Safeware
As always, well said.
I can’t find the precise quote, but the old argument of “there’s always risk” was rolled out on this one. The inference being there were times one could deploy operationally knowing safety was compromised. I accept this, but within limits. I’ve come across this in PE/DPA/DLO where on many occasions a safety problem has been ignored as it was not applicable in peacetime. I know those at Boscombe who conduct testing disagree, as do I, but when their recommendations move up the chain they are often mysteriously downgraded or removed. The upshot is that DPA/DLO will deliver kit which, while meeting the contractual requirement cannot be put to its intended use (e.g. warfighting). (The previous) CDP deemed this acceptable and, it must be said, the Services sometimes don’t help themselves by accepting what they are offered. (Chinook Mk3 is a good example of them not accepting it – I wish they would do this more often).
I’ve never got to the bottom of this (as, unsurprisingly, no-one wants to speak about it) but in conversations I’ve surmised the theory is that, upon carrying out a threat assessment for a given theatre/deployment, a UOR can be raised. I’ve argued, unsuccessfully, that when an aircraft mod is required this rather assumes at least 18-24 months notice of deployment. (It’s ok when you want to buy more ammunition, but even then “lean” extends the production lead time). Also, if you don’t put it in the MAR recommendations, then the Customer (HQSTC for example) cannot make a balanced judgement when considering acceptance into Service. As the saying goes “One mans UOR is another mans total incompetence and lack of foresight”.
I don’t know what happened on this aircraft type, but I do know for certain that what I describe is a weakness in the airworthiness/safety chain.