Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France [Archive] - Page 11

slats11

29th Mar 2015, 10:21

You have to remember that this is not a normal accident! AAIB is Air Accident investigation not AIR Murder investigation

Exactly. The situation is that the facts point to criminal action - to the point that an "innocent" explanation is pretty much implausible.

I really do admire and respect the painstaking work done by accident investigators. I'm often fascinated by Air Crash Investigation on TV. And I appreciate that the careful methodic approach of these professionals has done much to enhance air safety over many years.

Equally however, some crimes is so heinous that it is irresponsible and unreasonable to not release the information as soon as criminal investigators are clear what happened. They don't know all the fine details, and their investigation is ongoing. But they know the big picture. They wouldn't be releasing this information on the world stage if it was just one possible explanation - or even if it was just the most likely explanation. They are quite certain of the explanation.

Timely and transparent release of information is important for the relatives - who aren't even going to get a body to bury. Early answers are important to help the relatives process this awful event. The relatives of MH370 (and for two years those of AF447) have endured a special kind of hell. Early answers were not possible with those two events. But when everyone can see a plane fragmented on the side of the mountain and when innocent explanations are quickly excluded. who would really tell the relatives they will have to wait until the investigation is completed? And imagine the awful backlash if the truth only came out months later when it was known with certainty in the first couple of days.

There are security considerations also. Quick measures being implemented may not stop a 2nd incident. There are no guarantees when dealing with this sort of event. But just imagine is there was a 2nd event while the accident investigation was ongoing.

Remember the crucial accident investigation will be ongoing quietly in the background. And I am supremely confident in the ability of the accident investigators to do their important job not distracted by the information released by the criminal investigators. And if they find it was something else, then that will come out. But I don't think anyone really believes that is going to happen.

I would even go further than this. Maybe the release of information from the criminal investigators is taking the pressure and the media spotlight off the accident investigators, and allowing them to get on with their job.

Whenever the world changes, we have to change also. That may mean a departure from previous practice. But such change is sometimes inevitable as it is forced upon us.

Four Turbo

29th Mar 2015, 10:40

hotmetal

29th Mar 2015, 10:43

Because an out of control fire is a real threat to the safety of the aircraft. A real threat. Not a made up media storm threat. It is needed for prising open panels breaking in to areas where a fire may be. I'm sure somebody more knowledgable will be along with the stats on in flight smoke,fire, fumes events. IMHO this is one of the threats we really should be protecting against.

737er

29th Mar 2015, 10:49

Let's see. Still living with his long time teacher girlfriend he is broken up with. FA is now in a relationship with him knowing that.

Yes, pinch of salt. From both of them.

Back to reality. This is all fear based masterbation. Statistically there are literally dozens of other FAR more deadly things the public is exposed too which, unlike this, could be reliably addressed and improved resulting in REAL safety improvments.

The real mental illness????

Our own collectice inability as little scared dim-witted monkeys to be able to use logic and perspective instead of succumbing to fear based hype and sensationalism. Now THAT is the truth.

hotmetal

29th Mar 2015, 10:54

Totally agree with that. No ability to identify where the real threats and danger lie.

charliegolf

29th Mar 2015, 10:55

Back to reality. This is all fear based masterbation. Statistically there are literally dozens of other FAR more deadly things the public is exposed too which, unlike this, could be reliably addressed and improved resulting in REAL safety improvments.

The real mental illness????

Our own collectice inability as little scared dim-witted monkeys to be able to use logic and perspective instead of succumbing to fear based hype and sensationalism. Now THAT is the truth.

Like locking the flight deck door because of ONE incident? Or only allowing 100ml of clear explosive aboard?

737er

29th Mar 2015, 11:02

hotmetal

Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: oxfordshire
Posts: 113
Totally agree with that. No ability to identify where the real threats and danger lie.

Yup.

Even when we know exactly where they are and where they aren't.

Anxieties.com | How safe is commercial flight? (http://anxieties.com/flying-howsafe.php#.VRfblhhHaK0)

chopjock

29th Mar 2015, 11:19

If I was a captain would I leave a stranger alone in the FD and then lock myself out? Even if against my better judgement? I suppose I would have to if SOP dictates it?

athonite

29th Mar 2015, 11:33

I'm interested the way it is being suggested by the media that psychometric tests are the answer, and likewise Lufthansa claim all their pilots undertake regular psychometric test, clearly the tests don't work.

Psychometric tests fall into two areas:

(a) APTITUDE & ABILITY. This is to ensure the person has the ability and aptitude to succeed in initial pilot training, or conversion course.

(b) PERSONALITY. This test tries to map the person's personality, for example, 16 PF (16 personality factor). I have always been doubtful about such tests, I'd like to see the evidence that they have any validity.

Having said that, I fail to see how psychometric tests will ever detect underlying psychological and psychiatric problems and I believe that psychometric tests will be used as a a knee jerk reaction to satisfy the general public and authorities.

The way forward is to take a more holistic approach and a better awareness and understanding of those who we work with through HF/CRM and HP&L training programmes.

Here in the UK, I don't believe we have such tight privacy rules as Germany, according to the British Medical Association a General Practioner (doctor) can breach medical confidentiality, if they thought the patient could endanger others.

In the UK on renewal of a medical, you simply self disclose when and why you have seen a doctor since you last medical. Over twenty five years, I'm not aware my GP has ever been contacted, or that the CAA have ever seen my medical records.

However, in the UK our National Health Service (NHS) patients records are held electronically (unless you opt out), this holds all information on all medical treatment for an individual. So the simple answers here in the UK is that prior to a medical an AME (Authorised Medical Examiner) could access the patients records online.

The next point is should intemperate acts be immediately notified to the AME, this was first put forward at a conference in Dublin in the mid nineties, but was opposed at the time, not least by myself. However the present situation in the UK is that if an individual in the UK holds a firearms licence, my understanding the moment the police caution, arrest or charge an individual, their firearms licence is revoked until further investigation.

Oddly if an airline pilot is arrested for example an drink driving or a drugs offence in the UK, and he or she tells the police they are an airline pilot, my understanding they will notify the CAA, but if they don't tell the police their correct profession, the police have no reason to contact the CAA. So unlike the holder of a firearms licence, the problem is not flagged up! On that basis, it would seem sensible that there is a mechanism that certain criminal events can be flagged up, as they may be an indication of a lack fitness to fly, until verified by the AME.

Finally if the media reports are correct, if Lubitz had has issues with depression and coping with stress, at such an early stage in his career, I question why he was ever allowed by Lufthansa to continue with his career. I appreciate my view might not meet with equal opportunities, but the employee must be fit for purpose.

Unfortunately in the UK there is a lot of political correctness in terms of equal opportunities which often leads to the 'wrong stuff' being appointed on the basis of a disability or ethnic origin. To give a brilliant example, couple of years ago, I observed a court hearing, and the District Judge had such a severe speech impediment that the respondent and his very young barrister (counsel) had to ask the judge on a number occasions to repeat what he had said (up to three or four times) which clearly angered the judge, to the detriment of the respondent. I just came away with the impression, that this judge should never have been appointed as a judge, for the same reason he should never pursued a career as an air traffic controller!!!

737er

29th Mar 2015, 11:38

How about mandating that the press and government educate and warn the public IN PROPORTION to the real dangers of the things that are killing them and if they don't...

then hold them responsible for KILLING the public by scaring the the living bejesus out of them over safe things and praying on their latent fears to sell advertising and for political grandstanding?!

If we are really talking about safety then nothing else would even come close to saving as many lives.

Now there's a truth pill.

Pace

29th Mar 2015, 11:55

Athonite

Incontrollable Anger not depression appears to be behind all these awful incidents like a young person venting his anger against a school by gunning down a school yard of innocent kids.

This appears to be the case with all these mass murders including this one. The label of depression does not do a service to the vast majority of people who suffer that at one point or another and would not hurt a fly only themselves

A and C

29th Mar 2015, 11:58

If some sort of phsyological testing was mandated judging from the posts above 75% of the people offering opinions on this forum would be barred from the flight deck of airliners.

ChickenHouse

29th Mar 2015, 11:59

Does anybody here have insight to the current medical situation in Europe, who is responsible for pilot "airworthiness"?

When I was on duty there, we had strict medical supervision by the airline doctors, who knew us quite well after a while. I now hear rumors that the responsibility for the medical fit-to-fly reasoning was moved by EU regulations to some anonymous authorities. I cannot believe this to be true, because it would be so stupid to take responsibility from the once having the duty of operations plus knowledge of the pilots and give it to some buttheads in some far away offices.

enginebird

29th Mar 2015, 12:18

Any pilot in any system should be able to come foreword with these issues. At any time if a pilot feels he is not fit to fly, he shouldn’t.

Any manager, be it a chief pilot or chief medical officer should appreciate when a pilot does this. It means that the pilot trusts the system and so it should be.

There has always been the same dilemma:
You call in "not fit to fly" for the first time and your decision will be lauded as "professional". You call in sick for the third or fouth time and may have a not so pleasant discussion with the chief pilot not much later... :rolleyes:

silverstrata

29th Mar 2015, 12:19

It looks as though Lubitz prompted the captain to go to the toilet. If so, this was very premeditated.

'Open the goddamn door!': Desperate final pleas of Germanwings captain emerge as black box transcript reveals Lubitz's repeated attempts to coax pilot into toilet | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3016466/Open-goddamn-door-Desperate-final-pleas-Germanwings-captain-emerge-black-box-transcript-reveals-Lubitz-s-repeated-attempts-coax-pilot-toilet.html)

Hussar 54

29th Mar 2015, 12:21

As RANTANPLANE said earlier - probably we will never know why....

In the mid-90's when I was out of work, I did some HAZMAT procedural reviews + updates in Russia for a FTSE 100 UK company's operations there....Met the Group CFO ( Finance Director in those days ) a couple of times who was blue-chip background, a top, top businessman, and genuinely nice guy....

Fast forward 10 years or so, and having a fairly new wife and young daughter and having had a fantastically successful business career in finance / investment banking, which had accumulated a personal wealth of £10 million plus, he threw himself under a train near Heathrow....

To this day, nobody knows why and, more importantly, there were absolutely no signs in both his private and personal life, even on the day itself, that this was coming....

Whatever the experts eventually determine as the reason for the FO's actions, without him there to answer himself, it can only be a guess at best....

ExXB

29th Mar 2015, 12:27

silverstrata,

Out of principle I don't click through to the Daily Mail. I have no respect for their publication and they are not aviation-industry friendly.

Clicking through just adds to their hit count, which influences what they can charge advertisers.

Is there any other source?

Pace

29th Mar 2015, 12:33

hussar54

And asked whether he believed the crash that killed 150 people was the result of suicide, he said: 'People who commit suicide usually do so alone... I don't call it a suicide.'

You call it suicide above the comments from the prosecutor

lomapaseo

29th Mar 2015, 12:34

I'm not very sure of anybody's ability to look into somebody's instantaneous mind set bent on destroying themselves and others with them.

I would prefer to work on ways of mitigating such actions especially to others.

I have no problem with the unofficial release of the prelim results of this investigation to advise others who can take action towards this mitigation in a timely manner.

I just hate to think that a post 9-11 reaction created a new lethal -problem.

Air Snoop

29th Mar 2015, 12:38

A bad week for Air Safety has been made even worse by the irresponsible, premature and unnecessary release of CVR data. The need for this disclosure does not outweigh "the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future investigations" (Annex 13)

I hope the BEA publicly distances itself from this debacle.

MrSnuggles

29th Mar 2015, 12:43

Thankyou mods, things look a lot calmer now.

Two things:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france-126.html#post8923931
Chicken is right. The misunderstandings surrounding SSRIs seem to be huge. I hope Mr Chicken will elaborate on that.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france-129.html#post8924421
I can only speak for Sweden now.

There are some illnesses that our Doc HAS to report to Transportstyrelsen (our gouvernment agency that oversees transport by air, rail, sea, road). These includes epilepsy, diseases affecting CNS system, dementia of all sorts, schizophrenia, ADHD, autism spectrum to name a few. This is nothing you can escape or beg the Doc to hide. These tings MUST be reported.

There are also a few things that Doc can report if s/he deems the patient to be a risk for transport security. This includes a few vision problems, psycothic episodes, suicidal thoughts, a few joint problems, and a range of other thing that Doc may consider dangerous.

If you have come under Transportstyrelsen scrutiny, there are ways out. If the illness or syndrome is transient in nature (like temporary suicidal thoughts or joint problems) you are being followed up on a regular basis until Doc clears you and you get your licence back. The same with ADHD and autism spectrum. You are being monitored for a while with regular follow ups and if Doc says everything's A-OK you're green to go. It has to be a specialist in the field that clears you though. If you had mental problems, it needs to be a psychiatrist. Vision problems - an eye doctor. Cancer: onchologist and so on.

One more thing: I would like to agree with Pace. People who do this kind of thing have a mindset more like school shooters than being depressed.

Pace

29th Mar 2015, 13:01

Mr Snuggles

This is the problem I see that no category of illness has been diagnosed on this individual yet a media induced blanket diagnosis will lead to a Witch hunt on pilots! Who will pay for those extra tests? And what are those test for?

We especially in corporate jets pay our own medicals which with all the normal tests are already now very expensive.

We already see knee jerk reactions and unthought out reactions to CC being put on flight decks to appease the lack of confidence in the Airlines that this incident has caused

Was this guy a psychopath? what is his particular condition that caused him to take out 150 innocent lives in a mass murder obviously with NO consideration for those poor people in his care? Depression ? :ugh: I think not! It appears to be totally premeditated and planned just awaiting the opportunity

This is all far to vague and not specific Are there tests which can pin point a Specific condition that would make someone knowingly murder 150 people ? What is that condition? that is what needs to be identified and protected against not whether you have had an argument with the girlfriend or going through a divorce! Thats normal life

ExXB

29th Mar 2015, 13:01

nevillestyke.

And if you are a JetBlue co-pilot who has good cause to lock out the Captain?

There is no solution to this dichotomy. The failure wasn't with the cockpit door, the failure was elsewhere.

MartinAOA

29th Mar 2015, 13:11

As I stated before, the German employment law is to blame in the fist place. The FO had a motivation to conceal his health issues from his employer. He did it on purpose AND was aided by German employment law.

Under German employment law it is the responsibility of an employee to inform an employer if they were deemed unfit to work. An employer(DLH/GWI in this case) do not have the right to ask for medical information from any employee. It is their responsibility to tell their superior, to tell their employer if they are sick. Even doctors could not step in as the data would be protected.

Ian W

29th Mar 2015, 13:15

MONTREAL-- The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) deplores and condemns yesterday's leaking of certain elements of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) of the Germanwings flight 4U9525.

Not only do these leaks contravene the internationally agreed principles of accident investigation confidentiality set out in ICAO Annex 13, they are also a breach of trust to all those involved in the investigation and to the families of the victims. Furthermore, leaks of this nature greatly harm flight safety since they invite ill-informed speculation from the media and the general public and discourage co-operation with investigators in future accidents.

IFALPA once again stresses that the sole purpose of a CVR is to aid investigators in determining the factors leading to an accident and not to apportion blame or be used outside of its safety context. CVR details should only be publicly released following a thorough and complete investigation of the events that occurred, and not prematurely during the course of the field portion of the accident investigation, underway for less than 48 hours.

Leaking premature, unanalyzed, and partial CVR recordings, which lack the context of the entire body of factual investigative data, severely interferes with the investigative process, and can only lead to early conclusions on what exactly occurred during the time leading up to the accident. Any other use of CVR data is not only invalid, but is an unacceptable invasion of privacy best described as a search for sensationalism and voyeurism of the worst kind.

It is vital for the investigating body to ensure all information under their control is properly handled until the completion of the investigation.

In this early stage of the investigation, many critical questions remain to be answered, and IFALPA stresses the need for an objective accident investigation process through the collection of all the facts needed to draw an accurate analysis of events. Once again, IFALPA’s resources are at the disposal of the Accident Investigation Agencies to achieve these aims.

Note: The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations represents in excess of 100,000 pilots in more than 100 countries world-wide. IFALPA’s mission is to be the global voice of airline pilots, promoting the highest level of aviation safety and security world-wide and providing services, support and representation to all of its Member Associations.

1. It has become abundantly plain from the release of more data from the CVR that this was not an accident therefore the rules for accident investigation no longer apply. This is now a criminal investigation of a mass murder.

2. It is also plain that the security rules in place in many airlines and enabled by technology, are not sufficient to prevent this type of event recurring. It is therefore urgent to ensure that all air carriers and regulatory authorities are immediately aware of the issues and can take action that they see fit to mitigate the actual safety risk to their passengers and aircraft. This approach of provision of information for immediate mitigation of a risk is standard practice even in an accident investigation.

IFALPA needs to get off its high horse and think about what has been published and what IFALPA should do to assist mitigation of an actual risk. As is often the case in criminal investigations, which this now is, the investigators have not leapt to judgment on guesses and have a lot more information from the CVR which had not been made publicly available when IFALPA wrote their letter. Their letter in hindsight may not look particularly well judged.

silverstrata

29th Mar 2015, 13:49

It is therefore urgent to ensure that all air carriers and regulatory authorities are immediately aware of the issues and can take action that they see fit to mitigate the actual safety risk to their passengers and aircraft

Whoa there, runaway steed. And what 'actions' may they be? And how will they 'mitigate risks'?

The whole problem is that nobody knows what the 'right actions' may be. The cockpit door policy post 9-11 was not fully thought through, as we can all see. (Some of us did warn the authorities.) So why rush in with new proposals, when these new ideas are equally fraught with unintended consequences? See my post here.

(A reply to my post.)
http://www.pprune.org/8924209-post2552.html

And nobody has replied to my primary question yet.

Would you want a nuclear power plant to recruit anyone from the streets, give them a few weeks training, and then place them in charge of the nuclear power plant's control room? And give them full authority to overpower the power station's highly trained controllers, whenever they feel like it?

That is what the CAA and various airlines are proposing. Is this sensible? Has anyone thought this through?

Ancient Observer

29th Mar 2015, 13:51

Problems with "medical" evidence.

Too much emphasis on either psychologists or psychiatrists will get us nowhere.

Neither school of thought has anything other than unproven theories. Very few peer reviewed published studies in either of these pseudo sciences advance our knowledge of the human condition. Unless, of course, they point out the bleeding obvious!

When I was at Uni, only the mad and psychologically unbalanced medics went in to Psychiatry.

Hussar 54

29th Mar 2015, 13:58

Didn't mean to call it either suicide or murder....

And apologies if my post gives that impression....

Just wanted to give an example, from first hand knowledge, that we will never be able to know conclusively why the FO did what he did because he's no longer here to give us the reason(s)....Best guess / deductions, yes, but absolute certainty, no....

Pitch Up Authority

29th Mar 2015, 14:06

The class 1 medical is covering both Physical and Mental health issues.

In my opinion the mental part can only be covered by an expert that knows the aviation world inside out. The abuses by the low cost carriers have to have an impact on the mental health of the pilots. The fact that some have to borrow up to 150000€ leave them vulnerable.

But the most important issue is that getting a license has been reduced to a multiple choice exam and video game.

It is a serious profession and needs to be approached in a similar way. We have to get rid of these commercially exploited training schools as soon as possible.

Stone_cold

29th Mar 2015, 14:12

The release of the "contents" of the CVR was not necessary to the general public . The release of a transcript or a summary of initial recommendations to the relevant stakeholders who could actually effect change may be the point IFALPA is making .
The actual CVR recordings could be in isolation prejudicial . As we can see , many experts here already KNOW exactly what factors caused this when all the data has yet to be collated and investigated . The public and media(Pprune included) cannot change the regulations , so the need for details are a unending desire in this e-centric cyber universe to know all NOW .
Unfortunately , the media does influence the politics of the decision makers .

skyhighfallguy

29th Mar 2015, 14:28

Was lubitz on a regularly scheduled flight for him or was he called in on reserve?

Stone_cold

29th Mar 2015, 14:38

Just one possible correction ZS-NDV , and some have already have posted it , if access is denied via the CDLS , the keypad is disabled . As with all Airbus , not sure what this particular MSN had fitted . Also , you allude to the fact that there is a lot of assumptions here , maybe most have no reason to get too involved in the emotive discourse and await the outcome of the investigation ?

Superpilot

29th Mar 2015, 14:48

ZS-NDV,

1.) First point is valid. Completely valid. I have flown some old dogs and I know at best of times it's impossible to hear yourself chewing on food let alone breathing!

2.) Regarding the altitude selection. I dunno, some a/c have knobs which do have the faint click click sound, other's don't but it doesn't matter as the altitude selection on the MCP was relayed via Mode-S. Even the anoraks picked it up (http://forum.flightradar24.com/threads/8650-We-have-analysed-the-raw-data-from-the-transponder-of-4U9525-and-found-some-more-dat)

Putting 2 together from here and 2 from there results in me being convinced the guy just wanted to end his life in the most spectacular and selfish way possible.

I would highly recommend a review of this article (http://www.news.com.au/technology/science/professor-jim-fallon-reveals-how-he-accidentally-discovered-he-had-the-brain-of-a-psychopath/story-fn5fsgyc-1226941381291) for all.

Centaurus

29th Mar 2015, 14:49

Now that the cause of this tragedy is in the open and there were no technical issues, the time will come when it is a case of move on, folks - nothing to see here.

There may well be a lesson though, with reference to the normal practice of cadets from airline flying schools going straight into the right hand seat of jet transports following type rating courses. From the time these youngsters undertake their first flight simulator training in an Airbus or a Boeing, they are pounded on standard operating procedures and their training is primarily concerned with flying on automatic pilot. They have had no time to enjoy the thrill of real flying apart from the hard yards on the commercial pilot training courses.

What early enthusiasm and absolute love of flying they may have had in their first few dual instruction ab-initio flights, soon must wane as the competition increases for a future airline slot.

Assuming the cadet graduates with a CPL and no real aviation experience, he then finally passes a type rating course and is shoe-horned into an airliner.

From now on he hits the manuals every night. He might be unlucky enough to crew with an autocratic captain for his line training. We have all ben there-done that:ugh: All of his flying from now will be on automatic pilot and heads down into the button pushing with often constant criticism of his ability to absorb "instruction".

Is it any wonder some of these young people lose their enthusiasm and their initial love of flying since they first flew solo. It is not hard to see how disillusionment can set in when all they are now seeing is no more fun flying, but a future life of button pushing and SOP's. They learn these cursed SOP's as a defence against criticism rather than for a love of reading a technical manual.

Management who hire these cadets, must educate their captains to use old fashioned good manners and kindness when training these youngsters and avoid the carping and often destructive criticism that all pilots know can happen to the vulnerable. Cadet first officers should be encouraged to hand fly as much as possible where circumstances permit. Too often, captains forget that they once loved the thrill of actually flying an aeroplane, albeit years ago, rather than watch the automatic pilot do everything.

I wonder if the first officer that deliberately crashed his Germanwings A320 had been subjected during his Airbus training to a harsh training atmosphere where nothing he could do would please his instructors and check captains?

Investigators need to look into the personalities involved with this lad's training because rude and aggressive "instructing" can cause loss of confidence in one's flying ability. Heaven knows what demons then rise up when flight after flight is nothing but tension in the cockpit - be it simulator or the real thing. All of us have struck this problem during our flying career at one time or another. Some have the courage to kick back at the tormentors that occasionally occupy the left seat while others are helpless against it and need time to harden up.

All of this is not to say that the Germanwings first officer suffered unfortunate experiences during his training as an Airbus pilot. That will be left to the investigators to find out. But following this recent tragedy involving a new inexperienced cadet first officer, airline managements responsible for hiring cadet pilots should start to look more closely into their training personalities and training practices.

Young cadet pilots are far more vulnerable to the actions of irritable and impatient captains; much more so than experienced first officers - many of whom will have gained the confidence to tell the occasional autocratic screaming skull captains to show respect to the second in command and to back off or else.

Pace

29th Mar 2015, 15:14

Centaurus

Well written! I don't fly airlines but came through flying into corporate jets through 3000 plus hours of bashing around in numerous piston twins often single pilot and in conditions where you really had to think for yourself, Then followed by some ferry work! in jets too and often bottom of the pile old jets.

these youngsters rush into airline work missing all that out and it takes a different sort of personality to the flying I have done or would want to do.

Many fly multiple sectors hardly on the ground before setting off on another sector!!! bus drivers even if they are automated AIRBUS drivers (Not Pilots many of them ) but procedure and automation guys! such a soulless flying

But I still state even stressed or depressed people even people with suicidal thoughts don't harm anyone but themselves and certainly do not pre meditate the murder of 150 people if that is true and what appears to be the case.

That specific mental illness ( No different to any other medical diagnosis from Cancer to heart disease not a blanket he is ill diagnosis ) needs to be diagnosed and identified and people with that potential kept out of an aeroplane because be it an aeroplane or a school yard with a gun they are time bombs waiting to go off

No_Speed_Restriction

29th Mar 2015, 15:21

I believe a "clicking" dial is a customer option.

WillowRun 6-3

29th Mar 2015, 15:26

Limiting this to the questions or comments about early release of the CVR information in a narrow sense, and the nature of the post-incident inquiries more generally:
Ian W's post quite properly cites the language of the IFALPA press release insofar as it relies upon the ICAO "accident" terminology. But is it really, either, or? In other words, when the French law enforcement cadres take charge - by the way, what is the standard for their taking charge? Some posters have reached the conclusion that it is "obvious" or even, that anyone not seeing the obviousness is in some kind of denial, that the post-incident inquiry must be predominantly a criminal one. Was this an adjudicatory decision by a French tribunal possessed of competent jurisdiction? Do the French authorities have a stated, published standard which demarcates the suspicion of a crime from the evidentiary basis to proceed to investigate one which the law of France deems to have been committed?
But leaving such legal issues aside, once the criminal machinery is switched "on", that is not the end of the cause and effect analysis. And indeed, does anyone NOT think that the criminal investigators lack a major degree of the aeronautical and systems knowledge held, first, by BEA, and more broadly, its companion CAAs around the world and as united by ICAO?
And then....despite issuance of two-crewmember rulings in the immediate aftermath, no one, let me repeat no one, is wise enough and well-informed enough at this moment to prescribe, proscribe or inscribe what the solutions will be to the various problems. There are issues in FO qualifications, clearly, but their analysis let alone solutions lie deeply embedded in the state of the air carrier business in Europe and globally. There are issues in aeromedical standards and their enforcement, but hardly any real facts yet are known. There are issues too in such more concrete matters, like doors and keys and locks and codes and the inherent propensities of flying aviators to pay attention to lovely hosties who visit up front. Wait, that isn't an issue? (oh well, the more things change, the more they.....)

16024

29th Mar 2015, 15:29

Lots of truth in Centaurus post. I wonder if the investigators will take such a holistic view.

fastjet45

29th Mar 2015, 15:30

Centaurus, Pace

Interesting and good valid comments, I posted something similar in post 1441

banjodrone
The pool of pilots with such vast pre-airline experience simply does not exist in Europe. In the US you have a very active GA sector to get pilots from even at a time when the first Vietnam-era pilots are starting to retire. For that reason, in Europe we've mostly had to rely on pilot selection by raw aptitude, especially in the last 10-15 years or so, rather than the ability to recruit seasoned experts for their first airline positions. It's just how things are.

Well blame the authorities for this situation, it was not that long ago when they more or less scrapped the self improver route, (PPL, Instructor, CPL, Turboprop, 1500 hours later ATPL and maybe the right seat of a jet) in the UK in favour of young button pushing wannabes coming out with a licence after 200 hours !!!!!

rideforever

29th Mar 2015, 15:32

3. And, last but not least, no one ever once mentions the 30 second ear piercing alarm triggered by the Captain after entering the emergency code on the door..Could you explain what the implication of this is please ?

FE Hoppy

29th Mar 2015, 15:41

ZS-NDV

Suggest you research what is recorded by the CVR. Hint: it's not just the area mic.

Ian W

29th Mar 2015, 15:47

Quote:
It is therefore urgent to ensure that all air carriers and regulatory authorities are immediately aware of the issues and can take action that they see fit to mitigate the actual safety risk to their passengers and aircraft

Whoa there, runaway steed. And what 'actions' may they be? And how will they 'mitigate risks'?

The whole problem is that nobody knows what the 'right actions' may be. The cockpit door policy post 9-11 was not fully thought through, as we can all see. (Some of us did warn the authorities.) So why rush in with new proposals, when these new ideas are equally fraught with unintended consequences? See my post here.

(A reply to my post.)
http://www.pprune.org/8924209-post2552.html

And nobody has replied to my primary question yet.

Would you want a nuclear power plant to recruit anyone from the streets, give them a few weeks training, and then place them in charge of the nuclear power plant's control room? And give them full authority to overpower the power station's highly trained controllers, whenever they feel like it?

That is what the CAA and various airlines are proposing. Is this sensible? Has anyone thought this through?

You should read what I wrote again. It is up to the air carriers and regulatory authorities to decide what action they need to take to mitigate the actual risk. Some like you may say we do not believe this is a problem, or the measures we have in place are sufficient, or we really can't think of anything we can do to mitigate the risk. But they MUST be told where the hole in their cheese is - as their passengers safety is their first priority (as we are always told).

So the air carriers and regulatory authorities are told - the evidence seems to show that this was not an accident and one of the contributory factors that enabled the intended crash was that a junior first officer, apparently with medical issues, was enabled by existing procedures and systems to lock the captain out of the cockpit. You may wish to consider your current cockpit security procedures.

It is the regulatory authorities who have decided what they think needs to be done. Which like the locked cockpit doors may be an incorrect reaction in some people's view. But it is their responsibility. Delaying telling the operators and regulatory authorities of a real hazard is not allowed even under ICAO Annex 13.

WillowRun 6-3

29th Mar 2015, 15:56

To Ian W - thank you for the explanatory post. Yes, there is a responsibility to communicate as you have described.
Perhaps the problem is one of perception, in that the media, the rumor-writers and readers, and so, miss the important contextual words and limitations, the "preliminary-ness" of the message as you described it.
And/or, to some extent, perhaps the messengers omitted some, or most, or nearly all, of the sense of "preliminary-ness".
But what you have said about how the system is supposed to work in such a factual context, spot on, and again, "Gratitude."

SLFplatine

29th Mar 2015, 15:59

Under German employment law ... Even doctors could not step in as the data would be protected.

MartinAOA from what I have read which was reported as direct quotes from German physicians; per one the doctor has the discretion to do so though per another they would be rather reluctant as the legal consequences can be severe.

BOING

29th Mar 2015, 16:10

Perhaps after all of this discussion we may find that a person's interaction with other crew members and the "gut level" feelings they induce may be the most sensitive test of their mental condition. One interaction should not be conclusive but if several associates provide the same opinion then perhaps deeper investigation is warranted. I know that our airline had "Professional Standards" representatives in the union branch who you could approach to discretely report any undesirable attitudes by other crew members. Reports could then be dealt with on a peer-to-peer level but ultimately they could also be escalated to the company. This system was introduced to deal with some of the disastrous CRM failures of the period.

I know that personally I found out far more about other crew member's personal lives during long flights and beers in the bar on layovers than I wanted to know. My joke was that the worst words you could hear on the flight deck on a long flight was the Captain saying "Did I tell you what my wife's lawyer did to me last week?".

On one occasion I was able to help somebody out as a result of the bar debrief. The co-pilot I had been flying with for a couple of weeks suddenly became distracted and less chatty. Over a beer it transpired that his sister was involved in a bad case of domestic violence and they were arranging an escape from the husband, the co-pilot was concerned that the husband would try to take revenge while he was away. Being relatively new with the company he was concerned that his case would not justify company compassion. Easy fix, at end of trip I walked in with him to see a flight manager buddy and he walked out with time-off until the immediate problem was taken care of. I hope present airlines would be so flexible and sensible.

.

Dream Land

29th Mar 2015, 16:16

Question: What if any selections on the FCU are available to ATC via mode S?

Aluminium shuffler

29th Mar 2015, 16:24

Centaur's may be bringing a fair comment about flightdeck culture overall, but to suggest bullying is limited to trainers, and more specifically modern trainers, is utterly wrong. Bullying in the cockpit has reduced drastically over the years, but where it persists, is not specific to trainers.

What I think has changed is the reduction in life experience and thus the ability of very young FOs to cope with jibing and banter. I saw this first hand in another loco, where most of the FOs whined about some of the captains (and one TRE and one line shag more than most). There was nothing wrong with the captains; it was the FOs with very large but very fragile egos who simply could not take a well intended joke and crumple under the slightest comment That seems to be an issue with a large proportion, though far from all, cadets. The older FOs, including cadets, tend to have better life experience to equip them with a more appropriate sense of humour and balance of confidence and humility. I feel that it strongly supports a minimum age policy of 25, though Lubitz was older than that. If Lubitz had been older when he started, maybe he would have been better equipped to handle the pressures of flying and his health would not have suffered. That is, of course, speculative.

Floyd3593

29th Mar 2015, 16:25

I fear you're asking for something money can't buy. There is no need for a flight engineer and in any case the no3 would have to be a type-rated/trained pilot (albeit arguably no need to be current or valid medical). How are you going to find enough suitable people who are prepared to get up early, go to bed late and sit twiddling their thumbs every day? And where would they sit? The jump seat? Why not give them a rifle and make them wear a Stetson as well? :)

I think ExSp33db1rd in post 2526 summarises what the 3rd “pilot” does, or rather did, far more eloquently than I could hope to. I wholeheartedly agree when he states
“Has the Industry improved on that system ? I doubt it, but the Bean Counters are happy. Removing the Flt. Eng. from the flight deck was the biggest mistake

DaveReidUK

29th Mar 2015, 16:27

Question: What if any selections on the FCU are available to ATC via mode S?

As reported in several previous posts, Selected Altitude only.

framer

29th Mar 2015, 16:28

Re cabin crew on flight deck:
I take it there will be money set aside for massively increased vetting of new and existing cabin crew? No?
No chance of unintended consequences here then .
Good plan.

_Phoenix_

29th Mar 2015, 16:35

Linerider,
ALT knob makes ZERO noise... And, just a reminder, every assumption here is ONLY based on CVR recordings. FDR has still not been found.
Through the headset + the aerodynamic noise, you might not hear it, but if the noises are filtered out, then you might hear the sound of knob turning

Knobs were turned 15 times, see the source of this info in my post here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france-126.html#post8923922)

vapilot2004

29th Mar 2015, 16:36

Fullwings, once again I am mostly in agreement with your thoughts on this event.

The first scenario could be avoided by looking after aircrew’s mental health better and the second by improved training, SOPs, equipment, fatigue management, etc.

Where we have a problem in the system is the mental health conundrum. In the US, self-reporting of a substance abuse or serious mental health issue, while honest and respectable, it is a career-ending move. 1st Class Medical, depending on the mental condition suffered, may be restored, but your job prospects would diminish to practically nil among the US majors.

How do we mitigate this? Testing has proved to be inadequate - at the extremes - psychopaths and sociopaths have fooled the system before. It's an underlying problem that the flying public and few others outside of the cadre of professionals have seriously discussed - until now.

Perhaps Lubitz, if the accusations are proven true, will have started something that may lead to a better system for all of us - something clearly needed seeing how the lantern-jawed superhuman pilots of old are no longer among us.

janeczku

29th Mar 2015, 16:55

As reported in several previous posts, Selected Altitude only.

Vertical mode can also be derived from other available parameters.

rantanplane

29th Mar 2015, 17:02

Perhaps Lubitz, if the accusations are proven true, will have started something that may lead to a better system for all of us - something clearly needed seeing how the lantern-jawed superhuman pilots of old are no longer among us.

That might be true. One problem is that AME's usually are not psychiatrists and then psychiatrists don't know that much about mental illness yet. They work to some ancient medical standards, not up to date with neuroscience.

Apparently sociopaths can be detected with MRI scans. Ask some indirect questions to trigger responsibility and empathy and you will see their brain is dead silent in the part which should show reactions. I bet half of the AME's don't know what a sociopath actually is.

Denti

29th Mar 2015, 17:02

Vertical mode can also be derived from other available parameters.

How exactly would you do that without the FDR? One can only make some assumptions, but don't know for sure which mode was used.

Flying Palm Tree

29th Mar 2015, 17:22

Seems to me that all the FD crew need is a means to override the door locking system whatever the setting on the FD. That's to say a system that makes it impossible for FD crew to be prevented from reentry. Maybe crew should input a personal encrypted security code during pre-flight checks or before leaving the FD which would prevent closure against that code?

NigelOnDraft

29th Mar 2015, 17:49

Hi FPTSeems to me that all the FD crew need is a means to override the door locking system whatever the setting on the FD. That's to say a system that makes it impossible for FD crew to be prevented from reentryAs has been said here a number of times, there are valid reasons to prevent Flt Crew entering the Flt Deck e.g. the JetBlue case, and Hijack where the Flt Crew is being "persuaded" to open the door.

The system worked as designed - it just was not designed for this scenario ;)

Ian W

29th Mar 2015, 18:11

How exactly would you do that without the FDR? One can only make some assumptions, but don't know for sure which mode was used.

For those pilots who are unaware how much their aircraft tells ATC it may be interesting to read this document. This is how the investigators were certain that it was CFIT and not an emergency issue.

http://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/content/documents/nm/asterix/20140807-asterix-adsbm-part12-v2.2.pdf

It is a little technical but search on MCP or Vertical and you will see what is in the ADS-B standard as implemented by EUROCONTROL.

safelife

29th Mar 2015, 18:32

In an airline of considerable size not knowing the other pilot is more the norm than an exception. Actually specifically Lufthansa has a philosophy not to have pilots getting familiar with one another in order to maintain cockpit discipline or so I'm told.

Denti

29th Mar 2015, 18:38

It is a little technical but search on MCP or Vertical and you will see what is in the ADS-B standard as implemented by EUROCONTROL.

Actually, it is a technical specification, but even that does not support selected mode (V/S, open descent, managed/VNAV and so on). And secondly ADS-B is not implemented in europe yet, not certified and not required. However, Mode-S Enhanced Surveillance is, which doesn't support vertical mode either. Both of course transmit altitude target, which is the value that FR24 decoded in the datastream as well.

And even though a 25 year old aircraft had to be retrofittet to conform with Mode S EHS, it is doubtful it would be retrofittet a couple years later to conform with a 2014 non backward compatible specification that is not even required yet.

silverstrata

29th Mar 2015, 18:41

Centaur.

Young cadet pilots are far more vulnerable to the actions of irritable and impatient captains; much more so than experienced first officers.

Do you still fly Centaur? Over the last decade or so, CRM has ensured that the guy in charge normally sits in the right-hand seat - as Lubitz's laconic and disinterested replies demonstrate.

NigelOnDraft

29th Mar 2015, 18:49

And as someone said above “90% of the time I get in a plane with a stranger”
Is that the norm? Or a one off? And if it’s true I find It a bit shockingWas me. With >500 Capts and >500 FOs on the fleet, and doing, say 100 "trips" a year (trip varies from 1 to 5 days), you might see the issue ;)

ams6110

29th Mar 2015, 18:50

Murder by Fire Axe has appeared again. And why not - it is almost the ideal weapon for a single handed assailant. So why carry it? Has anyone ever needed one? Remove it and be happier at having CC as second person when needed.

It seems to me you either trust the cabin crew to have access to the flight deck, or you don't. Cabin crew bring food, coffee, tea to the pilots, which could easily be drugged or poisoned.

Denti

29th Mar 2015, 18:57

It seems to me you either trust the cabin crew to have access to the flight deck, or you don't. Cabin crew bring food, coffee, tea to the pilots, which could easily be drugged or poisoned

Actually, that is a good point. And then i thought back and guess what. I do drink only bottled water on board and bring my own food. It is much healthier than the packaged stuff we get on board anyway. And then, trust is a two way street, and currently the point is that pilots are not trusted anymore.

ericsson16

29th Mar 2015, 19:01

What chances of the flight crew upper age limits applications being increased after this terrible event ?

Kerosene

29th Mar 2015, 19:06

Was me. With >500 Capts and >500 FOs on the fleet, and doing, say 100 "trips" a year (trip varies from 1 to 5 days), you might see the issue

Wondering if any airline ever came up with the idea of forming small teams within their crew pools who fly regularly together. Human beings work best in groups of up to 30 people - part of our evolutionary heritage.

Not knowing your colleagues in the cockpit may be seen as advantageous or at least convenient by the airlines, but I don't think it leads to a high level of well-being among the crews. You'll probably find that your conversations with your colleagues don't go much beyond the basic introductions, as does your familiarity with each other.

flyawaybird

29th Mar 2015, 19:13

Centaurus
Your write-up on the above topic is not only educative but also beneficial, if all airlines of the world would adopt it in their Work Core Values, then we would have a more harmonious and relaxed Cockpits. As a matter of fact it should be applicable to other work sectors as well.
:ok:

eezeegeebee

29th Mar 2015, 19:18

Equally however, some crimes is so heinous [sic] that it is irresponsible and unreasonable to not release the information as soon as criminal investigators are clear what happened. They don't know all the fine details, and their investigation is ongoing. But they know the big picture. They wouldn't be releasing this information on the world stage if it was just one possible explanation - or even if it was just the most likely explanation. They are quite certain of the explanation.

I read the measured statement from IFALPA with a sense of relief and gratitude that the voice of reason is still to be heard above a cacophony of hysterical speculation, much of which, sadly, is to be found in these pages. However this appalling disaster occurred, the proven and highly-developed processes of accident investigation must still be conducted until all the information can be presented cogently, causes established, errors identified and recommendations and mandates issued to responsible parties. To think otherwise is to think along the lines of the poster I have quoted (and there are plenty to choose from). This is a juror who doesn’t need to sit through the entire hearing, who needs no evidence above the sly whisper heard outside the court-house to the effect that “’e done it, and no mistake”.

According to the original NY Times article on March 25 the initial source of the CVR leak was a “senior French military official” who “requested anonymity because the investigation was continuing”. The means by which the original information came into the public domain will, quite rightly, be the subject of its own enquiry in due course and one can only hope that, in turn, the relentless process of effective justice will grind out another truth there: establish the causes, identify the errors, &c, &c. Boring, slow, methodical? Yes – and unapologetically so. But these are the methods we must use.

Indirectly, this disclosure led to a press release in which the Marseille public prosecutor, Brice Robin, then elaborated on some of the contents of the CVR. M. Robin is not trained in air accident investigation – he is merely a prosecutor, a person whose speciality is to identify someone to accuse of a crime and then prosecute through the legal system. His premature public appearance has contributed nothing to the air accident investigation being conducted by BEA and has served only to feed the insatiable appetites of the global media monster that lives amongst us.

There are very few hard facts around which to formulate a working hypothesis – let alone a provable one – and yet the world has seemingly already made up its mind on the cause, basing this on a single un-attributed leak and the accusatorial conclusions of a man lacking any apparent aviation expertise. But before we completely re-design the world of air transportation, let’s take time out to review the evidence which has been presented so far to the court of public opinion. This might enable us to stay on track but, more importantly, create a platform for the defence to show why this case is far from proven.

Our first witness appears anonymously, but describes him/herself as a "senior French military official". Naturally this witness has refused to swear any form of oath. M. SFMO, what can you tell the court about this case?
“There was a very smooth, very cool conversation between the pilots. Then one of the pilots left the cockpit and could not re-enter. The guy outside is knocking lightly on the door, and there is no answer, and then he hits the door stronger, and no answer. There is never an answer. You can hear he is trying to smash the door down. We don’t know yet the reason why one of the guys went out. But what is sure is that at the very end of the flight, the other pilot is alone and does not open the door.”

The next witness is Remi Jouty from the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile. M. Jouty, what do you know of this incident?
“er we just succeeded in getting er an audio file which contains er useable er sounds and voices er we have not yet er fully er understood and worked on it to be able to say ok this is starting at this precise point in flight this is ending at this precise point in flight and er we hear such persons saying that etcetera this is an ongoing work which for which we will we hope to have a first rough ideas in mmm matter of days and having a full understanding of it in conjunction with other information er coming in particular from other recorded parameters er will take weeks and even months”

Finally, the court calls Marseilles public prosecutor Brice Robin. What can you tell the court, M. Robin?
"We could hear human breathing inside the cabin and that sound of breathing can be heard until the impact. That means that the co-pilot was alive. You then hear contacts from the Marseilles control tower on several occasions, but no answer from the co-pilot. The air traffic controllers then asked for the transponder code - 7700 - and there was no response, which means that this plane had now become a priority over all other planes for a potential emergency landing. The control tower even asked other planes to contact this Airbus by radio, and there was also no response. The alarms were activated to alert the aircraft of its proximity to the ground. At this moment we hear strong, violent knocks, almost as if to force the door open. I remind you that this is an armoured door, according to international norms, to protect against potential terrorist actions. These alarms, meant to alert the aircraft, were activated. Just until the final impact, we could hear the noise of a first impact on a slope. I remind you that the plane glided over a slope before it crashed at 700 km/hr on the mountain. I also remind you that there was no distress or emergency message - like a "mayday, mayday, mayday" - received by the air traffic controllers. The most plausible and probable interpretation for us is that the co-pilot, by a voluntary abstention, by voluntary abstention, refused to open the door to the cockpit to the flight captain and activated the button to start descent. So he activated this button to initiate loss of altitude for a reason that we are completely unaware of today but that can be analyzed as an intention to destroy the aircraft."

That is the entire case for the prosecution.

For the sake of argument now imagine that an event occurred during this flight, an unusual event certainly, but one that still has to be trained for by all commercial pilots and one for which specialised equipment has been installed at great cost on all aircraft. It is an event which will lead to death of all on board an aircraft at high altitude unless it is identified promptly by the pilots who must then deal with it quickly and professionally by the execution of a precise drill - the steps of which cannot be varied. Done by two pilots this drill is complex and demanding – done by an experienced pilot acting alone it becomes even harder. But when it must be executed by a single pilot who has no practical experience of it, minimal practise of it in a simulated environment and no experience whatsoever of having to do any form of non-normal or emergency procedure on his or her own in a real aircraft, it could lead to certain disaster. Miss any step in this drill, reverse or confuse the order of the first few steps and it is an assured fact that all on board the affected aircraft will perish. This event has killed before and it is one of the greatest certainties of flying commercial jets that it will kill again.

Nothing in the evidence from France can rule out the fact that this event occurred on board the Germanwings A320 on March 24th 2015. My learned colleagues will appreciate why the evidence of breathing noises being heard on the CVR right up to the moment of impact actually makes it more, not less, likely that this event occurred on this flight.

It’s time to back off and wait for the French investigative authorities do their job. There is nothing like enough evidence to predict the outcome of this enquiry, despite what the French public prosecutor would like to believe.

Just saying.

evansb

29th Mar 2015, 19:56

Given what has been released about this incident, I thought this thread would have concluded 24 hours ago...:rolleyes:

cactusbusdrvr

29th Mar 2015, 20:02

There is a lot of stupidity on this thread.

I've been flying for over 35 years, I have over 25,000 hours. In the last 22 years I've spent 16 years as an Airbus captain with over 600 different F/Os to fly with. There is no issue flying with someone you don't know. We are all trained and checked to the same standards. We fly under the same procedures, SOPs, and we are checked to see that we stay standardized.

Inevitably there will be someone you don't care for that you are paired with. It doesn't matter, you just fly the trip and go on with your life. No one at this level of flying will be allowed to go beyond the limit that their personal beliefs or quirks will affect safety. If there is such a breach of protocol either pilot can call the chief pilots office and get themselves or the other crew member removed. The union professional standards committee will also be involved.

In the USA we don't have cadets flying large transport catagory aircraft. You spend some years working your way up the aviation ladder. If you have a questionable reputation you will not make it to a major airline. Even in the US aviation is still a small world. Your bad reputation will make itself known. I am not saying that this F/O would have been caught out earlier butI think this is where the cadet system breaks down. Issues in the US are usually caught long before they rise to the major airline level.

Wader2

29th Mar 2015, 20:08

Having read ezgb' s, how do we KNOW the captain left the flight deck?

How do we know it was the captain hammering on the door?

Apparently the passengers remained calm, it it possible they were hypoxic until at lower levels?

wings folded

29th Mar 2015, 20:11

Indirectly, this disclosure led to a press release in which the Marseille public prosecutor, Brice Robin, then elaborated on some of the contents of the CVR. M. Robin is not trained in air accident investigation – he is merely a prosecutor, a person whose speciality is to identify someone to accuse of a crime and then prosecute through the legal system. His premature public appearance has contributed nothing to the air accident investigation being conducted by BEA and has served only to feed the insatiable appetites of the global media monster that lives amongst us.

You display total ignorance of French legal procedure.

Monsieur Robin is indeed not an air accident investigator.

He is a "Procureur de la République".

Contrary to your inflammatory remark, totally unfounded, especially the use of "merely" as follows:

he is merely a prosecutor, a person whose speciality is to identify someone to accuse of a crime and then prosecute through the legal system.

you are completely and utterly wrong.

The Code Penal and the Code Civil in France requires that a procedure be opened when a loss of life occurs. It is called "instruction judiciaire".

The BEA carry out their investigations entirely independently.

If a plane went down with only the pilot on board,, no damage or loss of life on the ground, BEA would investigate on the one hand and an "instruction" would be opened at the same time. It has happened countless times. The purpose is to establish the cause of the death(s).

Under some different systems, a coroner would carry out the same function

A Procureur has a duty like any public servant, to be open and inform the public of what is known.

Do not be confused into thinking that the intervention of a Procureur means that criminal actions are considered or envisaged or even contemplated. It is simply a matter of procedure according to the laws of France. When you are better informed about the "speciality" of the role of a Procureur we could hold a further conversation.

There is nothing like enough evidence to predict the outcome of this enquiry, despite what the French public prosecutor would like to believe.

He has opened an "instruction" and has reserved his right to amend the heading of the enquiry.

He has performed his public duty correctly and, contrary to your ill-informed prejudice, appears to hold no beliefs.

The Pontoise trial concerning Concorde revealed a staggering lack of awareness of French procedure from many contributors. Go and take a look. You might emerge more aware.

TheInquisitor

29th Mar 2015, 20:25

eezeegeebee,

You seem to have conveniently left out a few details in presenting your case - important details. Such as the (independently confirmed) act of deliberately selecting 100ft on the MCP and commencing a descent.

What we have are a series of confirmed (to beyond reasonable doubt) events, for which there is only one plausible explanation - Which is why the conclusions already reached hold up, and have been made public. I appreciate this is slightly different to concrete proof, but air accident investigations quite frequently fall short of the 'concrete proof' standard and settle in the realms of 'no other plausible explanation' or 'most likely explanation'.

There persists a lot of unreasonable (IMHO) doubts being raised here.

Hypoxia has been ruled out (beyond reasonable doubt).

Incapacitation has been ruled out (beyond reasonable doubt).

Who was were and who took which actions have been established (beyond reasonable doubt).

...all from combinations of CVR and Mode-S ES data.

I don't believe the FDR will add much, if anything, to these conclusions.

As shocking / unbelievable / unpalatable these conclusions may be, they are supported by the evidence, with no other plausible or likely explanation. It's time to move the discussion on.

eezeegeebee

29th Mar 2015, 20:28

you are completely and utterly wrong.

The Code Penal and the Code Civil in France requires that a procedure be opened when a loss of life occurs. It is called "instruction judiciaire".

The BEA carry out their investigations entirely independently.

If a plane went down with only the pilot on board,, no damage or loss of life on the ground, BEA would investigate on the one hand and an "instruction" would be opened at the same time. It has happened countless times. The purpose is to establish the cause of the death(s).

Under some different systems, a coroner would carry out the same function

A Procureur has a duty like any public servant, to be open and inform the public of what is known.

Do not be confused into thinking that the intervention of a Procureur means that criminal actions are considered or envisaged or even contemplated. It is simply a matter of procedure according to the laws of France. When you are better informed about the "speciality" of the role of a Procureur we could hold a further conversation.

The most plausible and probable interpretation for us is that the co-pilot, by a voluntary abstention, by voluntary abstention, refused to open the door to the cockpit to the flight captain and activated the button to start descent. So he activated this button to initiate loss of altitude for a reason that we are completely unaware of today but that can be analyzed as an intention to destroy the aircraft.

The niceties of the french legal system notwithstanding, this chap looks like he's already made his mind up about the incident. You can appreciate why one might be confused, n'est-ce que pas?

Rushed Approach

29th Mar 2015, 20:38

The most plausible and probable interpretation for us is that the co-pilot, by a voluntary abstention, by voluntary abstention, refused to open the door to the cockpit to the flight captain and activated the button to start descent. So he activated this button to initiate loss of altitude for a reason that we are completely unaware of today but that can be analyzed as an intention to destroy the aircraft

M. Robin may well have a public duty to report the facts but the above is subjective speculation on his part. It is not for him to comment on what may or may not be the "most plausible" explanation - at this stage this can only be based on what little evidence he knows now. He says the action of reducing the altitude can be "analysed" as an intention to destroy the aircraft - but it could equally well be "analysed" as an intention to get the aircraft down quickly (e.g. cockpit fire and many other scenarios that could leave no CVR trace). It's possible he wound the altitude down to 100 ft (the lowest it will go) initially when initiating an emergency descent thinking he would adjust it later, and for whatever reason he got distracted or was unable to adjust it because of subsequent events such as choking on smoke/heart attack/stroke.

The point is that there is no such thing as "reasonable doubt" when you are talking about a one in several million flights possibility. If he did indeed kill 149 people deliberately, then that would be an incredibly rare event in aviation history. If you are considering it as such, then you have to consider other very unlikely scenarios as possibilities if you are doing your job properly as an investigator, otherwise there can be no credibility to the process.

Alain67

29th Mar 2015, 20:40

Unfortunately , the media does influence the politics of the decision makers .
The medias are - as their name suggests - a link between politicians and citizens who, fortunately, can and may influence the decisions in a democracy.

Mooneyboy

29th Mar 2015, 20:44

Reading post by Centaurus and Pace highlights a few misunderstandings and generalisations about lo co world of flying the airbus.

I also believe some of the recent posts seem to be going towards the bashing of cadet FO's where really I think in this tragic german wings event 'the holes in the Swiss cheese' lined up in a very individual case.

Firstly to Pace, The A320 is an automated aircraft but shockingly can be flown manually without an AP FD and A/THR and I think you will be surprised at how often that does happen. Obviously there is a time and a place so a remote greek island ndb approach with strong gusts might be one of those times to leave it all in. I did a raw data approach manually done 20 miles out autothrust out and on the next homeward leg the FO turned round and asked if he do the same as me. Looking at this 22year old 1 direction lookalike who must definatley did not look very piloty to me with 400hrs TT I thought to myself will if he mucks it up at least it will give me more practice. He then preceded to do the most accurate and precisely flown manual raw data approach I have ever seen. Few months later let a very experienced FO fly a raw data approach fully manually. He had not taken into account the extent of the tailwind ( which on the airliners can be a big problem as there is a lot of energy to slow down something the GA guys and small biz jet superpilots probably won't know much about). If it wasn't for some prompting for the gear from me I we would have flown the ILS twice.

Centaurus

I have done a Boeing type rating and Airbus type rating in the last 10 years. Both included a fair bit of manual flying but most focus is on the failure of aircraft systems. Also both times I did line training (they were both as an FO and when I got cmd on the Airbus) you had to do raw data manual thrust no AP. Manual handling is becoming an increasing part of the recurrent sims.

Every pilot is an individual and needs to treated that way. You get FO's flown for mutiple airlnes in their 40's but will definitely get the hump if you point something out or guys with plenty of life experience before they got into flying who won't take banter its not just young cadets who fall to those faults.

eezeegeebee

29th Mar 2015, 20:47

You seem to have conveniently left out a few details in presenting your case - important details. Such as the (independently confirmed) act of deliberately selecting 100ft on the MCP and commencing a descent.

What we have are a series of confirmed (to beyond reasonable doubt) events, for which there is only one plausible explanation - Which is why the conclusions already reached hold up, and have been made public. I appreciate this is slightly different to concrete proof, but air accident investigations quite frequently fall short of the 'concrete proof' standard and settle in the realms of 'no other plausible explanation' or 'most likely explanation'.

There persists a lot of unreasonable (IMHO) doubts being raised here.

Hypoxia has been ruled out (beyond reasonable doubt).

Incapacitation has been ruled out (beyond reasonable doubt).

Who was were and who took which actions have been established (beyond reasonable doubt).

...all from combinations of CVR and Mode-S ES data.

I don't believe the FDR will add much, if anything, to these conclusions.

I haven't challenged the evidence that Mode S data recorded 100 ft from the MCP. But when QRH says ALT KNOB - TURN/PULL it doesn't say what altitude to select, does it? If I was stressed and kept winding it all the way, it would eventually read 100, even if the 100/1000 ring wasn't moved.

Before writing my post I carefully scoured NYT and other sources to find out what hard evidence is out there. Unless I missed something, no other assertions are possible exept what the three witnesses have said.

Before you can add anything, you've got to say what your source is, just like I have done. So...

How, precisely, has hypoxia been ruled out?
How, precisely, has incapacitation been ruled out?
Precisely which actions have been established?
Who took them?

FDR may or may not add anything. We must wait and see.

SLFplatine

29th Mar 2015, 21:07

First wings folded makes a nice summation Here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france-132.html#post8925041)

The two cents I would like to add is that the remit of the public prosecutor is to conduct a criminal investigation concerning an aircraft accident, period. He is to determine if a criminal act has been committed that caused the accident, he is not tasked with determining any other possible causes such as may be related to spontaneous equipment / software failures or deficiencies which may have caused the accident -that falls under the provenance of the BEA. Thus M. Robin is only looking for evidence of a crime. If he discovers enough the evidence to reasonably conclude that a crime has likely been committed then he will report such; he tells he has and he did. While there may be other possible reasons for this accident such as an unrecoverable equipment or software failure either due to the nature of that failure or due to pilot error in response due to inexperience it is not M. Robin's issue to address, that is BEA's issue. To sum up M. Robin was tasked to determine if enough evidence existed to indicate that a crime had likely been committed, he believes he has done so.

DaveReidUK

29th Mar 2015, 21:08

Vertical mode can also be derived from other available parameters.How exactly would you do that without the FDR? One can only make some assumptions, but don't know for sure which mode was used.

There are indeed flags (in the same transmission as the Selected Altitude) that indicate the status of VNAV, Alt Hold and Approach modes.

Apologies for not mentioning those.

TheInquisitor

29th Mar 2015, 21:17

How, precisely, has hypoxia been ruled out?

Noises of shouting, banging on the door, screaming from pax, clearly audible captain's voice from outside the FD - multiple sources show, IMHO, that Hypoxia can be ruled out BRD.

How, precisely, has incapacitation been ruled out?

Deliberate selection of an ALT below MSA and deliberate actions required by the F/O to keep the FD door locked out after the 5 mins are up - rules out his incapacitation BRD.

Precisely which actions have been established?
Who took them?

As described above - identifiable voice of the Captain on CVR outside the FD, examination of what sounds picked up by individual mikes allows for placement of those sounds.

You are right that little has been precisely determined - but little rarely is. Many facts have simply been determined to be the only plausible conclusions.

Many are understandably unwilling to accept this at face value. Many are also crying foul that info has been released this early in an accident investigation - a very unusual step.

But remember - this accident clearly seems not to have been an accident at all, and those conclusions have been able to be drawn pretty quickly and conclusively - which to my mind means different rules apply.

As for sources - all of this comes from what the French authorities have reported to be on the CVR, and I have no reason to doubt that.

NigelOnDraft

29th Mar 2015, 21:18

NigelOnDraft said:
Quote:
Was me. With >500 Capts and >500 FOs on the fleet, and doing, say 100 "trips" a year (trip varies from 1 to 5 days), you might see the issue
Wondering if any airline ever came up with the idea of forming small teams within their crew pools who fly regularly together. Human beings work best in groups of up to 30 people - part of our evolutionary heritage.

Not knowing your colleagues in the cockpit may be seen as advantageous or at least convenient by the airlines, but I don't think it leads to a high level of well-being among the crews. You'll probably find that your conversations with your colleagues don't go much beyond the basic introductions, as does your familiarity with each other. Nice idea, and has always been a debate with airlines not doing "constituted crews", and the military tending to.

Leave aside the technical merits, would prove unworkable with any sort of bidding system e.g. our Bidline ;) Mix in Part Time options, Union work, differing leave etc. and it would not work IMO. Some of our Cabin Crew contracts try it from time to time - not for safety but "customer service", but I think it tends to fail for the same rostering reasons?

Personally, I do not see it as an issue - we are all trained to the same SOPs, and if anything, at the end of a long tour, things might "relax" a little more than the author of the SOPs intended :oh:

Mooneyboy

29th Mar 2015, 21:25

I refer to the 'swiss cheese effect' as its a good example of how many individual events or factors unfortunately tie up to this one tragic event. Obviously I can only go by the media reports but to me Andreas major issues were:

1)His personality to be very detailed and controlling

2) Strong love for flying throughout most of his life. Was into glider flying (what real pilots do) and was even cabin crew so flying a major part of his life.

3) Depression/ untaken medication?

4)Relationship issues

5) Big possiblity of losing Class 1 due to eye sight and his whole career.

6) Reports of not getting on or gelling with the Captain

7) Reports of being bullied.

8) Now this last one is beyond my knowledge of the human brain but ability to act and do something morally horrific.

To me tragically that day these holes all lined up and he was presented with an opportunity and took it. Maybe he was taking medication which dulled his senses and sense of morality or conversely not taken his medication and he acted erratically. Maybe the chances of all these lining up was that chance in a billion.

A lot of pilots (sorry should really say system programmers) will have point no 2, and definitely some captains I used to fly with had 1 as well ( can be a very good thing). I am sure a lot of us have had or are having 4 and definitely in a flying career will have 6. So each individual item except number 8 is something that can happen or is a perfectly normal trait or event.

Its this number 8 which we need to figure out if its in our button pushing pilot society and how to find it which is the next big issue.

IcePack

29th Mar 2015, 21:27

Wonder how long it will be before an airline issues a directive that the pilots can only go on a "comfort" break if it doesn't disrupt the cabin service.

Rushed Approach

29th Mar 2015, 21:28

FlightDetent

29th Mar 2015, 21:29

... deliberate actions required by the F/O to keep the FD door locked out after the 5 mins are up ...
I was looking whether this is an established fact or just media derivative of whad had actually been released. No luck so far, can anyone help?

rideforever

29th Mar 2015, 21:41

'Being remembered and changing the industry'
I don't see how this incident would satisfy these words of a supposedly narcissistic mass-murderer.

After the 3 other recent crashes he is not really going to be remembered much. Even today after the Air Canada plane crash landed last night, the news has already moved on, as it has from the gigantic search in the Indian Ocean. And we moved on from that to Ukraine. Newspapers are fickle.

I think the general public are a little saturated with air disasters and other disasters these days.

And changing the industry ? Did he want to be 'remembered' by a new key code on the door mechanism ?!!!

Seems unlikely.

This was a guy that ran half-marathons and seemed all around successful. He is not going to kill himself because he had an argument with his gf. And if his eyes really were going then LH would have found him something. At least he can still run, he was good at several things.

I can imagine the newspapers have been able to dig up far less dirt on him then they would have on many other staff. Most of his acquaintances had only good things to say about him. Ask yourselves what your acquaintances would say about you.

I see no motive.

TheInquisitor

29th Mar 2015, 21:42

I was looking whether this is an established fact or just media derivative of whad had actually been released. No luck so far, can anyone help?

I believe this was a conclusion arrived at as the 'only plausible' explanation. The authorities mentioned it, but I'm not sure if they confirmed having heard the switch selection on the CVR.

To explain it any other way would require a series of largely implausible scenarios, ie:

1. Neither the captain, nor anybody else, tries to enter the code (implausible)

2. Everybody on that aircraft who is supposed to know the code has forgotten it (implausible)

3. Given 1 and 2 above, the keypad must have been overridden from inside the flight deck, using a guarded switch in a position unlikely to have been activated accidentally (only plausible explanation)

4. Override functions for 5 mins (with LH, confimed by LH CEO), then entry can be attempted again. Continued denial requires further deliberate action from the FD (not possible if incapacitated).

5. Door failure - certainly possible, but doesn't address at all the primary issue of the aircraft being commanded into a descent. Or why the FO didn't respond to multiple attempts to get his attention, from both inside & outside the ac.

The only plausible explanation for what transpired is the deliberate action of the FO - when viewed in the context of the other deliberate action taken (commanding descent).

Personally, I don't believe any rash or premature conclusions have been reached - no matter how much we would naturally wish to defend 'one of our own'.

Rushed Approach

29th Mar 2015, 21:45

Quote:

How, precisely, has hypoxia been ruled out?

Noises of shouting, banging on the door, screaming from pax, clearly audible captain's voice from outside the FD - multiple sources show, IMHO, that Hypoxia can be ruled out BRD.

Doesn't mean the aircraft wasn't depressurised or slowly depressurising or filling with smoke - those banging on the door could have had either toilet masks or portable oxygen masks on between shouts and they could have been wearing PBE.

Quote:

How, precisely, has incapacitation been ruled out?

Deliberate selection of an ALT below MSA and deliberate actions required by the F/O to keep the FD door locked out after the 5 mins are up - rules out his incapacitation BRD.

So an Airbus has never done something that isn't in the manual? Yeah right. So it's completely impossible that an FMA glitch changed the altitude? Or that the remaining pilot wound it down for some other reason?

Incidentally who that flies the A320 knows the time periods that your airline has programmed into the door system. What's the time delay after you enter the emergency code? I bet most of you have no idea. If you enter it again before the time delay has completed, does the time start again ... ? How familiar was the Captain/crew with the way the door system works?

It's perfectly possible that the aircraft had a different code programmed to the one the crew were trying. How often is this tested in your airline?

ccrvic

29th Mar 2015, 22:13

Deliberate selection of an ALT below MSA and deliberate actions required by the F/O to keep the FD door locked out after the 5 mins are up - rules out his incapacitation BRD.

Do we know that anyone *tried* to unlock the door after the initial 5 minutes?

If things were getting as hectic as we've heard, I can imagine them stopping trying that and just trying to beat the door down. It *could be* that the door would have unlocked if only they'd tried the code towards the end.

We'll only know for sure when the investigation is complete. Claiming "facts" now is almost certainly premature.

MikeNovember

29th Mar 2015, 22:15

Doesn't mean the aircraft wasn't depressurised or slowly depressurising or filling with smoke - those banging on the door could have had either toilet masks or portable oxygen masks on between shouts and they could have been wearing PBE.If FD gets depressurised the door gets unlocked automatically.

Pace

29th Mar 2015, 22:25

Rushed

I am sure we would all like this to be a mistake as murder of 150 innocent people by a mad pilot is the worst possible scenario for all of us
I like most started this protecting the pilots from those who said murder and insisted it was a pressurisation problem!
You say either the prosecutor is right or wrong implying it's a 50/50 thing it's more likely to be 98 % he is right 2 % he is wrong (( all the revealed evidence points overwhelmingly that way (( and I am sure non of us want that
Don't put to much on the AAiB reports about being definitive as that is not always the case

Seat 32F

29th Mar 2015, 23:23

What worries me most about this whole sorry affair is the knee-jerk reaction that seems to be arising, both from the airline industry itself, and some of the folks on this thread. I speak only as one of your lowly revenue-creating customers, so of course my opinion counts for nowt, I guess. But, I'll press on ...

I know that there are probably thousands things more likely to go wrong with a flight than having a suicidal pilot finding the perfect opportunity to drive into the ground; but us pax kinda rely on the fact that aviation is highly regulated and has a risk management regime that is probably second to none as far as transport safety and security is concerned.

So knee-jerk reactions are not what is to be expected; measured and appropriate responses are. Suddenly requiring two people on the flight deck at all times as a response to an incident that hasn't even had its proper investigation completed - what sort of signal does this send out to the general public? I'll tell you: it says that the industry considers this to be a problem that is potentially so serious that it needs to be urgently addressed. And then we have people here on the forum saying that Flight Attendants should not be allowed on the flight deck. Are we to believe that FA's are not subject to the same screening and security measures as those in control of the flight? Are we saying that potentially all crew are not to be trusted with our collective safety?

Perspective is needed here: despite all of the screening and safeguards, this guy got through the net, although it remains to be seen as to what exactly happened; nevertheless this was an extremely rare incident and from a risk perspective I'd have more of an issue with there only being two motors keeping me aloft instead of a comfortable four.

I would much rather see the airline industry say: we don't need to mess about with the way that the flights are operated, it's fine as it is. And let's face it, it probably is. Probably being the operative word.

Over and out.

log0008

29th Mar 2015, 23:39

The changes which come out of this crash must go well beyond recommendations such as always having 2 people in the cockpit. The industry as a whole MUST look at ways in which crews health/mental health can be better monitored.

Propduffer

30th Mar 2015, 00:08

If FD gets depressurised the door gets unlocked automatically.This happens when there is a pressure differential between FD and cabin. We (or at least I) don't know what that differential is; we don't know how tight the air seal is between the two spaces. If airflow between the two spaces is not completely constricted, a slow leak in either space to the outside would not open the FD door on a pressure differential. Below about 10,000 feet, there probably wouldn't be enough of a differential to unlock the door either.

A0283

30th Mar 2015, 00:18

One of the lessons of this and previous accident investigations has been, that it is not clear to the international public how BEA and French public "Procureur" investigations are operating side by side during aerospace accident investigations. Where goals and work run in parallel, where they overlap, how independence is assured - while working with a substantial set of common evidence.

This understanding has at least two sides. First, part of the public not taking the time to do (at least some of) the required homework. Second, the way in which French authorities make clear to especially the international audience, how they operate side by side.

It appears that both public and authorities have to improve their act. So we should appreciate the work of some pprune members to help us with our homework. And I hope more is forthcoming.

The officials on the French side appear to be doing their job, but not with respect to improving understanding about what they do in general and how that works out in this specific case. Not an easy case because the focus changed from an accident to, as it seems, an act with intent.

As a consequence there is a lot of confusion with the general public, and in for instance some pprune posts we can see posters judging the procureur investigation by accident investigation standards.

A partially separate and partially overlapping issue is leaking information. In this case there have been a number of 'serious' leaks. The strict control of CVR and FDR information, including legal and regulatory back up of this, suggests that the probability of leaks originating from the accident investigation side was low. The fact that a high French military (in some countries part of the police is military - I wonder which side it was) person or even official is said to be the source, is in line with that probability. This means that information control on the procureurs side can clearly conflict with the accident investigation side. And also conflicts with the legal requirements on the accident investigation side.

One question that I have had for many many years now is how 'serious' serious is. We do not have the transcripts or other prove available, but in spite of that there are judgements all around, and a lot of damage to the feelings of friends and relatives of the victims may have already been done. Lack of information from the official side and confusion appear to be extremely painful. I wonder if preliminary information that may have to be changed later would reduce or increase the suffering of victims and relatives, and also on the "improvement of safety" efforts on the aerospace professionals side.

So how sure are we, that the present framework is better than one with more and earlier official transparancy and openness. More transparancy by earlier and more complete official presentation and publication of information that includes how that information should be judged at the time of publication. Transparancy that reduces the pressure on all parties - investigators, procureurs, prosecutor, victims and relatives, authorities, relatives, professionals, and the general audience.

Heads of state, government ministers, high ranking police and military - we only need to look over the last two years - have made statements that were out of order, factually and technically incorrect, etc. I have great admiration for the way in which investigators have responded to this. But it should not be necessary for them to do this.

The context today is much different than it was years ago. Modern public requirements and technology are quickly eroding the foundation on which the present framework is built.

This post basically contains questions. In this case the lead is French. But the questions are of course the same or similar for other recent cases in other countries. However, we learn by accident investigations, so lets keep the scope confined to this case of GermanWings9525. I hope some people can help me with improving my 'homework' by sharing their insights and views.

oldoberon

30th Mar 2015, 00:39

This happens when there is a pressure differential between FD and cabin. We (or at least I) don't know what that differential is; we don't know how tight the air seal is between the two spaces. If airflow between the two spaces is not completely constricted, a slow leak in either space to the outside would not open the FD door on a pressure differential. Below about 10,000 feet, there probably wouldn't be enough of a differential to unlock the door either.

The manual specifically states :-

Unlocking the door, in case of cockpit decompression (the door then opens towards the cockpit under differential pressure).

http://nicmosis.as.arizona.edu:8000/ECLIPSE_WEB/TSE2015/A320_DOCUMENTS/A320_Operating_Manual_PDF_N_FCOM_RJA_TF_N_EU__20130329_DSC_2 5.pdf

WillowRun 6-3

30th Mar 2015, 00:43

A0283 - quite a post, and many thanks for it - would my understanding of your overall message (or a part of it, at least) be correct, if I summarize it as asserting the view that the international investigatory apparatus has been "overtaken by events"? With the contemporary state of saturation of media - electronic only, as well as more traditional tv and print journos now propagating electronically - the time for officialdom to find the black boxes, do the analysis, issue the report....that time has not only shrunk, it has essentially evaporated.
As to your larger theme about the state of affairs in the French system.....and while I am not reaching for my Public International Air Law textbook less than 2 feet away ..... I think it is accurate to say that neither the Chicago Convention itself, nor any of its various machinery such as Annexes and SARPs, trump or override or hold supremacy over, national law. And so I think, were the question to be framed within an ICAO lens, how does a State criminal investigation need to be coordinated with the inquiry conducted by that State's CAA - I think that is a matter for the State to decide, on its own. I tend to agree, the understanding of how France sees the two tracks, the CAA and the criminal, moving sensibly forward, is not immediately obvious, or perhaps entirely discernible at all.
Where this incident (what a horrible word to use, but avoiding "accident" seems wise, since that word denotes a lack of intent, but an intentional act on present "information" seems likely) will get very, very complicated legally is when questions such as the choice of applicable civil law arise, and even, the appropriate place to file suit. These types of questions - known to aviation (and aerospace - or if it is preferred, air and space) attorneys as "choice of law" and "forum non conveniens", respectively, are among the most convoluted in the entire body of law applicable here. And, with the twisted facts of this incident....once again, the old favorite of a law professor is the best summation: hard cases make bad law.

FoxHunter

30th Mar 2015, 00:48

Do we know that anyone *tried* to unlock the door after the initial 5 minutes?

If things were getting as hectic as we've heard, I can imagine them stopping trying that and just trying to beat the door down. It *could be* that the door would have unlocked if only they'd tried the code towards the end.

We'll only know for sure when the investigation is complete. Claiming "facts" now is almost certainly premature.

I'm curious about what all this CODE talk is? All doors I'm familiar with have a deadbolt in addition to the electronic lock controlled by the key pad. The mechanical dead bolt on an airliner door works just like the one in your house or flat. Just is about 100 times stronger than the deadbolt on your front door and 10 times stronger than the electronic logon the cockpit door. Once the deadbolt is engaged the door will never be opened in flight with any available tool. You can play with that keypad to the end of time with no effect because the door is locked by a mechanical means. The only way you can open it is with a key and the key is never, never carried on the aircraft.

slats11

30th Mar 2015, 01:31

One of the lessons of this and previous accident investigations has been, that it is not clear to the international public how BEA and French public prosecutors investigations are operating side by side during aerospace accident investigations. Where goals and work run in parallel, where they overlap, how independence is assured - while working with a substantial set of common evidence.

Thank you for explaining this.

Different countries do things differently. The French system isn't intrinsically wrong - it is just different to the British / USA system. You make a good point that this could perhaps be better explained.

One thing it may be work considering is that the flow of information from the criminal investigation process will be taking some pressure off the accident investigation process, and allowing this to proceed out of the media spotlight and public speculation. Criminal investigative bodies are used to intense media pressure, accident investigation bodies somewhat less so.

I have lost zero confidence in pilots as a result of this crash. The odds speak for themselves.

I have lost a bit of confidence however as a result of some of the attitudes displayed here:
1. Clutching at straws postulating increasingly more implausible explanations. I know you wouldn't do this when faced with an inflight emergency, so why do it here?
2. The insistence that no information come out until all the facts are "properly" assembled. With all due respect, there are other stakeholders involved. Politicians are answerable to citizens (voters). And aviation is answerable to its customers (passengers). Aviation does not live in some sort of bubble somehow divorced from the rest of society.

Please also remember that following recent tragic events in Paris, French public sentiment will be heightened towards any form of terrorist action. The French government and authorities have to deal with this reality.

Ian W

30th Mar 2015, 01:58

eezeegeebee

As soon as the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to satisfy himself that a crime was committed and it was NOT an accident, ICAO Annex 13 ceases to apply.

I rather think the same would be the case in the US where the FBI are always involved treating crash sites as crime scenes. They would not sit on their hands waiting for a year or so for NTSB to publish a report if it became apparent that it had been a crime; they would take over and treat the incident as a crime that they need to investigate and if that required publicity that is what it would get.

It is obvious from the quotes you gave and a lot of responses like yours on here that you do not want this to be shown to be a murder suicide. However, there is an extremely high probability that it was. As that is the case it is the duty of everyone involved in the various criminal and Annex 13 investigations to pass the known information to aircraft operators and regulators - for them to take appropriate action within their areas of responsibility to mitigate any similar risk. They can't pass on that type of information without stating what they think happened based on the CVR and other information. They have not released a full transcript just enough to justify their position that the incident has an extremely high probability of being a crime. How else can they warn operators of the risk they need to mitigate??

Old Carthusian

30th Mar 2015, 02:08

eezeegeebee
Your advocated approach is no doubt right when the actual situation is unclear but when one has sufficient information on which to form a conclusion then it is also legitimate to shall we say 'short circuit' the process and move more rapidly. One also has to note the agenda of the professional associations. Whilst conforming with the letter of the regulations they are in fact trying to protect the reputation of the profession rather than find the answers to the tragedy. This unfortunately is a trait of all professional associations and not just the pilots organisations.
We must also be careful when relying on probability - just because an event has low probability does not mean it won't happen. Too often this corollary is made and I see signs of this in your comments. Taleb is particularly good here. When the professionals who have more information than we do have come to this conclusion we can be pretty sure that they have got it right. This is (as you have noted) a very big thing. For official bodies to stick their necks out to this extent is significant and betokens a level of certainty about the events.
The causes of this disaster are already known even though they may not have been officially announced as such. As more evidence emerges it reinforces the mass murderer explanation and disproves other explanations. The questions asked from now on really need to focus on what can be done to avoid future repeats and if, in fact, anything can be done.

NSEU

30th Mar 2015, 02:28

It's perfectly possible that the aircraft had a different code programmed to the one the crew were trying. How often is this tested in your airline?

Before every flight.

What's the time delay after you enter the emergency code?

Mind your own business.

I'm curious about what all this CODE talk is? All doors I'm familiar with have a deadbolt in addition to the electronic lock controlled by the key pad. The mechanical dead bolt on an airliner door works just like the one in your house or flat. Just is about 100 times stronger than the deadbolt on your front door and 10 times stronger than the electronic logon the cockpit door. Once the deadbolt is engaged the door will never be opened in flight with any available tool. You can play with that keypad to the end of time with no effect because the door is locked by a mechanical means.

You are describing the older system. The current system incorporates elements of old and new.

The new door is designed to be bullet proof and (within reason) bomb proof. I wouldn't pin my hopes on an air marshal being able to open the door with a firearm.

PukinDog

30th Mar 2015, 02:34

No criminal investigative authority from any country is going to sit on its hands in the face of evidence being uncovered that suggests that a purposeful, criminal act may have been committed, particularly one that causes the deaths of others, and wait for months or years for the aircraft accident investigators to complete their investigation and then only act if the conclusion of the accident investigators rules out all other possibilities. It would be idiotic for them to do so.

If an aircraft was lost due to a mechanical malfunction, and due to the nature of the component(s) failures investigators had to accept that sabotage became a real possibly yet well before they had drawn their own definitive conclusions, do some here actually suggest that criminal investigators allow the trail to grow cold and evidence disappear and not conduct their own searches, seizures and timely interviews/interrogations using the investigative/legal roads that criminal investigators have at their disposal that aircraft accident investigators do not? That's not going to happen. Criminal investigators don't have to wait until "all the facts are in and conclusions made" by some other authority. They are in the business of collecting facts themselves when it comes to criminals and their activities/motives, backgrounds etc, and they are going to act and go about collecting their own facts based on suspicion. It's what they do.

skippybangkok

30th Mar 2015, 02:57

Thanks to Airbus......

If not for the flight mode protections, the crash would have been easier to make. I guess the co pilot had to suffice with max decent and speed rate

parabellum

30th Mar 2015, 02:59

The only way you can open it is with a key and the key is never, never carried on the aircraft.

Time for change then. The manual override key could be carried on the FD and whenever a pilot leaves the FD he/she takes it with them.

peekay4

30th Mar 2015, 03:14

Ian W:
As soon as the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to satisfy himself that a crime was committed and it was NOT an accident, ICAO Annex 13 ceases to apply.
That is not true generally, and especially not true in France, where criminal inquiry is initiated when there is a fatal accident. ** In major fatal aircraft accidents there will be two (or more) inquiries: one by the judiciary and one by the transportation safety board (BEA).

Even if a crime had been committed, the two inquiries continue to run in parallel.

The BEA will continue to investigate the crash and may make safety recommendations to prevent similar scenarios in the future. E.g., they may recommend rule changes with respect to pilots's mental health, requirements around minimum number of crew in the cockpit, changes to door locking system, etc.

The judicial investigation will also continue with the aim in assigning fault and determining civil or criminal liabilities.

In France the judicial investigation has priority over the safety investigation.

(** Strictly speaking, Annex 13 is not law in any country and does not apply to any accident. Annex 13 isn't binding to any signatory. Countries are free to adopt parts of Annex 13 into it's own procedures. In particular, major provisions of Annex 13 do not apply in France -- under any circumstances.)

slats11

30th Mar 2015, 03:15

Time for change then. The manual override key could be carried on the FD and whenever a pilot leaves the FD he/she takes it with them.

You probably can't have a system 100% effective for threats outside the cockpit as well as 100% effective for internal threats. Strengthening against one threat weakens against the other.

History suggests the external threat is the greatest.

But the internal threat can never be zero

Life is risky. The solution is risk management to ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable). Not risk elimination

NSEU

30th Mar 2015, 03:17

Time for change then. The manual override key could be carried on the FD and whenever a pilot leaves the FD he/she takes it with them.

Then we go back to situation where hijackers can overpower the pilot to gain entry to the cockpit (which is basically why they introduced the new door system).

log0008

30th Mar 2015, 04:05

Australia to also implement the 2 persons in the cockpit at all time law

Lonewolf_50

30th Mar 2015, 04:05

DZKal: really? Provisionally accepted.

Just a thought to complete puzzling over what might have been influencing the cockpit denizen:
What about smoke / fumes?

Don O2 mask, mic picks up breathing ... then what? Me, if I were the junior guy, I'd be calling the captain back without delay. Who wouldn't?

What if he senses, or thinks the plane is on, fire? Getting back to mother earth is a "must get down soon" sort of situation. (FDR data could put paid to this in a jiffy if/when readable). And of course, did someone set a course to nearest airfield? That does not appear to be the case ... no FDR data to confirm ... but a ground track that points toward that non-choice.

The hard to avoid point keeps coming back ... Captain can't get back in, which looks to be the dead bolt working as advertised.
And so one tries to determine: why would someone want to keep the Captain out of the cockpit if there's trouble afoot?
That's quite the elephant in the room, isn't it?

vapilot2004

30th Mar 2015, 04:14

That might be true. One problem is that AME's usually are not psychiatrists and then psychiatrists don't know that much about mental illness yet. They work to some ancient medical standards, not up to date with neuroscience.

Apparently sociopaths can be detected with MRI scans. Ask some indirect questions to trigger responsibility and empathy and you will see their brain is dead silent in the part which should show reactions. I bet half of the AME's don't know what a sociopath actually is.

Absolutely agree. I see no easy way to handle this with the current AME and fitness for flight guidelines in the US and assuming the rules are similar, the EU and UK as well.

Interesting bit about MRI's RP. A terrorism test would be pretty handy these days as well.

Tokyo Geoff

30th Mar 2015, 04:27

The disaster happened at 10:40 in the morning, returning flight. When he visited the doctor?

To be signed off sick, he wouldn't have needed to visit that exact day. He could have visited the week before and been signed off for a week, or a fortnight, or a month. Given there were multiple sick notes, it seems likely this was a persistent problem that wasn't getting better.

milkandhoney

30th Mar 2015, 05:06

M68: yes, apparently.

Bild reported that, early in the flight, Captain Patrick Sondheimer "entertained" his co-pilot in a long conversation that included the fact that he had not gone to the toilet in Barcelona.
Lubitz then offered that he could take over – but the captain did not respond.

After the plane reached cruising altitude, the captain instructed his co-pilot to prepare for the landing in Dusseldorf. But Lubitz responded "laconically", using words such as "hopefully" and "we'll see".
Lubitz then said to the captain "you can go now". Two minutes later, the captain told Lubitz to take over, and left the cockpit.

Less than a minute later, at 10.30am, the plane started losing altitude.
A few minutes later, Bild reported, there was a "loud bang" and the voice of the captain could be heard shouting: "For God's sake, open the door."
In the background, screams from passengers could be heard.
At 10.35am, again, "loud metallic blows against the cockpit door" were heard.

About 90 seconds later, an automatic alert said "Ground. Pull up. Pull up."
Outside, the captain screamed: "Open the damn door."
At 10.40 the plane's right wing hit the mountain. The last noise on the tape, Bild reported, was the cries of the passengers.

From Germanwings plane crash: Captain made two attempts to enter cockpit (http://www.smh.com.au/world/germanwings-plane-crash-captain-made-two-attempts-to-enter-cockpit-20150329-1mami9.html)

Frequent_Flyer

30th Mar 2015, 05:31

GlueBall

30th Mar 2015, 05:49

"THe complete explication (and accusation) was issued after only 48hours. 2. Other experts claim "normal breathing" would NOT be picked up by recorder."
Is the CVR audio in doubt? Would it be different if heard next week or next month? Are you aware that the CVR can pick up amplified breathing sounds if intercom transmit button is switched on?

B772

30th Mar 2015, 05:58

TomU.

Even though an F/O (co-pilot) may have a piece of paper saying he is qualified on the type all airlines I have worked for carry a third pilot for safety reasons until the new F/O is cleared to operate without a safety pilot.

This time (or hours, sectors etc) period will depend on the F/O's background, overall experience and progress on the type.

As a matter of interest there is a report saying the F/O only had approx. 100 hours on the A320.

In hindsight the Captain should have relieved himself during the turnaround.

WingPlank

30th Mar 2015, 06:05

Credentials: B737 & B767 B1 Certifier.

There seems to be quite a lot of confusion over the operation of the Cockpit Door Locking System.

The A319/A320/A321 FCOM is available for download from Smart Cockpit here:
A319 320 321 Equipment (http://www.smartcockpit.com/aircraft-ressources/A319-320-321-Equipment.html)

Go to page 34 of the document. It gives a good overview of the operation and restrictions. Where it quotes ‘From’ and ‘To’ times, this is company-specific programmable.

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 06:35

Even though an F/O (co-pilot) may have a piece of paper saying he is qualified on the type all airlines I have worked for carry a third pilot for safety reasons until the new F/O is cleared to operate without a safety pilot.

Which is the same in Germany. Usually for two or three days on the line until an incapacitation check flight has been done. It is the same for a new captain and for any pilot after he did a new typerating. In the case of experienced pilots within the company the time with a safety FO may be shortened to one day though.

From what i have read the 630 hours are probably the time on type, which would fit with his time since he started the typerating in 2013.

FlightDetent

30th Mar 2015, 06:50

This happens when there is a pressure differential between FD and cabin. We (or at least I) don't know what that differential is; we don't know how tight the air seal is between the two spaces. If airflow between the two spaces is not completely constricted, a slow leak in either space to the outside would not open the FD door on a pressure differential. Below about 10,000 feet, there probably wouldn't be enough of a differential to unlock the door either.
I do not think so. FCOM 25-11-20A refers. If cockpit decompression is sensed (whatever that is), the CDLS will unlock the door. The differential pressure (if any left - good point) would swing it open then.

weebobby

30th Mar 2015, 07:34

Very interesting article from The Guardian in the UK

Germanwings flight 4U9525: what?s it like to listen to a black box recording? | World news | The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/28/germanwings-4u9525-whats-it-like-to-listen-to-black-box-recording)

Once investigators do so, they can find vital clues in the tapes – even in the unconscious sounds emitted by the pilots. “You can listen for things like breathing rates,” says David Gleave. “You can judge stress levels, whether there’s been a heart attack. Maybe you turn up the pilot’s mic, or maybe you try to detect stress in the voice of an individual. You listen and try to work out if, when they’re silent, is it because they’re getting on with it? Or is it because there’s tension between them, and maybe that’s going to lead to a misunderstanding?”

rideforever

30th Mar 2015, 07:44

DaveReidUK

30th Mar 2015, 08:09

I'm curious about what all this CODE talk is?

Then you might want to click on one of the many links that have appeared in this thread to the Airbus video that helpfully explains the operation of the current A320 CDLS.

Anne.Nonymous

30th Mar 2015, 08:09

The entry of a code on the keypad sounds a warning in the FD so that the pilots can confirm through the camera who is wanting to enter and then operate the switch.
The normal code causes a single warning sound and the emergency code causes a continuous warning sound. Both these sounds would be easily detectable on the CVR.

Entering the wrong code does not lock the door or time- out another attempt.

To bar entry the switch (sprung loaded to the central position)only needs to be moved to the lock position and the time- out will commence. It can be instantly over-ridden by placing the selector switch to the unlock position.

FlightDetent

30th Mar 2015, 08:25

Then you might want to click on one of the many links that have appeared in this thread to the Airbus video that helpfully explains the operation of the current A320 CDLS.
True. I struggle to understand one of the answers of the French prosecutor, him saying the A/C was not equipped with the emergency code feature (due to being old). That would be a strange design.

link: Crash de l'A320: Conférence de presse du procureur de la République de Marseille, Brice Robin (http://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/crash-de-l-a320-conference-de-presse-du-procureur-de-la-republique-de-marseille-brice-robin-481649.html)
time mark 16:10 > two step normal access procedure
time mark 16:20 > question about override code
time mark 16:30 > answer

mary meagher

30th Mar 2015, 08:27

As PukinDog suggests, other rules apply as soon as it appears a crime may have been committed; the French authorities asked the German police to investigate the first officer's parental home and his private flat, and to interview his associates; delay may cause evidence to vanish...

The AAIB in the UK always releases a prompt preliminary report on an air accident if action can be taken to avoid repetition.

Anger and blame often felt by loved ones, even after a medical mistake. How difficult for those who have had to wait months and years for government agencies to find answers. It would be wrong to hide reasonable information about the cause.
The Americans and now the Australians now have a rule that two people must be in the cockpit at all times. A trusted and experienced cabin crew member present would make it more difficult for a rogue pilot to carry out his plan undisturbed and unobserved.

webvan

30th Mar 2015, 08:31

And if the switch has been moved to the "Lock" position then the keypad gets deactivated and therefore the 30 second buzzer that gets triggered when the emergency code is entered would not kick in. The fact that no buzzer was heard likely indicates that the FO toggled to "Lock" as part of his "plan".

In hindsight would if have made sense for the Captain to create a depressurization for that door to get unlocked, possibly by breaking a window?

FERetd

30th Mar 2015, 08:49

B772 Quote:-"As a matter of interest there is a report saying the F/O only had approx. 100 hours on the A320. In hindsight the Captain should have relieved himself during the turnaround."

100 hours on a short haul LCC equates to quite a reasonable number of sectors. The F/O should have been quite capable of operating the aircraft by this stage - there was no Safety Pilot and I haven't seen anything to suggest that the F/O was still under training.

The tragedy was not, at this stage of the investigation, caused by the F/O's incompetence.

Under the circumstances I think that it is grossly unfair to suggest what the Captain should have done.

deefer dog

30th Mar 2015, 08:55

Seat 32F:

What worries me most about this whole sorry affair is the knee-jerk reaction that seems to be arising, both from the airline industry itself, and some of the folks on this thread. I speak only as one of your lowly revenue-creating customers, so of course my opinion counts for nowt, I guess. But, I'll press on ...

I know that there are probably thousands things more likely to go wrong with a flight than having a suicidal pilot finding the perfect opportunity to drive into the ground; but us pax kinda rely on the fact that aviation is highly regulated and has a risk management regime that is probably second to none as far as transport safety and security is concerned.

So knee-jerk reactions are not what is to be expected; measured and appropriate responses are. Suddenly requiring two people on the flight deck at all times as a response to an incident that hasn't even had its proper investigation completed - what sort of signal does this send out to the general public? I'll tell you: it says that the industry considers this to be a problem that is potentially so serious that it needs to be urgently addressed. And then we have people here on the forum saying that Flight Attendants should not be allowed on the flight deck. Are we to believe that FA's are not subject to the same screening and security measures as those in control of the flight? Are we saying that potentially all crew are not to be trusted with our collective safety?

Perspective is needed here: despite all of the screening and safeguards, this guy got through the net, although it remains to be seen as to what exactly happened; nevertheless this was an extremely rare incident and from a risk perspective I'd have more of an issue with there only being two motors keeping me aloft instead of a comfortable four.

I would much rather see the airline industry say: we don't need to mess about with the way that the flights are operated, it's fine as it is. And let's face it, it probably is. Probably being the operative word.

Over and out.

Good post Seat 32F.

Barely a week since the tragedy and the crash site is still warm. FDR is yet to be found and at best the report is a year from being printed.

EASA have excelled themselves this time. This latest @arse covering initiative will do nothing to dissuade the next determined suicidal pilot, but obviously those in EASAland clearly believe that this is a credible threat that needs to be mitigated immediately!

tmac21

30th Mar 2015, 08:57

Could you explain what the implication of this is please ?

Quote:
3. And, last but not least, no one ever once mentions the 30 second ear piercing alarm triggered by the Captain after entering the emergency code on the door..
I believe it was said at the beginning that nobody had attempted to enter the emergency code?

roulishollandais

30th Mar 2015, 08:59

In French Law, criminal action is closed against anybody since he is dead ! So no action is possible against Lubitz or against the other crew. But perhaps the prosecutor thinks that the airline is culprit hiring a mental ill pilot, or doctors were culprit to prescribe some medics to a working pilot doing him sleepy or with bad judgment...

With the French Constitution international law (Annex 13 and possible published reserves ) has priority over all national laws and rules...

The prosecutor has no task to inform public and medias. At contrary the "instruction judiciaire" must be kept secret...

BEA investigation and judicial investigation MUST be independent. But Justice has no means nor specialists to do a crash investigation. They have to wait the published BEA report and use it...

Winnerhofer

30th Mar 2015, 09:10

EXPED is disliked because the automation drastically increases pitch and slows the aircraft more than necessary.
EXPED does not honour any preprogrammed constraints.
EXPED does not honour constraints programmed into the MCDU.

deSitter

30th Mar 2015, 09:11

In case it isn't obvious - the "let's wait and see" approach is fine when one is dealing with the remnants of an airplane that crashed for reasons that are unknown but presumed to exist. The air accident investigator's job is to pull together what are often very subtle clues to get a first impression of what may have happened, and then work it through to the final conclusion. They do an amazing, often miraculous job at getting to the bottom of things and aviation is infinitely safer because of their work. But this is no such case. It is absolutely clear what happened and there is no need for further investigation, and I would say not much reason to pry into the unfortunate life of the person responsible. Life takes tragic turns. No amount of hand-wringing or brow-mopping is going to get around the fact that psychotics are among us, and door or no door, if one of the crew is determined to crash the plane and kill everyone onboard, he's going to find a way to do it.

My concern is that invasive screening procedures actually have the reverse effect, of concentrating those who are naturally manipulative, while chasing away those normal souls to whom intense, invasive scrutiny is anathema. As much as I love flying and aircraft, I would no have more considered a career as a pilot than I would have one as a trapeze artist.

fireflybob

30th Mar 2015, 09:34

Pace, I understand your sentiments but is there not a "halfway house" on this issue?

There could be a legal obligation placed on doctors to inform the appropriate aviation authority and employer if they consider a patient who works in any safety critical industry is unfit for duty due mental health issues. They would not need to specify why that person is unfit for duty. I am all for human rights but with rights come responsibilities.

abgd

30th Mar 2015, 09:40

Apparently sociopaths can be detected with MRI scans. Ask some indirect questions to trigger responsibility and empathy and you will see their brain is dead silent in the part which should show reactions. I bet half of the AME's don't know what a sociopath actually is.1) It's not obvious that Lubitz was a sociopath. Assuming he's guilty of killing all the passengers, there could be any manner of psychiatric illnesses that led to the crash. Just picking on the sociopaths isn't going to solve the problem.

2) What are the sensitivity and specificity of the test? That is to say, will it give you lots of false positives or negatives? The answer, almost certainly, is 'yes'. So what do you do with the (say) 10-20% of pilots who are wrongly labelled as potential murderers?

3) At least some authorities think psychopaths are unlikely to commit suicide. Think of the stereotype of a pilot. Cool under pressure, despite the huge responsibility. A lack of empathy might actually be helpful under some circumstances. Maybe you actually want psychopaths as pilots (but not bosses).

I'm being slightly tongue-in-cheek, but I'm not actually sure that you know what a sociopath is.

All doctors get some mental health training. Not a lot in comparison with psychiatrists who've specialised in it, but we've all seen things that few laypersons have. I was sent in to have a chat with a delightful gentleman who had come to see the psychiatrists because his paranoia was getting worse. After the interview I was told to have a read through his notes. He'd taken an axe to several of his colleagues a few decades previously.

In the UK, most AMEs are GPs and a fairly large proportion of a GP's workload will be taken up by people who have psychiatric illnesses, declared or otherwise. In my emergency department I see a few overdose patients every week.

Overall, I agree with the premise that AMEs are going to be quite limited in their ability to make a psychiatric assessment of prospective pilots, but I don't think a quick 'techno' fix is going to be the answer either. But don't be too dismissive of AMEs. They are rather likely to know more about psychiatric illness than you.

Wedge

30th Mar 2015, 09:55

fireflybob

In the UK there is already is legal duty placed on Doctors to make a disclosure contrary to the usual duty of absolute confidentiality where the Doctor believes there is a risk of death or serious harm to others.

I don't know what the policy of the medical authorities is in Germany is and their unusually strict privacy laws may mean that such a disclosure by a Doctor is less likely to happen.

53. Disclosure of personal information about a patient without consent may be justified in the public interest if failure to disclose may expose others to a risk of death or serious harm. You should still seek the patient’s consent to disclosure if practicable and consider any reasons given for refusal.

54. Such a situation might arise, for example, when a disclosure would be likely to assist in the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crime, especially crimes against the person. When victims of violence refuse police assistance, disclosure may still be justified if others remain at risk, for example, from someone who is prepared to use weapons, or from domestic violence when children or others may be at risk.

55. If a patient’s refusal to consent to disclosure leaves others exposed to a risk so serious that it outweighs the patient’s and the public interest in maintaining confidentiality, or if it is not practicable or safe to seek the patient’s consent, you should disclose information promptly to an appropriate person or authority. You should inform the patient before disclosing the information, if practicable and safe, even if you intend to disclose without their consent.

GMC | Confidentiality guidance: Disclosures to protect others (http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/confidentiality_53_56_disclosures_to_protect_others.asp)

LandIT

30th Mar 2015, 09:59

Still, today, there are posts questioning how the Captain was unable to gain re-entry to the cockpit. Please can all posters read some pages back to discover that the re-entry has to be either authorised by the remaining pilot, or can also be denied by them. (the possible use of the emergency entry code can also be denied).

Almost immediately after the Captain left the cockpit, after announcing (heard on the CVR) the co-pilot is in charge, the co-pilot dialed up altitude "zero" and the plane began its descent. There is only one conclusion people. Further to this is circumstantial evidence, leaked, that he used suggestion to go to the toilet to encourage the Captain to go at that time. Assumption is knowing the Alps were in front and descent would have a very predictable end at his favourite place on the earth.

On the CVR and because of the pounding on the door, we can deduce the denial of re-entry of the Captain to the cockpit. Go ahead - tell us that's because the co-pilot was frightened or something. That's ACTIVE denial folks - using the toggle switch to lock the door. Timeout whatever. He could have also used the toggle switch to unlock the door at any time. He didn't.

All this while the plane descended, which we can assume the Captain and flight crew understood, as well as a growing number of passengers who eventually ended up screaming. If not all of them. Horriffic. Let's not be in denial of that. Hard facts people.

So please don't be in denial of the facts. The co-pilot locked out the Captain and descended the plane into the Alps. Cannot be clearer than that. He could have admitted the Captain at any time. He didn't.

What reason could the co-pilot have for not readmitting the Captain if the plane was in trouble? If the co-pilot was incapacitated, how could he actively deny entry (that's what it takes). He was not incapacitated, in fact he probably denied entry to the Captain more than once in the 8min descent into the mountains.

Get real. The co-pilot on this flight crashed the plane on purpose. Now - deal with it. Why - is not so easy to answer.

I like the French investigation comment. Suicide is taking your own life. Crashing 150 people on a plane into the French Alps - that is mass murder. That is what we are dealing with. The guy is a monster. For whatever reason.

Depression or not, what we are dealing with is mass murder. Has happened before as well. Not easy to answer why, or how to prevent it.

Stop looking for excuses for him. It is indisputable. It's on the CVR. Maybe there are more like him. That's why two people need to be in the cockpit. That doesn't mean it cannot happen again, or some other way, but it sure lengthens the odds people.

abgd

30th Mar 2015, 10:04

There could be a legal obligation placed on doctors to inform the appropriate aviation authority and employer if they consider a patient who works in any safety critical industry is unfit for duty due mental health issues.

A similar situation arises with fitness to drive - you have a duty to breach confidentiality if you believe your patient is driving despite a medical condition (e.g. poor vision) that makes them unfit.

In practice, unless you're a village doctor you're unlikely to see your patient driving about town so it comes up relatively rarely.

There are other situations in which you have to breach confidentiality and I'm fairly sure that if you felt that a patient was 1) unfit to fly and 2) was likely to do so, you would phone up your legal advisers who I'm fairly sure would tell you to breach confidentiality in this situation.

But with psychiatric issues you really don't want to discourage people from seeking help so better to accept that if a patient states they won't fly, you don't go behind their back to their employer.

There could be a legal obligation placed on doctors to inform the appropriate aviation authority and employer if they consider a patient who works in any safety critical industry is unfit for duty due mental health issues. They would not need to specify why that person is unfit for duty.

Think about it: they don't need to say why the person is unfit for duty, but only need to inform them if it's a psychiatric issue? How's that going to encourage people to seek help?

What you could do would be to have a mandatory obligation to inform the employer that they were unfit for duty for any and every cause, without giving the reason. Even and especially a bad cold.

rideforever

30th Mar 2015, 10:06

In the UK there is already is legal duty placed on Doctors to make a disclosure contrary to the usual duty of absolute confidentiality where the Doctor believes there is a risk of death or serious harm to others.Pilots already take action against unwanted snooping - unions and CVR disclosure.
Any change to medical confidentiality will probably be met with concealment and avoiding treatment.

WRT Lubitz; if he had been breathing fast or not at all, the papers would have easily wound that into his portrait as a murderer. Likewise if he had had an argument with the waiter in a restaurant last week. Or if he had only lived at home and not had a second apartment 'Oh he still lives at home'. If he had not won that award at the flying school 'He was just an average student'. Or if had no gf 'He was a loner'. Far too much imagination is going on.

Motive / Illness is very unclear. And any response must reflect the actual cause of the crash.

Pace

30th Mar 2015, 10:07

Fireflybob

Yes but you would still drive pilots away from receiving proper medical attention into the hands of alternative or quack therapies
In an era where mental health issues are being encouraged in television adverts by the government and various bodies is it right to treat pilots as potential mass murderers ?
If you identify that people with cancer of the liver are potential mass murderers then identify people with cancer of the liver not someone with toothache
We had a number of posts by so called psychologists giving their opinion that this poor guy suffered with depression
This guy suffered with far more than depression! With more and more coming from the tapes he appears to have been very calm and calculating had pre meditated a mass murder / determine firstly what was wrong with him and then eliminate people with that specific mental disorder from ever being at the controls of an aircraft not a blind witch hunt against thousands of pilots
No one has yet determined what was specifically wrong with this guy or what specific mental illness he had which would make him pre meditate the mass murder of 150 people

NSEU

30th Mar 2015, 10:12

1. THe complete explication (and accusation) was issued after only 48hours.
2. Other experts claim "normal breathing" would NOT be picked up by recorder.
3. No specific place of impact on ground.
4. The prosecutor said that one could hear the Co-Pilot change altitude settings whereas other experts claim this makes no sound whatsoever. The change of settings would be picked up by the other flight data recorder which - well - have they even found it or mentioned it?
5. At no point has there been any reference to the sound of deadbolting the door (now this makes a sgnificant sound) after the PIC tried to re-access the cockpit.

2. Who are these experts? For the purpose of CVR recording, the headset boom microphones are always live. No button pushing is required. Surely a microphone placed a centimeter or two from the mouth would pick up normal breathing (It's already been stated in this message thread that other crew members can sometimes hear breathing).

4. It was mentioned earlier that some make sounds, some don't (an option).

5. There are different types of deadbolting. Some are relatively quiet. Having said that, most likely the F/O's seat would have made a noise if he stood up to walk to the door (the investigators did say they heard the captain's seat earlier).

KClemens

30th Mar 2015, 10:12

@Wedge
In the UK there is already is legal duty placed on Doctors to make a disclosure contrary to the usual duty of absolute confidentiality where the Doctor believes there is a risk of death or serious harm to others.

This is the same as in Germany.

chopjock

30th Mar 2015, 10:14

LandIT
On the CVR and because of the pounding on the door, we can deduce the denial of re-entry of the Captain to the cockpit.

Deduce, exactly. Is that evidence though?
We still don't know that the capt. actually used the emergency code do we?

papershuffler

30th Mar 2015, 10:16

Re: sick notes in Germany

What is the procedure for issuing them? Are they issued by request of the patient, or is it down to the doctor to suggest?

In the UK, I've had doctors spontaneously thrust them at me, and I've had to specifically request them in response to being told to 'rest'. I've also had a GP write one out and say it was up to me if I used it or not.

CrabbitOldBugger

30th Mar 2015, 10:18

IN-2015/021: Minimum Number of Authorised Persons in the Flight Crew Compartment | Publications | About the CAA (http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=6694)

Ian W

30th Mar 2015, 10:42

Ian W:

That is not true generally, and especially not true in France, where criminal inquiry is initiated when there is a fatal accident. ** In major fatal aircraft accidents there will be two (or more) inquiries: one by the judiciary and one by the transportation safety board (BEA).

Even if a crime had been committed, the two inquiries continue to run in parallel.

The BEA will continue to investigate the crash and may make safety recommendations to prevent similar scenarios in the future. E.g., they may recommend rule changes with respect to pilots's mental health, requirements around minimum number of crew in the cockpit, changes to door locking system, etc.

The judicial investigation will also continue with the aim in assigning fault and determining civil or criminal liabilities.

In France the judicial investigation has priority over the safety investigation.

(** Strictly speaking, Annex 13 is not law in any country and does not apply to any accident. Annex 13 isn't binding to any signatory. Countries are free to adopt parts of Annex 13 into it's own procedures. In particular, major provisions of Annex 13 do not apply in France -- under any circumstances.)

Peekay4
I think we are in general agreement

Pukin Dog
No criminal investigative authority from any country is going to sit on its hands in the face of evidence being uncovered that suggests that a purposeful, criminal act may have been committed, particularly one that causes the deaths of others, and wait for months or years for the aircraft accident investigators to complete their investigation and then only act if the conclusion of the accident investigators rules out all other possibilities. It would be idiotic for them to do so.

Let us be perfectly plain. If a mass murder has happened and the criminal investigators believe that the air accident investigators are withholding evidence from them or impeding their criminal investigation, then I would expect the investigators themselves to find themselves charged with a criminal offense.

There seems to be a blank here in people's understanding of what has happened and the cross impact of State criminal law and ICAO treaties. As far as I am aware a UN (ICAO) treaty recommendation never trumps State criminal law especially in cases where large numbers have died (been killed). People here may not like that possibly because they are worried that the breach of trust by one of their number will rub off on all flight crew. But that is what will happen, as Peekay4 says, the criminal and aviation inquiries will continue in parallel using their own rules of engagement and obtaining different levels of information. Without the criminal inquiry much of the background information on Lubitz would not have been found that was obtained by police acting for the criminal investigation with police powers not the air accident investigation powers of the French BEA. (This also happened with the pilots of MH370 with no complaint from anyone here)

I cannot see that there is any way that criminal investigation will not take over. Step in their way and you could find yourself imprisoned for impeding police carrying out a criminal inquiry into what they see as mass murder. The FBI would do precisely the same had a similar crash occurred in the USA.

mcdude

30th Mar 2015, 10:45

Lubitz Hit EXPED

EXPED button not installed on the aircraft (D-AIPX)

http://www.ruhrnachrichten.de/storage/pic/mdhl/artikelbilder/5101752_1_dpa_148CF400A7A209A1.jpg?version=1427380668

FlightDetent

30th Mar 2015, 10:54

Deduce, exactly. Is that evidence though? We still don't know that the capt. actually used the emergency code do we?

Evidence? Are you in denial? So the Captain has to use the emergency code (not the normal intercom) to get back into the cockpit?

After the co-pilot has dialed up zero altitude. (for what valid reason?). Really? Really what? Some of us are trying to figure out what the published facts are.

While I in fact deduce the same as you do, there is no mention yet that a) the captain used the emergency override code, b) that such request had been denied. On the contrary, the prosecutor responded to a direct question with saying no such feature had been fitted to the aircraft.

c) - while I think the altitude selection was indeed voluntary/deliberate, there is no published fact (yet) to suggest the FO remained conscious thereafter.

Ian W

30th Mar 2015, 10:56

Crash A320: Les trois éléments qui ne collent pas avec la version officielle - DH.be (http://www.dhnet.be/actu/monde/crash-a320-les-trois-elements-qui-ne-collent-pas-avec-la-version-officielle-5515bd213570c8b952dfe897)

Not sure if this has been posted here already, but IMHO raises a few interesting questions:

1. THe complete explication (and accusation) was issued after only 48hours.
2. Other experts claim "normal breathing" would NOT be picked up by recorder.
3. No specific place of impact on ground.
4. The prosecutor said that one could hear the Co-Pilot change altitude settings whereas other experts claim this makes no sound whatsoever. The change of settings would be picked up by the other flight data recorder which - well - have they even found it or mentioned it?
5. At no point has there been any reference to the sound of deadbolting the door (now this makes a sgnificant sound) after the PIC tried to re-access the cockpit.

A Swiss newsaper writes along the same lines mentioning that the release of this cockpit data is against all laws and regulations and a lawsuit will be filed by several unions agains the prosecutor. Let me know if you'd like me to fully translate either article!
Die seltsam schnelle Festlegung auf eine Wahrheit - News Panorama: Vermischtes - tagesanzeiger.ch (http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/panorama/vermischtes/Die-seltsam-schnelle-Festlegung-auf-eine-Wahrheit/story/27189482)

These unions may be in for a real surprise. The prosecutor will say he was acting in a case apparently of mass murder, had to tell other airlines of the weakness of their system and as part of that would need to supply sufficient evidence to make them understand what happened.

Imagine if the prosecutor had warned aircraft operators and regulators that he believed that they had a weakness with their cockpit door procedures - but NOT provided CVR evidence. He would not have been believed. Even in light of the CVR and mode-S evidence there are people here who do not believe what happened. He had to release the information for his warnings and subsequent taking legal action to be understood.

If the prosecutor wins that case with the unions and I believe he will, then the CVR recordings could cease to have the degree of legal protection that these unions believe they have. The legal protections are in my view only there to prevent management using them, or for morbid tabloid media; they are not there to inhibit criminal inquiries or actions taken to prevent potential further loss of life. That view could be set in stone by a court case especially if obdurate unions insist on taking it to appeal to the highest levels.

keithpenny

30th Mar 2015, 10:59

What do you professional pilots you think of BUAP? and could it have been useful in this situation?

janeczku

30th Mar 2015, 11:08

Lufthansa manager suggests the FDR might never be found. (http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/germanwings-absturz-polizei-setzt-sonderkommission-alpen-ein-a-1026185.html)
What a strange thing to say merely days after the accident and considering the CVR was not really heavily damaged. Is it wishful thinking?

Ian W

30th Mar 2015, 11:15

Quote:
3. And, last but not least, no one ever once mentions the 30 second ear piercing alarm triggered by the Captain after entering the emergency code on the door..
I believe it was said at the beginning that nobody had attempted to enter the emergency code?

No the implication is that as the alarm was not heard the CDLS override switch in the center console had been set to override. When that happens all alarms both routine and emergency are muted. The fact that there were no entry alarms at all in the 8 minute descent also means that the override must have been reset after 5 minutes by someone on the flight deck. It is a guarded switch so cannot be accidentally set.

M68

30th Mar 2015, 11:15

Regarding exceptions of doctor confidentiality for "special" cases.
How would a doctor know what the patient's real job is? He could only rely on what the patient tells him.

infrequentflyer789

30th Mar 2015, 11:27

The cockpit door policy post 9-11 was not fully thought through, as we can all see. (Some of us did warn the authorities.) So why rush in with new proposals, when these new ideas are equally fraught with unintended consequences?
[...]
That is what the CAA and various airlines are proposing. Is this sensible? Has anyone thought this through?

Reading this thread, I find one of the most confusing things to be posts like this which imply that these are "new proposals" or untried / untested knee-jerk responses with no track record. This is simply not the case. As SLF, flying rarely since 9/11 (although not for that reason - other life changes) I have seen this procedure in operation multiple times, in Europe, and on multiple different airlines. In fact, I hadn't realised it was not regulation (as it appears it was/is in the US).

What the authorities are doing is simply asking _all_ airlines to implement a procedure that has already been in widespread use, as long as the locked door, in a large number of airlines all round the world - just not _your_ airline.

All safety measures have some risk of unintended adverse consequences in some situations, the aim has to be to ensure this risk is low in comparison to what you are trying to prevent. As with the locked door, we can only quantify one side of those risks, because we will never know how many adverse events have been deterred by the measure, however after over a decade and millions of flight hours in use we can definitely _quantify_ the risk of adverse consequences. We know the risks of the locked door, not from hypotheticals but from real events on record, the same should be true of this procedure. There are also more cabin crew than pilots, and if as you say they are less well vetted then there should be many more incidents of rogue cabin crew than rogue pilots. We can definitely quantify the rogue pilots from the record (it's not just this one), so you should be able to stop talking hypotheticals and start talking actual events or stats...

PS: Meanwhile, I would be very interested to know how you are getting your beverages for the flight through security - 100ml can't possibly be enough, and you can't be getting them from those "recruit anyone from the streets, give them a few weeks training" cabin crew, can you ? I don't want to stoke paranoia, but for a pre-meditated incapacitation what do you think the easiest, most common choice would be, roofie or fire-axe ?

MrSnuggles

30th Mar 2015, 11:28

M68

Regarding exceptions of doctor confidentiality for "special" cases.
How would a doctor know what the patient's real job is? He could only rely on what the patient tells him.

In Sweden that would be a no brainer. I did explain how our system works a few pages back; short version is that your Doc HAS to report some illnesses to Transportstyrelsen by law, and CAN report some transient conditions by own discretion. Transportstyrelsen then hugs this information until you come to them and ask for whatever permit you need (air, sea, road, rail) and then you are supervised for a period of time, and there's a lot of paperwork and medical professions involved.

So, in Sweden the Doc does not need to know what you work with. They just report as is stated by the law. Transportstyrelsen gouverns the whole thing and when you apply for some license your name pops up from their database.

MD11Engineer

30th Mar 2015, 11:40

Papershuffler:
Re: sick notes in Germany

What is the procedure for issuing them? Are they issued by request of the patient, or is it down to the doctor to suggest?

In the UK, I've had doctors spontaneously thrust them at me, and I've had to specifically request them in response to being told to 'rest'. I've also had a GP write one out and say it was up to me if I used it or not.

Same in Germany.The sick note will only contain the start date and the estimated end date of the sick leave, but will not contain any medical details.

FlightDetent

30th Mar 2015, 11:51

No the implication is that as the alarm was not heard the CDLS override switch in the center console had been set to override. When that happens all alarms both routine and emergency are muted. The fact that there were no entry alarms at all in the 8 minute descent also means that the override must have been reset after 5 minutes by someone on the flight deck. It is a guarded switch so cannot be accidentally set. Or perhaps the aircraft was not equipped with the feature, as per the procurator's brief?

marie paire

30th Mar 2015, 11:53

Seems to me that all the FD crew need is a means to override the door locking system whatever the setting on the FD. That's to say a system that makes it impossible for FD crew to be prevented from reentry.
That solution could result in a forced entry by a determined terrorist that know someone has the code. The US will never accept any such solution.

cwatters

30th Mar 2015, 12:06

Perhaps not as relevant as it may seem at first glance but on a local news group someone posted a link to this patent...

https://www.google.co.uk/patents/US8505850?dq=US8505850&hl=en&sa=X&ei=uRUUVZGyJMvvaI6MguAH&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAA

"Locking and unlocking system for the cockpit door of an aircraft and door with such a system US 8505850 B2"

In the claims...

an accelerometer configured to detect a maintained constant acceleration exceeding a preselected acceleration threshold value that indicates that the aircraft is in a dangerous descent,

Tom Bangla

30th Mar 2015, 12:27

So after 130+ pages of this thread, there would appear to be consensus that no procedural modification would have prevented this tragedy, bar the presence of a third crew member. The only obvious solution would be to enlarge the FD to include a toilet. But even that cannot offer total protection against someone bent on carnage, for reasons already noted.

Conclusion: the statistical risk of a recurrence remains minuscule. Regulating authorities and companies must swallow hard, and not allow paranoia and the frenzy of the moment to force it into inadequately considered responses.

andymurph

30th Mar 2015, 12:31

Andy_S

30th Mar 2015, 13:04

Conclusion: the statistical risk of a recurrence remains minuscule. Regulating authorities and companies must swallow hard, and not allow paranoia and the frenzy of the moment to force it into inadequately considered responses.

Indeed. A lot of people are proposing sledgehammers to crack nuts. In statistical terms, death by suicidal pilot is extremely rare and the industry could spend vast sums of money just to slightly lessen the likelihood of an already highly improbable event.

Of all the ideas I’ve heard, putting a member of the Cabin Crew in the cockpit for a few minutes seems the most sensible. Obviously not fool-proof, but their very presence in the cockpit may act as a deterrent, and it would mean two people rather than one are in a position to open the cockpit door if required. No hugely expensive redesigns, no need to employ additional pilots or flight engineers.

NigelOnDraft

30th Mar 2015, 13:11

What the authorities are doing is simply asking _all_ airlines to implement a procedure that has already been in widespread use, as long as the locked door, in a large number of airlines all round the world - just not _your_ airline...

Of all the ideas I’ve heard, putting a member of the Cabin Crew in the cockpit for a few minutes seems the most sensibleI think there is now much greater awareness of the rule, and its benefits and risks. However, what is clear is that by "adding" the rule, the purpose of that second person has changed - and not insignificantly :eek:

Do we assume the root cause of this accident was a pilot with a mental illness, with/without prescribed drugs being taken, and that if the medical authorities had all been in possession of the full facts, that pilot would not have flying that day?

If we do assume the above, I suggest you read your OM A with respect to the medical standards for pilots and cabin crew, and specifically with regard to this illness and medication, and self-diagnosis.

If your OM A is like ours (which I will not disclose), you might agree that compulsorily adding a CC to the Flt Deck whenever 1 pilot remains, "as a protection against mental illness", might not appear the wisest mitigation :oh:

I agree, on the surface what's changed since last week? Awareness I would add, and clear statements as to what and how that added person could do, and the tools they have to achieve it.

Discorde

30th Mar 2015, 13:19

From today's 'Independent':

The 'Rule of Two' (leading article, 28 March) used by some airlines to reduce the chances of an incident such as the Germanwings crash is not without its own dangers. A flight attendant in the flight deck with sinister motives could incapacitate the remaining pilot and take control of the door lock and then the aircraft.

It would be considerably easier for a terrorist organisation to infiltrate an airline crew with a flight attendant rather than with a pilot because pilots' histories are usually known in greater detail to their employers.

Overall, the 'lone pilot' option might be safer than 'pilot + non-pilot'.

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 13:40

As a layman I was surprised to read in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the local Newspaper in Munich, that when a plane goes down on land the Flight Recorder does not send out a signal and they say that that's why it is taking so long to find it. Is this true, and if so what is the reason for this? When a plane goes down in Mountains it seems illogical for the Flight Recorder not to signal it's location in hard to reach terrain.

Yes, that is true. However, the ELT (Emergency Locator Transmitter) automatically activates if a certain g load threshold is passed and can be used to locate the wreck. Doesn't help much in this case as the wreck was found very fast, and i suspect it never activated in the first place as it was probably destroyed.

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 13:42

Overall, the 'lone pilot' option might be safer than 'pilot + non-pilot'.

That is what quite a few on here and elsewhere have said from the beginning.

toffeez

30th Mar 2015, 13:54

The German state prosecutor has said the FO was treated some years ago for suicidal tendencies. That was before he obtained his pilots licence (don't know which one)

West Coast

30th Mar 2015, 13:57

That is what quite a few on here and elsewhere have said from the beginning.

Which beginning? Last week with the crash or the decade plus its been happening in other countries?

Your lot seemingly will go kicking and screaming into two person cockpit protocol, just remember it's the norm elsewhere. Stop with the drama already.

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 14:03

Your lot seemingly will go kicking and screaming into two person cockpit protocol, just remember it's the norm elsewhere. Stop with the drama already.

First of all, no, not kicking and screaming, but we do point out the dangers with that solution. And the norm elsewhere? It certainly wasn't in the USA (http://www.wsj.com/articles/united-shifts-cockpit-policy-to-require-two-crew-members-1427497078?mod=wsj_nview_latest).

Diesel8

30th Mar 2015, 14:09

Lonewolf_50

30th Mar 2015, 14:12

Quote:
3. And, last but not least, no one ever once mentions the 30 second ear piercing alarm triggered by the Captain after entering the emergency code on the door.. I believe it was said at the beginning that nobody had attempted to enter the emergency code?
And if the switch has been moved to the "Lock" position then the keypad gets deactivated and therefore the 30 second buzzer that gets triggered when the emergency code is entered would not kick in. The fact that no buzzer was heard likely indicates that the FO toggled to "Lock" as part of his "plan".
Tmac, does that post answer your concern?

Number21

30th Mar 2015, 14:18

I've read a few times on this thread that the chance of deliberate pilot crash is 'minuscule' or 'x is a thousand times more likley'.

I don't think that's correct. I count 72 fatal crashes in the past 20 years (let's just use this as an approximate number as my counting was done quickly).

How many deliberate episodes of a pilot or first officer steering an aircraft into terrain have occurred over this time period?

This one, Egyptair 990, silk air, air Maroc and probably a few more (many would add MH370 in here - possible, but I'll reserve my judgement until we have the CVR). I think 7 or 8 is the quoted number of commercial jet flights ending in this manner, even if we accept that a couple may be debatable it's still somewhere in the order of 5% plus of fatal crashes being caused by this aetiology.

Therefore, this is not a black swan event. It's a manifest risk that needs to be considered and ameliorated if we're trying to make air travel safer.

West Coast

30th Mar 2015, 14:20

First of all, no, not kicking and screaming, but we do point out the dangers with that solution. And the norm elsewhere? It certainly wasn't in the USA.

It is in the USA. Mandated post 9/11. Don't let your argument hinge on a press report.

AlphaZuluRomeo

30th Mar 2015, 14:31

lomapaseo

30th Mar 2015, 14:49

Corrective action is not about 100% prevention, it's about mitigation or minimization of effects. For instance, I'll accept flight disruptions, irregularities, but not catastrophic loss of all aboard

I have trouble following arguments that don't include weighing of managed risks.

For starters I would like at least to revisit today's assessment of terrorist risk that was thought to be minimized by a locked door vs requiring a second person (FA) during breaks vs a single man cockpit, etc. etc.

I don't have an answer (opinion) at this point but I sure don't accept most other answers I've read at face value on these pages without more data.

ams6110

30th Mar 2015, 14:57

you might agree that compulsorily adding a CC to the Flt Deck whenever 1 pilot remains, "as a protection against mental illness", might not appear the wisest mitigation

The reason for adding the CC is to be able to open the door if for some reason that is necessary. Or to put it another way, so that no single person will ever control the door lock. CC is is not there to evaluate the actions or mental status of the remaining pilot, clearly they are totally unqualified to do that.

Alain67

30th Mar 2015, 15:09

Well it's a ridiculous system then as in effect the French prosecutor is passing a subjective judgment as to whether a crime has been committed not even a week after the crash, and whether a crime has or not been committed cannot be determined until the full "proper" aircraft investigation has been completed. So his subjective "gut feeling" will either be right or wrong and so many hares may have been set running unnecessarily. How can such a daft system be justified when in many cases the prosecutor will be wrong?
It is the prosecutor's job to launch an accusation if he thinks there is some data making this possible ! It is a lawyer's job to argue that this data isn't convincing.
A trial will decide. Saying such a process is ridiculous seems to me... rather strange (I wouldn't like to say ridiculous, because I suppose things are working differently in other countries ; please do not fall in this US tendency saying that "if you don't do things like we do, it means you haven't still found the right way").

RedGritty

30th Mar 2015, 15:18

andymurph wrote "it seems illogical for the Flight Recorder not to signal it's location in hard to reach terrain."

The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) have attached to them a water-activated Underwater Location Beacon (ULB).

The ULB's do not operate when they are not immersed. They are intended to aid locating the recorder when an aircraft ends up in a lake, sea or ocean. An ultrasonic pinger cannot be detected through the air.

The FDR and CVR are painted a bright fluorescent orange. It was expected that this would be sufficient to enable them to be located among aircraft debris on land.

WillowRun 6-3

30th Mar 2015, 15:19

Quote: (lomapaseo) -
"Corrective action is not about 100% prevention, it's about mitigation or minimization of effects. For instance, I'll accept flight disruptions, irregularities, but not catastrophic loss of all aboard

I have trouble following arguments that don't include weighing of managed risks.

For starters I would like at least to revisit today's assessment of terrorist risk that was thought to be minimized by a locked door vs requiring a second person (FA) during breaks vs a single man cockpit, etc. etc.

I don't have an answer (opinion) at this point but I sure don't accept most other answers I've read at face value on these pages without more data."

Everyone has familiarity with the (so-called) "law" of unintended consequences. I propose, as a premise to contribute to the discussion, deliberation, analysis and so on -- as appropriately and correctly advocated by lomapaseo's post quoted above -- a "law" of escalating consequences. To wit, there is a pilot shortage. Air transport is growing; yet with airline financial situations in dire straits, expansive new training and screening processes seem unlikely. Point: yes, the horrible and tragic instance of a pilot using an aircraft as a murder weapon has, to date, been statistically very, very rare (even including incidents in countries which, to some posters, have been ignored in the Western Hemisphere). Prediction: under current trends, the risks of such situations as evidently has occurred will increase, not merely stay the same.

And Ian W earlier hit the grand slam home run - the French authorities had to act without delay to preserve evidence. No French law enforcement or prosecutorial authority has declared the civil aviation authority investigation deferred or canceled. No representative of said civil aviation authority has announced anything, or acted in any way, as if such a deferral or cancellation were in place. How, exactly, the two types of official enquiries shall be coordinated, may be a fair question. A harder question: how should they be coordinated in the future, even if the risk is a constant, rather than an increasing one?

Alain67

30th Mar 2015, 15:20

The prosecutor has no task to inform public and medias. At contrary the "instruction judiciaire" must be kept secret...
That is theoretically right, but practice has changed a little, because times are changing (social networks, etc).
The problem with secret is that it leads to leaks, rumours, etc. Therefore justice has understood that it's better to provide a limited but valid information rather than letting people speculate.

infrequentflyer789

30th Mar 2015, 15:25

I think there is now much greater awareness of the rule, and its benefits and risks. However, what is clear is that by "adding" the rule, the purpose of that second person has changed - and not insignificantly :eek:

As I understand the proposals, as I've seen it in action, as I understand what the FAA has always required (since locked doors), the purpose of the second person remains unchanged - it is to be able to "open the goddamn door". Nothing else. Otherwise could you explain what has changed on the airlines, and in regulatory environments, that already had this as SOP ?

It may or may not have helped in this case, it may or may not deter similar events (as with the locked door, we do not and will not know). What we do know, or can find out, is how many flights have been compromised by a lone pilot behind a locked door (some we know, some we can only suspect), and how many have been compromised by FA + lone pilot.

ettore

30th Mar 2015, 15:34

At the present stage, a press release of the German prosecutor say there is no material evidence and no indication whatsoever that Andreas L. was about to handle the way he did, nor any writing he left behind showing he intended to:

Die zuvor in Presseerklarungen mitgeteilten Ergebnisse von Beweiserhebungen gelten uneingeschrankt fort. Insbesondere fehlt es weiterhin sowohl an der belegbaren Ankundigung einer solchen Tat als auch an einem aufgefundenen Tatbekenntnisses. Ebenso wenig sind im unmittelbaren personlichen und familiaren Umfeld oder am Arbeitsplatz besondere Umstande bekannt geworden, die tragfahige Hinweise uber ein mogliches Motiv geben konnen.

Andreas L. had no physiological disease, according to the corresponding medical papers. He was treated for suicidal tendencies, but the treatment by a psychotherapist took place several years ago, before he obtained his pilot's certification. He made more recent visits to psychiatric specialists, but the doctor's notes connected with those visits did not record any suicidal urges or aggression toward others, according to the german's prosecutor's press release:

Die entsprechenden arztlichen Dokumentationen weisen bislang keine organische Erkrankung aus. Der Co-Pilot war vor mehreren Jahren - vor Erlangung des Pilotenscheines - uber einen langeren Zeitraum mit vermerkter Suizidalitat in psychotherapeutischer Behandlung. Im Folgezeitraum und bis zuletzt haben weitere Besuche bei Facharzten fur Neurologie, Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie mit entsprechenden Krankschreibungen stattgefunden, ohne dass dabei allerdings Suizidalitat oder Fremdaggressivitat attestiert worden ist.

Source : http://www.sta-duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Pressemitt/2015-03-30-PE-Flugabsturz.pdf

A question : is it usual that a pilot would get an ATPL despite a past history of suicidal tendencies ?

londonman

30th Mar 2015, 15:41

This is crazy. We have too many cooks spoiling the broth. If he had no physiological disease then what was he being treated for in the clinic recently? They said that it was not a mental illness. Now you are suggesting that according to the German prosecutors it was not physiological. So what's left?

The comment re Trial By Media is spot on. In this morning's UK Times they are still going on about the 'killer pilot'. Saying that the pilot asked him about the landing procedure and the co-pilot was alleged to have said 'Hopefully'. Now the Times is banging on that this word implies that he was planning to commit suicide. What utter tosh. It depends on the actual question asked by the pilot.

if the pilot had asked 'Can you run me through the landing procedure' ?

'Hopefully' - meaning that I hope I can remember the key actions correctly.

infrequentflyer789

30th Mar 2015, 15:57

I can't believe the black box was found without the memory card

It is far far more likely that this quote (which is itself unconfirmed) meant that the recorder has been found, but the crash survivable memory unit has not, rather than that the crash survivable memory unit had been found breached and without its contents.

Need to bear in mind that some information may be coming via translation from French to German before getting to English.

NigelOnDraft

30th Mar 2015, 15:57

Originally Posted by NigelOnDraft View Post

I think there is now much greater awareness of the rule, and its benefits and risks. However, what is clear is that by "adding" the rule, the purpose of that second person has changed - and not insignificantly

As I understand the proposals, as I've seen it in action, as I understand what the FAA has always required (since locked doors), the purpose of the second person remains unchanged - it is to be able to "open the goddamn door". Nothing else. Otherwise could you explain what has changed on the airlines, and in regulatory environments, that already had this as SOP ?

It may or may not have helped in this case, it may or may not deter similar events (as with the locked door, we do not and will not know). What we do know, or can find out, is how many flights have been compromised by a lone pilot behind a locked door (some we know, some we can only suspect), and how many have been compromised by FA + lone pilot. Please consider the following scenario
Buzzer goes off, Capt & FA in cockpit.
Capt assess the person requesting entry is a security hazard and wishes to deny them entry
FA decides the person outside the door is to be permitted entry.
and now please answer:
Under the "policy", whose decision is final?
In practical terms, should they disagree, whose decision is the one that can be made to apply?
I do not know whether the airlines with the policy have specified the above, my employer did not have the policy so I cannot help. But were I to operate as Captain under the policy, I would wish to ensure the policy made the answers (and others) clear to all.

I believe life has moved on since last week, and risks that were not apparent prior to last week are now known world wide. IMO this policy adds clear new risks, now the "2 in cockpit" rule is so widely known and practiced.

wings folded

30th Mar 2015, 16:03

Rushed approach Well it's a ridiculous system then as in effect the French prosecutor is passing a subjective judgment as to whether a crime has been committed not even a week after the crash, and whether a crime has or not been committed cannot be determined until the full "proper" aircraft investigation has been completed. So his subjective "gut feeling" will either be right or wrong and so many hares may have been set running unnecessarily. How can such a daft system be justified when in many cases the prosecutor will be wrong?

You display no clue about French legal process, yet choose to be critical of it.

The question of a "crime" or not is not relevant. I explained earlier that when a life has been lost, the "Procureur" for the relevant district opens an "instruction" I explained this in an earlier post ( Iwould quote the post number, but because of deletions, the number keeps changing)

Here 150 lives were lost.

The Procureur (please note the different vocabulary; "Procureur" is not the same thing as "prosecutor"), is obliged to open a case and be open with the public and with all concerned parties.

The Procureur is not investigating the technical aspects; BEA do that. They brief him, and he applies his required public duty to what follows.

He does not have "gut feelings" and as such they are neither subjective nor not so.

Just to be clear, because you seem not to have grasped it. When a death has occurred, the Procureur opens a case. It does not ergo facto mean that there is a suspicion of a crime having been committed.

The, in due course, BEA investigations and reports become part of the "instruction"

Got it now?

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 16:03

The FAA requires the second person so they can visually assess who is at the door for entrance. A very few limited airlines have a alternative method. It has nothing to do with opening the door or leaving the pilot alone in the cockpit.

Isn't video surveillance standard? In europe, with the exception of ryanair, it certainly is. Without video surveillance there was always a second person required on the flightdeck anyway.

NigelOnDraft

30th Mar 2015, 16:04

A question : is it usual that a pilot would get an ATPL despite a past history of suicidal tendencies ? Sort of the wrong question, albeit same outcome. It should be "can such a person get a Class 1 Medical?".

That said, I do not know the answer...

It does raise the issue with regard as to how responsible Lufthansa / Germanwings are? For many airlines, the past medical history is unknown to them - all they can see is if you have a valid Licence and Medical. It might be that Lufthansa do go beyond, especially via any cadet system - but the bottom line remains the same: if this pilot should not have been flying, that is not a matter for the airline, provided he had the correct Medical etc. It is for the Regulator (EASA and/or LBA) to answer, albeit I am sure they will try to keep their heads low.

AirScotia

30th Mar 2015, 16:04

Speaking as a frequent passenger, I'm deeply dismayed to learn that one of the two people on whom my life depends while in the air, may have demonstrated suicidal tendencies to the point where his airline makes him go for regular psych-checks. He shouldn't be flying my plane!

How in the name does such a person go on to achieve a commercial pilot's licence? Show him compassion, provide care and help - but don't under any circumstances give him the keys to a passenger-carrying aircraft.

ettore

30th Mar 2015, 16:07

@ Londonman

The German prosecutor's press release says precisely that he had been treated by several specialists : neurologist, psychiatrist and psychotherapist. Accordingly, ndreas L. definitely had an history of mental disorders.

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 16:24

Sort of the wrong question, albeit same outcome. It should be "can such a person get a Class 1 Medical?".

That said, I do not know the answer...

Since April 2013 AMC1.MED.B.055 Psychiatry, AMC1.MED.B.060 Psychology and AMC1.MED.B065 Neurology would apply.

I honestly do not know how it is handled at lufthansa, they do have several AeroMedical Centers that can on their own issue special approvals. However, as far as i know the company only gets to pay the bill and a fit/unfit message plus a copy of the medical, nothing else. Again, even if it is a company AME doctor/patient confidentiality does apply, except for those data that have to be submitted to the authority, however not to the company.

tmac21

30th Mar 2015, 16:25

Tmac, does that post answer your concern?
Thanks lonewolf_50, it just seemed odd when reported that nobody had attempted to enter the emergency code rather than they had but the lock meant it had no effect, does that suggest the captain knew it was locked?

Lonewolf_50

30th Mar 2015, 16:32

There is evidence that mandatory reporting drives problems underground - it discourages people seeking medical attention, and discourages people from being transparent with their physician. So it is a complex issue, and certainly no panacea.
It's been said before in this thread, but it is well worth repeating since policy making bodies often overlook this very human reaction to greater control/probing by "the system" into their lives.
6. He was too high functioning to be suffering from schizophrenia or another form of psychosis. Most likely a nasty personality disorder with narcissistic, sociopathic and borderline traits. Unfortunately these personality disorders are pretty common.
Heh, some decades ago one of our flight surgeons suggested that a few semi-undesirable traits, narcissism being the one he harped on that day, were common among Naval Aviators ... and he looked at us all for a moment before continuing "It makes sense, because it takes a healthy amount of ego to get into this business in the first place."
Yes, you guessed it: CRM was the topic of the day at that Safety Stand Down.

tmac21: that's my guess, as I go on the assumption that the Captain knew his aircraft and its systems.

Capot

30th Mar 2015, 16:33

lomapaseoFor starters I would like at least to revisit today's assessment of terrorist risk that was thought to be minimized by a locked door vs requiring a second person (FA) during breaks vs a single man cockpit, etc. etc.

Yes, which prompts the thought that so far the regulator (EASA and to a lesser extent LBA) has failed miserably, and predictably. Why?

Since October 2012 AOC holders in EASA-land have been required to have and operate effective Safety Management procedures, within their Management System. (OPS.GEN.200, for the really interested.)

To simply, perhaps slightly over-simplify, safety management is fundamentally the pro-active search for and identification of hazards, followed by assessment, prioritisation and mitigation. It is a necessary part of Safety Management that all employees are encouraged to report hazards they see or know about.

It is the regulators task to make sure that Operators are doing this, and to pull them up if not, with the ultimate sanction of withdrawal of the AOC.

I find it very hard to believe that any rational person would not admit that leaving 1 person on the flight deck, behind a locked and potentially impenetrable door is a hazard with a potentially catastrophic outcome, and then mitigate it either by having a 2-person rule, or by making it possible to gain entry regardless of the actions of whoever is on the other side. It might well then be thought that the 2-person rule is the only way to mitigate the hazard without increasing the terrorist/piracy hazard.

I find it equally hard to believe that many aircrew, at least, have not been very aware of the potential risk.

If anyone had reported this hazard, properly run Safety Management would and should have picked it up and dealt with it, and of course many airlines did just that.

But others did not, obviously, presumably because their Safety Management is more lip service than real.

The real villains in the piece, cowering behind their desks, are the National Aviation Authorities who did nothing about that except, perhaps, ask them politely to think about it. In the UK the CAA would have been worrying more about forcing Operators to buy their over-priced SMS courses than real safety at the coal-face.

And of course, in Europe we have EASA's merry band of bureaucrats who will now leap/have just leaped into action to prevent the accident after itt happened.

And once again we have seen that the USA is miles ahead of the rest of the world in aviation safety as opposed to paper-shuffling and politics.

paull

30th Mar 2015, 16:38

This is the declaration on the bottom of a ShotGun License application form.
Even my mother has to sign something like this to get a driving license.
What does it say on a ATPL Application form?

"I give the police permission to contact my GP and/or specialist to obtain factual details of any medical history in respect of this application.
This authority is valid for the life of the certificate(s).
I understand that my GP may share sensitive personal data with the police concerning my physical & mental health for the purpose of
enabling the police to make a fully informed decision on my application & I hereby consent to this processing of my personal data.
Applicant’s name
(please print)
....."
...

AirScotia

30th Mar 2015, 16:43

Is it certain that the airline knew this? From a quick scan here ok thought this was before he started.

We know that his paperwork was marked 'SIC' which apparently means that special medical supervision was required. This might mean that he had a chronic physical condition that needed to be monitored, but as it's been stated officially that no physiological problem was known to the airline, it sounds as if the medical monitoring was about his psychological state. Given that psychological problems manifested while he was in Lufthansa training, and before he obtained his pilot's licence, I'd say LH knew there were issues with this pilot.

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 16:56

We know that his paperwork was marked 'SIC' which apparently means that special medical supervision was required

Actually, the LBA denied any knowledge of any such entry yesterday. They would have to have it on their files though. I just wonder how he could have a medical without it. However, pretty much every entry on the medical can be given for a number of very different reasons.

NigelOnDraft

30th Mar 2015, 17:38

The evidence against the F/O looks overwhelming but based on a single memory card as far as I understand.I think there are 3 sources to date:
CVR
ATC: Mode C/S and Comms (or lack of)
ADS-B e.g. FR24
The last is somewhat "independent" in that it recorded in real time certain data - the most significant of which I would think are:
Selected Altitude would down to ~100'
Once past transition, I believe IAS is maintained accurately at just under 350KIAS (Max) - I am sure some maths will show whether or not M was consistent above Transition?
I would think if a "shootdown" or structural failure was responsible, the ADS-B data would be very different? Whilst we have heard little re the ATC Data, I suspect that would be as the ADS-B.

Ian W

30th Mar 2015, 18:15

Please consider the following scenario

Buzzer goes off, Capt & FA in cockpit.
Capt assess the person requesting entry is a security hazard and wishes to deny them entry
FA decides the person outside the door is to be permitted entry.

and now please answer:

Under the "policy", whose decision is final?
In practical terms, should they disagree, whose decision is the one that can be made to apply?

I do not know whether the airlines with the policy have specified the above, my employer did not have the policy so I cannot help. But were I to operate as Captain under the policy, I would wish to ensure the policy made the answers (and others) clear to all.

I believe life has moved on since last week, and risks that were not apparent prior to last week are now known world wide. IMO this policy adds clear new risks, now the "2 in cockpit" rule is so widely known and practiced.

Nigel, a nice straw man - however I think in this case even the slowest flight attendant might be influenced by the high rate descent, the proximity of the mountains through the cockpit window and the screams of the pax.

From a more psychological point of view, the action of the FO was a lot easier to take when 'alone' in his own little world and the people behind were just noises in his head. Having a person in the cockpit changes that psychological state as he would have been actively taking that person's life which is a little more difficult.

montague

30th Mar 2015, 18:26

I do HGV medicals and those ask for history of mental illness / suicidal ideation etc - usually they are my own patients so I tend to know their history. You can of course go to another doctor who may not know,
Re the shotgun licence until recently it has been "let us know if you think there is a problem" now it is "please send us a health report" ..... lovely battles underway as to what they mean by a "health report" . Patient has to pay for these BTW

gasbag1

30th Mar 2015, 18:30

"I have too much work and I am not able to do my job properly,"

"Interesting to me because it dovetails into one theory, which is that he was not up to the job, partially because of his inexperience. I think it is worthwhile to note that he would not have been in the cockpit of an American A 320 because he would be not meet the basic experience level to qualify in America. I hope its OK to make that observation, because I think its important."

Indeed I have wondered the same thought. Given the experience required to be hired in North America by an airline who operates the A-320 or B 737, the new hire would have flown with at least one or more previous airlines or commercial operations. During that earlier period any dangerous tendencies would have been noticed.

turker339

30th Mar 2015, 18:46

Don't forget to look at the situation from the other side of the fence. I know a F/O that lost his father, got into a depression (no suicidal tendencies though) and did the correct thing by going to an AME instead of going to a GP without declaring his profession. He lost his license and is now, having recovered fully, fighting to get it back. Shame this little ordeal will probably further cement his chances of getting back in the FD.

Denti

30th Mar 2015, 18:47

Indeed I have wondered the same thought. Given the experience required to be hired in North America by an airline who operates the A-320 or B 737, the new hire would have flown with at least one or more previous airlines or commercial operations. During that earlier period any dangerous tendencies would have been noticed.

Apparently not, remember the Fedex screwup and the Jetblue nutcase.

Anyway, the industry is different in europe to north america. In europe there have always been cadets entering directly into airliner flight decks. And airlines have run their own schools since WWII, therefore there is a lot of experience with training from the ground up.

Interestingly enough, every winter those cadets do fly in north america as well, in 737s too, not to mention those lucky cadets that make it into long haul early on and fly over there with their widebodies.

DaveReidUK

30th Mar 2015, 18:54

There are some incorrect technical statements, obviously the author is not an aviation specialist.

He seems also to have a problem with the English language, being under the impression that "accusation" and "evidence" are synonymous.

marie paire

30th Mar 2015, 19:35

Maybe screening at airports is now good enough the bomb proof doors are no longer necessary. 9/11 was a game changer, weakly armed hijackers probably can't get control of a plane again, and there have been several incidents thwarted by passengers. So maybe we need to revisit the issue of cockpit security.
I agree. But it will never happen. The US would rather see 100 full loaded planes go down than one hit the White House.

Rushed Approach

30th Mar 2015, 20:03

It is the prosecutor's job to launch an accusation if he thinks there is some data making this possible ! It is a lawyer's job to argue that this data isn't convincing. A trial will decide. Saying such a process is ridiculous seems to me... rather strange (I wouldn't like to say ridiculous, because I suppose things are working differently in other countries ; please do not fall in this US tendency saying that "if you don't do things like we do, it means you haven't still found the right way").

It's ridiculous (to me being UK based) because the whole point about aircraft investigations is that witness testimony is protected from being passed on to law enforcement agencies in the UK - i.e. aviation safety is placed above criminal proceedings. Clearly it's different in France. The reason for this is simple - if you screw up and are going to be prosecuted for it, then you are going to cover it up if there is a danger you will be locked up, hence every pilot would stay silent in any investigation in case they might be accused of a "crime".

So yes the French system does indeed appear to be different, but not for the better as far as flight safety is concerned some would argue.

Cantiflas

30th Mar 2015, 20:12

If I had a pound or dollar for every mention of "knee-jerk" in this context I'd be much better-off.I truly believe that this reaction is not so.The argument has been most probably finely balanced and this event was the tipping-point in Europe.
When the .38/45 and mega-Joule-proof doors came in,it fell to the lot of some of us to come up with a satisfactory procedure.The reason some airlines went for a minimum of two might have been the same as mine:I could not accept the idea of one pilot,on their own,behind something notionally impenetrable.I was coming from the standpoint of overall safety for all on board by having another pair of hands and eyes available-no algorithms,no statistics.Cabin crew are well trained and resourcful.

Rushed Approach

30th Mar 2015, 20:19

You display no clue about French legal process, yet choose to be critical of it.

The question of a "crime" or not is not relevant. I explained earlier that when a life has been lost, the "Procureur" for the relevant district opens an "instruction" I explained this in an earlier post ( Iwould quote the post number, but because of deletions, the number keeps changing)

Here 150 lives were lost.

The Procureur (please note the different vocabulary; "Procureur" is not the same thing as "prosecutor"), is obliged to open a case and be open with the public and with all concerned parties.

The Procureur is not investigating the technical aspects; BEA do that. They brief him, and he applies his required public duty to what follows.

He does not have "gut feelings" and as such they are neither subjective nor not so.

Just to be clear, because you seem not to have grasped it. When a death has occurred, the Procureur opens a case. It does not ergo facto mean that there is a suspicion of a crime having been committed.

The, in due course, BEA investigations and reports become part of the "instruction"

Got it now?

Thanks for the patronising reply.

In which case he doesn't need to pass subjective judgments as to what is "likely" to have happened does he? Thought not. Got it?

mercurydancer

30th Mar 2015, 20:19

rh200

30th Mar 2015, 20:24

The fact that this guy has put a whole plane into a mountain suggests that there is much more than depression at play here.

Exactly right, it seems to be along the same lines as those wanting to go out in some sort of twisted glory logic that they will know my name. I would suggest it gets group in the mass shootings type of thing.

There are possible reasons for this phenomena but this thread is not the place to discuss.

Ian W

30th Mar 2015, 20:27

It's ridiculous (to me being UK based) because the whole point about aircraft investigations is that witness testimony is protected from being passed on to law enforcement agencies in the UK - i.e. aviation safety is placed above criminal proceedings. Clearly it's different in France. The reason for this is simple - if you screw up and are going to be prosecuted for it, then you are going to cover it up if there is a danger you will be locked up, hence every pilot would stay silent in any investigation in case they might be accused of a "crime".

So yes the French system does indeed appear to be different, but not for the better as far as flight safety is concerned some would argue.

I actually doubt that very much, do you seriously think that if you deliberately caused the death of 149 people in UK, and the evidence is plain on the CVR that you did it and you are still flying happily with the airline that the AAIB would not pass that evidence to the police? Of course they would pass all the evidence to the police or they would be criminally liable themselves.
There is a huge difference between an accident due to human error and a deliberate crash.

montague

30th Mar 2015, 20:29

You cannot treat anyone until a diagnosis is made, or at least symptom control or empirical treatment. Its quite possible to attend a clinic or hospital for investigations and not be treated. I understand that in this instance, there is an attendance at a clinic for an eye problem.

It is not unusual for someone to present with a physical set of symptoms which either consciously or unconsciously cause the person to go to a doctor.

Conscious or deliberate attendance? Perhaps the person wanted to speak to a doctor but his employment would put him in some kind of jeopardy if he reported mental difficulties. Best go to the doctor with en eye problem?

Classic is the diabetics in the UK - plenty of type 2 DM HGV drivers who are fine so long as they are aware of the potential problems of one or two of the drugs. However some Type 2's end up up on insulin and that is a no no for the HGV licence - hence some reluctance to attend for monitoring of the condition.

Cows getting bigger

30th Mar 2015, 20:29

I'm a little bemused by the regular references to US cockpits and the strength of their 1500hr rule. That rule isn't exactly something that has been kicking around for too long and, if the jungle drums are to be believed, was implemented as a (knee jerk) reaction to the Colgan crash.

Sooooo, I'm not sure the example is mature enough to be quoted as why things are better over the western side of the Atlantic.

Alain67

30th Mar 2015, 20:35

@Rushed Approach
It's ridiculous (to me being UK based) because the whole point about aircraft investigations is that witness testimony is protected from being passed on to law enforcement agencies in the UK - i.e. aviation safety is placed above criminal proceedings. Clearly it's different in France. The reason for this is simple - if you screw up and are going to be prosecuted for it, then you are going to cover it up if there is a danger you will be locked up, hence every pilot would stay silent in any investigation in case they might be accused of a "crime".

So yes the French system does indeed appear to be different, but not for the better as far as flight safety is concerned some would argue.
Ok, systems are different. Yours (UK) might also have problems IMHO :
take the case of a serious medical error, or suppose an innocent is put in jail, do you think that in order to improve the efficiency of these jobs in the future, one should also stay silent ? We all tend to ask truth about faults made by others, and aren't very prompt to tell it when the problem is on our side.

BOING

30th Mar 2015, 20:40

CGB

Requirements change with time and demand but at my airline selection interview, about 30 years ago, ALL of the applicants had 4-jet time (some of 'em 8 jets :)). This was far above the airlines published basic requirements but I guess that if you pay the wages you get to select the employees.

Rushed Approach

30th Mar 2015, 20:49

I would point out that we do not know that IF a pilot was in the cabin he ever entered the emergency code. As far as I know, it is not possible for the airline to disable the emergency code option (the FCOM doesn't indicate so), so the assertion by the quoted individual from Germanwings does not make sense in saying that this option was not available. If a pilot was out of the flight deck, he and the rest of the crew could have forgotten the code (or have been told a different one to that which was programmed) which might explain why it was never entered.

I suspect the Germanwings aircraft did not have a physical "deadbolt" fitted, so that's another red herring.

Bilt mentions a GPWS "Sink Rate" warning on the CVR supposedly shortly after a pilot left the flight deck, yet this is an approach/go-around mode that you would not expect to be triggered at all in the scenarios discussed on here thus far.

Rushed Approach

30th Mar 2015, 20:55

I actually doubt that very much, do you seriously think that if you deliberately caused the death of 149 people in UK, and the evidence is plain on the CVR that you did it and you are still flying happily with the airline that the AAIB would not pass that evidence to the police? Of course they would pass all the evidence to the police or they would be criminally liable themselves. There is a huge difference between an accident due to human error and a deliberate crash

The point that you seem to be having extreme difficulty in grasping, is that what is "deliberate" cannot be determined until a proper investigation has concluded. Therefore if you want the best flight safety system, the quid pro quo is that you must assume those involved are innocent until proven guilty.

Otherwise you compromise the whole reporting system.

captplaystation

30th Mar 2015, 20:56

Denti said

"Isn't video surveillance standard? In europe, with the exception of ryanair, it certainly is. Without video surveillance there was always a second person required on the flightdeck anyway."

It appears that "exemptions" are/were available from certain national aviation authorities that have not (until this event ) mandated a 2nd Bod in the cockpit.

WillowRun 6-3

30th Mar 2015, 21:12

But Rushed Approach, a number of well-informed and experienced posters have pointed out, that the law enforcement authorities must, in the appropriate case, take steps to preserve evidence, and in the French system, to open a proceeding in the nature of an enquiry into the circumstances of the fatalities (if I understand what has been said about France's system). But - as I read your objection - this tends to undercut, or even guts, the premise of the reporting system (a system which has served the overall civil aviation enterprise so well for so long, it must be noted). Is there not a hybrid, a combination, an integrative and accommodative principle here, which mitigates to a great extent against the harms to the reporting system you have invoked? I think there is: the vast, vast majority, if not literally all, of licensed Air Transport aviators will understand that in this matter, the Germanwings disaster, the law enforcement authorities had a duty to preserve evidence and open an enquiry - because this is so totally different than the types of mishaps, incidents, and even crashes which the confidentiality system for reporting is designed both to motivate, and protect. I am not arguing here, from the primacy of the criminal or quasi-criminal laws applicable in France (though they do trump even the reporting system, in my understanding). I am, however, arguing that the reporting system remains intact, because aviators with ATP licenses - having completed so much training and having such high standards of professionalism - know intuitively as well as logically that the actions of the law enforcement authorities were triggered by the highly unique situation confronting world civil aviation on the slopes of the Alps, sadly.

36050100

30th Mar 2015, 21:17

Armoured doors, door codes, cameras, video surveillance, live telemetry, 2 persons in the flight deck, 200ml of yoghurt, toothpaste, soup etc etc.

I believe all are missing the point. If one of the people at the controls of a conventionally controlled aircraft (e.g. B737, B757 etc ) has malicious intent, he/she could have the wings off before the other pilot could do anything to stop it. I don't know whether the flight envelope protection on an Airbus would prevent the above.

So, truly the only way to prevent a recurrence is more rigorous psychiatric screening of flight deck personnel.

Brace yourselves folks!

turker339

30th Mar 2015, 21:33

The point that you seem to be having extreme difficulty in grasping, is that what is "deliberate" cannot be determined until a proper investigation has concluded. Therefore if you want the best flight safety system, the quid pro quo is that you must assume those involved are innocent until proven guilty.

Otherwise you compromise the whole reporting system. Hence why its always noted that the purpose of an aircraft accident investigation is to find the root causes and not to dish out blame. Once you start blaming people the system turns against you next time you are doing an investigation, as those involved refrain from sharing information due to the fear that they will be assigned blame for the loss of life/craft.

So, truly the only way to prevent a recurrence is more rigorous psychiatric screening of flight deck personnel.

To what extent and how often? The thing with psychiatric issues is that it is too random to catch. A 45 year old pilot with no history of any such issues can snap and take his aircraft down with all souls on board as a result. Not very likely? Well consider how many pilots fly daily around the world on how many flights. How likely is it that GW or any other airline was going to go down due to the alleged suicide attempt? A very low likelihood in terms of probability. Maybe not as good as for someone with a history of mental issues but never-the-less too damn good odds to not inconvenience the 99.9% of pilots that fly just as frequently as the F/O did, break up with their girlfriends or get a divorce, etc. and don't feel the need to dive for the mountains with the plane they're commandeering with monthly sanity/stability tests for airline pilots.

As mentioned earlier, where does it stop? Psych evals before each flight?

wings folded

30th Mar 2015, 21:34

Thanks for the patronising reply.

Patronising if you wish, Factual, though.

Unlike your "I suspect the Germanwings aircraft did not have a physical "deadbolt" fitted, so that's another red herring.

Pure supposition on your behalf.

roving

30th Mar 2015, 21:52

There has been much discussion of the roles of the French Prosecutor and the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile and whether it was competent for the Prosecutor to pre-empt the air accident investigation. Comment has been made that things are different in the UK.

If this link is correct, there has only ever been one criminal prosecution in the UK of a professional pilot as a result of their actions whilst in command of an aircraft being used for the purposes of commercial air transport and that was in 1991. The incident giving rise to the prosecution was in fact never investigated by the AAIB, but instead by the pilot's employer, British Airways, and the Civil Aviation Authority.

B741, British Airways, London Heathrow UK, 1989 (Legal Process - Flight Crew) - SKYbrary Aviation Safety (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/B741,_British_Airways,_London_Heathrow_UK,_1989_%28Legal_Pro cess_-_Flight_Crew%29)

Rushed Approach

30th Mar 2015, 21:59

FlightDetent

30th Mar 2015, 22:07

"I suspect the Germanwings aircraft did not have a physical "deadbolt" fitted, so that's another red herring.

Pure supposition on your behalf. WF, i know about 1997 and 2000 bulit MSNs, that had no deadbolt installed. The security door (with all the other bells and whistles) on those was, I think, retrofitted but a standard Airbus kit. OTOH, the 2005+ machines with with line-fit indeed came with the deadbolt.

The prosecutor in his brief stated that the airframe did not have the override emergency code feature (which I find hard to believe) and was 24 yrs old. Germanwings D-AIPX (Airbus A320 - MSN 147) | Airfleets aviation (http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-a320-147.htm)

KClemens

30th Mar 2015, 22:09

@papershuffler

What is the procedure for issuing them? Are they issued by request of the patient, or is it down to the doctor to suggest?

That depends. Usually a physicians decide wether one is
able to work or not. He judges according the diagnosis he made
and what a patients tells him during his visit.

I.e., if one has a severe flu with fever he will write a sick note without
asking him for that.

But if one shows up just with a cold a patient may ask for this because
one explains him, he/she would need some days off from working because
of having problems at work.

mary meagher

30th Mar 2015, 22:14

Ollie Onion posts on the Australian Forum, on 28 March, at 20:27 and points out that MOST INSURANCE POLICIES for loss of license and income protection specifically exclude mental illness. He says it asks a lot of a pilot to put his whole livelihood at risk by self reporting.

If this exclusion was removed - say, by regulators, there would not be such a severe penalty for a pilot to recuse his rating voluntarily.

Rushed Approach

30th Mar 2015, 22:15

Unlike your "I suspect the Germanwings aircraft did not have a physical "deadbolt" fitted, so that's another red herring.

Pure supposition on your behalf.

No, not pure supposition - based on 20+ years' experience of flying Airbuses around Europe - how about you? It's clear that nobody on here is going to reveal whether the aircraft had this security feature (fair enough - I wouldn't if I knew the answer) but that's the point - we don't even know what security features were fitted and what emergency options were used/available, yet somehow within a few days of the crash it's done and dusted by some on here. There are a lot of options, with multiple airline selectable options, and I'll bet if you asked all of that crew what they were you'd get 6 different answers, as pretty much any European A320 Captain would if you ask that in the security brief when you next go flying. Try it ...

TheInquisitor

30th Mar 2015, 22:19

The problem is that the very opening of "proceedings" means that "guilt" of a person or persons is a possibility. In this case all the witnesses to the crash itself are unfortunately no longer with us, and so cannot defend themselves, and meanwhile the tabloid press look to dig up every morsel that might back up the sensational potential outcome, whilst no doubt ignoring any mitigating evidence that might get in the way of a good story. If the co-pilot had survived the accident (let's imagine he's in a coma, one of several survivors) then what chance would he now have of a fair trial? None.

Let's not forget that a single "rogue" pilot is actually about the best outcome for the aircraft manufacturer and the airline in terms of the money each will have to spend to be seen to "correct" the situation. I'm not saying that there is any kind of cover-up here - I have great respect for Lufthansa and the French authorities and in many ways they are doing outstanding work. However, once you start such a cannon ball of a conclusion rolling it is almost impossible to stop it, even if significant doubts later arise.

This is the danger of the early "obvious" conclusion. Presumably the French prosecutor is aware of the implications on future flight safety and the unions' concerns, yet it has chosen to ignore them in favour of getting the "truth" out there after only a few days. Let's hope future lives will not be lost because of the lack of trust and thus lack of honesty engendered in what might be perceived as a "flawed" investigation system that could result in a pilot being a suspect in deliberately causing the injury of his/her passengers because of mental health issues years ago.

The "gains" in eliminating such incredibly rare events may well be swamped by the loss of life resulting from the loss of confidence of pilots in the integrity of the system that thay will be given a fair trial and hence their subsequent lack of co-operation with any investigation ...

With the greatest of respect, I think you are clutching at straws now.

NO mention of 'mental history' was made when the original story was 'leaked', to my recollection - that followed later. I believe you have that bit @rse-about-face.

The ONLY reason for info to be released so early on is that there is such overwhelming evidence of deliberate action that there is no other plausible explanation - and that evidence has come almost immediately from multiple independent sources.

As soon as this becomes apparent, it ceases to become an 'accident' investigation and becomes a criminal one. Ergo, none of the protections you describe apply, therefore I believe your argument is invalid.

And unlike you, I have absolutely NO faith in the French authorities, nor Airbus - however, I see no conspiracy here, or 'premature' conclusions. The first thing that went through my mind was 'not ANOTHER 'fantastic' Airbus P.O.S flying itself into the ground!' - however, my own prejudices were very quickly put aside as soon as I saw the FR24 data which was completely unlike any of the other incidents. Nor did I buy into the 'hypoxia' theory.

Severe Clear

30th Mar 2015, 22:31

Cows..."I'm a little bemused by the regular references to US cockpits and the strength of their 1500hr rule. That rule isn't exactly something that has been kicking around for too long and, if the jungle [B][I]drums are to be believed, was implemented as a (knee jerk) reaction to the Colgan crash."

1500-hour Pilot Rule Presents Challenges And Opportunities

"The FAA has issued a final rule that raises to 1,500 the minimum flight hours required by first officers for U.S. air carriers flying under Part 121 regulations, up from the current 250 hours. The new rules stem from a Congressional mandate following the 2009 crash of Colgan Air 3407, a Bombardier Q400, in Buffalo, NY. {More at source*}

"Quality of Time Logged"*

"The new regulations, however, do not address the quality of the logged time. Both pilots in the Colgan crash had logged more time than the new minimum; the captain had flown 3,379 hours and the first officer 2,244 hours at the time of the accident. "

*Source:
1,500-hour Pilot Rule Presents Challenges And Opportunities | Business Aviation: Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2013-08-01/1500-hour-pilot-rule-presents-challenges-and-opportunities)

More on Colgan Crash Probe:
NTSB scrutinizes pilots in Colgan Q400 crash probe | Business Aviation: Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2009-05-26/ntsb-scrutinizes-pilots-colgan-q400-crash-probe)

More on 1500hrs...Brad Tate's unintended...
The Unintended Consequences of the "1500 Hour Rule" (http://www.nycaviation.com/2013/12/unintended-consequences-1500-hour-rule/)

Rushed Approach

30th Mar 2015, 22:48

As soon as this becomes apparent, it ceases to become an 'accident' investigation and becomes a criminal one

Apparent to who? The point you are missing is that it can't be "apparent" until the investigation is complete. If the result is prejudged as "apparent" after only a few days then the whole investigation is potentially flawed as the evidence can be selected to fit the "crime" and evidence that doesn't fit is ignored or given little credibility.

To say that as soon as any crime is suspected means that any accident investigation then goes out of the window is to completely miss the point of protecting pilots from consequences if they "fess up". If you ever get the chance to visit the AAIB down in Farnborough please take it up - perhaps then you will understand the point I'm making.

RifRaf3

30th Mar 2015, 22:49

The assumption is that if a crew member (pilot) wishes to suicide and take passengers lives as well, that placing a cabin crew member with the remaining pilot will solve the problem.

What seems to have been overlooked is that the cabin crew member is even more probable to have the same suicidal/homicidal intent. They have been subject to less screening and observation in all respects. You are now placing them behind the remaining pilot and within reach of controls in a locked room.
The problem has merely been moved sideways.

Furthermore, with cabin crew outnumbering pilots by up to 10 to 1 on some aircraft, the probability of a terrorist 'plant' within the cabin crew possibly increases the overall odds that the alone pilot is a safer option.

TheInquisitor

30th Mar 2015, 23:08

Apparent to who?

Apparent to the investigators - hence why they informed the authorities and the information was released. The investigators are far more expert than you or I in this respect. I am inclined to trust them.

The point you are missing is that it can't be "apparent" until the investigation is complete. If the result is prejudged as "apparent" after only a few days then the whole investigation is potentially flawed as the evidence can be selected to fit the "crime" and evidence that doesn't fit is ignored or given little credibility.

What makes you think evidence has been 'selected'? The investigation pretty much IS complete - the CVR, combined with the Mode S ES data, combined with the ADS-B out data, is unfortunately pretty conclusive. What more do you believe a drawn-out and protracted investigation will reveal, or achieve? The very fact that conclusions have been drawn, and released, this early strongly suggests that this 'incident' is very much unlike most others.

There ARE people selecting (or rather ignoring) evidence to fit a preconceived idea - but it doesn't appear to be the BEA or French Authorities....

Imagine, if you will, that this investigation proceeded exactly as you suggest, and somewhere later down the line these same conclusions are reached - the public outcry, and the subsequent damage to our profession, would be catastrophic. 'We', as a community, would be accused of 'sitting on' information that could have immediate, serious safety consequences - at least in the public's mind.

You are also assuming that the investigation can't possibly be complete after only 'a few days' - I disagree. It would appear that in this case they have enough evidence to present a reasonable conclusion, else they would not have done so. Most accidents CANNOT be concluded upon in just 'a few days' - but this is not 'most accidents'.

To say that as soon as any crime is suspected means that any accident investigation then goes out of the window is to completely miss the point of protecting pilots from consequences if they "fess up". If you ever get the chance to visit the AAIB down in Farnborough please take it up - perhaps then you will understand the point I'm making.

What pilot is ever going to 'fess up' to deliberately endangering their aircraft? I see no 'damage' being done to the investigation of genuine accidents here.

We also need to bear in mind the investigators' responsibilities under Annex 13 5.11:

5.11 If, in the course of an investigation it becomes known, or it is suspected, that an act of unlawful interference was involved, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately initiate action to ensure that the aviation security authorities of the
State(s) concerned are so informed. (my bold)

...which is EXACTLY what the investigators have done.

I have already visited the AAIB, quite some time ago now - very sobering walking around those hangars - not for the faint hearted.

I guess we won't see eye-to-eye on this, Rushed Approach, but I imagine time will tell.

A0283

30th Mar 2015, 23:15

Does anyone have any insight in the actual specific configuration of this plane (not the original "as built" configuration, but the "as is"?).

Acars?
Engines - remote 'monitoring'?
Perhaps even Other air/ground information channels?

The answer to those questions would have a significant impact on a lot of what has been discussed and said till now. Even when installed you would still have to find out if it was working at the time.

From an accident investigation point of view it would be rather damaging if the procureur (I use the word procureur and not the word prosecuter) had based his statements on a rough and initial reading of the CVR only. If the same damage is perceived from a judicial point of view I don't know.

So would like to ask two questions:
A. Can anyone say something about the plane's configuration?
B. Is it acceptable under French judiciairy practice to make statements of what are in aerospace terms still 'not yet synchronized, non-confirmed, rough 'facts'', and if so, why and for what purpose are these statements generally made?

Note1: some papers and posters appear to state that the procureur was pressed by the NYT disclosure... Or later BildamS...
Note2: some papers and posters appear to state that the early publication was required in order to preserve evidence.
I don't understand why and how that would work ... It would help if the answers to A. and B. could also shed some light on these two Notes.

Leightman 957

31st Mar 2015, 01:03

Previous posts note that it is the FDR memory, not the FDR chassis, which remains missing.Just saying.

“No point of impact” is assumed because one has not been published and there is no apparent hole in the ground. Previous posts have described the geography as loose rock that can and does regularly shift down slopes which are all steep; impact would loosen much material and bury debris. Angle of a jangled repose is operant.

Depression, if relevant, is a contributor, not realistically as solitary reason for copilot's assumed actions. Many other significant contributors to irrational actions have so far been listed and it is that list, not individual factors, that matters.

There have been many posts claiming that recurrence of this type of event is miniscule. “With today's unequalled airline safety, 65,000 flights per day...” In one sense it is. But the actual equation is more like the chances of “picking” a winning Lotto or MegaMillions ticket, which is 1 in 259 million where I live. Hit the Lotto jackpot, you get filthy rich, and it only ruins your life. Fly once a year, in a year where there is only one unexplained airliner crash killing all aboard, and your chances of 'success” are 65000 x 365 or 1 in 23,725,000. Twenty three million is a big figure, but millions of Americans (half in fact!) annually spend billions combined to play/pay Lotto in the belief they have a better chance at hitting it big than dying in an airliner crash, even though it is ten times more probable that one will die flying on today's “safest ever” airlines than hitting the jackpot. While not wishing to be macabre, the outcomes are some what different, one requiring new financial management, the other with the airline passenger 'winner' being crushed, mashed, jellied, burned alive, fragmented, drowned, poisoned, or otherwise sliced and diced in new and different ways. Along I might add, with entire families which causes proportionally larger the social ripples of grief, anger and confidence questioning. My point is that the current event is fraught with potential not yet fully argued about. One should never forget the mercurial nature of public opinion.

DrPhillipa

31st Mar 2015, 01:19

While the FAA rule about 1500 hours is pretty new, the practical aspects of getting hired at a MAJOR US AIRLINE is much more than that.
A college degree, no FAR infractions, ATPMEL, And quite frankly 4000 or 5000 hours is not out of line. Much of that time will be in regional airliners.German Wings IS a "Regional Airline".

Ian W

31st Mar 2015, 01:22

Ian W

31st Mar 2015, 01:29

The problem is that the very opening of "proceedings" means that "guilt" of a person or persons is a possibility.

No it doesn't. It is standard procedure with an incident with loss of life. Similar rules pertain in the USA where the FBI will attend a crash site making it a criminal investigation. There is no presumption at the start that any crime has occurred. The probability of a crime only gets raised when evidence exists to support that assumption.

vapilot2004

31st Mar 2015, 01:33

First of all, no, not kicking and screaming, but we do point out the dangers with that solution. And the norm elsewhere? It certainly wasn't in the USA (http://www.wsj.com/articles/united-shifts-cockpit-policy-to-require-two-crew-members-1427497078?mod=wsj_nview_latest).

Denti, In the US, has been airline SOP, following FAA guidelines since Phase I post 9/11 cockpit door improvements, that there be two crew on the flight deck at all times. United Airlines, for reasons only known to them, waived that policy for "certain aircraft" according to that news story you linked from the WSJ.

I was surprised about this as you, certainly is SOP on all the carriers I have flown on in the US, including UAL, although haven't been on their 787.

:ok:

EDIT: I should add the guidelines and policies regarding two-crew cockpits were in place to assist in identifying the person on the other side of the door as "authorized", the opening of the door itself (this Phase I SOP was in place before automated magnetic locks and video cameras were fitted), and in cases of pilot incapacitation. The idea of a single pilot suicide was not part of the thinking at the time.

Another admittance of mine: I know here in the States, security and hyperbolic reaction is commonplace and much of what is done here is often after the fact and over the top. In this case, I believe the regulators and airline operation authors were well-founded in their recommended procedures.

While I am on this tack... The US also has some of the strictest regulation and policies in place (far from the most humane and practical to be sure) regarding mental illness and substance abuse among pilots holding ATPLs - that, however, would be another conversation - perhaps the one we should be having.

olasek

31st Mar 2015, 02:10

This is important to know, because whole investigation is based on scenario with captain locked out of FD.
Because this is what happened. There is recorded conversation between pilots discussing that captain is about to leave the cockpit, captain admitting he should have gone to the bathroom before the flight, FO eager to take over flying duties, there is even a sound of clicks when captain's chair is sliding, click of the door being open/shut, etc. You are way behind the news.

PeterTG

31st Mar 2015, 02:35

My understanding in most mass killing events or attempts there has invariably been a trail that is later unearthed where every body joins the dots and says we all knew he (never a she) was going to do it.

This man is no different in my view, there is plenty in his history that should have rung alarm bells. With each day more of that history is coming to light this should have been disseminated

The so called sick notes in his apartment are just a small part of it, but addressed to to the wrong person.

Mandatory reporting is not uncommon, for example in Australia it is mandatory for selected classes of people involved with children to report signs of abuse. In previous posts the Swedish model has been well outlined in relation to aviation

I appreciate that this is not a popular suggestion but it has to be faced.

Mozella

31st Mar 2015, 02:55

Therefore if you want the best flight safety system, the quid pro quo is that you must assume those involved are innocent until proven guilty. This attitude, while pretty common in today's ultra liberal, ultra PC world, is simply wrong and shows a lack of understand of what justice is.

Yes, when a defendant enters a court of law, the "LAW" must treat him with a presumption of innocence and, generally speaking, it is the state which must prove him guilty to some degree of certainty. The defendant need not prove his innocence since it is assumed.

But that's about where the presumption of innocence ends, at the courthouse door.

For example, before the sheriff comes to arrest me, I want him to be darn sure that I'm guilty. Not only the Sheriff, but also the D.A., and everyone else who has looked at the situation. I sure don't want to be cuffed and led away because some sheriff thinks I'm innocent.

And, on a forum such as this one, anyone can decide that the person in question is innocent or, if they wish, they may look at the facts, rumors, news stories, and assorted BS and decide that the guy is guilty as sin.

Furthermore, in a place which is supposed to support a free exchange of ideas, you may argue the other side but there is no righteousness in prohibiting a determination of guilt before any trial takes place. In that respect, a forum poster is no different from the D.A. and Sheriff.

Feel free to disagree but you have no right to say someone "must assume those involved are innocent until proven guilty". Doing so exhibits an ignorance of what is just and what is reasonable in a civilized society.

737er

31st Mar 2015, 03:04

My understanding in most mass killing events or attempts there has invariably been a trail that is later unearthed where every body joins the dots and says we all knew he (never a she) was going to do it.

For every person that has left a trail like this guy did, there are a million who have left a more troubling trail and never hurt a flea.

People always say they had a feeling or blah blah blah after the fact. He was weird. He was a nice guy but there was something about him.

Passenger 389

31st Mar 2015, 04:07

on 31st Mar 2015, 03:31 porterhouse wrote:

It is no 'rough' approximation it's a poppycock.
They would be briefing landing probably in another 45-60 min, if they were still alive.

In actuality, it has been widely reported that the Cptn completed a landing briefing of some sort with the FO even before TOC.

That timing seems unusually early to some on this thread (including you, it would appear). I believe Phoenix was wondering if the timing perhaps suggested the Cptn might not be feeling well.

I can think of some other possible explanations, but won't clutter the thread with my speculation.

Denti

31st Mar 2015, 04:32

I should add the guidelines and policies regarding two-crew cockpits were in place to assist in identifying the person on the other side of the door as "authorized", the opening of the door itself (this Phase I SOP was in place before automated magnetic locks and video cameras were fitted), and in cases of pilot incapacitation. The idea of a single pilot suicide was not part of the thinking at the time.

I have to admit, when we got the first reinforced doors in early 2002 they came with magnetic locks and video surveillance and thought it was the absolute norm everywhere, especially in the US. It was a retrofit and the placement of the monitor was sometimes awkward, especially on our 733s, but they allowed a clear identification from the start. And the emergency code for the magnetic locks provided a safe reentry in case of pilot incapacitation. Yes, we initially had the two crew rule but it was apparently clear we didn't need it, as door operation and identification was available from both pilot seats. And therefore there was no rule requiring a second crew as long as other means of identification and door operation were available. With either system inop (magnetic locks/video surveillance) we had to return to the two crew rule for obvious reasons. But those systems are extremely reliable, i have it experienced only once.

To be honest, i haven't seen any european airline without video surveillance, neither those i worked for nor those i jumpseated with (yes, flight deck jumpseats are still available).

The current mindset to add a second crew if one pilot has to leave the flight deck is more that it is needed as a suicide watch than as a door operator or for identification. Giving the changed working conditions for cabin crews though that is not without risks. In times of a widespread use of zero hour contracts, 6 month contracts and so on, cabin crew turnover is extremely high, up to over 50% of the workforce per season in some airlines. They only need a very perfunctory medical check before employment (can you walk? can you talk? you're hired) and none thereafter, they are not a known entity due to the short time with the company and extremely short training (4 weeks compared to 2,5 years for pilots) and have of course only a very limited background check as everything else would cost too much money. And now they are entrusted to keep the flightcrew in check and hold the lives of all on board in their hands.

As someone with malicious intent i know i would rather send my guys to a cabin crew class than trying to get in as a pilot, one is a near guarantee that they will sit in the flightdeck in a few weeks, the other is a near impossibility with failure rates of more than 90% during initial selection.