Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[FE Hoppy]

He was probably seeing what response there would be from ATC to an incorrect alt selection.

[oldoberon]

BBC news just now,

When asked to change height by ATC, investigation shows he dialed in mutiple heights from 100 ft 49,000 ft, but did not activate them

Ie F24 would not show it.

Unfortunatley I could hear but not see the TV, and they appeared to show a graphic of "him" turning a dial" sure it makes sense to pilots.

The captain was not in the cockpit at the time, and they clearly stated no one on board would have sensed any change of height ( there wasn't one), he practiced turning a dial!!

possibly as per post above by Hoppy to see ATC reaction.

[DB64]

Is it not possible that rather than practising he was going to crash the aircraft but could not go through with it?

[Airbubba]

He was probably seeing what response there would be from ATC to an incorrect alt selection.

Some ATC sites allow the controller to see the selected altitude in the ADS-B data but many do not from what I've read here on other threads.

I've been quizzed by a Chinese controller about a metric RVSM altitude in the window but perhaps he was checking the QNE mode C readout after level off rather than selected altitude from ADS-B.

Would the Germanwings A320 send out ADS-B data about the selected altitude and would the controllers be able to see it in this case? Anybody know?

[Ian W]

Is it not possible that rather than practising he was going to crash the aircraft but could not go through with it?

This was my thought too.
The change of attitude in his responses to an arrival brief that was noted right back at the beginning of the thread may have been when he decided to actually do it.

These were the first two flights after his period off duty during which it seems his girlfriend/fiancee had said she would leave.

[oblivia]

Is it also possible that this captain had a habit of leaving the cockpit? Is it normal to do so on both legs of a short trip?

[NigelOnDraft]

Is it normal to do so on both legs of a short trip? Yes - perfectly normal

[fireflybob]

Is it also possible that this captain had a habit of leaving the cockpit? Is it normal to do so on both legs of a short trip?

Hardly a question of habit or being "normal" but more one of when nature required it, least that's how it worked for me in 5 years of budget airline operation.

[langleybaston]

I trust that the naysayers, the conspiracy theorists, the "here they go blaming the pilot again" brigade have sufficient evidence that they are wrong by now?

Looks like a duck ..........

[FE Hoppy]

Mode s enhanced transmits selected alt. You don't need full ADS-B.

If the ground station is equipped it will be flagged on the display in amber after a delay.
There used to be a nice video showing this on Maastricht website but I can't find it now.

here it is:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9cQKPiGvD5Y&spfreload=10

[Denti]

These were the first two flights after his period off duty during which it seems his girlfriend/fiancee had said she would leave.

Actually they weren't. The day before he did a ferry flight to berlin schönefeld and deadhead back to DUS.

[Airbubba]

Mode s enhanced transmits selected alt. You don't need full ADS-B.


Thanks for that clarification and the video link.

So, was the altitude knob twiddling on the earlier sector indeed a test of whether the controllers would see the altitude selection?

Like a lot of us, I've flown in that airspace for years and still don't know much about what is displayed at the ATC positions.

[thcrozier]

I thought I read somewhere that the Captain never left the Flight Deck on the previous leg. I guess I was mistaken.

[captplaystation]

Tend to agree with DB64 there too.

Can't imagine what must be going through the mind (well, I can actually ) of anyone who was a passenger on the Southbound sector. :uhoh:

[DaveReidUK]

I'm (easily) confused. Did you mean, "northbound"?

No, the reference is to "what must be going through the mind [present tense] of anyone who was a passenger" on the DUS-BCN leg that day, now that it emerges that Lubitz may have used that flight to rehearse the procedure that subsequently led to the death of all on board the return leg.

[mommaklee]

It will be interesting to learn if he was alone at any point on the the fd on the ferry flight. If so, the choice to intentionally cfit with passengers seems rather clear, and moves the murders from an act of opportunity to one of choice.

[RifRaf3]

There is a serious issue of any pilot in a two pilot crew leaving the cockpit during climb or descent. It should only occur in cruise as there is nobody to monitor the cleared inputs. This is sub standard airmanship.

On the fatal leg the Capt did not try to get back in until 5 mins after the fatal descent had began. It indicates that he considered this as normal practice. He was out of his seat on both legs when the descent began.

[RifRaf3]

If it's now perfectly normal to have only a single pilot self-monitoring during major changes of vertical flightpath, then safety has eroded considerably.
It's not difficult to organise your toilet breaks before TOD.

[fireflybob]

Whilst I agree ideally a comfort break should be timed to be completed prior to TOD this does not preclude many routes, certainly in Europe, where ATC might require a level change well before the "normal" TOD.

[UV]

On the fatal leg the Capt did not try to get back in until 5 mins after the fatal descent had began. It indicates that he considered this as normal practice. He was out of his seat on both legs when the descent began.

Bit unfair...he had no idea what was to follow the second time.

[RobertS975]

As far as the Captain leaving the cockpit, I can certainly tell you that in the US, unless there was a significant ground hold delay after leaving the gate, it would be a small minority of flights of that length where a member of the crew would leave the cockpit. The fact that the Captain left the cockpit so soon after departure would be most unusual in the USA.

[Sky Wave]

Maybe the FO slipped something into the Captains Coffee to ensure that the Captain needed to go out.

Whilst I agree that under normal circumstances one wouldn't leave the flight deck during climb or descent if I had a stomach issue I would try and leave it at close to TOD as possible as I would't want to have a desperate need whilst on final approach.

Sometimes the bodies needs overrule the best laid plans.

[Denti]

If it's now perfectly normal to have only a single pilot self-monitoring during major changes of vertical flightpath, then safety has eroded considerably.
It's not difficult to organise your toilet breaks before TOD.

Which he did, he went to the loo right after reaching TOC. However, in europe there might be numerous level changes for many different reasons during the normal cruise portion of the flight. Some even having to do with how the company filed the flight plan. Had a flight on that routing lately and there were five planned cruise climbs/descends on the ATC flight plan.

As far as the Captain leaving the cockpit, I can certainly tell you that in the US, unless there was a significant ground hold delay after leaving the gate, it would be a small minority of flights of that length where a member of the crew would leave the cockpit. The fact that the Captain left the cockpit so soon after departure would be most unusual in the USA.

Which might have to do with the hassle of the two person rule, which still isn't mandatory in europe, although most airlines did implement it by now. I have since seen colleagues severely dehydrating as they want to reduce their loo breaks during flight. Something that is not really conductive to top physical and mental performance either.

[Sober Lark]

Is it not possible that rather than practising he was going to crash the aircraft but could not go through with it?
Fortunate the Dusseldorf to Barcelona track of that day was to the right of the four nuclear power stations along the Rhone valley. Indeed, from the crash site to Cruas nuclear power station it is only 79 nautical miles.

[Ian W]

As far as the Captain leaving the cockpit, I can certainly tell you that in the US, unless there was a significant ground hold delay after leaving the gate, it would be a small minority of flights of that length where a member of the crew would leave the cockpit. The fact that the Captain left the cockpit so soon after departure would be most unusual in the USA.

It may be pure coincidence and I only fly four times a week on short 1 - 1.5 hour flights, :bored: but I have noticed that the crews seem to be taking toilet breaks as the pax self load. I had not noticed this before. :hmm:

[deanm]

Ian W: I concur.

I'm only a (reasonably-frequent) SLF but, on a recent Oz-NZ-Oz trip, I noticed that both flight deck crew members visited the forward lav while pax were boarding.

Not something I'd observed previously...

Perhaps this procedure is a new before-take-off check item?

[20milesout]

@Rifraf3 and RobertS975,

keep in mind that central Europe is a very congested airspace, chances are that you have to descend from cruising altitude long before your desired TOD. Regarding this it makes sense to leave the flight deck as early as possible to do whatever you have to do back in the cabin.

[Sky Wave]

@ Ian W and deanm

I think the majority of us have always used the turn around as an opportunity to use the loo. The exception is if there are technical issues on the turn around and you run out of time. In that case rather than delay the flight I'd wait until the cruise regardless of the length of the flight.

I suspect you just happen to notice it happening because you're more alert to it.

[sAx_R54]

Is it also possible that this captain had a habit of leaving the cockpit?


Prelim also says that Captain reported problem with front toilet not flushing and he was advised from base to reset a breaker at the rear of the plane. Maybe attending to this issue was the reason for him to leave the cockpit.

[truckflyer]

I am wondering how many of you have actually bothered to read the preliminary report. So many are claiming that the Captain left the cockpit during the climb!

The report clearly states the Captain left the cockpit after reaching cruising level FL 380!

Page 28 of the report, in Initial Findings.
The Captain left the cockpit at the beginning of the cruise at FL380! (just shows how many arm-chair experts there are here, when you don't even bother to READ the FACTS!

So after TOC! And before TOD!
How hard is it to read and understand this?

This is perfectly normal, special due to LCC ops often only allow 25 minutes on the ground for the turn-around, and we can't always plan the exact moment we need to make our comfort break!

[shimin]

According to the official report, the same crew landed in Barcelona at 7 h 57. The takeoff from Barcelona took place at 9 h 00. Barely 1 hour for ground operation. Pretty tight.

[Greenlights]

I can't believe what I'm reading here.
Some argue about the toilet leaving of the captain. Wake up guys, he is human being, reason or not, leaving for toilet is a personnal problem. What do you want ? that pilots have to be chained on their seat ? :ugh:
Maybe some of you are uneducated and only get an atpl, but come on. It is nonsense to argue about it. Don't cut off the branch you're sitting on !

[gcal]

@shimin

A one hour turn around would be considered generous in Europe for an A320.

[shimin]

One hour for turn around in China is usually ok but pretty tight for such a full loaded A320 at rush hour time in a major airport, I mean.

[NamelessWonder]

According to the prelim and its' description of the GWI access system, the door could have been opened by the Captain using a 3-digit (+#) "emergency" code. It would seem that it would not be possible to attempt to do so after the initial 1-digit "access request" had been refused "Any interaction with the keypad is then disabled for 5 minutes". as this would make the keypad inoperative until approx 9:39.31 (approx 90 seconds before impact).

In the BEA sequence of events, at no time is this "emergency unlock" procedure imlemented, only "buzzing" of the 1-digit access request, use of the cabin intercomm and shouting/knocking on the door (plus some banging that could have been attempts at physical acccess).

Whilst they don't address it specifically, the suggestion of the report is that (in the case of the system in use on GWI) such an attempt could have been blocked by the co-pilot anyway "If the flight crew toggles the switch during those 15 seconds, the acoustic signal stops and the system reacts according to the command (UNLOCK/LOCK)." but there is no mention of any such attempt being made - perhaps not surprisingly, given the circumstances and the events of the intervening 5 minutes.

Clearly there are good reasons for the systems that are in place, but, as they highlight, such procedures inevitably introduce an element of compromise and risk.

[NigelOnDraft]

NW

I think it pretty safe to assume that numerous attempts at Emergency Access were made, or not bothered with due indications in the cabin.

Clearly there are good reasons for the systems that are in place, but, as they highlight, such procedures inevitably introduce an element of compromise and risk. Agree, when you run through the scenario toe door was designed for - a well equipped determined team in the cabin seeking access to the Flt Deck. The Flt Crew are having to deal with the situation, divert, ATC / Security agencies are going bananas launching fighters - they need a simple drill to at least ensure Flt Deck access will not be achieved.

I am not as confident as some the scenario is now "dead in the water", and the Pax will solve the issue and "take out the terrorists". A low pax load and a well rehearsed team - and the baddies want the aircraft as a weapon, and are not worried about the pax numbers they take with them.

The BEA and authorities various will have to balance the security and political risks and decide if there will be changes. My personal guess is they will not - nobody will want to be the ones that allow the next 9/11 - but I could well be wrong. They took no notice of the suicide risk prior GW, despite it being clear... there will just be a supposed tightening up of medicals and hope it does not happen again :oh:

[air2air]

Anyone object to us having the door to the loo on f/d? CC will have to use the ones at the back.

Then we only need to leave the f/d to look at the engines and reset the breaker for the toilets! which will reduce the burden on CC time to sit in the jump seat.

[M100S2]

An observation from the BEA preliminary report pages 22-23

From the previous DUS-BCN flight, aircraft level at 37000ft, captain leaves cockpit, seconds later ATC cleared them firstly to 35000ft and then circa 40 seconds later to 21000ft.

Lots of manipulation of target altitude to to 100ft etc during the time the captain wasn't in the cockpit, but when the captain returned to the cockpit four minutes later the target altitude selected was 25000ft and not 21000ft :confused:

ATC expecting 21000ft within an unstated time frame, but in the absence of terrain clearance issues would there be any reason not to set the desired altitude at anything other than 21000?

No indication of if this setting issue was resolved by subsequent communications and actions by the flight crew and if it raised any queries.

[VFR Only Please]

(...) Nobody will want to be the ones that allow the next 9/11. (...) They took no notice of the suicide risk prior GW, despite it being clear... there will just be a supposed tightening up of medicals and hope it does not happen again.

Requiring a flight attendant to wait on the flight deck while one of the pilots is out seems like a reasonable, unrevolutionary precaution.
Nobody wants to be the ones who allow the next GW either.

[Kitiara]

Of course, nothing will ever be able to stop a determined, skilled individual that is trusted with the operation of an aircraft from crashing it, no matter who is in the cockpit at the time.

EgyptAir 990 proved that.

[Solar]

In this case even if a CC person were on the flight deck what are the chances of them realizing what was happening in time to prevent this. I understand that she/he could have possibly let the captain back on to the flight deck but based on what has been reported it would seem that the alarm was raised only after the captain could not regain entry.
As has already been pointed out its all pretty moot anyway considering that if either of the two people at the front decide to end it there is not a lot that the other pilot, CC or SLF can do. Like anybody in control of people carrying transport the public places trust in the individual/s at the pointy end.
It's the trust in the system (and fellow workers) that allowed this individual to be in his position that I suggest should be questioned.
And no I don't have the answers for that.

[Contact Approach]

1 hour turnaround! What a joy! Give me that every time...

[PastTense]

The remains of all 150 victims of the Germanwings plane crash in the French Alps will be turned over to their families for burial now that investigators have completed the process of identifying them.Marseille Prosecutor Brice Robin said Tuesday that death certificates for everyone aboard the doomed Airbus A320 jet have been signed and turned over to officials at German airline Lufthansa, parent company of the low-cost airline.

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/05/19/world/europe/ap-eu-france-plane-crash.html

[D Bru]

European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - European Aviation: Commission releases Task Force's report on Germanwings incident (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5392_en.htm)

The Task Force recommendations are:
- The principle of 'two persons in the cockpit at all time' should be maintained.
- Pilots should undergo a psychological evaluation before entering airline service.
- Airlines should run a random drugs and alcohol programme.
- Robust programme for oversight of aeromedical examiners should be established.
- A European aeromedical data repository should be created.
- Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.

Next steps:
The Commission will review the recommendations, taking into account advice received from other sources such as the independent accident investigation led by the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA)). Where legislative action is to be taken, EASA will be requested to develop concrete proposals, which will then be included in EU aviation safety regulations. EASA will also be asked to produce non-legislative deliverables such as guidance material and practical tools for information sharing, and to monitor actions taken by Member States and industry.

[D Bru]

BTW, for EASA to call this an "incident" IMO grossly underestimates the magnitude of its impact on society and industry....

[flyhardmo]

Once again EASA task force ignoring the problem completely and making recommendations to satisfy the public ie: recommending the politicians solution.

How about a look at how pilots are treated, the ever reducing TC's and the struggle to survive under a mountain of debt, changing contracts and applying FTL's as targets rather than limits.

Physiological evaluations can be beaten/manipulated at first hire interviews and as people get fed up as their life circumstances change or work pressure builds up, the desire to do the undesirable may come at random times after the initial psych evaluation.

[NOT ORANGE]

Totally agree,the E.C. is completely missing the point in this,was he drunk or on drugs…no,he probably knew the chop was coming and was having a breakdown as a result.His actions were abhorrent but let's not deflect the real issues with bull**** recommendations in the hope that it will all go away.

[Airbubba]

The Task Force recommendations are:
- The principle of 'two persons in the cockpit at all time' should be maintained.
- Pilots should undergo a psychological evaluation before entering airline service.
- Airlines should run a random drugs and alcohol programme.
- Robust programme for oversight of aeromedical examiners should be established.
- A European aeromedical data repository should be created.
- Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.


Looks like most of this is patterned after what U.S. airlines have been doing for quite a while.

The psych eval (remember the Drs. Janus and the rocking chair at Delta?) had gone away at many American carriers for a while but has returned in online form in recent hiring.

The head U.S. Department of Transportation doc has wanted yearly pscyh evals for pilots for some time now and he may get it after the Germanwings 'incident'.

[Pitch Up Authority]

Banks, multinationals, corrupt governments, big airlines are run by psychopaths on behalf of their shareholders.

A crew of an airliner flies a plane, these aforementioned individuals fly around with billions, thousands of employees, whole countries.

What about psychological screening for those that run these bodies?

Where is IFALPA?

What about non European airlines flying into Europe?

Is EASA going to do anything about them?

[RAT 5]

What about non European airlines flying into Europe?
Is EASA going to do anything about them?

True. With EU airlines able to sub-charter their flights to cheaper operatives, albeit for short term, EASA rules may not apply to all EU flights with EU nationals as pax. The same will be true for non-EU airlines operating in/out of EU. In the latter case EASA may put their head in the and and say the pax have a choice; in the former the pax may not even know until they board the a/c. Knee jerk reactions often cause many more problems than they solve. e.g. 100ml bottles of liquid in hand luggage. Totally BS useless.

[His dudeness]

Typical reaction of the doushbags in cologne... they use that incident to flex their muscles and extend the reach of legislation even further into our lives.

None of the proposed points would have prevented the murder Lubitz has committed.

This is the biggest joke of all:

- Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.

"should"....

I can already see the MOLs of the airline world taking care of a pilots support program - that will consist of an axe, no doubt about that.

[PrivtPilotRadarTech]

Airbubba: "The psych eval (remember the Drs. Janus and the rocking chair at Delta?)"
That was very entertaining!

[aterpster]

His dudeness:


I can already see the MOLs of the airline world taking care of a pilots support program - that will consist of an axe, no doubt about that.

Well...perhaps. But, in the EU, the US, Canada, and OZ, the unions will short circuit your concern.

[ChissayLuke]

Not-so-random drink and drugs testing would be welcome imho.
And this alleged mass-murder only serves to demonstrate that controls over flight crew are still not yet adequate to protect the innocent travelling public. Who have a right, when they compulsorally place their trust and lives into the hands of two or three unknown, and unseen individuals, to expect that those individuals are Fit to Fly. In every sense.

[aterpster]

ChissayLuke:

And this alleged mass-murder only serves to demonstrate that controls over flight crew are still not yet adequate to protect the innocent travelling public. Who have a right, when they compulsorally place their trust and lives into the hands of two or three unknown, and unseen individuals, to expect that those individuals are Fit to Fly. In every sense.

It will never be 100%, anymore than trains, automobiles, and ships.

[ChissayLuke]

I don't recall saying that it ever would be.
But it is a sound aspiration, and there is a burden of duty of care upon 'regulators', to ensure that it is as near as it can be.
It is my view that the travelling public has a right to expect such.

[Kitiara]

I perceive the bigger danger here is not that we miss existing psychological conditions that affect pilots. Instead, my opinion (FWIW) is that increasing the pressure on pilots, and the intrusion of monitoring into private lives will drive some pilots into conditions that were NOT existing.

I agree absolutely that there needs to be a wholesale improvement in pilot support systems, and that pilots should be able to seek appropriate support and/or treatment for mental health issues. Just the same way as it is currently possible for physical health issues.

I just can't see that moving further down the road of intrusive monitoring linked to career-guilotines is going to achieve the intended result of reducing what is already a VERY rare situation.

[aterpster]

ChissyLuke:

I don't recall saying that it ever would be.
Well, perhaps I am misreading your previous statement:

...when they compulsorally place their trust and lives into the hands of two or three unknown, and unseen individuals, to expect that those individuals are Fit to Fly. In every sense. ...

[Pitch Up Authority]

ChissayLuke

The number of times pilots lay the finger on safety related issues within the industry at the risk of loosing their livelihood is a reality.

It is the regulating authorities that look the other side.EASA has started a witch-hunt.

As a passenger do not expect that when you pay 600 Euro to travel to the other side of the world or 35 Euro to go from Paris to Rome that nobody in the system is getting exploited.

If you accept this as normal then you have to accept the consequences as well.

The solution is simple. A slowdown of growth in the aviation industry and a complete revision of pilot training. This implies to keep it out of the hands of commercial enterprises.

[IcePack]

Pitch up authority well said.
Funny how jo public wants the cheapest but wants 5 star service.
When airfares were "well" priced maintenance was exemplary pilots well trained & not of a psychotic nature. ( yes some exceptions) so if Jo public wants/expects someone " driving" he can trust he better be prepared to pay for it!
Oh as for the 2 man rule. Well that has made it easier for those that wish us harm to get in on the act so to speak.

[Pitch Up Authority]

The suicide rate amongst doctors and in particular; dentist, psychiatrists and anestesist is amongst the highest of any profession.

The annual death rate due to medical malpractice outnumbers by far the loss of lives due to a crash.

And the shooting of MH17 has more to do with the fact that the authorities did not do their job properly by either closing down the whole airspace or issue an overflight ban to their respective airlines.

[ChissayLuke]

I'm glad to have provoked debate.
I stand by my oroginal comments.
And would respectfully point out that safety of the flying public has nothing to do with expecting 5 star service, or the price paid.
References to other suicides are irrelevant. They don't tender to murder many innocents.
If you really are real pilots, and really hold those views, perhaps you'd be kind enough to give full reference.

[jetopa]

My psychiatrist neighbor told me that the Germanwings F/O most likely was suffering from some sort of 'narcissistic disturbance' (= best translation I could think of from 'narzistische Störung').

Looking at descriptions about this diagnosis, I can think of a bunch of people who in my opinion might be suffering from this. These people are steering cars, holding scalpels in their hands or even managing big corporations.

[Less Hair]

He was classified as "unable to work" (not just "unfit to fly") by some of his doctors for the day of the crash but he ignored it and did not tell his employer. He took strong psycho drugs against his depressions, drugs that are only available by doctor's permit and might change your mind up to making you agressive against yourself or others.

[TWT]

Even drugs like the smoking cessation drug Champix/Chantix are implicated with their suicidal thought effects on some users leading to actual suicide.

[DirtyProp]

What about non European airlines flying into Europe?

Is EASA going to do anything about them?
If I recall, easa did stop some carriers that did not meet its standards.
They were not authorized to fly and land in europe.
Philippines Airlines comes to mind.

[DirtyProp]

I'm glad to have provoked debate.
I stand by my oroginal comments.
And would respectfully point out that safety of the flying public has nothing to do with expecting 5 star service, or the price paid.

If you believe safety comes cheap, either you're naive or misinformed.

[aterpster]

Passengers don't understanding airline safety at all unless they are in an allied field.

Some pilots fly terrible pairings, layover in lousy, noisy hotels and accumulate fatigue. Then, they head back to the airport marginally rested at best, and fly another lousy segment of the pairing.

[Kitiara]

I perceive the bigger danger here is not that we miss existing psychological conditions that affect pilots. Instead, my opinion (FWIW) is that increasing the pressure on pilots, and the intrusion of monitoring into private lives will drive some pilots into conditions that were NOT existing.

I agree absolutely that there needs to be a wholesale improvement in pilot support systems, and that pilots should be able to seek appropriate support and/or treatment for mental health issues. Just the same way as it is currently possible for physical health issues.

I just can't see that moving further down the road of intrusive monitoring linked to career-guilotines is going to achieve the intended result of reducing what is already a VERY rare situation.

[Nicolaus Silver]

Everywhere bean counters are cutting costs and jeopardising quality to make an extra buck with exponential bonuses paid to execs with no accountability for consequences. When is $x million profit not enough to start taking risks.

[averow]

We are seeing the same in my own field of anesthesiology and critical care. I am all for continuous quality improvement, etc. but it makes me very upset when a mid-level manager with much less education or experience that I have dissects my performance down to the microsecond including whether or not I use blue or black ink on my notes.

When performance reviews get very punitive then it fosters an uneasy atmosphere especially for a professional. :sad:

[Pitch Up Authority]

As pilots we accept: black boxes, CVR, a door to keep the terrorists out, two checks every year, a line check and an annual medical.

On top of this we get bombarded with the principles of CRM where it is accepted that every decision that is made may be challenged by the other crew member.

The result of all this is that pilots "rightfully" develop an attitude to demand the same from those that judge their personality traits.

If those that are about to peal us like an onion are not familiar with our profession we will end up with the good ones being thrown out.

The first one who dares to challenge the decision made by the psch will be considered as a rebel and unfit to do the job. I do not know a single good captain that does not draw a line in the sand when needed.

The decision taken by EASA has put us under the dictatorship of the psychologist and possibly worse that of the psychiatrist. The door is wide open for abuses and there is nothing we can do about it.

And the ONLY reason why this happened is that the doctors that were aware of the condition of the German Wings pilot DID NOT inform the airline.

Just to mention a common problem. Any pilot that gets involved in a divorce will have to explain his marriage complications to a shrink just in order to keep his job!!! Madness!!!

[aterpster]

Pitch Up Authority:

Just to mention a common problem. Any pilot that gets involved in a divorce will have to explain his marriage complications to a shrink just in order to keep his job!!! Madness!!!

That is simply awful! Where are your unions?

[flyawaybird]

Since this seems an isolated case because pilots have been flying for time immemorial and did not commit mass murders or even single killing. Does the case of narcissistic disturbance cause some people to just want to Kill?
I mean one wonders if this individual did this on purpose.:sad:

[Slfsfu]

I question the statement Since this seems an isolated case….

I think there have been as many as 4 or 5 in recent years where the investigation has come down on the side of intentional action by the pilot having been the cause of the fatal crash. Maybe around 1000 souls lost.

I do not presume to offer any comment on how to solve the issue. Just wanted to correct that statement.

[PastTense]

For Families of Germanwings Victims, Anger Burns Through Grief

Nevertheless, the families of the Haltern victims and those of more than 50 other victims are meeting on Saturday to discuss filing a lawsuit in the United States, where Mr. Lubitz was training when he was granted a leave to recover from depression. Elmar Giemulla, a German lawyer representing many families here, said he believed that in addition to additional compensation allowed under United States tort laws, a suit could help uncover more information about the extent of Lufthansa’s knowledge of Mr. Lubitz’s condition and how he could have been considered flight-worthy.http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/world/europe/for-families-of-germanwings-victims-anger-burns-through-grief.html?

[sb_sfo]

Not a lot of detail in that piece on how a US suit would be heard by a US judge, unless there were American victims?

[peekay4]

Not a lot of detail in that piece on how a US suit would be heard by a US judge, unless there were American victims?
Yup. There were three Americans onboard.

According to the Montreal Convention, a plaintiff may choose to bring suit in any one of five different jurisdictions:

The domicile of the carrier
The carrier's principal place of business
Where the carriage contract was made (*)
At the destination, and
Where the passenger has his/her "principal and permanent" residence (*)

(*) Assuming the carrier does business there either directly or indirectly through a commercial agreement (codeshare, etc)

That last jurisdiction, the so called "fifth jurisdiction", only applies when there is damage resulting from death or injury of passenger (which is obviously the case here).

Note that the citizenship of the passenger does not come into play; Only the "principal and permanent" place of residence matters.

[sb_sfo]

Thanks for the lesson.

[Greasy Monkey]

The autopilot system having the ultimate control over the door lock - whenever pre-set deviation limits for the flight controls are exceeded, the door is unlocked. The door lock should also be designed as fail-safe - requires power to retain locked state.

These deviation limits should be set according to the flight plan/route (automated calculation of % deviation, or similar), and if they are to be over-ridden, require two valid pass-codes from the assigned crew.

[armchairpilot94116]

Let's look at how many times a locked door has prevented entry by terrorists and others bent on ill intent since we started having these break-proof doors, versus how many times a pilot has killed everyone by locking these same doors.

Maybe it is better to do away with these doors.

Maybe the cabin crew need all be trained in martial arts and be expert at those skills, rather then just serving drinks/food as well.

[Herod]

It's been said before, but I'll say it again. TWO PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHT DECK AT ALL TIMES.

[gcal]

I do not understand how simply having two people there would have helped in this case.
How would a non pilot have understood what the intentions could be by the initial variations of height?
What could they have done once the realisation had settled in?
A second person in the case of incapacitation so they could call for help yes; but not in this case.

[Herod]

Simples. Opened the door.

[Uplinker]

Yes, this has been misunderstood.

The purpose of the 'baby sitter' in the cockpit while one pilot goes to the loo is purely to open the door and let that pilot back in to the cockpit.

The baby sitter is not expected to assimilate what the remaining pilot is doing to the flight path, nor are they expected to physically restrain or control that pilot by themselves.

They just open the door.

[Alain67]

How would a non pilot have understood what the intentions could be by the initial variations of height?
Seeing the ground getting closer would have been a major concern for every non pilot - and not stupid - person !

[Mr Magnetic]

Let's look at how many times a locked door has prevented entry by terrorists and others bent on ill intent since we started having these break-proof doors, versus how many times a pilot has killed everyone by locking these same doors.

Maybe it is better to do away with these doors.

Given that we can never know how many terrorists may have been deterred by the presence of a locked door, the only sensible way to quantify this would be to total up all historical incidents and "pro-rata" the result based on hours flown since the introduction of locked doors vs hours flown before.

I've no idea what number you would end up with but I suspect it would spoil your point...

[1201alarm]

It's been said before, but I'll say it again. TWO PEOPLE ON THE FLIGHT DECK AT ALL TIMES.

Absolutely agree. Lubitz most probably wouldn't have done this if he would not have been alone. He waited until he was fully in charge and had no chance of "failure".

The question is what is a smart way of always having two people in the safe perimeter of the cockpit? To bring a flight attendant upfront creates many other issues.

I would argue the two pilots have to be the two people who always stay upfront. We need to redesign the forward space so the pilot does not have to leave the safe perimeter to go to the loo.

[B2N2]

Really?
Its got nothing to do with the door or the toilet.
Red flags started showing during his flight training and they were ignored.

To bring a flight attendant upfront creates many other issues.
Name one...just one.

[Herod]

I have to agree with 1201alarm. At least on the 737, it would have made more sense to position the door aft of the forward toilet. It wouldn't have been too difficult to connect a hot water boiler for tea/coffee at the same time. Have a hatch to allow crew meals to be served, and the area becomes self-contained and secure. But at the same time, I'm also puzzled about the problems raised by having cabin crew in the flight deck when the pilot is out. It was SOP with both the companies I worked for post 9/11.

[IcePack]

B2N2 it is obvious 911 refers. 1 pilot + 1 cabin crew Hijacker. Mmm.
Not a well thought out solution IMHO

[wiggy]

Greasy Monkey

The autopilot system having the ultimate control over the door lock - whenever pre-set deviation limits for the flight controls are exceeded, the door is unlocked....
These deviation limits should be set according to the flight plan/route (automated calculation of % deviation, or similar), and if they are to be over-ridden, require two valid pass-codes from the assigned crew.

Great :rolleyes: ...so how would that work if one of the pilots becomes incapacitated and the other pilot decides to initiate an diversion to an en-route airport? He/she might be OK with the door becoming unlocked, but he/she and perhaps the Feds might not be...How would it work if you had to engage in serious weather avoidance - in addition to doing the weather avoidance, liase with ATC/cabin crew, etc, you've now got to enter (repeatedly?) codes? A "simpler solution" it is not....

1201

To bring a flight attendant upfront creates many other issues.

Agreed. If not done properly and with great care it certainly has the potential to create serious problems, and no, I'm not going to spell them out here.

[THR RED ACC]

I do not understand how simply having two people there would have helped in this case.
How would a non pilot have understood what the intentions could be by the initial variations of height?
What could they have done once the realisation had settled in?
A second person in the case of incapacitation so they could call for help yes; but not in this case.

Firstly brother, having a second person on the flight deck, they would have noticed the captain banging on the door and even seen him on the CCTV panel.

Secondly brother, the first officer (the scumbag coward that he really was and his parents must be so proud of him) would never have dared such a move with a second body in the flight deck.

All pilot suicide accidents have occurred when one pilot has been in the flight deck, except for Egypt Air (and some claim Air France 447 as well but no comment from me).

[framer]

To bring a flight attendant upfront creates many other issues.
Name one...just one.

1/ The 1 pilot + 1 cabin crew hijacker scenario ( unless you want to start vetting cabin crew in the same manner as we do pilots......cabin crew don't even do one on one interviews in some airlines, they do mass interviews......hardly the same standard)
2/ Distraction. How many pilots have been distracted by conversation with the cabin crew and missed position reports or a looming CB while they are organising their post flight drinks session? I'd suggest quite a few, I know that both myself and my Captain missed top of descent once when we had a particularly attractive young lady up front with us. When I go to the loo and I have a good looking twenty something male First Officer who is green on type, I know I return as quickly as possible if the cabin crew member who goes in is a young and attractive female. Distraction.

[THR RED ACC]

1/ The 1 pilot + 1 cabin crew hijacker scenario ( unless you want to start vetting cabin crew in the same manner as we do pilots......cabin crew don't even do one on one interviews in some airlines, they do mass interviews......hardly the same standard)

We may as well stop all modes of transport because this scenario could occur anywhere, be it trains, subway, ISS... plus the chance of two airline employees organizing a hijacking together is a very remote possibility. Yes the possibility still exists but for that argument, we may as well ban knives, forks and any sharp objects to protect our children.



2/ Distraction. How many pilots have been distracted by conversation with the cabin crew and missed position reports or a looming CB while they are organising their post flight drinks session? I'd suggest quite a few, I know that both myself and my Captain missed top of descent once when we had a particularly attractive young lady up front with us. When I go to the loo and I have a good looking twenty something male First Officer who is green on type, I know I return as quickly as possible if the cabin crew member who goes in is a young and attractive female. Distraction.

I am sorry but if something like that distracts you, then you have demonstrated a lack of airmanship and have jeopordized the safety of every soul on board. God forbid anyone who is that easily disoriented and distracted takes off from a coastal airport towards the sea/ocean in the middle of the night without any visual cues!

[david1300]

...
I am sorry but if something like that distracts you, then you have demonstrated a lack of airmanship and have jeopordized the safety of every soul on board. God forbid anyone who is that easily disoriented and distracted takes off from a coastal airport towards the sea/ocean in the middle of the night without any visual cues!

I have to agree. If I knew which airline you fly/flew for I would avoid it.

[flyburg]

THR RED ACC, brother!!

What if the captain bangs on the door to let him in but the copilot claims he's having psychotic episode!! What to do?? Legally she's obliged to open the door!

Think that's far fetched? I remember a incident on a jet blue flight where the captain developed such an episode!! Granted, the second person on the flight deck happened to be an off duty pilot, but what if there was not an off duty pilot onboard?

Wow, what choice would. A CA face, the copilot which a strange look on his face claiming the captain is crazy or the copilot is crazy. Just saying!!

[mm_flynn]

THR RED ACC, brother!!

What if the captain bangs on the door to let him in but the copilot claims he's having psychotic episode!! What to do?? Legally she's obliged to open the door!

Think that's far fetched? I remember a incident on a jet blue flight where the captain developed such an episode!! Granted, the second person on the flight deck happened to be an off duty pilot, but what if there was not an off duty pilot onboard?

Wow, what choice would. A CA face, the copilot which a strange look on his face claiming the captain is crazy or the copilot is crazy. Just saying!!
In that incident, the reporting says it was crystal clear to everyone which crew member was bonkers and which one was not. In real life, a flight crew member would need to have a very compelling case to lock the second pilot out and I can not imagine a flight attendent not being able to work out which of the crew had lost the plot in this situation.

I find it quite concerning that European pilots are both so afraid of their cabin crew (i.e. they are a real risk of incapaciting the pilot and taking over the aircraft while watching the door) and so easily distracted by cabin crew's looks and charm that they can't concentrate on flying. The US carriers all seem to employee pilots who are able to concentrate enough to fly while cabin crew man the door for their copilot to answer the call of nature.

[flyburg]

Wow,

I don't know how to begin to even answer that!

I merely stated that there are different scenarios!

Your statement regarding European pilots being distracted by CA's to the point the can't concentrate on flying. I remember a U.S. Crew so distracted by their laptops that they over flew their destinations by what? A hundred miles or so? Wasn't it a CA that alerted them to the fact that they should have landed by now?

Don't make this a U.S. versus European pilots! Totally uncalled for!

It is not about being afraid of a CA. It is just about is it really a solution!
What is the CA going to do when the remaining pilot rolls the aircraft upside down?

[Lonewolf_50]

Absol I would argue the two pilots have to be the two people who always stay upfront. We need to redesign the forward space so the pilot does not have to leave the safe perimeter to go to the loo.Be careful what you wish for. Management may wish to make you use piddle packs. :mad: Cheaper for them ...

@TheRedACC
All pilot suicide accidents have occurred when one pilot has been in the flight
deck, except for Egypt Air (and some claim Air France 447 as well but no comment
from me). No evidence supports that claim.
@Flyburg
What is the CA going to do when the remaining pilot rolls the aircraft upside
down?If he doesn't pull any back stick, hit the ceiling/overhead.

[mm_flynn]

Wow,

Don't make this a U.S. versus European pilots! Totally uncalled for!


The reason I made the contrast was that the CC in the cockpit answer is the standard in the US and doesn't appear to have suffered from any of the issues raised in this thread. It was not a comment on the relative skills of US and European pilots (Although I was poking fun at the concept that any pilot anywhere in the developed world would be distracted from flight critical activity by CC manning the door)

I am genuinely surprised by the number of posters who have raised the possibility that CC can be so readily infiltrated by terrorists that being alone in the cockpit for a short time with a CC member could present a credible risk of terrorist action ... yet having that same person with an airside pass and free to move about the aircraft in flight is OK.

[IcePack]

The US carriers all seem to employee pilots who are able to concentrate enough to fly while cabin crew man the door for their copilot to answer the call of nature.

But not when using laptops QED (missed destination remember)

[SeenItAll]

In many (several) of these believed pilot suicide instances, the perpetrating pilot appears to have taken some effort to mask what went on from investigators. This has taken the form of pulling CVR circuitbreakers, shutting down all comms systems, heading for the deepest Indian Ocean, etc.

This suggests that any action that ensures that the perpetrating pilot will be revealed beyond all doubt is likely to dissuade this pilot from making the attempt. Thus, a FA in the cockpit, while perhaps not trained to counteract a rogue pilot's rollover effort, is still likely to yell/scream what is going on, etc. By having all of this captured on the CVR, rather than silence, ensures that the perpetrating pilot and his/her family will not be able to evade condemnation/embarassment, etc. I suggest that this knowledge is likely to dissuade such dingbats from this form of suicide attempt.

[G-CPTN]

You suggest that pilot-suicides take measures to avoid proof, yet those gun-assassin-suicides seem to go out of their way to publicise their intentions - witness the recent case where the investigator said that he refused to mention the name of the assassin (to deny them the oxygen of publicity).

[c52]

What would happen if the plane had a mode - selectable by ATC or from a switch in each pilot's pocket or the purser's - that made it disable everything in the cockpit and fly itself to the nearest suitable airport with autoland?

It would be fine if you were sure the plane was otherwise doomed. The very existence of such a device would stop suicide attempts, and also the case where a plane took off from Cyprus and crashed for lack of pressurisation.

But I think it would be unsellable to pilots and passengers alike.

[c2j2]

Your suggestion with an autoland feature is a very good attack target for anybody intending to down a plane.

Crack the system, and you won. No-one will be able to stop it from happening, by design. And it even can possibly be done anonymously, from remote!

You think, autoland will stop a harmful end? No, just irritate the computer by erroneous sensor input, or even data that will cause the autopilot to crash the plane.

Adding more complexity adds more attack surfaces.

If you look at the reports about the 'safety' of the data buses in planes, it is a miracle to me nothing happened yet in that direction. Up to now, an attacker must still be physically on the plane. Offer external system overrides and it will be mis-used sooner or later.

[_Phoenix]

In fact, the idea of a function "Autoland" ìs not that bad. What can go wrong? Autoland is a routine in a bad weather:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwCDolQ0e2I

In case the computer receives erroneous data, simple autopilot disconnects and autoland function is disabled.
But when the plane's systems, FAC and FBW are 100% operational and the flight crew do not respond and the trajectory is dubious, then "Autoland" might save the day. ATC could initiate it or by one of the pilots and one of the cabin crew from outside of the cockpit, by entering a known code.
To be clear, only command Autoland is send, then autopilot does its job independently and undisturbed. It's better to command Autoland instead to scramble fighterjets to take down the rogue airplane.
On the other hand, after a bad landing the pilot can say: "We apologize for this autoland, time to time we have to test this function"

[Denti]

I am genuinely surprised by the number of posters who have raised the possibility that CC can be so readily infiltrated by terrorists that being alone in the cockpit for a short time with a CC member could present a credible risk of terrorist action ... yet having that same person with an airside pass and free to move about the aircraft in flight is OK.

Because we do know how easy it is to get that airside pass, sadly enough. Usually CC are cheap rented labor from some third rate agency, there for a couple months and then gone again. Yes, there are some airlines that still do employ most of their CC on real contracts and do not rent them in on an ad hoc basis, but i believe that will probably vanish as the other way is so much cheaper, especially if there is no business/premium product on offer.

The reason I made the contrast was that the CC in the cockpit answer is the standard in the US and doesn't appear to have suffered from any of the issues raised in this thread.

In my opinion there is a cultural difference. As far as i know the CC is required on both sides of the atlantic if there is no video system to identify the person in front of the door and make sure that the area is clear. Those systems are the norm in europe (apart from ryanair) but apparently weren't in the US. Therefore our US brethren are used to the CC in the flightdeck, we were used to not needing them and working without them, since they are not required (and trained) to open the door from the inside. Even now that they are supposedly trained most are not able to operate the electronic lock, not to mention the video system.

The whole thing is a farce to be honest, the result is that pilots do drink a lot less during a work day and dehydrate to prevent interrupting the passenger service and get some disgruntled CC and another one blocking the galley. If they have to do it anyway the remaining pilot has to cope with that disgruntled untrained person on the flight deck and still operate the door/video system anyway. It is simply a measure to placate the travelling public, not a real security measure.

[D Bru]

Today the EU launched an "Action Plan"

20/10/2015 - Transport (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/2015-10-20-easa-action-plan_en.htm)

"EASA intends to use both existing rules and innovative regulatory solutions for the implementation of the recommendations. Concrete actions will be launched in the areas of air operations, aircrew, Information Technology (IT) and data protection. The next steps will be:
- An Aircrew Medical Fitness workshop to be organised in early December 2015. The workshop will gather European and world-wide experts to discuss the implementation of the recommendations. The results of this workshop will be a draft proposal of concrete actions to implement the recommendations, to be further discussed and approved among all the interested parties: European Commission, EASA, airlines, crews, doctors, etc.
- Operational Directives in the area of air operations and aircrew might be published by EASA in the first quarter of 2016 to address specific safety issues and prepare proposals for new rules. Operational Directives are a new regulatory tool which may be used for the first time on this occasion. They will provide operators and national aviation authorities with indications on how to pro-actively implement the recommendations, and what are the actions required.
- New rules such as new acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material (GM) to existing regulations will be developed as needed before the end of 2016."

The integral "Action Plan" can be found here:
http://easa.europa.eu/download/various/GW_actionplan_final.pdf

[sabenaboy]

EASA is organising a survey about the 2-person-cockpit recommendation it made after the Germanwings crash.

You can participate here:
https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/2-person-cockpit

[ExSimGuy]

Back in the days when the 737 was first introduced, designed for 2-pilot operation, BALPA resisted this strongly on the grounds that "3 pairs of eyes is better than 2" during critical phases of flight (I was around that time working on BA's flight sim maintenance, having worked previously at Link-Miles building sims). The result was a "redesign" of the Trident, which was originally planned to be a 2-pilot aircraft, and the solution for BA was to introduce "P3" and move much of Trident's (previous Flight Engineer's) fuel and systems instrumentation (IIRC) back to the rear right side of the flight deck.

The problem of "pilot suicide" was not an issue then and neither was the much more recent terrorist issues that resulted in the self-destruct intention of a pilot enabling him to isolate the flight deck in order to carry out his suicide, and the resulting deaths of entire aircraft.

Reinstating the "P3" concept is unfortunately not a viable solution as we no longer have trained Flight Engineers, and moving back to 3-crew, even with one jump-seating, could not be practical in the short- or medium-term as "P3"s could not be brought into the industry fast enough.

Although hindsight is, as always "20/20", it seems that we are "hoist by our own petard" having phased out the 3rd cockpit member who, as I recall, was originally a trained engineer who could often fix a snag when away from base by his own skills. Maybe that's no longer feasible with modern aircraft, but it would probably have prevented several events in recent years when one of a pair of pilots have decided to self-destruct and take an entire aircraft's crew and PAX with him.

I'm not convinced that medicos could quickly enough respond to a pilot who, for example, found himself in a emotionally and financially disastrous divorce situation, or a financial catastrophe, and kept it to himself, to avoid this sort of scenario occurring again.

My thoughts (FWIW) - maybe an "Air Marshal" on the jump seat? Or would that be another weak point if it was the Air Marshal that became temporarily unbalanced :ouch:

Just my 2 cents,

[BigGeordie]

Typical knee jerk legislation. Introduce a new rule without thinking it through and afterwards wonder if it was a good idea.

[peekay4]

@ExSimGuy

Read about Japan Airlines Flight 350, from back in 1982. Suicidal DC-8 Captain decided to crash the plane. Both the First Officer and the Flight Engineer tried to restrain the Captain without success.

Plane plunged into Tokyo Bay. 24 dead. Captain survived and later acquitted: "not guilty by reason of insanity".

[ExSimGuy]

I'm guessing that was initiated from a low altitude - on take-off or late approach. Not enough time for the other 2 crew members to prevent it.

For a "nice" high-energy crash it has to be higher and faster. Hence the survivors on this one.

[ATC Watcher]

Passing legislation for a one off case is always a bad idea.

I followed the aftermath of this case for other reasons, and frankly unless you wear a tatoo saying " I am an airline pilot" to warn the Psychiatrists of the MD who you really are, and then you will need to force Medical doctors to warn your employer that you are unfit to fly, it will not work ,there is little you can do to prevent this in our open societies.
Lubitz went to see over 20 different doctors , was reported unfit to work by nearly all of them, but only a few declared they knew he was a pilot, and those one who knew just gave him a paper to stay at home.

EASA legislation will not change this.

Only in Russia (and some other CIS states ) I believe Airline Pilots are still given a medical check before every flight, by a company doctor. Was at least still like this a few years ago. Good lefts over from the Soviet times.

Last being 2 or 3 or even 4 in a cockpit , will probably not prevent a highly intelligent psychopath to hide , and do what he wants to do. That is at least what all the psychiatrist say.

[sabenaboy]

Don't (just) give your opinion here. Fill out the survey (as well).

[sabenaboy]

Read the European Cockpit Association's point of view on this issue:
https://www.eurocockpit.be/stories/20160216/minimum-occupancy-of-the-flight-deck-eca-position-paper

[Dont Hang Up]

The paper does a good job of identifying the main issues. However, without any proper risk analysis evident on those issues, it does seem to arrive at its conclusion...

The "minimum occupancy" concept is NOT an effective security tool. Quite to the contrary, such a measure has the potential of introducing a risk higher than the one it is trying to prevent, and for which effective mitigating measures are not readily available.

..like a rabbit from a hat.

[slast]

With all due respect, ExSimGuy, a lot of the history in your first few paragraphs is completely adrift.

The Trident was already in service when the 737 was first envisioned in 1964. It always had a Flight Engineer station, in the same location as all other 3 crew aircraft. It was never designed as a 2 crew aircraft and the idea that it was "redesigned" following pressure from BALPA is absurd. (It was originally designed to be a significantly bigger aircraft and was redesigned in 1958 to be smaller following pressure from BEA for commercial reasons, which proved to be spectacularly ill-advised, but that's another story.)

As BEA did not have any Flight Engineers on its payroll and didn't plan to get any, the then Air Registration Board allowed them to re-designate the 3rd crew member position to be a Systems Panel Operator (SPO) who carried out Flight Engineer functions in flight, but was not permitted to exercise any other privileges of a Flight Engineers' Licence. All Trident F/Os were licensed as both pilot and SPO and generally flew alternate legs in each seat. I joined BEA on this basis in 1965, and as far as I'm aware there was never any discussion of 3 crew versus 2.

The minimum crew controversy arose much later, in 1977-78, in particular with the DC9, B757/767 and A310, resulting in the 1981 report of The President's Task Force on Aircraft Crew Complement. This (1) reviewed the August 1980 decision by the Federal Aviation Administration to certify the McDonnell Douglas DC-9-80 aircraft for operation by a minimum of two persons; and (2) made recommendations concerning the use of two-member crews in the proposed Boeing 757 and 767 and other 'new generation' commercial jet aircraft. I was involved in giving evidence to that Task Force.

The only point at which I am aware of any movement of components in the way you suggest emerged at a discussion in Seattle between Boeing and the BA/BALPA joint flight ops project team for the B757, for which BA was launch customer along with Eastern. Boeing's statement that they had never at any time contemplated having a 3rd crew member in the 757 was undermined by our finding on a table in the D-cab briefing room a set of drawings of just such an arrangement where a number of overhead panels were relocated to a side panel.
Apologies for thread drift.

[flash8]

made recommendations concerning the use of two-member crews in the proposed Boeing 757 and 767 and other 'new generation' commercial jet aircraft.

Unless you were Ansett :)

[CONSO]

(2) made recommendations concerning the use of two-member crews in the proposed Boeing 757 and 767 and other 'new generation' commercial jet aircraft. I was involved in giving evidence to that Task Force. The 767 was initially designed for a 3 man crew and it was AFTER the first two flyable were starting fab that the cab was changed to a 2 man crew. One of the resultant issues involvede the ' skull cap ' ( the area between front cockpit windows and the overhead panels). The re routing of hydraulic systems resulted in certain valves/switches being located there. But the chicken gun tests ( x pound bird fired at that area at 200? mph ) resulted in enough damage to that area [ which would take out major hydraulic system controls ] - that the structure had to be redesigned from aluminum structural members to titanium, etc.

I forget all the reasons for the change from three to two- but foggy memory recalls a united airlines Pi*** contest re flight enginerers, crew costs and similar. :confused:

[phylosocopter]

I think that had there been a third crew engineer/systems, airfrance and airaisia system failure>stall would probably have been averted

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

I think that had there been a third crew engineer/systems, airfrance and airaisia system failure>stall would probably have been averted

AF447 had three crew in the cockpit for a good part of their stalled descent, and it didn't help them much. Adding more confused/dosoriented people in the cockpit isn't necessarily going to improve the outcome.

[His dudeness]

Although it has been done to death, a stick in the belly of the PNF would have helped...

[seen_the_box]

Although it has been done to death, a stick in the belly of the PNF would have helped...

Yep...just like it helped in the Asiana accident at SFO, and Turkish at Amsterdam, where tactile feedback through the yoke and throttles averted disas...oh wait.

My thoughts (FWIW) - maybe an "Air Marshal" on the jump seat? Or would that be another weak point if it was the Air Marshal that became temporarily unbalanced

Are you joking?

[dr dre]

Turkish and Asiana also had three pilots on the flight deck, and they both missed the low speed/low energy states.
How about more mandated hands on flying?
How about twice a year airline pilots do one hours flying in a Cessna? No autopilot, no IFR just good old look out the window and throw the plane around the sky?

[seen_the_box]

Flying a Cessna VFR has precious little to do with operating an airliner (although I suppose every little helps). It would be far more useful for all airlines to have a sensible automation policy that encourages raw data, manual flying on the line when appropriate.

[phylosocopter]

there might be a significant difference between three pilots in the cockpit and two pilots and a systems engineer. what air france and air aisia (and Aeroperú (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroper%C3%BA) Flight 603) hi-light is that computerisation did not do away with the need for an engineer just that that roll changed. If someone in either of those cockpits understood the systems and had a deep understanding of how various faults manifest those disasters arguably would have been averted. The problem was that the pilots could not figure out what information was valid and what to ignore. a dedicated systems engineer could have told them.

[A0283]

FYI. Found this yesterday on the Bea website.

[MrSnuggles]

Direct link to the BEA website for this crash.

https://www.bea.aero/les-enquetes/les-evenements-notifies/detail/event/descente-commandee-sous-pilote-automatique-collision-avec-le-relief/

[climber314]

Doctor Wanted Germanwings Co-Pilot to Be Hospitalized
Pilot’s doctors didn’t inform authorities out of fear of breaching Germany’s privacy laws

Doctor Wanted Germanwings Co-Pilot to Be Hospitalized - WSJ (http://on.wsj.com/1U9igVf)

[Squawk_ident]

The BEA Sshould published its final report today.

https://www.bea.aero/en/investigation-reports/notified-events/detail/event/descente-commandee-sous-pilote-automatique-collision-avec-le-relief/

[tubby linton]

Live press conference.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIJTtKNRd5w

[wiggy]

Interesting Tubby, thanks for the link, and some interesting stuff from the BEA gents.

What do you reckon the chances really are of all newbies getting affordable and adequate Loss of Licence Insurance, perhaps through their employer?

[ExSimGuy]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIJTtKNRd5w

"THIS VIDEO IS PRIVATE"

[wiggy]

I'm afraid you've missed it, Tubby's link worked fine but the live conference streaming finished about five minutes ago - at around 1230 French Time/1130 UK

[susier]

https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/BEA2015-0125.en-LR.pdf


Final report (English)

[tubby linton]

Wiggy, I would guess the chance would be nil from a lot of employers. Loss of licence insurance is very expensive to employers and those airlines that do retain it have been watering down the cover for many years.

[Heathrow Harry]

4.3 Mitigation of the consequences of loss of licence

The co-pilot was aware of the decrease in his own medical fitness and of the potential impact of his medication. However, he did not seek any advice from an AME, nor did
he inform his employer. One of the explanations lays in the financial consequences he would have faced in case of the loss of his licence. His limited Loss of License
insurance could not cover his loss of income resulting from unfitness to fly. More generally, the principle of self-declaration in case of a decrease in medical fitness is
weakened when the negative consequences for a pilot of self-declaration, in terms of career, financial consequences, and loss of self-esteem, are higher than the perceived
impact on safety that failing to declare would have.Organisations, especially airlines, can reinforce self-declaration of a decrease in medical fitness of their staff, by acting on some of the consequences of unfitness, by
offering motivating alternative positions and by limiting the financial consequences of a loss of licence, for example through extending loss of licence coverage.
Consequently the BEA recommends that:
€
EASA ensure that European operators include in their Management Systems measures to mitigate socio-economic risks related
to a loss of licence by one of their pilots for medical reasons.


IATA encourage its Member Airlines to implement measures to mitigate the socio-economic risks related to pilots’ loss of licence for medical
reasons.

[wiggy]

Tubby

Yep, aware of that, nevertheless I was quite interested that the provision (or not) of LOL featured quite so prominently in the Board's comments (as HH has posted) .....then again they're French and so perhaps not surprisingly have a interesting view on Employers' obligations ....

[akaSylvia]

So it looks to me like this comes down to, in any other country, the pilot would have been reported by the medical professionals and grounded until his treatment was completed.

[Bergerie1]

The Royal Aeronautical Society is holding a conference on aircrew mental health and well-being on 9 May in London. The link here shows that there is a considerable problem that needs to be discussed and treated properly - no knee jerk reactions - but a serious investigation as to how to deal with this issue in a fair way:- Royal Aeronautical Society | Insight Blog | Aircrew mental health and well-being: 2015 to 2040 (http://aerosociety.com/News/Insight-Blog/4098/Aircrew-mental-health-and-wellbeing-2015-to-2040?utm_source=The+Royal+Aeronautical+Society+e-communications&utm_campaign=6efb8a7c84-Daily_Bulletin_copy_205_3_4_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_01701ea34d-6efb8a7c84-291876761)

Read the link and take note of the statistics!

[air pig]

akaSylvia

So it looks to me like this comes down to, in any other country, the pilot would have been reported by the medical professionals and grounded until his treatment was completed.

I suspect the German medical privacy laws are a result of the happenings before and during WWII and the euthansia program T4 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_T4) in which doctors were 'implicated and even forced to disclose medical confdences' to the state authorities.

Any change to these laws are going to have to be debated in the German Parliament and any form of international legislation will be invalid as German state law is supreme.

[parkfell]

So would German State law be supreme over EU law?:confused:

[air pig]

Parkfell,

So would German State law be supreme over EU law?

Yes it is. Any law from an outside 'state' would have to go befoe the German Constitutional Court. This was put in place post 1945 to stop the state implementing things like the T4 programme.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Constitutional_Court_of_Germany

[tubby linton]

Wiggy,
The practice of pay to fly entry for new entrants to the industry places a huge burden on the junior pilot to stay healthy so that their financial investment can be repaid, I cannot imagine how much of a burden this would be to a young pilot who thinks that they may be in danger of losing their career for medical reasons. Perhaps rather than a loss of licence policy the employer could cancel the training debt.
The press conference mentioned that in other industries employees were offered alternative employment at similar renumeration if they experienced medical problems ,but I have never heard of any similar offer to a pilot.

[Rockhound]

Surely all this talk about breaching Germany's strict privacy laws is missing the point. It seems to me the physician(s) who examined Lubitz and had serious misgivings as to his health should have refused to clear him for flying duty. Any resulting repercussions would have been kept confidential between the physician(s) and Germanwings/Lufthansa.

Rockhound

[wiggy]

tubby

I agree 100%. I'll have another look at the text of the interview but I know one of the employers who will shift people to desk jobs was SNCF, the other was the French Nuclear Industry - I guess one of the advantages of working for an (effectively) nationalised company in a country heavy on social legislation. That said I don't think it's widespread workers right, even in France.

Where I work I can think of perhaps only a single individual I work who ended up behind a desk having lost his licence, but I believe even that wasn't a permanent position and he eventually left the company.

[IcePack]

So how many will seek medical help, (for anything)If they know the doc may report them?
So how will the authorities react to a call from an estranged partner or some other mal content.

Only way is to legislate descent Loss of Licence insurance.
(Granted that too could be inappropriately used, but at least the innocents may be protected.)

[Denti]

Surely all this talk about breaching Germany's strict privacy laws is missing the point. It seems to me the physician(s) who examined Lubitz and had serious misgivings as to his health should have refused to clear him for flying duty. Any resulting repercussions would have been kept confidential between the physician(s) and Germanwings/Lufthansa.


Actually, the privacy law is the whole point. Doctors are not allowed to contact the employer, if they even know who that is. Yes, the AME does know, but has it even easier by informing the LBA (german CAA) and they will pull his license, just takes about six weeks. But any normal MD does not need to know the employer, the profession or anything else about his patient, and cannot contact any other third party except in case of a direct threat to others. Which apparently none of his doctors saw. There is absolutely no direct link between employer and MD.

[zalt]

You've not read the report. German law does allow revealing medical data to protect others. The doctor however also did not cooperate with the BEA and no doubt is fearing a massive legal action.

[mercurydancer]

Depression is a common enough illness, and can be generally managed well. Like any other illness it does depend on the patient wanting to get well, and cooperating, despite the understandable effect of mental illness. Lubitz still had responsibility for himself. He chose to disregard this. Now suicide tends to be a complex thing and many at the point of suicide tend to think logically but in ways which do not take into account any consequence after the act itself. Think of the many people who have chosen "death by cop" - Its planned and logical, however horrific the consequences.

However, it remains Lubitz own responsibility to state that he is not well and request that he is taken out of service for a while. It is not entirely the doctor's fault in failure to report, even if it were legal. Lubitz may well have been evasive in his responses to the doctors, who may have suspected things may be badly wrong but do not know or could not imagine what he would do.

I feel that the scenario with the healthcare professionals would be something like - Are you feeling suicidal? Yes. Have you any plans? No. Now what do you do about that? Even though the body language may be telling you that the patient is lying, what do you do?

Equally interesting is that Lubitz was prescribed antidepressants only 8 days before his suicide. For someone with a long term health condition that is quite recent. If it was the first time he was prescribed antidepressants (which I doubt) then it would certainly have been irresponsible to have gone to work. If it was a change of antidepressants, it would be interesting to know which one, as some of them in the first few days can amplify suicidal feelings. In any case, 8 days after taking an antidepressant, it would have been unwise to fly an aircraft and I am sure that the prescriber would have said so.

[Ollie Onion]

I can assure you that for someone suffering some sort of mental illness, the fact that your DR will be able to report you to your employer will just mean people won't seek help.

[Mr Optimistic]

In his state of mind he could have thought he was doing everyone a favour, giving them the gift of avoiding their eventual end. No death from cancer, no grief from a child's death and so on.

[RexBanner]

Yeah because that would have completely nullified the sounds of the screams in the cabin and the frantic shouting and hammering of the captain on the flightdeck door. Don't make excuses for him, anyone who is able to ignore that and carry out such an act is a psychopath. He may have had depression but a clear lack of empathy and remorse makes him a psychopath and so does carrying out mass murder. Depressed people don't tend to take 150 innocent people with them.

[aerobat77]

after reading the final report we can say the captain requested the cockpit entry via the normal access code one time , after that he tried the intercom 4 times but he has never tried the emergency access code.

of course it could be denied from the cockpit so the outcome would be the same , but its a fact he never tried it.

[Mr Optimistic]

It's not a case of making excuses. It happened. It has to be understood.

[Denti]

You've not read the report. German law does allow revealing medical data to protect others.

Yes, it does. But only if it is very obvious that lifes are in danger. And even then an MD is open to a criminal case against him, the patient can sue him for any damages he has a result, which is millions in the case of a young pilot (the rest of his lifes income in that job) and of course he might lose his medical license as a result. The limits to report a patient are very high indeed. As mentioned above, a direct result of things that happened in nazi germany. Since nobody is required to truthfully state his occupation at his MD, privacy laws would have to be changed for everyone, and that is not going to happen in germany.

[dsc810]

So they got no video/imaging out of any of the passengers mobile phones on board.
or perhaps they did and though it wiser to say nowt?

[squib66]

Videos and photos from the cabin would have added little but feed the lowest common denominator of public voyeurism.

On privacy in Germany if you do read the report you see:

"On the one hand, German regulations contain specific provisions to punish doctors violating medical confidentiality, including occupational consequences and imprisonment up to one year.

On the other hand, the German criminal code has very general provisions stating that any person who acts to avert an imminent danger does not act unlawfully, if the act committed is an adequate means to avert the danger and if the protected interest substantially outweighs the one interfered with."


There is a good summary of the report here: https://twitter.com/Aerossurance/status/709290567780405248

[ExSimGuy]

(Warning - "Politics")

Since nobody is required to truthfully state his occupation at his MD, privacy laws would have to be changed for everyone, and that is not going to happen in germany.

How is it that Germany can have these "special laws", even if they are in conflict with the rules in the rest of the EU? As I understand it, UK is obliged under the EU agreement to implement all of the laws passed by EU, without any conditions.

(not trying to be "political" here, but this is one of the "bugs" of EU membership that the anti-EU campaign is regularly throwing up)

[Heathrow Harry]

there are NO EU wide laws on crimes - only things liek th eEuropean Arrest Warrent - which isn't actually just restricted tot the EU

Most of the things that get the OUT campaign exercised are to do with commercial issues

the European Court of Human Rights (founded by the UK) isn't an EU body at all

[Heathrow Harry]

I think the BEA have got this one right - airlines (and other companies) have to give people suffering from mental health issues some sort of support - take the guy off flying but continue to employ them AND allow them to return to flying once they are well again

I've known a few people with mental health problems and TBH for most of them it's been a temporary issue that they have got through

If we demonise it and throw them in thw street who the hell is going to go and seek help or turn themselves in??

[wiggy]

As I understand it, UK is obliged under the EU agreement to implement all of the laws passed by EU, without any conditions.

ExSimGuy

Not always true ( not making political point either , just trying to clarify this particular issue)

[captplaystation]

Whilst not wishing to sidetrack this debate, nor use it as a platform for criticism of "atypical employment", surely this is the opportunity EASA & the European Govts should use to put an end to zero hour contracts/bogus self employment etc.

The probability of someone , already depressive, self reporting a mental health issue , has got to be very low, if he understands that his income will thereafter be zero until he resumes flying duties again.

Turkeys don't usually vote for Xmas, and the elephant in the room that EASA et al will probably ignore is that the issue here is trying to make it less punitive for someone to seek help . . . . simples, give them the possibility to continue with their income protected (or at least a high percentage of it ) until the issue is resolved one way or another.

Inbetween zero-hour contracts & the brave new world of companies offering no (or inadequate ) loss of licence coverage, I don't see how we can realistically expect to increase self reporting.

[Lonewolf_50]

I can assure you that for someone suffering some sort of mental illness, the fact that your DR will be able to report you to your employer will just mean people won't seek help. Yep. Maybe that's the objective: cost cutting of a different sort. :mad:

[Bergerie1]

ExSimGuy,

The problem is that the Brexit advocates never specify the difference between an EU Directive and an EU Regulation. There are relatively few Regulations. And, as Heathrow Harry has pointed out, the European Court of Human Rights is not an EU body at all. I do wish the popular press would be a lot more factual about EU processes.

A Directive is a legal act of the European Union, which requires member states to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of achieving that result.

A Regulation is a legal act of the European Union that becomes immediately enforceable as law in all member states simultaneously.

[mercurydancer]

Yeah because that would have completely nullified the sounds of the screams in the cabin and the frantic shouting and hammering of the captain on the flightdeck door. Don't make excuses for him, anyone who is able to ignore that and carry out such an act is a psychopath. He may have had depression but a clear lack of empathy and remorse makes him a psychopath and so does carrying out mass murder. Depressed people don't tend to take 150 innocent people with them.
The term psychopath has a specific meaning and Lubitz doesnt fit it. A sociopath generally is not a criminal. Many successful businessmen are sociopathic. They have no qualms about ruining lives in a different way.

Not making excuses, but as I have dealt with many suicidal people I just want to introduce into the discussion how distorted the thinking can be. It may have been in his mind that "My life is not worth living, so what makes the life of anyone on board worth living?" Another scenario is that he was just comfortable in his little office at the front of the aircraft and took the aircraft into the mountains perceiving nothing but what was going on in his mind.

Depression has a very large spectrum, possibly one of the biggest catch-all diagnoses. It can range from simple reactive depression where the sleep is disturbed to suicidal and what would be called murderous intentions. Sometimes it depends on your job or what you are familiar with. If its firearms you may go on a killing spree. Depressives dont generally kill 150 but have certainly been known to kill as many as they thought or had the physical capability to do so. Women with post-natal depression sometimes kill their own children. They are not psychopaths but ill.

[RAT 5]

When do the supposed/perceived rights of the individual over-ride the established rights of the many? Does not a doctor, as well as having a 'duty of care' to his patient, also have 'duty of care' to society in general. The medical oath is to save life. Do the laws of privacy over-ride one's scariness about a patient's future actions?

[Lonewolf_50]

When do the supposed/perceived rights of the individual over-ride the established rights of the many? Does not a doctor, as well as having a 'duty of care' to his patient, also have 'duty of care' to society in general. The medical oath is to save life. Do the laws of privacy over-ride one's scariness about a patient's future actions?
Please don't ask doctors to play God. The ones who play it that way are enough of a nuisance already.


As for the rest (most doctors) you are asking them to be able to predict with a level of accuracy that the mind and emotional sciences simply can't handle.. Were it that good, suicide would have been cured long, long ago.


If the doctor to patient relationship isn't confidential, the patients will be less likely to share things with a doctor. That's good for nobody, neither the patient nor the public.

[flighttest-engineer]

Here is the final report:

https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/BEA2015-0125.en-LR.pdf

[CaptainMongo]

I have searched the final report several times.

Apparently the Captain or flight attendants never inputted the emergency access code - why?

How is it possible to change the selected altitude from 38,000 to 100' in one second?

Does German Wings altitude setting SOP make use the 1000' or 100' selection on the FCU?

Would it not take 4-5 twists of the altitude selector to go from 38000 to 100' even if the 1000' selection was used because one would have to switch to the 100' mode to input 100' in selected altitude?

[wiggy]

Apparently the Captain or flight attendants never inputted the emergency access code - why?


I can't see where the report states that. Reference?

How is it possible to change the selected altitude from 38,000 to 100' in one second?

I'm obviously missing something subtle.. from what I've seen when jumpseating on a 'bus I'd have thought you'd probably do it the same way you do on a Boeing MCP, i.e. turn the knob quickly...

[Heathrow Harry]

page 9

"He kept the cockpit door locked during the descent, despite requests
for access made via the keypad and the cabin interphone."

I read that as they entered the Emergency code but he jsut switched it to LOCK every time thus overriding the keyboard

[CaptainMongo]

Page 36:

"Note: The buzzer recorded at 09 h 34 min 31 most probably corresponded to a routine access request because it is the first access request following the Captain's departure from the cockpit and because the operator's normal practice calls for trying the normal access code before dialling the emergency access code. Therefore, the possibility that it corresponds to an emergency access request cancelled after 980 ms by an action on the toggle switch is considered to be extremely remote."

From what I read all requests for access were via the routine (normal) method. The emergency access method was never attempted. If it were there would be additional sounds recorded emanating from the door specific loud speaker. Also considering the time frame he would have needed to select lock only once and all subsequent requests for access (routine or emergency) would have been muted.

I fly the Bus, I can spin the selected altitude knob and maybe go from 38,000 to 22,000 then have to spin again and most likely one more time to get to 1000 and then reset it to the 100' range to get to 100' feet. So 3-5 spins - I don't think I could do that in a second - is it a big deal ofcourse not - it just stood out to me.

[wiggy]

I did see that comment but as I read that it seems to only refer to that particular singular (and seemingly first) request for access. Even in that comment they say can't even definitively rule out that it wasn't an attempt at emergency access, just that it was extremely unlikely because of SOPs. That in turn might perhaps lead to the conclusion that the investigators had no way from the audio data of ever telling which "code" was used for entry.

Maybe it's more clear in the original French langage version.

(Edit to add:spent too long typing - I appreciate you maybe can't answer but is the buzzer sound for normal access the same as the buzzer for emergency access?)

As for the comments about the " Alt knob" :ooh: on the MCP :E Thanks for your comments, I wonder if the "one second" is plus or minus. I'm not planning to try it but you could certainly wind most Boeing MCP alt selectors down to 100' in not much more than a second.

[aterpster]

RAT 5:
When do the supposed/perceived rights of the individual over-ride the established rights of the many? Does not a doctor, as well as having a 'duty of care' to his patient, also have 'duty of care' to society in general. The medical oath is to save life. Do the laws of privacy over-ride one's scariness about a patient's future actions?

I can speak to the duties of a psychiatrist in the United States. First and foremost, psychiatrist are afforded more protection by law than other medical doctors or than other types of mental health practitioners.

Psychiatrists cannot disclose fantasies that a patient may have. Nor can the psychiatrist disclose past crimes the patient may have confessed. But, if the patient makes a credible threat to commit a crime then the psychiatrist is required by law to report that specific threat to law enforcement.

[Denti]

But, if the patient makes a credible threat to commit a crime then the psychiatrist is required by law to report that specific threat to law enforcement.

And that part is not different in Germany. However, it has to be very credible, otherwise the psychiatrist will be open to litigation.

[Mainsail]

I know this is a professional pilot forum but bear with me. Just before Christmas 2014 a truck crashed into a crown of Christmas shoppers in Glasgow, Scotland killing 6 and injuring 15. Turned out the driver was suffering blackouts and despite being on medication did not till his employers for fear of loosing his job.
This is a global multi-industry problem it impacts aircrew, train drivers, coach drivers, passenger ship crew and probably a lot of people in other industries.
1 in 4 people will suffer a mental health issue at some stage (not all suicidal) and because the problem is global, it affects all cultures and nationalities, its no good one country bringing in regulations if nobody else follows suite.
So you have to design a system that will not stop the majority of people who now seek help, keeping quiet for fear of their jobs, and it being acceptable to all cultures and nationalities.

We need to change the perception of mental health issues, to employers, employees, governments and regulatory authorities on a global scale.

That is a very very big task, and persoally I cannot see it happening any time soon.

Hope I am wrong and somebody wiser than me comes up with a workable solution quickly.

[CaptainMongo]

When the emergency access code is entered the cockpit buzzer sounds continuously for a period of time (company specific but probably 10-30 seconds) in the cockpit. During this period of time the door remains locked. The cockpit occupant can select deny on the cockpit door switch thus denying entry. If deny is selected, the door remains locked. Any further inputs on the cockpit access panel are ignored and the buzzer inhibited for a period of time (company specific but probably 10-20 minutes) If nothing is selected the cockpit door will unlatch for a very short period of time allowing entry.

[jaytee54]

I know this is a professional pilot forum but bear with me. Just before Christmas 2014 a truck crashed into a crown of Christmas shoppers in Glasgow, Scotland killing 6 and injuring 15. Turned out the driver was suffering blackouts and despite being on medication did not till his employers for fear of loosing his job.
This is a global multi-industry problem it impacts aircrew, train drivers, coach drivers, passenger ship crew and probably a lot of people in other industries.


The only way round this I can see is some kind of loss of license insurance. It would have to be mandatory, and built into employment contracts. People with financial commitments are just not going to admit health problems that will end their career without an adequate and mandatory safety net.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Even that only addresses the financial aspects. Without a cultural acceptance, there's still the "X couldn't hack it, he must be weak" etc stigma. How many people who suffer "burnout" and admit it, feel trusted again, or ARE trusted again? "We can't give Y this challenging task, you know what can happen (wink, wink)" It's not even necessarily malicious, the person saying that likely thinks they are somehow "protecting" the person.

Money is of course important, but not by any means the whole story.

[Radgirl]

In the UK the General Medical Council places a requirement on doctors to over ride individual patient confidentiality if the risk to society or others is greater. The obvious one is an absolute requirement to report a stabbing, even though some are not the result of crime.

The issues are

a some countries have privacy laws and dont have a GMC

b doctors are busy and dont always know exactly what a patient does

The flip side of all this is that pilots might not seek help for either physical or mental health issues, exacerbating as opposed to solving the problem.

[mercurydancer]

In essence the mental health aspect of the responsibilities of the healthcare professionals is obvious. If Lubitz had said he had plans to crash his aircraft into a mountain then yes the professional had to do something about it.

I dont think in actuality it would have been that clear, even with hindsight. The normal questions asked tend to follow a formula. Are you feeling suicidal? That is a yes or no question. This is followed if the positive is given, Do you have any plans? If its a no then whatever the suspicions of the medics then they are not on firm ground to do much.

[MrSnuggles]

One thing I just thought about was that a big problem could be the number of doctors Lubitz went to.

This way he spread out the crazy to several doctors, enough that noone could see just how much crazy he had. Although some of them did acknowledge the crazy and wrote him prescriptions and sick leave, they were not entirely in the loop. It was only after-the-fact when all doctor notes had been collected that the total crazy became evident.

Is there any airline that has an appointed psychiatrist for crew members? This, including job security, could reduce risks much more than putting a CC member in the jumpseat. IMHO of course. And SLF status behind the keyboard, I might add.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Actually, ignoring for now the issue of whether someone poses a risk to others.

IF a docyor considers you are suicidal, then you pose a risk to YOURSELF and I would imagine that gives them a duty to you - their patient - to do something about it. The fact that none of the doctors involved sought anything more as an action than a referral or a sick note or whatever suggests that none saw anything that escpecially worried them.

I don't think they need any kind of "duty to inform an airline" - the pilot's a threat to himself anyway, and is that not enough?

With the full acknowledgement that i don't know what any particular law might say regarding doctors and potentially suicidal patients.

[Linktrained]

In 2000 Dr Harold Shipman was found guilty in the UK of killing 15 patients. And an Inquiry suggested that he may have killed over 200.

The UK medical standards and training were altered to prevent a repeat, with modern data processing. Patients have been able to allow this information to be used to improve the Health Service.

Whether this had been possible to allow such information to the Central Medical Board in the case of Civil Pilots, I know not. (The CMB has recently had its long experience in such matters, much reduced, which may be a pity.)

Something along the lines of the U.K's Medical Records arrangements might have made the many Medical consultations by Lubitz worth noticing, especially as they may have been with different Doctors.

Modern Information technology would not have been available when the Confidentiality requirements were (understandably) imposed, but that was,now, several decades ago.

LT

[Linktrained]

As pilot I was required to have a Medical every six months and one of these every two years had to be at C.M.B. Doctors told me of one pilot who had passed his Medical in the morning - and then dropped dead in the street in afternoon. ( The unpredictable - as has been mentioned by others.)

"Six monthly flying checks" do not appear to have been done, until I had completed some 3500 hours with two different U.K. employers and different aircraft types, mainly Trooping worldwide, as the only other pilot, on board ( just a C.P.L. with I/R were enough, even to operate some B.O.A.C. First Class services.) Standards as well as passenger capacities and speeds have altered since !

LT

[abgd]

IF a doctor considers you are suicidal, then you pose a risk to YOURSELF and I would imagine that gives them a duty to you - their patient - to do something about it.


It's a bit more complicated than that. If a patient is clearly barking, then they can be sectioned. However, if they say, 'Doctor, I'm 92. All my friends have died. My knees keep me awake at night. I'm not depressed, but I think I've had enough.' and they don't have signs of clinical depression then you would try to help them medically or practically, but almost certainly couldn't section them, and you couldn't break medical confidentiality to their relatives either.

The truth of the matter is that a lot of people are at some risk of killing themselves, but only a small proportion of these will benefit from being coerced onto a psychiatric ward.

[Bergerie1]

Here is a very well reasoned article from Flight Global pointing out the difficulties faced by those who are suffering from depression or from some other mental health problems:-
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/opinion-aviation-must-address-a-catch-22-for-mental-423276/

[portmanteau]

Further to Snuggles views, while working in Flt Ops back office regularly involved with pilots and their medical renewals etc I often wondered at this culture of confidentiality and the jealous guarding of it by this particular group of professionals. What is so "confidential" about anyones state of health? Why does it get to the point that it cant be mentioned in this group's case because "someone might lose their job"? ( as no doubt the pilot group will maintain). Isnt the fact they might lose their job sufficient reason for their state of health to be known by someone in authority other than their doctor?

We had a very large in-house free medical centre but still some pilots chose to go to outside practitioners ( at their own cost but that was hardly an issue of course). I and many others had the same choice but I dont recall any non-flyers electing to go "private".

Funny ie peculiar, how the very group with peoples lives in their hands have the opportunity to avoid the close scrutiny you might think ought to be an automatic requirement. Solution; pilots are medically examined by airline appointed doctors who are free to notify management when " fitness to fly" is called into question.

[wiggy]

Solution; pilots are medically examined by airline appointed doctors who are free to notify management when " fitness to fly" is called into question.

I don't see how your scheme would foil somebody who was absolutely determined to hide a medical problem.

Also using your logic it sounds like you think crew members would have to go to the company Doc(s) for every single consultation for every single ailment, regardless of what it is (from sniffles and colds through to broken bones, perhaps even worse) and also regardless of where the crew member is taken ill.....it would of course also need to be a service available 24/7. Leaving aside the legal and logistical problems associated with your plan best of luck getting the company bean counters to pay to set up that kind of service...where I work the company medical facilities have been steadily reduced over the years and I doubt it could even cope with all pilots demanding that their recurrent medicals were done in house, let alone 4000+ pilots using it as a G.P's service.

[Denti]

Leaving aside the legal and logistical problems associated with your plan best of luck getting the company bean counters to pay to set up that kind of service.

I could even see that in the case of large airline groups. In fact i do use the services of the Lufthansa medical center myself, but expecting any AOC holder to have that kind of infrastructure? Not a chance in hell. And it still wouldn't prevent anything critical. And it wouldn't work, at least in germany, without large changes to several laws. For example has everyone the free choice of MD as long as the MD fulfills a few basic requirements. Especially the employer cannot force any employee to go to a certain MD or AME. Not to mention the privacy law which is not going to change.

[portmanteau]

wiggy/denti Airlines can appoint doctors to carry out medicals for licence renewal without having to employ them. It just happened that they did where I worked.

The BEA Final Report is 104 pages long of which around 50 deal with all the medical aspects and their conclusions/recommendations suggest to me that some radical changes will follow. The industry just cannot sit back and hope this doesnt happen again. Remember also that when MH 370 is eventually found the possibility of a similar scenario to GW may be discovered.

[wiggy]

Yes, I've read the report and I'm also aware of how airlines can appoint AMEs.

You still haven't answered how you prevent a pilot who is really determined from hiding aspects of his/her medical medical history from his AME and/or employer.

Lets imagine your plan is enacted and "my" company ( or even my national Government) insists I go to doctors appointed by them for any medical consulations and Class 1 renewals.

Lets also imagine I have a temporary condition I don't want my company or AME to know about.....I could simply get it dealt with by another doctor not connected with the company, and in fact one who may not even be in the same country or even continent as the employer. If I don't tell the treating physician about my employment and I never tell my company or AME about the outside consultation they will never be any the wiser.

Writing rules insisting pilots use company employed or company appointed doctors will not magically solve the "Lubitz" problem.

[portmanteau]

wiggy, Its your plan not mine. I havent mentioned any old consultations, just medicals for licence renewal. You are not giving enough credit to the AMEs. In front of them is a pilot to be examined, the result of which will determine whether he/she has her licence renewed. Particularly in the light of the Germanwings and other similar events I am sure AMEs are expert enough know what questions to ask so it doesnt follow that pilots will always be able to hoodwink them. In fact Lubitz wasnt even determined to hide his condition, he was quite open with several doctors though not of course with his employer. And therein lies the problem and solution. Confidentiality exists between pilot and Ame, extend it by only one step, to between Ame and employer.

[Denti]

Why would you need that? If the AME cannot issue a medical, he will issue the pilot with a form that says exactly that, while inputting the same in the CAA online system (LBA in germany) and the CAA then will pull the license of the pilot in question. Without a medical he can not be rostered to fly. So there is no need for any additional information. Either he is fit to fly and gets his medical, or he isn't.

In cases that are not that clear cut, an AMC or the authority has to decide if a medical can be issued, and what if any restrictions are on that medical.

I would argue that Lubitz was open about his condition during his initial training. But not nearly as open apparently when he relapsed later on during his career because he was afraid he might lose his job, a direct result of the current state of fear in the long running and very bitter conflict between pilots and managment in the lufthansa group, where pilots see their jobs outsourced to cheap contracts left and right.

[wiggy]

portmanteau

This is probably one for an AME to come back at but in the meantime and with no disrepect to them intended I think you're overestimating what goes on when the AME renews (or not) your Class 1, 2 or whatever.

I don't see how even the best AME can't see/detect everything that might be wrong with you in a short consultation.

In fact Lubitz wasnt even determined to hide his condition,

Correct - so how does your plan to stop this ever happening again uncover someone who really is prepared to lie and has hidden his/her tracks?

[portmanteau]

wiggy/denti
At the heart of this matter is a medical check system which is clearly unable to prevent
suicidal pilots getting into the cockpit. I have made a suggestion to help block some of the holes in the system. As pilots you surely must have some ideas on what can be done?

[Marlon Brando]

Do germanwing pilots being paid while they're sick and can't fly ?
If they're not, like Ryanair, this should be the key point of this story.

Anyone got the answer ?

[Denti]

Do germanwing pilots being paid while they're sick and can't fly ?
If they're not, like Ryanair, this should be the key point of this story.

Yes, they do get paid. It is not a zero hour contract like the contractors that fly for ryanair. In germany by law a maximum of six consecutive weeks, thereafter up to 78 weeks a lower pay by the health insurance (public health insurance) or even longer on private insurance.

@portmanteu, the main problem is you can't. Mental problems are not easy at all to diagnose, especially if the person in question does not want to disclose any problems. Even specialists in that field struggle there. And AMEs are not psychiatrists or anything close. And psychological testing doesn't help much at all. Lubitz passed a three day test to get into the lufthansa cadet training and as far as i know another two day test battery after his break.

From statistical evidence in other fields where people have problems, like for example alcohol abuse, the best thing to do is offer peer support and support in general, not the chance of losing your income, job or even license. In that case pilots that think they may have a problem consult either their peer support or a professional without any fear of reprisal and get into fixing that problem.

Granted, that is not an easy fix, it means in many carriers a change or company culture and it is not one of those easy measure politicians love so much because they can sum it up in one simple sentence.

[Fantome]

D-AIPX - Airbus A320.
24 March 2015

Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses
pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile.

The BEA report is certainly exhaustive on the subject of the confidentiality between pilot and medico and the circumstances in which entrenched codes of confidentiality may justifiably be breached without fear of retribution from in some countries harsh punitive legal sanctions. Incidentally, let's not fool ourselves, there are countless doctors who in the case of doctor/patient confidentiality, and given the wide variation in doctor competency, are ill equipped to decide the best course of action where a perceived threat to the safety of others lives and property occurs. (Incidentally, in Australia the bureaucrats have infiltrated the aviation medicine department of the regulator to the extent that for many working in the industry any of their dealings with Avmed are fraught with alarm and suspicion, with daily instances of cock-ups and frequent cases of sheer medical ignorance and incompetency. If you tell them on renewal that you sometimes feel sad or nod off in front of the TV you may be scored low on their wacky richter scale. Be very careful how many drinks you admit to imbibing per day or week. )

Back on topic . . .. The BEA report should be required reading for all concerned about the wider implications of medical matters impinging on air accident investigation and reporting.

Some extracts from this fascinating document -

The BEA recommends that:

EASA require that when a class 1 medical certificate is issued to
an applicant with a history of psychological/psychiatric trouble
of any sort, conditions for the follow-up of his/her fitness to fly
be defined. This may include restrictions on the duration of the
certificate or other operational limitations and the need for a specific
psychiatric evaluation for subsequent revalidations or renewals.

Routine analysis of in-flight incapacitation
Currently available data does not provide accurate awareness of in-flight
incapacitation risks, especially in relation to mental health issues. This lack of data,confirmed by the difficulties experienced during the investigation in collecting data on previous similar incidents or accidents, can be explained by the reluctance to report this type of event, by the lack of investigations being carried out, by ongoing judicial proceedings, and/or restrictions linked to medical confidentiality

Promotion of pilot support programmes
The investigation has shown that in spite of the onset of symptoms that could be consistent with a psychotic depressive episode and the fact that he was taking medication that made him unfit to fly, the co-pilot did not seek any aeromedical advice before exercising the privilege of his licence. This is likely the result of difficulties in overcoming the stigma that is attached to mental illness, and the prospects of losing his medical certification and therefore his job as a pilot. Self-declaration in cases where pilots experience a decrease in medical fitness or starting a regular course of medication can be fostered if psychological support programs are available to crews who experience
emotional or mental health issues. Existing programs, overseen by peers, provide a “safe zone” for pilots by minimising career jeopardy as well as the stigma of seeking mental health assistance. These programs are sometimes underutilised for reasons such as: employees questioning the confidentiality of the service; the perception that a stigma is attached to asking for professional help with personal matters; or lack of unawareness of the program and its capabilities. Management of a decrease
in medical fitness can be optimized by including the intervention of peers and/orfamily members. AsMA recommends extending awareness of mental health issues beyond the physician to facilitate greater recognition, reporting and discussion.

Peer support systems are well implemented in major airlines, particularly in North America,where just culture principles are well known. However, these types of systems may pose significant implementation challenges when they are applied to smaller sized organisations that are less mature and have a different cultural background. For these peer support groups to be efficient, crews and/or their families need to be reassured that mental health issues will not be stigmatised, concerns raised will be handled
confidentially and that pilots will be well supported, with the aim of allowing them to return to flying duties.


Some known incidents of disruptive behaviour -
This list does not include events due to terrorist attacks.
Date
Aircraft Operator
State of Occurrence
Deaths
Circumstances

18/01/2015
A320
Condor
Portugal
0
The aircraft was in cruise at FL370 approximately 60 NM from Lisbon
when the co-pilot became incapacitated, and could no longer perform his
duties. The captain diverted to Faro, where the plane landed uneventfully.
The copilot was then transported to the hospital, where he exhibited
behaviour during the following days that raised psychiatric concerns.

29/11/2013
ERJ190
LAM
Namibia
33
The aeroplane was in cruise at flight level FL380 when the co-pilot left the
cockpit to go to the toilet, leaving the captain alone. On three occasions,
different altitudes were selected to order a descent to the ground with
autopilot. The CVR showed variable levels of aural warnings, as well as
noises of repeated knocking and calls, corresponding to attempts to get
into the cockpit.

27/03/2012
A320
JetBlue USA
0
As the plane was leaving New York-JFK and climbing in altitude in its
scheduled five-hour flight to Las Vegas, the captain said something to the
first officer (FO) about being evaluated by someone, but the FO did not
know what he meant. The captain then talked about his church and the
need to “focus” and asked the FO to take the controls and work the radios.
The captain began talking about religion, but, according to the FO, his
statements were not coherent. The FO became concerned when the
captain said “things just don’t matter.” According to the FO, the captain
yelled over the radio to air traffic control and instructed them to be quiet.
The captain turned off the radios in the aircraft, dimmed his monitors, and
sternly admonished the FO for trying to talk on the radio. When the captain
said “we need to take a leap of faith,” the FO stated that he became very
worried. The captain told the FO that “we’re not going to Vegas” and
began giving what the FO described as a sermon. The FO suggested to
the captain that they invite the off-duty JetBlue captain who was on board
the flight into the cockpit. However, the captain abruptly left the cockpit to
go to the forward lavatory, alarming the rest of the flight crew when he
didn’t follow the company’s protocol for leaving the cockpit. When flight
attendants met the captain and asked him what was wrong, he became
aggressive and banged on the door of the occupied lavatory, saying he
needed to get inside. While the captain was in the lavatory, at the request
of the FO, a flight attendant brought the off-duty captain to the cockpit,
where he assisted the FO with the remainder of the flight. When the
captain exited the lavatory, he began talking to flight attendants,
mentioning “150 souls on board.” The captain walked to the rear of the
aircraft but along the way stopped and asked a male passenger if he had a
problem. The captain then sprinted back to the forward galley and tried to
enter his code to re-enter the cockpit. When the FO announced over the
public address system an order to restrain the captain, several
passengers assisted and brought him down in the forward galley, where
he continued to yell comments about Jesus, September 11, Iraq, Iran, and
terrorists. The FO declared an emergency and diverted the aircraft to
Amarillo (Texas), landing with passengers still restraining the captain in
the galley. He was removed from the aircraft and taken to a facility in
Amarillo for medical evaluation. This incident is being investigated by the
FBI.

30/07/2009
Saab 340B
Mesaba USA
0
The flight was in cruise with 33 passengers on board when the cockpit
crew was alerted by a passenger that the single flight attendant had
become "no longer coherent" and was performing "numerous unusual
activities." The captain instructed the passenger to get the flight attendant
seated and the beverage cart stowed, and then diverted to a nearby
airport. The flight attendant was transported to a local emergency room
and diagnosed with "acute anxiety." There were no indications that the
flight attendant had any pre-existing medical or psychiatric conditions.

28/01/2008
B767
Air Canada
North Atlantic Ocean
0
The aircraft was
operating a scheduled passenger service from Toronto
(Pearson) to London (Heathrow). On first contact with Shannon ATC the
commander made a PAN call and requested a diversion to Shannon
Airport due to a medical emergency. The First Officer’s behaviour became
belligerent and uncooperative which convinced the commander he was
now dealing with a crew-member who was effectively incapacitated The
aircraft landed safety at Shannon where medical assistance was waiting to
meet the aircraft.


23/01/2001
DC-3 Galaxy Air Cargo
USA
2
The aircraft departed an island runway in Alaska during dark night VFR
conditions without filing a flight plan. The airplane collided with a volcanic
mountain at 1,500 feet amsl on the runway heading, 4.5 miles from the
airport. The captain's medical certificate had previously been considered
for denial after serving 49 months in federal prison for cocaine distribution,
but after review, the FAA issued the captain a first class medical. FAA
medical records for the captain do not contain any record of monitoring for
substance abuse. The first officer's medical had also been considered for
denial after an episode of a loss of consciousness. After a lengthy review
and an appeal to the NTSB, the FAA issued the first officer a second-class
medical. A toxicological examination of the captain, conducted by the FAA,
found cocaine and metabolites of cocaine. A toxicological examination of
the first officer found two different prescription antidepressant drugs.

31/10/1999
B767
EgyptAir
North Atlantic Ocean
217
The aeroplane was in cruise at flight level FL330 with a flight crew
consisting of a captain, a duty co-pilot and a relief co-pilot. The duty co-
pilot left the cockpit, and the relief co-pilot took his place in the right seat.
Eight minutes later, the captain left the cockpit in turn, leaving the relief
co-pilot alone. The autopilot was then disengaged and nose-down inputs
were recorded on the FDR. The aeroplane descended. The engines were
shut down. The captain returned to the cockpit and tried to take back
control of the aeroplane. The captain repeatedly asked the co-pilot to help
him to pitch up the aeroplane (“pull with me”) but the latter continued to
command the elevator to pitch nose down. The aeroplane regained
altitude before descending again. It collided with the surface of the ocean.
The reasons that led the co-pilot to take these actions could not be
determined.

11/10/1999
ATR-42
Air Botswana
1
The pilot, the only person on board, deliberately flew the aeroplane into
the ground by crashing at Gaborone airport. The validity of his licence had
been revoked for medical reasons.

19/12/1997
B737
Silk Air
Indonesia
104
While the aircraft was in cruise at 35,000 ft, the flight recorders stopped
recording one after the other. The aeroplane suddenly started to descend.
No Mayday message was transmitted before or during the descent. The
aircraft crashed into a river. The Indonesian led safety investigation was
not able to identify any technical problem that would make it possible to
explain the accident though the captain's mental state and sounds on the
CVR led other non-Indonesian agencies to conclude conclusively that the
captain was entirely responsible for the what transpired.

09/05/1996
BAC 111
British Airways
France
0
The aircraft was in cruise between Birmingham (UK) and Milan (Italy)
when the first officer complained of feeling unwell, stating that he was
"frightened of the altitude". The commander summoned the purser onto
the flight deck using a single chime of the cabin staff call system. The first
officer refused the offer of oxygen and a soft drink. He continued to show
symptoms of anxiety and stress, such that the purser felt unable to comply
with the standard incapacitation drill which calls for the crew member to be
slid back in the seat with the harness locked. The captain decided to
divert to Lyon, France where the plane landed without further incident. The
interviews conducted after the incident revealed that it was not the first
time this first officer acted like this, and he admitted having taken
psychotropic medication, without declaring it to the aeromedical
authorities.

21/08/1994
ATR42
Royal Air Maroc
Morocco
44
The captain disengaged the autopilot and deliberately directed the aircraft
towards the ground. The co-pilot was in the cockpit but was not able to
counter the captain’s actions.

09/02/1982
DC-8
Japan Airlines
Japan
24
After having disengaged the autopilot on final approach at a height of 164
ft, the pilot pushed the control column forward and set the thrust levers on
idle. He then moved the thrust levers of engines 2 and 3 to the reverse idle
position. While the aircraft’s attitude decreased, the co-pilot tried to pull on
the control column. The co-pilot was unable to raise the nose of the
aeroplane because the captain was pushing forward on the control
column with both hands. The aircraft crashed into the sea 510 m short of
the runway. The investigation led by a Commission of the Ministry of
Transport of Japan showed that the captain’s actions resulted from a
mental problem. He was suffering from schizophrenia.

[portmanteau]

I rest my case m'lud.

[sitigeltfel]

Update on FBI investigation into aspects of Lubitz's training, illness and competence.

http://theweek.com/speedreads/645945/fbi-investigation-reveals-suicidal-germanwings-pilot-failed-key-training-milestones (http://theweek.com/speedreads/645945/fbi-investigation-reveals-suicidal-germanwings-pilot-failed-key-training-milestones)

[aox]

The father of Andreas Lubitz has chosen to mark the second anniversary of the crash by saying his son was not responsible, was not depressed, and instead the father and a journalist plan to hypothesise that the son was incapacited by carbon monoxide fumes in the cockpit.

Unsurprisingly this has drawn criticism from the bereaved families, and possibly from other members of the Lubitz family.

Germanwings crash families angered by pilot's father - BBC News (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39379724)

[ZFT]

The father will clutch at any straw and that is understandable. The journalist is nothing but scum and as for being an 'expert'. Well, the facts speak for themselves.

[B738bbjsim]

So, by his hypothesis, the carbon monoxide must have changed the altitude on the FMGS from FL380 to 100 feet too?

[Toryu]

The whole hypothesis is based around the toxic cabin air story, which is largely pushed by Tim van Beveren, who acted as the 'expert journalist' here.
You may google this guy and come to your own conclusions.

This guy has written a couple of investigative books that touch on some aspects that deserve to be more thoroughly worked on. The way he promotes it, though, makes me think he is more interested in selling books than actually helping the industry improve.

The cabin air hypothesis does not only imply the alt-selection knob mysteriously turned by itself (twice!), it also doesn't have an explanation why the door wouldn't open.

And of course the date wasn't carefully selected to maximize publicity...

[bobwi]

Doesn't this man have any decency? How painful for the victims. This father should be ashamed, not looking for publicity. The same counts for the so called "expert".

[SMT Member]

The father I can understand, being one myself. If my daughter was to be involved in something similar, it would be exceedingly hard for me accept she'd committed suicide, taking all her passengers with her. It is not outside the realm of plausibilty, that I would be in total denial and grasp at any straw trying to prove her innocence. To put it shortly, I do not expect to be acting rationally.

As far as the 'journalist' goes, however, he deserves nothing but utter contempt and ridicule.

[gearlever]

As far as the 'journalist' goes, however, he deserves nothing but utter contempt and ridicule.

Indeed, but T.v.B. in this case acts more as an expert/consultant which even makes it worse.
I've seen the whole live dicussion today and had the impression T.v.B. doesn't believe his own words.

[ExDubai]

Yepp, don't know why he jumped on that ship. He did a really great job on the Fume story.

[wiggy]

Unsurprisingly this has drawn criticism from the bereaved families, and possibly from other members of the Lubitz family.

FWIW it drew criticism on French news this lunchtime, though they unfortunately seeemd to imply the father was responsible for the unfortunate timing.

[captplaystation]

Disgusting behaviour, with no respect shown whatsoever for the sensibilities of the victims families, seemingly motivated purely by "self promotion" of the supposed "expert" (who seems curiously unable to read & interpret the contents of an accident report.)

And, if he can, how the hell does he explain the somewhat inappropriate selections on MCP of altitude/speed (which if I remember had to be increased several times to finally arrive at Vmo) deployment of speedbrakes, disabling/denial of door code entry . . . . not to mention the "practice run" with the MCP Alt on the previous sector.

Should be taken outside & given a good kicking.

The Father (at a push ) may have some excuse for this behaviour, the creep propelling the whole thing along to suit his personal egotistical/money grabbing agenda should be shot. :mad:

[Airbubba]

Disgusting behaviour in the name of "self promotion".

These 'free-lance aviation journalists' need to keep coming up with novel theories to promote their 'investigative' work.

Another recent example:

The passengers and crew of Malaysia Flight 370, which disappeared on a flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing three years ago today, were lulled into a blissful sleep leading to a “happy death” long before the airplane crashed into the sea. That’s the conclusion we must draw if the Boeing 777 was lost, as I speculate it was, due to the incapacitation of the pilots in a depressurization of the aircraft. After that, the plane flew on its last heading until running out of fuel somewhere in the South Indian Ocean. Flight MH370 was a ghost flight.

As I write in my book, The Crash Detectives, the airplane was flying at 35 thousand feet when a sudden and rapid loss of pressure occurred on the plane. For reasons discussed in the book, the captain was probably not on the flight deck at the time. At that altitude, the co-pilot has just seconds to act.

Trembling of the extremities is one of the first symptoms of sudden onset of hypoxia. So when the first officer reached to the airplane’s transponder, intending to tune the frequency to the emergency code [sic], those spasms in his arms led him to inadvertently turn the dial to standby. He is not aware but he has severed the only means air traffic control has to identify the blips on their screens as the plane flying as MH 370.

Now, as his condition deteriorates even further, the pilot puts on his emergency mask and turns the airplane back towards Kuala Lumpur. Here he encounters the 2nd failure; the mask is not providing him with 100% oxygen under pressure so he is not regaining his mental acuity. He is suffering from insidious hypoxia. Revived enough to make decisions, addled enough to not realize he is doing the wrong things he never begins a descent to an altitude where the occupants of the airplane can survive without supplemental oxygen.

Malaysia Flight 370 Victims Likely Experienced "Happy Death" (http://christinenegroni.com/malaysia-flight-370-victims-likely-experienced-happy-death/)

[Alsacienne]

Malaysia Flight 370 Victims Likely Experienced "Happy Death" (http://christinenegroni.com/malaysia-flight-370-victims-likely-experienced-happy-death/) ... nice sentimental writing with some elements of aviation fact but .... NOT CONVINCING.

[Steve6443]

Not only is it not convincing, it's patently WRONG - for example, the author refers to Alaskan Flight 536 as being a 737 when in reality, the decompression at 26.000 feet happened to an MD-83; the issue with a 737 was flight 808 and after it hit the jetway / baggage handling equipment, it was removed from service pending an inspection, it did NOT suffer an explosive decompression.....

Based on such a shoddy level of investigative journalism, the rest of the book is most likely going to be a story straight from Cloud Cuckoo land....

[A320ECAM]

Can someone confirm whether or not that BA no longer utilises a 2 person cockpit policy? If this is the case, then it is indeed worrying.. The United States adopted a 2 person cockpit policy immediately after 9/11 so why wasn't this policy also adopted across Europe?

[DaveReidUK]

For a whole bunch of reasons:

Assessment of effectiveness of 2-persons-in-the-cockpit recommendation included in EASA SIB 2015-04 (https://www.eurocockpit.be/sites/default/files/summary_of_survey_results_sib_2015-04.pdf)

[PoppaJo]

Virgin Australia pilots believe 'rule of two' suggests a lack of trust (http://www.smh.com.au/business/aviation/virgin-australia-pilots-believe-rule-of-two-suggests-a-lack-of-trust-20150402-1mdj39.html)

[wiggy]

Can someone confirm whether or not that BA no longer utilises a 2 person cockpit policy?

Do you really expect an answer to that or any security related issue on an open forum?

As to your further comments about the US situation - have a read of the EASA SIB Dave R kindly posted a link to.

[armchairpilot94116]

A solution for one problem can create a separate and entirely different problem. Super secure cockpit doors have led to pilots being able to down aircraft when alone in the cockpit with no way for others on the aircraft to regain "control" of the cockpit. This anti terrorist door created the opportunity for those pilots who are unwell or misled to kill everyone on board for whatever reason they may have.

Perhaps it's time to rethink this strategy. Let's go back to regular doors and screen passengers better. Once you let on terrorists , having a secure door does not solve ALL of your potential problems. It is impossible to be reasonably sure another pilot is not going to use the opportunity of being alone in the cockpit to once again down the aircraft. But we need to ask ourselves if the problem of having pilots down aircraft behind secure doors is greater than the problem of terrorists gaining access to the cockpit. Which problem is greater?

[gearlever]

Now AvHerald jumps in....

Crash: Germanwings A320 near Barcelonnette on Mar 24th 2015, first officer alone in cockpit, initiated rapid descent, aircraft impacted terrain (http://avherald.com/h?article=483a5651/0158&opt=0)

[DaveReidUK]

"Assessment of arguments

The evidence suggesting incorrect investigation proceedings appears very strong and thus clearly underlines that there is a need to conduct further investigation to clarify all those points. It remains fully open whether such investigations would lead to a completely different scenario of how this aircraft came down possibly exonerating the first officer or whether these investigations would bring about firm evidence proving the first officer's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt."

Translation: "Here at Avherald, we have an extremely flimsy understanding of the way an accident investigation is carried out, its scope, and (perhaps most importantly) its purpose. But we're not going to let that get in the way of some free publicity."

[wiggy]

Have to say I'm struggling with the AvH take on this on this.

You can argue about legal process perhaps, but.....

P1 can't enter flightdeck. Why? Because according to AvH there's no evidence he entered the emergency code ( well AFAIK there wouldn't be...) or it might due to a mystery defect reported previously.

Then somehow (presumably AvH think due to another fault, coincident with the door remaining locked) the aircraft begins a descent that ends with ground impact....

[gearlever]

Indeed. Still don't understand why Lubitz used his oxy mask....

[Nemrytter]

Translation: "Here at Avherald, we have an extremely flimsy understanding of the way an accident investigation is carried out, its scope, and (perhaps most importantly) its purpose. But we're not going to let that get in the way of some free publicity.":D
This means AvH has lost any remaining shreds of credibility in my eyes.

[HeartyMeatballs]

AvH has gone downhill. Last week the author was saying that the laptop restrictions were a threat to safety because of the batteries and had some seriously overly dramatic headline. Completely ignoring the fact that it was to reduce the risk of a terror attack.

I'm waiting for a 'new take' on MH370 (perhaps aliens?) or 9/11 being missiles dressed up as airliners and all of the passengers are being held in Area 51.

It seems AvHerald is trying to go more mainstream. RIP AvHerald.

[gearlever]

Elvis alive?

[Less Hair]

AVherald's strong side in my view has always been listing global incidents and accidents fast and fact minded, in their no nonsense, easy to read standard format. Now going into the accident-analysis or possibly even the comments branch might stretch it a bit too far it seems. That goes beyound what a small company can do.

I hope they keep their trustworthy core business as that made them almost unique.

[gearlever]

So do I.

Isn't it a one man site?

[HeartyMeatballs]

They're not all that. I can think of a couple of incidents I've witnessed/heard and nothing has appeared. And these were incidents which were a lot more serious than smoky ovens or strange smell incidents which seem a staple of AvHerald these days.

Then you've got the idiotic comments that accompany each post.

Simon did good when it came to the Wideroe near catastrophe which was brushed off by the crew and operator but it seems this Germanwings incident is not going to have the same outcome.

The facts are fairly solid. That is Andreas Lubitz took the plane down. As sad and as uncomfortable as it is to believe that one of us could do that, all of the evidence points to that being the chain of events.

[Less Hair]

We don't know how much pressure is put on sites like that to stay quiet, withdraw stories and such. It's big business lawyers you might interfere with all the time.
Under these conditions AVherald does quite a good job.

[gearlever]

Yes indeed.

But don't think the Germanwings crash will have a different outcome.

[AN2 Driver]

Maybe those who are critical of the AVH in this subject should ask a different question.

I don't think what triggered that article was the question of guilt, but the question whether there were things in this investigation which deserve scrutiny because they are either wrong or at least do not live up to the standards of a normal accident investigation.

I remember when the accident happened that I was taken very much aback when the French held a press conference before even the FDR was found and declared they knew what happened. That is just not how ANY accident investigation is done, nor are the police or state lawyers the people to communicate this.

Think about it. This fact alone put a undue and uncalled for bias on the whole thing and probably some of the questions asked in the AVH article are more than justified. AVH are not the only ones asking that either.

My own take of this whole thing is that I would want to know if this investigation went wrong and if it did why and for what purpose. And I am quite certain that this is the purpose why AVH decided to publish this article. I think they are well aware of the risk of voicing their concerns but they have not been known to shut up when they thought something needed to be investigated. The Windroe incident proves that I think.

Whether the final outcome is the same or not is not the issue at all. The issue is, that there appear to be quite a bit of questions which need answering as to the nature and content of the final report.

[Less Hair]

The french state prosecutors went public early with some precise factual information. No complaint about that. There was a huge public interest given the unique circumstances that couldn't wait years for some proper investigation to finish everything.
I clearly prefer this over unofficial leaks bit by bit where you never know where they come from.

[wiggy]

I was taken very much aback when the French held a press conference before even the FDR was found and declared they knew what happened. That is just not how ANY accident investigation is done, nor are the police or state lawyers the people to communicate this.


You may think and wish that but FWIW the French system often appoints an examining magistrate with serious powers immediately very very quickly after any fatal accidents, road, rail, sea or air, and they can and do sometimes talk to the press.

I saw the said press conference and whilst you are right, the some of the comments were surprising and yes, the FDR hadn't been found or read at that stage the conclusions that had already been drawn at that stage from ADS data seem to have stood the test of the subsequent investigation by the technical teams involved in the investigation over the next several months.

[DaveReidUK]

I don't think what triggered that article was the question of guilt, but the question whether there were things in this investigation which deserve scrutiny because they are either wrong or at least do not live up to the standards of a normal accident investigation.

With respect, Avherald isn't remotely qualified to make that judgement.

While it's easy to understand the reluctance of a grieving father to accept that his son was, in all probability, guilty of causing the pointless deaths of of 150 people, that reaction has no relevance whatsoever to the BEA investigation. Few now doubt that the "what" and the "how" has been established beyond reasonable doubt; the "why" is not for the investigation to determine.

There sadly seems to be a trend nowadays among otherwise competent aviation journalists to stray outside of their area of competency, and Avherald is fast becoming one of the worst offenders. Stick to facts, Simon, and leave the analysis to the professionals.

[Karel_x]

From the beginning I had some doubts. The results came too quick and were too wild. Yes, they are probable and can be correct. But before you charge somebody for murder of 150 souls, you should have more solid evidences. Not so many speculations and list of unanswered questions.
From my point of view, people like Simon are reasonable opposition, forcing investigators not to draw unfounded conclusions. Media are hungry for "strong" scenarios and Simon is a kind of counterbalance. Regardless he is true or wrong now.

[DaveReidUK]

You're missing the point.

The results came too quick and were too wild.

The BEA investigation was released on 16th March last year, nearly a year after the crash.

Yes, they are probable and can be correct. That's why investigations use the term "probable cause". Any conclusions reached can be subsequently reviewed should any new evidence emerge that wasn't available to the investigators. I'm not aware of that having happened in this instance.

From my point of view, people like Simon are reasonable opposition, forcing investigators not to draw unfounded conclusions.Are you suggesing that Simon's hubris extends to claiming that he is capable of influencing the conduct or findings of a safety investigation?

[_Phoenix]

Still don't understand why Lubitz used his oxy mask....
Where does this information come from?
Not from the final report, though.

Is it just a rumor?
CNN archive (https://archive.org/details/CNNW_20150329_180000_CNN_Newsroom_With_Poppy_Harlow/start/11300/end/11400)

[gearlever]

Sorry, my bad. Maybe it was in the preliminary report, anyhow I have to correct myself.

Thanks:D

[FlightDetent]

... The results came too quick and were too wild. Yes, they are probable and can be correct. But before you charge somebody for murder of 150 souls. ... Hopefully I did not cut your quote out of the context.

I had listened twice to the prosecutors speeches, in the immediate aftermath there were actually only very few of them. To what he did say.

Not to how media explained his statements, or to what PPRuNe has shared about his alleged position. I found the official speeches / press releases fair and worded with extreme precision and proffesionalism. The press were much different, of course, and PPRuNe in trail of the latter.

What I mean to say now is that any theories suggesting foul play in the investigation - based on "pilot suspiciously accused early before the facts had been researched" - hold no water, specifically because the French Authorites exactly did NOT do that.

[wiggy]

I had listened twice to the prosecutors speeches, in the immediate aftermath there were actually only very few of them. To what he did say.

....... I found the official speeches / press releases fair and worded with extreme precision and proffesionalism.

Very much agree.

[A320ECAM]

I'm sorry but what are AVHerald trying to insinuate with their latest article? It looks like a load of hogwash and I don't have the patience to try and read it..

[DingerX]

Avherald's a weird site. First off, because DavidReidUK is the Anti-Avherald: mention the site, and he's guaranteed to make an appearance, taking every opportunity to mock it.

Second, yes, it's just one guy, and he has some rather odd standards of journalism. For example, he doesn't report "unofficial" sources: as near as I can tell, he uses recordings from LiveATC and ADS-B sites, but he doesn't always credit them. In fact, he sometimes even claims it's his policy not to credit them.

Third, his coverage is spotty. Of course it is. He's aggregating a number of official and unofficial sources, and he won't tell you what they are. Every day, there are a variety of events -- IFSDs, In-flight emergencies, even evacuations -- that don't make it to his pages. We all know this.

Yet, if you want somewhere on the internet that brings together concrete (and not-so-concrete) information on aviation events, what else are you going to do? Read through 175 pages of some thread on PPrune, where the same facts are repeated every five pages in between moral indignation, idiotic speculation, and wild-ass pontification?

It's no wonder that Avherald has been the point-of-origin for a variety of aviation-oriented stories that hit the news.

This is also what's rather disappointing about Simon's weighing in on this issue after meeting with the parents. Reading his account, each piece of evidence in favor of the "suicide theory" might be suspect for a different reason. If you chain these improbabilities together, then it might be the case that something other than a suicide happened, provided there was an autopilot failure, door lock failure, FDR failure, and the poor FO suddenly passed out while maintaining a regular breathing pattern through the mouth. Oh, and someone falsified the record of his depression. That's considerably more improbable than case made.
The BEA, however, is interested in Probable Cause, not the preponderance of evidence or certitude beyond reasonable doubt.

[gearlever]

Of course AvHerald isn't perfect, but do you know any better?

[DaveReidUK]

Indeed. Still don't understand why Lubitz used his oxy mask....Where does this information come from?
Not from the final report, though.

Is it just a rumor?

The assertion that Lubitz was on oxyen during his time alone in the cockpit was made first (I think) in this Paris Match article published on 31st March 2015 (7 days after the crash)

Inside the A320 - Exclusive: The final moments before the crash (http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Exclusive-The-final-moments-before-the-crash-736774)

and, unsurprisingly, picked up subsequently by many of the mainstream media.

[A320ECAM]

So is the father trying to claim that his son never crashed the a/c on purpose?

What does he suggest happened then? The A320's autopilot set the altitude to 0 and then engaged OPEN DES mode all by itself?

[IcePack]

I think that is what he is saying. (If you read the report their are some "straws" he can grasp"