Jess….
“The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
During this grilling, Reid claimed that:
- More knowledgable people than he made the decision not to fit the £50K system.
- The pilots he spoke to didn't want the system and would rather it was spent on something else (JPA?)
- The fact the RAF didn't develop the system was because they didn't have the US experience of anti-aircraft small arms fire in Vietnam.
- The system was being currently fitted to airframes.
- Airframes that were not fitted were still perfectly safe.
Is there anyone out there that can contradict this oxygen thief waste of space? He appears not to understand that learning from experience does not have to be first hand, and has no grasp of elementary logic - if something is safe then why does it need to be made safe?”
I concur.
The point he seems not to understand (presumably in common with those who feed him these answers) is that it is not for the user community to specify an engineering solution; but to identify the problem, and assist DEC and HQSTC (?) categorise it as a Limitation (in which case they develop a work around) or an Operational Constraint (in which case DEC is more or less duty bound to take it forward – although this is subject to deeper categorisations such as Critical, Major, Minor). The trick here is to tag it (legitimately of course) as a Safety Constraint and cry Duty of Care. That way, it hits DEC post haste. Terminology may change, but the basic process stands.
DEC, having successfully bid or identified funding through offsets etc, “task” the IPT. And oversee the work through their Requirements Manager. It is for these people to develop an engineering solution and progress it to delivery. It is therefore ALWAYS disingenuous to say aircrew never said they wanted this or that system.
Why would the RAF need to “develop” the system if it was already fitted to the same aircraft in other countries. Assuming the basic system was approved by Lockheed Martin for other variants, it is a relatively simple job to do this on the RAF’s. Unless, of course, the LM design was unsuitable in some way and, say, could not get through our MAR process.
Given the practice that the aircraft is deemed safe (through the MAR process) at the “as built” build standard (in this case, excluding the foam system / DAS) then this is another disingenuous and meaningless statement. Did he say “airframes”? I’m sure they are safe, but I’d want the whole aircraft to be safe as well. A typical misunderstanding as to safety audit trail. One hopes they have a Whole Aircraft Safety Case which reflects the In Use build standard, not just the As Built one.
I imagine some pointed questions based on the above would make them squirm.