Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[Denti]

Why are some posters insistent on telling the world how the CDLS works? If you are in this game proffesionaly, you keep it to yourself.

That information is in the public domain anyway. You can download the full FCOM on smartcockpit or watch the airbus training videos on youtube.

[737er]

I work for one of those carriers that had no two crew policy. However, in case of a video system malfunction or an electrical lock malfunction of course we had to use a two crew policy to keep at least one pilot in his seat at all times. Standard backup procedure. We move now to a full time two crew policy and i really feel much safer with that 19 year old non-background checked, zero hour contract part time FA behind me...



The real fallacy comes from the idea that 2 pilots on the flight deck can even prevent a determined nutcase at the controls from crashing the plane. There are many instances during any flight when the reaction of the sane pilot wouldnt come even close to being quick enough to save the plane.

We read stories about passengers going berserk on a monthly basis and trying to storm the cockpit. United had one last week.

Luftansa has one of the most extensive mental evaluations screening in the world, if not THE most extensive.

These are extremely rare and isolated occurences. Until we come up with a mind reading device, they will continue to be unpredictable and unpreventable.

Flying is safe. Pilots do a remarkable job. The mental weakness is mainly a societal collective one which is fear based and illogically reactive.

Here is the real issue:

Anxieties.com | How safe is commercial flight? (http://anxieties.com/flying-howsafe.php#.VRZK0hhHaK0)

[Denti]

Denti: I'm not sure what you mean by 'background checked'. Was Lubitz 'background checked' and, if so, did it all impinge on his admittance to the cockpit? Obviously not. I'm a firm believer in the psycho-social factor of eyes...as in, you're less likely to act like a deviant if there are others watching you. Not foolproof, but there you go. In security, there's really no such thing as perfect. You just look for improvements. In my opinion 2 on FD is better than 1 on FD, even with imperfections.

Although that might be true, it now becomes extremely easy to reenact 9/11. Simply apply for a part time FA position, and you will be invited into the flightdeck with just one pilot there and a sharp axe right beside your jumpseat. Time will tell which is more likely, both are extremely remote possibilites.

[737er]

Would it be possible for the other pilot to prevent a crash, keeping in mind that the suicidal pilot will fight the other pilot and try and prevent him from recovering the plane?



In the flight regime you discussed (as well as others) the answer is absolutely no.

Automation which can handle the dynamics of airline flight safer than pilots are a few decades out despite the diatribe sometimes asserted. Right now the automation as a tool to the pilot interface is the best we have and the best we will have for a long time to come. If folks realized the extent and frequency to which automation performs inadequately and has to be switched off, they would change their tune on the subject quickly.

[slats11]

I don't understand how you can claim that the health of the pilots is the 'real' problem, and at the same time claim that discussion of 2 on FD is a waste of time.


I have never said it is a waste of time. It is a reasonable measure as it will instil some public confidence and may have a small deterrent value.

I doubt it will thwart someone who is determined to crash the plane and who has a premeditated plan.

But it may prevent the sudden impulsive act. However I think impulsive act is incredibly rare, and all pilot "suicides" to date are premeditated.

The fact a struggle in the cockpit (subduing or removing the FA) will be captured on the CVR may be a deterrent - but only if trying to make it look accidental is important.

[Doc on board]

CokeZero: There are many, many possible scenarios of suicidal or psychopathic individuals breathing calmly while engaging in an act most would consider only possible in a 'heightened state'. His regular breathing is not at all inconsistent with his actions. Also, I don't think the hypoxia thesis holds much weight now. Set to FL 100 and no comm while capt banging on cockpit door...pretty damning. But yes, in the interests of objectivity, we should wait for full report.

[737er]

Dualinput

Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: 30k
Posts: 55
I don't think full automation (removing both pilots) is going to work. There would be various instances where human intervention will still be required. i.e diversions. If this is done remotely (from ground), imagine the risks we will expose ourselves to! Technologically and security wise. Imagine some radical group hacks all the airplanes in the sky as we speak! Scary!





Not to mention a myriad of other circumstances it simply can't handle and... hate to break it to everyone...but it's very unreliable in a relative sense. It needs constant monitoring much the same way as humans hand flying do and in many ways more.

It's a great tool in many situations. But thats all it is. That thing people say about "those things fly themselves" is pure malarkey.

[ChissayLuke]

Increasingly, it appears that the only salient detail of this mass murder is the mental state of one man, apparently hidden from his employer. And how he was able to execute this dreadful act, so easily, after biding his time, and waiting for his opportunity, which he knew would one day come.
Little thought seems to have been given on this thread to the friends and relations of 150 or so murdered innocents, who will have to live with the consequences of this dreadful act, for ever.
Wrong place, wrong time for them? Or is there a deep issue within aviation that allowed this to happen?
I'd gladly pay more for my air ticket, if it gave me demonstrable reassurance that the FD team were better scrutinised, and absolutely on top of their game, on the day that I take my seat.

[mcdunav]

@slats11: How are we calling AirAsia crash poor decision making? The complete facts are not even out yet.

Someone people have suggested that the cockpit door can remain open as long as the pilot is in the lav and a cart placed in the way of the aisle and the cockpit with a flight attendant guarding it. Wouldn't this be better than the 2 person rule?

[kwh]

I /imagine/ that one flight crew member having some kind of brain fart has been a problem in commercial cockpits for as long as there have _been_ commercial cockpits. The post war years into the 1960s when perhaps the majority of commercial aircrew in Europe were potential PTSD victims vulnerable to flashbacks from their last combat mission would seem to be a time when if this was ever going to be a problem, it would have been particularly acute... and yet we don't read about Constellations and DC6's being deliberately flown into mountains very often back in the day so what is different now?

Could it be the breach in the rule of three bought in by two person cockpits? As with flight management systems, two is plenty when both are working properly but you need three so that when one breaks down the other two find it easier to spot that there is a problem and can override the malfunctioning unit. Never mind the practical problem of only having one person on the flight deck when the other pilot goes to the toilet, if the guy was not firing on all cylinders prior to the point where he was left alone to do his worst, two people in the cockpit not in the midst of a mental breakdown might have been better placed to spot it than one on his own and instigate precautions that 99999 times out of 100000 would be completely unnecessary paranoia but once in a blue moon would prevent a tragedy...

[737er]

Doc on board

Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: Tacoma, WA
Posts: 14
737er: Agree, we are a long, long way from fully automated. But, wouldn't that only support more eyes? Also, you really think it's impossible to correct massive input for CFIT from cruise? If it's at least possible, isn't it worth it?




Doc,

Not sure I understand what you mean by "more eyes". Please explain and I will give you my take.

As far as CFIT from cruise recovery, sure it's possible. But if a nutjob is bent on crashing the plane, then all we would be doing is changing the timing in which he accomplishes that.

[noalign]

737er: Agree, we are a long, long way from fully automated. But, wouldn't that only support more eyes? Also, you really think it's impossible to correct massive input for CFIT from cruise? If it's at least possible, isn't it worth it?
I hope the datalink to control the planes full of paying passengers are more reliable than the comms that go silent in certain parts of the country even when someone is not downstairs hacking at the cables.

I liked flying with three in the crew. It made things easier during emergencies and non-normals. Someone to fly, someone to read the procedure and someone to perform the procedure. Even in a two pilot aircraft using an augmented crew with an IRO in the seat during critical phases of flight. Still the sensible division of duties. We are concerned with safety, right?

That attempted hijacking that was thwarted by a three man crew had a better outcome than the four successful attempts that followed.

[Doc on board]

737er: Just meant that in an age when full automation was still considered too buggy for commercial flight, it would argue for a human failsafe, in this case an extra crew member on FD. And that includes the possibility of using physical force to deal with a rogue pilot. One good example is JAL 350, where the FO and FE overpowered the capt, and more survived (150) than would have had there been only one crew member on the FD.

Anyway, I'm off to bed. Have a great night all!

[abgd]

and yet we don't read about Constellations and DC6's being deliberately flown into mountains very often back in the day so what is different now?

Aircraft were being flown into mountains all the time though - far more than now. Black boxes were less sophisticated, or non-existent, so it would be harder to tell after the event what the cause of the accident actually was. And because there were so many more accidents from all the 'classical' pilot error and mechanical causes, as a proportion of the accidents they may have made up a smaller percentage and therefore been easier to dismiss.

[TessCoe]

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

[737er]

Quote:


Exactly. The most vulnerable part of the plane now is the mind and the mindset and the ideology of the pilot.

Me:
Nothing statistically supports that claim as being true.




Slats,

Human factors, Risk Resource Managment (CRM) and strategies to improve pilot performance linked to those are one thing. And as you point out the most important thing. I agree.

The distinction is that somehow "now" there is a problem with pilots as the deliberate cause of crashes rather than either the savior or as the "tried but could have done better."

We have a tendency to eat our own. One extemely rare and bizarre incident does not a sound safety reaction make, no matter how outrageous or tragic it may be.

Ask George W. Bush about 9/11. :}

[vapilot2004]

The real fallacy comes from the idea that 2 pilots on the flight deck can even prevent a determined nutcase at the controls from crashing the plane.

The two-crew rule was mainly in place in the US to facilitate flight deck crew identification upon return to the cockpit after a break. For aircraft without video surveillance at the door, there was a need for somebody to confirm the person at the door was alone and authorized. You don't want the only guy left at the controls to have to get up out of his seat to accomplish this. The US does have differing O2 rules when above FL250 compared to the EU and other parts of the world, and this procedure of using the cabin crew was in line with that regulation.

For the reasoning behind a two-crew requirement post-Germanwings, we only have to look at the nervous traveling public and their accommodating airline executives to find our answer. No airline wants to appear less safe than the others and the idea of a sense of security - however false it might be as in the case of a two-crew cockpit scenario preventing a deliberate downing of the aircraft - is appealing to both passengers and airline executives.

[737er]

737er: Just meant that in an age when full automation was still considered too buggy for commercial flight, it would argue for a human failsafe, in this case an extra crew member on FD. And that includes the possibility of using physical force to deal with a rogue pilot. One good example is JAL 350, where the FO and FE overpowered the capt, and more survived (150) than would have had there been only one crew member on th



No problem with more pilots on the flight deck in my world. There are some studies that show jumpseaters as a distraction which decrease performance.
For example, didn't seem to help in SFO.

For fighting the bad guy, no doubt an improvement I agree.

[Superpilot]

It's the DM but they are quoting our trusted professionals....

European aviation chiefs FORCE British Airways to carry an extra person in the cockpit | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3014474/EasyJet-Virgin-Atlantic-making-planes-vulnerable-terror-attacks-knee-jerk-new-safety-measures-wake-Germanwings-tragedy-say-air-safety-experts.html)

[sAx_R54]

bille1319

Isn't it strange how none of the tabloids have been seen to apologise to Gernanwings and Airbus for suggesting just prior to the crash that this A320 was past its sell by date and insinuating maintenance problems.

Not just tabloids! Litany of it on here from first page.

[yarpos]

"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"

why not just say what you want to say instead of trying to be cute?

[DaveReidUK]

Already linked about 6 hours ago at post 2275

Same newspaper, different story (that's a link to the story about Lubitz pre-announcing his intent).

Re the article on BA being forced to adopt the two-person policy, it's not immediately obvious how an EASA recommendation can "force" an operator to do anything (although of course public opinion, orchestrated by the press, can often have that effect).

[4Greens]

The whole point of two pilots is backup if one of the pilots is ill or incapacitated. Leaving one pilot on the flight deck invalidates the whole process. A third pilot can be cruise qualified only. It is an ideal training process.

[737er]

European aviation chiefs FORCE British Airways to carry an extra person in the cockpit | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3014474/EasyJet-Virgin-Atlantic-making-planes-vulnerable-terror-attacks-knee-jerk-new-safety-measures-wake-Germanwings-tragedy-say-air-safety-experts.html)

It's how we have done it in the states for a long time. Is it actually better (or less safe as the folks in the article maintain)?

Nobody really knows because it all depends on the circumstances. Those circumstances are so rare that there is no reliable data. It's risk managing gone wonky as a reaction to illogical fears as exacerbated by the media.

[sAx_R54]

@Claybird

I just wish the vast majority of non-professional posters (both in this thread and in the Fight Deck area as a whole) would take their philosophical, medical, detective-related, sociology-related, conspiracy theory-related and any other posts not related to the nature of the rumors section of PPRuNe elsewhere.


It would appear that much of the 'philosophical, medical, detective-related, sociology-related, conspiracy theory-related and any other posts', has emanated from your fellow professionals. Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings!!

[Flying Lawyer]

yarpos "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"

why not just say what you want to say instead of trying to be cute?


Tesscoe meant:

Who will guard the guards?
Sometimes translated as Who watches the watchmen?

[pilotmike]

From a previous post of mine: Apologies in advance if I have missed any vital pieces of information; I have tried to check the published information thoroughly before posting.

Some things are simply not adding up for me, particularly the 'evidence' supporting the theory that this was a malicious act by the FO. It seems that the FO has as good as been found guilty of murder without full evidence or any trial, however...

1. We are assured that the sound of the FO breathing (note: 'normally', not hyperventilating or panicked) is heard through to the end. Similarly, we're told that the Alt select can be heard being wound down, a seat being moved, and the door being opened and/or closed. Yet I haven't heard of any reports of the FD door being positively locked in the 'Lock' position, yet this should be clearly audible if these other faint sounds have been picked up. I cannot help feeling that this would be of sufficient importance to have been explicitly stated in the very detailed account offered by the French authorities of what they have heard. Some have questioned how breathing, described as gentle can be heard. I can assure readers that with digital signal processing techniques, including correlation and autocorrelation, signals significantly below the noise floor (ie completely drowned out by noise to the human ear) can be measured and heard, making the CVR a very rich source of audio clues that we wouldn't normally be able to hear. Few are aware that GPS operates by receiving signals sometimes 30dB or even 40dB below ambient noise levels (ie when massively swamped by noise which is many orders of magnitudes stronger than the actual GPS signal) by using this very technique.

2. Is the reported 'normal' breathing consistent with the alleged actions the FO is apparently guilty of doing? It gives the impression of being indicative of a relaxed, possibly incapacitated or even semi-conscious or unconscious person rather than someone knowing they are pointing at a mountain and about to die.

3. It has been assumed that the FO was conscious, if for no other reason than because he HAD to repeatedly re-lock the door after the 5 minute time-out. Have we had this explicitly stated by the authorities who know the facts or heard the CVR audio? If so, wouldn't this positive re-locking be clearly audible on the CVR as per my point above? However, the FO did not NEED to re-lock the door. If the Captain was preoccupied with banging on the door, as has been reported, it is entirely possible, even likely that he never made a (further) attempt to activate the access code as by this time his desperation to re-enter the FD would very likely be closing down options in his mind, to simply trying to smash his way in, just as we have been told. And wouldn't any attempt to re-enter the entry code be reported on as significant? A brief break in the door banging while a code is re-entered would be quite obvious on the CVR.

4. We are informed that the passengers were apparently unaware of the problem until the final seconds. By all accounts, the Captain made significant efforts to either gain the FO's attention, or indeed to break the door down. Are we really to believe that this all went completely unnoticed by the passengers?

Given these anomalies, I don't believe we have been told significant facts that have been revealed by the CVR. And it also seems very premature to judge the FO as totally guilty, as many have done so on this very forum, until the full facts are known. Maybe the media reports forced their hand, but I believe this partial revelation of CVR evidence combined with strong suggestion that the FO deliberately did this is not the way to handle such an important investigation as this.
Also, why would a landing briefing be given during the initial climb? This is a time to be on the lookout for any pressurisation problems etc, closely monitoring leveling off etc, certainly not distracting attention away from these essential monitoring roles with a landing briefing.

How could they have listened to the destination ATIS to determine runway in use and expected approach, specific local WX etc to be able to give a detailed and full brief by this stage of flight?

This reported 'landing briefing' doesn't make much sense - I think there was more to this specific briefing than has been mentioned by those who know, along with the actual discussion that gave rise to the reported change of mood of the FO.

[Denti]

It's how we have done it in the states for a long time. Is it actually better (or less safe as the folks in the article maintain)?

Apparently only some have done that: United Shifts Two-Crew Cockpit Policy on Certain Boeing Jets - WSJ (http://www.wsj.com/articles/united-shifts-cockpit-policy-to-require-two-crew-members-1427497078?mod=wsj_nview_latest)

[nsmith]

@Nutwood

Client confidentiality laws usually have a let out clause if the doctor has reason to believe the patient might be a danger to themselves and/or others.

I wonder if the main "let out" is the pilot leaving the doctor's surgery without mentioning the things he or she fears will result in a dismissal.

[737er]

It's how we have done it in the states for a long time. Is it actually better (or less safe as the folks in the article maintain)?
Apparently only some have done that: United Shifts Two-Crew Cockpit Policy on Certain Boeing Jets - WSJ

Interesting Denti. As a general rule in the US it has been a mandatory for over a decade. United must have been able to carve out a deal for some of its planes from its FAA designated Principle Operations Inspector. First of its kind I've heard of, but there might be other limited examples as well if this one could happen.

[Ozmd]

Sad event. If the speculation proves to be true, the most foolish step that can be taken is to screen all pilots by psychologists. Among all medical sciences psychology remains the most non science (non sense too!). Their diagnostic and statistical manual is a shame to humanity. There is no way a person can see through the others mind. The tests they employ, the tags (irreversible) they utilise only serve to stigmatise people. If psychologists can detect criminals there would be no reason for law enforcement.

If these speculations are true, then the issue actually is the universal deployment of cockpit door lock systems as a knee jerk reaction to something that happened somewhere. They should have thought about possibilities like this.

Please don't stigmatize Pilots or anyone suffering from mental health disorders the vast majority wouldn't even hurt a fly! In the modern capitalist society, if we employ the depression scoring system, every single person is depressed!

[Denti]

Interesting Denti. As a general rule in the US it has been a mandatory for over a decade.

As i understand it the main concern is identification and door operation. Those are available by other means. All airlines i have worked for have video surveillance of the door area and forward galley as well as something akin to the much quoted CDLS. As backup, if either the video surveillance or the electric door didn't work the two crew rule had to be used, as otherwise the pilot would have to leave its seat to open the door or identify whoever wants to enter. That is the reason apparently why ryanair used the two crew thing, they simply didn't pay for the video surveillance.

[Capn Bloggs]

Also, why would a landing briefing be given during the initial climb? This is a time to be on the lookout for any pressurisation problems etc, closely monitoring leveling off etc, certainly not distracting attention away from these essential monitoring roles with a landing briefing.

How could they have listened to the destination ATIS to determine runway in use and expected approach, specific local WX etc to be able to give a detailed and full brief by this stage of flight?

Nothing to it, Pilot Mike, especially in aircraft that like climbing until Top of Descent. In fact, waiting until you level off (with a short cruise segment) until you start preparing for the arrival is increasing the pressure.

Don't read too much into the tea leaves...

[Greenlights]

This accident was predictable because the industry has been putting new pilots under great pressure in the low cost industry.

The industry has reacted with varying degrees after it became clear what happened.

I predict it will over react in the next few months in persecuting pilots who have declared problems with depression and probably ground many who pose no threat to their colleagues and passengers. Hopefully I am wrong but with experience comes a chunk of scepticism about regulators and airline managers.

NOthing to see with industry or low cost or pressure.

According to his ex G/F, Andreas, wanted to commit a terrible act to be famous. He said her "I will do something that will change the system and my name will remembered".

so this case is nothing to see with "accountants fault".

[enginebird]

LH's CEO Spohr is probably right, there is no way to make sure something like this will never happen again.

Pilot associations do not seem to dare reject the two-person-rule under the current circumstances, although we all know that the rule is problematic for a number of reasons. However, the two-person-rule is welcomed by the airlines as a cheap and immediate measure that seems to make the flying public feel safer. This will change after the first crash due to a recently hired FA knocking out the remaining pilot from behind, locking the door and flying the plane into ground or a skyscraper. :ugh:

[737er]

Spot on engine bird. You mean the FA's who have no medical certificate and many of whom openly talk about being on antidepressants!!

Try this one on, compare the suicide rate of FA's compared to commercial pilots and I can practically guarantee the results.

[twalfa]

I liked flying with three in the crew. It made things easier during emergencies and non-normals. Someone to fly, someone to read the procedure and someone to perform the procedure. Even in a two pilot aircraft using an augmented crew with an IRO in the seat during critical phases of flight. Still the sensible division of duties. We are concerned with safety, right? I second the above posting.

[ettore]

Focusing on the actual issue of the tragedy, the WsJ writes (Updated March 27, 2015 6:55 p.m. ET):

The person familiar with the investigation said Mr. Lubitz was undergoing treatment for depression elsewhere in the Rhineland area of western Germany.

Under German privacy laws, a doctor isn’t required to inform the patient’s employer about any illness, nor should the note excusing him or her from work include any information about the patient’s condition.

However, Hans-Peter Hartung, the head of University Hospital’s department of neurology, said doctors in Germany could choose to inform the police or a patient’s employer if the condition seemed like it could pose risks for others. “We are entitled under the balance of risks, and if there are looming problems, to breach medical confidentiality,” he said.

But Jochen Lamp, spokesman for the German association of psychiatrists, said only very unusual circumstances would prompt a psychiatrist to breach a patient’s confidentiality, as the legal consequences of such a move can be severe.

U.S. pilots are required to tell the Federal Aviation Administration about all prescription medications, substance abuse, drunken-driving arrests, mental disorders and suicide attempts. As part of an effort to prod pilots to deal more forthrightly with mental health issues, the FAA a few years ago reversed course and allowed airline pilots to take certain antidepressant drugs while staying on the job.

At the time, the FAA chief said “we have to acknowledge that depression is not uncommon and pilots need to be allowed to get help without the fear of losing their pilot’s certificate.”

Europe also relies on pilots to self-report psychological problems not caught by the airline.

James Fraser, the FAA’s top medical officer, spelled out the industry’s dilemma at a pilot-safety conference in Washington in August 2014.

In cases of “psychotic events in the cockpit or [when] a pilot or first officer has been walked out of a cockpit,” he told the audience, questions inevitably follow about why the FAA didn’t prevent it. Some critics even call for a thorough psychiatric evaluation or every pilot at each periodic medical exam, he said, but “that’s not a solution.”

In the end, Dr. Fraser said, “the solution lies in self-assessment, not in any kind of regular psychiatric assessment.”

He emphasized that the FAA depends on pilots “to be honest and forthright” answering questions about issues such as “prior hospitalizations and mental disorders and things of that nature,” while recognizing that psychiatric problems sometimes can emerge suddenly.

Mr. Lubitz’s medical certificate was last renewed in July 2014. The certificate, which is required for a pilot license, is updated annually. Germany’s Federal Aviation Office said Friday that his certificate showed he had an unspecified medical condition requiring regular checks. A spokesman for the agency said whether the record related to mental or physical health was confidential information.

Another person familiar with the matter said Mr. Lubitz didn’t have a terminal illness.

Germanwings Co-Pilot Andreas Lubitz Concealed Depression From Airline - WSJ (http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanwings-co-pilot-andreas-lubitz-concealed-depression-from-airline-1427484790)

[auntyice]

In essence in order to protect the integrity of the flight deck a double door system would seem the only secure way of ensuring two qualified pilots have permanent access to the flight deck. Built in logic would only allow the outer door to be locked when using the toilet, the outer door only being closed prior to the inner door being opened.
Highly impracticable to retrofit but certainly possible the design stage.

[737er]

What is needed in pilots responsible for the lives of several hundred trusting people is EXPERIENCE, and MATURITY. Any pilot should never forget that priority.




In a perfect world I would agree Mary. The problem is, now more than ever, that experienced pilots don't hatch out of an egg. Also, when you look at accident rates in the US (I'm not qualified to comment about the rest of the world) for regional airlines, their younger, less experienced pilots fair extremely well on safety. Many are in their early 20's and fly jets as sophisticated as anything else and which are no easier to fly than some heavy jets. All while they are becoming the pilots you ultimately prefer.

So how to get from point A to B....

[Denti]

I was shocked to read he only had 630 hours in all those years! that flagged up problems

No, gliding hours are usually discounted in reports abut commercial pilots. He had 630 hours on A320 since he started his typerating in summer 2013. That is not unusual, but on the low side. There are others that fly even less. For the last 8 years or so i average only around 300 hours a year flying full time in airline operations.

He started gliding at age 14 or 15 and has glided ever since, last year he did apparently only 20 hours of gliding, but for someone working in the airlines that is not unusual as most gliding clubs only have flight operation during the weekend which is not always easy if you work most weekends.

[Oakape]

Currently, are F/A's prohibited from entering the flight deck when one pilot is out? Not at my airline & I haven't seen evidence of it at other airlines either. So all this concern about a F/A in the flight deck with just one pilot seems a little misplaced, as there has been nothing preventing it for some time now.

[737er]

Currently, are F/A's prohibited from entering the flight deck when one pilot is out? Not at my airline & I haven't seen evidence of it at other airlines either. So all this concern about a F/A in the flight deck with just one pilot seems a little misplaced, as there has been nothing preventing it for some time now.



It's a valid point by itself, but there is no disputing you are adding another human to the mix. A human which is as at least as likely to become the perpetrator as the pilot. The point being that with the statistics involved, no matter how minute the odds, it doesn't support a safer enviornment unless you assume the perpetrator is on the outside. (Which is what SHOULD be happening)

If you assume the perp will be a crew member, you just increased the odds of having have happen exactly what the misplaced fears are about. So this "fix" as applied is inappropriate to the recent occurrence which spawned it.

[StuntPilot]

Trying to look past the current media frenzy, is there any news about the FDR? The CVR was found damaged but the container holding the memory modules was intact, it just had a couple of scratches. Given the proximity of CVR and FDR in the plane one would expect something similar for the FDR. There was at some point news about a recovered FDR but the 'memory modules were missing'. Then, investigators were 'optimistic' and it seems that they had 'spotted something'. I have not heard any more news along that line.

Is it known what was exactly recovered and what is still missing? Did the crash proof container separate or was the crash proof container found and was its integrity breached so badly that the memory modules themselves are missing or damaged?

[Brummy]

Regarding breathing audio: My airline requires mandatory donning of crew oxygen mask when alone in the flight deck. If Germanwings required it too, you would have an excellent breath pattern recording.

[Interflug]

Regarding breathing audio: My airline requires mandatory donning of crew oxygen mask when alone in the flight deck. If Germanwings required it too, you would have an excellent breath pattern recording.
Logical fallacy with this: why should a suicidal mass murderer in the moment of his evil deed feel the need to comply with company regulations regarding wearing oxygen masks as a precautionary measure?

But the recorded breathing is explainable, if he was wearing his headset. Which I also don't know why psychologically it would make sense to wear it at this point, but who knows.

[givemewings]

If its true that his girlfriend reported that he had planned something


The impression the articles give is that she did *not* report it (at least to anyone who could have taken action)

I know for sure if I were frightened enough to leave a partner based on their behaviour, who was employed as a pilot and uttered that statement to me, I would be very, very concerned.


But perhaps being employed in the same industry would have some influence on that.


People say after an event like this (9/11, school shooting, etc) "It came out of nowhere" but almost all of the time when probed will say something like "I had a weird feeling about this person" "something didn't seem right" "it didn't add up"

It seems this lady ignored her intuition, very unfortunately. Of course, just reporting that exchange in itself may not have prevented this event, if he did in fact plan to crash a flight all along, but it may have been enough to ground him pending investigation and get the help needed....


I feel for the poor girl, she must be feeling horrible right about now. Probably for the best the media haven't name her...

[jaja]

Ref the previous post about if CVR is able to pick up the normal sound of a person breathing

I have spend close to 10.000 hrs as a captain on an A320, and I have never been able to hear my colleagues breathing. Not even through Intercom, when he/her wore a headset.

The CVR microphone would also not be able to pick up normal breathing. You will know if you have spend time in an A320. And there was even more noise on this MMO/VMO descent from aerodynamic noise.

[A and C]

The facts are simple , you can't legislate for those with unbalanced mental health, only mitigate for it.

The two persons in the flight deck is a sensible move from the industry and about the only thing you can do.

The security industry is already the tail wagging the aviation dog and the last thing we need is the so called security experts using this happening as way to make a fast buck.

[737er]

People say after an event like this (9/11, school shooting, etc) "It came out of nowhere" but almost all of the time when probed will say something like "I had a weird feeling about this person" "something didn't seem right" "it didn't add up"



Yes and that's often true when the person turns out to be innocent. If they are guilty then its brilliant. If they turn out to be innocent it never gets in the news and people just shrug and walk away. "I knew there was something weird about that guy! Oh he's innocent....oh"

About as credible as the media is on reporting aviation facts.

[NigelOnDraft]

But the recorded breathing is explainable, if he was wearing his headset. Which I also don't know why psychologically it would make sense to wear it at this point, but who knowsBecause in many Operators, at least most I know, you wear them from prior start until after shutdown?

[Brummy]

Because you have to put it on before the other crew member leaves and the headset is often not worn except for take off and landing. I fly the A320 by the way!

[givemewings]

I'm referring more to the fact that certain things may jump out at someone, but they are unsure why (no context) and are pushing down the intuitive danger signal they are getting... I know I'd rather get someone checked out and be wrong then say nothing and watch them go on to harm someone else/many someones...


I guess my point is, that family/friends of people working in safety critical jobs should not be afraid that by expressing concern for whatever reason that it will become an automatic reason for them to lose their job/license/whatever... in that sense, the industry does need to change to enable those who need help to get it. Lubitz's ex GF may well not have said anything for fear she might be wrong and get him fired, when the main concern should be the fitness to fly of the pilot while giving them other options if indeed they have a problem. Not every pilot who has a mental health issue has a major one posing a threat to life (their or otherwise)

I think the specifics of that have been pretty well covered by other posters here.

[DIRRIK]

We are trying to avoid the nearly unavoidable . What about cockpit policy in cargo planes? They can also fly into a building.
I m not sure if by letting people into the cockpit who have had no training for it, we are going to avoid this or make the cockpit a safer place.

[latetonite]

Everybody pilot will agree with me that a 'minimum 2 persons on the flightdeck' rule only serves the prevention of one falling asleep.
I also think we are planting lettuce upside down if a CA has to supervise the lonely pilot.

Pure 'Window dressing'.

But I see an opportunity for loco's to engage pay to fly, non typed MPL holders to act as 'pilot observers'.
They can invent a whole stack of SOP's for them too.

All in the name of safety.
Hopefully the public will buy it, and the crew puts up with it.

[alwayzinit]

For many years in the Air Force my doctor was a "company" man who had a duty to report any psychological issues up the chain of command, due to the "special" ordnance we carried.
I now work for a company where all the pilots are under the care of company doctors. This situation does have grey areas , doctor patient confidentiality issues versus the "greater good".
Simply put, had either of Lubick's doctors contacted GWs about his mental state this crash could have been avoided.
The debatable point about one's right to privacy over the right of innocents being murdered by a fruit loop needs to be settled IMHO.

[GlueBall]

Most of the newer headsets with integral microphones are so lightweight that sometimes you forget that they're still on your head as you get off the seat. And yes, I've heard copilots breathe when the intercom switch was held or stuck in transmit mode.

[WW I Flying Ace]

The CVR microphone would also not be able to pick up normal breathing. You will know if you have spend time in an A320. And there was even more noise on this MMO/VMO descent from aerodynamic noise.They can remove the background noise from the CVR recording by audio processing tools. That makes it easier to detect also faint sounds.

[Denti]

But I see an opportunity for loco's to engage pay to fly, non typed MPL holders to act as 'pilot observers'.

You know, there are no MPL holders without a typerating, as the MPL is only issued after LIFUS (Line Flying Under Supervision) has been successfully completed.

Why a rogue FA? With only two in the front for the vast majority of the time, what is to stop a rogue FO or capt doing a here's Johnny?

Nothing, never has, never will. However, it is a lot easier to get into the FA position than in the FO/CPT position for those with malicious intent. Just apply to an open position (and there are always some with turnover rates of more than 50% per year) and you're there.

[Pace]

We are trying to avoid the nearly unavoidable . What about cockpit policy in cargo planes? They can also fly into a building.
I m not sure if by letting people into the cockpit who have had no training for it, we are going to avoid this or make the cockpit a safer place.

Dirik

The problem is also there on Positioning flights when there is no one on board other than the two crew so its not just Cargo Flights and in the wrong hands an empty jet is just as lethal a weapon as a full one.

Going back to Cabin crew entering the Cockpit when one crew member leaves this is opening another avenue for terrorists organisations to train an extremist with a good record and to then get that Girl/Man to apply for a job as Cabin crew (easily achieved) That makes terrorism more likely as the terrorist FA only has one person to deal with and can stop entry to the cockpit by the other crew members.

The only way Cabin crew should be allowed access to the flight deck is by training them for that role. Designating certain Senior Cabin crew with a track record of at Least 3 to 5 years with the Airline.
Those Senior and trained Cabin Crew with a long track record in the company should be the ONLY Cabin crew qualified and allowed to enter the Flightdeck

to allow any Cabin Crew to enter the cockpit with one flight crew member is asking for future trouble

[737er]

Well life goes on for everyone. Things happen. It can be a fine line between outing a loved one thus ruining their career over nothing and doing the right thing. So if a pilot friend going through a divorce says he is depressed and wants to kill her, do pick up the phone and call the FAA knowing he has been a rock solid pilot for 2 or 3 decades?

People say a whole lot of things they don't mean and almost always it's nothing. Everyone needs confidants. Pilots are human, it doesn't mean they have any intentions other than complete commitment and dedication to the wellbeing of their passengers. Creating a situation for pilots in which they are unable to intrust anybody with the inevitabilities of life isn't the answer.

[framer]

QuantzClearly, the only efficient solution would be one marshall per flight,
disguised in cabin crew (male or female), trained for action, discreetly carrying a weapon, seated
in FD each time one pilote has to get out.

Clearly you should stick to writing/ journalism. If a pilot can go rogue, why can't a marshall? Now you have twice as many people that have to be sane.....ie you've halved your odds. Brilliant.
Bringing an extra human to the flight deck makes no sense whatsoever, it double your chances of a takeover. The pilot can still crash the aircraft anytime they want, but now someone else also has that opportunity.....someone who hasn't been psychologically screened no less. It may make the odd person feel safer, but that just means they are a bit dim.

[Quantz]

I assume that is a joke, or am I reading this correctly. You want someone who isn't a pilot to come and sit with you with a gun everytime someone goes out to the toilet. Why are you on this forum?

Do you have another efficient solution ? Not "someone with a gun", as you write improperly : a police officer or an agent from an enforcement agency with a gun.
I don't see why this couldn't be debated here.
As a passenger, and as a long-haul pilot's and former army fighter pilot's son myself, I would certainly be reassured by such a disposition.
No psychiatric test whatsoever will permit to detect if, when and how a psychopath will act. My wife is a therapist herself and she knows she will not meet some patients
alone in her office — borderline is borderline.
And please, aggressiveness is of no use here, a bit of decency won't do no harm. I took precautions in what I wrote, with some caveat.

[Wader2]

Everybody pilot will agree with me that a 'minimum 2 persons on the flightdeck' rule only serves the prevention of one falling asleep.

No it doesn't. It may reduce the risk, it does not prevent it. Once we had 4 out of 5 asleep including both pilots.

[dmba]

Patient/doctor confidentiality hasn't exactly helped much here.
Whoever the doctor was signed him off for work. It appears that he suffered from some form of mental illness that led him to intentionally crash a plane full of people. This could have happened at any point in the past 50 years and maybe already has. What are the genuine ways to avoid it? At no point should the doctor be obliged to warn somebody that a pilot has such an illness...?
With this type of illness, surely the doctor should be assessing potential risk to other people...

[Mark R. Beacon]

Many years ago, while undergoing line training as F/O in a new company, I started getting stressed, due to wanting to do well, not screw up etc. I started making small confidence/stress related mistakes like dropping check-lists, missing my call-sign and rushing things. The training captain, a calm elderly guy with a lifetime of experience, must have recognised this and announced in the cruise " I am going back for a break. You have control."
This was just what I needed. I looked around the flightdeck, noticed the beautiful sky for the first time, checked all flight parameters, and methodically collected my thoughts for the descent and approach. Requests from ATC were complied with in an orderly and professional manner. I was the business!
When the boss returned, I updated him on our progress, and asked if he would like an arrival briefing. "Ready to copy, Sir." was his reply. I went on to pass my line check with distinction.
Now, more than twenty years later, I am a training captain. Recently, I had a similar occasion, this time with an experienced F/O on a command upgrade. I knew he was very capable, but saw the stress mistakes creeping in. I remembered that time long ago, and went for a break, leaving him alone. It did the trick, and all was well from then on.
How sad, that recent events have now prevented this valuable training aid from being used.
Even on smaller types with less than fifty seats, there will presumably have to be two flight attendants, otherwise there will be no-one to look after the pax if one is guarding the pilot, and a flight attendant on the flight deck can also be a distraction.

[Mr Optimistic]

Actual studies show there are 125 to 150 police suicides per year, at a rate of 14 - 17/100,000 (the public is 11/100,000 and the Army in 2009 was 20/100,000).

I don't understand the logic of this debate. A malcontent in the front seat has plenty of opportunity to cause harm and perhaps will not wait for a toilet break. If you are content with two crew up front most of the time, introducing a temporary stand in only increases risk. Only real mitigation would be to return to 3 on the FD, all screened as now.

[Air Snoop]

The only way Cabin crew should be allowed access to the flight deck is by training them for that role. Designating certain Senior Cabin crew with a track record of at Least 3 to 5 years with the Airline.

Agreed on that one, they also need a good understanding of what goes on if they are expected to detect the unusual. Would a cabin crew member have intervened in this case when the FO dialed an altitude and pulled the knob to descend? I suggest not until too late.

A shrink may be able to expand but I guess suicide is a lonely thing and maybe someone else on the flight deck would break that mind set, whereas alone on a locked flight deck he is on his own to do as he pleases. Any shrinks on?

Also, you always hear breathing on CVRs because the mikes are 'hot' to the CVR.

[givemewings]

Those Senior and trained Cabin Crew with a long track record in the company should be the ONLY Cabin crew qualified and allowed to enter the Flightdeck

to allow any Cabin Crew to enter the cockpit with one flight crew member is asking for future trouble


That will not stop a determined sleeper. Look at the guys who planned 9/11. They were in it for the long game.


Then you also add the dimension of increasing the already steep authority gradient present in some cultures/airlines whereby a junior cc feels unable to contradict/intervene in a situation where a senior is showing poor judgement/unable to perform said duty... again... the solution creating its own problems...

737, I agree, that sort of environment won't help either, but there needs to be some sort of go between... even some kind of confidential help line for the industry where people can vent, get advice or even run the 'my boyfriend said XYZ, he's flying tomorrow, should I be worried?' type scenarios without fear of getting anyone sacked. Then they could follow up if they so chose...

Such a helpline exists in Australia for kids/young adults facing problems they feel they can't go to anyone else about. It's funded I believe by donations/govt funding. A few cents per airline ticket worldwide? Worth it.

[AfricanSkies]

Sigh. Although access to the door is absolutely worthless in preventing crew mischief, because if a pilot has murderous intent he will be able to destroy the aircraft in a myriad ways, if you *must* go on about the door, here is a solution for you.

Lock the passengers in.

They're the threat the door is supposed to guard against, no?

Move the door back so it seals off the cabin, where the threat is.

Then we can have an open cockpit, walk around, stretch our legs and aching backs, chat with the crew and enjoy our jobs a bit more. Its not good for my mental health to be locked into a 2x2m room 12 hrs a day.;)

[vctenderness]

After 40 years flying as cabin crew I had a pretty good basic knowledge of the flight deck.

However if I had been sitting in on the German Wings flight whilst the Captain was absent I would not have noticed anything unusual in the co pilot altering the flight level it would be a normal action if he had received instructions from ATC.

The only time I would have been of useful assistance would be after the initial request to enter the cockpit was declined.

I guess I could have opened the door as I am familiar with the operation of this but would that have been sufficient given the time available for the Captain to get into a position to fly the aircraft safely?

I think that two persons at all times is a good idea but don't think it is the answer to the problem alone.

[MrSnuggles]

Are we really sure that FO's depression played a role here at all?

He went to a doctor and got a sick note. Are you sure that was for depression? It could have been an injured knee after all that running.

He went to a hospital that did not treat him for depression. Bad knees?

When he had a bout of depression in 2008 he reported it and was treated until he was satisfyingly well. As you all noted, five years went by until he actually flew an airplane.

There are other possibilities out there. Don't slam people because once they were depressed. You can recover very well from a depression with the correct treatment. You can also be depressed without having suicidal thoughts. So excluding every single pilot that has suffered from depression is not necessary, although I see some here make those claims. On the contrary, a pilot that does not fear losing his/her job because of this illness have better chances of recovery because for them there is a light at the end of the tunnel, they have something to fight for!

I also see that many of you have absolutely no idea how SSRIs actually work and how they are linked to suicide. That is sad. Very sad. Misinformed, I would say.

[DaveReidUK]

Even on smaller types with less than fifty seats, there will presumably have to be two flight attendants, otherwise there will be no-one to look after the pax if one is guarding the pilot, and a flight attendant on the flight deck can also be a distraction.

No, if you're referring to the new EASA recommendations, they exempt aircraft operated with only one cabin crew and those with 60 or fewer seats.

[Interflug]

Well, whatever his mental state was, he committed mass murder.
Allegedly he did. It might look like the most likely scenario, but it would be a logical fallacy to rule out other chain of actions and events at this point.

It's a good exercise for the rational mind not to fall too early for believable yet unproven. Particularly for pilots, supposedly one of the most rational minded professions out there.

[DaveReidUK]

After 40 years flying as cabin crew I had a pretty good basic knowledge of the flight deck.

However if I had been sitting in on the German Wings flight whilst the Captain was absent I would not have noticed anything unusual in the co pilot altering the flight level it would be a normal action if he had received instructions from ATC.

I'd be willing to bet that every member of the cabin crew realised that descending 30,000 feet less than an hour after departure from BCN wasn't SOP.

[Hunter58]

If the two persons on the flight deck is such a critical procedure as the door can be locked from inside leading to a mentally unstable person being able to abuse of the aircraft for other than the intended purpose, I wonder, as has Nigel, on the potential backdraws of such procedure.

A better way, IMHO would be to have an override key in the cockpit that the person wanting to take a personal break takes with him/her and therefore can get into the cockpit any time.

[jaytee54]

Just to play devil's advocate a little.
What if, during the Captain's toilet break with the Flight attendant in the cockpit, there is a depressurisation problem and the remaining pilot decides on an emergency descent? That's what Lubitz's action may have looked like to a FA, though we pilots know different.

Is the FA now likely to club the pilot with the fire extinguisher to prevent him/her, or do we give limited pilot training to all cabin crew?

Any solution has to be carefully thought through.

[MrSnuggles]

If, and I mean IFF, this was indeed a planned act including concious and thought-through actions, I will be very angry and very sad. Because then this is a mass murder. And that can not, will not, never be justified.

But first: We don't have enough evidence. Right now there are rumours, innuendos and circumstantial evidence to something that might have been.

And second: In all other cases where there were confirmed suicide-murders by airplane, the employee in question had a beef with someone in the company. PSA1771, EgyptAir990, FedEx705 (unsuccessful but makes this list anyway). SilkAir185 has some convincing circumstantial evidence that this is the case. All these guys had a very special personality, one that didn't take defeat well. Most of them almost led a double life. Did this German youngster qualify to that? We don't know that yet.

What I do know is that I agree with Pace on this one. An act like this is more the mindset of a school shooter than that of a depressed person.

But to be honest... we simply don't know what really took place in that cockpit yet!

ETA: Oh yes, I forgot that Mocambique flight, can't remember the number now... Again, strange fellow with company issues.

[mseyfang]

Aviation runs on trust. You trust the mechanics to do their jobs right, you trust the dispatcher who plans the flight, you trust the ATC controller handling your flight, you trust the security screeners to keep weapons off your airplane, you trust the cabin crew to do their jobs properly and you trust the person in the other seat to know their stuff and operate the aircraft safely.

It is an amazing thing that we often climb into cockpits with total strangers and yet have an aviation safety record that makes the drive to the airport the riskiest part of the journey.

Sometimes, the system breaks down, but these are exceedingly rare occurrences. Aviation remains an extraordinarily safe industry despite the incredible complexity of the aircraft and support systems that keep us flying.

9/11 prompted a massive overreaction that changed the industry and job for, IMHO. the worse. It would be tragic if this event did something similar. What would be even worse is if the trust that keeps everything running was undermined, particularly since this seems to be the kind of "black swan" event that by definition is at the tail end of the probability distribution.

When I hear talk of mistrust of cabin crew, "airlock" doors, armed marshals and the like, I cringe -- and think about early retirement. I chose aviation because, like most, I absolutely love flying airplanes. Retiring from flying and using the law degree I have may be something I need to consider if things get even worse than they are because this prompts yet another ill-considered overreaction.

To truly live is to accept a certain level of risk and the elimination of all risk is an unattainable fantasy.

But, to sum things up, this remains, despite it all, a remarkably safe business, which is a fact that is often lost when incidents, whether accidental or deliberate, occur.

[DaveReidUK]

A better way, IMHO would be to have an override key in the cockpit that the person wanting to take a personal break takes with him/her and therefore can get into the cockpit any time.

That would be equally flawed.

The door has no way of knowing whether the key is being used by the crew member or by a terrorist who has gained possession of it by duress. And if it's the latter, you have taken away the ability of the cockpit occupant(s) to deny access.

[portmanteau]

why the assumption that henceforth CC could be a risk on the FD? unless things have changed since my day, any of them can and do go there already in the course of their duties and so far as I know none yet have turned out to be
hijackers or worse. demonising them in advance is not conducive to good crew relations.

[DaveReidUK]

surely this crash was because one pilot denied access to the flight deck by the other pilot so that ability NEEDS taking away?

More specifically, the sole flight deck occupant denied access. That, of course, is what's behind the two-person proposal.

I agree that your chip-and-pin idea might work, but frankly I can't think of any proposed solution that doesn't risk unintended consequences.

[unworry]

The statement by the Prosecutor has opened the flood gates to every possible allegation against the F/O. Most of these allegations are totally without merit or fact,...Sure, so let's state what's known at this time...

Fact: moments after reaching cruise, the captain left the cockpit (source: CVR)
Fact: moments after the Captain left the FO dialed in ALT 100' (source: ADS-B data, FT24)
Fact: the captain was unable to reenter the cockpit (source: CVR)
Deduction: the FO locked the door to ensure the captain could not return to the cockpit and intervene.

So we have a few indisputable events that indicate this was an intentional act by the FO to crash the plane.

The more recent pages here are speculation as to the FO's motive, contributing factors .... and whether this type of incident can be mitigated in the future, or not. The press is naturally having a field day, but the special investigators and prosecutor have plenty of leads to pursue

Though I'm concerned how this will affect the flying public's perception of pilots and the illusion of safety, in a "mass murder" scenario such as this I wonder whether the normal air crash investigation rules can apply. (and to be clear, in no way do I condone the leaks of CVR or anonymous reports from investigators in the know, which seem to have sparked this circus in the first place)

[RobertS975]

Still lots of doubt about the suicide scenario IMO... no evidence that captain actually used the keypad, a controlled and stable decent profile, no attempt to erase the CVR just before impact... one would either want to scream at the cruelty of the world or else keep it completely secret and erase the CVR. Absolute silence and normal breathing isn't a plausible third choice!

I continue to remain absolutely astounded that an individual with 630 hrs TT accumulated over 7+ years was allowed to be a crew member on a modern, complex airliner in saturated airspace!

I am a pilot for 30+ years (non-pro) but also a physician. When we credential physicians for hospital privileges, we very carefully examine any significant time hiatus in someone's career pathway.

Unfortunately, but understandably, airline pilots are always a single medical event away from losing their medical clearance.

Anyway, count me as one who feels that a "rush to judgement" is happening here

[jaytee54]

There have been several proven, or very likely, past instances of mass murder by pilot suicide. Why suddenly now do we start a witch-hunt against depressed pilots? We have accepted the risk in the past. We could continue to accept the risk, but with greater vigilance.

In the USA many hundreds of people, or is it thousands, are killed each year by guns, but the pro-gun lobby has convinced that country's politicians that guns should be allowed, even encouraged, rather than give up their democratic freedom. They value their freedom and accept the attendant risk.

Maybe we should accept the risk and stop the witch hunts and media hype.
Maybe we should get rid of the locked door now we see the risks it imposes.
Maybe we should scale back airport security in line with reality. How many bombers has airport security found and stopped, worldwide, in 20 years? They did once confiscate my nail clippers, just in case I attacked my copilot with them. Honestly, I had no intention of crashing my 767 into London.

Stopping terrorist attacks, and the mass shootings like in Norway, Dunblane and Columbine, and this latest aviation mass murder, is more about surveillance and infiltration or terrorists and keeping a friendly eye on family, friends and work colleagues.

[VinRouge]

The big giveaway there were problems was the alleged impulsive purchase of 2 brand new audi cars. Smacks of severe manic depression on a high.

If this guy was recently prescribed anti depression medication and was taking it unsupervised, it apparently can be not a good thing.

The question we have is how we maintain a certain level of patient confidentiality whilst protecting the wider community.

This isn't just an issue for aviation, this affects all areas of high consequence inductry, be that oil, nuclear or mass civilian transit. If it is managed incorrectly, it will make the situation worse by pushing those with illness underground. Time airline insurers recognised terms, conditions and company procedures that could support these individuals? Makes pretty good business sense.

[McRotor96]

For people stating that they don't like the idea of a '2 person' rule - or who are uncomfortable with the extra person being a FA. Perhaps it is worth looking at the rest of the world - specifically at the USA where that IS the rule. How many pilot killings have been on US carriers operating that rule? It seems to be zero.

The '2 person rule' is not a perfect solution - that doesn't exist - but the evidence to date suggests that it is an important, simple and inexpensive precaution that appears to be largely effective. Which is presumably why it has been implemented (in true stable-door fashion) by many carriers in the last few days.

[SLFplatine]

May I ask you, what do you think the primary role of the flight attendant is? Do you think they are purely there just to serve you coffee or tea?

No, the primary role of the FA is PAX flight safety.
The point here is that there is IMHO a higher risk of a rogue FA with terrorist intent getting inserted into a flight crew than there is of a pilot with a clinical mental issue alone on the flight deck or of a rogue pilot with the terrorist intent driving the plane.

[Lost in Saigon]

Wow never has so much been said by so many knowing so little :ugh:

It is so obvious how many real professionals are on this thread (Hint use 1 hand to count them)

Talk about hijacking, this is as the website suggests is a Professional Pilots rumour network.

I cannot believe how many muppets with no idea about real aviation are posting absolute drivel on this thread.:mad:

Moderators, please delete any posts to do with aircraft security immediately lest the mentally unstable amongst us get ideas.

Any person who has posted anything to do with security or how systems work should be investigated by the appropriate countries terrorism units. And while I'm on a rant, CNN please stop with the experts, there is a reason they are ex-pilots :=

Are you suggesting all the non-pilots should stop making posts about FD door security procedures? Where do think they got this information? It is readily available all over the internet.

As long as the specific door codes are not revealed, I have no problem with it.

[PAXboy]

Interesting and, in my view sensible, development.

The Latest: French pilots' union files lawsuit over leaks about Germanwings crash - 3/27/2015 5:49:34 AM | Newser (http://www.newser.com/article/a7e6da1c6c524ffebe9ff0abffc99bed/the-latest-french-pilots-union-files-lawsuit-over-leaks-about-germanwings-crash.html)

French pilots suing over crash leaks | Toronto Star (http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/03/27/french-pilots-suing-over-crash-leaks.html)

[bunk exceeder]

Sky marshals appeal to some but try googling "cop goes crazy with gun" and enjoy the rich delights of what comes up. And I'm sure we recall that US Arways "Federal Flight Deck Officer" whose gun went off in the cockpit some years ago. Not to mention recent high jinx with the Secret Service.

I've encountered the very very occasional "odd" cabin crew member. I guess if we want the most trusted member of the cabin cew, that would likely be the CSD/CSM/FSM/Senior/Lead, or whatever they are called in one's airline. But there was this one CSD.... Airline management and cabin crew unions would/will almost certainly wail about effect on cabin service. But that can be worked out. Edited to add that they are also so much of the fun and camraderie of the last decades that the "second person" sounds fine to me.

And many mental health professionals are mandated to report any ideations of suicide or harm to others. It seems to me that in this already multi linked chain of events, the buck kind of stops at the point where he was able to get on the aircraft, much like the security system has failed if a potentially dangerous passenger makes it onboard. What can be done to catch people with inappropriate mental health issues earlier? Punishing everyone for the misdeeds of one in a million is pointless and there seems to be a variety of missed opportunities in this case. While Cheapo Airlines might think it adequate to come up with a "sanity self assessment checklist" for us to complete on check in, to be placed in the circular file immediately thereafter, seriously, what can be done to catch a disturbed individual before things get out of hand? But then what's to prevent someone from saying they drive a cab when they seek help?

[AirScotia]

From the Daily Mail article linked to above:

Earlier today, a passenger on the outbound flight from Dusseldorf to Barcelona, which is believed to have had Lubitz on board, questioned why the co-pilot didn't down that flight instead.
Michael, 45, said he saw the pilot leave the cockpit during the 6.45am flight for a toilet break.
He told Bild: 'I sat in the fifth row. I could see the front of the plane. The toilet behind the cockpit was apparently out of order, I could see the red light flashing throughout the flight.
'A man over 40, probably the pilot, in a grey V neck sweater came through the curtain. He went through the plane probably to the rear toilet.
'After an estimated three to five minutes he came back and again opened the cockpit door.'

It seems unlikely that the forward loo was fixed during the turnaround, so the co-pilot would know that the loo break in the return flight would take longer than a few seconds. Also, this would tell him that the pilot did not have a personal embargo on visiting the toilet during a short flight.

[camber3]

It is unfortunate the current portrayal of this event has made the greater flying public feel unsafe. Regardless of the copilot's actual medical status, the fact he might be able to choose to still fly with an adverse mental state without being stopped is of concern..understandably.
The captain should have overriding access to his 'ship's' deck.
These people should have fast easy access to a toilet, that's bloody ridiculous they don't.
Looking forward to reading the final assessment of this tragic accident that includes the fdr data.

[txl]

I'm a little flabbergasted reading the extensive discussion of door mechanics here. The door is not the problem: Post 9/11 doors have been designed to keep somebody out of the flight deck if the person(s) inside don't want them to enter. That's what this door did. Any possible override systems render the whole thing moot.

The problem is rather that this particular person got a seat in the cockpit in the first place. A company (and by extension, an industry) that drags somebody with a documented mental condition along and puts him in a high risk position has a serious problem. Hell, I wouldn't even be admitted to the initial test because I'm too tall (and too old by now probs). And a guy with a history of major depressive episodes – which is not a "burn out" but a serious clinical diagnosis – gets to become FO?

Also, regarding the "2 persons on deck at all times" rules, I think most of you here are missing the point. It's not about the FA wrestling control from a rogue pilot. And it's not about the FA opening the door, although both might be an added bonus in some scenarios. It's about not creating an opportunity. I'll go out on a limb here and speculate that this wouldn't have happened at this time with this particular flight if the FO hadn't been left alone in the cockpit.

As somebody from the med field already pointed out in this thread somewhere, suicide-crimes like this tend to be premeditated, but not meticulously planned. Perps think a lot about how they're going to do it. But they need an opportunity (and maybe a trigger event), and when they see one, they act spontaneously. And this is a coward's crime. The Germanwings FO wasn't somebody who'd go mano-a-mano with his captain or somebody else in the cockpit.

[smiling monkey]

No, the primary role of the FA is PAX flight safety.
The point here is that there is IMHO a higher risk of a rogue FA with terrorist intent getting inserted into a flight crew than there is of a pilot with a clinical mental issue alone on the flight deck or of a rogue pilot with the terrorist intent driving the plane.

And on what basis do you form that opinion? Any precedents that would suggest that kind of scenario is likely?

And I hope you realise that flight attendants regularly visit the flight deck anyway and have been doing so since day one. Flight Attendants being asked to accompany flight crew on the flight deck whilst the other is on a visit to the toilet is standard practice in my airline and I'm sure in many others too. Indeed they are there for your safety and are highly trained for that purpose. I'd be much more worried about untrained passengers intervening with onboard security issues, which, by doing so, has the potential to inflame an already tense situation.

[Piloto2011]

I cannot see why so many are opposing the two-crew rule.

This guy was emotionally weak despite his ability to hide his illness. Just the presence of cabin crew on the flight deck would have prevented this tragedy. Never ever would he have tried to overpower fellow crew. Only the thought of being entirely in control allowed him to carry out his plan.

I appreciate why many pilots perceive agency cabin crew with only two-week training as a potential threat and why the rule makes it easier for extremists to get past the cockpit door in flight.

However, as far as I am concerned thus far this rule has been successful in the US and to my knowledge there have not been any female suicide pilots, let alone loonie cabin crew trying to overpower flight crew. Not saying this will never happen though.

Why not further restricting the two-crew rule to only the purser allowed on the flight deck with only one pilot present and the door shut?

Being appointed the role of the purser requires longer employment with an operator plus a decent performance record. Also, cabin crew allowed onto the flight deck from now on are to undergo a more thorough background check including a more restrictive medical similar to a flight crew's.

[wings folded]

Quote:
Andreas Lubitz knew perfectly the area where he directed the aircraft. When he was younger, his family and him came in this area ( Massif des trois Evêchés) and la Seyne-les-Alpes. This region seems very well appreciated by the glider pilots because of its well-renowned air streams. AL had already flown in this area and since he was 15. A lot of German glider pilots frequently come in this area. AL was member of a glider aero club and was still qualified to fly them. Its family and himself were known by local people in the region

Killer co-pilot was 'passionate and obsessed' with the Alps: Andreas Lubitz used to fly gliders over the mountains and knew the area very well | Daily Mail Online
What a load of Rubbish ! how would he know the Captain would decide at that point to go off to the toilets. What if 15 minutes later? would he have turned around and headed back?

This was an autopilot descent which happened to impact at that point with the set descent profile on an almost straight line.

Had the Captain decided to vacate the flight deck 15 minutes later it would have impacted that extra distance further on on whatever descent profile he added and into whatever country area / city happened to be in the way

Of all the nonsense being spouted about this event, this has to rank high. Pace is absolutely right. The pilot in command left his seat when his bladder informed him of the need so to do. He did not leave his seat at precisely the right moment to allow his fellow pilot to set a descent profile to crash somewhere which he knew well.

What is the interest in propogating the bollocks that the Mail comes up with?

[giblets]

There has been much talk about the fitness to fly (and even in the UK down driving too), the problem is the individual is still the missing link, they have to make the decision on their own fitness in many scenarios.
Surely there is a case to say that Dr's should be obliged to inform an airliner/ employer/ regulatory body when a pilot is unfit to fly (or a condition affect their ability), thus cutting out a whole chain of events that would/ could occur ( from depression to sleep apnea).

[Capvermell]

The 2 crew rule on the flight deck will only double(at least) the chances having the bad guy behind the locked door. He/She will have a plan to overcome the other one easily.

I don't agree with that view at all as the FAA has already had the second non pilot person in the cockpit during loo breaks etc rule for several years and there have been no suicides by flight deck persons incidents at all in that time.

Generally someone who acted in the way this co-pilot did acts that way because of the feeling of unlimited megalomaniacal type power that being in sole charge of a vital life preserving system of this kind overwhelms them with because it is a way to compensate for the frequent feelings of inadequacy, self loathing and/or lack of control over their own life that they often secretly hold. The various psychopathic hospital nurses and also Dr Harold Shipman all had very similar psychological motivations. So generally those who have taken this kind of action seem to be largely motivated by the very fact that they can do it in secret without being subject to the criticism of and comeback on their actions that they face in their day to day life.

However as the vast majority of pilots are still male and the substantial majority of flight attendants are still female and relatively slightly built the chances of them overcoming the remaining pilot on the flight deck seem to be relatively low. Also the ground security checks that crew are now subject to mean that in general they couldn't usually get a knife or blade or gun on board to allow them to overcome the pilot/co-pilot left without a major struggle, the outcome of which would be highly uncertain. Of course there does still seem a small risk that members of a terrorist cell might take employment with a small airline as both say a pilot or co-pilot and/or co-pilot and flight attendant and then wait until the day to arrive when they were both serving on the same flight.

However the one additional feature that could be added to all passenger aircraft and that would probably have avoid both this crash and the Helios crash is providing a means in the main passenger cabin for flight crew to always be able to contact either ATC or their control bases and for either ATC centres or an airline's main control base to be able remotely send a signal that would immediately release the cockpit door. On the other hand as soon as potential suicide terrorists know that these protections are in place they will undoubtedly tend to try to instead crash the aircraft and kill everyone on board by putting it it in to an immediate and irreversible stall (in the manner of Silkair Flight 185).

So the big question is really how many years will it be before we have aircraft where an auto pilot flight path cannot be set that will fly the aircraft directly in to terrain (surely can't be difficult with global GPS now available everywhere) and how long it will be before the flight crew cannot make any control surface inputs that the auto-pilot and flight management systems know will stall or crash the aircraft. And if we do reach that stage then there are still going to be aircraft that crash due to faulty software design or faulty vital components in safely controlling the aircraft (eg altimeter, Pito tubes or even an uncontained engine failure damaging vital flight control surfaces) that might have been able to be avoided had we still had two pilots on board with the ability to access full manual control of the flight (the Lockheed TriStar crash at Sioux City for instance immediately comes to mind as a case where with full automation the flight would almost certainly not even have got anywhere near the ground).

So in short there is no perfect solution that a determined terrorist may not get around (including hacking in to any automated remote control systems with malicious and malevolent intent for aircraft with systems designed to land the aircraft remotely in the event of dual pilot disablement) but one suspects that ensuring crew in the cabin can always contact ATC and/or the airline's main ground base at all times and providing the ability to send a cockpit door release signal remotely (from the ground) would both be useful initial steps in the right direction.

[smiling monkey]

And i used to visit the flight deck on most flights prior to 9/11 once spent 2 hours there going to the USA AND YOUR POINT ?

When a terrorist organisation see that as an opportunity to gain access and plant a pretty FA and there is a crash then things will change again

Ever done any combined CRM training with flight attendants? You get to know your colleagues pretty well especially when you socialize with them back at base or on overnights. I'd guess in the corporate flying world, you're on your own; byo food and coffee in a thermos perhaps?

[AirScotia]

Breaking news from New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/world/europe/pilot-andreas-lubitz-sought-treatment-for-vision-problems-before-germanwings-crash-authorities-say.html?emc=edit_na_20150328&nlid=68980622&_r=0

He was being treated for vision problems.

[McRotor96]

Surely there is a case to say that Dr's should be obliged to inform an airliner/ employer/ regulatory body when a pilot is unfit to fly...

If the Doctor had informed the airline, it probably would have prevented this tragedy. However, the other 5 major murder/suicide incidents would not have been picked up or prevented by a Doctor. And I think that is important - those 5 pilots were fit to fly, with no history of mental health problems.

However - all 5 were experiencing one or more feelings of shame, anger, resentment, frustration and rage. Triggered by work or personal situations and the perceived attack on their inner sense of self.

And I suspect the same will be true here. A trigger event and his personality profile created a deep inner rage / frustration - and led to his (and the others') desire to punish 'someone' for the intolerable injustice they imagined had been visited upon them.

As such, his medical depression may be contributory or it may be irrelevant. Either way doctor-reporting won't stop it happening again. Preventing the opportunity to be alone at the controls has worked in the USA and may turn out be the best solution of all.

[Effluent Man]

I have followed this thread from the outset,but have not contributed because I didn't feel that I had anything worthwhile to add. All i will say is this. The number of commercial airline pilots employed throughout the world probably numbers tens of thousands,the chances of none of them going sufficiently mad to commit an act such as this are probably quite long.

You can't really get over the problem by installing sky marshalls because the same mathematical formula applies,and I would have thought it quite likely that in general people losing it are going to try to cover their deteriorating mental state.

Interestingly we have not seen it happen with coach drivers who could achieve something of a similarly horrific outcome on an Alpine road. The Moorgate tube disaster is one where the possibility of driver suicide remains not ruled out.

Is it the spectacular nature of an air crash that is the main motivatiion? Sadly I think what has happened makes a re-occurence more not less likely and I cannot imagine any scenario that could entirely prevent it if an individual is minded to try. Only time will tell of course if it does happen again.

An inevitable corollary will be a big loss of passenger confidence in airline safety. Mechanical and technical failures have been largely eliminated and we are now faced with human frailty which I think may prove a much tougher nut to crack.

[RJM]

I wouldn't dare to comment on the aviation aspects of this horrible business, but it occurred to me that LH may have preferred the news of the FO's apparent actions to leak early and 'bring the public along with them' so to speak, rather than have the terrible revelation hit the headlines later with even more impact on public perceptions of the company.

[GlueBall]

"...providing the ability to send a cockpit door release signal remotely..."

Supplementary steel bolts on most armored cockpit doors, when manually latched would override the electronic lock.

[Hunter58]

For all the ones who propagate that the two personas at all time rule in the US has never brought any problems...

Sorry, flawed argument. Until the 10th of September 2001 one could have argued that noone has ever used a commercial aircraft as a weapon and that therefore it will never happen.

The rule in the US is there as otherwise the armoured and locked door is not cerifiable, exactly because a pilot left alone with psychological problems may take advantage of the situation.

The concept of the door is wrong to start with, as it assumed that all pilots are superheroas and will unde no circumstances ever let the baddie into the cockpit under extreme duress. Unless you have ever been under duress you don't know how you would react to it.

The whole system is based on a series of flaws that look good, but in reality are not. Time for a complete (and non public) rethink.

[AirScotia]

The Independent has picked up on Lubitz's eyesight problems.

Germanwings plane crash: Co-pilot Andreas Lubitz 'sought treatment for eyesight problems' - Europe - World - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germanwings-plane-crash-former-girlfriend-claims-tormented-copilot-would-wake-from-nightmares-screaming-were-going-down-10140972.html)

An ex-girlfriend is also quoted:

The woman, a flight stewardess named only as Maria W., said Andreas Lubitz told her he was receiving psychiatric treatment and would wake up distressed in the night during their five-month relationship in 2014.

She was quoted by the German newspaper Bild as recalling how Lubitz would change when he talked about the pressures and conditions of his job.
"He never talked much about his illness, only that he was in psychiatric treatment,” she said.

"We always talked a lot about work and then he became a different person. He became upset about the conditions we worked under: too little money, fear of losing the contract, too much pressure."

[Wader2]

The concept of the door is wrong to start with, as it assumed that all pilots are superheroas and will unde no circumstances ever let the baddie into the cockpit under extreme duress. Unless you have ever been under duress you don't know how you would react to it.
.

More realistically it gives the pilots time to safely select the appropriate squawk and make a radio call before opening the door.

While you might believe opening the door is to invite a 9/11 most recent hijacks have been for asylum purposes. Either way, would you sit safe in your bubble while people were shot, aircraft depressurised, set on fire or whatever?

And for your second point, been there so I have an idea.

[NWA SLF]

Not the FDR but the memory module. First stated by President Hollande but also confirmed by other sources, the FDR was discovered the second day with the memory module dislodged (meaning gone). Observing pictures of the recovery, as expected when an aircraft hits a steep slope a lot of dirt was dislodged and mixed with aircraft debris rolling down the hillside. I have watched videos of recovery workers digging into the loose soil to recover components with part protruding from the soil, and with such a part in one video there was an electronic circuit board. FDR recovery still could be as easy as picking up the right piece of debris or it could mean sifting through tons of soil.

[BOING]

Have to say this but it will never happen.The best way out of this dilemma would be the return of the third pilot.

The third pilot was a "roadblock" on the route from the cockpit door to the pilots and the controls.
The inclusion of a third pilot means that there would never be less than two pilots on the flight deck.
Pilots work at 25% of their maximum capacity most of the time, 95% of capacity some of the time and on occasions, when things go wrong, at 125% of their capacity. The third pilot dropped that 125% back to 95% and made the whole operation safer.
The third pilot had a 3D view of everything the pilots were doing and what they were seeing on the instruments, a much better view than the pilots had of each other. The third pilot was often the first person to detect an incipient problem.
Somehow, having a third pilot on the flight deck moderated any opinions and actions of the two pilots, a stabilizing influence.

Incidentally the third pilot increased the number of new jokes on the flight deck by 33%:):)

[Hempy]

ASN News » List of aircraft accidents and incidents intentionally caused by pilots (http://news.aviation-safety.net/2015/03/26/list-of-aircraft-accidents-and-incidents-deliberately-caused-by-pilots/)

40 years: 591 dead in 11 world jet suicide events. Matched in the USA every 1 day (hospital errors) & every 6 days (gun deaths). Get a grip.

[JustAnotherPoorSlob]

Clearly, the only efficient solution would be one marshall per flight,
disguised in cabin crew (male or female), trained for action, discreetly carrying a weapon, seated
in FD each time one pilote has to get out.
Practically impossible to do, cost-wise and from a legal point of view also maybe.
In that case, Lubitz would have had a marshall disguised in cabin crew seated beside him, which would have easily defeated him in any of his ill-conceived designs.
And that marshall should be carefully vetted too, of course…

Until the marshal has a problem. There is no vetting that's 100%. The current solution (another crew member in the cockpit) makes as much sense as just having a pilot and copilot alone in the cockpit (which does make sense).

We're never going to get 100% prevention of this, and certainly if the copilot wanted to commit suicide we couldn't prevent it, but we can at least deny him the opportunity to commit murder in the process

[toffeez]

According to the officials searching / investigating no part of the FDR has been found. I think they know better than Pressy Holly.
Which other sources (exclude journos please) have confirmed what?

[FullWings]

Trying to find a technical solution on the aircraft to the “problem” of a suicidal pilot is pointless, IMHO. Whether it involves doors, other people, computers or whatever, if the guy trying to crash the aeroplane and kill himself and possibly others is determined enough, they will succeed despite any precautions.

There have been many fatal accidents in the past where the pilot(s) have been doing everything in their power NOT to crash, yet it has still happened. I think most people who don’t fly for a living truly don’t understand how a moment’s inattention or an incorrect control input during a critical phase of flight (like takeoff and landing) can lead very quickly to disaster. A deliberate contrary action could speed that up to almost instantaneous.

For non-pilots, imagine sitting in the passenger seat of a car doing 60mph. Just as you are about to pass a car going in the opposite direction at the same speed, the driver turns sharply into the path of the oncoming vehicle. Even if you had a duplicate steering wheel fitted on your side, it would be too late to do anything in the fraction of a second that remained.

The real problem is how to avoid having a pilot with severe mental health issues operating an aircraft. By the time they are sat in the seat it is too late...

[Odysseus]

Hempy, you said

40 years: 591 dead in 11 world jet suicide events. Matched in the USA every 1 day (hospital errors) & every 6 days (gun deaths). Get a grip.


Perhaps you could relax your grip a little? There is a very significant difference between implementing a homicidal mass casualty event, and - for example - making a mistake with treating a patient, or a patient infecting their bed-neighbor with a lethal bug.

At the end of a 'perfect' state-of-the-art flight everyone should arrive alive; while at the end of state-of-the-art treatment not everybody survives.

[JW411]

Purely as a matter of interest, Mrs 411 and I were discussing this crash last night. She flew as CC on the 1-11, the 707 and the DC-10 with Laker (I only ever flew the DC-10). She tells me that it was standard procedure on the 1-11 for one of the CC to sit up front whenever one of the pilots took a break and that was 30 - 35 years ago. (All the other aircraft in the Laker fleet carried a flight engineer so the problem didn't occur).

[Hempy]

Odyssues, You did read the article, didn't you?

The point being that a little bit of perspective wouldn't go astray. It's happened before, it'll probably happen again, and no amount of 'do this, do that' will change it. Odds are you'll die in a car accident on the way to the airport, so just relax and put it down to a statistical anomaly.

[MATELO]

What a heart wrenching statement by the father of Paul Bramley. Very dignified and full of what looking to the future should be.

[Castlehard]

Not sure how credible Maria W. Is. She claims she was locked in a bathroom by Lubitz. That's not my understanding of how bathroom doors typically function.

[Leightman 957]

Great post Mark Beacon (currently 2390). Trust, wisdom, familiarity with the team, all in decline. I could tell a similar story. Trust amplifies when it is given, but has a hard time growing when not given. Familiarity provides more windows into another person. Randomized crews may be graphed as being capable of efficient action but I will never believe they function together as a cohesive, well informed team.

But would you have done the same thing if you 1) had just met the person; 2) found you had some unexplainable dislike for the person?

[NigelOnDraft]

Piloto2011 I cannot see why so many are opposing the two-crew rule ... Just the presence of cabin crew on the flight deck would have prevented this tragedyI am afraid I disagree - it likely would have just altered the exact way he did it.
Why not further restricting the two-crew rule to only the purser allowed on the flight deck with only one pilot present and the door shut?

Being appointed the role of the purser requires longer employment with an operator plus a decent performance record. Also, cabin crew allowed onto the flight deck from now on are to undergo a more thorough background check including a more restrictive medical similar to a flight crew's. Such mitigations would reduce the concerns many have (including my own), but in the same breath would be why the airlines would likely resist (cost).

But they still leave the biggest problem unanswered - you are trying to "mitigate" having pilots on board who will deliberately crash the aircraft. That to me is an unacceptable premise, and not possible to comprehensively mitigate against. So I think the basic issue needs to be addressed, not accepted?

[Good Business Sense]

After 9/11, certainly in the airline I worked for (very big wide body operator) , the doors just appeared - no scenario guidance, no what ifs,no training, nothing

[AirScotia]

@Castlehard:

Not sure how credible Maria W. Is. She claims she was locked in a bathroom by Lubitz. That's not my understanding of how bathroom doors typically function.

In continental Europe, internal doors often open outwards rather than inwards. You can lock someone in by blocking the door and refusing to let it open.

[aguadalte]

FullWings: Trying to find a technical solution on the aircraft to the “problem” of a suicidal pilot is pointless, IMHO. Whether it involves doors, other people, computers or whatever, if the guy trying to crash the aeroplane and kill himself and possibly others is determined enough, they will succeed despite any precautions.

There have been many fatal accidents in the past where the pilot(s) have been doing everything in their power NOT to crash, yet it has still happened. I think most people who don’t fly for a living truly don’t understand how a moment’s inattention or an incorrect control input during a critical phase of flight (like takeoff and landing) can lead very quickly to disaster. A deliberate contrary action could speed that up to almost instantaneous.

For non-pilots, imagine sitting in the passenger seat of a car doing 60mph. Just as you are about to pass a car going in the opposite direction at the same speed, the driver turns sharply into the path of the oncoming vehicle. Even if you had a duplicate steering wheel fitted on your side, it would be too late to do anything in the fraction of a second that remained.

The real problem is how to avoid having a pilot with severe mental health issues operating an aircraft. By the time they are sat in the seat it is too late... (my bold)

Thanks FullWings! Finally a sensible post in this forum. The airline companies who have just decided to add a second person into the cockpit while one of the pilots are out are only responding to media hysteria! To add another person into the cockpit is to add another potential for hazard, once if a pilot wants to do harm, he will find a way to do it!!!

[Lemain]

But they still leave the biggest problem unanswered - you are trying to "mitigate" having pilots on board who will deliberately crash the aircraft. That to me is an unacceptable premise, and not possible to comprehensively mitigate against. So I think the basic issue needs to be addressed, not accepted? There may be another way. Most agree that drone/remote control/pilotless is not the way to go at least for the foreseeable. The PF could crash deliberately in close ground proximity by sudden gross control action impossible for PNF to overcome let alone a FA. In this case the pilot chose to set an un-cleared course, speed and descent towards high terrain. It would be fairly easy for an algorithm either onboard, ground or interactive ground/flight to take or prevent contol action in extreme circumstances. It would require a huge amount of technical evaluation and pilot input to find an appropriate balance but I think it could be done and implemented in a useful timescale.

[NigelOnDraft]

It would require a huge amount of technical evaluation and pilot input to find an appropriate balance but I think it could be done and implemented in a useful timescale. Trouble is the only "useful timescale" most are working to now is that for tomorrow's newspapers :ooh:

[McRotor96]

ASN News » List of aircraft accidents and incidents intentionally caused by pilots

40 years: 591 dead in 11 world jet suicide events. Matched in the USA every 1 day (hospital errors) & every 6 days (gun deaths). Get a grip.

Right. But 422 of them were in the past 3 years, suggesting this is something the airlines are right to be concerned about.

And your entire premise is wrong. Imagine if the industry had adopted your "acceptable loss" / "grip-getting" attitude? Presumably an occasional mid-air collision or door falling off would simply have required some corporate manning-up rather than spending millions to develop collision warning systems and redesigning doors...?

[SilverCircle]

To all who are speculating about quotes taken from this interview with his ex:

Please bear in mind that this "exclusive interview" with his ex-girlfriend was conducted by German newspaper "Bild". A sensationalist publication, comparable with Daily Mail and such, or even worse.

It's also well known that they pay good amounts of $ for "exclusive interviews".

I wouldn't pay too much attention to what is written in that newspaper.

[ams6110]

The reinforced locking doors were certainly a reaction to 9/11 but I disgree that they were not carefully considered. No solution is perfect. The reinforced doors and locking mechanisms prevented some possible risks and introduced others. These new risks were doubtless considered and thought to be far less likely than the ones that were prevented, and thus a resonable trade off for the benefit provided, as nearly every safety and design decision is.

Life is not risk-free and it cannot be. We can never assure 100% safety.

[xcitation]

aguadalte

The real problem is how to avoid having a pilot with severe mental health issues operating an aircraft. By the time they are sat in the seat it is too late...

Are you suggesting a sanity cross check pre-flight?
Paramedics establish if a patient is mentally altered at a scene by confirming they are 4x4. Meaning you ask 4 basic questions and verify 4 correct answers e.g. name, todays date, who is the President, do you know where you are. Any hesitation or spurious answer helps assess the individuals state of mind.

IMHO this is flawed and far better to assume that one flight crew might become mentally altered at any time i.e. mid-flight. So you should have at least 2 people behind the security door at all times. Maybe consider putting a bathroom inside the secure cockpit area. Allowing only one person up front is clearly a single point of failure in an environment engineered for redundancy.

[fireflybob]

Quote:
ASN News » List of aircraft accidents and incidents intentionally caused by pilots

40 years: 591 dead in 11 world jet suicide events. Matched in the USA every 1 day (hospital errors) & every 6 days (gun deaths). Get a grip.
Right. But 422 of them were in the past 3 years, suggesting this is something the airlines are right to be concerned about.

And your entire premise is wrong. Imagine if the industry had adopted your "acceptable loss" / "grip-getting" attitude? Presumably an occasional mid-air collision or door falling off would simply have required some corporate manning-up rather than spending millions to develop collision warning systems and redesigning doors...?

McRotor96, not sure that logic is correct - rather than the number of deaths would not number of fatal accidents be a better comparison? 40 years ago there were not as many aircraft capable of carrying 300/400 passengers given that most of the accidents involving suicidal pilots caused the deaths of all on board.

[nsmith]

@McRotor96

For people stating that they don't like the idea of a '2 person' rule - or who are uncomfortable with the extra person being a FA. Perhaps it is worth looking at the rest of the world - specifically at the USA where that IS the rule. How many pilot killings have been on US carriers operating that rule? It seems to be zero.

The '2 person rule' is not a perfect solution - that doesn't exist - but the evidence to date suggests that it is an important, simple and inexpensive precaution that appears to be largely effective. Which is presumably why it has been implemented (in true stable-door fashion) by many carriers in the last few days.

It is seeing yet another knee-jerk reaction that worries me. You may well be correct, but I would have thought making this change and doing it correctly would require a fair amount of careful planning. Also, the huge publicity of this recent event may have caused the bad guys to see weaknesses in the system that they had not seen before.

[RatherBeFlying]

The doors have since inception constituted an opportunity for a sole person to do what he wants with the aircraft without interference.

As long as the problem of pilot suicide only manifested itself in third world airlines, we first world folks perceived ourselves safe. I still remain disappointed that the regulatory authorities took no action the first time this happened.

Human nature is such that where there is an operational weakness, somebody someday will take advantage of it.

Back in the days when Stevenson et famille were putting up lighthouses in remote locations, much thought was given to minimum crewing.

Two keepers were deemed insufficient since one keeper could quietly do in the other and claim an unfortunate accident without any witnesses to the contrary.

The lighthouse minimum crew was set at three.

As for cabin crew being up front, many are given the training to help out in case of incapacitation. What we have here is the most severe form.

As for limited hours flown, military pilots are flying fast jets with far fewer hours.

[Hunter58]

nsmith

especially the last part of your post deserves a big thumbs up. I just had some user PM me in forcefull languague because I in a previous post had suggested a complete rethink of securty procedures involving the flight deck (and I gather from some commentators that I am not alone on this) outside of the public eye.

Of course any realistic and balanced approach to any procedure in therms of security needs to be outside of the public eye. Every procedure has weaknesses and a public discussion especially in a procedure design phase only highlights them to any misbehaving party.

[number0009]

40 years ago there were no aircraft capable of carrying 300/400 passengersWe had widebody aircraft by three different manufacturers at that time.

[NigelOnDraft]

IMHO this is flawed and far better to assume that one flight crew might become mentally altered at any time i.e. mid-flight ..... Allowing only one person up front is clearly a single point of failure in an environment engineered for redundancy. But this misses the fact that even with 2 (or 5) people up front, your mentally altered person can still kill everybody.

As earlier stated, 500' on Approach, full down elevator, full power, maybe flaps up. On the Airbus, you even have the luxury of a red button to lock the other pilot's sidestick out.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Surely, if a person holds in their mind even a basic concept of the usual and customary (not even necessarily the "precise and technical") process for a proper Annex 13 investigation, there are very real concerns over the way this post-incident inquiry has been conducted. That being said, if a poster (such as the one referenced above) wishes to cast doubts upon whether the aircraft manufacturer might wish to get to a speedy conclusion, despite running roughshod over normal processes, then another question becomes a question that is fair to ask: does the configuration of the A320 Airbus type, as operated by the carrier in question, make it easier for a twisted aviator to conduct such a fatal flight profile? If there is nothing about the aircraft itself which either facilitated the fatal flight profile, or even attracted the twisted aviator into conducting it, then, what interest could the manufacturer really stand to have here, other than the insured risks which, to be blunt, are nominal. I know not even a paltry fraction enough about avionics and flight controls and the so-called magenta line to be able to answer this, but unless you can state a valid reason why the aircraft manufacturer might be called to account, again for either attracting a twisted aviator or facilitating him, in the way the flight controls and automation are arranged, there is no link between the seemingly highly irregular process conducted by the investigating authorities on the one hand, and the manufacturer on the other.

[noalign]

Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 3,550


Quote:
Quote:
ASN News » List of aircraft accidents and incidents intentionally caused by pilots

40 years: 591 dead in 11 world jet suicide events. Matched in the USA every 1 day (hospital errors) & every 6 days (gun deaths). Get a grip.
Right. But 422 of them were in the past 3 years, suggesting this is something the airlines are right to be concerned about.

And your entire premise is wrong. Imagine if the industry had adopted your "acceptable loss" / "grip-getting" attitude? Presumably an occasional mid-air collision or door falling off would simply have required some corporate manning-up rather than spending millions to develop collision warning systems and redesigning doors...?
McRotor96, not sure that logic is correct - rather than the number of deaths would not number of fatal accidents be a better comparison? 40 years ago there were no aircraft capable of carrying 300/400 passengers given that most of the accidents involving suicidal pilots caused the deaths of all on board. He mentioned both the number of deaths and events. You might also want to brush up on your history of airliners with regard to seating capacity and service entry dates.

[NigelOnDraft]

Here is my guess why it is "unusual":
BEA receive CVR 0945 day after accident
BEA Press Conference ~1630 same day by which time they are just realising what seem to have happened. Director keeps very guarded.
BEA listen to CVR, under standard conditions a few more times, and cannot alter likely conclusion
BEA, iaw ICAO (? French Law?) realise this is likely to be a "criminal act" and are forced to consult, even hand over to Police / prosecuters.
This is where it goes "wrong". The Police/prosecution chain is not as practiced or secure, and by that evening, it has leaked to the US News Chaneels which we all wake to next morning
2 plane loads of relatives arrive in MRS, Prosecuter has to brief them on findings.
Prosecuter holds news conference ~1000 to confirm earlier News Reports
We have heard, I believe, nothing from the BEA since that first Press Conference? So I suspect the whole thing is partially (or wholly?) out of their hands for now?

Anybody who knows more about police / air accident investigation protocols please chip in. 9/11 similar where FBI did most, NTSB pretty quiet.

[RTD1]

The latest story making the rounds is that he was being treated for eyesight problems.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/world/europe/pilot-andreas-lubitz-sought-treatment-for-vision-problems-before-germanwings-crash-authorities-say.html?_r=0

I wonder if this might be a key part of the puzzle.

1) Wants nothing more than to fly for a living.
2) History of depression, which he hides from employer.
3) Eyesight problems, which he can't hide from employer and which may result in loss of pilot's license.
4) Above triggers a depressive episode.

[AirScotia]

The latest story making the rounds is that he was being treated for eyesight problems.

RTD1, I posted this twice, hours ago. I certainly think it's significant.

Clearly, also, someone on this investigation is leaking like a sieve.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Sir Nigel (on-D), yes, your recitation of the events reads as quite accurate, and the inferences you draw also appear eminently reasonable and measured. Yet....can the "officialdom" apparatus of CAA and CAA-related investigatory bodies, and where involved, law enforcement & investigatory authorities, REALLY be caught this far behind the lickety-split timing of the social media era? Point is, some of this lack of proper sequencing seems largely if not almost entirely traceable back to a kind of fat, gray-suited, out-of-touch bureaucratic mentality which is essentially oblivious to the massively, I say massively shrunken time lag between event and media (including internet) deluge. I know in higher ed, and trucking - both industries in which I have done substantial legal work (hey, 18-wheelers, 18-year-old coeds, it's all the same deal, baby) - getting up to pace with the INSTANT-aneous world these days took a lot of effort. Perhaps BEA and the other authorities are being unfairly and/or accurately criticized in this post....I'll reclaim my two Indian-head pennies, if so.

[Rushed Approach]

The evidence so far may well suggest a more likely particular cause for this accident.

However, it is possible that there are other explanations. For example, suppose the engines came back to idle for no apparent reason and the aircraft went into Open Descent (a known software issue on the A300 for example, although I haven't seen it happen on the A320 yet).

Suppose the very inexperienced First Officer couldn't understand such a rare malfunction with no ECAM to guide him and this induced panic/anxiety that brought on a heart attack or stroke that left him "breathing normally" on the CVR but he could have been unable to move or speak (this is not uncommon with stroke or heart attack victims).

Meanwhile the cockpit door could have been incorrectly programmed with the emergency code and so the one the crew tried to use to enter didn't work (this has also happened). When did you last check the emergency code worked on your A320, that's if you even remember it?

Let's not forget that it's heavily in the airline's and manufacturer's interests for an accident to be blamed on incorrect or inappropriate pilot action. Yes these "holes in the cheese" are very unlikely to have lined up, but it's nevertheless possible.

It's interesting that with the commotion in the cabin, terrain warnings and then the GPWS going off and with the ground rushing towards him that he managed to breath normally whilst supposedly fully conscious despite supposedly having mental health issues.

I'm also interested in what the transponder Mode S reported to ATC - did ATC see a radar return whereby the altitude was wound down below MSA for example as the aircraft began its descent? Were ATC to be heard questioning him on the CVR as to why he was descending to such a low altitude? Or was no such lower altitude selected? Maybe he used V/S ... ?

[RTD1]

RTD1, I posted this twice, hours ago. I certainly think it's significant.

Clearly, also, someone on this investigation is leaking like a sieve.

It's definitely significant. You can hide crazy but you can't hide blind. It's also a far more likely triggering event than the breakup with his girlfriend which as far as we know might have happened last year.

[wingletflyer]

Clearly, also, someone on this investigation is leaking like a sieve.

IMHO this is the most unusual situation... If this accident would have taken place somewhere in the 3rd world countries.. I wouldn't have difficulty to accept this leakage ...
This investigation has not being conducted according to ICAO 13 and we should ask the last 2 questions:
Who is serving this information to the media and what is the purpose of it?

[mcloaked]

@Rushed approach: "It's interesting that with the commotion in the cabin, terrain warnings and then the GPWS going off and with the ground rushing towards him that he managed to breath normally whilst supposedly fully conscious despite supposedly having mental health issues."

It is possible that the copilot might have worn his headset to try to reduce ambient noise, and sit in the seat with his eyes closed blanking out external noise as much as possible and staying oblivious to sight and sounds during the descent - as part of his executed plan.

[WW I Flying Ace]

BEA, iaw ICAO (? French Law?) realise this is likely to be a "criminal act" and are forced to consult, even hand over to Police / prosecuters.I think as per French Law if an accident claiming lives takes place a criminal investigation has to be opened. The same happened e.g. when Condorde went down in Paris.

[fireflybob]

He mentioned both the number of deaths and events. You might also want to brush up on your history of airliners with regard to seating capacity and service entry dates.

noalign, yes he did mention that. To make a valid argument you would of course have to conduct a proper statistical analysis. I am not meaning to say the numbers of deaths is immaterial but I am saying that in this case the number of accidents is probably more valid.

It was my maths than caused me to infer that there were no 300/400 seater airliners 40 years ago (I was thinking 1965) but even then I think the point is valid in the sense that generally speaking airliners carry more passengers per aircraft (as aircraft performance and design has improved) now compared to a few decades ago bearing in mind most aircraft are virtually full on every flight now which was not the case years ago before the advent of budget airlines.

[DaveReidUK]

We have heard, I believe, nothing from the BEA since that first Press Conference? So I suspect the whole thing is partially (or wholly?) out of their hands for now?

Anybody who knows more about police / air accident investigation protocols please chip in.

ICAO Annex 13 does not impose any obligation on the investigating AIB to release any information prior to the Preliminary Report, which becomes due 30 days after the accident.

And, if and when it is established that the deaths and injuries sustained in an occurrence are "self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons", then it ceases to be an Annex 13 investigation.

[Rushed Approach]

It is possible that the copilot might have worn his headset to try to reduce ambient noise, and sit in the seat with his eyes closed blanking out external noise as much as possible and staying oblivious to sight and sounds during the descent - as part of his executed plan.

True, but he would still had heard the door entry requests and the EGPWS alerts (which obviously are designed not to be masked by even ANR headsets). I guess there are no stats, but how likely is it that someone committing suicide and committing mass murder can manage to breath normally whilst slamming into a mountain at c. 400 kts?

[NigelOnDraft]

Informing aviation security authorities
5.11 If, in the course of an investigation it becomes known, or it is suspected, that an act of unlawful interference was involved, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately initiate action to ensure that the aviation security authorities of the State(s) concerned are so informed.

[Machinbird]

What an appalling loss of life!

Lubitz's hiding of relevant, potentially disqualifying personal information from his employer is a violation of the trust expected of a person in a critical occupation, but is also a very human reaction to threats to their livelihood and self-image.

The implementation of two persons in the cockpit rules is a logical first step, although it is not a perfect solution, to the cockpit access problem created by the 9-11 cockpit doors.


What is needed , long term, is implementation by regulators of a Human Reliability Program regulation. These programs already exist for people who do other critical actions such as with nuclear reactors. You can get a taste of what this type of program would entail here: https://fmt.kcp.com/OSTfederalagent/Docs/HRP.pdf

The bad news is that there will be a personal cost and loss of freedom as well as program operational costs in $$. If the unions play their hands right, they should be able to at least generate some compensating pay for their members in the process of agreeing to go along.

[Ian W]

So we don't have the bandwidth for real-time recording, because that would need way too many satellites and be too expensive but we will have enough to operate the aircraft from ground stations.


That should save a dollar or two!!

There is more than enough bandwidth now to stream DFDR and probably CVR. There is intent to provide streaming video to WiFi in the aircraft to replace some IFE. Similarly, there is enough bandwidth available to provide 'optionally manned' aircraft control links. There are multiple ways of providing these high bandwidth links not all will be via SATCOM. More importantly within a decade even the high bandwidth comms in use today will look as old fashioned as telegraph using Morse code.

[Iceheart]

Are you suggesting a sanity cross check pre-flight?
Paramedics establish if a patient is mentally altered at a scene by confirming they are 4x4. Meaning you ask 4 basic questions and verify 4 correct answers e.g. name, todays date, who is the President, do you know where you are. Any hesitation or spurious answer helps assess the individuals state of mind.

If I may, let me share some of my personal experience from the entirely different point of view - namely, from the point of view of someone who's been dealing with major depression; what's more important though, four of my close friends have attempted suicide, one of them succeeding (erm). Socially vulnerable people tend to stick together, sort of.

First of all, I am not a medical professional, nowhere close, so this is entirely anecdotal evidence; yet, in all those four suicide attempts, nobody has noticed anything unusual in the person's behavior just before it happened, and I seriously doubt that any "sanity test" in the form of questionnaire, long or short, conducted by a professional, layman or paramedic, would discover the immediate trouble. In my opinion, when people are saying like "oh, his or her replies were shorter and more tense than usual, we should have known etc etc" - it's all hindsight.

Yet, at the same time, none of these unfortunate events were entirely unexpected, and I'm fairly sure that a proper psychological screening - let me emphasize "proper", that's not the 10-question self-assessment form - would reliably detect significant majority of those who're in danger of attempting suicide, sooner or later. That doesn't make them unfit to fly; nevertheless, it probably necessitates certain precautions and more frequent and thorough testing, that, it an ideal imaginary world, could be combined with a help and support program (well, a proper support program, not the one which ends with a SSRI prescription). It's never going to happen, of course - rather, the society in whole is usually more than happy to hand the gun and bullets to those who're contemplating the idea of shooting oneself, instead of offering any kind of help.

Yet again, a point I should make is that in all those cases of suicide that I happen to know, it happened when the person in question was alone. Just saying; and I don't know the exact proportion of cases when the person wasn't alone. But, judging from what I've seen, it feels to me that a 2-person rule - how inconvenient, "knee-jerk" and what else it might seem - may actually prove to be quite efficient, and it's quite possible that this measure could have prevented at least the latest tragic event that is being discussed on this thread.

[Wader2]

It is possible that the copilot might have worn his headset to try to reduce ambient noise, and sit in the seat with his eyes closed blanking out external noise as much as possible and staying oblivious to sight and sounds during the descent - as part of his executed plan.

In a word, yes. Anything is possible. He might have . . .

[Rushed Approach]

Again, we don't know all the detail of what the "sick note" says or what it means in Germany.

In the UK, a "fit note" may advise you not to work, but it is not binding on employers, who only need to take it into account according to Department of Health guidelines.

The problem is that there are two parallel medical systems running (at least that's the case in the UK) i.e. the GP/NHS system and the CAA/AME system. These systems are totally disconnected and independent, and therefore do not talk to each other unless a medical practitioner in one chooses to interrogate the other by some means. It is thus very easy to hide medical conditions from a UK airline if that is what you are intent on doing.

[Bus Driver Man]

Agreed on that one, they also need a good understanding of what goes on if they are expected to detect the unusual. Would a cabin crew member have intervened in this case when the FO dialed an altitude and pulled the knob to descend? I suggest not until too late.

A cabin crew member probably wouldn't have noticed anything unusual about changing the altitude and starting a descent with the AP on.
However, wouldn't it be suspicious if the captain tries to get back in the flight deck and the FO doesn't let him in anymore?
The emergency code? The banging on the door? No reaction from the FO?
All it takes is one crew member to open the flight deck from the inside.

Note: I'm not saying that having a cabin crew member in the flight deck is the solution for this. There will always be other ways for people with bad intentions. And with this, I don't want to imply that the cause of the crash is proven. The investigation is still ongoing.

[Ian W]

A lot of calls going up for video surveillance.

The simple truth is that video surveillance would add very little in 99.99% of investigations. Investigators can derive a remarkable amount of information from audio recordings. FD mikes are incredibly sensitive, and all other connected mikes (boom mikes on headsets etc) are usually recorded too on most modern types. And multiple mics allow for an impressive amount of conclusions to be drawn - such as exactly where on the FD sounds are coming from. Different switches, levers, controls all make slightly different noises - these can be examined in great detail and firm conclusions drawn in most cases.

To include video recording would require significant modifications - the recorders would need a huge capacity increase, likely needing a redesign, or the installation of an additional recorder. And a cheapo solution like a GoPro would be useless - the recorders are built the way they are, and installed where they are, for a purpose - crashworthiness - and assuring that purpose is NOT cheap.

Neither is the re-certification of ALL the aircraft so modified, to ensure that the mod hasn't introduced new problems with the rest of the carefully-designed aircraft systems.

In short, it will be a significant cost - for probably very little real benefit - even before we get into privacy issues.

A FAR CHEAPER option would be to hire more pilots - to take the pressure off already over-worked and stressed crews. And train them properly. And pay them better. And.... And...

And it would have done nothing to prevent what happened on this flight - and likely shed very little additional light on the eventual happenings.

The cockpit is a very simple environment for video software to compress. Only those pixels that are altered need to be sent. Therefore, for most of the time there is very little for the video to send. The compression of even moving areas is extremely efficient. Just imagine that there had been video recording of this GW incident on the same CVR memory. There would be none of this hamsterwheel debate. Now imagine if that recording had been compressed and sent as soon as ATC felt that there was a problem or the aircraft automatics felt there was a problem - say an EGPWS warning. Already ATC can tell the aircraft to send them information over ADS-C and the pilot is unaware that the contract has changed. The same could easily be done with uplink of CVR/DFDR information without the crew being aware and without them able to stop it. A compressed transmission of a few minutes of DVDR/CVR may only take seconds.

It is unfortunate, but the actions of a few have reduced the trust of the paying passengers and could result in a far more detailed recording of what is happening in the cockpit. I have no doubt that the air carrier's insurance will be interested in this level of recording too, as a self inflicted hull loss may not be insured. It may become a case of if you want aircraft operator insurance you must have this specific level of recording equipment operating in the cockpit.

[xcitation]

NOD
Quote:
IMHO this is flawed and far better to assume that one flight crew might become mentally altered at any time i.e. mid-flight ..... Allowing only one person up front is clearly a single point of failure in an environment engineered for redundancy.
But this misses the fact that even with 2 (or 5) people up front, your mentally altered person can still kill everybody.

As earlier stated, 500' on Approach, full down elevator, full power, maybe flaps up. On the Airbus, you even have the luxury of a red button to lock the other pilot's sidestick out.

You make a very good point, ultimately it is all about reducing risk. No solution is perfect. At least the sane pilot would have a fighting chance to deliver a knuckle sandwich.

[aguadalte]

xcitation: Are you suggesting a sanity cross check pre-flight?
Paramedics establish if a patient is mentally altered at a scene by confirming they are 4x4. Meaning you ask 4 basic questions and verify 4 correct answers e.g. name, todays date, who is the President, do you know where you are. Any hesitation or spurious answer helps assess the individuals state of mind.

No, I'm thinking on a more comprehensive approach in which a pilot's career could be properly monitored and on the need to amend the legislation so that our profession could be classified as a profession of rapid wear, were, for example a pilot could voluntarily step out to earlier retirement (or forced to retire in certain circumstances) without being financially prejudiced in his/her's retirement, through a pilots fund or a company's paid complement. This would, not only, take out of the skies, pilots who feel are not fit to fly, but keep working for economical reasons, would take the stress out of TRE's and medical staff, who have the duty to decide on who's fitted or not to fly, and would return the dignity that our profession has long lost!

[TheInquisitor]

I've been trying to get some perspective on this - and this is what I've come up with so far.

There have been, so far, 6 recorded incidents of pilot suicide since records began - only 3 of which have been confirmed, the others being 'most likely' / 'no other explanation' events. For the sake of argument, let's add MH370 to that to make it 7.

To get this perspective, I've been trying to get a reliable number for the total number of commercial flights made over that period - and that's been quite difficult. The best I can come up with is somewhere between 450 and 550 million since 1960. (if anybody can come up with a more authoritative number, please feel free)

All of that means that the probability, based on historical statistics, of being caught up in a pilot suicide, are somewhere between 64-78 Million-to-one.

In other words, significantly LESS probable than pretty much ANY other recorded cause of aviation 'occurrences'. In fact, you are MORE likely to be killed as a result of being hit by lightning - by a factor of at least 3.5 (chances of being killed in a lightning strike are 19 million-to-one, in the UK).

Why do I mention this?

It will be no comfort to anybody affected by this tragedy - just as any other statistics will be of any comfort to any other individual affected by an aviation (or any other) tragedy. But the clamour of 'something must be done!!!' needs to be put into context.

It remains the single LEAST likely cause of an 'occurrence' (I say 'occurrence' because it involves a deliberate act, and 'accident' wouldn't be an appropriate description) throughout the whole spectrum of causality.

Let us therefore, as an industry, not act in haste - lest we introduce even MORE unintended consequences that may turn around and bite us in the @rse sometime in the future...

[NigelOnDraft]

How many of you people fly regularly with people you don’t know?90%+ of the time I will have never met them before check-in.

At least the sane pilot would have a fighting chance to deliver a knuckle sandwich.Well yes, but being an Airbus, the initial reaction would likely be "what's it doing now... errr" :E

[prayingmantis]

Seems a lot of people are focused on the reported normal respiratory rate. Just wanted to point out some things, irrespective of what the final cause of this accident turns out to be.

1. You close your eyes and relax - you already know the outcome. You have put the plane into a gradual descent, it will not structurally fail prior to impact, & you know nothing will affect the outcome until the end. Maybe the GPWS would jar you out of your relaxed state, but.... I still think someone who knew the outcome may not become overly excited if this was their intention.

2. He's pictured on the internet, in numerous photographs, running. Was he very physically fit? Might explain a lower baseline respiratory/heart rate.

3. Person took medication. Xanax? Alcohol? Propranolol? Opiate? The list is endless. Some, while not approved for flight, may have been prescribed while he wasn't flying and being treated for his mental illness (e.g. xanax or propranolol or another anxiolytic or antidepressant). And he might have taken something random that day. I assume alcohol or some other impairment would have been noticed by the other pilot, but he could have popped a boatload of pills at some point that only took effect late in the game.

If this act was related to depression, he may have needed something to decrease his inhibition. Lots of people who commit suicide tend to do this (from my experience as a pathologist). Alcohol is usually number one, but it doesn't rule out something else. Doubtful enough tissue will be identifiable for tox, unfortunately.

Pure speculation on my part. But thought I'd offer some other possibilities for the people that are placing a lot of emphasis on the normal respiratory rate. Happy if others completely disagree (us scientists like having our theories dispelled!)

[TheInquisitor]

And, if and when it is established that the deaths and injuries sustained in an occurrence are "self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons", then it ceases to be an Annex 13 investigation.

Exactly the point I made earlier in the thread - meaning all the lawsuits ref 'early' release of CVR info may be going nowhere...

[Wader2]

Colt, civilian crews are in huge organisations compared with small air force units. They don't live in each other's pockets, socialise off duty as a general rule of even necessarily know by sight all the others.

Perhaps in the post-war golden age with navigators, radio operators, engineers, and a cabin staff, with one crew flying multiple stages then the crew would be 'constituted' . Neville Schute wrote a novel on that basis, DC6 or similar aircraft.

[Clandestino]

And, if and when it is established that the deaths and injuries sustained in an occurrence are "self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons", then it ceases to be an Annex 13 investigation.

No.

Abso:mad:lutely no!

Aviation safety investigations do not stop just because criminal investigations are running in parallel and usually interfering a lot!

All the leaks so far have come from criminal investigation and last time I checked, satisfying morbid curiosity was nowhere mentioned in BEA's agenda.

BTW, could someone please direct me to the real TM470 crash thread, I can only find 10 pages in African aviation. Surely, with amount of outrage over mass murder + suicide that has filled this thread, one could reasonably expect at least 30-40 pages of the same stuff for the basically same scenario?

[Denti]

I’m not from a commercial aviation background but I assumed that, in general, crews Flew as “a crew” and new each other?

No, it is not possible. Remember, airlines are pretty huge and the logistic problems to always crew the same together is pretty huge. I work in a pretty small airline, but we still have around 1200 pilots in 10 different bases and (currently still) three different fleets, although there is some overlap between the MFF and the pure narrowbody airbus fleet. On my old fleet i knew all the guys on my base (around 60 crews), but even then it was pretty common to fly with someone from out of base, it was the norm during simulator events. Now i'm on a new fleet and nearly every time i turn up for work i get to know someone new. That is actually a lot of fun to and probably will continue for the next two years or so, especially as crews from closed bases will be relocated to mine.

I heard from a colleague that the old GDR Interflug operated a team crewing system where small teams were crewed together, dunno how that worked out, but they had many more persons on the flightdeck to begin with.

There is a possibility via preferential bidding to bid for a certain partner, either flight deck or cabin crew and in theory those should be crewed together more than normal.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Quote:
"Exactly the point I made earlier in the thread - meaning all the lawsuits ref 'early' release of CVR info may be going nowhere..."


Technically, perhaps accurate. However. . . project your thinking back to 1944 (please) when the Chicago Convention was written. In that context, there was no such thing even imaginable as an investigation into such an accident - for that is what air crashes start out being presumed to be - proceeding to a conclusion in a handful of days. And though my historical knowledge is more gut reaction than evidence-based, I am not aware of piloted-mass murder "by" suicide having taken place, circa 1944 (excluding the Japanese suicide pilots, kamikaze - hardly the same as civil air transport). True, the pace of modern aviation has accelerated (in all senses, and there are many) greatly. But there is something very "cutting corners" or "jumping the gun" or even "premature exculpation" about the cut to the chase, it was deliberate, Annex 13 switch off. breaker down and locked, drill that has been rehearsed in the relevant jurisdiction(s).

[DaveReidUK]

Aviation safety investigations do not stop just because criminal investigations are running in parallel and usually interfering a lot!

I didn't say that the investigation would stop, only that the provisions of Annex 13 would cease to apply. And that would only happen once criminal intent had been established.

[TheInquisitor]

Agreed, WillowRun - not saying I agree with the approach, just that that's the way it's panned out here.

In an accident, there is always the alignment of the 'holes in the swiss cheese' to discover - which takes time, and painstaking sifting of all the evidence, etc.

In this case, it looks like all that needs to be known to draw reasonable conclusions is already there - plus, it seems like it wasn't an 'accident' - rather a deliberate act.

That one mere fact changes the whole philosophy of the investigation - there aren't any 'holes in the cheese' to line up. It appears to have been a singular cause, by a singular act. Thankfully, an exceptionally rare one (as per my previous post);.

[Alain67]

This investigation has not being conducted according to ICAO 13 and we should ask the last 2 questions:
Who is serving this information to the media and what is the purpose of it?
ICAO 13 cannot override a state law.
BTW, in a modern democracy, can you imagine they would answer nothing to say to the relatives when 149 persons have been killed ?
Professionals are working for their customers, the last ones are not travelling just to make the first ones enjoy their job ;-)

[funfly]

Some people with depression will consider taking their own lives, some actually do. This man may or may not have been a depressive but he was something else far worse to consider and execute a form of mass destruction.

Obviously intelligent, as he was able to conceal his malady, he would have had little difficulty in amending his plan and tactics in order to cope with whatever security features were in place.

I fear that all the protection systems in the world will fail to prevent such a madman carrying out horrendous crimes. The best protection for the rest of us must surely be an attempt to prevent such people from being in a position where they are able to carry out such action.

At any one moment there are over 5,000 aircraft in the air. Safety of systems has been addressed and to a great degree solved. The training, screening and career potential of pilots seems to have gone in a different direction with a sector of the airlines. How a business can spend £20M on an aircraft and them cut financial corners on the human element beggars belief.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Sorry, I just haven't time to read a couple of hundred posts every time I log on (I wish I had a job, at least I'd get a day off once a week !) so apologies if this has been covered, but disagree that now insisting that a F/A become the standby crew on the flight deck, to satisfy the 2 person rule, will suddenly alert bad guys to apply for the job.

Haven't F/A's always been allowed on to the flight deck, so what's new ?

Also .. "Security" will have removed the pilots nail clippers so he won't be able to defend himself against a F/A who picks up the fire axe !

[fireflybob]

Colt, civilian crews are in huge organisations compared with small air force units. They don't live in each other's pockets, socialise off duty as a general rule of even necessarily know by sight all the others.

Perhaps in the post-war golden age with navigators, radio operators, engineers, and a cabin staff, with one crew flying multiple stages then the crew would be 'constituted' . Neville Schute wrote a novel on that basis, DC6 or similar aircraft.

All true but what has changed with the budget airlines now on the scene is that night stops when crew members can socialise are a rarity. When I flew for the charter airlines in the 1980/1990s quite often you'd do a couple of night stops flying the W pattern at hotels where even crews from other flights were staying.

Compare this now with typically 5 on, 3/4 off pattern varying between earlies and lates and wanting to recover on days off and/or crew members going home from a remote base to family on days off there is also little interaction. In my experience even when there was the occasional "do" at base (e.g. Christmas) those on earlies next day could not attend, those on lates were probably too tired to turn up at circa midnight when the party was almost over and many others would be in another country spending days off with family.

Also much of the communication to/from the Company is now via email/web etc or by phone to some roster clerk the other side of the Irish Sea who you had never met.

The hectic nature of the flying with short sectors and rapid turnarounds leaves little time for getting to know your fellow crew member other than in an operating capacity.

All these factors can compound the feeling of being isolated and merely a "worker drone in the collective" encapsulated in Charles Handy's book "The Empty Raincoat".

[Air Snoop]

Annex 13 investigation does not stop because there is a criminal investigation in progress (Lockerbie in UK) but some jurisdictions make it very difficult to maintain the high standards of Annex 13 investigators and are gungho with evidence that would not be disclosed prematurely.

[fireflybob]

That one mere fact changes the whole philosophy of the investigation - there aren't any 'holes in the cheese' to line up. It appears to have been a singular cause, by a singular act. Thankfully, an exceptionally rare one (as per my previous post);.

I know what you mean but beg to disagree.

You could argue that in this case one of the holes in the swiss cheese was mandating locked cockpit doors in the first place.

[costalpilot]

couple of things seem odd to me:

1. they found an "unfit for duty" torn up note in his trash? Assuming the wording is correct, is that the kind of note a German private physician would give a patient? Does that sound right to anyone familiar with German procedure? Cause it sounds more like an excuse from an airline PR person than an actual note from a private physician. I'm talking about those specific words. Just asking.

2. 600 hrs? really? does that sound like normal time for A 320 first officer new hire at even a low cost carrier in Germany? anyone know?

3. he got a years LOA due to a medical problem in initial training? Is that right? If you couldn't hack initial training at any airline I've ever heard about, you were terminated. Are the germans different, or is the info wrong?

4. I wish folks would not assume that he did this cause he was depressed. I doubt that any reasonable mental health professional would ascribe to the theory that he did it because he was depressed. He may have well been depressed, but he was something else a lot worse than that, imo.

[Denti]

1. they found an "unfit for duty" torn up note in his trash? Assuming the wording is correct, is that the kind of note a German private physician would give a patient? Does that sound right to anyone familiar with German procedure? Cause it sounds more like an excuse from an airline PR person than an actual note from a private physician. I'm talking about those specific words. Just asking.

The real name is "Arbeitsunfähigkeitsbescheinigung" or more commonly used "Krankschreibung". The first term is pretty well translated as "unfit for duty". It just contains the start and end date of the time needed off duty, no diagnosis or anything else.

2. 600 hrs? really? does that sound like normal time for A 320 first officer new hire at even a low cost carrier in Germany? anyone know?

Yes, that would be normal for a pilot at the end of his first or in his second year on the line.

3. he got a years LOA due to a medical problem in initial training? Is that right? If you couldn't hack initial training at any airline I've ever heard about, you were terminated. Are the germans different, or is the info wrong?

Initial training is the lufthansa flight school where he was in the process of training for his Multi Pilot License (MPL). Not to be confused with initial training for airlines that hire direct entry pilots.

[Pace]

costalpilot

Here We go again ) Half the thread has been deleted already

Normally ANY person goes to their Doctor to GET a sick note to give to their employers because they feel unwell to work! They give that note to Employers and take the time off. Its unusual that a patient requesting a sick note would tear it up as that means they don't want to use it for whatever reason and the employer would not know anything about it unless the patient handed it in

600 hours is perfectly normal and could be half that for an FO his ATPL remains frozen till 1500 hours

Depressed people normally would not hurt a fly and that blanket term to cover a person who has knowingly murdered 150 people doesn't fit anymore than the young person who hates school goes to the school and mows down with a gun scores of innocent children to satisfy his anger at the school. Those who describe him with a blaket depression do a discredit to millions of people who suffer depression but are caring sensitive people who would not harm a fly only themselves! This guy was a warped monster for what he has done and in a different league to just depression. The Yorkshire ripper was a saint in comparison and he was locked up for life

[MD11Engineer]

1. they found an "unfit for duty" torn up note in his trash? Assuming the wording is correct, is that the kind of note a German private physician would give a patient? Does that sound right to anyone familiar with German procedure? Cause it sounds more like an excuse from an airline PR person than an actual note from a private physician. I'm talking about those specific words. Just asking.

This information did not come from LH's PR office, but from the Düsseldorf's prosecutor's office.

Here is the full text (in German):Die Pressemitteilung der Staatsanwaltschaft Düsseldorf im Wortlaut (http://web.de/magazine/panorama/germanwings-absturz-airbus-a320/pressemitteilung-staatsanwaltschaft-duesseldorf-wortlaut-30540810)

[Murexway]

Odysseus: Similarly, being video-monitored during flight operations may become a condition of the privilege to be an passenger airline pilot.And video monitoring of this cockpit would have done what to prevent the crash? In aviation we're not looking for video evidence to skewer someone. We're interested in changes to procedures which, hopefully, will prevent a repeat of the event.

Despite being low-tech, a second person in the cockpit to simply open the door is worth more than a thousand cameras to record video for the media afterward.

[Pace]

Despite being low-tech, a second person in the cockpit to simply open the door is worth more than a thousand cameras to record video for the media afterward

Murexway

The reason for this crash was twofold! Firstly a mentally ill pilot determined to put his name in history by murdering 150 people who were in his care.

Secondly the door system which was designed to keep terrorists out was used to keep a terror (ist ) in to do his evil deeds

The answer is not in Cabin crew but a means of the locked out pilot gaining access to the flight deck and overriding the pilot inside.

In this case it was a mentally disturbed pilot inside but also consider that while one pilot is out of the flight deck a terrorist could in a flash push in and with some knowledge stop the other crew member entering.

There has to be longterm a system of overriding a terrorist or mentally sick pilot from blocking access

[athonite]

No factor in isolation causes an accident, and this was something that Professor James Reason, of Manchester University, as one of the leading experts in Human Error always stressed including the active and latent failures that are always present in accidents, just consider the Herald of Free Enterprise, Quinteshill, Bhopal, Erebus, Piper Alpha disasters.

Fireflybob is correct to suggest that there will be more than one factor, not least the human factors consideration in having a locked flight deck door, but if you take the Reason Model (Swiss Cheese) further by considering the SHELL model, and by that I mean the interfaces that will always exist between the Liveware(pilots), Software (proceedures, SOPs), Hardware (the aircraft), and the Environment (Wx,Altitude).

Hence in this disaster:

Liveware-Liveware (No one detected that were issues with the co-pilot, for example other crew members, medical officers, and the company)

Liveware-Hardware (no means of Captain getting back into the flightdeck)

Liveware-Software (company culture, rapid turnaround, leaving am inxeperienced pilot at the controls, the need for a crew member to leave the flight deck on such a short flight, when perhaps this should have been done on the turnaround, perhaps a need to amend the SOP here).

Liveware-Environment (possibly this doesn't come into play, unless there was a loss of pressurisatiion).

This isn't a comprehensive list, just the start as facts become clear, but if any pilot seriously thinks there is only one factor in this accident, then I kindly suggest that they haven't recieved the Human Factors/CRM training they deserve.

[unworry]

managed to breath normally

Seems a lot of people are focused on the reported normal respiratory rate.

Aren't we reading too much into this?

I dont recall the original reports describing the pattern of breathing, only that the pilot was breathing. Feel free to correct me if wrong.

[NovemberYankee]

Been a pilot for 45 years and a suicide counsellor for 12 years. I offer a few pertinent facts:
1. Men are 3x more likely to take their own life than women.
2. When men kill themselves, they usually use violent methods such as firearms, hanging, jumping off a high building/bridge, crashing a car etc. Women, by contrast would much more typically take an overdose.
3. Men are notorious for hiding suicidal feelings until it is too late. Women typically wear their heart on their sleeve - anyone around them is likely to see the signs that they are becoming mentally unstable and self destructive.
Time for more women on the flight deck?

[Basil]

athonite, Are you a professional pilot? I ask because you seem to suggest that you have knowledge and wisdom which is denied to many of us.

the need for a crew member to leave the flight deck on such a short flight
What if it's a longhaul flight?

AFAIK there is no serious current or proposed means of preventing either pilot from deliberately crashing the aircraft. Would that there were.

These are extremely rare events and, correct me if I'm wrong, the first by a Western European pilot.

[Gipsy Queen]

"Some people with depression will consider taking their own lives, some actually do. This man may or may not have been a depressive but he was something else far worse to consider and execute a form of mass destruction".

This is a long thread and as I'm of a similar age to Funfly, I feel life may be too short to wade through it all - apologies if this has been raised before.

I agree, it seems probable that something more than "simple" depression applies here. I would have thought that had this fellow's clinical condition been less profoundly disturbed, it would have been both simple and convenient, since he was a member of the local flying club, to leave a note, book a spamcan for an hour and quietly disappear into the boonies. To deliberately kill all the others suggests a psychotic condition which would have been difficult to conceal, particularly in the intimacy of a flightdeck.

An obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that some amendment to patient/doctor confidentiality protocols is required to allow a doctor to alert appropriate authorities of his/her concerns in respect of mental stability. Perhaps this already exists but if so, something went horribly wrong on this occasion.

[athonite]

BASIL - since you asked ATPL/FI/IR, 32 plus types flown, in excess of twenty years experience in Aviation Human Factors, including academic research, published papers, training of crews from over twenty five countries worldwide!

I only questioned the need to leave flight decks on short haul flights, not long haul, by that I mean flights up to say three hours.

[Ozmd]

To the people saying it's not the door but it's the person: if you employ some reductionist thought process - would you disagree that opening the door could have altered the course of events from what is available as information? I am not sure it would have changed the ultimate outcome (may have been too late) but I am sure it would have changed the course of events. So the door problem needs to be addressed period.

[woodja51]

All this discussion about getting into the cockpit/ rogue pilot / 2 inside at any one time etc is fair given the current situation.

That said I have been banging away ( no pun intended) for about 5 years on the following "elephant in the room" whereby on several jet liners, those with hostile intentions do not need to even get into the flight deck to achieve their aims.

Whilst the recent events raise several issues, I cannot help think that the one here presents even more concern given the state of global politics. And now we seem to have another one starting in Yemen with ME coalition partners.

And I repeat, this is a Rumsfeld ' known unknown'. It has been elevated to those in power / authority capable of changing it - with no result as yet. Make your own mind up if it's mere sensationalism or a potential threat, yet to materialise.

http://youtu.be/mLmzvF2qkDY

[underfire]

exactly, it doesnt matter why he did it, only that it does not happen again.

[NSEU]

According to the officials searching / investigating no part of the FDR has been found. I think they know better than Pressy Holly.
Which other sources (exclude journos please) have confirmed what?

Sounds to me like the CVR and the QAR (sans media) were recovered. I don't see how the data module of the FDR could have ejected it's media (as reported by many).

[Mark R. Beacon]

Thanks Leightman 957. I honestly do not know if I would have taken the same break to leave someone I did not know or like alone on the flight deck. I hope I would have, but I am retiring soon, so I guess I will never know.

[Coagie]

Anti-depressants have been found in Lubitz's apartment. Don't know if the names will be published. In case they are, Fluoxetine Hydrochloride, called "Prozac" in the USA is called "Fluctin" in Germany as far as I know.

[Lemain]

The 'cabin crew nanny' idea does have the merit that it makes it more difficult for a pilot to do something surreptitious, or lock the door; also has a 'chum' value for someone in emotional distress. It's also harmless, zero cost and can be implemented overnight. Has to be a good first response to this tragedy.

[RatherBeFlying]

I lost a dear friend to suicide one Christmas Eve. She was cheerful and ebullient in her last weeks. Those around her had no idea.

I know others who lost dear ones to suicide. It's a devastating surprise to the families.

Far worse are the murder-suicides where children are among the victims. First responders are at risk of suicide (sometimes years later) after coming across such scenes. Any such tragedy you come across is one too many.

A number of these people were under psychiatric care. It's a hazard of the profession that some patients suicide, but the shrinks are usually caught by surprise.

Bottom line -- if the shrinks are incapable of predicting suicide, so are the aviation authorities.

[skridlov]

I posted about this on P93:
"There would seem to be a limited number of items that would qualify as a significant find at the FO's home(s). It's too soon for an analysis of the computer content and no suicide note was found.

My guess is that they've found anti-depressants. One of the main questions that doctors ask patients who are commencing a course of SSRIs (Prozac etc) is whether they are experiencing any suicidal feelings.

One of the reported side-effects of SSRIs is suicidal impulses (obviously only in a limited - but statistically significant - number of cases).

That would fit the evidence so far released.

Another poster denied that there is any evidence for this being generally the case with SSRIs however GPs are still alert to the problem as far as I'm aware.

[hawkerjet]

well, I never mentioned dispute, because the Pilots actually sign a contract when being hired and are well aware of their salary.
what I was referring to, and maybe not clear enough, was that the pilot salary in general is not very much and as a result of this low pay, the industry is losing out on potential great candidates who will look elsewhere for better paying jobs. This leaves a shortage of qualified pilots which the larger better paying airlines will select the best available leaving those that did not get on with a higher paying carrier, to settle for next best which may be a LCC.
I was hoping the readers of my post were able to understand that and use their critical thinking skills because it is quite obvious to a reasonably intelligent person that low salary alone will not cause a plane crash but is a contributing factor as additional stress...

[Bond'll Do]

The main type of suicidal ideation is one thing and often treated quite well with medication under the auscpices of an experienced GP or Psych specialist.

Most suicidal ideation is 'inwardly' expressed.....however there is a type that relates to more than just internal suicide ideation ans becomes 'exogenous' and relates to others. This type is often related of 'Schizoactive' personaily disorders and Schizophrenia-types also.

We are all prone to a possible 'psychosis' on day based on our personality issues ans lifestyle/background.

I deal with all manner of these issues daily and have done for the last 20yrs.

We can only begin to understand what went wrong in this case. I have many times advised to 'ground'/de-roster pilots for many reasons over the years.

Pilots work in a very unusual set of circumstances compared to most. Slight hypoxia at altitude, especially on longer-haul and also sometimes very limited rest periods.

[MartinAOA]

This tragic incident would probably not have happened in the first place IF there were not such nonsensical privacy law or the employment law in Germany. Under German employment law it was the responsibility of an employee to inform an employer if they were deemed unfit to work. An employer(DLH/GWI in this case) do not have the right to ask for medical information from any employee. It is their responsibility to tell their superior, to tell their employer if they are sick. Even doctors could not step in as the data would be protected. And YES, there is a motivation to lie about health issues to an employer!

[WillowRun 6-3]

This horrendous tragedy and senseless loss of life, and damage to so many utterly blameless loved ones, must, simply must become a source of motivation for all parties (individuals, organizations, States) involved in the apparatus of contemporary global civil aviation to "get cracking" and define, and solve, problems now brought into starker relief.
But beyond this truism - and I know, certainly, ICAO is a process on top of another process on top of several more - there is something else dramatically calling out for attention here. Post after post, over many dozens of pages, want to reach the subject of suicide. If the reported facts hold up, once the civil AND criminal investigations are completed, the FO did take his own life. But it is a dishonor to the memories of the crash victims and their families to contextualize the immoral conduct at issue here as a "suicide" rather than as a mass murder in which the villain also took his own life (again, based on the information to date). Even if mentally ill, which is far from known at this juncture, morality still attaches and applies.
For perspective, those who want to pontificate about suicidal impulses and actions, or even just want to discuss it, have a look at J.D. Salinger's cryptic short story, "A Perfect Day for Bananafish" - suicide is hardly the big mystery so many want to make it out to be.
I don't have any draft revised SARPs in my pocket, no I don't. But this air crash disaster is a watershed event, not quite on the scale of four aircraft turned into air-to-ground missiles, but just one, or at most two, rungs down the ladder.

[aterpster]

Some fighter airplanes have software that prevents an inadvertent crash into terrain. Not real new stuff.

Keep in mind, though, the fighter pilot does not want to die in a CFIT. He has a distracting mission though. Once he returns to base, his purpose is to make a safe approach and landing.

However, if he decides to kill himself on short final, he will succeed.

Same for any airliner.

[Lonewolf_50]

The 'industry' did not create this guy
Utter nonsense
This guy created this guy

Blaming everything but this guy
The industry
The pay
The security system
The process
Etc

This guy is solely responsible for this
Period

What is scary is pilots are trying to make excuses or transfer responsibility
To justify these actions
Very disturbing

This has happened a few times out of millions and millions of flights involving 100's of 1000's of pilots

This has nothing to do with aviation
The occupation just made it easier and more catastrophic
While I see your point, I will suggest to you that our current "culture" is morphing more and more into the "Drama Queen Culture" of the self obsessed. If one pays attention to the social pathology that plays out on social media, which I do as my wife and I had to deal with our kids being exposed to it as it exploded and they entered the wired/connected age, this C/P's acting out is a logical (and irrational at the same time) taking of cultural influences to an extreme.

I expect a right pillaging for taking this position, but being in a nation full of drama queens, some of whom I deal with in the workplace, generation X has been succeeded by what I have heard called "generation whine" and "generation Y" and "generation Why is the world so hard?"

With change in culture and tech comes cost. It is sometimes hidden, it is sometimes very obvious. Back in the 70's, a guy named Toffler called it "future shock." I suggest that those of us from previous generations may be experiencing future shock in terms of dealing with the current generation of young adults. Consider what that does to the CRM challenge?

We only share some common cultural points of reference. Those we don't is where the frustration lies ... and likewise, my father who grew up poor in the Great Depression only shares some, not all, cultural points of reference with me and my siblings.

I hate to say this, but expect more of this crap, not less, in terms of the "it's all about me" attitude and how that plays out when people get into stress conditions. I say this realizing that I don't know this guy from Adam, and could be utterly wrong about what was going on inside his head.

Flame me if you must, but I thought I'd toss this out there. My experiences with young adults in the past ten years has been strange, to say the least, in part because I can only partly identify with their concerns and world view. It isn't the same as mine was, but it is similar. It's in the differences that we can sometimes be blind to their emotional needs and motivations.

[training wheels]

After investigating the route which they took out of Barcelona, I have deduced that the airways they would have planned from LEBL to EDDL is via UN870 and UT853/T853.

The turning points along these airways, I assume are LEBL - DIBER SOSUR ROTIS MAXIR LUSOL IRMAR MOLUS PENDU IXILU GIVOR SORAL DIK ARCKY NOR - EDDL

Of course 4U 9525 never got any further than MAXIR, but it is after the waypoint ROTIS that interests me.

The track from ROTIS to MAXIR is 043. If this was infact in the FMGS flight plan, and the aircraft was in managed NAV mode for lateral navigation when it crashed, then it would have stayed on this track during its descent.

But if you look at the track from FD24, it's final track was actually 026. That is, it turned 17 degrees to the left from its assumed FMGS flight plan track, that's if the airways they intended to take is the one I have above.

This turn happened before top of descent (according to FD24 raw data published elsewhere). Wouldn't such a turn off track (pull selected mode) be consistent with memory item procedures for an emergency descent?

[Mr Optimistic]

Does it really matter? The guy took the plane into the ground using the automatics he was trained to use. We are all vulnerable to the calculated actions of those we rely on. No need to invoke spectres of evil, human beings all have weakness's.

[Floyd3593]

Have to say this but it will never happen.The best way out of this dilemma would be the return of the third pilot.

The third pilot was a "roadblock" on the route from the cockpit door to the pilots and the controls.
The inclusion of a third pilot means that there would never be less than two pilots on the flight deck.
Pilots work at 25% of their maximum capacity most of the time, 95% of capacity some of the time and on occasions, when things go wrong, at 125% of their capacity. The third pilot dropped that 125% back to 95% and made the whole operation safer.
The third pilot had a 3D view of everything the pilots were doing and what they were seeing on the instruments, a much better view than the pilots had of each other. The third pilot was often the first person to detect an incipient problem.
Somehow, having a third pilot on the flight deck moderated any opinions and actions of the two pilots, a stabilizing influence.

Incidentally the third pilot increased the number of new jokes on the flight deck by 33%:):)

Long time lurker here who joined after an incident as a pax on an old 737 operated by MAH as it came into land at KUL. This was shortly before the MH370 and I have lurked ever since, but I want to come in on Boing's post above.
As a passenger of many years standing as I'm an old fart, i've NEVER been comfortable with the 2 pilot arrangement and removal of the flight engineer. You don't need to be a pilot or psychiatrist or something to realise this, it's simply counter-intuative.
There may be some good that comes out of this tragedy, if only if it draws people's attention to the flawed idea of having a cabin attendant as a '3rd person'. How fundamentally flawed is this? So, we have all these safeguards to prevent 'terrorists' doing mischief but allow them to become cabin crew with possible access to an axe behind a single pilot's napper? It's a quick (and cheap) fix, but in my view risks / may cause a clearly discernible 'unintended consequence'. If we go down the one person in the cockpit route then in reverse order of preference it has to be: - 1) Senior flight crew / Purser only; 2) pilots able to access toilet facilities without leaving the flight deck; 3) revert to a 3 pilot flight deck. The last is by a country mile the best alternative but may be the most expensive.
I'd just like to address those posters shouting about costs and the public's demand for 'cheap' tickets. The public doesn't demand cheap tickets. (most of) the public want the cheapest fares available. Should I ever be offered the possibility of flying for a few dollars less on a plane with less stringent safety requirements I know what I would do... I'd WILLINGLY pay extra to travel with a 3 man crew up front, every time, no question.

[training wheels]

Does it really matter? The guy took the plane into the ground using the automatics he was trained to use. We are all vulnerable to the calculated actions of those we rely on. No need to invoke spectres of evil, human beings all have weakness's.

I thought this was a forum for professional pilots? If you understood the implications of what I posted, then yes it does matter.

[md80fanatic]

Very well said, thank you sir. :D

[Lonewolf_50]

training wheels, if I read your intent correctly, you are addressing the potential of a bad timing event wherein after the Captain headed to the loo, a decompression event, or a perceived one, arose that the CP felt he had to handle. And, sadly, didn't handle it too well. (Or perhaps another kind of malfunction?)

A thought to go along with this: above 25K, but not on O2 while the Captain was away.

Am I following you well enough?

FDR data might provide some insight as to whether this line of inquiry has some data points that align ... so those who are voicing frustration with all of this public discussion with no FDR data known to be available are asking a valid question: why the early conclusion?

[rantanplane]

Psychologists say since years the western society is becoming more and more narcistic and sociopathic. The Medias are celebrating these characters, either they are pop stars or politicians. I read Lubitz was obsessed with flying, beeing a pilot. So he had no escape path for his career in mind if he looses his medical?
Perhaps the treating doctors failed to see this coming problem.
I know pilots who started further education during their career just not to be dependent on their medical, business administration or technical stuff for aviation management for example. They even don't need to change their company. I remember one SAR pilot who got trained as mechanic as he loved his unit so much. Just in case he was not fit to fly.
We all have resonable choices not to create a one way dead end road with our careers, especially pilots should think that way, beeing trained to see the wider picture.

[slats11]

French authorities have set a world record for the swiftest accident investigation in the history of commercial aviation.
Who needs more than 48 hours to investigate an air crash anyway? The french authorities certainly don't think they do.


Come on. The media releases are not coming from an aviation investigation body. They are coming from a completely separate criminal investigation body.

The final 9/11 investigation took ages. No one criticised Pres Bush for describing it as a terrorist action that same day. Because it was completely clear that is what it was.

The Police would not be making such media releases on the world stage if they were not 100% confident.

Please don't underestimate the skill and competency of people from a different professional background just because it is unfamiliar to you.

Captain left the deck (so all was ok), then descent initiated, no communications from aircraft, and did not let Captain back in.

Now I guess there are possible barely conceivable alternative explanations. Maybe the copilot was hit in the head by a metor and was left unconscious but breathing, and his arm spasmed ank knocked the FD. I guess that's possible.

But all alternative explanations would be very long odds, and I guarantee all the purists "wanting all the facts" would not bet $1000 on these.

Like MH370, the facts point clearly to deliberate action. Sometimes 2 + 2 really does = 4. Sorry, but sometimes it simply does.

If recovered, the FDR will add some useful detail. But it will almost certainly be a minor edit rather than a complete rewrite of the explanation we have at the moment.

Please also put yourselves in the position of the grieving next of kin of those murdered. They want information released in a transparent manner as soon as authorities are confident in the explanation. And they are damn well entitled to it.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The problem, slats11, with your argument, is two-fold. First, in France (presumably you are aware of this, but not everyone else necessarily will be), inquiries into civil aviation accidents are much more likely to become criminal matters than in most all other countries. That is, the French regard a civil aviation accident as almost, or nearly, always, a criminal matter from the jump. What this means is that the criminal investigators are MORE, rather than less, well-acquainted with the procedures, standards, and requirements of fact-gathering and fact-finding. At the very least, the pronouncements should have included significant cautions against regarding the presently known facts as conclusive. Second, the procedures, standards and requirements established by the ICAO system do NOT countenance, I mean do NOT tolerate, a rush to judgment. Even leaving aside the fact that there are loads of individuals who do not accept official explanations of what happened on the 11th of September - and I am not defending their sanity or lack thereof - but even leaving them out of the picture, that event was of an entirely different nature. Civilians on the ground and civil society in general were attacked, as opposed to a single flight (as serious as the single flight incident is, still, very different). So statements attributed to Bush-43 do not disprove or counter-weigh against the deliberation expected of civil aviation authorities, whether conducted solely a civil inquiry or a criminal one as well. For heaven's sake, I have no idea where the FDR is or whether its data will be intact if and when it is found. But I do know if lawyers had entered this feeding frenzy in a public way - before the grisly task of recovering the remains of the victims has reached its sorrowful and morbid conclusion - howls of outrage would descend. The rush to judgment, while less outrageous, still is conduct unbecoming civil aviation authorities. And this is so EVEN IF the ultimate facts prove out to be exactly, totally exactly, as you have posited them to be. Process matters.

[rantanplane]

Communicator, the drug issue might be very relevant, though just adding to the holes or giving the final kick. As they found drugs in his home, would be interesting which one. Big danger if psychotic people are missdiagnosed with "depression" ! Recepy for disaster. Once I had a "low mood" period , I simply had a hidden infection for a longer time as it turned out later. Can't remember the drug the doc gave me " just try this boy" ...
No suicide thoughts but I felt becoming completely disconnected to the world and myself. I stopped immediately and went to a different doctor who found the real issue.

[Communicator]

As they found drugs in his home, would be interesting which one.

Not just interesting, but CRUCIAL.

... if psychotic people are missdiagnosed with "depression" ! Recipe for disaster.

The problem is MUCH worse than this - even if depression etc. is correctly diagnosed, treatment with common "anti-depressants" can lead to suicidal impulses, (more rarely) psychotic episodes, mood instability, and other phenomena. The risk is particularly high after such drugs are DISCONTINUED.

Even non-psychotropic drugs - e.g. prescription pain killers, cough syrup, etc. - can have significant psychiatric effects.

Again - sorry to hammer the point - we need to know the name of EACH AND EVERY DRUG OWNED OR USED BY the dead Germanwings FO.

[MartinAOA]

This turn happened before top of descent (according to FD24 raw data published elsewhere). Wouldn't such a turn off track (pull selected mode) be consistent with memory item procedures for an emergency descent?

They were right on the track. The crash occurred between the waypoints MAXIR and BLONA on the airway UN853 which consists of the waypoints LUSOL, BODRU, OKTET, IRMAR. Precisely it occurred between the waypoints BODRU and OKTET on the UN853, which corresponds to 025° MT. So it seems like there was not an emergency diversion.
According to the Aviation Herald the aircraft was found at approximate position N44.2705 E6.4289

[_Phoenix_]

training wheels: Wouldn't such a turn off track (pull selected mode) be consistent with memory item procedures for an emergency descent?
As per flightradar24 raw data (http://forum.flightradar24.com/threads/8650-We-have-analysed-the-raw-data-from-the-transponder-of-4U9525-and-found-some-more-dat)
Between 09:30:52 and 09:30:55 we can see that the autopilot was manually changed from 38,000 feet to 100 feet
Which is consistent with time required to turn the knob (in 1000s). Possible 4-5 turns?
But,
No, the buttons, lever that you turn. You turn several times according to how much altitude you want to lose. It's a deliberate thing. It can't be done automatically. Well, if his head was to hit it, maybe it'll move by a quarter of a turn, but it won't do anything. It won't turn it 15 times.
15 times (http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1503/26/nday.05.html) is too much. What other inputs were done?
So, there is not only a deliberate altitude change that would be just suffice.

[latetonite]

To Communicator: So much for medical confidentiality..

[Chicklets]

I'm not a pilot. I'm an epidemiologist. I had to wade in and say that the alleged association between SSRIs or other antidepressants and suicidal or violent behavior is a bit more nuanced than perhaps is being portrayed here in recent posts.


The problem is that people who seek out medical care for depression or other illnesses and are prescribed these drugs are already at a higher risk for these behaviors. To state that "In other mass murder/suicide incidents, psychotropic drugs played a role" is not quite accurate. The persons involved may or may not have taken antidepressants, but this does not mean the drugs caused the behavior. The scientific literature on the subject is complicated but overall seems to indicate that the drugs don't cause suicidal or violent actions in adults.


I hasten to add that infowars is an extremely poor site for obtaining health information. Mr. Jones likes to promote such nonsense as vaccines causing autism, etc. In addition, the TIME magazine article linked has a major flaw. In it, they report data from the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS). This is a passive reporting system that states right on the front page that none of the reports prove causality. There is quite a low standard of reporting--any consumer can send in an alleged adverse event to a drug. The good part of the FAERS system is that it's an excellent brute-force screen for adverse events that weren't picked up during FDA approval. The bad is that anything at all can be reported and subsequently misinterpreted by people, such as the author of the TIME article, who don't understand its limitations.


What does this have to do with Lubitz? I very much doubt that antidepressants caused him to deliberately fly a plane into a mountain. However, they may have caused another symptom, which caught my attention immediately--vision problems. If it's not a side effect of a drug, sudden vision problems in and of themselves, depending on their severity, might very well be cause for serious concern in a person as young as Lubitz. Of course we don't know the severity of the vision issue, but this particular symptom could be a harbinger of something far worse.

[londonman]

I'm not convinced that knowing which drugs he had will take us any further forward in terms of a definitive answer. You only have to look at the list of potential side-effects of most drugs. Not only does this list seem to be endless but also the same side-effects appear across many different types of drugs.

Sometimes the possible side-effects seem contradictory. One drug I use says 'may cause high blood pressure'....'may cause low blood pressure'!

[Chicklets]

"I'm not convinced that knowing which drugs he had will take us any further forward in terms of a definitive answer"


It also fails to provide a crucial piece of evidence: was he actually taking them? Finding the medication leads to the conclusion that he sought help for some kind of mental illness from a medical professional with prescribing abilities. Anything other than that is pure guesswork.

[janeczku]

The problem, slats11, with your argument, is two-fold. First, in France (presumably you are aware of this, but not everyone else necessarily will be), inquiries into civil aviation accidents are much more likely to become criminal matters than in most all other countries. That is, the French regard a civil aviation accident as almost, or nearly, always, a criminal matter from the jump.

Well put, WillowRun. The governing legal framework (and mentality no less) is in many aspects at odds with ICAO principles, e.g. with regard to the authority of the technical investigative body over the evidence. BEA and prosecutors have repeatedly been fighting over the FDR or CVR in the past. As recently as in the aftermath of the 2008 Air New Zealand A320 crash prosecutors interfered with the technical investigation by preventing the BEA from sending the recorder to the United States for read-outs. The BEA's authority over the accident cause determination has also repeatedly been undermined by the executive branch (e.g. when days after the 1988 A320 demonstration flight crash the French transport minister declared that technical problems of the new aircraft could be ruled out).
The fact that the executive branch now set precedence by leaking the content of the CVR to the public contrary to Annex 13 5.12 does not bolster my expectation in a proper investigation according to ICAO standards.
Undoubtedly the BEA's job has not gotten any easier, now that the executive branch has already shared their determination of the cause of accident with a world audience.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Earl.... I suffered a devastating divorce mid-career, and my Chief Pilot, knowing about it, offered me time off. I rejected the offer and asked him not to unilaterally ground me.

I explained that although my personal life was dissolving outside my control, my job, that I loved and felt totally in control of, was the only stable rock that I could relate to at the time, and to sit at home moping would be disastrous.

Consequently I continued flying and with colleagues who were sympathetic, understanding, and supportive and with whom I could relate to, who helped me through it.

I shudder to think how a bureaucratic system of shrink "experts" would have dealt with it if the C/Pilot had insisted on transparency for the sake of the gutter Press. ( X is an unknown quantity and a 'spurt' is a drip under pressure - but then you know that )

I don't think I would have been writing this 35 years later !

[PrivtPilotRadarTech]

Well put, WillowRun. The governing legal framework (and mentality no less) is in many aspects at odds with ICAO principles, e.g. with regard to the authority of the technical investigative body over the evidence. (...)
Undoubtedly the BEA's job has not gotten any easier, now that the executive branch has already shared their determination of the cause of accident with a world audience.

Yes WillowRun and Janeczku, that was well written. I just read an article in Vanity Fair by William Langewiesche, a pilot, who said much the same thing. He called the the jump to conclusion "inexplicable." I'm just a curious onlooker, so I'm pleasantly surprised to get this much information so early, but ... why? It occurs to me that if the German co-pilot is at fault, it's not the AirBus. Some people might want to get that message out as soon as possible.

[vapilot2004]

For all the ones who propagate that the two personas at all time rule in the US has never brought any problems...

Sorry, flawed argument. Until the 10th of September 2001 one could have argued that noone has ever used a commercial aircraft as a weapon and that therefore it will never happen.

The rule in the US is there as otherwise the armoured and locked door is not cerifiable, exactly because a pilot left alone with psychological problems may take advantage of the situation....



Hunter, actually two-crew cockpit procedures come out of a need to 1. identify cockpit crew for re-entry and 2. operate the door. (see my post about 11 pages back here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france-116.html#post8922592) and a more in-depth post regarding mental illness here. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/558654-airbus-a320-crashed-southern-france-115.html#post8922485))

Reason being for the procedure: not all aircraft were fitted with video surveillance equipment and magnetic door locks.

Regarding the idea of FA's suddenly becoming threats in cases of flight deck crew breaks is a little strange. These are the same crew that supply hot coffee and (sometimes) food and are routinely granted access to the flight deck. If we trust them for that job, I am not sure how sitting in the jump seat for a few minutes is going to provide much more of an opportunity for one hell bent on ill intent.

This system has worked fine in the US for over a decade. In addition, US 1st Class Medical rules and airline-imposed zero tolerance policies for mental illness or substance abuse also seem to work reasonably well- outside of the effect on the affected pilot's life via a career in ruins.

[Sergejev]

I have to agree with janeczku (http://www.pprune.org/members/330159-janeczku) and some others here that an air accident investigation should be allowed to take its course regardless how tedious it might be at times. Shooting from the hip doesn't help anyone - well it might sell news - but in the end the relatives want the truth.
Why the Marseille prosecutor was given such coverage with his verdict reached after some 48 hrs is astounding. However with such high number of causalities and so many Wikipedia aviation specialists around it is not very surprising that pressure is mounting to find someone to hang or a country to flatten like after 9/11.


Having seen aviation bodies and manufacturers lobbying over the decades for passengers to accept a certain ++ on their air tickets so that FDRs can be introduced on a wide variety of commercial aircraft it is rather more surprising that a prosecutor sees no need to see this valuable data before coming to a conclusion.
After all it took the same French authorities over two years to find the AF 447 recorder at depth. And three years to complete the investigation report. They must have been glad they did spend all that time and those millions in order find the real cause of the accident. And consequently introduce recommendations that surely will help preventing similar accidents in the future. Needless to say that even here on PPrune many had it wrong until the FDR in combination with CVR data was properly analysed.
Only then would it be OK in my opinion to unleash experts like NYT, Bild Zeitg, R Quest, P Geller and have a go at who/what ever secures the most readers, viewers or listeners: young FOs, old Capts, the gliding club, the ex girl friend, shrinks, pharma industry and of course the mosque in the next town.

[training wheels]

training wheels, if I read your intent correctly, you are addressing the potential of a bad timing event wherein after the Captain headed to the loo, a decompression event, or a perceived one, arose that the CP felt he had to handle. And, sadly, didn't handle it too well. (Or perhaps another kind of malfunction?)

A thought to go along with this: above 25K, but not on O2 while the Captain was away.

Am I following you well enough?

That is correct. An emergency descent procedure involves an immediate turn off track (in my airline, we turn 45 deg off track for two minutes and then 45 degrees in the opposite direction to parallel track) so that you don't run into another aircraft below you on the same airways.



FDR data might provide some insight as to whether this line of inquiry has some data points that align ... so those who are voicing frustration with all of this public discussion with no FDR data known to be available are asking a valid question: why the early conclusion?

Yes, agreed. We may not have the complete picture yet, although it appears the investigation is complete.

[fireflybob]

Am just interested to know whether Lubitz's training for commercial flying had been via the MPL route or not?

[Exascot]

I do not normally post on R&N and I will get ridiculed by my colleagues for doing so but I am sure that ExSp33db1rd will agree with me that with a nav and flt eng on board this would never have happened. Bring them back I say. I used to leave the three of them on the flight deck for hours on their own in the cruise with F/O contemplating the solitude of command not diving at mountains.

[Denti]

Am just interested to know whether Lubitz's training for commercial flying had been via the MPL route or not?

I assumed as much as lufthansa flight training does train for the MPL. But they switched to MPL training in 2009 (for new courses) and L started a year before that, so in all probability he did the normal CPL/IFR with ATPL credit.

[FullWings]

Regarding the idea of FA's suddenly becoming threats in cases of flight deck crew breaks is a little strange. These are the same crew that supply hot coffee and (sometimes) food and are routinely granted access to the flight deck. If we trust them for that job, I am not sure how sitting in the jump seat for a few minutes is going to provide much more of an opportunity for one hell bent on ill intent.
Some might argue that routine access to the flight deck would mostly occur when there are two pilots present. If you have a regulation that requires a non-pilot to be there at all times when there is only one pilot at the controls, you have created a situation with a higher vulnerability to a “sleeper”. There is also increased opening of the FD door in a predictable manner. If you were paranoid, you might want it the opposite way round, i.e. access to the FD is only allowed when two pilots are there.

The airlines that have the “rule of two” are either forced to do so by their regulator or are too cheap to install video surveillance and/or remote door opening so need a third party in there to check through the spy hole and open/shut the door, which a single pilot cannot do without getting up and leaving no-one flying the aeroplane for a while.

To be fair, both the rogue FA and suicidal pilot scenarios are in the extreme low probability end of the spectrum. CFIT, runway excursions, equipment failure, etc. are hugely more popular when it comes to breaking aircraft. This gets overlooked when you have a spectacular accident like the one we are discussing and you get lots of knee-jerk reactions which make the overall job of safely transporting people from A to B more difficult.

If you try and be objective, what increase in safety will you get from having a non-pilot on the FD? What is their function? If it’s to open the door against the wishes of the remaining pilot, the result of that depends entirely on which of the two has malicious intent. Even if it is the pilot who has "gone postal”, how is a non-pilot going tell the difference between that and normal/non-normal operation by SOP? And what are they going to do about it in the limited time available?

The ultimate truth is that a pilot who is determined to crash an aircraft can do so irrespective of how many people are in the cockpit and who they are. You have to trust pilots to fly the aircraft in a safe manner as there is no alternative. Where attention needs to be focussed is in making sure that those sitting at the controls are in the best possible mental state for doing their job correctly. Unfortunately, the recent trend has been for the amount of stresses, distractions and obstacles put in the way of sensible aviation to be on the increase...

[ExSp33db1rd]

Exascot .. Totally agree.

I was hired because the pilots Union - BALPA - had negotiated an agreement that there would always be a THIRD pilot on every flight deck, to sit behind the Captain and "watch" - and usually keep ones' mouth shut, unless of course one noticed something out of order, I once prevented a possible wheels-up landing, long story for another time! One was also used to tune beacons, communicate with Company, sort maps and charts etc. leaving the Captain to fly,and the co-pilot to monitor, undistracted by mundane tasks.

The management decided that the third pilot / Second Officer, had little to do in the long Atlantic cruise sector after top of climb, and the navigator had little influence in the take-off and landing phase, so why not combine the two tasks ?

It was decided that rather than train ex-W.W.II navigators to fly, most were approaching retirement anyway, it was more cost effective to employ young pilots as Second Officers ( a grateful taxpayer had taught us to fly via the RAF National Service scheme ) and teach us to navigate, then make the navigators redundant ! (Bean counters at work of course )

Still, the system worked, I and my colleagues spent some time as navigators and virtually trainee pilots, watching and learning, and although I had a commercial licence and type rating I wasn't allowed in the right hand seat for the first 3 years of my flight deck experience, and by then had over 1,000 hours "flight experience" in my logbook. ( I was occasionally allowed to sit in the left hand seat when the Captain went for a toilet break and no Astro navigation duties were required - on the strict understanding that I didn't touch anything !)

We kept our type rating qualifications valid with a 6 monthly check in the simulator, like everyone else, a little difficult when we never actually handled the beast on the line, but we were given a fleet of Chipmunks at Croydon airport to play with on demand, to keep our pilot licences and handling skills current. Eventually we became "proper" co-pilots and were suitably experienced as a result - not a 630 hour junior pilot left on our own, and of course the flight deck door was never locked.

Has the Industry improved on that system ? I doubt it, but the Bean Counters are happy.

Removing the Flt. Eng. from the flight deck was the biggest mistake. I believe that the early 757/767's were built with a F/eng position, but the launch airlines had them re-rigged as a 2 crew machine? Others will doubtless correct me.

[firefish]

I’m sorry if this has been said before, close to 130 pages of posts is simply too much to go through.

I’ve been thinking about some of the statements that there’s a security problem with the low price carriers. At first I just waved it off but maybe there’s something to it after all.

I haven’t worked for a large carrier but when I drove business jets for a charter company we were a small group of pilots, say about 20, who worked there.
Anyway, the company was downsizing so about half of us got laid off. During the few months that the soon to be-unemployed pilots flew with us who stayed the atmosphere on flight deck got a little frosty. And I think that that would have meant that it would have been harder to detect if a colleague was loosing it.
In the case of large carriers, how would a situation with constant pressure from management, a mix of pilots with different employment situations (some full time, some part time, some contract) affect the climate on flight deck?
And what are the chances that a pilot, who doesn’t feel balanced, actually turning to the company if he knows he’s nothing more than a number on a sheet of paper with an eager line of other numbers just waiting in another pile of paper for a chance of replacing him?
And I’m NOT saying that anything of this applies to GW, I know nothing about the company, but merely in general.

On a side note. During intial training the word was that the larger company, the higher security. The longer you could avoid flying with the same crew member(s) the better as it would reduce the risk of the crew establishing non-SOP routines. Maybe it’s time to rethink this – the risk of going non-standard can be thwarted by proper training but training can’t help you to know and support your colleague.

Another side note. When I flew in Russia we had to be cleared by a medic before flight. It was just a 30-second look over but it involved checking the pulse and a question or two. If something was amiss, there would be a more thorough check.
The purpose of the check was mainly to stop intoxicated pilots from flying but I heard from others that they sometimes found out other illnesses (such as heart problems).
In the GW-case I find it hard to believe that a pilot who’s mentally ill enough to do what he did wouldn’t show any physical symptoms.

[unworry]

re: why the change in heading

Scenario 2)
There is some planning ahead and Lubitz knows that he will be left alone at about that time, or he brings it about, and he had made calculations. He changes the heading and sets the desired flight level with the aim of ending up somewhere in particular. Maybe his calculations are wrong but maybe he was aiming for that valley and the perpendicular wall at the end. Apparently he knew the area from some visits.

here's the flight plan, originally posted by @HeathrowAirport (http://www.pprune.org/members/206879-heathrowairport)

(FPL-GWI18G-IS
-A320/M-SDE2E3FIRWXYZ/H
-LEBL0835
-N0426F300 DALIN UN870 DIBER/N0434F340 UN870 SOSUR/N0441F360 UN870 MAXIR UN853 BLONA/N0448F380 UN853 DIK/N0408F270 UN853 ARCKY UT853 IBESA T853 NOR T857 BIKMU BIKMU1G
-EDDL0140 EDDG
-EET/LECB0011 LFFF0100 LIMM0045 LSAS0056 EBUR0126 EDUU0125 EDVV0129 EDGG0132 REG/DAIPX PBN/B3B4C4D4O4 SEL/HLJK OPR/GWI DAT/VM DOF/150324 RVR/075 RMK/ACFT CERTIFIED NOISE STAGE 4 TCAS)

http://i60.tinypic.com/344p1cp.jpg

[rantanplane]

As far as I understand the News from Germany, there is no doubt at all for the German authorities and Lufthansa what happened and that the cause of this DELIBERATE crash is solely linked to the FO. The evidence so far is shocking obvious. The question is WHY and there is already one answer: we will never really know. But one could find answers to other questions, like has there been any chance for the FO to come out of his desperate state of mind? Have any warning signs been missed by others?

[londonman]

I'm taking the comments made by his allegedly 'ex' girlfriend with a very large pinch of salt. Methinks she is enjoying her 15 minutes of fame a tad too much.

@rantanplane. No, I disagree with the use of the word 'deliberate'. That implies intent. We do not know (nor does anyone else, for that matter, at this moment in time) whether he did this with intent and full knowledge of his actions OR if he did it while affected by (a) drug side-effects (b) some physical illness, mini-stroke whatever etc.

[Pace]

And if we ever went to single crew with more automation but an ability to over ride which there would have to be SCARY

[roulishollandais]

So the French prosecutor is saying without proof that Lubitz started the descent acting on the FMS. Was Lubitz asleeped and confused by medics or toxic fumes already happening by Germanwings ?
How is it possible that Lubitz loged only 200 hours since 2013 in German wings ? Was he really integrated in that low cost airline ?

[rantanplane]

In the GW-case I find it hard to believe that a pilot who’s mentally ill enough to do what he did wouldn’t show any physical symptoms.

History has proven that exactly the mentally ill who shows signs of mental illness don't go for the big masterpiece to end it all like Lubitz has done it. Thus , it's more about distorted personalities than mental illness.

[AmuDarya]

MONTREAL-- The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) deplores and condemns yesterday's leaking of certain elements of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) of the Germanwings flight 4U9525.

Not only do these leaks contravene the internationally agreed principles of accident investigation confidentiality set out in ICAO Annex 13, they are also a breach of trust to all those involved in the investigation and to the families of the victims. Furthermore, leaks of this nature greatly harm flight safety since they invite ill-informed speculation from the media and the general public and discourage co-operation with investigators in future accidents.

IFALPA once again stresses that the sole purpose of a CVR is to aid investigators in determining the factors leading to an accident and not to apportion blame or be used outside of its safety context. CVR details should only be publicly released following a thorough and complete investigation of the events that occurred, and not prematurely during the course of the field portion of the accident investigation, underway for less than 48 hours.

Leaking premature, unanalyzed, and partial CVR recordings, which lack the context of the entire body of factual investigative data, severely interferes with the investigative process, and can only lead to early conclusions on what exactly occurred during the time leading up to the accident. Any other use of CVR data is not only invalid, but is an unacceptable invasion of privacy best described as a search for sensationalism and voyeurism of the worst kind.

It is vital for the investigating body to ensure all information under their control is properly handled until the completion of the investigation.

In this early stage of the investigation, many critical questions remain to be answered, and IFALPA stresses the need for an objective accident investigation process through the collection of all the facts needed to draw an accurate analysis of events. Once again, IFALPA’s resources are at the disposal of the Accident Investigation Agencies to achieve these aims.

Note: The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations represents in excess of 100,000 pilots in more than 100 countries world-wide. IFALPA’s mission is to be the global voice of airline pilots, promoting the highest level of aviation safety and security world-wide and providing services, support and representation to all of its Member Associations.

[WW I Flying Ace]

So the French prosecutor is saying without proof that Lubitz started the descent acting on the FMS.As far as I can see, public prosecutor is doing what he is supposed to do: prepare a court case against suspected criminals. Whether he has sufficient proof or not is then decided in a trial.

[vapilot2004]

Fullwings: I stated in a prior post (there have been several on this issue) that the two-crew procedure for US carriers was there to mitigate a lack of both video cameras and magnetic locks on the cockpit door. I agree with you that an FA posted in the cockpit might not be a fully effective deterrent for a rogue single pilot. As others and history suggested, in some cases, neither has a fellow pilot in the next seat.

I feel the procedure is now being implemented by EU and UK airlines for two reasons (aside from new regulatory guidance) 1. no airline wants to be considered less safe than another (ticket sales) and 2. the airlines need to show some form of threat mitigation was in place in order to limit liability in case of a similar incident occurring down the road.

[PukinDog]

londonman

I'm taking the comments made by his allegedly 'ex' girlfriend with a very large pinch of salt. Methinks she is enjoying her 15 minutes of fame a tad too much.

@rantanplane. No, I disagree with the use of the word 'deliberate'. That implies intent. We do not know (nor does anyone else, for that matter, at this moment in time) whether he did this with intent and full knowledge of his actions OR if he did it while affected by (a) drug side-effects (b) some physical illness, mini-stroke whatever etc.

Do you actually know the girl in question and so have something to lend support to what you say you "methinks", or are you just assigning her an inflated penchant for attention-seeking based on your own prejudices and therefore not something you think, but merely feel? You seem completely comfortable implying what her intent is (attention-seeking and media vanity that would lead her to embellish and perhaps lie), and then in practically the same breath take to task someone about the relationship between "deliberate" and "intent" with regards to the pilot.

You can be assured that both the criminal and accident investigators are NOT going to take her statements "with a grain of salt" as you do, and will interview and pin down anyone else as well who had any interaction with this guy that might lend insight into his mindset and later actions. If there is evidence that points to this possibly being a premeditated, criminal act, it's their job to take relevant statements and facts seriously, and the are very good at separating the relevant from the attention-seekers. But they don't just blow them off based on a feeling.

[Pace]

Amudarya

You have to remember that this is not a normal accident! AAIB is Air Accident investigation not AIR Murder investigation
Most accidents are pilot error or incorrectly handled malfunctions which lead to an accident! Yes it would have been better if this had been handled in the correct way and due process but because this accident has been so emotive and the public and media have demanded answers today rather than in months to come certain parts of the investigation have been leaked which have lead to the media becoming judge jury executioner And has lead to the airlines putting in safety changes reflecting that verdict
The investigation will carry on and further detail will probably come out but don't hold your breath that there will be any announcement that Lubitz far from being a mass murderer was in fact the hero of the day trying to save a stricken aircraft single handed !! It won't happen

[FullWings]

vapilot,I feel the procedure is now being implemented by EU and UK airlines for two reasons (aside from new regulatory guidance) 1. no airline wants to be considered less safe than another (ticket sales) and 2. the airlines need to show some form of threat mitigation was in place in order to limit liability in case of a similar incident occurring down the road.
Agreed but ticket sales largely come down to price, otherwise no-one would ever fly with some carriers, given their safety records. To limit liability you’d have to show that what you did wasn’t just a PR attempt, which might prove difficult in the cold light of day.

Looking at the end result, there is no real difference between crashing into a mountainside because a pilot has decided to end it all and crashing into a mountainside because the pilots have made a mistake or a series of mistakes. People are dead and the aeroplane is in pieces. The first scenario could be avoided by looking after aircrew’s mental health better and the second by improved training, SOPs, equipment, fatigue management, etc.

[londonman]

@pukindog and blondie2005

You make fair points in that, no, I do not know her personally. However, I do have 35 years as a clinical psychologist plus I speak fluent German and so watching her interviews I do come to this opinion. I admit it is no more than that and were I to spend more time with her away from the media spotlight then I freely admit I might change my mind.

Perhaps my judgement is coloured by the incessant media babble that want to latch onto any comment - often taken out of context - with which to further hang the co-pilot out to dry when we simply don't know. It is fast becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Or a witch-hunt, if you like.

And so posts like ciderman's disappear as they are based on reading the tabloids.

[rantanplane]

From le Figaro, French newspaper.

Quelle était la cause de la dépression d'Andreas Lubitz, le copilote allemand de l'A320 de l'avion de Germanwings qui s'est crashé dans les Alpes, fortement soupçonné d'avoir fait plonger volontairement l'avion ? Selon des informations du dossier judicaire allemand, transmises aux enquêteurs français, Andreas Lubitz souffrait d'une déficience visuelle très forte, suceptible de s'aggraver. Une dégradation de la vue qui risquait fort d'obérer son avenir professionnel

Obviously he had an other big health issue to deal with, most likely terminating his career.

Lubitz was obsessed with beeing a pilot, there was nothing else in his live one can read out of the many statements made from people who knew him.

He had many choices to turn things. But he went to work, he locked the door,
he changed the settings, did not opened the door despite his captains efforts and desperate 148 other passengers behind him. He choose to die on a place he loved most, the French Alpes. He learned to fly gliders there. Now he stopped flying at this most scenic place.

From a medical point of view he might not be 'guilty', but also from a medical point he knew bloody well what he was doing. And he somehow must have been a good pretender.

[Lemain]

I'd WILLINGLY pay extra to travel with a 3 man crew up front, every time, no question. I fear you're asking for something money can't buy. There is no need for a flight engineer and in any case the no3 would have to be a type-rated/trained pilot (albeit arguably no need to be current or valid medical). How are you going to find enough suitable people who are prepared to get up early, go to bed late and sit twiddling their thumbs every day? And where would they sit? The jump seat? Why not give them a rifle and make them wear a Stetson as well? :)

[spelling_nazi]

Newsflash.

Cabin crew can enter the flight deck any time they like, currently ( with permission) one pilot ,two or more on the deck.

Your scare mongering about cabin crew hijackers is ridiculous .

[Basil]

athonite, No offence intended. Just that, those of us who've done a CRM course would cover that sort of thing, if not quite in the terms you present.

Our CRM course included FO and FE reports upon captains and vice versa. I DID, later, fly for a Far East airline which wouldn't have dreamed of permitting such lèse-majesté. I felt a little sorry for those whose self assessment was so far removed from their peer assessment to be almost laughable.
Before you ask, mine suggested a tendency towards the 'prima donna'; having had a daughter inform me that 'pilots are arrogant ****s' I considered I'd got off lightly ;)

[david1300]

Not just interesting, but CRUCIAL...

Even non-psychotropic drugs - e.g. prescription pain killers, cough syrup, etc. - can have significant psychiatric effects.

Again - sorry to hammer the point - we need to know the name of EACH AND EVERY DRUG OWNED OR USED BY the dead Germanwings FO.

With respect, "WE" need to know nothing of the sort. The investigators will know all of this and more, and will consider it in their investigation of the crash. What are you going to propose next, that passengers get a list of all medications taken by the flight crew over the previous x years so the can decide if the pilot is fit to fly?

Some posts here are worse than most, and this is one of the worst.