk left shortly after his attempt to raise the issue. I understand your point, but the routine day low level ops all started in afg. I am not sure the leadership was ever on receive.
Last edited by nigegilb; 4th Oct 2010 at 23:34.
