Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[737only]

Only way is to prescribe to always have 2 persons on the flightdeck. This is already standard by some airlines. This at least requires conspiracy between 2 persons...

[Capt.KAOS]

Apparently a locked door system which does not allow the captain to go back to the cockpit for for whatever reason is wrong. There should be a code that allows only the captain, F/O and head purser to overrule the doorlock from the outside.

Furthermore this crash after all the other crashes lately proves that some kind of constant datastream via satellites should be installed a.s.a.p. With the current state of tech should be not a big problem.

[Pace]

Jack

Most of us can probably remember as kids being invited up to the front to see the cockpit and chat to the pilots / 9/11 changed all that and a multi billion airport security industry Grew

Yet I use the tubes and friday night millions stream into those tubes. Dragging cases and from every religion and ethnic background imagine able
Security there would bring the system to a stop

Now there is the possibility of terrorism from within the cockpit and that is what it would be if proved to be true? What security costs in lost time to industry ?
Where do we go from here ?

[athonite]

It seems we need a rethink here in terms of the way we operate as follows:

(a) For short sector flights less than three hours I can see no reason why the crew need to leave the flight deck at all. As a healthy pilot should be able to 'last' until his destination.

(b) Having said that a cabin crew member in the jump seat when I pilot does leave the flight deck seems sensible, but on a short flight, any considerate pilot would not want to take the cabin crew away from their duties, just because they haven't 'planned ahead'.

(c) Then there is the turnaround, the low cost airlines will not like this, but flight crew should be allowed a mandatory, say 15 min break, in other words add fifteen minutes to every turnaround. This allows the use of toilets, freshen up and stretch their legs, not least as this is good for your alertness and health, and reduces the likelihood of a DVT.

(d) Then rethink of flight deck doors is needed, in terms of its operation and structure. The latter becomes apparent through this thread, that in the case of sudden decompression on the flight deck, it seems likely that the armoured door will end up embedded in the flight deck, failing that the adjacent partitions will collapse into the flighdeck.

(e) Finally, on this thread there was a suggestion of greater psychological enquiry regarding pilots, this would be very problematic, not least for those who had ever suffered depression or 'normal life events' at sometime, which probably includes most pilots, again how could you access issues such as breakdown of a marriage, financial problems, cumulative stress or extreme religious views. Of course I can see the psychologists and psychiatrists jumping on the bandwagon and employment laywers would have a field day.

[twentyyearstoolate]

Whilst it makes sense to always have 2 people in the cockpit, the idea that a FA "behind" the other pilot does not inspire confidence. Should the one person with ill intent be the FA and NOT the pilot, it would be pretty easy to disable the pilot from behind very quickly.

This scenario is greatly reduced with a longer training/experience period. ie another pilot/engineer. Not foolproof, but certainly better than an FA who can be there in a few weeks.

[Peter-RB]

The entire reason and activation of locked doors was done with the best of safety intentions going back to the days of the VC10 being blown up in the Jordanian deserts, but is it beyond the wit and sensibility of all the brains who build these A/c, as well as you who fly them to come up with a safer system.

After all there does seem to have been quite a few situations from the Egyptian Pilot suicide to this latest incident that could be put down to a simple LOCKED door, with no other means of entry..WHY!!

[Squawk_ident]

The problem is the BEA attitude that refuses to speak at all. This behaviour is starting to bother a lot of people here. The almost military attitude of this body reminds me what happened in the AF447 disaster. Because the BEA refused to unveil the CVR transcript, someone decided that enough was enough and released it to the exterior. The transcript was released in a book "Erreurs de pilotage Nr5" by Jean-Pierre OTELLI in Sep 2011.
I think that a reform of this institution should be done. The BEA will explain that it is not its role to speak because of the judicial inquiry but in our world today this kind of attitude is totally unacceptable. The press conference yesterday was a masquerade if not a farce as I have heard. The Chairman when he was speaking knew that he was not saying the truth or hiding it, totally or partially. The BEA reputation in the crash investigations is widely admitted and not discussed but, if what have been published by the NYT is true ( how can you invent such things?!) this reputation is sullied if not ruined. The BEA is not entirely responsible of that. The BEA is an official body depending of the DGAC and the Minister of Transport and everything is subject to the administrative supervision. It says what one tell him to say.
The BEA site was named as "dot org" and now is "dot aero". It seem that the only desire of the BEA is to proclaim that it is independent but from who? This is intolerable. The BEA is an official body depending of the French State and do not have to be ashamed of that.

For the time being the BEA remains silent.

Now about the door. A 320 driver explained some minutes ago the way of working of the cockpit door on this aircraft.
There are two codes. The second is a high security one and is known by the crew only. The door is then opened with a switch. There is also an electrical lock mounted on the door in the cockpit side. This lock is activated by the crew and there is a timer. When activated the door will remain closed. The pilot said that it may be activated without having to stand up, according to your size.

[BEagle]

In my opinion, a flight deck should always have a minimum of 2 people present, each of whom is capable of detecting and preventing an unauthorised act or incorrect procedure on behalf of the other. That is the 'two man rule' as applied to safety critical situations to prevent potentially hazardous activity and should become SOP for two person flight decks during flight.

[TODALDA]

There is a 'rule' about theories called 'Ockham's Razor'. The fewer assumptions upon which the theory is based, the more likely the theory is to be true. For sure, in all disasters a number of phenomena have to line up as has been shown from all investigations from the Titanic onwards. Normally one event is the trigger, whatever the failings which proceeded. An iceberg with Titanic, failed O ring with Challenger, damaged tyre with Concorde.
It is more likely a single event has caused this incident, locked doors or no locked doors, suicidal pilots or not, slowly failing cabin pressurisation or not.

[glofish]

Isn't it ironic all these knee jerk reactions to previous incidents?

Let's add zillions of more automation gimmicks and gazillions of doors to be triple-locked and bigger hordes of friendly numpties who check us out on every flight.

We will however continue to be shook up by accidents induced by programs that were intended to "protect" us, or others induced by doors now locking out pilots in absence of the bad terrorist.

The cry is now out to do more extended background checks on us stupid and malicious pilots .....

.... but we will continue to forget to do this to the airline managers who drive us nuts and fatigued to the point of braking.

Automation, locks, eternal checks, checks, checks, but no more common sense!

Brave new world!

[wiggy]

Not subscribing to the rogue pilot theory, just answering Beags point of:

In my opinion, a flight deck should always have a minimum of 2 people present, each of whom is capable of detecting and preventing an unauthorised act or incorrect procedure on behalf of the other. That is the 'two man rule' as applied to safety critical situations to prevent potentially hazardous activity and should become SOP for two person flight decks during flight.

Good luck - for that to be a meaningful precaution you need a minimum of three type rated pilots on each and every commercial flight......anything else (e.g using cabin crew to "sit in") would just be window dressing.

weebobby

Strange also that we are having to find things out from the Americans and not the Europeans......

I you think you're "finding things out" from any news source at the moment then have I got news for you.....I'll grant you the Americans seem to good at quoting un-named sources, unattributed sources .....perhaps it's simply a case of the American speculation being better/louder than the European version.

[Cagedh]

Only way is to prescribe to always have 2 persons on the flightdeck. This is already standard by some airlines. This at least requires conspiracy between 2 persons...

That is not going to solve anything!! Who says the FA wouldn't be dangerous him/herself?

Anyway, any pilot, who would be determined to crash the plane has a very good chance of being able to do so, regardless of how many people are in the cockpit! A nice firm push on the yoke or stick at 500 ft AGL, would do the job. That will work even in an Airbus!
Absolute security is unachievable.

[captplaystation]

There was also a persistent "rumour" that one Air Asia pilot (the Capt ) was not in his seat, which the investigators finally discounted.

As was posted on here yesterday, it may have been better if the BEA either said nothing (if there is nothing to say that is best ) or told us a little more about the contents of the CVR, less speculation run rife. . . . which is exactly what appears to have happened.

As previous poster has said, there is a code for the door lock . . . . . . . . so, "normally" 8-10 min is plenty time to get back in. . . . assuming he had found a portable 02 bottle if depressurisation was involved.

[Cagedh]

Why are you people openly discussing the finer details pertaining to system (door) operation and more frighteningly, door procedures!

Because anyone with access to Google or Youtube can find this info since many years. Nothing new is being said here!

[NigelOnDraft]

There should be a code that allows only the captain, F/O and head purser to overrule the doorlock from the outsideThat may well be the case now ;) but I suspect you are wanting that code to be genuinely secret?

Trouble is when it comes to apply to a fleet of 150 aircraft, 3000 pilots and 10000 Cabin Crew. How do you inform people of the codes, rely on the crew remembering, change it regularly (?).

Prior to this accident, most debate over the door concerned the funny occasions the crew locked themselves out...

[kevinbr]

Unintended consequences can be roughly grouped into three types:

Unexpected benefit: A positive, unexpected benefit (usually referred to as luck, serendipity or a windfall).

Unexpected drawback: A negative, unexpected detriment occurring in addition to the desired effect of the policy (e.g., while irrigation schemes provide people with water for agriculture, they can increase waterborne diseases that have devastating health effects, such as schistosomiasis).

Perverse result: A backfire or perverse effect contrary to what was originally intended (when an intended solution makes a problem worse). This has been dubbed the 'cobra effect', after an anecdote about how a bounty for killing cobras in British India created a perverse incentive for people to breed cobras.

There will never be absolute security or safety, and often something implemented to solve one issue, will then open the door to an unintended issue.

[Doors to Automatic]

Or perhaps the co pilot had such limited hours it was just easier to program the plane to head down ??


Experience has nothing to do with ability to operate autopilot and other aircraft systems - this is dealt with IN FULL during type-rating training.

[Chugalug2]

If pilot suicide is now being seen as a problem, irrespective of this accident, then I'm rather surprised that a pilot orientated forum hasn't spotted the obvious solution, ie a third pilot!

Such a requirement would remove the possibility of the flight deck ever being occupied by one person alone, would remove the need to remove cabin crew from the cabin, and of course offer further pilot employment opportunities. As it would be a regulatory requirement, then no carrier would have a financial advantage over others. Any regulator that did not conform would soon find its airlines barred from all airspace other than its own. Costs of course would rise, fares would no doubt follow, but death by pilot would hopefully cease to be a statistical concern...

[Denti]

No you would have a cabin crew member there capable of opening the door from the inside quickly if any problem arose. Would make it much harder for a pilot to commit suicide.

No, it wouldn't make it harder to commit suicide, FAs usually do not have any idea what i'm doing anyway and can't do anything against it. But it would make it much harder for a minimally screened person after just a six week training course to crash a plane with only one pilot in the flightdeck to prevent it. And then there's the big elephant, or rather crash axe, in the flightdeck that either could use to get rid of the other.

[Zoso]

No, it wouldn't make it harder to commit suicide, FAs usually do not have any idea what i'm doing anyway and can't do anything against it. But it would make it much harder for a minimally screened person after just a six week training course to crash a plane with only one pilot in the flightdeck to prevent it. And then there's the big elephant, or rather crash axe, in the flightdeck that either could use to get rid of the other.

Yes but they could open the door if they heard and saw the captain banging on it.

[vanHorck]

The names of the pilots have not been released, only the hours of the captain were released, in excess of 10K hours.

Allegedly this is due to privacy laws in Germany, but this is not sustainable in the current rumor situation.

By now Germanwings will have lifted the medical files, investigators will have talked to not just family and will know a lot more.

So the secrecy is not only the French side but also the German side.

With all the current labour issues in German aviation we can only hope this was an individual drama not something even more sinister in an industry where the individual has to often finance his own expensive education (contrary to medecine etc).

[NigelOnDraft]

By now Germanwings will have lifted the medical files,As an aside, the only medical details my employer need have on me is my Medical Expiry date.

[c53204]

Those who are supposed to enlighten us could be partly to blame - safety specialists, aviation designers/engineers, aircrew.... all with one aim - reduce operating costs, save money... call it what you want. The slogan 'safety first' is frankly a farce these days and too many incidents involving 'cost savings' is foremost in a lot of peoples minds.

I know the miles/per passenger is a lot lower for military (non combat areas) transport aircraft. But they far fewer passenger losses/incidents? Better maintenance, crews? Or simply, they don't need to make a profit.

I shall now don my flame retardant sleeping bag.

[grafity]

Maybe those Germanwings employees have a bit of decency?

[LEGAL TENDER]

I was on a LH flight not long ago, maybe last year. European short haul, I think it was an Embraer. They taxied and lined up with the cockpit door open. To my surprise they then started the takeoff also with the door open. A CC member then only got up to shut the door a few minutes into the climb. I did find it a bit strange that such an obvious thing could go unnoticed by so many different crew members (2+2). Made me wonder about the level of attention going on in that cockpit.

[soupisgoodfood]

Maybe because the leakers are OK with leaking general key info to inform the public, but don't see it necessary to possibly compromise an investigation by leaking personal details about the pilots? How would the names of the pilots be useful to the public at this stage, except to fuel speculation? Just look what happened with MH370. Maybe some people have learnt a lesson.

[kafky]

Companies should invest much more on pilots and crews mental health. Just that. I am Clinical Psychologist that work in this area. I am raising awareness for this problem on students since LAM accident.
There are excellent crisis teams and researcher over europe that can and should be requested to give strategies to prevent and solve those problems.
After the third pilot solution, there will need a fourth and so on. Trust is gained when you address fundamental causes.

[Sirius 1935]

I was on the same squadron as Tsu Wei Ming who flew Silk Air 185 into the ground and I always thought he was a misfit. I wouldn't have recognised it as mental illness but he was definitely an odd ball.

[weebobby]

soupisgoodfood - agree that we do not need to necessarily know the names...

but what did LH have to hide when 2 days ago we were only told the pilots hours and no mention of co-pilot or his hours ???? Now turns out he only has 600 hours..........

[ChickenHouse]

With all the current labour issues in German aviation we can only hope this was an individual drama not something even more sinister in an industry where the individual has to often finance his own expensive education (contrary to medecine etc).
Not only the labour issues, but also their Stasi-like surveillance of pilots humble-minded disposition by a mechanism called ZUP. If a personal drama is to come true such general suppression has shown its absolute ineffectiveness. I see a lot of similar thinking towards ruling the world by law force around me and I keep telling that is is not working.

[Halfwayback]

Quote from previous post in this thread

I normally sit and watch but this is getting seriously bad. Everyone wants to be the 'Man'.
I have 48 years driving aircraft including A340 and B747-400 and 24000+ hours.

For me if you post an opinion, mislead or copy comments and put them into the media you must be held accountable. And no, not good enough to say "not me sir I was reporting from a source". You must be prepared to put your credibility, proffessional career and personal assets to the test. That is whats required of most International Pilots. So put up or shut up.

May I take this opportunity to remind ALL Posters that they are legally responsible for what is posted on this site and the Owner of the site WILL comply with subpoenas for Poster's details.

Now you will understand why the Moderators delete posts and remove others that just take up 'bandwidth'

Halfwayback
Moderator

[vanHorck]

French internet tv BFMTV en Direct: regarder la chaine info en live - BFMTV (http://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/live-video/) now stating that another French media is claiming that the pilot flying was the captain and the co pilot was outside the cockpit.

It s obviously hearsay.

[athonite]

KAFKY - I'm really interested interested as a Clinical Psychologist how you would on a practical level you would address issues of mental health within an airline? Do you have any experience of airline company culture? Can you enlighten us?

[mcloaked]

One of the problems of so much speculation here is that there are various scenarios that cannot be ruled out and it seems a lot of people then become convinced that one or other of the possibilities is reality, and then continue to try to find more and more reasons that it is what really happened - when in reality until there is evidence to rule out options that could not occur, then the possible scenarios remain just speculation no matter how well informed.

It is also of concern that there are journalists who are reading this forum, as well as pilots and pax, and that some journalists are using the speculation from this forum to present in news websites - I have seen one news website yesterday, that used one of the scenarios discussed earlier in this thread as if it was factual information. Please therefore think carefully, before posting, about the consequences of what you say here. Remember also that there may be others reading this forum who may not merely be interested bystanders but could have mal-intent, so information passed in postings could be used for malign purposes, even if there are other sources of similar detail.

[His dudeness]

Now turns out he only has 600 hours..........

so ? meaning ?

Allegedly this is due to privacy laws in Germany, but this is not sustainable in the current rumor situation.

They will surface, no doubt, some "nice" BILD or other reporter will like get them from colleagues or elsewhere. Are the laws good ? ABSOLUTELY. I dislike a lot of the laws in Germany, this one is a good one.

Is it your or the publics business who the cockpit crew, the CC or the passengers are ? Absolutely not.

[vanHorck]

With allegations as serious as the ones being voiced by NYT and AFP, it would be highly irresponsible of the investigators not to rapidly address this exceptional allegation, not least in view of the perception of the public at large versus the flying crews and the consequences for the entire industry.

I beg to disagree with his Dudeness. The backgrounds of the crews has become even more important over the last 18 hours and the press should be allowed to do their work, even if they are deemed here to be an irresponsible bunch. They are also one of our mechanisms for an honest society

[weebobby]

VanHorck i would agree if it is not addressed today then it adds fuel to the fire.
All they have to say is the NYT/AFP reports are false but will they..........

[silverstrata]

May I take this opportunity to remind ALL Posters that they are legally responsible for what is posted on this site and the Owner of the site WILL comply with subpoenas for Poster's details.



Point taken. But then we are all back to posting comments in doublespeak and reading newspaper reports in doublethink. In what way does covering up the political issues of the day help with aviation safety?

How can plugging your ears and shouting: 'la, la, la, I cannot hear you,' help improve any kind of safety, be that personal, corporate or national? As we have all seen, we have had this Nelsonian policy for a decade or more and it has successfully exacerbated the problem not improved it.

[old,not bold]

If it is Pilot suicide, and I remain to be convinced"....remain to be convinced" indeed. I should hope you do; it's pure, unfounded, unsubstantiated speculation. As are all the other wild guesses posed so far.

[toffeez]

Why do so many people think it's the BEA's job to dance to the tune of the popular press?
They will confirm or deny when they decide the time is right.
They will announce the pilots names, in due course.
The BEA's job is to find the cause of the accident and make recommendations.
Feeding the hungry mob as soon as possible is not their priority.

[Flying Pinguin]

The New York Times reports information about the cockpit audio analysis disclosed by an anonymous high rank officer participating to the investigation.

Why always the americans? What do they have to do with a German airliner flying from Spain to Germany and crashing in France?

[Quantz]

Just for clarification, I'm a french writer and journalist, living in Brussels.
As far as we know (Thu. morning, 1136, Paris time), it was the FO who was blocked outside, and the captain inside flight deck.Both were speaking in german prior to the incident. When banging on the door, the FO receives no reply, no reaction apparently.

Source : Le Monde.fr
Crash de la Germanwings : le copilote était coincé à l'extérieur du cockpit avant l'accident (http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/03/26/un-des-pilotes-etait-coince-a-l-exterieur-du-cockpit-avant-le-crash-de-l-a320_4601341_3214.html)

[Ian W]

Quote:
My question is, would visual recordings of the cockpit and the cabin help with investigations?
Not gonna happen as long as the cabin crew and flight deck officers are represented by labor unions.

In light of today's information I would be surprised if cabin video recording and streaming to 'the cloud' is not mandatory worldwide within 5 years. There may be requirement for the content to be held 'in escrow' by a third party, perhaps ICAO or the #AA of the airline's home country with only access after an incident/accident, but it will happen.

[Wirbelsturm]

Why do so many people think it's the BEA's job to dance to the tune of the popular press?

Perhaps it's because the job of the BEA is to collate what facts they can and come up with an initial findings report ASAP based upon the factual information garnered from the scene of the accident in the event that the accident/incident was caused by a mechanical/systems failure that might have an affect on other aircraft of the same type.

Obviously in this case the accident was on 'home soil' so to speak with a huge media circus surrounding it and extreme pressure on the investigators to produce some form of 'reason' behind what was a quite baffling scenario.

What the BEA or any other organisation should not do is 'leak' tidbits of information without robust investigation behind them.

All IMVHO of course.

[vanHorck]

According to Dutch press, Lufthansa has replied to the NYT allegations by saying:

"we currently do not have information which confirms the NYT allegation".

German wings has commented to Le Dauphiné Libéré:

"We are leaving no stone unturned to obtain more information and will not speculate".

[LEBB]

Red it a couple of days ago but diid not give it any thought.Lufthansa plans to axe germanwings around october. Under the new brand/company pilots will earn 40% less.

[His dudeness]

The backgrounds of the crews has become even more important over the last 18 hours and the press should be allowed to do their work, even if they are deemed here to be an irresponsible bunch.

What exactly is the work of the press here ? To bother people in grief ? To satisfy a bunch of ...... glued to the TV in need of trivia and drivel ?

If your lines mean they (the press) have an investigative role here, then I say : NO they haven´t. And especially not the sort of media that is in the hands of people and/or corporations such as Rupert Murdoch. Western societies are way past the time were we had independent and investigative journalism. We have allowed single individuals and corporations to "generate opinion" in their favour. And with the internet/twitter/facebook and all that other bollocks everybody can be a semi journalist, with the consequences we see today all over this planet and especially in "our" societies.

They are also one of our mechanisms for an honest society

No they are not. Not anymore -> see above. And an honest society does not exist. Anywhere. Because humans are humans.

Its the BEAs and BFUs part in this investigation to be THE mechanism of honesty in this case.

[Eutychus]

The NYT article does not give the nationality of its source.

Edited to add: Or in fact, it says they are French: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/world/europe/germanwings-airbus-crash.html

[DaveReidUK]

Why always the Americans? What do they have to do with a German airliner flying from Spain to Germany and crashing in France?Quite a lot, actually.

It's standard practice for the engine manufacturer to be invited to be accredited to an accident investigation.

CFM International, the World's Leading Aircraft Engine Manufacturer (http://www.cfmaeroengines.com/)

[hallava]

With unengineer.. If i was working on airline security id be the one reading these, you cant bury your head in the sand and think about if no one talks about it it doesnt exists. And if i.. As non aviator can have some security threatning information regarding aviation safety.. On discussion board.. I rest my case..

[Flying Pinguin]

@ Eutychus: you are right. I saw a translation of the original NYT article and I was induced to misunderstanding. I have modified my post.

It remains unclear how it possible that the NYT is capable to give these info before the French or the Germans.

[johnnyramjet]

Flying Pinguin, since there were two American passengers on board and that Honeywell and CFM are contributing corporations to the A320, what's wrong with a little experience in helping the families find answers to this accident. The more help the better.

[Flying Pinguin]

@johnnyramjet: correct, anyway I just discovered that NYT reported information from a French officer, not American as I wrongly mentioned in my first post.

[LadyL2013]

athonite - not the poster you addressed, but I also work in the field.

IMO, mental health needs to be treated and addressed in the same way as any other illness. Many sufferers are entirely capable of carrying out their job as if they are well, others may require medication or therapy to do so and some may need to stop work temporarily whilst they recover.

There is still a lot of stigma and ignorance surrounding it in terms of what people think a person with mental ill health is going to act like or how competent they are able to be. I know from speaking to some friends in the aviation industry that some airlines can be very harsh about it and others can be pretty good.

Considering the prevalence of MH problems most of us have probably been piloted by a sufferer. I think when you make it a very taboo thing, it drives it underground and problems may only get worse. Indeed I would encourage a very open and honest MH culture within aviation where a sufferer can be assessed and treated so that if possible they can continue their career with the appropriate support.

Of course it may mean depending on the severity and type of illness that some may be unable to fly again and absolutely this should be the case if there is any risk beyond normal. The truth is though is that many sufferers can be effectively treated and return to 'normal' the same as many physical illnesses.

[Pace]

We are going on one leaked report that banging was heard on the door.
That one of the pilots could not gain access.

If that was true and there is NO official statement to back that up then if the other pilot could not gain access it would mean that the other pilot had locked the door.

If that was the case then I cannot see any possible explanation of pilot incapacitation as it would have taken a conscious decision to lock the other pilot out and the conclusion can only be with bad intentions.

But we are relying on a leaked report which has hit all the tabloid press today.

I am not an A320 Pilot but a corporate jet pilot and we do not have doors to the PAX but lets take another innocent scenario that the door was not locked from the inside?

Reaching a high level like FL380 will make two things more likely firstly a depressurisation and secondly once the climb phase is complete and the aircraft is established in the cruise is the most likely time that a crew member will leave the other crew member at the controls and go back to the toilets.

Even with the banging on the doors IF that is correct and failure for the other pilot to gain access it does not preclude the possibility of depressurisation with one crew member at the controls and the other in the toilet.

The other pilot in the toilet would realise something was seriously wrong and attempt to join his colleague but within seconds would be becoming muddled and probably unable to put in the right code or infact entering the wrong codes in desperation he would hammer on the door before loosing conscious while having a door which is normally functioning

I still find it hard to believe its likely that a crew member (not impossible) would take himself out and 150 PAX on purpose and a more obvious reason even given the door banging could exist
There is no evidence that the door was locked from the inside

[BigFrank]

Does the fact that the head of BEA stonewalled about the contents of the cockpit recorder at a press conference which his organisation had decided to hold, but that this information subsequently came into the public domain within 12 hours by a most circuitous route, reflect well on BEA's press relations judgement?

[Good Business Sense]

Whatever the reason for crash -

- in the "old days", most of the time, the road to an airline jet cockpit was long. Prior to landing the big airline job most pilots flew in all manner of organisations over many years. You built up a reputation in the industry/military, people knew you, a trail if you like, a history - Chief Pilots etc could get the "gen" on you pretty quickly. A "good egg", "reliable", "a good pair of hands", etc etc.

Now with £100k plus and a year or two at flight school you, with no work experience anywhere, no history, nobody knows you from a bar of soap, are welcomed into the right seat of an airline jet.

I think there many problems with this but the one that struck me most was security.

[ChiefT]

Provided, the NYT / AFP scenario is true, one question is switched out here: Why descended the aircraft? Even if the pilot left on the flight deck became unconcious, the AP would fly the aircraft until it runs out of fuel.

[RiSq]

I find it bizarre that some have suggested that pilots should not be able to leave the FD for a toilet break - like they have to condition themselves or put themselves through some sort of diet plan which equates for their flight times and sectors. If you aren't, then you probably aren't running at 100% anyway as you aren't drinking enough and are likely dehydrated, which compromises your performance and decision making.

No matter on your working environment, its a basic human right to be able to go to the toilet or have a quick freshen up break. On some flights, especially on budget carriers from my observation as a well flown PAX that the crew don't even get to leave the FD on turnaround once they've finished doing checks and then start to do their pre-flight checks again for TO.

As much as we want the perfect solution for everything, there is no such thing. There will always be a risk, no matter the measures put in place. I wouldn't deem the FC going to the toilet as an acceptable compromise even as a PAX and 3 crew FDs are a thing of the past except for some very old soviet airliners and LH/ Training

In a time when they want Pilots to do less and increase automation, there's no way on this earth that a 3 crew set-up will happen, especially on short haul.

[wiggy]

Does the fact that the head of BEA stonewalled about the contents of the cockpit recorder at a press conference which his organisation had decided to hold, but that this information subsequently came into the public domain within 12 hours by a most circuitous route, reflect well on BEA's press relations judgement?


I heard the conference, my French is iffy but as I understood it he didn't stonewall, he simply said nothing had been ruled in or out and the FDR had yet to be analysised. In other words the head of the BEA did what the head of the NTSB or the AAIB would have done in similar circumstances...and quite right to.

Before rushing to judgement about the BEA bear in mind that "this information" is coming from unattributed sources in the media and could yet be shown to be as a work of fiction or widely adrift of the truth.

[athonite]

LADY2013 - I entirely agree with you, but practicalities are going to be very difficult indeed!

[Denti]

- in the "old days", most of the time, the road to an airline jet cockpit was long. Prior to landing the big airline job most pilots flew in all manner of organisations over many years. You built up a reputation in the industry/military, people knew you, a trail if you like, a history - Chief Pilots etc could get the "gen" on you pretty quickly. A "good egg", "reliable", "a good pair of hands", etc etc.

That might have been true in the USA, it certainly wasn't in europe. Closest to the US might have been the UK, but even there BA had their flight school and nowadays their future pilot program, Lufthansa had their own flightschool since flying was allowed again after WWII in germany and only hired non-cadets if their demand was bigger than the supply of cadets.

[AndyJS]

"Officials confirmed to the AP and AFP news agencies that recordings showed that one of the pilots was locked out of the cockpit before the crash."

Germanwings plane crash live: Flight 9525 pilot 'locked out of cockpit' of A320 downed in France - Europe - World - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germanwings-alps-crash-live-airbus-a320-pilot-locked-out-of-cockpit-of-plane-downed-in-france-10134724.html)

[Nock187]

This may have already been answered through the thread (the pages keep piling up!)

1. If the PF held the sidestick pitch down to max, then I'm guessing the aircraft would eventually reach a point where the A320's speed protection would kick in and pitch and speed stabilize at a sort of nose-down equilibrium @ max permitted speed?

2. Would any Bus pilots here be able to comment on whether the final descent profile/speed of Flight 9525 fits with a pilot holding the nose down at the speed protection limit?

3. Could a pilot descend faster in an A320 by manually switching flight control modes?

[kungfu panda]

That might have been true in the USA, it certainly wasn't in europe. Closest to the US might have been the UK, but even there BA had their flight school and nowadays their future pilot program, Lufthansa had their own flightschool since flying was allowed again after WWII in germany and only hired non-cadets if their demand was bigger than the supply of cadets.

The problem is 20+ years ago there was a proper selection process of cadets, where 1 in 5000 would be selected. Now the cadet is the one with the mum who can pay. It is an unacceptable system.

[ACMS]

Nock-----my question to you is why would you need to? Surely flying at VMO with idle thrust would be sufficient to do whatever nasty cr** you were planning.

Hit the ground at 330 KIAS 3000 fpm is just as bad as 350 KIAS at 4000 fpm

Doesn't matter does it, game over as you've seen.

The data suggests they were doing around 330 KIAS at 3,000 fpm.

[Denti]

The problem is 20+ years ago there was a proper selection process of cadets, where 1 in 5000 would be selected. Now the cadet is the one with the mum who can pay. It is an unacceptable system.

Certainly not the case at Lufthansa (Germanwings). They still have that selection process going and make it in turn affordable for everyone to train with them. As do the other big carriers with their own flight school. And after the selection process the flight training is another selection process as well.

If you fly for the likes of Lion Air (which apparently you do according to your posts) then your perspective might be a bit bleak, but all is not lost in other parts of the world.

[vanHorck]

German prosecutor has confirmed only one pilot was in the cockpit according to BBC News based on a Reuters source

[The Ancient Geek]

There is a simple modification which would alleviate the lockout problem.
The LOCK function should only be enabled when both seats are occupied.

This seems to be a good balance between the terrorist risk and the pilot lockout risk.

[Sleeve Wing]

We now have nearly 1200 posts on this tread in a very short time, all speculation.
What concerns me is the fact that very few of the many posting here are prepared to give us any qualification information in their public profiles.

The number of guesses would be massively reduced if only the professionals were allowed to comment. Then we might get some constructive comment. :ugh:

[Lawro]

If the rumours prove valid & unlawful interference the cause of this disaster , it will prove to be the last straw for piloting.

People will not trust pilots & after a number of similar cases , external control will prove to be less of a risk .

The technology is already there & manufacturers along with airlines more than happy to cut out the perceived weak link.

[NigelOnDraft]

Would any Bus pilots here be able to comment on whether the final descent profile/speed of Flight 9525 fits with a pilot holding the nose down at the speed protection limit?It has been repeatedly pointed out earlier the observed descent rate was about half that given in the FCTM for an emergency descent profile (inc Speedbrake)

[VJW]

kungfu panda You have no idea what you're talking about. 20+ years ago that 1 person in 5000 was some senior training Captains kid. The supply and demand is different now clearly and if there were a shortage of pilots the paying for ratings would disappear. I have to point out though that paying for ratings doesn't imply that you're guaranteed to pass it. Implying that those who do pay for ratings, had their parents front the bill is again just another example of your ignorance, and lack of understanding in the system - and so far off topic it barely warrants a reply.

[DenisG]

German newspaper BILD reports that the Prosecutor General in Düsseldorf has confirmed to them that according to preliminary results of investigation, only one pilot was present in the cockpit.

[Pontius Navigator]

There is a simple modification which would alleviate the lockout problem.
The LOCK function should only be enabled when both seats are occupied.

This seems to be a good balance between the terrorist risk and the pilot lockout risk.
Sorry, how would you manage this scenario.

PNF goes to toilet. About to open door passenger attempts to enter cockpit as well.

[AndyJS]

Kulverstukas (http://www.pprune.org/members/119846-kulverstukas): the final paragraph of the full article, (not the headings).

[AndyJS]

The French prosecutor is confirming the earlier media reports about the sequence of events.

[cldrvr]

Did the French prosecutor just give us the cause? FO selecting a descend and keeping the Captain out, flying it in the ground without saying a word.

Pilot suicide taking the rest with him, selfish bugger

[zedoscarro]

French authorities saying FO was on flight deck and commanded the plane do start descent...

[marie paire]

This is the official statement by "Procurer de Marseille" during the press conference now under way.

[LUALBA]

Confirmed by BEA: FO has manipulated FMS and he was alive until the end of the Flight.

[atakacs]

Live conference now.

Authorities confirm that the copilot was alone in the cockpit and willingly put the aircraft into the ground :mad::mad:

[strake]

Co Pilot now named as Andreas Günter Lubitz.
Did Germanwings pilot deliberately lock his co-pilot out of cockpit? | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3012053/Pilot-doomed-Germanwings-jet-locked-cockpit-crash.html)

[AndyJS]

French prosecutor: most likely interpretation is deliberate action by the co-pilot.

[Jet Jockey A4]

Official now...

Captain was out of the cockpit and co-pilot starts a descent via autopilot.

Captain tries many times to call co-pilot by interphone and then by knocking on the door without any responses.

ATC calls aircraft without response. ATC even tries to tell pilot to select 7700 on transponder.

CVR picks up breathing from inside the cockpit, then loud banging on the door and then picks up EGWPS call out "TERRAIN, TERRAIN" and then initial impacts.

[DrGitfinger]

Press conference BFMTV en Direct: regarder la chaine info en live - BFMTV (http://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/live-video/)

They have the last 30 minutes of the flight on the CVR.
Conversation between pilots was normal - "cheerful"
After about 20 minutes, captain runs through landing procedure.
Co-pilot's responses to this are described as "laconic"

The co-pilot was left alone in the cockpit.
Co-pilot heard operating FMS to select altitude - can only be a deliberate act.
Hear captain using the interphone to request access to cockpit.
No response.
Banged on door.
Sound of breathing inside cockpit (continues until the impact).
Marseille ATC calls heard - no response from co-pilot.

Press conference continues...

Question: what do you mean by "laconic"
Answer: the replies by the co-pilot were vey short, would have expected more of an exchange.
No real dialogue at this stage - in contrast to the "cheerful" exchanges earlier.

[vanHorck]

Single pilot German copilot in control confirmed at live press conference, inclusive actioning descent voluntarily.

Captain requests access after returning from the toilet. No answer from PF.

Completely normal breathing is heard from cockpit till the end.

No comms with Marseille, nor reply to Squawk 7700 request. Other planes also fail to make contact.

Alarms are heard, followed by attempts heard to force the door.

Just before the final impact there is another bang possibly hitting a ridge.

No Mayday was ever sent out, nor was any response given to attempt at radio communications.

He had no reason to initiate the descent, no reason to refuse entry to the captain, no reason to refuse the comms.

What a sad day.

[Jackonicko]

Of the many issues arising here, as a frequently paying passenger, I find that the idea that one of the two pilots on board may be viewed (by his own captain) as being incapable of being left on his own by virtue of his inexperience and inability to be profoundly shocking.

That a sane Captain could profess to preferring to soil himself than to leave an inexperienced first officer alone at the controls is mind-boggling.

With a two-pilot cockpit, surely pax have the right to expect that in the event of a pilot incapacitation, the remaining pilot (whether captain or F/O) will be fully and entirely qualified and capable of safely and competently completing the flight, regardless of weather conditions, and indeed that he would be capable of dealing with any emergency or hazard.

If that is not the case, then surely we have to reintroduce a three pilot cockpit at least every time there is a 'second dickie' with less than a particular level of experience/skill/capability?

And perhaps junior, inexperienced first officers should also only fly within a constituted crew, in which two more experienced pilots would get to know him or her better, and be able to start to form an impression of both skills and psyche?

As an aside, if members feel that postings by non pilots get in the way, or are not worth reading, then perhaps one solution would be for posts by vetted members who can prove themselves to be qualified to whatever level were deemed appropriate to automatically appear in bold, with a particular background colour, to allow the less patient to skim through what they might view as dross, and read only the posts by professional pilots.

[Captain Nomad]

Why can't the cockpit door policy be reviewed? How many hi-jacks has it really saved? It seems a classic case of 'create a solution to solve one problem and create another problem in the process.' The second problem may be worse than the first...

What about a finger print or retina recognition key if the door must stay?

[AndyJS]

Article from 2013 featuring the co-pilot:

FAA recognizes Andreas Guenter Lubitz (http://aviation-business-gazette.com/A44/B58/Pilot-Andreas-Guenter-Lubitz-Rheinland-Pfalz-.html)

[Return 2 Stand]

Press Conference (Sky News) with the French now confirming it. :sad:

Their words "He voluntarily refused to open door and initiated descent"

[The Ancient Geek]

Quote:
Originally Posted by The Ancient Geek http://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france-post8918361.html#post8918361)
There is a simple modification which would alleviate the lockout problem.
The LOCK function should only be enabled when both seats are occupied.

This seems to be a good balance between the terrorist risk and the pilot lockout risk.

Sorry, how would you manage this scenario.

PNF goes to toilet. About to open door passenger attempts to enter cockpit as well.

There is a balance of risks.
Sadly suicides tend to chose a copycat method and we would appear to be suffering from a spate of these incidents. There are no totally foolproof answers, we need to take a considered and balanced action to alleviate a new risk which is an unintended consequence of the successful locked door policy.

[kungfu panda]

Money only buys you the opportunity to be a pilot. There is still selection all the way through training and the good/safe airlines will chop you if you're not up to standard.

I entirely disagree, the experience of the First Officer seems 100% relevant. Unfortunately it has not made business sense to fail cadets.

[AnglianAV8R]

Live press conference by French Official now...

Cockpit voice recorder info .... Captain left cockpit. Co Pilot initiated descent by keying attitude selector. Captain called at door, knocked, no response from Co-Pilot. Then noise of human breathing heard... All the way to impact. ATC calls heard several times, no response

Ground proximity alarms heard. Sounds of violent attempts to force door. Just before final impact... Screams and possibly very first noise of impact is heard. Then silence.

Dialogue in cockpit beforehand was entirely normal.

Official is adamant that the descent was a deliberate action by co-pilot.

Questioned about ethnicity of co-pilot. Ans - German, no suspicion of terrorism.

Edit: I'm curious to know how they can be sure he had keyed the altitude command, when they only have CVR ?

[jeronimo]

I have flown the A320 in a low cost company in Europe and what struck me during the training is how only few experienced pilot on A320 did know the emergency door access. We tend to remember only the normal code.
If the pilot being outside knew the emergency access code, he should have been able to enter, doesn't he ...

[WillowRun 6-3]

A few (succinct) inputs:
1. If the quality of discussion on the forum has declined over the past several years as more posters have shown up lacking any piloting credentials whatsoever, part of the reason for the decline also is, over the same time period, a greater number of individuals have found that posting on internet message boards at all is an interesting and - sometimes - useful thing to do. I can't prove this correlation between SLFs-with-agendas and increased propensities to type on keyboards wired together, but it is true in many other sectors (the rise of internet-based "learning platforms" in higher ed, for example, over approximately the same time period).

2. BEA is part of the system France, as a sovereign State, applies to civil aviation and accident investigations - and the French system includes a much more dominant criminal and prosecutorial element than in the U.S. or U.K. or most all other States. NOT saying this is better, worse, or any thing of the sort - just that the criminal-system element changes the willingness of authorities to disclose to the press, media, public.

3. Talk of imposing tighter and/or more extensive mental health evaluations on flightcrew members - great, please give me the roadmap for how the SARPs would be formulated so as to apply across the many different cultures, traditions, even societal conceptualizations of what is "mental health" in the first place. Annex 1 of the Chicago Convention would authorize ICAO to reform airman licensing so as to include a greater component of mental health screening - but a high degree of skepticism is needed that this could be accomplished in a manner which encompasses the many different social attitudes of the many divergent States which are State Parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention of 1944).

[Squawk_ident]

Procuror 1230
2nd black box not located

30 min entirely recorded
20 minutes normal courteous
cdb is heared doing briefing landing DUS and answers very short (laconic)
we hear captain ask f/o to takes control
seat going back and door closing
natural need
f/o alone
fms manoeuvred to command descent of the aircraft
voluntary action



lot of call by the captain to open the door with public address no answer
knocks on the door no reply
human respiration can be heard until the end of flight so pilot alive
Marseille control calls repeatidly no reply
atc controller asks for 7700 no reply
atc ask other pilots to radio relayed to ctc MRS no reply
alarms ground proximity




loud bang like to smash the door

pull up pull up
before impact first noise on a talus before hitting mountain
no mayday mayday

our interpretation and plausible :

F/Oi voluntarily refused to open the door to captain
and action the button to order the lost of altitude. Reason unknown but can be analysed as to destroy the aircraft

Andreas Lubitz is the name

[goaroundnow]

Germanwings plane crash: Co-pilot 'wanted to destroy plane' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32063587)

[RiSq]

Sorry, how would you manage this scenario.

PNF goes to toilet. About to
open door passenger attempts to enter cockpit as well.

Surely in the same way that I have seen it done by some carriers now. Either a member of CC stands in front of the door and seatbelt signs on or CC goes into the Cabin - the question is, is it an acceptable risk.

I hardly see how it's different to how it works now anyway. If someone REALLY wants to get in when the pilot needs a toilet break, they can. Again, it's all probability of risk. The only way to circumvent it altogether is to put a toilet in a cockpit?

But in response to the post you were replying to, The 2 pilot in seat idea wouldn't work and it's just something else to go wrong and overly complicated. Why?

[Lord Farringdon]

Enoon:
Incidentally and on another point, my heart goes out to the engineers who maintain the aircraft. Every time something happens the morons in the media note that the aircraft recently had some fault corrected, and explicitly or implicity, begin to point their uninformed fingers of blame. I am sure that the maintenance crews are already racking their brains and searching their consciences and such accusations must be very distressing for them.

An ex Air Force acquaintance of mine worked in later life at a facility overhauling helicopter gearboxes for numerous operators. Whenever a helicopter crashed his demeanor changed and he genuinely become very anxious and fearful that the crash might have been caused by an act or omission of his while performing a gearbox overhaul. His stress and anxiety eventually reached a level where he left the industry.

So I feel the maintainers out there and understand what thoughts they must be having when one of the aircraft they service everyday has a tragic accident.

[vanHorck]

So now that we know what happened the next phase is to find out why...

People must be pretty desperate to take 149 people with them. It could be terrorism but he didn't say anything,so no religious or political screams prior to a martyr death. Keeping silent means a missed unique terror opportunity.

This therefore sounds like extreme depression of a 24 year old leading to a suicide unable to think of consequences for others.

I hope for the aviation industry his reasoning was not around the current financial woes of young pilots who have invested the value of a house to get a job which in many cases now only pays a mediocre salary.

[Greenlights]

Something not really clear to me....
why the FO have to lock the Cpt outside and start the descent?!
I can't think about deliberate suicide from a young man

you're kidding ?
actually statiscally, youngs commit suicide the most.

[Whenwe]

In the days when I was flying I controlled access to my office!

How many more people must die before they review this "locked door" policy?

And don't give me this blah, blah, blah, about terrorists etc. I have had enough of this.

And I could also fly a Tiger Moth.

[WHBM]

The locked door approach seems to have contributed to a number of incidents. Some form of key kept inside the flight deck that a crew member could take with them if they are leaving is something to look at. We seem happy to have a crash axe inside the flight deck, why not a key to get in the door as well.

Regarding why crew on a sub-2 hour flight even need to use The Facilities rather than before starting, that is I am afraid a feature of LCCs, minimum turnrounds at the outer point all scheduled by operational research down to the minute, everyone busy, and a desire to stick any delay in turnround on somebody. So the practice develops of doing so once you reach the cruise. Likewise the LCC justification for not having a cabin crew member step in is, I suspect, that on a sub-2 hour sector they are expected to be up and selling from the cart the moment the belts sign goes off. It's a question for the various boards of directors, whether commercial zeal has been allowed to get ahead of operational integrity.

[5 APUs captain]

Piggy Back is right.
SELECTION - that's a problem.
Psychological tests should be implemented in EVERY airline. Not only native language check.

[seltsam]

His name - Andreas Lubitz - both traditional German names.
28yrs - 630 hrs flying

[londonman]

@J74

I can't think about deliberate suicide from a young man

Where have you been hiding all these years? Sadly there are many young people who will take their own lives.

As far as the question of 'secrecy' by the authorities is concerned, if this was America then I'd be pointing at the lawyers insisting that everything was run past them first. Strong possibility that this might be happening here. Even to the extent of insurance companies calling the shots? For example, in the UK many schools with Public Liability Insurance are forbidden by their insurers from admitting or even apologising for any incident. Crazy world.

[Pace]

If this is correct what an awful situation and terrible for the families. We know nothing about the FO and his background was he a mentally unstable Lad or someone with Radical views i.e. terrorist actions?

Airbus will be relieved that their aircraft was not at Fault
German wings will say their pilot held a first class medical
Who will be held at fault the medical profession?

Very Very sad I cannot understand the mentality of someone who could do this to so many people in his care if true

I hope for the aviation industry his reasoning was not around the current financial woes of young pilots who have invested the value of a house to get a job which in many cases now only pays a mediocre salary.

If that was the case throw himself under a train not destroy the lives of 150 people

[CrabbitOldBugger]

AndyJS


That is a junk web site with info hoovered up from the FAA pilot register.

[Kulverstukas]

No mobile or SMS from passengers? Can investigation board demand raw data from mobile providers aling the route?

Pax electronic devices? Any recovered? Content examined?

[Ollie Onion]

The lunacy of the locked cockpit door policy has been exposed here, at NO time should anyone person be able to block access to the flight deck. We would almost be better to go back to a light door that can be locked but is not impenetrable when forced. Someone trying to break in from the outside is likely to be stopped by crew and passengers, sadly with the current policy no one can intervene once someone gets to be alone behind that door.

[TomU]

It does rather seem that the decision to install intrusion proof Flight Deck Doors has become a victim of the Law of Unintended Consequences.

[Squawk_ident]

F/O was entitled to pilot
Don't know how old
Preciously the procurer said rather loudly : he is not a terrorist if you want me to say that.
At the very end of the record shouts are heard. Death is immediate.

F/O was 28

[RiSq]

If this is correct what an awful situation and terrible for the families. We
know nothing about the FO and his background was he a mentally unstable Lad or
someone with Radical views i.e. terrorist actions?

Airbus will be
relieved that their aircraft was not at Fault
German wings will say their
pilot held a first class medical
Who will be held at fault the medical
profession?

Very Very sad I cannot understand the mentality of someone
who could do this to so many people in his care if true


Someone of a sound mind cannot comprehend the thought process of someone who is mentally ill or suffering depression - that's half the problem.

When a family member tried to commit suicide, I had a real hard time trying to understand why or how - it just made me frustrated. The problem is, they are not thinking logically. It's completely illogical. That's one of the big issues with Mental health. It's hard to relate to or comprehend unless you have been in that situation and thought in such a way at some time or another (Which I have not)

This is something the families will have to deal with. The problem is, this is the worst probable outcome, as part of the grieving process is knowing and understanding "Why" - Which if it was mechanical is easier than this, as you cannot comprehend or make sense of it logically. I feel for the families.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Lets start at the top.

Germanwings is a low cost operation. This means what it says on the tin. Low cost. The public only sees low fares, but that is not possible without low cost.
So where do low cost companies cut the cost? Everywhere! Staffing, training, maintenance, terms and conditions, HR, fuel, flight and duty hours, you name it, it is all done at the lowest possible cost.
Finance people love this, but we as pilots know one basic thing: Safety cost money.

The captain of this ill fated flight was a Lufthansa captain. Or was he? Was he not a Germanwings captain? Did he do this transfer happily, or was it a case of "you do this or else?"

The first officer was a low hour pilot. Nothing unusual about this. I was one myself. But when I started my company put me through a lot of training before the gave me a type rating. Yes, I did not have to pay for it!
Well, both training and terms and conditions for new hires have been reduced. A lot. In my airline, this affects the motivation of the new guys. They earn slightly more that a McDonalds worker.

The LH group pilots are in conflict with their management. They have been on strike. Pensions and salaries, and if the rumor is correct, GW is heading for a big reduction in both.
I have been in the same situation. A lot of pressure from the top, including turning other airline staff agains the "overpaid and underworked" pilots. Threats of bankruptcy and loss of job and income
While all this was going on, we were supposed to fly as usual. Safe and on time. Not let any management bullying affect us.
Did it? Of course. Some more than others. A lot of complaining and pissed off pilots. Some went sick. Depression? Who knows, but guys got tired. Not fit for flight. Most went to work anyway.

We are stuck behind a CRM barrier in the shape of a steel door. It keeps the bad guys out, but it also enables a suicidal pilot to lock out his colleague.

This industry is getting sicker by the day. I am sure there will be more accidents before a red flag is raised. The Americans have started to reverse the situations. How many accidents do we need in Europe before we do the same?

[Capt Turbo]

Tabloid reports are .....tabloid reports.

However, an Air India Express incidence a few years ago indicates a possible scenario:
Captain went to the toilet...the inexperienced F/O involountarily disconnected the A/P when alone in the cockpit and the aircraft entered a steep descent....the F/O was too panicked/busy to let the captain back into the cockpit....the captain finally gained emergency entry and literally crawled (according to himself) over his seat and pulled back the yoke....aircraft overstressed during recovery...but recovered after several thousand feet descent.

Once, while deadheading, I had to use the emergency entry procedure when the cockpit crew was in an "undesirable mental state". During that incidence I had more adrenaline in my body than during my other 40+ aviation years combined, and it took some combined effort to get the code right during the stress of the moment.

During line checks or LPCs I regularly ask the crew for the current code: Not everybody remembers the latest, revised one. If you press an outdated code, you will not get access.....simple.

I have witnessed several cases of door failures that had to be reset.

In case of a rapid, severe decompression the door is designed to blow open, so that scenario (decompression/door knocking) is unlikely IMHO.

As other has pointed out here, the armed & locked door may solve a certain security issue, but it does create other serious safety issues.

Can anyone confirm for sure that LH/4U does not require a C/C in the cockpit when a pilot vacate??

[NigelOnDraft]

It does rather seem that the decision to install intrusion proof Flight Deck Doors has become a victim of the Law of Unintended Consequences. Enough previous incidents (LAM, Ethiopian. more?) but authorities chose to ignore.

After the Ethiopian, when I went out, I'd ask the FO in jest where we were going to divert to...

Even if you up the psychological checks on entry (1st Class 1), this omits all current crew, and the prospect of change post Class 1 issue? I mentioned earlier it would be very hard to change the current system without severe disruption to the current airline schedules.

[oldoberon]

Serious problem.

There is a growing awareness that aircraft are vulnerable when one pilot leaves the cockpit.

If you allow any form of access from the cabin, for instance to avoid a Helios situation, then it might be used by desperate cabin crew during a hijacking. If you don't then either pilots can not leave the flight deck during the flight of if they do the aircraft is vulnerable.

There haven't been nearly as many hijackings since armoured doors were installed but I am a little surprised that once they were mandated no one took the time to think it all the way through.

Agreed but don't forget you can't prove a negative, if they just wanted to blow up aircraft and kill all on board they could still try that but haven't succeeded, so have the other changes reduced their effectivity and would those also have reduced hijackings.

[horizon flyer]

Well said catch21, heart breaking.

It looks like more risk of this than terrorist action.

Should it be redesigned that pilots can go to the loo with no locked door between them and the cockpit with another door between the loo and cabin.

I guess the quick answer is, there must always be two crew members in the cockpit at all times. So before a pilot leaves the cockpit for any reason a crew member comes in and stands behind the door to let him back in.

Trust no one, the cockpit must always have two people in it, I think is a must be solution, no matter what is done with the door system.

[kungfu panda]

I don't believe it was suicide. I believe that the First Officer accidentally disconnected the Autopilot, the aircraft went into a descent. He was unable to stop the descent. In attempting to open the door for the Captain he accidentally locked the door on 5 minute timer. He then went into shock and was not responsive to anything.

[Superpilot]

Reasons for committing suicide:


Loss of dearest loved one
De-debilitating disease
Extreme physical pain
Ideological reasons
Financial hardship (huge loans, low pay in comparison, no way seen out of the mess).


Which one would you most associated with an otherwise talented young German First Officer?

[DaveReidUK]

@EastofKoksy
"Mode S transponder data should provide information about the selected altitude - assuming the descent was initiated by one of the pilots."

ADS-B OUT data will have the same and more, along with a higher frequency of updates.

No, it won't. Selected Altitude is a Mode S EHS download parameter (DAP), nothing to do with ADS-B-Out

[DarkSoldier]

In my company the pilot is never left alone in the flight deck. If one of us wants to go to the loo, then we have a CC member sit with the other guy in the FD until the one that has gone out returns. So you would never have a lone person in the FD. One wonders why this was not a policy in Germanwings, or other airlines that have had similar incidents - could this have prevented this disaster?

[Kulverstukas]

They just say in the news that the Co-Pilot did the descent on purpose and left the captain out of the door on purpose...


Does "on purpose" means that there was "Thou shall not pass" on the VCR?


What they could hear on the voice recorder was the breathing noises of the co-pilot, so he was alive until the end.

Alive do not equals to conscious as far as I can understand english...

[RiSq]

A previous post by gbpeck or something similar has been deleted, as I'm sure
mine will, but he or she made a valid point. If contemplating suicide, would
someone rely on the other pilot going on a comfort break on a short
flight? It seems unlikely.


Your post suggests a premeditated suicide, which a lot are not. A lot of the suicides that happen at train stations around the UK - the people haven't just upped and ran to the nearest station to jump under a train - they are in their business suits with all of their items ready for their business day and have gone to the station for their commute. Something happens at that exact moment and they jump.

Although it can be premeditated, most are not, as pre-planning means some logical thought process and most suicides are illogical thought processes.

[gordonroxburgh]

I'm sure we will get recomendations and these must be acted on universally by the industry to ensure that nobody can be left alone in a locked flight deck door.

2 sensible ways :

Key or RFID type Fob in the cockpit that goes with any crew memeber when the leave the flight deck, that will allow access no matter what security setting the door has been placed on.

Upgraded door system to allow a per flight specific random door code to be generated that would override any security settings.

[2Planks]

The unanswerable question is how many atrocities have been prevented by the raft of security measures since 911 (and others such as baggage screening following bombs in earlier years). Airlines (especially flag carriers) are highly lucrative targets for terrorists as they strike fear into the populace and are seen as a national totemic symbol of the nation you are trying to attack/alter the governments courses of action. So it is a matter of balance - in my view cockpit doors have probably saved more lives that they have ended. Nothing in the above statement detracts from the absolute tragedy here.


I also suspect that whatever the motivations of this individual, he would have found another way of disabling his captain with or without a cockpit door mechanism.


On a different tack, there is an irony between the number of posters resisting the placement of in cockpit cameras for privacy reasons and the number calling for the early release of the pilot's names........

[LEBB]

Quote:
I hope for the aviation industry his reasoning was not around the current financial woes of young pilots who have invested the value of a house to get a job which in many cases now only pays a mediocre salary.



I red the other day germanwings was meant to be scrapped/ rebranded in the autumn.
New pilots can expect to earn a 40% less.

[capster]

I'll repeat myself

In the freighter I fly, we manage to make our own coffee, heat our own meals and use the toilet without the help of an air hostess, all the whilst complying with our SOP. If a galley and toilet were located behind the cockpit door and my colleague were to become suicidal, at least I would have a chance to disable him without being locked out of the office, as long as he doesnt have over 100ml of toothpaste or deoderant on him.


What I am suggesting is that in airliners that carry pax, the flight deck crew have their own toilet and galley behind the cockpit door. This would result in a few less rows of seats, and will therefore never happen.

[SD.]

Having lost a friend to mental illness last year, it has opened my eyes to mental health. My friend left work early one day, his colleagues felt he was just having an off day. Within 15 minutes the guy was dead, just 2 text messages and one letter left.

No one knew of his illness and none of us suspected that he may take his own life.

This could have happened on any sector that day, the only saving grace is that the skipper left the FD at TOC and not just before TOD. There could have been far worse consequences had the aircraft crashed into an urban area.

[Wossname]

How common is it for captains to leave their seats and flight decks on such a short sector? If it is relatively uncommon, then the FO (if it is proven to be by his hand) must have either been considering this action for a number of flights, or just took his opportunity on the spur of the moment.

Is it too simplistic to say there would/might have been signs that all was not well with this young pilot?

[Capt Kremin]

If you accidentally disconnect the AP in an Airbus nothing much happens. It just sits there.

There is no default mode on an Airbus that will send it on a descent at VMO.

This was deliberate.

[CISTRS]

We really must make these jobs worth their candle - even at the cost of the ticket price. Professional pilots terms and conditions, rostering, rest periods, FTLs, have been eroded for the past decade if not longer. The job MUST be made tolerable, or we will generate more of these tragedies...
This does not necessarily mean more pay - just better overall conditions and a culture of valuing professional pilots.
With more low time cadets being taken into the teams, we must value them. They are the Captains of the next generation.

[FullyFullyReady]

If every LCC cadet was subject to recurrent psychological assessment, such carriers would find themselves in a pickle with regard to crewing requirements. While I have never suffered from mental illness I can empathise with cadets who, after putting in almost 2 years of hard work and financial commitment can find themselves sitting in that right hand seat and being paid nothing or little more than minimum wage at certain airlines. Demands from loaning banks, parents, finding a roof over one's house, eating healthily, having any kind of life, working long hours for days on end can take it's toll, especially if this low 'pay' is continuously wearing on the FO's mind.

[Voodoo78]

First post here.

The only solution that I can think of to limit the chances of this happening again is to move the cockpit door back so that the toilet becomes part of the cockpit safe area and is only used by crew.

This way, none of the pilots will need to leave the cockpit area unless, they are on a wide body, long-haul flight where there is a relief pilot. Even then, the relieved pilot does not leave until such time the relief pilot is in his seat, which is normal procedure anyways. (I would think!)

On smaller planes, this is slightly more problematic because of the loss of the forward toilet, but this can be resolved by adding another toilet which will inevitably mean less rows and more squeezed PAX as the airlines will not like the idea of less sardines.

[NigelOnDraft]

I'm sure we will get recomendations and these must be acted on universally by the industry to ensure that nobody can be left alone in a locked flight deck door...Trouble is you are now designing a system to cater for a suicidal pilot... which rather admits there could be such individuals out there.

The regulation and industry relies on pilots to be the solution, not the problem. Once you swap that, there are plenty of other problems unearthed.

Remember, we have single pilot Ops up to a certain size, and serious studies being made into single pilot airliner Ops, especially in cruise / Long Haul.

[RAFAT]

kungfu panda - disconnection of the autopilot in nearly all commercial aircraft is annunciated by an aural warning, no such aural alert was contained in the CVR data (as it was not mentioned in this morning's press conference) so the autopilot was not disconnected.

[Pace]

The obvious solution which will be peanuts in the whole cost of the operation is an extra cabin crew member trained in a different way to monitor safety issues and PAX as well. It would be his/her duty to monitor the entry and exit of crew members and to remain in the cockpit so there is no one pilot alone at any time.
What will that cost an extra 20,000 euro PA?

[Denti]

As a low hours pilot was he also low paid? Was he under financial pressure?

Germanwings FOs are on the Lufthansa mainline pay, only exception is that the overtime threshold is higher. The entry level pay is around 68k €/year according to lufthansa management, they enjoy the full benefits of lufthansa. Yes, they have to pay back part of their flight training (60k) which is deducted from their pay in several different ways between which they can choose. Max level pay for an FO at Germanwings is around 130k/year.

[Batman737]

Firstly this is a tragedy. Even more the terrible if it were caused by a deliberate act. I do think posters are seriously missing the point here. Sadly the closed cockpit door and secure flight deck philosophy is absolutely essential!!

The point is being missed!! What is also essential in my view is that there should never be less than TWO people on the flight deck during flight. SIMPLE.

I am a 737 Captain for a major operator and we don't have any expensive security equipment such as cameras to look in the cabin or double doors etc.

When a pilot needs to leave for the toilet we follow a very sensible procedure to identify who is at the door through use of a communication protocol and visual verification (peephole). The Cabin is secured and the pilot then leaves the flight deck (whilst the other pilot remains ALWAYS at the controls) a member of the cabin crew then passes into the flight deck and the door is re secured. When the pilot is ready to come back the same procedure is followed. The Pilot Flying when ready asks the cabin crew member to visually identify through the peep hole and then simply opens the door at which point they swap over again. Both pilots are now back on the flight deck. It is my understanding that this procedure is predominantly to substitute the use of cameras etc as one pilot must ALWAYS remain at the controls during flight. This procedure however also ensures that TWO people are ALWAYS on the flight deck. Should anything go wrong with the pilot flying such as falling unconscious or God forbid some sort of extremely erratic behaviour (like wanting to kill everyone) then the cabin crew member simply turns the door handle from inside the flight deck at any time and this mechanically opens the door outwards to the cabin enabling others to gain access.

I cannot speak for other airlines but my understanding is that if they have cameras etc then there isn't necessarily a requirement for a procedure to keep TWO people on the flight deck. Crews from other airlines will be able to confirm whether this is the case.

If it is the case then it is the rules applied by the regulators and the procedures designed by the airlines which need potential review not the fact that we need to get rid of the cockpit doors which are essential to secure the flight deck.

People are just focused on keeping the looneys out. What if they are already inside??

It's sadly very simple.... A MINIMUM TWO PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHT DECK DURING FLIGHT!

[horizon flyer]

In fact RiSq I believe someone committing suicide is thinking very logically. What they see is no future, so why carry on, there is no point, so end it all.

This is the thought process behind suicide. So why did he think he had no future? that is the question.

[c53204]

Many, many 'non professionals' trust the mentioned 'professionals' with their lives - banking, air travel, Doctors, etc, etc.

Often it is those professionals we trust, who let us down. Sadly this thread is slowly pointing to another 'professional' doing just that.

It's an open forum and allows (to a degree), freedom of speech.

[sp3ctre]

I just don't see how you can "fix" the problem of a pilot wanting to down a plane. Sure, you could bring in measures to make this particular situation less likely, but what is to stop a pilot in control of the aircraft stuffing it into a row of houses (or the airport terminal) on descent. In that case there would be very little reaction time available to recover the situation.

[Gary Brown]

You can watch the press conference of Brice Robin, the French state prosecutor based in Marseille (who has responsibility for the region of the crash) here (http://www.scoopnest.com/fr/user/itele/580978439114489856). Scroll down to the second - clearly labeled - video screen on the page. In French, of course.

[ChickenHouse]

SELECTION - that's a problem.
Psychological tests should be implemented in EVERY airline. Not only native language check.
These tests will only do one thing - they grow a mental monoculture and not for the very good. I understand, this is a typical European reaction, BUT, this thinking already lead to two world wars and I don't want a third. So, No, this would only help politicians to win elections, but changes nothing on the threat.

[NigelOnDraft]

How common is it for captains to leave their seats and flight decks on such a short sector? If it is relatively uncommon, then the FO (if it is proven to be by his hand) must have either been considering this action for a number of flights, or just took his opportunity on the spur of the moment.

Is it too simplistic to say there would/might have been signs that all was not well with this young pilot?DUD-BCN-DUS I would say, at some point, very likely.

On the turnround there is much to do, the cleaners are in the toilets, the water doesn't work to wash hands, no air conditioning.

I am not a psychologist, I'll fly with a different colleague most days, and we have grown up in different eras, possibly cultures etc. The slightest query to or about someone will result in a bullying and harassment accusation re racism / sexism. We are actively taught in our airline to be "tolerant" of everybody, which equates to me the opposite of seeking out potential issues.

[londonman]

@Pace. It's not just the salary. He/she will need to sit somewhere and so that will be lost revenue in addition. Your point is well made however.

[Tom Bangla]

Point taken, but I suspect this is less to do with LCC economics and more a rare consequence of a human mind in a dark and sad place. I don't know if there are any security measures that would completely eliminate the potential for something similar to happen again.

[Simplythebeast]

So now we can stop speculating about the cause of the crash we will speculate on what causes a person to commit suicide instead, all the suicide experts putting their views forward. Low pay, oh yes that must be it? Someone else giving us an opinion that the majority of railway suicides are committed on the spur of the moment...... That is absolute rubbish and I can confirm that, having investigated a large number of such incidents.
Let's wait and see what is eventually discovered about this individual before making up lots of 'reasons' why he did what he did, please?

[TWT]

One guy standing can,with a little bit of effort,neutralise one guy who is seated.Even with 2 pilots on the flightdeck,if one of them makes a certain choice then the result can still be the same.There is no simple answer.

[bud leon]

It's very clear that the airline industry has the most thorough incident investigation systems and arguably the least effective responses to the outcomes of those investigations.

The industry must take into account the concept of paying passenger perceptions. It can't continue the current cockpit security arrangements. This incident, as infrequent as it is historically, should not be regarded as a rare outlier.

It's clear that the post 9/11 security arrangements are not effective. The industry needs to acknowledge the current limitations of automatic control.

Despite all the noise this forum highlights a number of recurrent themes that managers should heed.

[NigelOnDraft]

I am a 737 Captain for a major operator and we don't have any expensive security equipment such as cameras to look in the cabin or double doors etc.

When a pilot needs to leave for the toilet we follow a very sensible procedure to identify who is at the door through use of a communication protocol and visual verification (peephole). The Cabin is secured and the pilot then leaves the flight deck (whilst the other pilot remains ALWAYS at the controls) a member of the cabin crew then passes into the flight deck and the door is re secured. When the pilot is ready to come back the same procedure is followed. The Pilot Flying when ready asks the cabin crew member to visually identify through the peep hole and then simply opens the door at which point they swap over again. Both pilots are now back on the flight deck. It is my understanding that this procedure is predominantly to substitute the use of cameras etc as one pilot must ALWAYS remain at the controls during flight. This procedure however also ensures that TWO people are ALWAYS on the flight deck. Should anything go wrong with the pilot flying such as falling unconscious or God forbid some sort of extremely erratic behaviour (like wanting to kill everyone) then the cabin crew member simply turns the door handle from inside the flight deck at any time and this mechanically opens the door outwards to the cabin enabling others to gain access.

I cannot speak for other airlines but my understanding is that if they have cameras etc then there isn't necessarily a requirement for a procedure to keep TWO people on the flight deck. Crews from other airlines will be able to confirm whether this is the case.The whole point of the expensive cameras and door lock system is to avoid and mitigate the system you highlight. If these systems fail we go back to your system. This would be at the heart of why going back to your system for all is not likely acceptable - it makes clear that we up front cannot be trusted, and that undermines much of our industry's safety foundation.

Not saying of course it will not happen as a kneejerk response.

[archer_737]

We really must make these jobs worth their candle - even at the cost of the ticket price. Professional pilots terms and conditions, rostering, rest periods, FTLs, have been eroded for the past decade if not longer. The job MUST be made tolerable, or we will generate more of these tragedies...
This does not necessarily mean more pay - just better overall conditions and a culture of valuing professional pilots.
With more low time cadets being taken into the teams, we must value them. They are the Captains of the next generation.

I won't disagree with you but keep in mind that, if it turns out that the FO deliberated descended and crashed, we're talking about a guy with 630hrs on type.
That is what? A year in the airline? Can't think a guy with such a low time and having passed through only a few experiences (the good and the bad ones) will be such in a mood of doing a thing like that.

My point is, sometimes you can't blame rostering, low pay, pressure... it's just human nature. Some people go nuts and then **** happens. If it was a suicide it will be hard for us in the industry to believe and to accept but we somehow will have to.

[Mozella]

I guess the quick answer is, there must always be two crew members in the cockpit at all times. So before a pilot leaves the cockpit for any reason a crew member comes in and stands behind the door to let him back in.

Trust no one, the cockpit must always have two people in it, I think is a must be solution, no matter what is done with the door system.
A cabin crew member in the cockpit might help in the case of a suddenly incapacitated pilot, it also opens the possibility that a "sleeper cell" terrorist working as one of the cabin crew could attack the remaining pilot and cause destruction of the a/c. Yes, a slim chance, but the point is that no system is foolproof.

How about a "dongle" or key slug, or other removable device the captain can take with him when leaving the cockpit which would disable the capability to disable the external key pad? The door could still be locked, but not disabled until the pilot returned and re-inserted the device back into the console. This idea is not fool proof either, but it would be relatively cheap and would have prevented this particular crash.

[wheelsright]

It seems to me that it would be beneficial for investigators to release "known" facts during the course of an investigation. What is the point of trying to conceal facts? It only encourages speculation and leaks.

At the same time, officials should do their utmost to avoid speculative conclusions or releasing information that is not agreed to be fact by all relevant parties.

I think that it would be unwise to follow the path of giving free access to the cockpit and remove the protection afforded by a locked door. The world today is different and the potential for interference with flight crew is not as uncommon as it used to be; whether by terrorist or otherwise.

At the end of the day if a member of the flight crew is determined to bring an aircraft down it is very difficult to stop them; door or no door. These issues need a thorough and objective analysis and review. There is no simple solution, it will always be a compromise.

I look forward to the true facts coming out of this tragic event and what, if anything, could have been done to prevent it...

[sitigeltfel]

Some background info on the co-pilot....

The First Officer was Andreas Lubitz, 28. He was "young". He was from Montabaur, in Rhineland-Palatinate. He had 630 flight hours. He joined Germanwings in September 2013 straight from the Lufthansa Flight Training School in Bremen.
Lufthansa said both pilots were trained at the Lufthansa Flight Training School in Bremen. The captain had over 6,000 flight hours' experience and joined Germanwings in May 2014. Previously he was a pilot with Lufthansa and Condor, a Lufthansa partner airline.
The first officer joined Germanwings in September 2013. He had about 630 flight hours. They were unable to confirm whether this was his first job as a professional pilot, or any previous experience.
The German newspaper Bild reported the first officer was from Montabaur in Rheinland-Pfalz and cited the city mayor Gabriele Wieland speaking to the DPA press agency.
A flying club which the First Officer was a member of has released a statement in tribute to him:

" Andreas died as First Officer on the tragic flight. Andreas became a member of the association as a teenager, he wanted to realise his dream of flying. He began as a gliding student and made it to become a pilots on an Airbus 320.
He was able to fulfill his dream, the dream he has now so dearly paid for with his life. The members of the LSC Westerwald mourn Andreas and the other 149 victims of the disaster on March 24, 2015.
Our deepest sympathy goes out to the families. We will not forget Andrew. The members of the Luftsportclub Westerwald."

The first officer lived with his parents in Montabaur and also kept a residence in Dusseldorf, according to Ms Wieland.
Andreas Lubitz: First picture of Germanwings pilot and what we know about him - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11496066/Andreas-Lubitz-and-Patrick-S-What-do-we-know-about-the-pilots-on-Germanwings-flight-4U9525.html)

[fizz57]

We seem to be approaching the point where, in public perception at least, pilots cause more accidents than they avoid. This incident will certainly strengthen the case for the pilotless aircraft, and reduce public resistance to such a proposal.

[macdo]

Well, yesterday I would not have believed it possible, but it would appear that we have a suicide by the First Officer.

We will now be faced with the usual call for "something" to be done.

But what? Eventually this is a matter of trust which we have to have in people.

A train driver, bus driver, surgeon, ship captain, the list goes on forever of people who individually hold our lives in their hands.

Even with an extra member of staff on the flight deck an a/c can be crashed on purpose in moments.

Who is going to prevent me suddenly stamping sudden full rudder at m0.81?
Is a flight attendant going to stop me switching off the flight control computers and applying full forward side stick?
Of course, the answer is no,

[MartinAOA]

As a result of this tragedy the FQ, which suppose to be the most demanding part of the entrance assessment requirements for potential cadets at DLH, will certainly come under scrutiny. The FQ tests personal/psychological integrity of potential cadets-the same essential attributes which failed in this case.

[Ixixly]

For those of you interested in the debate about a crew member in the Cockpit and if it would do any good, let us not the forget the lessons from Federal Express Flight 705

Federal Express Flight 705 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Express_Flight_705)

A Deadheading Crew Member boarded the aircraft with every intention of crashing it and even armed himself with handheld weapons but still failed to do so, in no small part due to him being outnumbered.

Keep this example in mind for those who think that having extra crew in the Flight Deck or even making sure there is CC in there to cover for a Flight Crew Member needing to use the facilities will serve no purpose.

With the remaining Pilot flying being in their Seat and the CC sitting in the Jumpseat I'd say it would be particularly difficult for the Pilot Flying to attempt to incapacitate the CC Member, it would be bloody obvious when the Pilot Flying tries to get up and do something as they should not be leaving the seat at all.

A CC Member might not be able to tell when you've done something wrong to intentially cause harm but they'll figure it out pretty quickly and at least it gives a far greater chance for the Pilot Not Flying to be able to regain access to the Cockpit and try to save them whilst the CC Member does their best to restrain the one causing the problem!!

[LEEDS APPROACH]

As a none pilot please permit me to put forward a theory? Before 9/11 Locking doors were a very good idea but from that point the parameters changed. Security measures were massively upgraded to prevent multiple terrorists getting aboard. From that point it was better to have the security doors removed. If a lone terrorist or someone unstable mentally manages to get aboard then the whole plane can stop the situation being fatal. Is it not a case of reacting to something that happened in the past with a solution that no longer perfectly fits the changed parameters of the present? Keep the massive airline security but remove the doors so that a lone threat cannot become the sole person in charge of the controls?

[dipperm0]

A question from a non familiar A320 pilot: on my last A/C there was to way to get the aircraft going down : either ALT SET ou V/S. Are the same modes available on the 320 ? If yes, is it possible regarding the company procedures that at the time of the beginning of the actual descent ( above Toulon), the V/S was set to minus 3000 ft/mn in preparation for a future descent ?

[wiggy]

none of the pilots will need to leave the cockpit area unless, they are on a wide body, long-haul flight where there is a relief pilot. Even then, the relieved pilot does not leave until such time the relief pilot is in his seat, which is normal procedure anyways. (I would think!)


Trouble is you've got types such as the 777 doing 8-9 hour 2 pilot sectors...and on some variants there's no loo forward of 2 left/right so plumbing an extra toilet in up front would be non trivial.

[HighFlyer55]

The airline I fly for has a policy of never leaving anyone alone on the flight deck. If either pilot needs a bathroom break, a cabin crew member occupies their seat. Fool proof system? No, but certainly doesn't hurt.

[henra]

One guy standing can,with a little bit of effort,neutralise one guy who is seated.Even with 2 pilots in the flightdeck,if one of them makes a certain choice then the result can still be the same.

Yes, but it would still be a much, much higer hurdle than just waiting until the other left the Cockpit and then start pursuing what one's up to.
Suicides are rarely direct acts of violence towards others and the People committing them are seldom extrovert, physically violent People. If anything they only tend to be violent by effecting 'collateral' fatalities as is the case with quite a number of wrong-way Drivers.
So, such a measure would probably massively reduce the risk of such an occurence although probably indeed not totally eliminate it.

The other Thing is that the door locking logic might need some tweaking, especially in the light of the fact that after 9/11 passengers will not sit there and wait when an obvious intruder is threatening a Crew member in order to enforce antrance to the Cockpit. So, a code that after -say 30s- allows entrance no matter what, would allow passengers/CC to intervene should a Cockpit Crew member be threatened to allow entrance to the Cockpit and still prevent this really tragic and horrible Scenario.

[BRE]

I listened to most of the press conference (interupted by streaming hick ups), and I must say I liked the presecutor very much. He had obviously listened to the recording carefully and had been briefed, and was trying to give an honest summary while trying hard not to be misunderstood.

Some of the things he said or did not raised questions:
1. While he described the clicking of the altitude knob and the breathing of the FO in great detail, there was no mention of a buzzer. Can the lock/deny function be activated before the first request for entry? If so, will it suppress the buzzer even on the first request?

2. He said the pax were unaware of the drama until the very last moments when cries could be heard. How on earth could they not notice the Captain trying to break down the door?

3. There is no mention of any recovery attempt, whereas transponder data say the flight gained 2000 ft prior to impact. Eye witness accounts are compatible with TOGA being applied.

4. No mention of the Mirage.

[dusk2dawn]

It has been reported, that the co-pilot can be heard breathing during the descent.

Is it really possible to hear normal breathing on the CVR in a 20 year old 320?

[Ranger One]

Well, yesterday I would not have believed it possible, but it would appear that we have a suicide by the First Officer.

I've held off posting to this (largely) drivel until it was confirmed.

When you take 150 with you, the primary action is murder, not suicide.

We tend not even to consider cases where the motivation is more personal than political as 'terrorism' - but that is to make a serious category error. Terrorism can be personal as well as political. The subject in this article is school shootings, but I urge people to read it carefully; the points he makes are very perceptive:

How We All Miss the Point on School Shootings (http://markmanson.net/school-shootings)

Don't flinch from calling it what it is; this was a terrorist mass murder. The piece we're missing is the motive - and even if it turns out it isn't political, that doesn't diminish the terrorism.

[Batman737]

The whole point of the expensive cameras and door lock system is to avoid and mitigate the system you highlight. If these systems fail we go back to your system. This would be at the heart of why going back to your system for all is not likely acceptable - it makes clear that we up front cannot be trusted, and that undermines much of our industry's safety foundation.

Not saying of course it will not happen as a kneejerk response.

NigelOnDraft none of your response really made any sense to me at all. Sorry.

Why would you want to mitigate having TWO PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHT DECK AT ALL TIMES DURING FLIGHT?! A very sensible and effective procedure. Checks and balances. Nothing 'Kneejerk'. We do it already. My understanding is that FAA regulations already require it for American carriers. I doubt it would lead to the world thinking we 'cannot be trusted'.

[VinRouge]

Time for an alternative and independent mental health service for crews? This seems to be happening far too often and must now be featuring in the safety stats(although you would have to make some assumptions about MH370).


If an individual is struggling with their health, the potential of loss of income and a job they love may prevent treatment. There has to be a mechanism provided that gives individuals the potential for greater protection in the industry through what could be caused by a run of bad luck. For many young professionals layered with significant debts and on low pay, the shame of bankruptcy and professional failure may be too much of a risk for treatment to be sought. Of course, given professional treatment, an individual may have sense talked into them; but such a mechanism will have to lie outside of the company, authority and even possibly union.


I really hope there is an alternative explanation, but the message needs to be clear in industry however, this is not suicide, its mass murder.


A difficult one to fix no doubt.

[Evanelpus]

Is it really possible to hear normal breathing on the CVR in a 20 year old 320?

In the land of the journalist, everything is possible.

[Alpine Flyer]

... I tend to find that Germans are a lot less security conscious than other Westerners.
Well, I'm not German, though close, but sometimes we find other nationalities more rigid about one thing or the other. One could as well say that "the British" are too picky about security and I don't see a discernible difference in the level of public safety as a result of this differential between Germany and Austria.

As for the annual psych, some companies would love this at it would be a great way to get rid of unwanted pilots. Furthermore, the predictive power of psychology seems to be limited, as ever so often serial killers or molesters are released as "healed and no further danger to society" only to prove their shrinks wrong.

All in all it is certainly quite early to say "suicide" or "terrorism". I remember a case where a Captain not older than the Copilot of the GWI flight had a kind of fit/seizure in-flight (pre 9/11) and was pretty much useless for the remainder of the flight, though alive and breathing. I wouldn't bet a penny on someone afflicted by that absolutely avoiding touching anything on the flight deck that might cause a descent...

[md80fanatic]

i'm still not totally convinced of the suicide angle. Without knowing precisely how long that cockpit door would hold, a suicidal FO in total control of the aircraft would dial in a 3000fpm descent from FL380 and then sit back and do nothing? I know suicidal people are irrational by definition, but with full control of the situation, for an unknown amount of time, one would think a much steeper descent, and a turn to the closest terrain linearly would have been in order? Seems more likely that the FO was not conscious for whatever reason sometime after the Captain left the cockpit.

[NigelOnDraft]

Why would you want to mitigate having TWO PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHT DECK AT ALL TIMES DURING FLIGHT?! Because it costs money

[cats_five]

Why can't the cockpit door policy be reviewed? How many hi-jacks has it really saved?
<snip>


How can we know? Now would-be hi-jackers know the door should be looked, would they move on to another, softer, target?

[skot]

Found via the BBC website - this pretty much answers all of the questions re granting or denying access to the cockpit (assuming that this, or a similar, system was installed on that plane)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixEHV7c3VXs&feature=youtu.be

[Xeque]

No it won't. You cannot rely on your average home computer to work correctly 100% of the time despite them being around for 30 years and more.
Rely on only computers to fly a passenger carrying aeroplane? That would be the death of the industry.
(a) computers are programmed by humans. Once the programme is locked in then any errors made are locked in too.
(b) old programmers adage - there is always one more bug.

[Lizz]

Posting as I'm wondering if anyone's thought the same thing.

They're saying the f/o was having normal conversations at the start of the flight, then on the brief for the decent he's 'laconic'. Forgive me if I'm wrong but unless the captain had said before the brief that he was going to the toilet afterwards, f/o wouldn't have known he would be left alone thus not realising until after the brief that he could do whatever he did so his bluntness surely would have nothing to do with it?

[macdo]

Will not prevent a determined pilot from crashing the aircraft.

Just think about it.

[fireflybob]

Is it really possible to hear normal breathing on the CVR in a 20 year old 320?

With the hot mike system with CVRs I would say yes it is.

[JamesT73J]

Is it possible he was incapacitated by faulty oxygen apparatus, possibly becoming irrational? I.e. panicking into initiating a descent prior to passing out.

Doesn't explain the door defeating the commander, though.

The breathing being audible on a hot mic seems impossible in a very noisy cockpit, unless of course it is insulated by the oxygen mask.

[Batman737]

Because it costs money

NigelOnDraft

Seriously? Are you with us? Why would it cost money?

One of the cabin crew stays on the Flight Deck momentarily with the PF until the PNF returns. It's not new. It's not rocket science. :ugh:

[macdo]

The Airbus flight deck O2 mask has an integral mike which is activated when you pull the mask out of its stowage.
The nature of the sound when using it is very distinctive and the cvr would have identified its usage very quickly.

[McBruce]

like Colgen with fatigue and experience, our system in Europe puts massive debt onto young individuals with huge stressors that can open the door to depress a lot of young individuals. I wonder if this has played its part.....

[NigelOnDraft]

NigelOnDraft

Seriously? Are you with us? Why would it cost money?

One of the cabin crew stays on the Flight Deck momentarily with the PF until the PNF returns.The CC is taken out of the service, making ££. It is small fry I accept.

But you miss the bigger reason I stated. Currently you require the CC on the Flt Deck to check the ID of the person entering, and action the door. If that system is not required, then the sole purpose of the CC there is to oversee the pilot - a rather big step to admit.

[b8361811]

Could someone from the industry please tell us if there are any consequences for your medical if you ask for help because you feel severly depressed? Imagine this young guy, just two years on the job, feeling more and more depressed. Would he be afraid to seek medical help because this might be the end of his career? This itself would have started a self-enforcing cycle of helplessness and seeing no way out other than suiciding himself. Tighter screening would thus be counter-productive. If this guy was able to turn himself in, get diagnosed properly and e.g. be treated with one of the modern drugs like citalopram or escitalopram he might well be fit to fly (IF he suffered from depression, might be some other condition as well). A few years ago, we had a discussion here on PPRuNe about alcoholism and how it is a medical condition that needs professional help to get out of. And how many pilots delay seeking help because they are afraid of losing their job...

[pilotmike]

@Jackonicko Of the many issues arising here, as a frequently paying passenger, I find that the idea that one of the two pilots on board may be viewed (by his own captain) as being incapable of being left on his own by virtue of his inexperience and inability to be profoundly shocking.

That a sane Captain could profess to preferring to soil himself than to leave an inexperienced first officer alone at the controls is mind-boggling.

With a two-pilot cockpit, surely pax have the right to expect that in the event of a pilot incapacitation, the remaining pilot (whether captain or F/O) will be fully and entirely qualified and capable of safely and competently completing the flight, regardless of weather conditions, and indeed that he would be capable of dealing with any emergency or hazard.
You are correct: all pilots should have demonstrated their competence to complete the flight 'single pilot' safely and competently by the stage of final line check, and usually followed up in subsequent OPC and LPC checks.

This does not stop some pilots (usually captain) doubting the ability of their 'co-pilot' (usually first officer). This cannot always be taken as solid evidence of the (in)ability of the one being doubted; it can also offer insight into the mindset and potential CRM issues with the one expressing the doubt.

[short bus]

If you really have a pilot that is focused on a suicide/mass murder plot, a two person flight deck rule doesn't seem like much of a hurdle. If you are planning to kill everyone anyway, why not just start off by bludgeoning/strangling/stabbing/slip a ruffie/etc. the pilot next to you and then the two person rule is bypassed. If the pilot looks to be too hard to handle, maybe the replacement FA would be easier.

[air pig]

The French prosecutor seems very certain it is all the co-pilots fault. Another scenario is: captain exits cockpit and first officer becomes incapacitated for whatever reason, such as brain haemorrhage or epilepsy and he disengages the autopilot in his confusion or the fit process. You may still hear breathing without response.

[SD.]

To be fair Nigel, even Europe's ultra low cost airline use 2 in the FD method at all times.

[RussellBrown]

He was due a 40% wage decrease.

[fastjet45]

Lizz
They're saying the f/o was having normal conversations at the start of the flight, then on the brief for the decent he's 'laconic'. Forgive me if I'm wrong but unless the captain had said before the brief that he was going to the toilet afterwards, f/o wouldn't have known he would be left alone thus not realising until after the brief that he could do whatever he did so his bluntness surely would have nothing to do with it?


I doubt for one minute it was a spur of moment decision to do what he did, this kind of act would have been planned a long time before and he would have been waiting for the right opportunity.

[macdo]

That is already the case. The remaining pilot can stop the code usage so that it cannot be extracted from the crew member outside the flight deck under duress and used to gain illegal access to the cockpit.

[roving]

There appears to be a assumption, that if the senior pilot had been able to unlock the door, that would have ensured the safety of the crew and passengers.

Therefore if changes are made to enable a pilot to open a deadlocked door, such a tragedy will not reoccur.

I am not sure that the prospect of a violent confrontation on a flight deck between two pilots, as each struggles to take control of a passenger jet, is likely to instil public confidence.

The loss of all those lives including many children and teenagers, to say nothing of the fear they must have experienced in the final minutes of their lives, demands more than mere changes to the security system on the door to the flight deck.

[Andy_S]

A suggestion regarding the Cockpit Door Policy could be an exit code entered by the pilot to re-enter. What-ever code the Pilot leaving enters, he re-enters to get back in. How simple is that?

At the end of the day, if you devise a system that allows a crew member to re-enter a locked cockpit, you introduce a weakness to the system that could be exploited by others.

[Lord Farringdon]

Well, yesterday I would not have believed it possible, but it would appear that we have a suicide by the First Officer.

We will now be faced with the usual call for "something" to be done.

But what? Eventually this is a matter of trust which we have to have in people.

A train driver, bus driver, surgeon, ship captain, the list goes on forever of people who individually hold our lives in their hands.

Even with an extra member of staff on the flight deck an a/c can be crashed on purpose in moments.

Who is going to prevent me suddenly stamping sudden full rudder at m0.81?
Is a flight attendant going to stop me switching off the flight control computers and applying full forward side stick?
Of course, the answer is no,


Trust is indeed the only answer to this problem. There have been train drivers who have failed to stop at terminus stations and ultimately investigators have not be able to come to any other conclusion than driver suicide. The Moorgate incident on the London Underground springs to mind. But thankfully, despite the opportunity presented to solo drivers throughout the subways of the world, it seems their minds don't generally follow the same dark labyrinths that their train full of passengers do. We have to trust them.

I think we have to accept that suicide cant be stopped, mainly because we rarely know it is going to happen. But, changing all the rules everytime an event like this occurs is probably not the answer either. So, leave the security doors in place, ensure there are two on the FD at all times, don't substitute intelligent pilots for unintelligent computers and don't overplay the state of mind issues during medicals.

What airlines could do is ensure that all employees flying and non flying have easy access, without prejudice to caring, confidential and non-judgmental support services for staff who feel they need help. Does your airline already have that?

[skot]

1. Because the doors are designed to withstand a grenade attack
2. Because you think it's a sensible idea to have an axe in the main cabin?

[MaxReheat]

If nothing else, this tragedy highlights what every flightcrew member has been saying to each other since the knee-jerk secuirty reactions came in post 9/11; that if one of us wanted to crash our aircraft, we could do so with little difficulty.

This exposes the security farce - no yoghurts, bottled drinks, Swiss Army knives etc - that we have been forced to accept fro the past 14 years.

As a previous poster said; we should be part of the aviation security solution. The politically-driven authorities have never accepted this and this awful incident has blown a hole in their logic with regard to flightcrew and security.

[NigelOnDraft]

To be fair Nigel, even Europe's ultra low cost airline use 2 in the FD method at all times.Understood - but have they paid for the full Phase 2 measures? Or just stuck with Phase 1?

If the latter then the 2 CC is required, and avoids asking the question of "why" they are there :oh:

Are there airlines out there requiring 2 crew and have Phase 2? (not suggesting we name them...)

[PanPanYourself]

No it won't. You cannot rely on your average home computer to work correctly 100% of the time despite them being around for 30 years and more.
Rely on only computers to fly a passenger carrying aeroplane? That would be the death of the industry.
(a) computers are programmed by humans. Once the programme is locked in then any errors made are locked in too.
(b) old programmers adage - there is always one more bug.

Driverless cars are already safer than human operated vehicles, there is no reason to think this won’t be the case with pilotless aircraft.

We rely on dedicated software to keep nuclear power plants from melting down, and other critical, life or death applications, like medical software, and don’t forget the armed drones sent to kill people!

Mission critical software is not “your average home computer”, this is software that is dedicated to specific tasks, not general purpose, "jack of all trades” software like Windows, which is much easier to screw up and let bugs creep into. The chances of mission critical software catastrophically failing is orders of magnitude less likely than a pilot suicide.

Moreover, it doesn’t have to work correctly 100% of the time, just more than human pilots do.

[Squawk_ident]

The Prosecutor of Marseille observed at the beginning of his presentation, and he seemed a little bit annoyed that he would have liked to be informed earlier about the contents of the CVR. He did not listen to it by himself but only read a document. Dialogues were translated into French.
At the very beginning of his declaration, the Prosecutor announced it had opened an investigation for "voluntary homicide", that's what I understood as well as journalists. Asked later about this, the Prosecutor said that the his judicial inquiry was for "manslaughter" contrary to what everyone had understood. He said immediately after, that he might re-qualify this into "intentional homicide" in light of the information in his possession. He would seem that the prosecutor did some kind of lapsus linguae

[HeathrowAirport]

@Andy_S looks like someone on here has deleted my suggestion. What a :mad: Only the Pilot leaving the cockpit know's the code he has entered. It's something he must remember whilst using the facilities. It can't be that hard can it? You are telling me that the Pilot leaving the cockpit is going to be interrogated by terrorists at that instance and force a code from him? I highly doubt it.

We are using an outdated system post-9/11 that is fictitious. It needs changing, clearly. If MAS370 is found out to be similar to this incident, then we know we have a few rouge pilots possibly still flying around the world ready to strike. In the digital age, you'd think something better than a keypad could be used for entry/exit of a cockpit door. Entering a one-time only code a bit like RSA SecurID into a NEW exit panel for the cockpit, and being able to use this to gain entry would negate this issue, and if in use 3 days ago. The captain could have re-entered the cockpit. Same with Ethiopian last year and possibly MAS370.

[air pig]

1. Because the doors are designed to withstand a grenade attack
2. Because you think it's a sensible idea to have an axe in the main cabin?


there are fire axes inthe main cabins.

[Batman737]

NigelOnDraft

That argument really doesn't stand up I'm afraid and is no justification for not having a simple and effect procedure in place that may be a possible preventable solution to recent tragedies. I think you'll find it becomes an absolute requirement for all operators very soon. It's a multi crew team orientated environment. We all oversee one another throughout the whole operation. This is no different. A simple protection against any form of incapacitation.

TWO PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHT DECK AT ALL TIMES DURING FLIGHT. Facilitated by a member of cabin crew remaining momentarily on the flight deck (as they would during single pilots ops in the event of a pilot incapacitation) during toilet breaks etc. It's not new. It's already applied. It should be mandatory. Nuff said!

[LilyMars]

Would breathing sound normal if you were somewhat in hypoxia and went into a bit of a trance?

I'm remembering a tube incident now - the 1975 Moorgate disaster - where they reckon the motorman (Leslie Newsom?) went into a trance of some sort and, keeping his hand firmly on the dead man's handle, drove the train straight through the station and hit the end of the tunnel. Wasn't drunk, or on anything, and was unlikely to be suicidal. I seem to remember he had hundreds of quid in his pocket to buy his daughter a car or something after work.

But then in that Egypt Air crash - the first officer who was blamed for murder-suiciding the plane was bringing care tyres home for his son on the flight! Not sure I'd bother if I was planning something like that.

Is there a piloty equivalent of the tunnel trance they reckon Mr. Newsom went into? If it was at night I reckon most would be saying he'd lost his spatial awareness.

Can I also add, as my SLF two bobs worth, that I'd rather pay a few quid extra and see three people on the flight decks again than, as others have suggested, further automation and removal of pilots. Three brains are used in most plane systems, aren't they?

[Bralo20]

Skot

1. Because the doors are designed to withstand a grenade attack
2. Because you think it's a sensible idea to have an axe in the main cabin?

As far as I know it's still an EASA requirement to have a crash axe in the cabin, even 2 of those for larger planes.

[VinRouge]

Could someone from the industry please tell us if there are any consequences for your medical if you ask for help because you feel severly depressed? Imagine this young guy, just two years on the job, feeling more and more depressed. Would he be afraid to seek medical help because this might be the end of his career? This itself would have started a self-enforcing cycle of helplessness and seeing no way out other than suiciding himself. Tighter screening would thus be counter-productive. If this guy was able to turn himself in, get diagnosed properly and e.g. be treated with one of the modern drugs like citalopram or escitalopram he might well be fit to fly (IF he suffered from depression, might be some other condition as well). A few years ago, we had a discussion here on PPRuNe about alcoholism and how it is a medical condition that needs professional help to get out of. And how many pilots delay seeking help because they are afraid of losing their job...


Well lets put it this way, if you were giving someone their class I medical renewal, would you be happy to let them fly if you suspected them of mental illness? Do you think this horrendous incident is going to improve the situation? The industry needs some form of independent service where individuals can seek help and be treated, safeguarding against loss of licence.

For an industry that prides itself on OCD-like standardization and monitoring of behavior, why would a company take a risk on an individual?

[RussellBrown]

This accident resembles the one with Mozambican Airlines (LAM) in November 2013. By now ICAO should have changed the rules prohibiting that anyone (pilot) is left alone at the cockpit at any single time during a flight. Seeing something like this repeating.

[shaun.s]

1. Because the doors are designed to withstand a grenade attack
2. Because you think it's a sensible idea to have an axe in the main cabin?

1. Small arms/projectiles, I doubt very much 'grenade attack' is a design case.
2. Yes, there is. Obviously not going to detail where.

Edit: Few posters got there before me. In any case, I don't think the press conference stated whether a fire axe could be heard being used.

[macdo]

I think you make a good point.
Airlines, in recent years, have been putting more pressure on pilots, basically asking a lot more for less and less.
It may turn out that this relatively young pilot may have had any number of stressors in his life caused by the way that we now recruit, train and employ.
Pilots and their employers are constantly in a battle over cost reductions and efficiency savings.
Maybe it's time that we looked after the pilots a bit better and stopped regarding them as a bunch of overpaid prima donnas.

[wheelsright]

It always amazes me how many assumptions are made...

It may be that the Pilot did not have the correct code to enter (there could be a variety of reasons for this scenario).

It may be that the door lock/keypad malfunctioned and/or had a history of malfunction.

If may be that the PF had some kind of medical emergency outside of being a psycho or being a terrorist.

Plus a plethora of other unlikely scenarios...

In an investigation you should not be seduced by the most likely explanation. It is always tempting to discount unlikely events but it is almost always unlikely events or a series of unlikely events that precipitates disaster.

[Cagedh]

If nothing else, this tragedy highlights what every flightcrew member has been saying to each other since the knee-jerk secuirty reactions came in post 9/11; that if one of us wanted to crash our aircraft, we could do so with little difficulty.

This exposes the security farce - no yoghurts, bottled drinks, Swiss Army knives etc - that we have been forced to accept fro the past 14 years.

As a previous poster said; we should be part of the aviation security solution. The politically-driven authorities have never accepted this and this awful incident has blown a hole in their logic with regard to flightcrew and security.

Very good post! We don't need an other string of knee-jerk reactions to this very tragic accident. Whatever measure will be taken: a pilot sitting in one of the cockpit seats will always be in a position where he can easily crash the plane. Try to keep common sense: an FA coming into the cockpit when one of the pilots goes to the toilet will not stop a pilot who really wants to crash the plane from doing so. (Distraction from a good-looking flight attendant, might turn out to be just as deadly) So please, no exaggerated reactions from bureaucrats behind a desk who don't know anything about flying please!.

[ANstar]

TWO PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHT DECK AT ALL TIMES DURING FLIGHT. Facilitated by a member of cabin crew remaining momentarily on the flight deck (as they would during single pilots ops in the event of a pilot incapacitation) during toilet breaks etc. It's not new. It's already applied. It should be mandatory. Nuff said!

Whats to stop the remianing fligth crew member using the crash axe against the FA... or in the USA some of the flight crew carry guns so they would just shoot them. If they have intent they will find a way.

[deefer dog]

BBC reporting:

David Gleave, an air accident investigator whose specialty is pilot suicides, says the aviation industry needs to start looking at the psychological profiles of pilots. "We may find that this pilot had various stresses that may have led to some form of relatively irrational behaviour. It could be a vast amount of debt taken out for pilot training, it could be family matters, it could be religious matters. There's all sorts of areas that the psychological specialist will start to look at during the investigation but I certainly think that it's going to be reviewed fairly quickly."

[Lizz]

@fastjet45 I agree it wouldn't be spur of the moment however if he didn't know he'd be alone the tone of his voice should make no difference, that moment could have come anytime but the way it's been reported makes it sound like he was plotting to do something because he knew he was about to be alone.

I've suffered severe depression myself in the past which has reared it's ugly head after feeling better at times. I remember doing a medical questionnaire for a job and I purposely did not mention my history on this as I know the stigma that surrounds it. The job before that I only came out about it as I was being disciplined and I needed to tell the truth to save my job, work life after that admission was tough so it wouldn't surprise me if he was suffering he wouldn't want to tell anyone even more so being in a job where good physical and mental health is needed. Imagine not only having to admit depression but admitting that after years of hard work and getting your dream job you have to admit that even that isn't making you happy. Obviously though I can only give my opinion on what I felt and put that in to the shoes of someone in that job, I am by no means saying this was what was in his mind.

[londonman]

According to the BBC News website, they say the French Prosecutor is saying the act was deliberate ie suicide. That the F/O deliberately hit the button to put the plane into a dive.

Yet seems to me that there have been enough valid reasons put forward here (no audible tone heard on button push/ temporary loss of critical thinking meaning the door delay button accidentally pressed) that the French prosecutor simply cannot state that.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I recall a conversation with a major airline training captain in 1994, where he stated that pilots were henceforth going to be just another component in the company, and that training, ability and all else would be secondary to costs. Apart from JAL 351 in 1982 (where the pilot was mentally upset, but the company had known about it for 2 years and done nothing), it seems that pilot suicides in airliners started in 1994.

I would suggest that overworked, underpaid, highly indebted and significantly less capable pilots (because the good ones won't put up with the first 3) might have something to do with this.

Go reread the Colgan Air report.

[Denti]

As far as I know it's still an EASA requirement to have a crash axe in the cabin, even 2 of those for larger planes.

No, at least not that simple. It depends on distance from crash axe to personnel. On aircraft shorter than A321 there is only one axe and that is on the flight deck.

[macdo]

You need to take on board that the reason that it is not done, is that it would not be a foolproof way to totally stop the possibility of death by pilot.

The best you could hope for would be a 3 pilot crew, but since 90% of civil flights are 2 pilot, it is immediately obvious that the global airline industry would come to a sudden halt due to insufficient manpower. It can barely cope with the low pilot numbers right now.

It's also worth noting that out of those 3 pilot operations the 3rd pilot is often asleep in the crew bunk. Getting necessary rest so that he can safely operate the aircraft.

[standbykid]

I'm of the opinion that an airliner is designed to have 2 pilots to properly fly it, and without exception in the case of an emergency. It is unacceptable that SOP allows for the flight deck to be manned solo, even for a short amount of time. Other than installing a bucket in the flight deck I don't know a solution, but it seems like a massive over sight.

[seltsam]

Right now Germanwings press conference
First Officer was trained 2008 by Lufthansa in Bremen and Phoenix
Followed by 11 month working in the cabin before getting F/O position

[PENKO]

Was it ever mentioned in the press conference wether the sound of the cockpit door access system was heard? It makes a lot of noise when someone from the outside requests entry. You should also clearly hear the access being denied. Or do Lufthansa/Germanwings utilize a different system?

They did mention knocking on the door..

[Wader2]

Heathrow Harry, hotel safes have one time codes. Set to lock, set to unlock, next time you can set differently.

Exit flight deck, code lock door: return, unlock, job done (or job done first :))

[viking767]

630 hours since 2008?

[auntyice]

It's not about locking flight deck doors it's about suicidal pilots. At certain stages of any flight a deranged pilot will achieve his aim no matter how many are on the flight deck.

[FlightCosting]

On a FR flight from TFS to NYO a few weeks ago when either pilot needed to take a leak, seat belt lights on, no cabin service and cc sits in the cockpit. That makes sure the forward toilet is clear and the CC in the cockpit can open door for returning pilot or call him in case PIC is incapacitated. If the airline that legacy carriers love to denigrate can do this, why not all airlines. I expect new JAR regs asap.

[aeo]

Can't help but feel had someone been positioned in the FD during the Captains absence things would've been different... If not to let him back in, then to at least have given the solo pilot less of a feeling of opportunity..

Gutted... Totally gutted...

[BigAl94]

What we need are highly trained cabin crew dedicated to passenger safety and comfort rather than trolley dollies selling scratch cards and trying to extract the last euro out of every pax. Two on the flight deck at all times during flight should be a mandatory requirement.

[PassengerDan]

The Lufthansa CEO just explained that there is indeed a code that can be input to open the cockpit door from the outside but that this can be overridden/denied by the officer inside the cockpit. Either the Pilot forgot or didn't enter the code, which Lufthansa CEO cannot believe, or each attempt was overridden by the co-pilot.

[macdo]

Interesting discrepancy just being reported at a news conference being held by Germanwings right now.
They are saying the Captain did not enter the emergency code to open the door and there was no immediate explanation as to why.
I wonder if the door locking system was u/s. Not unusual for them to fail and go into the deferred defects.

[Kerosene]

Without entering into speculation over the cause of the accident.

A while ago I met a lady from Australia who told me she was a "Supervisor". I didn't know what that was and she explained that supervisors are working on an indivual basis to help professionals in their fields to remain goal orientated and sane - someone they can always, and regularly have to turn to, to keep the needles 'in the green'. She also said it's a very established system in the medical professions, where it is obligatory. She was paid by the employers but maintained strict confidentiality towards her individual clients.

The lady was absolutely stunned to hear that, in my experience, there was no such system present in aviation.

It is truly remarkable that we have such elaborate schemes for maintenance and the verification of our technical skills, but no system such as supervision to help us with the psychological challenges of our work and lives.

[G-ARVH]

He was due a 40% wage decrease. - Well said Russell in Post 1230.


Folks - Note a 40% decrease in wages.


So that the public in Europe (and elsewhere) can fly around for the price of a pair of Jeans.

[ChickenHouse]

630 hours since 2008?
Facts are a bit too little to say that. It could be 630 hours on type, but if it would be 630 hours total I second the question mark.

[Ahernar]

About automatic planes -
I would not trust a fully automatic plane - someone could tamper with the computers and aircrafts are more mobile and harder to secure against unauthorised access than the nuclear plant from your example . Unfortunately there is little to do in this matter , maybe just a vote machine to the pax to open the door . Will not stop a determined individual to do something on approach / takeoff but it will prevent him crashing into a city or a nuclear plant for example .

[JerseySean]

Lufthansa chairman and CEO Carsten Spohr tells a news conference in Cologne that staff at the airline, and those at its subsidiary Germanwings, are "absolutely speechless" and "deeply shocked" at the news of the co-pilot's actions. "I would not have been able to imagine that the situation could get even worse," he adds.

[webvan]

They didn't say that, they said they didn't know if he'd tried to enter the code.

Now in the French PC they did not say they heard the buzzer that goes off when such a code is entered...

[seltsam]

F/O started training with Lufthansa in 2008. In this press conference the Lufthansa CEO now states that his training was interrupted for some time. Reasons for this break he can't share (protecting privacy?)

[Longtimer]

The presence of both pilots will not stop one of them from incapacitating the other (fire ax) etc and still committing suicide. It is the armored door that allows pilot suicide. We don't know for a fact that the door has prevented others from taking over the aircraft but we do know in fact that it has allowed pilots to kill hundreds of innocents while taking their own lives. it almost seems that the door must be eliminated or that we have to go back to 3 person cockpits that would require the presence of 3 people at all times.

[fastjet45]

Superpilot

Reasons for committing suicide:

1. Loss of dearest loved one
2. De-debilitating disease
3. Extreme physical pain
4. Ideological reasons
5. Financial hardship (huge loans, low pay in comparison, no way seen out of the mess).
Which one would you most associated with an otherwise talented young German First Officer?


Well I fly in the corporate bizjet world and looking from the outside inwards number 5 has been generated in most airlines with pay2fly schemes, maybe the bean counters and senior management need to take a long hard think about the future recruitment processes.
Certainly in the bizjet world paying for your own rating or training is thankfully rare as often the end result is usually no chance of getting a job.

[PassengerDan]

Interesting discrepancy just being reported at a news conference being held by Germanwings right now.
They are saying the Captain did not enter the emergency code to open the door and there was no immediate explanation as to why.
I wonder if the door locking system was u/s. Not unusual for them to fail and go into the deferred defects.

See my reply earlier - that's not what I believe was just said. I speak German fairly well.

[RoelB]

sp3ctre

I just don't see how you can "fix" the problem of a pilot wanting to down a plane. Sure, you could bring in measures to make this particular situation less likely, but what is to stop a pilot in control of the aircraft stuffing it into a row of houses (or the airport terminal) on descent.

Automation.. I know this isn't the most popular answer here, but A/C can (and I am sure they will) get systems that will prevent any single human factor on the flight deck to pose an immediate threat to the plane, either intentional or not. Where the FCS will simply not allow to be flown into terrain or outside of normal FE.

As such a system could have unwanted side-effects in case of emergencies, there should be an override option. But it's easy to come up with an system/procedure that can be operated quickly and intuitive but physically requires two people - or maybe even disables automatically upon a mechanical or environmental emergency.

The two-man rule is a well-known security measure and such a system will at least require two people conspiring to crash the plane or make a conscious decision to override the FCS protection for some good reason.

IMHO, door locking procedures should be revised as well. There should always be a way to get back in, possibly requiring ground clearance using a comms system from the cabin that cannot be overridden from the FD. From the ground, the decision to authorise opening the door in this case would have been easy: unauthorized descent, no contact with the flight deck and a captain standing outside wanting to get in.

[macdo]

Worth noting that LH have thorough psycho testing before employment. I actually know someone who failed the test!

[sideslyp]

Just a PPL here...

Wasn't it the case that Qantas used to have a policy that a low-hour junior would sit as the third pilot observing (even domestic flights) the two seniors and learning? If we had this, we would: 1) third set of eyes during take off/landings to raise awareness of any anomalies 2) great way to learn for the junior 3) decreased chance of any kind of situation like we are presumably looking at here. ... I am expecting that everyone is gonna say: 'Utopia!, Money!'...Well, what would stand against making the junior spend some time in the jump seat as part of the required airline training (ok - pay him the cabin crew rate, but I am pretty sure, he/she will still be keen on learning..)...or am I missing something /

[rideforever]

Shocked by the statement that the co-pilot is to blame.

On the CVR he has apparently normal breathing to the end, I don't see that means anything at all.

It shifts the spotlight from the reinforced locked door policy, and for there not being 2 people in the cockpit at all times. And wraps up the case very quickly in light of numerous recent unexplained incidents.

I see no motive or evidence here for the co-pilot taking the blame.

Maybe he had a stroke, heart attack, took some drugs that knocked him out, or a part of the ceiling panel dropped on his head.

How can his breathing be normal if he is committing suicide and crashing a plane ?

[JamesT73J]

It is truly remarkable that we have such elaborate schemes for maintenance and the verification of our technical skills, but no system such as supervision to help us with the psychological challenges of our work and lives.

I recall reading in 'Fulcrum' Alexander Zuyev made much of the borderline obsessive medical monitoring of pilots in Soviet times, that the flight surgeon like any good doctor had their finger on the pulse of what was going on with their people. The point of the writing was to demonstrate what Zuyev felt was an unfair myth about physical health of Russian crews, in particular alcohol abuse, but the prominence of friendly medical personnel in pilot's lives was notable.

There was also a documentary about Aeroflot on telly in the 90s that showed similar. It seemed as rigourous as Western standards, just very frequent.

Whatever comes next, I hope it's not more knee jerking.

[2Planks]

Before this thread gets morphed into one about wages or lack of - who is right?


We have Denti - a long term Pruner and purveyor of common sense saying the guy was on €68kpa and would not be expected to take a pay cut


or 2 guys who have 20 posts between them blaming this tragic incident on a pay cut.


If there are public sources available could someone provide a link then we can discuss cause and effect.

[Denti]

Worth noting that LH have thorough psycho testing before employment. I actually know someone who failed the test!

Actually most that attend fail the test, only about 1 to 5% of all applicants pass it. However, they do not test for mental illness, they test if the applicants fit into the job and company profile.

[SD.]

There's a huge difference between psychometric testing and mental health assessments.

In various recurrent training sessions, I've heard all about stress and fatigue management. IMO, this is just lip service.

[blind pew]

While I can only comment on my limited experience in three flag carriers.

My first paid three months full salary on sick leave then after a reduced income sacked you after a further three months.
Loss of license insurance paid only 10% of sum insured for mental problems.
These were the days when being labeled a "nutter" was one's fate.

I lost my license on mental health grounds in 1996. My company paid my salary for nearly two years before taking my medical away from me whereby I was transferred to an invalidity pension which was paid out of the (separate) pension fund.
It was in the companies financial interest to permanently remove my class 1 medical and the examining doctor was the company doctor.
In Hindsight it was possibly aerotoxic syndrome as we had a spate of pilots with similar mental health problems. If our illnesses had been classed as work related then the company would have been financially responsible.

Fortunately I only suffered severely from the Black Dog for seven years.....

Hopefully we will discover that it had nothing to do with mental illness as such but perhaps a seizure ...which has happened in flight to colleagues.

IMHO the security measures will have a sensible re hash but it's too late to redeem the flight engineer.

In the UK, hospital mental committal is only available to a male if he has seriously attempted suicide on three occasions. It is time to come out of the stone age.

[flyingchanges]

I see no motive or evidence here for the co-pilot taking the blame.


He would have had to proactively denied the Captain's access. If he was incapacitated, this thread would not exist.