Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[gearlever]

IMHO the father is only a victim of the PAID journo (self called expert) sitting on the far right.

https://youtu.be/RaJOTaPK0sc

[Marama]

I think the BEA checked with Airbus and Germanwings about how the cockpit door for this aircraft was programmed, apparently the normal access code generates a buzzer for only 980ms and they ruled out completely that a 'clacking' noise heard during the 980ms buzzer was the switch being set to LOCK. The noise probably was Lubitz doing something at that point in the process of locking the door and preparing himself for what he was about to do.

[noske]

I'm sorry but what are AVHerald trying to insinuate with their latest article? It looks like a load of hogwash and I don't have the patience to try and read it..
Alright, so here is one father who says that he does not refuse to believe that his son did this, but that he would like to be offered more convincing evidence. And then he goes on to present the building blocks for a story (he doesn't really spell it out like that) that the co-pilot just liked to play with the altitude selector whenever the captain was away, just so he could watch the associated marker move on the ND, but on the accident flight he was unfortunately knocked unconscious by turbulence during one of these exercises. And the captain was not prevented to return to the flight deck by someone flipping the door control switch to LOCK, but because one digit on the :mad: keypad didn't work.

Btw., the reasoning offered for that specific last item is the one thing that makes the AVHerald article worth reading, more precisely the section titled "Keypad, normal and emergency entry".

But make no mistake, I have little doubt whether or not Lubitz did all this intentionally. From the BFU statement in the final report, appendix 3 (emphasis is mine):
This assessment of the capability to act combined with the factual information, that the co-pilot [...] has made enquiries concerning the function of the door system and suicides, according to documents available to BFU, resulted in the above-mentioned conclusion.

[gearlever]

And then he goes on to present the building blocks for a story (he doesn't really spell it out like that) that the co-pilot just liked to play with the altitude selector whenever the captain was away, just so he could watch the associated marker move on the ND, :

Is it enough to slect a lower altitude to see the banana? If my memory serves me right the alt knob has also to be pulled, e.g. starting a descent.

Stand to be corrected.

[MartinAOA]

Didn't they find web searches on his tablet computer in the days leading up to the crash which included "ways to commit suicide" and "cockpit doors and their security provisions"?

[DaveReidUK]

See the quote two posts prior to yours.

[gearlever]

This is really strange (flight to BCN)

On the previous flight, the following facts can be noted:
ˆˆ at 7 h 19 min 59, noises like those of the cockpit door opening then closing were recorded and corresponded to when the Captain left the cockpit; the aeroplane was then at cruise speed at flight level FL370 (37,000 ft);
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 29, the flight was transferred to the Bordeaux en-route control
centre and the crew was instructed to descend to flight level FL350 (35,000 ft), an instruction read back by the co-pilot;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 32, the aircraft was put into a descent to flight level FL350 , selected a few seconds earlier;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to
continue the descent to flight level FL210;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
ˆˆ from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit;
ˆˆ at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control
centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
ˆˆ at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.On page 28 of the final report you can find the corresponding graph, scary.

https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/BEA2015-0125.en-LR.pdf

[wiggy]

I must repeat my question as of before..

Is it true or false that BA no longer follow the two cockpit policy?

You can repeat your question as often as you want but no professional aviator with any sense will give you answers to questions involving security measures - being blunt there is a principle called "need to know" and in this case you don't "need to know".

If you insist on conflating this with the elderly pax: severe credibility probs with the media reports, done to death elsewhere on Pprune.

[Nemrytter]

You can repeat your question as often as you want but no professional aviator with any sense will give you answers to questions involving security measures - being blunt there is a principle called "need to know" and in this case you don't "need to know".Nonsense, it's common knowledge. You can check this yourself - as pax - quite easily by sitting within sight of the front of the cabin at a time when a crew-member takes a comfort break.:ok:

[FlightDetent]

You're free to find out. Just do not ask us to say it. :)

[wiggy]

Nemrytter - you're not wrong but as someone once said: "You might say that, I can't possibly comment :E :ok:

Seriously though, and just to clarify matters for the sake of A320ECAM ......

For good reason most (?all) companies have a blanket prohibition (on pain of dismissal) on staff discussing security matters with e.g. non employees and others outside the organisation.

[Nemrytter]

or good reason most (?all) companies have a blanket prohibition (on pain of dismissal) on staff discussing security mattersDepends if you count the 2 person rule as a security measure or as a passenger comfort/reassurance measure.:}

[A320ECAM]

I cannot believe that the AVH would give the father of Lubitz time considering what Lubitz did?

The moment the plane lost RT, the French should have sent up two F-16s to check what was going on in the flight deck. Had they seen Lubitz alive and conscious, then that would shut Lubitz' ignorant and unapologetic father up once and for all!

[wiggy]

the French should have sent up two F-16s

Leaving aside reaction time you might want to have a look at the French Air Force orbat.

In any event as I recall it at the time reports were they were pretty quick to react but no way they could intercept in time to observe events unravelling.

[gearlever]

The moment the plane lost RT, the French should have sent up two F-16s to check what was going on in the flight deck.

No F-16 in french airforce.

One Mirage was sent at 09:48, airbus crashed at 09:41 UTC....

[Steve6443]

I cannot believe that the AVH would give the father of Lubitz time considering what Lubitz did?

The moment the plane lost RT, the French should have sent up two F-16s to check what was going on in the flight deck. Had they seen Lubitz alive and conscious, then that would shut Lubitz' ignorant and unapologetic father up once and for all!

I agree with point 1 - AvH is losing the plot by allowing the father time and space to voice his doubts as to the heinous and criminal act his son carried out.

The second point is unnecessary - after all, the data from the FDR is very clear what happened. The son didn't just 'play with the selected altitude' and become unconscious, he was adjusting the target speed as the aircraft descended. Had the father's claims held any truth, the son could have returned the target altitude back to a safe level, rather than repeatedly turning the target speed ever higher.

As the last movement of the speed control knob happened more than 4 minutes after the altitude was selected to 100 feet, it was clear that Lubitz knew what he was doing, the father should shut up and think of the families of the victims......

[gearlever]

Steve, I fully agree. Especially with regard what Lubitz did on the incoming flight to BCN, check my post of April 4th.

Cheers

[Steve6443]

Steve, I fully agree. Especially with regard what Lubitz did on the incoming flight to BCN, check my post of April 4th.

Cheers

The problem is, the father could point to that recording and say

'see, he did that on the previous flight, the a/p altitude knob was something he always played with when the other crew member was out of the cockpit'

and try to use it as proof the son never intentionally crashed the aircraft because in the previous flight, the turning to 100 feet had made no difference; unfortunately - so is the probable reasoning of Lubitz Senior - on the return flight his son became incapacitated after he had adjusted the altitude to 100 feet, hence the plane crashed.

The fact that he wasn't incapacitated enough to stop continually modifying the target airspeed over the next 4 minutes hasn't yet registered with this ill-informed and crassly insensitive father - but I can live in hope that he eventually reads this and understands how much anger he is causing families of the victims by his refusal to accept the truth.

[gearlever]

Yes Steve, but it's not Andreas father, it's the journo T.v.B. who is arguing that way, payed by G.Lubitz.

[Steve6443]

Yes Steve, but it's not Andreas father, it's the journo T.v.B. who is arguing that way, payed by G.Lubitz.

Doesn't matter.... Whoever pays for the piper, determines the music being played.

[gearlever]

Exactly Steve.

I'm wondering also why AvHerald is so keen about 4u9525.... I mean the owner of that site went to Berlin to visit the press conference. Can't remember any other case where he did that.

And it wasn't about fumes....:O

[noske]

Simon attended the BEA press conference for the final report on AF447, for example. And he didn't make the trip to Berlin just to hear Günter Lubitz talk, but he was in town for a few days anyway - at least that's what he says (4th paragraph in the avherald article).

I can understand that the part about the possibly defective door keypad got his attention, and that he asked BEA for more information about it:
6) Has the BEA received information about an occurrence on D-AIPX a few days prior to the crash, that a flight crew managed to lock themselves out of the cockpit while still on the ground and needed maintenance to get back into the cockpit?
7) Did the BEA investigate this occurrence, or did the BFU investigate this occurrence? Is it possible to receive that investigation report?
8) Is it correct, that this occurrence was caused by the failure of the digit x (Editorial note: actual key removed for publication) on the keypad?
9) Is the BEA in possession of the relevant tech log entries and is this occurrence included in this tech log? Was the keypad replaced, or was the defect deferred by maintenance?
And I find their response kind of disappointing:
I am well aware that the recent press conference has renew the interest in this event but as far as the BEA is concerned, we have published the final report and have nothing else to add or to comment.
But then again, maybe he shouldn't have submitted a whole catalog of no less than 25 questions about all kinds of weird topics brought up at the press conference, including gems like "Is the BEA aware that there are 4 different versions of the CVR transcript?" :ugh:

[AN2 Driver]

I'm wondering also why AvHerald is so keen about 4u9525.... I mean the owner of that site went to Berlin to visit the press conference. Can't remember any other case where he did that.

No, he did not go to Berlin to be at the press conference, as far as I know that trip was scheduled a very long time before it was known to happen. He apparently decided to visit it as he was there anyway and had the time to do it.

Why AVH is keen on the story he has answered more than clearly. Like many of us the Herald staff seem to find that there are a lot of unanswered questions which need addressing, some of them quite pressing ones such as the keypad issue and generally the conduct of that investigation. That is reason enough to keep looking at it.

[Less Hair]

This is a pilot's father trying do defend the family or similar in formation flight with some "investigative" journalist with some non proven suspicions. So far okay but nothing to bring forward the topic itself. Shouldn't we wait for actual news to come up? Apologies but I don't care that much about the FO family's PR.

[DaveReidUK]

I don't think what triggered that article was the question of guilt, but the question whether there were things in this investigation which deserve scrutiny because they are either wrong or at least do not live up to the standards of a normal accident investigation.

Like many of us the Herald staff seem to find that there are a lot of unanswered questions which need addressing, some of them quite pressing ones such as the keypad issue and generally the conduct of that investigation. That is reason enough to keep looking at it.

What is it about the conduct of the investigation that makes you repeatedly say that ?

The BEA knew from the start that, because of the particular circumstances of the crash, every word they published would be subject to intense scrutiny and, on the whole, the investigation report reflects that (including a detailed discussion of the CDLS as applicable to the airframe in question)..

[BluSdUp]

Mental illness ?
Lack of understanding of what goes on and accepting it.
As father, as son we say in Norway.
A total lack of understanding how things work, and how to behave.

This :mad: Andreas is a mass murderer and a traitor to his country and his profession.
3 independent investigations say so.
Andreas was a rotten egg, and his Father knew he was a Coo Coo.
His inaction and his sons action has made a mess.

He could have stopped him, he did not.
He should not attack others, for telling the truth.

[gearlever]

Question:

Is it possible to turn the ALT SEL knob on A 320 from 38.000 ft to 100 ft within one second?

[FlightDetent]

Absolutely yes.

[Marlon Brando]

The father is victim too.
He lost his son, and his son went from the perfect son (young pilot from the national airline) to a mass murderer.

He (the father) feel probably guilty about his son's actions, but he has nothing to do with it. And all Germany hates him now, and his wife (the mother) ass well, And all the Lubitz Family.

So, as a father, you can :
1- commit suicide (alone please)
2- deny the truth
3- go insane

He chose the second option...

I feel sorry for him

[abgd]

He could have stopped him, he did not.

That's a big allegation to make. Do you know of anything we don't, to support you in making it?

Lots of people have - and muddle through with - severe psychiatric problems. It's far from true to say that their nearest and dearest always know what's going on, or how unwell they are.

[BluSdUp]

We all have problems, and we all hide things.
But you have to be blind as a father is you in this case did not see that your son had big problems and needed serious help and restrictions.
If Your son drops out due to depressions it is Your duty to help him. If not there is something wrong with You.
I think Lubnitz Sr just proved to all that he was not a good and passionate father. He could have helped his son get proper treatment and job on the ground. That is what good Dads do!

And , no, I am not privy to any information You dont have.
But my field of interest happens to be Human Performance in Aviation, or the lack of it.
This person should never have been near an aircraft , never mind flying one!
Some knew this but chose to turn the blind eye, that is a crime.
His father must have known or should have.

[gearlever]

BluSdUp

Lubitz father is denying a depression of his son.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaJOTaPK0sc&t=5488s

[abgd]

But my field of interest happens to be Human Performance in Aviation, or the lack of it.
This person should never have been near an aircraft , never mind flying one!
Some knew this but chose to turn the blind eye, that is a crime.
His father must have known or should have.


I don't speak German well enough to appreciate Lubitz senior's perspective. But speaking generally, a very high proportion of people suffer from psychiatric problems at some point in their lives and few go on to kill themselves, let alone anyone else. The lifetime prevalence of major depression is 20-30% depending on which figures you look for.

Now, there are clearly several types of depression (and related illnesses). Certainly some stories about Lubitz suggest that his illness was unusual and should have raised red flags if they are true as reported. However speaking more generally, people who kill themselves often do surprise friends and family. Also, the brighter you are, the more unwell you can get whilst still seemingly holding things together. And even if families know about a person's low mood, it's not uncommon for it to seemingly improve shortly before they decide to kill themselves - presumably due to the newfound sense of purpose.

And , no, I am not privy to any information You dont have.

In that case I'm afraid I find your comments both ignorant and disrespectful - not so much to Lubitz' father about whom I know very little, but with regard to the bereaved relatives of people who have killed themselves in general. The writing isn't always on the wall, and even when it is, it can sometimes only be read in retrospect.

[abgd]

I never disputed that Lubitz killed himself and his passengers.

[gearlever]

On the previous flight, the following facts can be noted:

ˆˆ at 7 h 19 min 59, noises like those of the cockpit door opening then closing were recorded and corresponded to when the Captain left the cockpit; the aeroplane was then at cruise speed at flight level FL370 (37,000 ft);
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 29, the flight was transferred to the Bordeaux en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to flight level FL350 (35,000 ft), an instruction read back by the co-pilot;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 32, the aircraft was put into a descent to flight level FL350 , selected a few seconds earlier;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to continue the descent to flight level FL210;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
ˆˆ from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit;
ˆˆ at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
ˆˆ at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.

[BusAirDriver]

At around 1:33 in that youtube video, Tim Van Beveren, is saying that he believes Lubitz was dialling down the Altitude in the FCU on way to Barcelona, to see the optimal descent point / profile, this was regarding what happen on the previous sector to BCN.

Really clutching at straws these people.
These people are in serious denial regarding what happen. :ugh:

[woodpecker]

ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to continue the descent to flight level FL210;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
ˆˆ from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit;
ˆˆ at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
ˆˆ at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.

Being a Boeing driver I am confused by the above statement that "the changes did not influence the descent path".

If the descent was initiated to FL 350 and 100 feet selected "in the window" the a/c would continue as commanded towards FL350, but, if the "window" height was increased, as suggested, to 49000 feet, on a Boeing, the A/P would have discontinued the "v-nav" descent and reverted to "Alt Hold". Surely the same would have occurred on an Airbus!

Over to you bus drivers...

[FlightDetent]

Mode reversion, yes - but to SEL V/S of the moment when the ALT selector goes through the currently passing level / altitude.

[gearlever]

Anyhow, the question is why did Lubitz fumble around with the ALT SEL knob?

[KayPam]

In ALT mode, you can move your alt bug as much as you want, nothing will happen until you push or pull it.

[gearlever]

Yeah, but he was already in a descend.

[Longtimer]

German airlines drop safety rule prompted by Germanwings crash
3 hours ago

From the section Europe
Germanwings has now merged with Eurowings

German airlines are dropping safety rules brought in after the 2015 Germanwings plane crash which require two people in the cockpit at all times.

Andreas Lubitz killed 150 people by crashing the plane - apparently on purpose - after the plane's captain left to use the toilet.

Airlines now say the two-person rule has no safety benefits.

Eurowings, which merged with the Germanwings brand, is one of the airlines now dropping the requirement.

The German airline association BDL announced the change, which will come into effect by 1 June, on its website. It said its airlines will be re-introducing their original cockpit safety procedures.

The European Aviation Safety Agency, which was behind the original rule change, relaxed the requirements last year to allow individual airlines to evaluate their own safety needs.

BDL said that its airlines had "independently" reviewed the rules and decided that the two-person rule had no safety benefits - and could actually be more dangerous.

The group said the changes caused "more frequent and predictable" opening of the cockpit door and expanded the number of people with access to the cockpit.
Safety rules about cockpit access were enhanced following the 2015 crash

It also said that the risk of a similar incident to the Germanwings crash was extremely low, and the risk of criminal or terrorist activity was much higher.

Lufthansa, the country's biggest airline, is one of the groups removing the requirement. Its airlines include Austrian Airlines, Swiss Airlines, and Eurowings - which was merged with Germanwings in 2015, a process which had begun before the company's high-profile crash.

[KayPam]

Nothing that observers didn't say on the very day they said they would implement this rule.

[aterpster]

It also said that the risk of a similar incident to the Germanwings crash was extremely low, and the risk of criminal or terrorist activity was much higher.


Bad choices, but I agree with that conclusion.