Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[Innaflap]

kcockayne

What the industry has traditionally done is to analyse events and figure out the best way to deal with them - and I am sure this will be no exception as I am sure the travelling public will be looking at who implements the best solution.

Short term I believe that there will need to be another person in the flight deck when a break is required. The build of the individuals concerned is just part of the discussion. In this case the FO was hardly a hulk and whereas CC tend to be more on the lithe side than the Amazonian, I wouldn't discount the abilities of anyone, however slight, to get the door open again if the alternative was certain death.

[oldoberon]

So we have initial FDR reports stating that there were deliberately entered speed changes (seems he wanted to ensure no survivors).

That should be that, no more he could have been unconscious, frozen with fear etc etc. It was deliberate.

Ah but I read, it could have been system inputs because they have not told us which method he used to make these speed changes, aand do they actually know themselves.

I fully believe if they did not have conclusive proof these were pilot driven changes they would not have siad so.

Time to accept the inevitable If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, IT'S A DUCK!

Cabin crew on FD:-

RE CC on FD, since 9/11 how many attempted incidents have there been on aircraft using CC on FD utilise the CC, to my knowledge ZERO, how many incidents on those not using it which may have been prevented, one maybe two (MH370), and yes I accept there was incident with both pilots on the FD.

Most terrorist organisations are not stupid they know which airlines use CC on FD, but do not appear to have used it as an aid to terrorism, on the other hand neither has there been a big terrorist incident on those airlines not using CC on FD. Conclusion is something else is deterring this avenue for terrorist groups.

Is this why they tried shoe bombers, underpants bombers, mix your own inflight bombers, and various bomb plots on freighters, clearly the total "ground side" is much much better, yes we have to win everytime they only have to win once in a while.

Hence the CC on flight deck to allow entry is an extra (but not ultimate) protection against crew lock out.

[md80fanatic]

The article I read stated he was adjusting speed to prevent overspeed alarms from sounding. I suppose that means he was dialing down airspeed, progressively, to keep the AP from pitching up automatically during overspeed?

[Pace]

PS I assume you do know the rules (or lack of) re CC operating with depression / mental illness / associated drugs, their medical checks (nil) etc.?

Nigel I am a corporate jet pilot so I know the rules re flight crew but not CC

[wisman]

Remove that door and we are back with safety,and we have the original emergancy exit door, into the flightdeck from the cabin vv. and let the airports take care of security, The door today is a security gadget, and it dos not belong on the aircraft, and it is killing our pax and it will keep on doing this until it is removed.

[marie paire]

The article I read stated he was adjusting speed to prevent overspeed alarms from sounding.
Incorrect. the BEA site states that "à plusieurs reprises au cours de la descente, le pilote a modifié le réglage du pilote automatique pour augmenter la vitesse..." in English "several times during the descent the pilot adjusted the automatic pilot to increase the speed..." (emphasis added).

[CloudB]

Quote:
Lufthansa states that only around 2% of those that pass the whole selection process fail during flight training and have to be let go. Those figures seem to be consistent for the last 30 or 40 years. There is something about that statistic I really do not like. It might tell us how good the selection filter is, but it might also be telling us how doggedly they hold to their initial, possibly incorrect, assessments. That nothing has changed over the last 30-40 years I also find quite troubling.


Troubling indeed. 2% fallout compared to what? LFT MPL training has a fallout rate of more then 50%.

[Roadster280]

Please confirm that you would "empower" the CC in this scenario to override the specific verbal instructions of the Captain?

It almost certainly would have, but then it would not have been planned in this way. You cannot look at one accident in isolation - you need to design a "system" to provide the minimum overall risk.

"Mentally ill pilot crashes aircraft and kills all on board". How best to address? Prevent the situation in the 1st place, or accept it as fact, and devise solutions that not only allow the mentally ill pilot to still achieve their aims, but opens up a whole range of new hazards.

PS I assume you do know the rules (or lack of) re CC operating with depression / mental illness / associated drugs, their medical checks (nil) etc.?

No, I don't know the medical rules re CC, nor would "I" empower CC to do anything. I am "just" a passenger. Frequently, but still, "just a passenger".

However, I do feel qualified to comment on such basic things, because my life (and yours) depends on getting it right. Clearly, the system that was in play at LH prior to this event did not prevent the incident, and therefore, LH had not got it right.

Alternatively, if it is ultimately deemed that LH did have it right on the basis that other approaches were "more wrong", then we must all live with the fact that we are now in an era when "suicide bombers" can be among the pilot cadre in European flag carriers.

As I am sure you're aware, in the US there are arrangements with FAs entering the FD when one pilot needs to pee/whatever (assuming no relief pilot). Whatever the protocol is that they use, might be a good starting point. It seems to work. But then so did single-pilot in LH until recently.

[Kerosene]

What I find remarkable about the whole event is that it was such a rough and surprising awakening for the aviation community in the Western spheres. There had been numerous pilot suicides/homicides using aircraft in other parts of the world before:

ASN News » List of aircraft accidents caused by pilot suicide (http://news.aviation-safety.net/2013/12/22/list-of-aircraft-accidents-caused-by-pilot-suicide/)

The industry, including the regulators, had completely ignored this risk and put their blinds on.

While at the present level of technology nothing will stop a fully determined flight crew member at the controls from inducing a catastrophic event, all measures must be taken to prevent anyone who has or over time develops such a state of mind of ever being there.

That people with actual mental problems have been there, and do get there, points to a huge cultural and systematic failure of the industry.

There are no easy solutions, and the good ones will cost money; but companies have to assume full responsibility for who they hire and place at the controls of their aircraft, for every flight.

The financial consequences for a company's failure to KNOW beyond doubt who they can trust with responsibility on any flight must be so crippling that companies are forced to either develop deep cultures of care, or disappear; respectively never be allowed to operate.

Such cultures must care for the development and wellbeing of their flight crews, including providing the means to help where necessary and safety nets in case problems cannot be rectified.

It goes without saying that cultures built on financial exploitation of pilots such as P2F or zero hours contracts, competing in a race to the bottom, must not have a future.

[flyawaybird]

Pace

In addition to your comment, Lubitz did some research online about the cockpit door mechanism. He intentionally planned his action and as you said, he was just waiting for the right moment.

[BOING]

At least in the US, all the airlines will do is add a box for each crewmember to tick on the flight release form confirming that they are fit to fly.:rolleyes:

[WillowRun 6-3]

Kerosene (just a few posts above this one) relates how the industry, seen as a worldwide entity or unit, has just now, with this tragic crash, pulled its head, ostrich-like, out of the sand. Indeed, the worldwide industry ostensibly lives under the banner of "Uniting Aviation" (literally, these hang inside ICAO world headquarters) - but why then does the industry appear to accept that so many States are only 60 percent compliant with safety standards, and many others not even that proficient?

1. What if access to the FD is restricted to a senior-level FA, someone trained and steeped in the safety culture of aviation? (Yeah, I get it, that such a senior-level person is not always present in CC, but that's like observing the world's .600 batting average on safety.) And give the FA the civil aviation equivalent to ROEs - Rules of Engagement. The experts can write them, but the general idea is to authorize what the FA can do relative to opening the door, and what not do. No crystal ball is 1000 percent transparent, but that is no reason not to try to address what is known and what can be anticipated.

2. Some cabin attendants already have the training and capacity - on some carriers at the least - to subdue unruly pax. This means the air carriers and regulators have found them - those who have such training and actually apply the plastic restraints in an incident - capable of abiding by the standards of aviation security and safety.

Under no circumstances, allow a recently-hired, relatively untrained, FA into the FD, given the availability of significantly more experienced, more trained, and hence more trusty and reliable, flight attendants.

3. Accelerate the Sky Marshall program and proliferate it widely. If you don't like FAs on the flight deck, and you are willing to have a Sky Marshall at all, then replace the FA with a trained aviation security and safety professional. (Plus ROEs, sure.)

4. Over time, and it will be a pretty long time surely, move certification standards so that having a lav inside the cockpit door becomes standard. And work in a 3rd crewmember - isn't it true that being seated on the FD was thought to be a great training exercise for ATCOs back in the days of the "fam" flight (familiarization)? - so, for the junior-cadre FOs who didn't learn to fly in the military or otherwise in a fully professional environment, would not such flights yield valuable training inputs?


Finally, unless and until the industry undergoes a financial, operational, and most of all, managerial-attitudes renaissance, humane and more pragmatic approaches to aviators with psychological concerns in their individual lives is about as likely as, well, as a return to those mythic days of Capt. Vern DeMerest aboard The Golden Argosy to Rome (apologies to Arthur Hailey, author of Airport).

[Landflap]

Clud B ; Good points. My interest is in Selection & Training and at risk of being flamed for not reading the multitude of posts, may I ask if the Lufthansa Acadamy is the same as was set up in the 60's ? Highly selected young men & women were selected and trained and PAID FOR in order to join the sponsoring Airline, or, has the Acadamy developed into the commercial world where so called "Cadets", in fact, pay for their own training & not, therefore, subjected to the rigorous criteria of the past ?

Please don't tell me that cadets, having secured money loans enjoy the future of having the loans extinguished by the sponsor after succeful training is remotely comparable with the Cadet schemes of the 60's like BOAC/BEA (Hamble), BUA (Perth), BKS/Cambrian (Oxford & Perth) etc.

Claims that this troubled mass murderer was subjected to a selection procedure with only 1% passing (Germanwings) and as a ,so called, "Lufthansa Cadet" was party to only 2% failing the course is leaving me unimpressed.

I repeat, for the glory days of the '60's where airlines selected and paid for the training of cadets, this guy would not have succeeded in phase one of, at least, a six phase selection procedure.

[Down Three Greens]

Let's just clear things up. If you pull 'open descent' above crossover, the aircraft will maintain the Mach number say 0.77. At around crossover or when the Mach/button is pressed, it will change to CAS at the current selected Mach/CAS. As you descend, the overspeed protection and indication will move from MMO to VMO...and gradually move up the CAS scale towards its stated VMO.

Assuming that an individual wants to expedite descent, or 'kinetic energy', in open descent it would require the selected speed to wound up towards VMO. I.e. A speed change

[Basil]

I have no incontestable solution to this difficulty but I do not believe that having CC or 'Sky Marshall' on the flight deck when one pilot leaves is enhancing safety.
You are replacing one potential problem with another.

[Blondie2005]

That people with actual mental problems have been there, and do get there, points to a huge cultural and systematic failure of the industry.

There are no easy solutions, and the good ones will cost money; but companies have to assume full responsibility for who they hire and place at the controls of their aircraft, for every flight.

Such cultures must care for the development and wellbeing of their flight crews, including providing the means to help where necessary and safety nets in case problems cannot be rectified.

It goes without saying that cultures built on financial exploitation of pilots such as P2F or zero hours contracts, competing in a race to the bottom, must not have a future.

Spot on. There will have to be a much greater focus on regular checking of mental health. This will come at a financial cost to pax and a cost of greater intrusiveness into the 'private lives' of crew, but it needs to be done.

We also need to 'normalise' poor mental health in our culture. Depression is a default human reaction to trauma (e.g. bereavement, relationship breakdown, suffering a life-threatening event) and millions of us will suffer it, although the overwhelming majority of us recover. It's very common and not a reflection on the individual. Employers need to put in place care and reassurance programs to deal with it. An employee ringing in with a sick note with a diagnosis of depression shouldn't feel more scared or ashamed than one ringing in with a sick note for flu.

(I would just add that IMHO this pilot was psychotic, not depressed.)

[Sailvi767]

"""Think everyone forgets the aircraft hijacked on 9/11 operated with locked cockpit doors. """

I think you forget that the procedure back then was to allow a hijacker access to the cockpit if demanded. The doors and locks were a joke back then also. A simple shoulder shove and the door was open.

[pilotmike]

WillowRun 6-3's idea: Accelerate the Sky Marshall program and proliferate it widely. If you don't like FAs on the flight deck, and you are willing to have a Sky Marshall at all, then replace the FA with a trained aviation security and safety professional. perfectly demonstrates the problem that some appear to have difficulty grasping: that there is NO ideal solution to dealing with the problem the world finds itself suddenly having to react to, namely a rogue pilot.

Just one of these knee-jerk reactions with massive potential unintended consequences is to promote the Sky Marshall to the role of Sky God, as they are "...a trained aviation security and safety professional".

But wasn't the pilot exactly that, until last week? (S)he was highly trained, both in aviation and was good at security too, as (s)he'd demonstrated good use of the impenetrable FD door to keep only the rogues out .... until last week.

So who exactly is this Sky Marshall, this trained aviation security and safety professional armed with a lethal weapon, so cool and un-flappable that they could almost be mistaken for a pilot......? Did you know that:

- he had previously flunked flight school but forgot to let this be known?

- he held a serious grudge against the industry, pilots in particular?

- he learned last week that his house was about to be repossessed?

- just yesterday he found out that his wife was having an affair with the neighbour who happened to be a pilot?

Ever the true professional, this Sky God is determined to go to work as normal. He knows he risks losing his job if he admits to his employer that he's feeling depressed about the sack of ***** life was throwing at him recently. But he just can't see any way out.

Are you sure it still seems reasonable to appoint this armed "trained aviation security and safety professional" to act as as judge and jury over the very pilots he despises, with a loaded weapon to execute his decisions on who is acting reasonably and rationally, and who is not?

There are no simple, all encompassing solutions. All else is just window dressing - deckchairs on the Titanic if you like.

[Ian W]

From the last few posts, perhaps with the exception of Pace, the response to the concerned SLF who pay your wages was: "there is no way of preventing this problem, all methods make things slightly worse - so nothing to see here - move along".

Unfortunately, there is something to see here. This incident and the recent ones linked to here ASN News » List of aircraft accidents caused by pilot suicide (http://news.aviation-safety.net/2013/12/22/list-of-aircraft-accidents-caused-by-pilot-suicide/) and probably MH370, all seem to have been instigated by pilots left alone in the cockpit. This worries your SLF paymasters. The response to their worry? Well if a pilot wanted to kill themselves and all the pax they could do it simply by [several other ways] - this is meant to calm their concerns?

There really needs to be some hard thought given to this. By far the best is the suggestion that pilots suffering from mental health issues will be supported and _not_ lose income if they then fail medicals, in the same way as other medical issues. This would not be perfect, but at least it would remove the dicincentive to report mental health problems. It would also show something positive was being done. Up until then a CC 'door monitor' seems to be a good suggestion.

This incident will slowly drop out of the headlines over the next weeks, it will then reappear with a lot more noise and considered media documentaries when the BEA produce their reports. The industry had better be speaking with one voice on something positive and productive by then as that positive note can be put into those documentaries. However, what I expect is the equivalent of patting the SLF on the head and saying "don't worry your empty little heads about things you don't understand". That would be completely the incorrect approach for the industry to take and it would probably find itself facing poorly thought out mandates as 'they are doing nothing'.

[Flyer94]

From memory, it may be correct only 99%:

Lufthansa recruitment test consists of 2 parts: the basic examination test controls mathematical, physical and technical understanding, spatial awareness and concentration.

The other part, called company qualification, checks the character of the applicant. This investigation faces a failure rate of 95% because most people do not fit into the mindset and behavior patterns LH requests for FD stuff. It is said that a healthy self-confidence (some call it "a kind of arrogance") is even helpful. At least one must be sure of himself and of belonging to an elite in an elite company, but also be a team player.

The remaining 5% receive admittance to LH pilot training and hence a takeover guarantee after the end of training. And now, only 2% of all accepted apprentices fail pilots education.

So the LH recruitment checks only general suitability and whether someone fits into the desired "LH behavior". It says nothing about the mental health of an applicant.

[peekay4]

Some of the 'solutions' here presume that a history "mental illness" is a necessary cause of suicides.

However, there can be many motives to pilot suicides:

- The SilkAir 185 pilot allegedly had over $1.2 million in stock-trading losses and had taken out a new life insurance coverage going into effect the day of the crash.

- The EgyptAir 990 relief co-pilot reportedly crashed the plane after an altercation with the Chief Pilot (who was onboard the flight) over a sexual harassment claim.

- The Royal Air Maroc pilot supposedly crashed his plane after a failed love affair.

None of these pilots had a clinical history of mental illness.

[Blantoon]

None of them had a documented history of mental illness.

Nobody without a mental illness crashes an airliner deliberately, religious fantatics (debatably) excepted.

[PrivtPilotRadarTech]

I have no incontestable solution to this difficulty but I do not believe that having CC or 'Sky Marshall' on the flight deck when one pilot leaves is enhancing safety.
You are replacing one potential problem with another.

This reminds me of my mother, who refused to wear a seatbelt while driving, pointing out that in some circumstances (she cited going off a bridge into a river, as I recall) the seatbelt could trap her in the car. As some might put it, wearing a seatbelt is "replacing one potential problem with another."

I always wear my seatbelt, for the same reason I want the "two in the cockpit" rule. It's the safer alternative.

[GXER]

@peekay4

Which simply shows that practical measures that will make it harder for a rogue pilot (depressed, psychotic, disturbed, whatever) are exactly what should be done and the sooner the better. Two person cockpit rule is simple and adds a significant obstacle that any FD crew bent on self-destruction would have to overcome. It's not a complete answer but it is an obvious first step.

[Lonewolf_50]

Nobody without a mental illness crashes an airliner deliberately, religious fantatics (debatably) excepted.
Sir, that is not quite correct. It is not necessarily a sign of mental illness to get destructive/negative thoughts and emotions that lead to suicidal ideation.
We had extensive (and eye watering) education on the difference between a personality disorder and mental illness, and life changing events whenever a service member would off himself (which was far too common, thanks) over the two decades that I was a serving officer.

Unless you define mental illness as "not normal, like me" then using such a broad term to classify what leads to such ideation being put into action does more harm than good. There are a host of emotional issues that arise in a given suicide decision ... I'll PM you on a few points that don't merit public discussion.

[fyrefli]

That's my point Glueball, they established it was a criminal act without all the relevant information. Which is what really annoys me, but i suppose like police they have the right to arrest someone on the suspicion of something and then release them when they find they didn't do it.

You've pretty much answered your own point. They didn't "establish it was a criminal act without all the relevant information", they established from the initially available information that there was a need for a criminal *investigation*.

[Piltdown Man]

There is a difference. Your Mother's objection to a wearing a seatbelt was based on poor interpretation of factual data. Having an additional crew member enter when another leaves does have valid, historical data as to why it should not be done. The data I've seen shows that in last ten years or so, six or so accidents have been attributed to suicides. In that time, tens of millions of flights have taken place without incident. However, during a short period some time ago, our little airline has suffered missed R/T calls, snagged controls and C/Bs and water ingress on avionics. The starting point of bigger problems. Furthermore, just exactly what are cabin crew expected to do to stop someone intent on topping themselves. Our company have very few cabin crew I could over-power, with or without a fire axe. This unsafe, stupid rule is the invention of a mindless bureaucratic trying to appeal to the half-witted public, the baying media and their political masters.

The problem is that not enough time and effort (in fact, no effort) has been invested in making sure that pilots like me start off and remain sane throughout their careers; even when they have to personal problems to deal with. Even less will have been spent on bus and train divers, medics, police officers, service personnel etc. All of whom could ruin your day should they be having a bad one.

[Denti]

and btw... lufthansa should rethink if it is the way to go to judge the people only by the results of tests done on a computer instead of common sense with a classic interview face to face.

Well, in the second phase there is quite a bit of face to face interaction. The first one is mostly computer stuff though. And there is a reason why there is a specially trained captain in that second phase as well as the psychologists and HR personnel.

However, as with all those tests the focus is on finding out if someone does fit the company profile and the profile they want to see on their flight decks. Mental health never was a focus point, but i guess that is about to change.

[Wader2]

The problem is that not enough time and effort (in fact, no effort) has been invested in making sure that pilots like me start off and remain sane throughout their careers; even when they have to personal problems to deal with. Even less will have been spent on bus and train divers, medics, police officers, service personnel etc. All of whom could ruin your day should they be having a bad one.



So, is there a solution? Of the people cited only a pilot can kill upwards of 500 people in one go though a train driver can come close. A car driver or truck driver can wreak havoc too.

Should we be pragmatic and accept that a minute number of our 6 billion companions will chose some inventive way of murdering a minute number of us?

The cost of minimizing a minute threat to a small number is to inconvenience a huge number. What we need is balance.

[GXER]

I am becoming despairing of the myopia in this thread.

The unavoidable and necessary truth that exists at the heart of the vast majority of commercial aviation transport is that responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight rests on the shoulders of the captain and FO. The balance between those two is what it is, and not the subject of this post.

The simple and worthwhile objective of the "two person on FD at all times" rule is that it materially reduces the ability of either to usurp the responsibility and authority of the other, so helps to ensure that the conversation between the two can continue on whatever basis applied before one or the other left the cockpit.

That's it. Period. It doesn't alter (give or take fractions) any risk that doesn't already exist.

[oldoberon]

SKYnews german prosecutors have searched the premises of 5 doctors known to have treated Lubitz

[Gilmorrie]

Was it reported over what period of time the five doctors were consulted?

[RoyHudd]

Does the possibility of a 3rd event, similar to the Air Botswana Embraer 190 and the GermanWings A320 exist?

And if so, what can prevent it?

[tubby linton]

if the FDR data module has been found, the contents read and leaked,which part of it was found last week,and where were their relative positions?

[ChissayLuke]

Second black box contents were not 'leaked'. They were reported. As fact.
FD crew should be ready for greater scrutiny.
Mentally fit for flight?
No 'pilot error', regardless of what they face?
SLF, who pay for them to do what they do, and place Full Trust in them to get it right; each and every time, have a right to expect this.
Or perhaps, a genuine airline pilot, might wish to tell me that I am wrong.
Get real, guys, and smell the flowers. Accountability is coming. Or at least, I fervently hope it is.

[klintE]

Does the possibility of a 3rd event, similar to the Air Botswana Embraer 190 and the GermanWings A320 exist?
And if so, what can prevent it?

I think every serious airline company need to have internal examination system to prevent from flying people with mental problems.

1. Before they hire someone should send him (or her) to own* clinic for medical set of tests.
2. Should be a clear list of a diseases which disqualify from being hired as a pilot (and IMO clinical depression should be on that list)
3. Verdict should be simply 'yes' or 'not'.
4. +Periodic inspections (once a year)

* - (i mean the doctors know for what kind of company examination is proceeded)

[peekay4]

In 39. Years as a flight engineer before ,CRM numerous times found myself being the third man out that provided necessary insight to defuse a hostel situation between Capt & Fo

This is the solution. A third deadheading pilot should be mandated. I'm sure he could be usefully engaged.

3rd crew isn't a panacea.

JAL Flight 350 plunged into Tokyo Bay when at 200' AGL on short final into Haneda, the Captain decided to commit suicide by pushing the yoke forward and activating the thrust-reversers.

The crash could not be prevented despite the FO desperately pulling back on the yoke while the Flight Engineer was physically restraining the Captain.

[Ollie Onion]

klintE,

The approach of excluding anyone who has clinical depression is a slippery slope! Do you exclude everyone who had clinical depression in the past and has recovered according to all the available evidence?

You say pilots should be checked every year, what do you think will happen if you start checking pilots every year with the threat of dismissal if they are found to be depressed? I suspect you will end up driving this condition further underground or triggering MORE of these episodes.

The problem with some mental illnesses is that they can be very hard to pick up and diagnose especially if the individual concerned wants to hide the fact. The only way to tackle this is to have a very open and honest culture around mental problems. Airlines need to be very clear that it is a disease like any other and that time and resources will be put into you rehabilitation just like any other and only when all avenues of recovery are exhausted you may lose you medical certificate but be eligible for normal loss of licence provisions.

The problem we have at the moment is alot of airlines especially low cost ones don't provide ANY loss of licence or income insurance. Also most loss of licence policies will NOT pay out on mental disorders so the whole think encourages pilots to just keep quiet.

I have worked for an airline that provided flight crew with sick leave of 5 days per year, actively docked your pay if you had any more than this, required a doctors certificate at your own expense for EVERY single sick day and had NO loss of licence insurance available to the crew as it was our problem to sort out. Net result of those policies was that I was flying regularly with crew who were in no way or shape fit to fly. Airlines have to take ownership of this problem aswell, cheap no cost solutions like the CC in the flight deck may look good for public perception buy the crews physical and mental health which can cause these events needs actual time and resources to be committed.

[mercurydancer]

Klint

largely I agree with you, but with some reservations.

Reactive depression is very common and it is likely to affect many people. Reactive depression is a very frequent result of normal life events, such as a parent or partner (or even worse, a child) dying. A good occupational health service of any employer should have the mechanisms to deal with this. If they do not, then they should.

A diagnosis of clinical depression should not need to condemn the person to a life without significant responsibility. I mean not just pilots but surgeons and many others with life and death responsibilities.

It is good to monitor the recovery of a person from depression, but the person must be able to recover from it. If they can do so then everyone is satisfied. It may even result in better team structures. (I have had depression, I see some signs in you, are you all right? would be as good as a starting phrase and would in many cases be welcome)

[Kerosene]

...The only way to tackle this is to have a very open and honest culture around mental problems. Airlines need to be very clear that it is a disease like any other and that time and resources will be put into you rehabilitation just like any other and only when all avenues of recovery are exhausted you may lose you medical certificate but be eligible for normal loss of licence provisions...

Bravo to your whole post!

I fear the reality will be a different one, more along the lines of more regular and rigorous checking, colleague reporting, blaming and terminating, thus creating an even larger culture of fear and suppression, with predictable consequences.

Unfortunately the industry has suffered from a good amount of neglect and lack of oversight on behalf of the regulators and authorities. Practices as you mention flourish in a deregulated environment where profit is all that matters and safety an afterthought. Difficult to reverse this trend and broadly establish positive, open and trust based cultures now.

Ideally, airlines would do all in their power to get the best and most promising candidates (and not the ones with the biggest wallets), and hiring them would make them assume a large responsibility for the supervision and development of each flight crew member. As with management positions in good companies, flight crews should be eligible to good working conditions, and in case things aren't working out to the satisfaction of the employer (for whatever reason except willful neglect and criminal conduct), generous serverance packages/loss of license deals should be the norm.

But perhaps I'm dreaming.

[DrPhillipa]

It would seem that this is now on the verge of turning into a medical malpractice issue. I wonder if the 5 doctors together have enough insurance to get LH group out of their 300m+ problem.

[GarageYears]

How many of you have been through a mental evaluation?

You can't "measure" some magical indicator, right? An opinion is made based on a series of questions basically. If someone wanted to hide their true feelings, be they depression, mania, psychosis... whatever, they easily can.

Only people who "want" to be helped will answer truthfully. When your job is on the line that isn't likely to happen is it?

I fear all this claptrap talk of "testing" has imaginary outcomes that reveals the "truth". Sadly that's not how it works. Sorry, but that's reality.

[klintE]

Do you exclude everyone who had clinical depression in the past and has recovered according to all the available evidence?
If someone is fully recovered than should pass the examination with any problems, right?
You say pilots should be checked every year, what do you think will happen if you start checking pilots every year with the threat of dismissal if they are found to be depressed? I suspect you will end up driving this condition further underground or triggering MORE of these episodes.Fear of test can't lead to depression. If so, than it's an evidence that person is unsuitable with stressful environment like flying an airliner.

Also most loss of licence policies will NOT pay out on mental disorders so the whole think encourages pilots to just keep quiet.
Yes they may not want to admit it.
So the company needs to check it forcedly.



Reactive depression is very common and it is likely to affect many people. Reactive depression is a very frequent result of normal life events, such as a parent or partner (or even worse, a child) dying. A good occupational health service of any employer should have the mechanisms to deal with this. If they do not, then they should.

Ok, I should expand my list with temporary ban on flying

[G-CPTN]

An opinion is made based on a series of questions basically.
When I was seriously, deeply, clinically depressed, I was told by the examining Psychiatrist that I was "as sane as he was".

I still don't know whether that was a compliment.

And yes, at some stage I was about to commit suicide - but that is no longer a possibility.

And for those who doubt my intentions, I had written notes, rigged the rope, and was standing on the branch of the tree . . .

There were reasons for my contemplation, the depression was part of the result of those reasons - but not the whole cause.

[Buzz Coil]

In the last 30 years the term "Depression" has come to mean anything from the down feeling you have, when your football team loses, to Paranoid Schizophrenia in the mental health field. It is probably not productive to paint everyone with Depression with the same brush when screening pilots and other professions where public safety is involved.

Rather than changing everything, the Airline Industry and it's regulators should start by finding out exactly what was wrong with Lubitz and why he "slipped through the cracks" and got a commercial pilots license. Then, they should decide what specific changes should be made to stop the specific type of instance of another Lubitz obtaining a license. This way, you minimize the chances of The Law of Unintended Consequences and a bureaucratic boondoggle rearing their ugly heads.

[Gilmorrie]

I'm wondering why there are so many deniers here on this site, many of whom seem to be professional pilots? There must be some collective motive or reason.


Now that the data recorder information is beginning to be officially released, most reasonable doubts must become somewhat dispelled.

[Loose rivets]

I've wondered about posting this story for a long time. Perhaps now is that time. Fourty-five years ago my fleet manager practically jumped out of his seat and shouted at me. Stop! You can't talk about a captain like that! If you want to say things like that you'll have to appoint a QC and do it in high court.

I had pleaded with him to ground a captain that had joined us some months before. It was my job, I was a 'training FO', one that flew with new captains until they'd done 500 hours. Mostly it was fun, and indeed appreciated, but this supposedly retired captain had seemed odd right from the beginning. The flight leading up to that 'interview' was beyond bizarre. It was my last flight with that airline. Probably the best job I ever had. But I'd had weeks with this bullish creature and enough was enough. I had two months leave stacked up and I told them that was my notice. I had already talked to the PALPA rep, the chief training captain, and almost anyone that would listen. Nobody did anything - at least that I know of.

Imagine advising the skipper as he climbed into his seat that the checks were not done (due to no APU and no ground power.) Why not, he bellowed as he lit the first engine. The checks were not done and the brakes were not on. We had no start clearance and our lass charged into the flight deck and said people were still coming up the ventral air-stairs. It was a 1-11 with engines just feet from their heads. In a few years I could have shut the HP cocks and de-planed the pax, but things were different then. But I wish to God I had.

As we were taxiing out, I noticed a hint of fuel in the centre tank. Nothing unusual for a while, but on takeoff it seemed to be showing about 200kgs. The aircraft was going nowhere on that 32c Rome day. I was not authorized to abandon a takeoff, but advised him and firewalled the taps. He said nothing. He very often said nothing. As we staggered past the Coliseum, I was numbed to see a tonne of fuel in the centre tank. By the time were were established in a climb it registered full. We were three tonnes over-weight on a 39 tonne aircraft. He said nothing when finally he did the paperwork.

When we arrived in the UK, I shouted down for no one to touch the fuel panel. To my everlasting relief, and with an engineer to witness the opening, I saw the centre tank selected to zero. I thought I knew the electrics on that aircraft to the last resistor, but it seems refueling on battery can fool the system. To this day I have never had that confirmed.

All this followed weeks of being with someone that was obviously an alcoholic and too strange to be put into any category. A very senior captain, and I thought, a friend, said to me, "You know, Robbie, I let the fact he was an ex XXX captain sway me when I passed him." Even he did nothing.

This was perhaps the worst of dozens of things I had to cope with in that period, but many were just as bewildering. "What's that?" he said, pointing to the DME. "it's our DME distance from XXXX" "What's DME? We had Decca in XXX." Every departure from base was a series of DME turns.

Now comes the part that this is all about. Years later, a different life it seemed, and I was in a garden party in my Essex home town. My host's wife said she wanted me to meet her old boss. He'd been fleet manager of the 1-11 fleet. He seemed a really nice chap, very sharp etc. When I mentioned my Nemesis' name, he was surprised. "How do you know him?" When I told him I stormed out of a good job because of his bizarre behavior, he looked stunned, and said, "Don't tell me that man flew again!"

I learned a little of why he was 'retired'. Shame he wasn't grounded. Alcoholic and probably much worse. They tried to help him, but he was a lost cause. Shame. My life would have been very, very different if he'd just stayed retired.


But now, here's a thing. He was deranged, of that there is no doubt, but it was my senior colleges that leave me numbed to this day. The behaviour of my fleet manager was so unexplainable that it is difficult to know how these things happened, even in that era. Once, a well known training skipper relinquished his seat to a very quiet chap that was the fleet manager's 'secretary.' The skipper went down the back and was chatting to the girls. He did that a lot. We were descending past 4,000' when I got a clear view of the fields north of Munich. He had decided to pull against the autopilot until it snapped out. He then pushed. I was managing the usual bad air system and looking up. We pulled about 1.5 g. Maybe more. No one said a word. He had no type rating and I learned later, no time on twins. Probably 300 pages would describe that year, but lets fast forward to c 1999.

I announced to a crew that I was going for a job interview. I was invited to sit on the jump-seat. Top of climb, young skipper goes down the back to chat to the girls. Nothing changed then. I was invited to sit in his seat. He reached across and clicked the autopilot out. "You fly it. If my five year old can fly it, anyone can."

I had not flown a glass flight-deck, but it seemed fairly straightforward. It was kind of surreal, I looked down as saw the Red Arrows three miles or so below. I reached for the trim wheel. Mmmm . . . there wasn't one. For the whole cruise I didn't dare fiddle with the trim button . . . just in case. The FO finally communicated with me. He held up on finger. Ah, that rings a distant bell. Take box one. Okay, it's been many years, but I think I can do that. I later learned the FO didn't really speak English. Not really speak it.

This is just the things that might be relevant now. I can't forget wrenching the controls out of the hands of a chap that had turned the wrong way in the Innsbruck valley. The turn, by necessity was past 60 degrees. I was just a kid then, and my only thought was. "I hope to God I'm right."

I think the whole point of this is that the sick person in the seat on one horrific day is just one part of the spectrum. In my experience, management has been consistent, in it failure to ensure safety, and worse still, it's failure to act honorably. It has been a long and painful learning experience learning about people, but there it is. The truth is so often hard to, not accept, but to admit.

[mickdonedee]

And yes, at some stage I was about to commit suicide - and for those who doubt my intentions, I had written notes, rigged the rope, and was standing on the branch of the tree . . . You could also have contemplated driving a car into a bus shelter with people to ensure your suicide was reported on the news if you were an egocentric sociopath that Lubitz obviously was. The fact that you had no thoughts of murder-suicide implies you would never contemplate deliberately crashing an airplane and taking the lives of passengers. I agree with others that pilots with depression shouldn't be banned from flying if they still care about their own safety and the safety of their passengers. However, no pilots should be allowed to be entrusted with the safety of passengers if they have no empathy for other humans which can be uncovered in testing for sociopathy traits.

[Denti]

may I ask if the Lufthansa Acadamy is the same as was set up in the 60's ? Highly selected young men & women were selected and trained and PAID FOR in order to join the sponsoring Airline, or, has the Acadamy developed into the commercial world where so called "Cadets", in fact, pay for their own training & not, therefore, subjected to the rigorous criteria of the past ?

It is not the 60s anymore, but the academy is basically still the same although conditions have slightly changed. The selection process is still very strict and the training is paid for by Lufthansa, however, the cadet does have to pay back some of the training cost once he has got a job with a Lufthansa company, but there is no loan to take out at all. Currently the selection is a selection done in three steps (BU or basic tests, FQ or company qualification and company medical), however it is possible to fail at several points during those steps.

[noalign]

Since this is a website oriented towards Professional Pilots, is it time yet to begin discussing how we should be able to go to work with the expectation that we will not become victims of workplace homicide? You know, the same expectation assumed by all of the other posters to this thread in whatever workplace they go to.

[RGN01]

Noalign, your post prompted me to write.

In this thread there have been a few posts suggesting video recording in cockpits and this has been widely and strongly resisted by posters - many of whom I assume to be pilots.

We have also had numerous stories about dysfunctional cockpit relationships and bad behaviour, often accompanied by statements to the effect that the individuals concerned had been or are powerless to change this. They were either not believed or not taken seriously.

My contention is that video recording should be standard and should be routinely kept for weeks or months so they can be made available to support later review of cockpit behaviour. They could be used to support allegations of 'bullying' by the captain or other, less easily defined undesirable behaviour that may be indicative of another problem when viewed over a longer period (e.g. I find it somewhat unlikely that Lubitz never displayed any unusual behaviour before this incident).

I am purely SLF but have an abiding interest in all things aviation and do a lot of flights each year so have a vested interest in the safety of civil aviation generally!

We have heard how surgeons in some areas are required to work with video recording active. I once worked for a company that mines and sells diamonds and, although the office buildings I was in presented minimal threat to the safety of people in them we were continually being video recorded and monitored (except for a few places like the bathrooms!)

Video recordings do not serve a punitive purpose only - they tell the story of what happened only and can be used to defend good or positive behaviour as well, for example when wrongly accused of bullying by the FO.

So, why the resistance to the cameras by professional pilots? Video recordings, and a suitable reporting and oversight environment around it, could save lives.

[DirtyProp]

Second black box contents were not 'leaked'. They were reported. As fact.
FD crew should be ready for greater scrutiny.
Mentally fit for flight?
No 'pilot error', regardless of what they face?
SLF, who pay for them to do what they do, and place Full Trust in them to get it right; each and every time, have a right to expect this.
Or perhaps, a genuine airline pilot, might wish to tell me that I am wrong.
Get real, guys, and smell the flowers. Accountability is coming. Or at least, I fervently hope it is.
Pilots are always held accountable.
By definition the PIC has the ultimate responsibility for every flight.
If you don't trust the pilots you are completely free to choose other transportation methods.

[Cows getting bigger]

xollob, indeed. Pilots are no more accountable than bus drivers, train drivers and ship's captains. Let's just drop this precious and illogical argument against video cameras. It is time to wake up and accept that we are just another cog in the big gear of like.

[Wader2]

The spy in the cab (FD) is seen as a way to 'hang the guilty b*****d'

The spy can also exonerate. In a road traffic accident it proved the obvious suspect was wholly innocent. In the cockpit it can prove all the correct actions were taken. In a tight situation the pilot's hands never left the yoke (joke warning :))

Then think on of the dozens of aircraft where the cockpit door doesn't even exist.

Helicopter operations to oil rigs, sight seeing tours, light aircraft etc all have the ability to be crashed. The only difference is their kinetic effect compared with a large airliner. The door is clearly an irrelevance as regards pilot suicide and passenger safety.

What is different is the kinetic effect rather than the number of passengers. Those therefore calling the locked door as irrelevant and a CC in the FD increasing the danger from the kinetic risk are logically correct.

Pilot screening might mitigate the threat from suicide but would the cure be worse than the bite? More medical s, better compensation etc would drive up costs, reduce passenger numbers which would drive up costs which would . . .

Or would the majority accept the risk?

[LadyL2013]

Not in the mental health field, by the public perhaps.

Depression is not feeling low because you've had a bad day or because your team loses. No one with any level of competence is going to give you a diagnosis because of that. Reactive depression is sustained low mood that impacts on your ability to function following a significant life event, when the expected amount of time to recover has long since passed but one cannot return to normal functioning. Clinical depression is sustained low mood that impacts on your ability to function but with no particular cause-it just happens and it is very difficult to shift without treatment theraputic or medicinal.

Paranoid schizophrenia is a whole other kettle of fish and should inhibit a career in flying, the former shouldn't. Again no mental health professional worth their salt is going to think they are the same. Even if you gave a layperson the diagnostic criteria, the checklist is vastly different.

I can get why the public is confused, primarily due to irresponsible reporting by the media.

[caneworm]

"I think every serious airline company need to have internal
examination system to prevent from flying people with mental problems".


Good idea, but it's not enough.
The authorities & airline managements must have full access to a pilots,
* financial situation, (mortgage, debts, gambling history)
* marital situation, (married, divorced, separated, dependants)
* personal health history and that of all family members
* lifestyle choices, (gay, cross dresser, transgender, hellfire club membership)
* traffic violations
It's our employers right to know everything about their workers to determine their fitness to fly.

[DirtyProp]

Good idea, but it's not enough.
The authorities & airline managements must have full access to a pilots,
* financial situation, (mortgage, debts, gambling history)
* marital situation, (married, divorced, separated, dependants)
* personal health history and that of all family members
* lifestyle choices, (gay, cross dresser, transgender, hellfire club membership)
* traffic violations
It's our employers right to know everything about their workers to determine their fitness to fly.
Good point.
As a pilot then, it is my right to know everything about the management and their decisions, to make sure that the company that I work for doesn't end up bankrupt or else and I lose my job.

[Mac the Knife]

Yes, by regular intense scrutiny it may be possible to pick up another Lubitz before he does it.

At the price of driving all the sane pilots nuts or away.

Mac

[Just like with Shipman]

:sad:

[Denti]

Interesting article (http://www.efpa.eu/news/european-(aviation)-psychologists-react-to-crash-german-wings-flight-4u-9525-) by those professionals whose job it probably will be to assess us in the future.

Especially the following paragraphs point at the core problem, the inability to really test for later mental issues.

"EFPA and EAAP underline that psychological assessment and human factors training are among the elements that make aviation the safest form of transport around the world. Together with technical and operational measures they ensure that catastrophic events, like the crash of flight 4U 9525, are highly exceptional. Also, the selection of pilots in Germany, as conducted by DLR, meets the highest professional standards.

Psychological assessment before entry to flight training and before admission to active service by an airline can help to select pilots who are mentally and emotionally prepared for the work and who can handle stressors effectively.

However, it cannot forecast the life events and mental health problems occurring in the life of each individual pilot and the unique way he or she will cope with these."

[Denti]

"I think every serious airline company need to have internal
examination system to prevent from flying people with mental problems".


Good idea, but it's not enough.
The authorities & airline managements must have full access to a pilots,
* financial situation, (mortgage, debts, gambling history)
* marital situation, (married, divorced, separated, dependants)
* personal health history and that of all family members
* lifestyle choices, (gay, cross dresser, transgender, hellfire club membership)
* traffic violations
It's our employers right to know everything about their workers to determine their fitness to fly.

Actually, i could live with that. However, all that information, from everyone who has the right to ever enter a flight deck, has to be available to those that control entry to the flightdeck anyway, the pilots. Dunno about other companies, in my outfit everyone on the operational side of the airline will at some point or another enter the flightdeck. So every pilot, flight attendant, maintenance engineer, everyone from documentation, crew planning, control, revision (they do jumpseat flights), operations office, flight planning, network operation center, the whole management, auditors from the authority, partner airlines, IATA, every crew member of any airline worldwide (as those are allowed to jumpseat) and so on.

Sadly, that will make it impossible, so we have to rely on our judgement, as usual.

[MichaelOLearyGenius]

The AME should be allowed full access to pilots' complete medical records at initial and annual medical examinations.

[vlieger]

I think it is pointless to discuss the technicalities of all of this in too much detail. We need a broader perspective and yes, a social context. How can you see this terrible event in isolation of the race to the bottom of the last few years? The article below describes it aptly as a "sick pilot being a symptom of a sick industry".

Germanwings crash in the Alps: sick pilot a symptom of a sick industry (http://www.marxist.com/germanwings-crash-in-the-alps-sick-pilot-a-symptom-of-a-sick-industry.htm)

Of course, in a PR attempt to be seen to be “doing something”, most airlines, worried about their profit margins and perceptions of the flying public, are now introducing a policy of always having two crew members on the flight deck (already common in the USA). This cheap and immediate measure seems a sensible policy at first sight, but clearly the law of unintended consequences applies here as well. What if the cabin crew member is the rogue member of staff, locks the door, restrains the remaining seated pilot and takes control of the aircraft to nose-dive it into the ground? Somebody with minimal screening on a zero hour contract? (the reality in low-cost airlines, where there is a high turn-over of cabin crew because of the poor working conditions).


Currently, when a pilot is suffering from one of a multitude of situations which is impairing them mentally, from fatigue (very common) to a specific mental condition, there is no adequate support system in place. The perception is that we will be out the door and back on the dole with no hope of returning to work. This is not conducive to the best possible mental state for those sitting at the controls to do their job correctly.


The truth is, a cancer has been eating away for quite some time at the aviation industry as a whole. Low cost airlines have initiated a race to the bottom and through sheer market forces legacy carriers have been forced to follow suit. In order to understand how it came to this we have to go back a few decades.

It is unclear how much Lubitz was aware or involved in all of this. What is clear is that he lived in this social context and became socially alienated to a pathological level. Was it a feeling of lack of control over his own life and future? A hopelessness about nobody caring for him that he could no longer bear? We will probably never know.

We believe it is more useful to provide a general framework of the current state of the aviation industry than what is being spouted in the mass media about this tragedy. It has never been much in the public eye, but pressure has been building up for quite a while now. Morale is at rock bottom in most airlines. Unions are either non-existent or powerless to stem the tide, never mind offer an alternative that can inspire their members (we would suggest taking a good look at London tube drivers). What was once one of the best careers to aspire to is now quickly becoming a laughing stock. Why would anyone bother going through all this drama when the public perception is of a pilot just pushing a few buttons “as these things fly themselves anyway” (nothing could be further from the truth) in some cases to earn less than a train driver?

The point is not to empathise with Lubitz or justify his actions, despicable as they are, but to try and understand why a human being might act this way, so that people can then try to ensure it does not happen so easily again. Within aviation in the last few decades, this has been the goal of aircraft accident investigations: not to apportion blame to any particular individual, but to try to uncover a chain of events in order to draw the lessons. Rather than just throwing our arms in the air and declaring Lubitz was a “madman” or a “rotten apple” living in a social vacuum, our aim should be a lot higher. As such, we cannot see this event in isolation but have to see it within the context of the degeneration of the aviation industry in particular and the prevailing malaise in society in general.

[NigelOnDraft]

vlieger: that link you posted - never did I think I'd read something from a journal titled "Marxist" and applaud it, but the first half I agreed with... will read the rest later.

Originally Posted by caneworm View Post
"I think every serious airline company need to have internal
examination system to prevent from flying people with mental problems".

It's our employers right to know everything about their workers to determine their fitness to fly.There are a few flaws in what you say. Firstly you start with "every serious airline company" and end with "our employers right to know everything ". LH is unusual in that it is a large airline with resources, and as such has been seen as accountable for the pilots' mental health assessment. caneworm's link gives what I think is more accurate:Naturally, airlines select candidates who can deal with those stresses and pressures. For that matter, Lubitz was a product of Lufthansa Flight Training, a prestigious institution that uses the infamous DLR test. This Flight Aptitude and Skills Test is one of the hardest selection procedures in the industry and has a very low pass rate. However, as all current selection procedures, they do not check for mental illness. Sure, psychological profiles are checked, but those simply determine if someone fits into the job and company, not if he or she has a mental illness (as if this would be possible anyway).Even if LH did have the resources and legal right to know everything, make the assessment, a small startup airline with 1 or 2 737s would not... but can still end up as GW.

Health, including mental health, should be a level playing field, and a Class 1 Medical Certificate is, and should be IMO, the sole criteria for "fitness to fly". Reword your post to:"I think every Aircrew Medical authority need to have an examination system to prevent from flying people with mental problems".

It's the Authorities right to know everything about the Pilots to certify and determine their fitness to flyI might agree, albeit how on earth they would achieve it I do not know?

[Wader2]

In my past life we had a positive investigation with a regular review every 5 years. You had to make full disclosure, you were interviewed, your family was interviewed, your friends and bosses were interviewed. The process took about 3 months and was very expensive. And it didn't work.

[DirtyProp]

Interesting article by those professionals whose job it probably will be to assess us in the future.

Especially the following paragraphs point at the core problem, the inability to really test for later mental issues.

"EFPA and EAAP underline that psychological assessment and human factors training are among the elements that make aviation the safest form of transport around the world. Together with technical and operational measures they ensure that catastrophic events, like the crash of flight 4U 9525, are highly exceptional. Also, the selection of pilots in Germany, as conducted by DLR, meets the highest professional standards.

Psychological assessment before entry to flight training and before admission to active service by an airline can help to select pilots who are mentally and emotionally prepared for the work and who can handle stressors effectively.

However, it cannot forecast the life events and mental health problems occurring in the life of each individual pilot and the unique way he or she will cope with these."

But of course.
Looks like we are forgetting that pilots are human.
No human will ever be predictable 100% of the time. Never happened, never will be. If you want total and complete predictability all the time, every time, get a computer.

[NigelOnDraft]

Arranging for a CC to guard the cockpit door when one pilot is unavoidably absent is such a mitigation, which has the added benefits of being immediately available at zero cost. Arguing that it is pointless because it may not guarantee a repeat is a kindergarten reaction.
Really, this is elementary logic. If adding the CC was "zero risk", I might agree.

As the excellent article above states:Of course, in a PR attempt to be seen to be “doing something”, most airlines, worried about their profit margins and perceptions of the flying public, are now introducing a policy of always having two crew members on the flight deck (already common in the USA). This cheap and immediate measure seems a sensible policy at first sight, but clearly the law of unintended consequences applies here as well. What if the cabin crew member is the rogue member of staff, locks the door, restrains the remaining seated pilot and takes control of the aircraft to nose-dive it into the ground? Somebody with minimal screening on a zero hour contract? (the reality in low-cost airlines, where there is a high turn-over of cabin crew because of the poor working conditions).It requires a "risk assessment" of the variables, and a conclusion.

If it was such "elementary logic" why did EASA/CAA require the airlines not only to review their risk assessment, but if they added the "2 in cockpit rule" the added risks of that must be assessed and mitigated?

[Denti]

It might be interesting to remember that Lübitz worked as a flight attendant (as do many other lufthansa students while they wait their three to five years on a flight deck seat). The new policy would have guaranteed him the alone time to do his job much earlier, and he had already glass cockpit flight experience through his flight training as the lufthansa advanced trainer is a Cessna CJ1. Would have been easy to use that crashe axe and then do what he did now, admittedly easier now, but possible without much of a nuisance back then.

And he was properly vetted, had even undergone the procedure of losing his medical, getting it back due to his psych eval that cleared him again after his depression. Now, cabin crews do not get vetted, have only very rudimentary medical check and a very high percentage of muslims compared to the flight deck crew, not that that has anything to do with the current case. But it might have somewhere else.

[Wader2]

Curiously, as it happens, today's paper relates how a rail company has had its licence to operate suspended after two incidents last month when the ran red lights. They had a driver and fireman on the foot plate.

[NigelOnDraft]

Quote: Originally Posted by NoD

If it was such "elementary logic" why did EASA/CAA require the airlines not only to review their risk assessment, but if they added the "2 in cockpit rule" the added risks of that must be assessed and mitigated?

I think you're clutching at straws in a desperate attempt to hold on to unsustainable logic and a failed argumentI would contend I am not "clutching at straws", but quoting the EASA recommendation.

I might suggest you are clutching at straws describing something as "elementary logic" when it explicitly contradicts the EASA recommendation :ooh:

[GXER]

Or just inaction by one mind persuaded so by the other.

Now you're clutching at straws.

So your hypothesis is that a CC, trained and competent to deal with difficult passengers, will be readily persuaded by a rogue pilot to deny re-entry to the other pilot on the grounds of mental incapacity and that the first pilot will then be completely free to take unimpeded action to fly the aircraft into the ground; and all the while the CC is ignoring the pleas of the second pilot to allow re-entry and remains completely accepting of the first pilot's instructions without question or hesitation. Yep, that's really plausible. :rolleyes:

[Ian W]

It doesn't mitigate a thing.

I've posted this before but imagine if Lubitz had persuaded the CC that the captain was acting weird and to not let him back in?

I am constantly surprised by the low opinion 'front crew' have of the 'rear crew'.

Most of the cabin crew are very very aware of the progress of the flight as they have a set number of tasks to carry out in sometimes very brief periods. Starting descent just after level off when the flight attendant is aware that there is an hour to go would be extremely suspicious. All the flight attendant does then is open the door. This becomes extremely likely when the aircraft is in high rate descent approaching mountains.

You also need to take into account that the 'alone in the cockpit' part was needed as most suicides are solitary events.

[skyship007]

Some of you need to read the El Al report about flight deck security, because the Q&A section covered all the possible "What ifs" relating to opening the door. For example, if you have a Wifi method, you will have compromised the security of the flight deck, because some geeky terrorist will just hack the system and open the door.
There is no point swapping one risk factor for another!

[gcal]

'Originally Posted by caneworm
"I think every serious airline company need to have internal
examination system to prevent from flying people with mental problems".


Good idea, but it's not enough.
The authorities & airline managements must have full access to a pilots,
* financial situation, (mortgage, debts, gambling history)
* marital situation, (married, divorced, separated, dependants)
* personal health history and that of all family members
* lifestyle choices, (gay, cross dresser, transgender, hellfire club membership)
* traffic violations
It's our employers right to know everything about their workers to determine their fitness to fly'

A persons sexuality or gender is nothing to do with their ability to fly.
I have known homosexual and lesbian pilots and at least one, extremely capable, transgender pilot.
It is nothing to do with a persons employer and there are strong laws in place to prevent such discrimination.
That you call these things 'lifestyle choices' perhaps says more about you and your own prejudices.

[Ian W]

so you can provide some elementary logic as to why the areas listed above as examples do not need to be protected in a similar fashion ? closing the barn door after the horse has bolted isn't pro-active risk assessment.

if its what public think will make them safe so be it. I don't think and at least hope the public aren't that misinformed though, where there is a will there is a way, as mentioned in the excellent Marxist article.

We just end up becoming a red tape society, like H&S & HR drones ! :(

The areas that you list probably do need to be protected in similar fashion, indeed some are.

However, - if you had not noticed - aviation is held to a higher level of safety than other forms of transport . There have been several occasions when lone pilots have become suicidal and killed their passengers ( ASN News » List of aircraft accidents caused by pilot suicide (http://news.aviation-safety.net/2013/12/22/list-of-aircraft-accidents-caused-by-pilot-suicide/) ) It is less easy to find similar occurrences in other walks of life; the Moorgate train crash 'suicide' claim is just one of the possibilities together with the driver totally losing attention. Also, unfortunately, an aircraft accident will get far more publicity than other accidents. So you are in the spotlight as a 'Sky God' and all you can do is give the school yard response "train drivers are left on their own too"?

This is a problem that the industry must fix. If there is another similar suicide incident in the next year or so, the politicians will take over with mandates and wholly indeterminate regulations with unintended consequences. Individuals or airlines refusing those political mandates would just have their licenses to fly/operate withdrawn. (Note how rapidly BA backed off when 'told' by the CAA to institute 2 in the cockpit) It makes eminent sense for the industry to mitigate the certain hazard of another lone pilot crash before the decision is taken out of the industry's hands.

[Denti]

Starting descent just after level off when the flight attendant is aware that there is an hour to go would be extremely suspicious.

That is actually not all that unusual. Descends and climbs happen, quite often in fact, especially in europes pretty crowded airspace. They usually do know how much time they have for their service, the rest usually not. Had the case once where we climbed to 410 and then had to descend down to 200 right away just to get out of turbulences. Nobody ever asked what we were doing or why we were so low. They never noticed the descend, just that the turbulences weren't as severe anymore.

[Ian W]

That is actually not all that unusual. Descends and climbs happen, quite often in fact, especially in europes pretty crowded airspace. They usually do know how much time they have for their service, the rest usually not. Had the case once where we climbed to 410 and then had to descend down to 200 right away just to get out of turbulences. Nobody ever asked what we were doing or why we were so low. They never noticed the descend, just that the turbulences weren't as severe anymore.

They probably asked no questions as you would have announced what you were doing. However, continuing high rate descent into mountains while keeping the captain locked out would have not gone unnoticed would it :)

[winterymix]

Lubitz may have planned his atrocity years ago, perhaps during the long break in his training. Society doesn't have a good way to ferret out those people without a conscience. Psychologists need to develop those tests. "if an instructor gives you a poor grade on a test, what would you want to do to the instructor if you could get away with it?"

A good first step would to give tests to pilots that would try to determine if pilots have a functioning conscience.

Any objection from the pilots here?

[GXER]

CC in FD is not at all a tentpeg stopper; for instance:
Bad guys infiltrate a number of sleepers who wait, for years if necessary, for opportunity to bludgeon single pilot.Why bother with CC and why wait all that time. Why not train a few people to fly (P2F) and get jobs with carriers. Then there will be lots of easy opportunities to take control and crash the aircraft when the other pilot leave the cockpit. Without a "two person rule", that so many professional flight crew seem so set against, what could be easier?

[Basil]

Why not train a few people to fly (P2F) and get jobs with carriers.
Even if they have the education and ability, it would take about a year and a pile of money to get the frozen ATPL. Then they need the P2F job which won't be with a major.
Much quicker and easier to put a number of CC in position.

[Denti]

Why bother with CC and why wait all that time. Why not train a few people to fly (P2F) and get jobs with carriers. Then there will be lots of easy opportunities to take control and crash the aircraft when the other pilot leave the cockpit. Without a "two person rule", that so many professional flight crew seem so set against, what could be easie

Yup, that would be possible. However, much much more difficult. First you have to be one of the lucky few ones who pass the selection criteria, then the background checks, then you need to upfront 100k€ to train and two years of time in which you have to be perfectly immersed into the target society (weirdos do get reported). Check out the wannabe forums how difficult it is to get that job.

All still possible, but now with just 4 weeks of training, a perfunctory check, no upfront cost at all you know you will be there.

[Ian W]

Even if they have the education and ability, it would take about a year and a pile of money to get the frozen ATPL. Then they need the P2F job which won't be with a major.
Much quicker and easier to put a number of CC in position.

Quick and easy are western traits. How long has it been since 9/11? A strategy to put 'their' pilots into cockpits could be coming to fruition now with 'their' pilots possibly even captains on the smaller airlines.

[Maoraigh1]

(Not an aviation or medical professional.)
Have I missed something? I've seen no mention of this guy's earlier, pre-flying background. School? What the other kids thought? Home? Social status?
The depression diagnosis might be irrelevant/wrong - like flu and Ebola have similar symptoms. The mental state to commit mass murder (without political motive, where you are killing the enemy) seems so uncommon that the medical profession may not have enough data to predict it.

[Sailvi767]

So what everyone seems to want is to have the medical profession determine if pilots are fit to fly both physically and mentally.
Does it bother anyone that we are asking a profession that is unable to police its self and kills more people every year by a order of magnitude then airlines through rampant drug abuse, alcohol abuse and malpractice to police another profession?

[Hotel Tango]

Oddly enough prior to 911 FDs were much less often with only the 2 crew up front. This was down to the fact that there would be regular FD visits from interested passengers, or the jumpseat would be occupied by ATCOs or other aviation related personnel. During my ATC career I spent about 90% of my many flights (as pax) in the FD jumpseat. Sometimes (in certain types) there would even be two of us!

[INeedTheFull90]

For those of you who think recovered pilots who once suffered from depression, or those who suffer it during their careers and recover should never fly again then surely you must support making having a baby disqualifying? I mean perfectly healthy happy people have their lives turned upside down by post natal depression so should women be banned once they have been given birth? After all you never know who is suffering it and many hide it very well.

[WillowRun 6-3]

In an effort to bring a focus onto one component of the large set of issues or problems either (a) created by the GW incident, or (b) put into much starker relief by the incident, the point at which this post is aimed at communicating is that reform of employment-related laws, procedures and regulations is not an unknown animal. Even large-scale reform.

Several statutory examples may be cited (though to make the point, these references are not included here) whereby the laws relating to employment significantly constrain the arbitrary or retaliatory action of an employer, when such employer is confronted by an employee who has taken action of which the employer strongly disapproves. The constant refrain of those posters who, while appearing to support the concept of greater self-reporting in general also withhold stronger support, is that they are convinced the airline company simply would sack (fire, terminate, furlough indefinitely) any pilot who self-reported. So, from a perspective of law reform - which by the way, is somewhat the antithesis of the "do something to reassure the public" because law reform does not happen overnight - from a perspective of wanting to instigate or prompt serious efforts to update and make more effective existing laws, legislating and implementing a solution to the "they'll get sacked, if they self-report" problem is attainable.

But attainable only in the micro sense. A good number of other posters have lamented the sad state of the airline business, and even a well-drafted, wisely implemented, and well-intentioned law reform move will not solve the rest of the problems which demand attention.

[Alain67]

Sir, that is not quite correct. It is not necessarily a sign of mental illness to get destructive/negative thoughts and emotions that lead to suicidal ideation.
We had extensive (and eye watering) education on the difference between a personality disorder and mental illness, and life changing events whenever a service member would off himself (which was far too common, thanks) over the two decades that I was a serving officer.

Unless you define mental illness as "not normal, like me"
Not normal and suicidal are not the same thing.
Not normal doesn't mean mental illness, of course.
But suicide is a serious mental malfunction, thus I might ask you what do you mean by "illness", if it is different ?

[langleybaston]

Suicide MIGHT be a serious mental malfunction, but I believe it is entirely possible to kill oneself as the result of an entirely logical process. For example:

old, tired, ill, going to get worse, no dependants, so lets do it with a minimum of inconvenience to third parties and pain to myself.

Entirely logical I submit.

[ChissayLuke]

Let's step back from the FD door, as a means of prevention. There are probably more posts now on this subject than there were originally from the hypoxia theorists.
ALL that counts is the suitability of the flight deck crew for the job they are required to do. Fly the aircraft from A to B.
Are they mentally fit for purpose? Are they physically fit for purpose?
Are they trained, and current, to meet any scenario that faces them on any particular flight? To the point where there is zero risk of 'pilot error', whatever?

Only then will the travelling, paying public be reassured into placing their trust, lives and faith into their hands.
It would appear that hose who control and enforce such matters are still falling short of their responsibilities.

[mary meagher]

Well, it's up to the lawyers, now! Very likely both Germanwings and Lufthansa will be in serious financial trouble. Lufthansa admits it knew Lubitz was unstable; Germanwings spokesperson disclaimed any prior knowlege at all!

For an airline to escape liability it must prove it was entirely free from blame.

[porterhouse]

. To the point where there is zero risk of 'pilot error', whatever?
There will never be zero risk, thousands fly daily and no one dreams of zero risk. There is no testing, training or pilot selection regime that would assure zero risk. Do you have zero risk when you board a bus, train or cross a street??

[NigelOnDraft]

ALL that counts is the suitability of the flight deck crew for the job they are required to do. Fly the aircraft from A to B.
Are they mentally fit for purpose?Judging from the medical experts above, in that there is no "test" for this, the best you can hope for is "maybe"?

Are they physically fit for purpose?Once per year they are assessed, and certified as "fit for purpose". In between times it is "self assessed". As detailed elsewhere, given the implications of calling in sick in some airlines' HR policies, it would appear quite often "not". And as also detailed elsewhere, frequently fatigued to the same extent as having imbibed in one or 2 alcoholic drinks :sad:

Are they trained, and current, to meet any scenario that faces them on any particular flight?No - no pilot has ever been trained to meet "any scenario". Twice per year in the Sim, and once per year or 2 via Route Check they are assessed in a program set by the regulator.

To the point where there is zero risk of 'pilot error', whatever?Never

Only then will the travelling, paying public be reassured into placing their trust, lives and faith into their hands.Best they get a train timetable then :ok:

It would appear that hose who control and enforce such matters are still falling short of their responsibilities. I personally think the regulators do a pretty good job, but not perfect. But you seem to have some expectation of their responsibilities that far exceeds realism :8

[truescience]

@Sailvi767 yes. Because it is based on the medical model which determines the causes of a person´s problems are located in their body. Whenever the true cause is outside, for example, in regulations or relationships between people, prescribing drugs can only eliminate the present symptoms and trigger new ones.

"A 2010-survey by the Norwegian public service broadcaster, NRK, revealed that half of the pilots have fallen asleep or dozed off while on duty, with almost 4 out of 5 pilots stating they have felt too tired to be in the cockpit."
https://www.eurocockpit.be/stories/20121105/barometer-on-pilot-fatigue

[rantanplane]

Well, it's up to the lawyers, now! Very likely both Germanwings and Lufthansa will be in serious financial trouble. Lufthansa admits it knew Lubitz was unstable; Germanwings spokesperson disclaimed any prior knowlege at all!

For an airline to escape liability it must prove it was entirely free from blame.

1. Still all up to investigations and filing the facts. For the next months.
2. Germanwings belongs entirely to LH.
3. Lufthansa flight school knew about a phase of depression during his time becoming a professional pilot. Apparently the actual flight management did not know he was still "unstable" these days.
4. And he wasn't unstable according his colleagues but rather a good pilot.
5. Germany is not the UK, not such a blame society there. Innocent until proven guilty as far as I am aware.

People who do up simplified and ignorant comments like this should better watch out the next Lubitz could be from one of their friends or family.

[Carjockey]

The question seems to be, how do you effectively assess a persons ability to fly a passenger aircraft reliably and safely?

People develop their character and become 'professional' through training and experience.

When they become truly professional they understand that once in the driving seat (so to speak) any personal or outside influences are a big no-no and are not a factor in the performance of their work.

Training in any industry should not simply be focused on teaching a skill but also in building character. That means a tough (not to say ruthless) training schedule designed to weed out those who don't have what it takes at an early stage.

Does the present day airline industry have such a training schedule?

[Leightman 957]

The many mentions of possible investigative intrusions into every aspect of a pilots life represent more ways a pilot may be incorrectly deemed unfit to fly. Those intrusions are all valid because we can think of cases where they have been valid. But each new one also represents another possible step up in pilot apprehension about how he is being viewed by his employers, each new one representing an additional level of distrust. One distinction that has repeatedly cropped up in posts is that suicide and murder usually do not have the same personality profiles, but there are at least some cases where they do.

The trait of empathy has come up a few times and needs to be emphasized more because empathy enables social responsibility, and lack of it weakens social responsibility. I would guess (but don't know) that the probability of lack of empathy was higher in people where suicide was combined with murder. Unlike some other traits, I think empathy or weakness can be revealed in mental assessments. Those with more knowledge I should speak up about this.

However it appears clear that there was more involved than simple murder here. This was an act of anger and retribution made in isolation against something about which we so far have virtually no information on.

It's amazing how easy it is to find exceptions to all of the suggestions for improvements. An evaluation including empathy also has flaws as possibly/probably the case of Egyptair 990, where a last minute blowup having powerful repercussions on the pilot probably precipitated an action he would not otherwise have taken. Without that bit of information about 990's pilot, the question of possible motivation was quite a mystery. With that bit the scenario of a sudden decision to throw away a lifetime's work and an imminent and comfortable retirement becomes at least somewhat plausible and less mysterious. The same kind of thing may have occurred in the GW case that made him pick this flight, or any flight at all. Just because there is intention, planning, and motivation doesn't mean final action always results. If that was true there would be a lot more instances of violence of every kind than there are. We can hope that there might be some additional suggestions of this possibility in the CVR portions not yet released, or that other figures in the GW pilot's social circle may yet come up with more information. It is a little odd that quotes by people who knew this person have been so very few. So far he doesn't seem to have had a social life outside of flying glider, which we need to recall is a group activity. However it is unfortunately also easy to come up with last minute pilot pressures that do not involve last minute relational blowups. Every new slice of preventive cheese being suggested has its own set of holes.

[Wader2]

Tat quotes by people who knew this person have been so very few. So far he doesn't seem to have had a social life outside of flying glider, which we need to recall is a group activity. However it is unfortunately also easy to come up with last minute pilot pressures that do not involve last minute relational blowups. Every new slice of preventive cheese being suggested has its own set of holes.

Is it possible that some people show discretion and reserve their evidence for the official enquiry?

PS
Maxred, we only know what was leaked.

[maxred]

Is it possible that some people show discretion and reserve their evidence for the official enquiry?

Oh if only that could be the case. Discretion, reservation, tact, humility, sorry not in this case. If one reads most of the 150 pages on here, and then watch the news, and look at the newspapers, it is apparently all a done deal. This despite, very limited, actual evidence. But where did the truth count in life?

[west lakes]

FACT (through knowing someone is affected)

Not all those with mental illnesses are suicidal

Not all those who are suicidal have mental illnesses

Those that have mental illness, or not, may think about suicide but never go through with it.
Or may suddenly decide at very short notice to go through with it.

A difficult position for those that have some idea about the issues, impossible position to those that have no idea, react to media comments or think they are reacting to public views!!

[A0283]

Accident to the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX, flight GWI18G, on 24 March 2015

INFORMATION ON 3 APRIL 2015

The aeroplane's Flight Data Recorder (FDR) was brought to the BEA's premises yesterday evening. The BEA team started opening operations as soon as it arrived.

The initial readout shows that the pilot present in the cockpit used the autopilot to put the aeroplane into a descent towards an altitude of 100 ft then, on several occasions during the descent, the pilot modified the autopilot setting to increase the speed of the aeroplane in descent.

Work is continuing to establish the precise history of the flight.

[Mr Optimistic]

Pax here. Puzzled by all the discussion about the subtleties of suicidal tendencies. This guy was a mass murderer and a suicide. Suicidal isn't the whole picture.

[Random Number]

I'm a passenger, so can't contribute to the technical aspects of this discussion, but I did want to add my personal view.

When I take a taxi, I trust the driver to not swerve into oncoming traffic. When I take a bus, I trust the driver. When I take a train, I trust the driver.

And when I fly, I trust the pilot. I also trust the maintenance engineers, the air traffic controllers, the manufacturers and their assembly technicians, and their subcontractors, inspectors, etc, etc. I trust all these people to have put together a package and service that will get me from A to B, safely.

This trust existed before this crash, and it exists today. I would fly Germanwings tomorrow if I had to, because I'm trust it's staffed by good people and good pilots who do a professional job.

Given enough samples and enough time, travel by any means (even walking) will encounter a fatal event. Sometimes with a technical root-cause and sometime with a human one. Internally triggered or externally. It's a statistical certainty, but you can't live your life afraid.

Flying remains incredibly safe. Things happen, rarely, and when they do we must all take a moment for those that were affected, and ask the questions that must be asked. Sometimes there are things that can make a material difference in future outcomes, but sometimes it comes down to just bad luck and statistics.

I'd love to get a flight deck tour mid-flight, but... you know... regular people are crazy, and I feel over the years people are getting even more so. Maybe people have always been crazy and it's just camera phones and youtube that now we're seeing more examples. Although it's a shame, I prefer the pilots behind a locked door.

TL;DR: I trust pilots.

[ChissayLuke]

Nigelondraft, your response to my post typifies the mediocrity that currently exists.
And you offer some, predictable, crashing glimpses of the obvious.
It can be better than this. And 150 or so now dead people, their relations and friends have a right to expect it to be so.
Visit not your simplistic, mediocratic views on me, please. This is Aviation. And it can, and should be Better.

[Twiglet1]

Germanwings passenger reveals pilot on Berlin to Paris flight gave pre-takeoff speech | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3024288/Germanwings-passenger-reveals-pilot-gave-pre-flight-speech-row-look-eye-calm-nerves.html)

Nice work

[steve611]

"Training in any industry should not simply be focused on teaching a skill but also in building character."

The General Medical Council in the UK think that this is something to be introduced to doctors training in the light that their investigations have resulted in at least 28 suicides while under investigation by them.

Push hard and you will break committed individuals, You might well break more than you had already.

[2dPilot]

How are pilot candidates tested today?

Around 40 years ago I applied to BOAC to become a pilot, along with 1,000s of other applicants. I passed two selection stages down at Eastleigh.

Besides the math & English tests, I will always recall the day we had 1000 yes/no questions to do in - IIRC - a couple of hours. Simple yes/no questions on the face of it, one I especially recall "Do you like tall women?"

On the face of it this test seemed simple until you realised that batches of questions were being repeated, in slightly different order, or with new questions interlaced. And, one couldn't recall with any certainty what had been answered 10 paged back, or even if I would agree with my previous answer in the light of new questions! The time limit precluded any possibility of looking back through the questions/answers.

I can only assume this was a mixture of 'Psych' test and a stress test.

Do pilot applicants today go through anything like those rigorous tests we did?

As it turned out, the fuel crisis of the 1970s' and being just pre all the war-time pilots retiring, BOAC had 'very limited' need for pilots and took less than 100 that year and I wan not amongst them.

[737er]

Here is an article written by a psychiatrist on the subject:

Andreas Lubitz, Psychiatry, and the Germanwings Disaster - The New Yorker (http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/no-psychiatry-could-not-have-prevented-the-germanwings-disaster)

[737er]

Germanwings plane forced to land in Venice after fears over cabin crew member's health | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/travel_news/article-3025410/Germanwings-plane-forced-land-Venice-passenger-cabin-crew-member-suffered-acute-feeling-sickness-flight.html)


Here is a prime example of inaccurate and completely unresponsible reporting.

The headlines reads that two emergency landings were performed.

One was a precautionary engine shutdown and the other was a standard medical diversion. (Almost certainly caused by the mass illogical fear and panic the media propagates). There was no emergency landing.


In both cases, as usual, the pilots performed splendidly.

I'm for freedom of the press, but when will we somehow cease to allow hacks like this from praying on public fears to sell advertising spots?

One of these so-called emergency landings was almost certainly created by the media. Instead they should be covering heart disease and car crashes in the same proportion as to which they are killing the public.

[CloudB]

re post #3144 "People develop their character and become 'professional' through training and experience. " Exactly.

"Training in any industry should not simply be focused on teaching a skill but also in building character." Right on.

"Does the present day airline industry have such a training schedule?"

Maybe. Sometimes. Maybe not. It depends on the specific airline and it's plans.

Lufthansa has trained their pilots Ab-Initio since 1955, so they got their schedule figured out pretty much to their liking.
Then, Lufthansa switched to the Multi Crew Pilot License program in 2008, as noted.
The MPL training schedule at LFT is the following: (212.5 sim, 99 hrs aircraft, course length 23 months)
- Ground school 813 hrs, like ATPL ground school
- Core phase 87 hrs aircraft with 20 hrs solo flight time and 3.5 hrs upset recovery training included. FNPT II 28.5 hrs
- Basic phase 12 hrs aircraft CJ1+. FNPT II CJ1+/MCC 100 hrs
- Intermediate phase FFS A320/B737 20 hrs
- Advanced phase FFS 64 A320/B737/EMB 64 hrs
- LT 12 TO/LDG
- IOE 40-60 sectors

Out of 1326 MPL students 528 MPL graduates produced as of May 2014.

As an alternative and new system of training, the MPL program has not yet come under careful scrutiny and evaluation. Most people have not even heard of it, have not met any MPL holders, and those that have cannot relate, or don't even give a second thought. Although, the MPL program may prove to have merits, it will also carry hindrances. To put it bluntly, it's a corporate experiment, and the participants are corporate guinea pigs.

[ChissayLuke]

Interesting that in today's news, the head of Lufthansa appears to be making a strong apology for the 'accident'. And separately, the German aviation authority has been criticised for its under-scrutiny of aircrews.
The latter should, imho, have been in the public domain before now. I wonder if any other authorities are similarly underperforming.

[CaptainEmad]

Nigelondraft, your response to my post typifies the mediocrity that currently exists..

ChissayLuke,
Yes, 149 innocent people have been murdered by the hands of a 'pilot'.
We are all searching for answers to this unbelievable crime, but...

Unrealistic, out-of-touch suggestions such as yours deserve clear, simple (not simplistic) explanations as to why simplistic knee-jerk solutions are unlikely to improve the safety of the public.

Safer air transport is a work-in-progress. We are always improving our understanding of what causes crashes. The large effort that has gone into improving safety the last 50 years or so is one we should be immensely proud of. No mediocrity there.

PS Your suggestion that pilots should be trained 'to meet every scenario' helps me to understand the depth of knowledge you may or may not have about the subject. :rolleyes:

[737er]

737er

May I suggest you stop reading the Daily Mail, which thrives on appeals to lower common denominators. There's much better out there to choose from.



Tom,

Good suggestion. It was probably a poor choice in media to frame my point but that story with all the same hype is running all over the place.

The media exploits our collective risk illiteracy and the result is less overall public safety than if they were to cover real risk, even if it were just in approximate proportion.

It's making the public neurotic about things they should have confidence in and that detracts from addressing more deadly risks.

[Ian W]

How are pilot candidates tested today?

Around 40 years ago I applied to BOAC to become a pilot, along with 1,000s of other applicants. I passed two selection stages down at Eastleigh.

Besides the math & English tests, I will always recall the day we had 1000 yes/no questions to do in - IIRC - a couple of hours. Simple yes/no questions on the face of it, one I especially recall "Do you like tall women?"

On the face of it this test seemed simple until you realised that batches of questions were being repeated, in slightly different order, or with new questions interlaced. And, one couldn't recall with any certainty what had been answered 10 paged back, or even if I would agree with my previous answer in the light of new questions! The time limit precluded any possibility of looking back through the questions/answers.

I can only assume this was a mixture of 'Psych' test and a stress test.



It was a psychological test, also - at the time - known as a 'speed test'. In the long distance past it was one of my 'majors' specialist subjects.

There is a lot of work put into designing those tests. Asking questions twice with different semantics that 'beg' a particular but different response will flag up those who are trying to 'look good' in their answers. Others will ask questions that cannot be true such as: True or False - I am always early for meetings. Again shows up someone wanting to answer what they believe is wanted. These questions are added to what Eysenck called a 'lie scale' once the value on the lie scale goes above a certain level then the subject fails the test.

There are 'spot the odd one out' questions where every one of the 5 examples could be the odd one out dependent on how your brain works. (imagine a list of animals - each odd one out: only single syllable word, only word that is more than 7 characters, only bird, only domesticated, only carnivorous etc etc) These are very very hard to create.

The 'subject' is then given say 120 seconds to answer 100 mixed questions and told that the number answered is one of the test criteria. Just reading the test may take 3 minutes, so you know that the subject cannot finish but the point is to not have them give considered answers.

These days the tests are more likely to be flashed up or scrolled on a computer screen at a particular rate which provides a similar metric.

These tests will not identify empathy, sociopathic tendencies etc. There are tests that can do that as there are brain scans that can show potential sociopaths. But these tests are not very effective. For example not all sociopaths will be picked up by the tests and scans and some that are picked up are demonstrably not sociopathic. So there are many false positives and false negatives.

Anyone putting their faith in tests of emotions and mental states of subjects will be sorely disappointed. They are far more likely to be counter productive by alienating the flight crew community.

[Rockhound]

Thank you, 737er, for posting that piece from The New Yorker by psychiatrist Gary Greenberg. I'm no psychiatrist or psychologist but there's no mistaking good common sense, of which you can never get enough. Kudos to Mr Greenberg!
I hope Lufthansa and Germanwings will not be pilloried to kingdom come.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

I am constantly surprised by the low opinion 'front crew' have of the 'rear crew'.

Most of the cabin crew are very very aware of the progress of the flight as they have a set number of tasks to carry out in sometimes very brief periods. Starting descent just after level off when the flight attendant is aware that there is an hour to go would be extremely suspicious. All the flight attendant does then is open the door. This becomes extremely likely when the aircraft is in high rate descent approaching mountains.

You also need to take into account that the 'alone in the cockpit' part was needed as most suicides are solitary events.

Don't put words into my mouth. I do not have a low opinion of cabin crew.

How many crew have you spoken to about this recently? I've asked four if they'd know what I was doing and how to stop me and ALL of them admitted they wouldn't have a clue. They wouldn't open the door if I asked them not to. The two person in the FD rule will not stop a recurrence of Lubitz.

And I'm speaking as someone who has flown for two airlines who have had the two person rule since 9/11 and I don't have a problem with it.

[Ian W]

I expect we will have to agree to disagree, I would have thought with the captain outside asking to be let in, screaming/panicking flight attendants and passengers (probably visible to the cockpit flight attendant) and the aircraft in rapid descent toward mountains, most flight attendants in the cockpit would take a little more reassurance than you telling them not to let the captain in. Indeed, I would think it would be extremely unlikely now that they would not let the captain in after Lubitz flew the GermanWings A320 into the ground. That's what happens when you have lost people's trust.

[DirtyProp]

who pays the pilots salaries on a commercial airliner? So with all respect the guests on board have a right to have a sane brain sitting in the cockpit.
Yes, absolutely.
But ridiculous expectations like pilots trained for any possible scenario and no risk at all? Please.

[timmermc]

According to the German newspaper "Welt Am Sonntag". http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article139148626/Die-Lufthansa-und-ihre-Aerzte-sind-in-Erklaerungsnot.html

Laut EU-Verordnung 1178/2011, die seit April 2013 auch in Deutschland umgesetzt ist, müssen Fliegerärzte das Amt von einer Depression informieren und den Fall ans LBA verweisen. Nun können die Lufthansa-Fliegerärzte zwar behaupten, L. sei geheilt gewesen, so dass es keinen Grund mehr für eine Verweisung gegeben habe. Aber es gab ja immer noch den SIC-Eintrag in der Lizenz. Ganz gleich, wie man es wendet: Es sieht nicht gut aus für die Lufthansa und ihre Ärzte.

Translation

According to the EU Regulation 1178/2011, which is implemented in Germany since April 2013 Aeromedical Examiners must inform the Office of a depression and refer the case to the LBA. Now the Lufthansa Flyer doctors can indeed say that L. had been healed, so that there was no reason for referral. But there was still the SIC entry in the license. No matter how you turn it: It does not look good for Lufthansa and their physicians.

[ChissayLuke]

'ridiculous expectations'?
Hardly.
Seems an entry-level requirement to me.
Would any genuine commercial pilot beg to differ?

[Denti]

According to the EU Regulation 1178/2011, which is implemented in Germany since April 2013 Aeromedical Examiners must inform the Office of a depression and refer the case to the LBA. Now the Lufthansa Flyer doctors can indeed say that L. had been healed, so that there was no reason for referral. But there was still the SIC entry in the license. No matter how you turn it: It does not look good for Lufthansa and their physicians.

The physicians actually have nothing to do with it. They do not see the license and don't need to. They do see the medical which is the only place that should carry the SIC entry, which it didn't in Lübitz' case. The german LBA is sometimes not working to its rules, in my first EASA license they had my medical restrictions entered as well, in the next one i got issued half a year later they were gone and remain solely in the medical where they belong.

An SIC entry in the license is just an "for information only" and not binding, the only place where it is binding is in the medical. The EASA license doesn't have an expiration date whereas the medical has.

[Klauss]

Questions:

a) in the beginning, there was a reference that an oxygen-mask was worn by the copilot.
>>> has that been confirmed, or not ?

b) in some german news, it was stated he wanted to marry soon.
>>> confirmed, true, or rumor ?

Thanks.

[NigelOnDraft]

Would any genuine commercial pilot beg to differ? Yes... if someone who has just done 6+hrs LHS A320 today satisfies your criteria?

I refer back to my previous post (which you described as 'mediocrity') to give, IMO, an accurate response to your points.

Since you either did not like or understand my response, please could you expand on your post's questions:A: Are they mentally fit for purpose?
B: Are they physically fit for purpose?
C: Are they trained, and current, to meet any scenario that faces them on any particular flight?
D: To the point where there is zero risk of 'pilot error', whatever?
E: It would appear that those who control (who?) and enforce (who?) such matters are still falling short of their responsibilities (which are?). e.g. by saying how you think they either are, or should be conducted?

The genuine passengers I met today expressed their thanks for their flights today, and getting them to their destinations safely and comfortably. I saw no sign of the lack of trust expressed by "passengers who pay our wages" on here ;)

[Sky Wave]

The genuine passengers I met today expressed their thanks for their flights today, and getting them to their destinations safely and comfortably. I saw no sign of the lack of trust expressed by "passengers who pay our wages" on here

Absolutely. I also believe that this very sad event has made our passengers appreciate us more. On the few flights that I've operated since the event far more passengers than usual are expressing their thanks and coming out with statements like "Thank You for getting us home safely"

[rottenray]

Yes... if someone who has just done 6+hrs LHS A320 today satisfies your criteria?

The genuine passengers I met today expressed their thanks for their flights today, and getting them to their destinations safely and comfortably. I saw no sign of the lack of trust expressed by "passengers who pay our wages" on here ;)


I consider myself to be one of those genuine pax you're speaking of, and this crash hasn't altered my opinion of pilots and safety one bit. I know I have more to fear from the average idiot on the highway.

The FA stepping in for a pilot leaving the flight deck seems to be working fine in the US, and it might provide a small deterrent in some cases.

Better screening might help as well.

After all, every little bit helps - and as someone up-thread mentioned, air safety is a work in progress.

[goldfish85]

I have been asked many times in the past week about why don't we screen you pilots to avoid this kind of problem. I simply report what the Aerospace Medical Association says. (This is the professional society for flight surgeons.)

Following a March 27, 2012, incident in which a pilot of a major commercial airline experienced a serious disturbance in his mental health, the Aerospace Medical Association formed an Ad Hoc Working Group on Pilot Mental Health. The working group met several times and analyzed current medical standards for evaluating pilot mental health. The result of the working group was a letter sent to the FAA and other organizations worldwide interested in mental standards. The Committee found that it is neither productive nor cost effective to perform extensive psychiatric evaluations as part of the routine pilot aeromedical assessment. However it did recommend greater attention be given to mental health issues be aeromedical examiners, especially to the more common and detectable mental health conditions and life stressors than can affect pilots and flight performance. They encouraged this through increased education and global recognition of the importance of mental health in aviation safety.
published in Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine: 83, 2012, pp 1185-1186

[highflyer40]

Everyone keeps referring to the U.S. In regards to it works there, so why not use it elsewhere. As has been posted on here at least twice, there is a study of US pilots where it is shown that only about 25% of US pilots actually following the rule about having 2 person on the flight deck at any given time.

[Bill G Kerr]

If only 25% of US pilots obey the 2 in the cockpit rule..... it still seems to work!

[uffington sb]

It seems that some non US airlines have it as SOP. We came back from Goa in a A320 before the GW incident and a CC member went into the FD and a pilot came out and used the toilet. She came out of the FD as he went back in.

[framer]

most flight attendants in the cockpit would take a little more reassurance than you telling them not to let the captain in.
I've asked three flight attendants to open the door when the F/O was ready to come back in. Not one of them could do it. 100% fail rate of the new system. I'll keep asking but I don't think the stats will improve until the new procedure requires training of the flight attendants.
This says quite a lot about the implementation of the new procedure, and the motivation for it's existence.

[de facto]

So what you are saying it that your cabin crews so far were unable to turn a door knob and open it??

[framer]

Yip.
All I said was , you let him in, it's good practice. To a person they all started looking for a switch in the center consol, one couldn't find it, the other two found it but could not operate it even when aware of which way it needed to be moved. Not one of them thought about the door knob.
I then talked them through it and everyone was happy. Isn't it interesting though that there is no requirement to give them any instruction in how to carry out their new role? That is my main point, the whole thing is window dressing. If management thought there was any real risk of losing an aircraft and that the new procedure might mitigate the risk, there would be training.

[de facto]

Oh boy..
In the scenario of one pilot in his/her seat and a cabin crew standing behind,if the CA hand starts to wander around the center pedestal it would be a direct slap on the hand.
There is no need for them to manipulate that switch really,unless you let them seat on either pilot seat which is a big no no.
Ill get my coat...

[Ian W]

Yip.
All I said was , you let him in, it's good practice. To a person they all started looking for a switch in the center consol, one couldn't find it, the other two found it but could not operate it even when aware of which way it needed to be moved. Not one of them thought about the door knob.
I then talked them through it and everyone was happy. Isn't it interesting though that there is no requirement to give them any instruction in how to carry out their new role? That is my main point, the whole thing is window dressing. If management thought there was any real risk of losing an aircraft and that the new procedure might mitigate the risk, there would be training.

Then it is up to you to provide that training - a few seconds in your preflight brief would be all that is needed. If, or perhaps when, there is another Lubitz the airline involved will go the way of PanAm and TWA and politicians will get involved and then everyone will lose.

[DirtyProp]

'ridiculous expectations'?
Hardly.
Seems an entry-level requirement to me.
Would any genuine commercial pilot beg to differ?

Sorry to burst your bubble, but your expectations are unrealistic and, frankly, ridiculous.
Life is unpredictable, and so is air travel.
No 2 flights are exactly alike, and even if they are similar to each other for 99.9%, there will always be something unusual or unexpected.
And that's exactly the reason why we have humans in the cockpit and not computers. With so many variables playing in every flight, it is downright impossible to predict every possible scenario like you suggest.
If we could do that, pilots would be replaced by computers already. That might happen, but not anytime soon.
I suggest you review your expectations.

[Basil]

the CA hand starts to wander around the center pedestal
Agreed, a VERY dangerous route to follow.

[mickjoebill]

Yip.
All I said was , you let him in, it's good practice. To a person they all started looking for a switch in the center consol, one couldn't find it, the other two found it but could not operate it even when aware of which way it needed to be moved. Not one of them thought about the door knob.
I then talked them through it and everyone was happy. Isn't it interesting though that there is no requirement to give them any instruction in how to carry out their new role?

So you set up fellow workers? To what end? To belittle them?
You and your airline put cc in a position they were locked in without training to carryout their duties.

[PrivtPilotRadarTech]

That's unbelievable. This is serious business, but not rocket science. People who are trained and trusted to manage the evacuation of a burning aircraft should also be trained and trusted to handle "two in the cockpit" duties. Those should be thought out by experts, just as the emergency evacuation procedures are.

[framer]

Then it is up to you to provide that training - a few seconds in your preflight brief would be all that is needed.
Thanks for the tip. Strangely enough that's exactly what I have been doing lately. I'm 99% sure that not all crew are getting this 'training' though. My point remains, management don't believe in this policy, if they did it would be trained like all other procedures.

So you set up fellow workers? To what end? To belittle them?

Calm down Mick, everything is ok. I am actually one of those Flight crew who really does care about c/c and I have more than once gone in to bat for them against managers who use bullying tactics against them. The sole purpose of them being there is to open the door, I gave them a shot at practicing it and then talked them through it, nobody felt belittled so you'l have to find another topic to wring your hands over.

[RatherBeFlying]

What’s become clear over the past 30 years of research is that there’s virtually always a personal grievance that will start a person on a pathway to mass murder

http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/science/the-mind-of-those-who-kill-and-kill-themselves.html

[Pace]

That's unbelievable. This is serious business, but not rocket science. People who are trained and trusted to manage the evacuation of a burning aircraft should also be trained and trusted to handle "two in the cockpit" duties. Those should be thought out by experts, just as the emergency evacuation procedures are.

i agree 100% with that comment but would add that only CC who have worked for the airline for 3 plus years should be eligable for flight deck duties that will help close another potential threat from relatively unknown CC

[Ollie Onion]

I don't think it is mean to question the crew. I asked a Cabin Manager a couple of days ago what the purpose of being in the flight deck was. She thought it was to keep an eye on me, she wasn't sure what she was watching out for :ugh:. The point is that the Cabin Crew have NOT received any guidance on what they are actually doing in the flight deck. I then went on to ask what she would do if I told her that I was going to lock the FO out as I wasn't happy with his behaviour, she said that she guessed that would be o.k., she changed her mind when I asked if she would then be happy if I started descending to divert the aircraft. It was a very valuable conversation because it has caused her to have a good think about the potential situations she could find herself and it showed me that the current policy is a total joke and there for public comfort only. At that time she is now authorised to be the most important person on the aircraft as the company expects that she should over rule the CAPTAIN and open the door if she thinks it is not right.

[Pace]

Yet mental health experts who study mass murder-suicides said that depression and thoughts of suicide, which are commonplace, fall far short of explaining such drastic and statistically rare acts.


Timothy J. McVeigh was spurred by anger at the government to blow up a federal building in 1995.

“People want an easily graspable handle to help understand this, to blame something or scapegoat,” said Dr. James L. Knoll, the director of forensic psychiatry at the State University of New York Upstate Medical University.

But to zero in on depression is “a low-yield dead end,” he said, adding, “There’s something fundamentally different here, aside and apart from the depression, and that’s where we need to look.”

Serious mental illness, studies of mass killers suggest, is a prime driver in a minority of cases — about 20 percent, according to estimates by several experts. Far more common are distortions of personality — excesses of rage, paranoia, grandiosity, thirst for vengeance or pathological narcissism and callousness.

“The typical personality attribute in mass murderers is one of paranoid traits plus massive disgruntlement,” said Dr. Michael Stone, a forensic psychiatrist in New York who recently completed a study of 228 mass killers, many of whom also killed themselves.

At last some sense and why knee jerk reactions and mass examination and intrusion into pilots personal lives is a waste of time AND AN INFRINGEMENT OF PILOTS HUMAN RIGHTS without identifying the particular personality trait that can murder and plan the murder of 150 people! Depressed people don't do that. As stated above serious mental illness only accounts for 20% of mass murderers indicating that 80% will have no sign of serious mental illness. So where do you go from there filtering out suspect pilots ?

[vctenderness]

I am pretty certain that cabin Crew recurrent training from now on will include some form of training on this subject.

It will possibly form part of the CRM section that pilots and cabin crew attend together, at least in BA they do.

[Ian W]

Despite its extremely low probability the GermanWings crash was the instantiation of the greatest fear of many pax. Knowing that you are about to die for several minutes and not being able to do anything about it.

Out of the woodwork come the geeks and avionics manufacturers seeing a large market open up

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/science/planes-without-pilots.html?_r=0

These ideas will be proceeded with if the industry does not have a defined and non-cosmetic response.

[IcePack]

Certainly advise that a long term career in aviation may not materialise if NY article comes to fruition

[evansb]

There are plenty of 19 pax airliners operating with NO cockpit door, and NO Flight Attendant. What do you propose to do about that? Plus many biz-jet terminals have NO passenger screening, allowing all manner of psychopaths, socio-paths, and manic depressive types to fly all over the world. Personally, I don't think ANYTHING should been done about it, but I'm sure this will keep several (many) pundits awake at night worrying that the sky is about to fall.

[za9ra22]

First post - and undoubtedly not as helpful as I imagine, but as a passenger this incident has not reduced my trust in the skills of professional pilots, and their ability to get me safely to my destination - this despite the certain knowledge that with the right circumstances, something similar will happen again.

Which in a way is the whole point, because with due respect to posters who have made a range of thought provoking contributions to the question of the second person on the flight deck, perhaps the pertinent issue here is that of circumstance.

There’s very little credible doubt that Lubitz deliberately crashed the aircraft, but despite lots of conjecture, no clear motive as to why. Without that motive, the root cause of his actions, it isn’t possible to target future preventative actions aimed at weeding out the potentially dangerous entrants to the profession, or in identifying them and mitigating the threat once they are already qualified and flying. What you can do however is change the circumstances in-flight which may contribute to not just a decision to deliberately crash a plane, but also help facilitate it happening.

It is not true that all acts of extreme behavior are conducted in private, but it is true that most perpetrators of such acts have waited for the right circumstances to fit their needs and intents. In this instance, nothing could have served Lubitz’s needs and intents better than an empty flight deck, and his actions as we know them appear to demonstrate that he needed or wanted to be isolated and alone to do what he did.

Would he have seen a member of the cabin crew present as a deterrent? We can’t know for sure, but we can know that it would not have allowed him to act in isolation, nor with certainty that he was going to succeed, when that crew member could have opened the door at any time for the aircraft commander to re-enter the flight deck. A crew member on the flight deck with him would have changed the circumstance, and thus dynamic of the situation, to something certain to be less constructive to his intent, and that may have been enough to save 149 innocent lives on this occasion, either by deterring Lubitz from his planned (or unplanned) actions or by letting the commander back on the flight deck in time.

What seems certain is that if another Lubitz in the same frame of mind were to be left alone on the flight deck again, the result would be more loss of life. If another crew member present were to save even only one in ten of those flights, it would be hard to argue against the policy.

Of course, that raises the question of how competent cabin crew members may be to identify and resolve such difficult circumstances, and I can only speak as a passenger with far more experience of cabin crew than of pilots, but I find them remarkably capable of handling problematic and stressful situations and difficult people with speed and efficiency. For sure they wouldn’t know how to operate controls on the flight deck, and it wouldn’t be reasonable to expect that capability, but from having to deal with the traveling public in such numbers and confined spaces, they seem very capable of sizing up people when they need to. I would trust (most, at least) to grasp what is happening on the flight deck in the kind of situation we have seen happen here.

[AirScotia]

Speaking as a passenger, I'm more reassured by the two-person cockpit idea than the professionals on here seem to be.

I think most situations where a single individual is given private, unmonitored power over the lives of other humans is inherently dangerous. There will always be a small proportion of people for whom the temptation to abuse that power may become irresistible at certain times - look at doctors, nurses, and the police. Almost all of the biggest scandals happened because the person concerned was handed a high degree of trust on account of their profession, and could operate in privacy.

Another human being in the cockpit does not guarantee that a rogue pilot won't smilingly put the plane into a calculated descent. However, it reduces the opportunity. The rogue pilot is likely to have to make conversation with the crew member - thus reducing the time to do something naughty - or will have some concern that the CC has flying skills and can see the naughtiness being done, or will find it necessary to maintain the mask that covers the psychosis.

Of course, the presence of CC does not guarantee that the rogue pilot won't smash his colleague's head with an iPad and do bad things. But it certainly doesn't increase the chances, and that's the best that can be hoped for.

Edited to add: I see I'm in agreement with fellow passenger ZA9RA22.

[holdatcharlie]

As a non-pilot I would be interested to know from those at the front end how isolated from the pax you feel? There you are, stuck right at the front, in a very confined space, your office - right on the top floor. You have no rear-view mirror, just windows looking forward (OK some side windows too). Do you sometimes forget about the pax - particularly on long-haul - fast asleep in the back?

I ask this as I wonder whether Lubitz was aware of anyone else but himself (and the pilot)? Do you think he might have just sat there thinking: 'this is it'. He was all alone, in his own little world. Then he locked the door, shut out the rest of the world, set the controls and maybe took something to relax or render himself unconscious?

I'm trying here to separate the suicidal from the mass murderer.

But then, if he did feel like that, he could simply have taken his glider up for one last time....

[Pace]

ian

I always find it amazing that you guys will turn up for a flight with a complete stranger climbing in with you!

It is so far removed from my world.

Yet I understand you are all trained to one standard making such a situation possible.

that is not the way it used to be with crews flying together for years. It had its advantages but also disadvantages.

I just wonder whether the Captain and Lubitz had spent nights out and days together as well as flying together many times whether he would have become very suspicious that something was seriously not right with the guy? and taken his concerns higher or at least to have not trusted him alone?

i am not suggesting putting solid crews together but at least rostering crews so the FO and Captain at least know each other from previous trips and can quickly sum up the character of the guy they are flying with his weaknesses strengths and life events going on? Intuition is a very strong friend

I ask this as I wonder whether Lubitz was aware of anyone else but himself (and the pilot)? Do you think he might have just sat there thinking: 'this is it'. He was all alone, in his own little world. Then he locked the door, shut out the rest of the world, set the controls and maybe took something to relax or render himself unconscious?

Absolutely not!! The Police found that Lubitz has been researching the door locking mechanism on his computer days earlier so had plenty of time to consider what he was about to do to the 150 people on that aircraft! his Girlfriend had reported that he told her he was going to change the face of aviation!!

This was totally a premeditated and planned murder and destruction of himself

[wiggy]

Ian W

Constituted crews have significant advantages as well as the potential for developing their own 'standard practices'. Perhaps a way out would be a system where a small group was constituted so crews were always drawn from the same subset.

As I remember it that sort of worked on the military with smallish crew numbers and a small number of crews. But TBH I'm really not sure how you'd begin to administer that in a large airline with, say, a company total of 4000 pilots and 10,000+ cabin crew, and with typically 400-500 pilots or more on each individual type the company operates. Each one of which will have their own requirements for days off/leave depending on their domestic situation.

There's much more isolation in the job these days than there was 20 years ago and there are fewer options for gelling socially as a team... Given the workload nobody is going to hang around at "base" for a get together on a Friday PM :hmm:, and short haul night stops ( if your company does them) are often minimum rest. Many Long haul "slips" aren't much better. Chuck in a system of management being physically remote from the "Flight Line" and communicating by e-mail rather than personal contact and it's easy to see how someone with personal problems can hide things away and escape notice for a long time. Ratchet the work up even more and it's going to be even more difficult ... thanks EASA.

BTW the idea of airline crews developing their own "standard practices" is something management are very keen on avoiding...:eek:

[dr dre]

Certainly advise that a long term career in aviation may not materialise if NY article comes to fruition

There's nothing new in that article that hasn't been said before by the pilotless airliner crowd. Plus it quotes Missy Cummings, a known publicity seeker who comes out of the woodwork every time an aircraft crashes to attract attention for her cause.

[Tom Bangla]

za9ra22

Thoughtful post. Just one comment I'd like to make:

that raises the question of how competent cabin crew members may be to identify and resolve such difficult circumstances... I find them remarkably capable of handling problematic and stressful situations and difficult people with speed and efficiency.

That's because they have designated authority over pax. Their primary function, in theory at least, is to ensure safety. The captain has overall command of the aircraft and all aspects of its flight. In the command hierarchy, cabin crew are far less likely to question a pilot's actions than those of an errant passenger.


Pace

I just wonder whether the Captain and Lubitz had spent nights out and days together as well as flying together many times

Unlikely, perhaps, given that Lubitz only had 600 total flying hours?

[wiggy]

Edited to Add: I'm sure somebody asked..:confused:

Maybe the pilot did crash the plane intentionally, maybe he didn't. I don't know. I just get the feeling that there was too much of a rush to pin blame somewhere and now that the snowball has started rolling nobody is trying very hard to slow it down or stop it completely.

My thoughts on this (and they're not original):

The first raw "hearing" of the CVR, plus the info from ATC, may well have been extremely damning and I suspect no matter how often you listened to it, analysed it, the conclusion was always going to be the same- in most accidents there will be "grey areas" or unknowns that need investigating before any conclusion could be drawn, but not here. Nevertheless I suspect in time honoured fashion the authorities may well have wanted to sit on the initial conclusions for a while, awaiting further analysis/data (e.g. the FDR) but somebody very rapidly leaked what was heard on the CVR, at least in part, to the media (and hands up, yes, I was very sceptical of the NY Times but it seems they were right, at least in part). At that point the authorities realised the game was up and that releasing a standard statement along the lines of "no comment, we are months off reaching an absolutely definite conclusion, our report will be published next year" wasn't going to cut it.

It's kind of difficult to see how the authorities could have handled this particular accident any differently, but it doesn't bode well (IMHO) for people's expectations in the wake of any future accidents.

[Pace]

The other thing to consider is two forces arriving at that conclusion. normally the AAIB (Air Accident) not air murder handle aircraft accidents usually pilot error or system malfunction incorrectly handled causing pilot error. Rarely is an accident due to an aircraft becoming unflyable.

In this case many of us refused to acknowledge the unthinkable that another pilot in our profession would purposely commit mass murder on people in his care and i still find it hard to take that fact in. He must have had a very very warped and sick mind which the vast majority of mentally ill people would never contemplate.

So there were enough arrows pointing to a suspected mass murder and the criminal authorities became involved.

Their findings lead to their own conclusion that the extreme likelihood was that Lubitz crashed the aircraft in a pre meditated and planned fashion with total disregard for the people in his care.

the AAIB research was jointly with the criminal investigators reinforcing what they had discovered.

This is the last thing that any professional pilot would want as we already have to jump through too many hoops especially with EASA and really don't need more hoops. Ok there are lessons to be learnt and certain practical changes which can be made to minimise a repeat happening again

it is an extremely rare occurrence so over reaction would also be a mistake but that is what we fear regulations with no practical sense for public consumption only and authorities and airlines wanting to be seen to be doing something to placate the minds of an unknowing public at our cost/ I hope that helps explain ?

[BRE]

I don't think this article has been posted before at pprune, at least according to a Google search:
Germanwings-Absturz: Piloten stehen unter großem Stress - DIE WELT (http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article139087743/Eigentlich-duerfte-man-mit-uns-nicht-mehr-fliegen.html)

The gist:
- interviewed an anonymous CPT with a German charter airline
- selection standards at his airline not nearly as strict as within LH group
- has had to talk down many a FO, even in good weather
- some of them make so little money they have to live in out in the sticks and report to work dead tired from commuting
- some of them were P2F, having paid 60 k€ to an agency for the opportunity to build time
- one of these recently told him in the cockpit that he was clearly the customer
- captain frankly said that FOs within his airline are accident waiting to happen but nobody wants to talk about it

- interviewed an FO on long haul with LH
- complained about issues with long trips, body clock, only 24 h layover, but acknowledged that life was still good compared to other airlines
- real stress being generated by recurring sim checks and medicals
- knew of colleagues who preferred to go to external doctors rather than LH's medical service
- failing sim check twice usually means end of carreer with LH

- interviewed freelance airline pilot (didn't know those existed), instructor and checker
- pilot marked essentially dead in Europe, positions only in Gulf area or Asia but T&C not attractive
- more stress being put on pilots by airlines

[za9ra22]

Tom

Quote:
that raises the question of how competent cabin crew members may be to identify and resolve such difficult circumstances... I find them remarkably capable of handling problematic and stressful situations and difficult people with speed and efficiency.

That's because they have designated authority over pax. Their primary function, in theory at least, is to ensure safety. The captain has overall command of the aircraft and all aspects of its flight. In the command hierarchy, cabin crew are far less likely to question a pilot's actions than those of an errant passenger.

Fair point - there clearly is a hierarchy which would have some impact on how cabin crew are likely to respond, and I'll accept that as a valid issue.

However, in this instance, given a first officer on the flight deck and a captain banging on the door for re-admission, wouldn't that very hierarchy be more likely than not to have resulted in the captain being let back in? In this instance at least, would it not increase the probability of 150 lives being saved?

There are too many variables in both circumstance and individuals/personalities to predict outcomes with any certainty, but introducing a cabin crew member to the flight deck where one or other of the pilots is elsewhere would certainly disrupt destructive intent in some scenarios.

[Denti]

However, in this instance, given a first officer on the flight deck and a captain banging on the door for re-admission, wouldn't that very hierarchy be more likely than not to have resulted in the captain being let back in? In this instance at least, would it not increase the probability of 150 lives being saved?

We don't know, it is as simple as that. If you think back to the JetBlue case it probably was a good decision not to let the captain back into the flight deck. In the Germanwings case it probably would have been a good decision to let him back in.

Die Welt on non-LH-group airlines in Germany
That article is kinda difficult for me. Some stuff is correct, some is quite wrong and some is distorted a lot. It starts with the oversimplification that every airline outside the Lufthansa group is pretty much the same as the one with the green logo in which the interviewed captain apparently works. There is a pretty wide variety of working conditions between very close to lufthansa to extremely bad.

[737er]

This is an excellent discussion and one which I hadn't considered. In the case of jetBlue, if you put a new FA on the flight deck with with the sane FO then you would increase the odds substantially that she would have let the Captain back in if he was frantically banging on the door. Another aspect of unintended consequences in all this.

[cats_five]

This is an excellent discussion and one which I hadn't considered. In the case of jetBlue, if you put a new FA on the flight deck with with the sane FO then you would increase the odds substantially that she would have let the Captain back in if he was frantically banging on the door. Another aspect of unintended consequences in all this.

I thought it happened in the US, and the US has a 2 on the FD rule? From what I have read about it, the FO would have had no doubt that locking him out was the right thing to do if he had been able to hear what was happening in the cabin. Can he?

[wiggy]

I guess the point is that that whilst the FO might well have no doubt (in their mind) about not letting the captain back in....what is running through the mind of the (possibly very new and junior) FA with his/her hand on the door handle?

Does he/she obey the FO's instructions not to open the door because the F/O is the "officer on deck" and "has the helm"....:ooh: or does the FA open the door because regardless of what the "your only the co-pilot" ;) says it's the captain outside and he/she is screaming to be let in?

As has been said before there's more to this than just chucking an FA onto the flight deck and saying "oh look, problem solved, we've introduced a two on the flight deck at all times rule".......

[oblivia]

Here's a description of the JetBlue incident from the LA Times:

Osbon [the captain] began speaking incoherently and became increasingly agitated as the flight went on.

After yelling at air traffic controllers, he turned off the radios in the Airbus 320, which had more than 130 people on board, and "sternly admonished the FO for trying to talk on the radio."

"The FO became really worried when Osbon said, 'We need to take a leap of faith,' " investigators said.

Initial reports after the jet made an emergency landing in Amarillo, Texas, said the co-pilot had tricked Osbon into leaving the cockpit by suggesting he use the bathroom. The complaint says Osbon bolted out of the cockpit on his own and headed for the bathroom, alarming crew members. This was about 3 1/2 hours into the five-hour flight.

In the ensuing melee, Osbon reportedly "aggressively grabbed" a flight attendant's hands; banged on the bathroom door and yelled at a woman inside to get out; yelled at passengers; and pounded so hard on the locked cockpit door that the first officer feared Osbon was breaking through the bulletproof barrier.

I don't think anybody on either side of the door was ever in any doubt about which pilot was the sane one.

[wiggy]

In the Jetblue case, if it is exactly as described, I'd agree, but the danger is when behaviour is not that clear cut.

What happens if an outwardly calm captain demands access back onto the flight deck after talking a "break" and an outwardly calm F/O tells the flight attendant " don't let him in, he's been acting oddly...."??

Good luck in sorting out a protocol for that one.

[NigelOnDraft]

Good luck in sorting out a protocol for that one.Trouble is, you cannot easily have a protocol for over-riding the chain of command.

As in the JetBlue case, and other instances of an FO "intervening" in what, retrospectively, turns out to be a good decision, all seems good. In flying terms verbal intervention is advised first - but ultimately (for Flight Safety) it is vague when the FO can say "I have control" (even though required).

Extending that protocol to require a CC member to override the Capt's command, when in either case (i.e. the CC obeys or overrides) the result may be a hull and all pax loss - or far worse :oh:

It is easy to think of / cater for the typical personalities and situations - but we need to address the exceptional.

[Ian W]

Extending that protocol to require a CC member to override the Capt's command, when in either case (i.e. the CC obeys or overrides) the result may be a hull and all pax loss - or far worse :oh:

It is easy to think of / cater for the typical personalities and situations - but we need to address the exceptional.

Absolutely true.
However, the way that the exceptional may be addressed is the way starting to be proposed in the NYT. All of a sudden the aircraft responds that it does not trust any of you and all the cockpit controls (including CBs) cease to work. You are now passengers in an 'optionally manned' aircraft.

There are avionics manufacturers and beancounters salivating at that thought.

So it would really be good if a productive way forward could be identified rather than the continual howling down of alternate ideas. The status quo is only there because nobody has yet changed it - not because it is ideal.

[wiggy]

it would really be good if a productive way forward could be identified rather than the continual howling down of alternate ideas

Agreed...so come up with a logical, workable, "safe" (define?) credible idea and the "continual howling down" will stop. Until then the critical comments will continue.

There are avionics manufacturers and beancounters salivating at that thought.

Of course they are....but perhaps not for reasons of safety.

[Greenlights]

I don't see the point, that many still debate about this accident...it's very rare, and may happen in the futur, there is no solution. It is all about human being.

[gcal]

@Greenlights

'I don't see the point, that many still debate about this accident...it's very rare, and may happen in the futur, there is no solution. It is all about human being'.

You say it was an accident. I'd say it was deliberate so not an accident.
It is true you will never find a complete solution; but no harm at all in debating and thinking through.
When something new and terribly shocking (not unique though) happens people are bound to debate.
I think that is healthy.

[aterpster]

Tony Tyler: Germanwings Probe ?Shouldn?t Set A Precedent? | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/tony-tyler-germanwings-probe-shouldn-t-set-precedent#comment-84111)

[Ian W]

I don't see the point, that many still debate about this accident...it's very rare, and may happen in the futur, there is no solution. It is all about human being.

In hazard and risk analysis there are often some hazards that although extremely rare/very very low probability - are totally unacceptable. I believe that this is one of those events. These events must be prevented rather than saying as you imply (or as can be inferred from what you say) millions of people fly every year this was only 149 that's an infinitesimally small risk, therefore, we can just shrug our shoulders and say we still meet the target level of safety. That does not wash with an unacceptable hazard, especially one that may have relatively simple mitigation.

[John Farley]

Ian W

I take your point about some risks being unacceptable but in my view it is just not possible mitigate this particular risk.

You say it is relatively easy to mitigate - how so? How would you prevent any pilot on short finals just stuffing the pole forward and so diving into the ground before the other pilot had any chance to react?

[mm_flynn]

Ian W
I take your point about some risks being unacceptable but in my view it is just not possible mitigate this particular risk.

I think it is impossible to totally mitigate the risk a flight crew member might decide to crash an aircraft. However, there does seem to be a track record of c. 5 'pilots' deciding, when temporarily alone, to crash their aircraft.

It doesn't seem unreasonable to believe that people on their own can come to the conclusion to kill themselves (and act on it) more readily than when in the company of someone else. In a 'always 2 people' environment, to achieve this, the 'pilot' needs to instruct the cabin crew to lock the other pilot out. It seems very unlikely the CC is going to go along with this if 2 minutes earlier they had a friendly wave and chat while the pilot went off to the toilet and then remaining flight deck crew pushes the nose towards the ground while insisting that the other pilot not be let in.

I can see some argument that allowing cabin crew in could allow them to kill the flight deck pilot and then lock out the remaining pilot; However, I think this scenario is vanishingly unlikely as a result of mental health/suicide, etc. However, if you have a terrorist operative in your crew (flight deck or cabin) I am sure you all can think of a number of ways they could bring an aircraft down. This risk doesn't seem to be material increased by a 2 in cockpit rule.

[wiggy]

It seems very unlikely the CC is going to go along with this if 2 minutes earlier they had a friendly wave and chat while the pilot went off to the toilet and then remaining flight deck crew pushes the nose towards the ground while insisting that the other pilot not be let in.

"pushing the noise towards the ground" might be nothing more sinister than the required swift'ish response to a TCAS RA.....how good is the average CC members knowledge of the FCOM 1 and QRH?

Now if the suggestion is that there always has to be two rated pilots on the flight deck we might be heading towards common ground.

[NigelOnDraft]

However, there does seem to be a track record of c. 5 'pilots' deciding, when temporarily alone, to crash their aircraft.I am intrigued by the "5"? LAM, GW. EgyptAir started solo, but carried on when Capt returned. SilkAir had 2 up front. FedEx the non-pilot employee (at the time) attacked the Flt Crew. PSA the non-pilot employee shot the pilots. MH370 might be any of the above, or none.

[JaxofMarlow]

In hazard and risk analysis there are often some hazards that although extremely rare/very very low probability - are totally unacceptable. I believe that this is one of those events. These events must be prevented rather………..

OK, how ? And can we have another example where risk has been totally removed altogether that involves human beings.

[Carbon Bootprint]

SilkAir had 2 up front.I don't believe that's been established for certain, as there was a period of from 5 to 10 minutes from the time the CVR stopped recording before the aircraft went into a death dive. Authorities have speculated that during that time (after Capt. Tsu returned to the cockpit and pulled the breaker), FO Ward may have left the flight deck for whatever reason.

I seem to recall the crash of Air France 422 (actually operated by TAME) in 1998 was for a time suspected as suicide as the normal takeoff procedures from Bogota appeared to have been disregarded before it flew into a mountain. It occurred not long after SilkAir, which may have fueled some of the suspicions. In any case, the probable cause was eventually listed as loss of situational awareness in crap weather.

[WillFlyForCheese]

John Farley:

I take your point about some risks being unacceptable but in my view it is just not possible mitigate this particular risk.

You say it is relatively easy to mitigate - how so? How would you prevent any pilot on short finals just stuffing the pole forward and so diving into the ground before the other pilot had any chance to react?
Just because you cannot eliminate all of the risk doesn't mean you shouldn't try to mitigate for some of the risk. It should be perfectly acceptable to implement measures to try to prevent an incident like this.

No - I do not portend to have all of the answers - or all of the solutions. We (the collective) quickly instituted a measure ("impenetrable" doors) in response to 9/11. It created opportunity that we (perhaps) did not foresee. Refining what we did in response to try to prevent what now appears to be more than a "one off" seems appropriate.

Put yourself on board. What would you have done in the Capt's position? Would you have wished for CC on the Flt Deck? Have you really thought about that?

[John Farley]

mm flynn and WillFlyForCheese

My post was to give my views to Ian W about his post.

Of course I am not against anybody who wants to reduce the ways a suicidal pilot can crash an aircraft and comes up with solutions that eliminate specific methods. However there will always be one way that cannot be mitigated or protected against (the short finals case). That is the point I was trying to make to Ian W.

[Pace]

In hazard and risk analysis there are often some hazards that although extremely rare/very very low probability - are totally unacceptable. I believe that this is one of those events. These events must be prevented rather than saying as you imply (or as can be inferred from what you say) millions of people fly every year this was only 149 that's an infinitesimally small risk, therefore, we can just shrug our shoulders and say we still meet the target level of safety. That does not wash with an unacceptable hazard, especially one that may have relatively simple mitigation.

Ian

of course its totally unacceptable as was 9/11 but 9/11 and the reactions to 9/11 have cost $billions in the way it changed the face of airports, inconvenience to the flying public and lost time to Industry. It has made flying a tedious, stressful form of travel with massive delays at airports and a loss of human liberty

Some of the very protections against another 9/11 have facilitated this equally awful act.( the security door) Because it was that system designed to keep terrorists out which Lubitz studied days before with a fundamental flaw in its system to make his awful plans a possibility

Most things are possible but they also come with a huge cost as the reactions to 9/11 showed.

This is not a time for emotional reactions a time for political intervention a time for knee jerk or ill thought out legislation or even a time for the Multi Billion $ security industry to see an opportunity for making more money but a time for calm and practical look at how another Lubitz can be deterred from ever doing this again.

i stress the word Deterred rather than stopped because there has to be a balance.

High in that contemplation must be the fact thats its unlikely that another Lubitz will ever do this again, A one off awful action by a very damaged and disturbed mind who somehow escaped notice not only by the medical world but also his colleagues who he worked and trained with.

Any action has to be balanced by the cost not just in money terms but by further restrictions making aviation less attractive to the paying public as happened with 9/11 but also to the would be pilots of the future who will not see flying as a desirable career to follow.

i have been flying for 30 years and i do so because I enjoy what I do! The day I don't enjoy what I do because it all becomes a mass of hassle is the day to hang up your hat and do something else and probably most pilots are the same.

Anything you do will carry a cost and also a price and as in this case may also open up a risk to another equally unforeseen but unlikely tragic event. Will the PERCEIVED benefits out way the negatives of any such action ?

[DrPhillipa]

"pushing the noise towards the ground" might be nothing more sinister than the required swift'ish response to a TCAS RA.....how good is the average CC members knowledge of the FCOM 1 and QRH?This is irrelevant, she or he has simply to decide whether opening the door to the captain or FO is reasonable. Independent of what the Pilot Flying is doing is there a sensible reason to exclude the other pilot Y/N? People skills, is supposed to be what CC are trained for isn't it?

[SKS777FLYER]

Discussed in other posts about how to mitigate risks posed by rogue pilots ...
A forbidden sequence of words in these hallowed threads... "uninterruptible A/P"..... Much like the way drones have been flown for decades, remotely via radio control/ data link.

Detailed patents applied for years ago by an enormous aviation entity.

[wiggy]

she or he has simply to decide whether opening the door to the captain or FO is reasonable. Independent of what the Pilot Flying is doing is there a sensible reason to exclude the other pilot Y/N?

On what basis does he/she do that? There might well be a sensible reason to exclude the other pilot, but the CC member quite possibly has no idea what the interaction has been between the two pilots in the minutes/hours before one of them left the flight deck..and before it's explained to them the TCAS RA kicks in....( and I know I'm playing Devil's advocate here)

People skills, is supposed to be what CC are trained for isn't it?

Ummm...There are people skills and then there's the skill set needed to spot a crime about to happen.

For the sake of interest seeing as many seem to like the idea of "two up" all times and are happy with one being CC can I ask what are the proposed rules (because there have to be some)..always let any pilot back on to the flight deck? In all circumstances let the captain back in? Only let F/O in if captain agrees? Let any pilot back who gives a cheery wave....etc

[Pace]

always let any pilot back on to the flight deck? In all circumstances let the captain back in? Only let F/O in if captain agrees? Let any pilot back who gives a cheery wave....etc

Wiggy

The flight crew have an absolute right to be where they belong on the flight deck.
Any flight crew Captain or FO has a right to re enter and have access to the flight deck.

The remaining Flight Crew member still on the the flight deck has no rights to block that entrance to him/her unless they have absolute backed up evidence that their actions are correct.

I would suggest that a Captain /FO on the outside who has lost the plot would be noticed by the CC who I am sure would be relaying messages to the remaining pilot flying that pilot X has lost the plot and just assaulted a CC or whatever?

On the ground the remaining handling pilot would I am sure be able to justify his actions with multiple CC and PAX witness.
There are a number of reasons why the other pilot may not be able to continue with his / her duties,illness, incapacitation jumps to mind but that becomes a team event with CC and even a PAX Doctors involvement! I cannot think of any innocent situation where one pilot would unilaterally have cause to lock out another flight crew member without third party involvement and witness

But you cannot get away from that absolute right principle! Any other argument goes into the realms of absurd

[wiggy]

I'll bow out for the moment (hurrah I hear you say), pointing out that contrary to some newspaper reports EASA themselves are yet to be convinced that 2 on the Flight Deck provides the guaranteed/only solution, and have concerns about introducing extra risks, and have therefore not yet at least made it mandatory:

From EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2015-04:

"The Agency recommends operators to re-assess the safety
and security risks associated with flight crew members
leaving the flight crew compartment due to operational or
physiological needs during non-critical phases of flight.
Based on this assessment, operators are recommended to
implement procedures requiring at least two persons
authorised in accordance with CAT.GEN.MPA.135 to be in
the flight crew compartment at all times, or other equivalent
mitigating measures to address risks identified by the
operator’s revised assessment.
Any additional risks stemming from the introduction of such
procedures or measures should be assessed and mitigated."

[gcal]

@Wiggy

Some sense there from EASA.

[Sober Lark]

There have been relatively few cases in the past which look similar to this sad A320 loss.


Some people would argue that it is worth spending more and more money managing risk especially where human life is concerned. But even in these cases there will be a break-even point. We may not like to think about risk control in these terms but it is realistic.

[Pace]

wiggy

Any additional risks stemming from the introduction of such
procedures or measures should be assessed and mitigated."

I too agree that the EASA comments are a sensible and balanced approach.
this last bit is rather vague?

I can only presume it means that the airlines need to consider the additional risks of allowing CC onto the flight deck with one pilot present.

A free for all allowing any CC to take up that role would indeed add risk maybe greater than the risk of a rogue FO and should be mitigated.

i could see a CC rating/ endorsement for flight deck procedures with training both on simulator and classroom as well as length of service and experience being a move which would substantially lower that risk and make that CC a useful addition to over all safety and risk mitigation. The cost would be in the extra training and the extra pay those CC should have for holding such an endorsement. Even give them the right to wear a half gold bar on the uniform to identify such endorsed CC

For me the above a re look at the door system with a blocking override ability and a system put in place for colleagues to be able and more aware of expressing concerns over an individual pilot is all that needs to be or should be done

[mm_flynn]

I am intrigued by the "5"? LAM, GW. EgyptAir started solo, but carried on when Capt returned. SilkAir had 2 up front. FedEx the non-pilot employee (at the time) attacked the Flt Crew. PSA the non-pilot employee shot the pilots. MH370 might be any of the above, or none.

I believe the 5 that are referred to are (1994 - 2015)
LAM - Started Alone
Egypt Air - Started Alone
Silk Air - Is believed to have started alone (but unclear due to disabled CVR and FDR)
Royal Marco - Unclear
German Wings - Was alone

There are a couple of others where a single pilot has taken a commercial aircraft and used it to kill himself and others - but of course that is a totally different mitigation.

[jaytee54]

The cost would be in the extra training and the extra pay those CC should have for holding such an endorsement. Even give them the right to wear a half gold bar on the uniform to identify such endorsed CC
You cannot be serious!

[Pace]

You cannot be serious!

Very serious! you cannot have a policy where a young inexperienced CC can be placed doing flight deck duties after a few weeks training to become a CC and no real knowledge of his /her background.
With no real knowledge for them to act as a cabin crew observer over one pilot and all that entails or could in a worst case scenario entail ? would that be a serious option or sensible option?
surely it would require a level of training and background with the company of possibly 3 years to be a safe option

[jaytee54]

Three and a bit thousand posts on this thread have convinced me that:-


Computers are better at accurate flying, humans are better at problem solving.

Fully automated aircraft are not really viable/trustworthy yet, maybe never will be.

Humans make mistakes sometimes, and just occasionally do some strange and tragic things, justified in only that one mind.


There is no way we can stop the occasional human error or the extremely rare murderous action. All of the solutions mentioned could be circumvented by a problem solving human. I think we just have to live with it as one of the very slight risks inherent in aviation, and virtually every other aspect of life. It is still safer than fully automated aircraft.

[Ian W]

In hazard and risk analysis there are often some hazards that although extremely rare/very very low probability - are totally unacceptable. I believe that this is one of those events. These events must be prevented rather………..

OK, how ? And can we have another example where risk has been totally removed altogether that involves human beings.

"where risk has been totally removed altogether that involves human beings" Is not the sense of what I wrote.

One argument is that if you can only come up with 5 or 6 cases of pilots causing death out of the millions of flights in the same period then that is such a low risk that we can disregard it and do nothing - which is what is being said by many posters.

My position is that for many people the hazard of being flown into the ground by someone they have trusted their lives to is totally unacceptable, so the normal risk analysis of the case being of such a low probability that we needn't attempt to mitigate it, is no longer true. Despite its low probability as much as possible should be done to reduce the risk of 'rogue' pilots crashing the aircraft.

I can assure you that logical or not - if a similar crash happens again you can rely on an extremely strong, potentially irresistible, push to automate pilots out of the cockpit.

[wiggy]

Oh what the heck..please allow me a "one more time" ....

Pace

Re: your flight deck observer idea:

surely it would require a level of training and background with the company of possibly 3 years to be a safe option

Agreed..in fact why not give them 2/3/4 bars and call them a pilot......

Ian

if a similar crash happens again you can rely on an extremely strong, potentially irresistible, push to automate pilots out of the cockpit.

Indeed, that may well happen eventually but in the mean time can I ask if that "crash" happens tomorrow are you planning to ground commercial aviation for the decade(s) that your automated/partially automated airliner will take to become a reality.

[jaytee54]

Very serious! you cannot have a policy where a young inexperienced CC can be placed doing flight deck duties after a few weeks training to become a CC and no real knowledge of his /her background.
surely it would require a level of training and background with the company of possibly 3 years to be a safe option.

The best security should include a degree of randomness, as a rigid prescribed system can be subverted by any decent problem solver. So why not leave it to the senior CA? Or the Captain could choose:- "could XXX come in while I take a leak?"

That way you get someone who is both available and suitable.

Your way would be a rostering nightmare. If there Must be a half-bar CA on every flight, in the front galley, what happens if they take ill and there is no qualified standby? Do you cancel the flight?
Then think about "How could a person with ill intent USE this system?"

[winterymix]

News reports suggest that Lubitz may have slipped the captain a diuretic in a beverage. Thus, premeditation to get the captain out of the flight deck. No matter what new technology and procedures are introduced, some diabolical mind will calculate a work around.

Aircraft are really safe and dependable, the rare maniac is not.

[sky9]

News reports suggest that Lubitz may have slipped the captain a diuretic in a beverage.

Speculation or based on facts?

[TWT]

News reports suggest that Lubitz may have slipped the captain a diuretic in a beverage. Came from a media allegation that he had Googled 'diuretics' in the days leading up to the crash.Even IF it is true that he did an internet search on the subject,there cannot possibly be any proof that he actually spiked the Captain's beverage.

[Pace]

Your way would be a rostering nightmare. If there Must be a half-bar CA on every flight, in the front galley, what happens if they take ill and there is no qualified standby? Do you cancel the flight?
Then think about "How could a person with ill intent USE this system?"

jaytee

Surely the same argument would go for a Cabin Crew manager/ess or senior Cabin crew and rostering? if they are not available do you let the aircraft go with newbies?

who ever is allowed to enter the flight deck to diminish the likelihood of another Lubitz must surely be trained for that role and know how to unlock the door or handle different situations with a difficult or potentially dangerous flight crew member.

He/ She will be alone with that potentially dangerous flight crew member so probably not the best idea to send up a 22 year old girl who has been one month on the job and doesn't have a clue what she is looking at or dealing with?

Have you considered the possibility of a planted terrorist taking such a job ? at least this way you will only use CC with three years on the Airline which itself will reduce that possibility! Nothing that is done will make a future Lubitz impossible only less likely.

There are already private reporting systems in place where a pilot can report a safety concern without making it official and keeping a degree of anonymity. Part of the reason that lubitz got through the net was that no body noticed anything wrong with the guy. Colleagues and friends are best placed to notice and report concerns over any pilot so maybe such a site could be accessible to pilots, friends or relatives to make their concerns known whether justified or not?

[gcal]

@Pace

' Nothing that is done will make a future Lubitz impossible only less likely'

That is it in a nutshell.

[GlueBall]

Any cabin crew is qualified not to sit in the vacant pilot's seat, but to sit in a jump seat nearest the door, or to stand next to the door and to open the door manually to preclude the other pilot from being locked out.

[Groucho]

Once again posters are just NOT reading the foregoing 3244 posts.

Pace - there is NO need for the 'replacement' crew member to be trained to open the door in normal circumstances:

1) A fully equipped 'normal' door can be opened easily and safely by the remaining flight crew member from their seat

2) Should this flight crew be physically unable to do so, there is an emergency ingress system to allow access from the cabin

The only time the 'extra' crew would need to open the door is if THEY judge it is necessary to over-ride the authority of the Captain of the aircraft (the remaining flight crew) where they do not wish it to be opened. This is the major issue most of us have with the system. It opens a huge can of worms.

I don't think it has still been clearly established exactly what happened on the JetBlue flight where the nominated Captain was 'locked out' by the F/O, whether there was an extra crew member in the cockpit and how the situation was handled by them.

[fastjet45]

Peekay4
So he spent SIX YEARS (since 2009) convincing numerous doctors that he had a mental illness, all so he can hide his motive crashing a plane in 2015?

A terrorist wants the world to know why he commits mass murders, not hide it.


The first time you knew about the 911 terrorists was just after 2 planes crashed in to buildings and after years of hiding and training as pilots :=

[PrivtPilotRadarTech]

Groucho: "I don't think it has still been clearly established exactly what happened on the JetBlue flight where the nominated Captain was 'locked out' by the F/O."

I found the FBI report, which is quite interesting. OUTSTANDING response by
the FO and CC. Briefly, the captain was acting erratically, so the FO suggested they invite an off-duty captain to the cockpit. The captain abruptly went to the lavatory, but alarmed the CC by "not following protocol". It's short, you'll want to read the whole thing.
FBI ? JetBlue Pilot Charged with Interference with a Flight Crew (http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/press-releases/2012/jetblue-pilot-charged-with-interference-with-a-flight-crew)

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Very serious! you cannot have a policy where a young inexperienced CC can be placed doing flight deck duties after a few weeks training to become a CC and no real knowledge of his /her background.


Well what, exactly, do you think happens at the moment?!

[Pace]

Well what, exactly, do you think happens at the moment?!

LSM

We are talking about in Europe where we do not have a two crew in the cockpit policy when one flight crew vacates and did not have that policy when Lubitz crashed the jet so enlighten me because I don't know if you know something different ?

Maybe that policy existed all the time and the fact that Lubitz was alone was a breach of that policy so exactly put me right )

If your saying any CC takeS them a drink and one might be called in or pop her head around the door to flash a smile when the one flight crew is alone then yes I am sure that does happen. So??

The chances of this happening again are very very small probably less than that CC flashing a smile being a planted terrorist so the other option is to do nothing? Business as usual?

[Lord Spandex Masher]

It's not a regulation but for many airlines it's SOP and they've done it for over a decade, including the two I've worked for since 9/11.

It's also a standing arrangement that the first sector a CC works they spend at least the take off and landing on the jump seat.

Many times I've flown with senior CC who have only one year of flying experience, prior to being promoted, and the other crew have less.

[Denti]

that Lubitz studied the door locking system days before on his home computer and this was a major part of his plan to carry out this mass murder undisturbed

If you read the original text about that it just states that he apparently only used a few minutes. That is not research and he didn't need to, he had all the relevant information on his company notebook anyway.

It's also a standing arrangement that the first sector a CC works they spend at least the take off and landing on the jump seat.

We do it during their ACM flight, but yes, that is normal. However, there are two pilots present and at the controls, still quite a chance for some mischief.

The new rule is unnecessary for those airlines that have phase 2 doors, i haven't flown for one that didn't. That they now use the two crew rule is simply to show the public that they do something. It doesn't increase safety, at best it leaves it at the same point where it was, more probably it lowers it.

Especially in those companies that just use non background/medical checked zero hour contractors in the cabin and have a high turnover.

[Lonewolf_50]

Especially in those companies that just use non background/medical checked zero hour contractors in the cabin and have a high turnover. If one wants to raise the institutional security red flag, one need only look at that to recognize a vulnerability that must be addressed and mitigated.

PPRT:
FBI summary was most interesting. Thanks for the link.

[peekay4]

The first time you knew about the 911 terrorists was just after 2 planes crashed in to buildings and after years of hiding and training as pilots
But they didn't spend years planning to disguise the aftermath of their heinous attacks as something else other than a terrorist attack!

In fact they made it damn obvious it was a terrorist attack! That's the whole point of terrorism, to make a clear statement of action for their cause!

No terrorist is going to deliberately crash a plane and want it mistaken for a mental health issue!!!! :ugh:

[jaytee54]

@gcal +1
@Pace

' Nothing that is done will make a future Lubitz impossible only less likely'

That is it in a nutshell.

The purpose of legislating the existing informal practice of having a CA in the cockpit for breaks is so that regulators can show they are doing something, to reassure the public.
As a mental health professional observed way back in the thread it also reduces the likelihood of a mentally unstable person committing this kind of mass murder.

But professional pilots know that even if there were four fully qualified pilots in the cockpit, if one of the pilots seated at the controls were determined he could easily crash the aircraft by applying extreme control inputs, 90+ roll and max positive or negative g and it is unlikely the others could stop him before bits started coming off the 'plane. All he has to do is wait until the other pilot gets up from his seat. The three not strapped in at the controls would be thrown around the cockpit or unable to reach.
The SilkAir aircraft broke up and went down in under a minute, didn't it?
As did the BAe 146 whose crew were shot by a deranged passenger.

Consider the Russian pilot's young son. He wasn't deranged, but still managed to crash the aircraft despite the presence of two fully qualified sane pilots who should have been able to overpower him, you would think.

The best (only) chance we have is not to allow such a person from strapping in at the controls.

I still say admit a CA to the cockpit, and let the pilots or senior CA decide who it is.

[victor tango]

All these views on cabin crew attending the flight deck for the purposes posted seem to me to miss the point, in that, CC are employed primarily to serve their customers food and refreshments and attend to their needs as per their company policy.
The other, and main function, is cabin safety procedures in an emergency situation.

Now, to expect them to monitor pilots whilst one goes out of the cockpit, seems to me quite ridiculous, due to the fact that (no reflection on them) they haven't been trained so to do.
Even if they got the necessary training, what have we ended up with, a CC member who is trying to do a fairly stressful job, to then change hats and become a person on the same professional standard as pilots and start supervising them !

Come on chaps.......there must be a better solution than this. :ugh:

[Denti]

Come on chaps.......there must be a better solution than this

That is the price solution everyone is trying to find. Of course each party with their own agenda in mind. At the moment it is impossible to be seen inactive, so everyone is scrambling. I know it is a big issue at the currently running IFALPA conference, it is a big issue with airline companies and ICAO is already trying to find their own way as well.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

There isn't a solution.

[Denti]

Indeed. But the public has to be convinced that something is being done. So the usual game is on.

[RobertS975]

Pace posted: "Part of the reason that lubitz got through the net was that no body noticed anything wrong with the guy. Colleagues and friends are best placed to notice and report concerns over any pilot so maybe such a site could be accessible to pilots, friends or relatives to make their concerns known whether justified or not? "

Another reason why the 1300 hours or whatever that one needs for an ATP is a good idea... more time to weed out the moonbats fom the ranks. That may not have mattered a whit, but we'll nevr know.

[dr dre]

I've posted this elsewhere but I'll do it again:
Egyptair -FO was 59yrs old and had 12'000hrs
Silkair - Captain had 20 years experience, former fighter instructor pilot
JAL and LAM Mozambique - both Captain's involved in those incidents

Now how doing would doing 1500hrs in predominatly single pilot flying (charters, instructing etc) whilst flying alone weed out moonbats, if in this case flying with an experienced professional for 600hrs on the A320 no-one saw anything to be too concerned?

[SamYeager]

All these views on cabin crew attending the flight deck for the purposes posted seem to me to miss the point..[snip]

Now, to expect them to monitor pilots whilst one goes out of the cockpit, seems to me quite ridiculous, due to the fact that (no reflection on them) they haven't been trained so to do.
Even if they got the necessary training, what have we ended up with, a CC member who is trying to do a fairly stressful job, to then change hats and become a person on the same professional standard as pilots and start supervising them !


A number of posters do seem to be making (unwarranted IMHO) assumptions of the purpose of the CC on the flight deck. I believe the primary purposes of the CC are to (a) alert the pilot who is currently absent if the flying pilot becomes ill or in any other way erratic and (b) open the sodding door so that the other pilot can enter.


There has been speculation that the flying pilot might disable the CC but given the pilot will be strapped in (at least initially) I think the only way that could easily happen would be by means of a gun which is a different bag of worms.


Will this proposal solve the problem completely? NO! It is however comparatively easy to implement, from the airline's point of view does not increase crew costs although there may well be some increased costs for training.

[Citation2]

I was wondering why the french military did not send fighters to intercept the aircraft as he didn't declare emergency nor sqwaked 7700.
It happened many times when pilots unintentionally deviated from track or altitude and they were intercepted in no time.
Any clues?

[Smudger]

Just don't think there was enough time to recognise the situation and react.. if fighters were scrambled what could they have done ?

[ATC Watcher]

Fighters were scrambled early and were on it pretty fast ( from nearby Orange AFB) but they came too late, There were the ones that gave the exact crash position to ATC/SAR.

[Groucho]

Citation: "I was wondering why the french military did not send fighters to intercept the aircraft as he didn't declare emergency nor sqwaked 7700."

Assuming a 'normal' peactime alert state (10 minutes to airborne) it would be impossible to 'scramble' to an event which reportedly lasted 8 minutes.

I think it was said a while back that fighters airborne in the nearby training area (which is probably the cause of the 'bend' in the track between BCN and DUS) were diverted to the scene (and apparently reached it pretty quickly).

[W.R.A.I.T.H]

I think it was said a while back that fighters airborne in the nearby training area (which is probably the cause of the 'bend' in the track between BCN and DUS) were diverted to the scene (and apparently reached it pretty quickly).


Yep. In one of the first interviews with local witnesses of the prang, one was quoted to say that fast jets buzzed the crash site within a minute of it happening.

[mcdude]

A number of posters do seem to be making (unwarranted IMHO) assumptions of the purpose of the CC on the flight deck. I believe the primary purposes of the CC are to (a) alert the pilot who is currently absent if the flying pilot becomes ill or in any other way erratic and (b) open the sodding door so that the other pilot can enter.


There has been speculation that the flying pilot might disable the CC but given the pilot will be strapped in (at least initially) I think the only way that could easily happen would be by means of a gun which is a different bag of worms.


Will this proposal solve the problem completely? NO! It is however comparatively easy to implement, from the airline's point of view does not increase crew costs although there may well be some increased costs for training.

Very smart post. I have operated with this policy for many years. It was introduced by my opeartor to address incapacitation and door operation issues. In the case of the GermanWings crash, had the policy been in place, it possibly would not have stopped the event occurring, but it certainly would be one more issue for the FO to deal with (assuming the reports are correct). In this respect, a deterrent policy, although not intended as that.

[Groucho]

McDude "It was introduced by my opeartor to address incapacitation and door operation issues."

What particular 'issues' did you have with a Phase 2 door?

[mcdude]

GROUCHO - CDLS system failure.

[deptrai]

1400 people, including relatives of victims, rescue workers, senior politicians from several countries attended a memorial service in Cologne today, which had elements of a state funeral. Some people argued whether there should be 149 candles or 150, yet the catholic cardinal insisted there were 150 victims, and that he's not the one to judge. I'm usually sceptical to priests and the like, but forgiving is probably a sensible way to deal with such tragedies, for those affected.

[deptrai]

A lot of the suggestions in this thread sound like a solution in search of a problem. Yes admittedly this happened once but how likely is it to happen again? Yes, we can learn from this accident, but I don't think many pilots will spend the rest of their working life being completely paranoid about their colleagues. There are better ways to improve aviation safety imho, that will yield better results. Overworked, tired pilots, unstabilized approaches, get-there-itis, while miniscule threats to safety judging by the numbers of accidents, still seem like a vastly bigger issue, realistically

[mm_flynn]

A lot of the suggestions in this thread sound like a solution in search of a problem. Yes admittedly this happened once but how likely is it to happen again?
It appears that Flight Deck Crew have tried to crash the aircraft at least 6 times (the 5 actual crashes broadly attributed to suicide plus at least JetBlue 191) in the last 25 years. So it seems a once in 5 years event, on the same order as mid-air collisions of commercial aircraft before TCAS.

The US has a system that worked the one time it appears to have been used, EASA has a system that didn't work the one time it was needed. It seems reasonable that some effort is spent to review the respective systems and reflect if any changes should be made.

The general thrust of the comments from European commercial aircrew show a (to me at least) surprising concern about the security status of the cabin crew and a worrying concern about spending time alone with them occupying the flight deck jump seat.

I am not sure if this is a real concern or more a response to introducing a limit on the handling pilot's authority, even if this authority is limited only to override the handling pilot's decision to bar the non-handling pilot from the flight deck.

I would suggest people think back to the occasions they* (or people they know, or even have heard about) have decided it was appropriate to lock the other pilot out of the flight deck. Was there any occasion where you consider the circumstances might have resulted in any CC incorrectly siding with the locked out pilot and letting them back onto the flight deck against the wishes of the handling pilot.

* realistically, I am assuming almost no one has actually had occasion to lock a member of the flight deck crew out so this will mostly be a reflection on the publicized events.

[Mark in CA]

In the days just after the Germanwings co-pilot Andreas Lubitz, 27, flew himself and 149 other people into a French mountainside last month, Lufthansa’s chief executive confidently pronounced that Mr. Lubitz had been “100 percent” fit to fly, highlighting how little the airline knew of the pilot who shook confidence in the company’s reputation for training and management rigor.

Mr. Lubitz’s journey to the moment when he found himself alone at the controls of Germanwings Flight 9525 from Barcelona to Düsseldorf on March 24 exposes a series of failures and weaknesses at Lufthansa and throughout the industry and its regulators in dealing with mental illness among pilots. And it shows how little the industry and its regulators have done to acknowledge and address the most extreme manifestation of those psychological strains: pilot suicide.


http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/world/europe/germanwings-plane-crash-andreas-lubitz-lufthansa-pilot-suicide.html?emc=edit_na_20150418&nlid=145194&_r=0

[His dudeness]

The best (only) chance we have is not to allow such a person from strapping in at the controls.

And since we can´t do this with 100% certainty, we have to accept that these things happen.

[Capvermell]

LordSpandexMasher wrote:-There isn't a solution.

Yes there is:-

1. Vastly enhance current aircraft control systems so that they simply refuse deliberate control inputs by a pilot in charge that could only have the intent of crashing the aircraft. This would include obvious things that seem to not currently exist such as auto pilots also knowing about the height of all terrain and high buildings or masts etc on the ground so they would never accept any flight route that would fly the airplane deliberately in to terrain. The aircraft should only be capable of being descended to anywhere near ground level at locations where there are known suitable airports of an adequate minimum runway length for that aircraft type.

2. As part of that vast enhancement in auto pilot systems also require that all commercial passenger aircraft over 40 seats or whatever figure is decided on (it is probably going to be too expensive to retrofit and/or fit at all these kinds of protections for very small scheduled passenger aircraft) have a capability where the flight controls on the flight deck can be locked out from the pilot in charge and an auto land sequence to land the aircraft at the nearest commercial airport with a long off runway be initiated remotely by either the nearest ATC centre or the airline's own operations and control centre.

3. In order to facilitate the use of the remote auto land facility at point 2 above ensure that there are various prominently marked emergency telephones in break glass type cabinets in the passenger cabin (with a suitable threat of an up to 10,000 Euro fine or up to 6 months in jail for inappropriate or malicious use) and galley areas that either cabin crew or passengers can use to contact ATC or the airline base in an emergency to demand that control be taken out of the hands of the flight deck crew right now and the plane auto landed at the nearest suitable airport in terms of runway length and current weather conditions.

None of this can be done overnight but it could be designed in to all new builds within may be two years and retro fitted to all aircraft still flying within five years if they still have at least five years expected remaining use as a commercial aircraft ahead of them at that point in time. So in ten years we might actually be fully protected against such a possible event in all but very small passenger airplanes (which only carry a tiny percentage of total passenger numbers and passenger hours flown) will probably not have such protection because it is not economically viable (although it may become so in the fullness of time such as another 25 years from now)

At this point a pilot in charge could then only crash the airplane by carrying on materials that would let him set fire to the flight deck or similar but in principle security checks for getting airside also ought to prevent any pilot from being able to do that.

With the current state of computer automation it surely can be done if the threat is perceived to be large and significant enough and there is also the political will to force the manufacturers and the airlines to do it.

[mm_flynn]

Yes there is:-

1. Vastly enhance current aircraft control systems so that they simply refuse deliberate control inputs ...

Pilot shuts down engines, multi billion technology defeated as aircraft inevitably crashes.


2. ... have a capability where the flight controls on the flight deck can be locked out from the pilot in charge and an auto land sequence to land the aircraft at the nearest commercial airport with a long off runway be initiated remotely by either the nearest ATC centre or the airline's own operations and control centre.

New low risk approach to hijacking airlines introduced in name of safety. (you can now hack the comms from a safe ground location nowhere near any security)

[NigelOnDraft]

Capvermell Quote:
There isn't a solution.
Yes there is:-Your solution(s) are decades away from being technically feasible, let alone financially acceptable.

For instance:and an auto land sequence to land the aircraft at the nearest commercial airport with a long off runwaywould require huge infrastructure investments.

We are far from any aircraft being able to truly "autoland". Today's aircraft can land without a pilot manipulating the flying controls in the landing phase, but require 100% interaction, monitoring and potential intervention from the crew in the approach and landing phase.
if the threat is perceived to be large and significant enough and there is also the political will to force the manufacturers and the airlines to do it. This I agree with - we are far from meeting either of those factors IMO.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

LordSpandexMasher wrote:-

Yes there is:-

1. Vastly enhance current aircraft control systems so that they simply refuse deliberate control inputs by a pilot in charge that could only have the intent of crashing the aircraft. This would include obvious things that seem to not currently exist such as auto pilots also knowing about the height of all terrain and high buildings or masts etc on the ground so they would never accept any flight route that would fly the airplane deliberately in to terrain. The aircraft should only be capable of being descended to anywhere near ground level at locations where there are known suitable airports of an adequate minimum runway length for that aircraft type.

A, Too easy to confuse with a deliberate attempt to avoid, for instance, a mid air collision. B, I'll just crash it onto the suitable and adequate airport instead.

2. As part of that vast enhancement in auto pilot systems also require that all commercial passenger aircraft over 40 seats or whatever figure is decided on (it is probably going to be too expensive to retrofit and/or fit at all these kinds of protections for very small scheduled passenger aircraft) have a capability where the flight controls on the flight deck can be locked out from the pilot in charge and an auto land sequence to land the aircraft at the nearest commercial airport with a long off runway be initiated remotely by either the nearest ATC centre or the airline's own operations and control centre.

You're just shifting the capability of mass murder to ATC or the OCC but with no way of overriding. What will be the conditions required for this lock out to be initiated?

3. In order to facilitate the use of the remote auto land facility at point 2 above ensure that there are various prominently marked emergency telephones in break glass type cabinets in the passenger cabin (with a suitable threat of an up to 10,000 Euro fine or up to 6 months in jail for inappropriate or malicious use) and galley areas that either cabin crew or passengers can use to contact ATC or the airline base in an emergency to demand that control be taken out of the hands of the flight deck crew right now and the plane auto landed at the nearest suitable airport in terms of runway length and current weather conditions.

You believe a drunk passenger or mentally unstable cabin crew? I know, I fancy hijacking this aircraft and now all I have to do is make a 'phone call to the airline's very own self help hijack help line.

At this point a pilot in charge could then only crash the airplane by carrying on materials that would let him set fire to the flight deck or similar but in principle security checks for getting airside also ought to prevent any pilot from being able to do that.

Or disabling the system....

Like I said.

[Capvermell]

NigelOnDraft wrote:- Your solution(s) are decades away from being technically feasible, let alone financially acceptable.

We are far from any aircraft being able to truly "autoland". Today's aircraft can land without a pilot manipulating the flying controls in the landing phase, but require 100% interaction, monitoring and potential intervention from the crew in the approach and landing phase.

So what is the Boeing Honeywell Uninterruptible Autopilot then?

See Boeing Honeywell Uninterruptible Autopilot - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Honeywell_Uninterruptible_Autopilot)

The Boeing Honeywell Uninterruptible Autopilot is a set of sub-routines aimed at defeating attempts at aircraft hijacking by removing electrical power from an aircraft's flight deck, and irrevocably passing pilot authority to the autopilot and navigational computer for an automated landing at a safe airfield that can deal effectively with the incident.

In 2005, avionics supplier, Honeywell, was reported to be talking to both Boeing and Airbus about fitting a device aimed at preventing a 9/11-style hijack. On 16 April 2003, Honeywell filed patent [9] Airbus and BAE Systems, had been working on the project with Honeywell. Development sped up after the September 11, 2001 attacks.[10][11] The patent for the system was awarded to Boeing in 2006

Of course I realise this is an Airbus A320 but normally Airbus is way ahead of Boeing on such matters and it says above that Honeywell was also taking to Airbus about its system.

And even if no regular scheduled Boeing commercial aircraft yet has it on board it seems to be in a state of development where that could happen within 5 years if the political will was there.

[Basil]

Could those who are not aviation industry professionals please stop clogging up this thread and making fools of themselves?

[peekay4]

BEA plans A320 flight to validate Germanwings CVR data (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/bea-plans-a320-flight-to-validate-germanwings-cvr-data-411534/)

FlightGlobal -- Investigators will conduct a flight with an Airbus A320 to validate sounds picked up by the cockpit voice recorder of the Germanwings aircraft that crashed in the French Alps on 24 March. ...

The aim is not to simulate events on board that aircraft before it crashed, says BEA. Instead, the investigators want to ensure that the sounds of selector knobs and switches being used – as recorded by the CVR on the Germanwings flight – can be precisely attributed to specific controls in the cockpit.

Some interesting details:

[German transport ministry Alexander Dobrindt] says the co-pilot's capacity to act throughout the descent has been "fully proven". FDR data shows that the first officer not only changed the altimeter and speed settings several times but also "actively used the control organ [sidestick]" during this period, he says.

"These three elements are verifiable on the FDR and thus [make] conclusively clear that the co-pilot intervened several times consciously to bring that aircraft to a crash," he says.

The article also states that a preliminary report will be published "within weeks".

[Rotor Work]

SBS Dateline, 8,30pm Sunday 26th
Are our planes safe?
Examines the recent German Wings tragedy.

Should be available to watch soon on SBS on Demand
Regards RW

What is SBS On Demand? | watch tv online | SBS On Demand (http://www.sbs.com.au/ondemand/about/#/Menu/Programs/Featured)

[DaveReidUK]

Should be available to watch soon on SBS on DemandDateline Presents: Are Our Planes Safe? | Current Affairs | Dateline | SBS (http://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/story/dateline-presents-are-our-planes-safe)

"Due to publishing rights, the content you are trying to watch is currently not available outside of Australia". :ugh:

[TWT]

It was a doco by ITN Productions for Channel 4's Dispatches programme with Matt Frei,so it's probably already been on in the UK.

Here:

http://www.channel4.com/programmes/how-safe-are-our-planes/on-demand/61713-001
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[DaveReidUK]

Ah, you're right - they appear to have changed the title from "How Safe Are Our Planes?" to "Are Our Planes Safe?" to make it easier for Australians. :O

Viewable on YouTube.

[frankpgh]

FAA questioned mental health of Germanwings pilot - CNNPolitics.com (http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/29/politics/germanwings-pilot-faa-mental-health/index.html)

[Mr A Tis]

Varies news agencies reporting today that the Co-Pilot practised rapid descent on the outbound flight to Barcelona. Data from flight recorder.
Germanwings crash: Co-pilot Lubitz 'practised rapid descent' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32604552)

[bill fly]

Sounds a bit strange.
- A pilot knows how to descend without practising it on a cruise flight
- Was he alone in the cockpit? If not what did the captain do about it?
- What did ATC say about it?
We'd better wait until the BBC gets its facts sorted out...

[LadyL2013]

If that happened, how did the Captain not say or respond the first time, or did he?

[Titania]

FlightRadar24 has published the altitude profile of the previous GermanWings flight. Here: https://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/595885345457209345

[thf]

Preliminary Report, May 6 2015

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2015/d-px150324.en/pdf/d-px150324.en.pdf

[NigelOnDraft]

If that happened, how did the Captain not say or respond the first time, or did he?Detailed in the report, but Capt was not on Flt Deck.

In fact, the descent was ATC instructed and flown normally, the "practice" was just the selection of 100' (and other incorrect values) on the FCU for periods of time as I read it.

Not much new I saw in the Prelim Report, but a useful summary of the current factual status.

[susier]

Quick question regarding security camera...page 24 of the report says:


'Parts from the cockpit (access door to the cockpit, sidestick, security camera) were also found in the upper part of the site.'


Is this something that's been referred to previously?

[Ian W]

Medical aspects: the investigation will seek to understand the current balance
between medical confidentiality and flight safety. It will specifically aim to explain
how and why pilots can be in a cockpit with the intention of causing the loss of
the aircraft and its occupants, despite the existence of:
„
regulations setting mandatory medical criteria for flight crews, especially in the
areas of psychiatry, psychology and behavioural problems;
„
recruitment policies, as well as the initial and recurrent training processes
within airlines.


This aspect of the investigation will raise the bar for aircrew who have suffered 'depression' or similar problems. I could see this being the subject of EASA ruling probably leading to worldwide regulation changes.