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weebobby
24th Mar 2015, 18:30
From AV Herald:

Radar data suggest the aircraft had reached FL380 about 3 minutes prior to leaving FL380 and descended from FL380 through FL110 in 8 minutes (average rate of descent 3375 fpm). The aircraft appeared to have levelled off at FL068 for one minute while on a northeasterly heading of 26 degrees true, mountains rise up to 8900 feet about 1nm north of the last reported aircraft position.

4468
24th Mar 2015, 18:31
As far as hypoxia, after a cabin decompression is concerned: Wouldn't it be usual to keep the a/p in for the descent, and dial 10,000 (or higher?) into the MCP? (Useful consciousness 20-30 secs?)

In which case the a/c would level at that altitude, and fly to fuel exhaustion/impact with terrain?

I accept, everything currently known seems to tally, but a significant number of possibilities are still very much in play. No doubt the talking heads on TV will be able to explain all!:rolleyes:

aviator17
24th Mar 2015, 18:31
What about a rapid developing fire and smoke? Crew started emergercy descent but unable to call ATC...

DaveReidUK
24th Mar 2015, 18:32
They will very likely find the following:
"A slower rate of speech, long delays in answering questions and slurred words are tell-tale signs of hypoxia" Very likely? That's a tad premature, given how little we know so far.

weebobby
24th Mar 2015, 18:34
a hypoxia event seems most likely to me

with the pilots managing to set the plane in a steady descent before being knocked out ?

strange that it didn't level out at 10,000 but maybe they accidentally set the level out to 6800 ?

Trackdiamond
24th Mar 2015, 18:37
Not any air accident or explosion for that matter has got to be terrorist or Islamic driven.If it was malucious terror..they would have owned up by now.if we have to speculate let us be more intelligent about it and base it on known facts...like possibly that 30 minute delay whose reason isnt being disclosed even when GW is interrogated. This is an old and highly utilized aircraft...maintenance ussues might be at work? LCCs normally operate young fleet to enable dispatch reliabity for their frequency hungry and effivient operations.Why would an airline like LH get rid of it?? But to pass it on to its subsidiary?! Perhaps they couldnt find a buyer...too old and used at 58000 hours???

aviator17
24th Mar 2015, 18:37
If A/P disengaged?

DaveReidUK
24th Mar 2015, 18:38
The aircraft appeared to have levelled off at FL068 for one minuteI wouldn't place too much credence on that, it could equally be that a minute or two elapsed without FR24 having received an altitude update, rather than the aircraft having levelled off in the meantime.

Trackdiamond
24th Mar 2015, 18:43
Surely MCC/OCC might have some clues....?

threemiles
24th Mar 2015, 18:44
The aircraft appeared to have levelled off at FL068 for one minute

This is nonsense. You must filter the FR24 data as the clocks of the different receivers are far apart and misleading. Receiver 1418 is the one with the best and cleanest data.

txl
24th Mar 2015, 18:46
German magazine "Der Spiegel" is reporting that after the accident, a number of LH and 4U crews refused to board and fly their Airbus. A couple of flights scheduled from DUS and STR have been cancelled. A LH spokesperson confirmed the there have been Germanwings crews that didn't fly "due to personal reasons".

According to the report, the crews in question had doubts that the planes were fit to fly. The A320 that crashed today had been grounded (AOG) at DUS yesterday due to a faulty nose landing door. The problem with the door had been fully adressed, Lufthansa said, so the plane was fit to fly from DUS to BCN and back today.

German flightdeck union "Cockpit" has called off any plans to strike again. A spokesperson said there are other things to talk about now.

Jet Jockey A4
24th Mar 2015, 18:50
I cannot see any sign of the initial impact where surely a hole in the ground would appear, perhaps even a major part like an engine would have been spotted.

Yet there are small debris all over both sides of a small hill going down the slopes on and down into those two small valleys.

Can someone explain this?

DaveReidUK
24th Mar 2015, 18:51
The problem with the door had been fully addressed, Lufthansa said, so the plane was fit to fly from DUS to BCN and back today.It flew a DUS/MAD rotation yesterday afternoon/evening.

Golf_Seirra
24th Mar 2015, 18:52
Looking at footage / pics what surprises me is there is no smoking hole or evidence of ground impact...I have seen C130's fly into the hillside around Kabul and leave a distinctive pattern....hell, even the AN12's & Mi-8's leave a mark...something is missing if it is CFIT related...

Dannyboy39
24th Mar 2015, 18:53
58000FH is hardly "old". Well within the A320 design life.

b8361811
24th Mar 2015, 18:53
German magazine "Der Spiegel" is reporting that after the accident, a number of LH and 4U crews refused to board and fly their Airbus. A couple of flights scheduled from DUS and STR have been cancelled. A LH spokesperson confirmed the there have been Germanwings crews that didn't fly "due to personal reasons".

According to the report, the crews in question had doubts that the planes were fit to fly. (...)

This is more of a sign how bad a magazine "Der Spiegel" has become. They just cannot imagine that such an accident and the loss of colleagues you possibly personally know can make you unfit to fly.

I have written to "Der Spiegel" and asked them to substantiate their claim or to drop this wild speculation.

R6DXB
24th Mar 2015, 18:54
leave him and forget about " Der Spiegel" as one of the last sources you can rely on.......

TheInquisitor
24th Mar 2015, 19:00
German magazine "Der Spiegel" is reporting that after the accident, a number of LH and 4U crews refused to board and fly their Airbus. A couple of flights scheduled from DUS and STR have been cancelled. A LH spokesperson confirmed the there have been Germanwings crews that didn't fly "due to personal reasons".

Absolutely the right thing to do if your mind isn't on the job at hand - such as having just learned the fate of some of your colleagues / friends. Not sure we can infer serviceability issues from this action.

Are we 'fixating' here? An awful lot of votes for a hypoxia scenario with no actual evidence of such.

Is it possible that another failure of some description lead the crew into being so busy trying to 'aviate' that they never got as far as 'navigate' or 'communicate' - hence the apparent straight-line descent and no call?

sky9
24th Mar 2015, 19:01
From 38,000 to 6000 in 8 minutes would equate to a 4,000 fpm ROD beyond the normal 2,500 at normal speeds.

The aircraft is getting on, is there any history of fuselage damage in its history; tail strikes or corrosion around the pressure bulkheads?

Easy Street
24th Mar 2015, 19:02
Absence of an impact crater isn't so surprising in mountainous terrain. There will be little or no soil covering, and clearly any cratering in solid rock is going to be much less than on flatter, soil-covered ground. Also, since the terrain is already quite rugged and craggy, the presence of a new feature would be that much harder to discern.


In-flight breakup would become apparent in the size, shape and number of debris fields. If, as the footage so far suggests, the debris field is contained and singular, in-flight breakup would appear unlikely.

busTRE
24th Mar 2015, 19:03
Could a structural failure/rupture (whether "minor" such as a baggage door or "major" such as Aloha Airlines Flight 243) cause both an interruption in communications as well as a degrading ability (hydraulics leak?) to control the aircraft? Age of aircraft and number of cycles might be a factor?

I understand fuselage cracks have been detected in A320s of this vintage, so you couldn't rule it out. But not can you rule out a whole host of other possibilities.

macdo
24th Mar 2015, 19:03
Rather depends if the fixed O2 is switched on. Has been known...

busTRE
24th Mar 2015, 19:05
Rather depends if the fixed O2 is switched on. Has been known...

Yes it has but in a slow loss the descent action should be effective well before any crew performance issue arises.

skyhighfallguy
24th Mar 2015, 19:10
Rate of descent: greater than cruise descent, but less than emergency descent (loss of pressure)


Speeds (really only ground speeds for now), are in the normal range (not too fast, not too slow).

Someone shoots pilots and crashes plane into mountain is ONE scenario.

COCKPIT Fire , loss of consciousness OR PARTIAL loss by crew after they started a descent.

everything else doesn't make sense.

A reminder, that SULLY was talking up a storm while he landed in the hudson and had less than 2 minutes in the air after engines out.

These guys had 8 minutes to do something, UNLESS they were incapacitated or PARTIALLY incapacitated either by nefarious or accidental reasons.

Bralo20
24th Mar 2015, 19:10
58000FH is hardly "old". Well within the A320 design life.

The designlife of the A320-200 is (or was?) 60.000FH and 48.000FC

An Extended Service Goal Program is available which extends the life to 120.000FH and 60.000FC but it's unclear if this plane did get this program or not. If not then it was close to the end of it's life, if so then it had a long way to go.

CargoOne
24th Mar 2015, 19:11
A320 has initial LOV/Limit of Validity 60.000 FH / 48.000 FC.
There is a certified life extension programme (ESG) which brings LOV to 120.000 FH / 60.000 FC.

I know Lufthansa did ESG on some of their aircraft but don't know about this particular one as it has not hit the original LOV yet.

In regards why this aircraft was transferred to Germanwings not sold - there is no such thing as second-hand ex LH A320 aircraft. All units either flown by LH or transferred to Germanwings/Eurowings. LH mainline still operates a bunch of 1989 production units (msn 006x/007x/008x)

MATELO
24th Mar 2015, 19:19
Quick question for the Airbus drivers..

If you select a rapid decent on the Auto-pilot (3300pm) for a emergency (decompression) would the A320 recognise over speed and deploy the spoilers accordingly to slow the aircraft down if there was no more input from the crew.

NigelOnDraft
24th Mar 2015, 19:26
Quick question for the Airbus drivers..

If you select a rapid decent on the Auto-pilot (3300pm) for a emergency (decompression) would the A320 recognise over speed and deploy the spoilers accordingly to slow the aircraft downSOP AP Mode for Decompression Descent is OP DES (FL CH for Boeing types), which is idle, and Pitch v IAS/M. By manually selecting speedbrakes, you can increase the RoD in that mode.

In case of overspeed, the protections will control the speed via pitch. I would have to remind myself what will happen if you OP DES at, say 0.8M, when IAS becomes limiting. Not sure if it switches to IAS automatically - I tried to get someone else to look at that earlier ;)

rog747
24th Mar 2015, 19:26
if the A320 had a decompression then the 'procedural thing' to do is descend to 10000' PDQ, squawk 7700 and tell ATC what is happening and what you need in terms of airspace - is that so?
but knowing these chaps knew they had Les Alpes in front of them surely they would/should have turned around to head back to safer altitudes and look at nearest diversion options ? - which were all more or less behind them

if you need to EMER descend from 38000' what is the RoD and time please you require to get to 10000' asap?
is it more or less than than the approx 3700-4000' pm @370kts this a/c took in about 8 mins to get to 7000'?

if you had a depressurisation, an engine failure, a cabin fire or
say a windscreen blown out (is that poss?) a high level birdstrike into the
windscreen (how likely could that be?) would you still stay on track and descend into the mountains?

but this a/c stayed on track more or less as flight planned and it descended below MSA sadly and fatally impacted into the mountain range not that far from the peak tops by the look of the pictures/wreckage

with no radio calls, no 7700, no turn back indicates the poor crew had something going on which was beyond them

I'm not a pilot but retired now after many years at LHR&LGW in Traffic and Ops with British Midland Airways (amongst others)

thanks

macdo
24th Mar 2015, 19:27
Use of EXP Expedite Descent button is prohibited by most operators due to the automatics inability to control the speed properly. This was quite an old bus, so probably had it fitted, but I'd be surprised if Germanwings allowed its use.
It's not really needed, as you can achieve a safe 5000fpm simply with open descent and very careful use of speedbrake. All this talk of 3500 fom being a hi speed dive is nonsense, certainly a smartish descent but the vs amber caution only come on around 5000fpm. Sorry can't remember the exact figure.

And no, the speed brakes do not automatically deploy, the aircraft protects itself from over speed with a gentle pitch up to recover the normal sped range.

mickjoebill
24th Mar 2015, 19:28
Quote:
Departure was delayed by half hour.The spokeswoman VP couldnt account for why it did when interrogated by a journalist.

An Australian journalist in London says that one of the school kids had lost/misplaced their passport and that at one point there was concern that they would not make the flight.

Potentially a cause of delay?

busTRE
24th Mar 2015, 19:32
Rather depends if the fixed O2 is switched on. Has been known...

Yes it has but in a slow loss the descent action should be effective well before any crew performance issue arises.

Interflug
24th Mar 2015, 19:33
There is no passport control flying between BCN and DUS.

bsieker
24th Mar 2015, 19:34
58000FH is hardly "old". Well within the A320 design life.

The original Design Service Goal for the A320 was 60,000 flight hours and 48,000 cycles, but there are life extension programmes. I don't know if this particular aircraft has undergone the requirements for the "Extended Service Goal".

Some information can be found here (http://www.lufthansa-technik.com/documents/100446/160376/Technik+Connection+4-2012.pdf).

jdsworld
24th Mar 2015, 19:40
Apologies if it has already been answered but why is there an apparent discrepancy in timings from the FR24 information and the timings that the media and Germanwings are saying was last contact?

FR24 had last contact at 09.41 yet Germanwings says it was 09.53?

NigelOnDraft
24th Mar 2015, 19:41
if the A320 had a decompression then the 'procedural thing' to do is descend to 10000' PDQ, squawk 7700 and tell ATC what is happening and what you need in terms of airspace - is that so?Not really. Priorities in order:
Get on Oxygen
Establish comms between the 2 pilots, confirm who is flying.
That pilot states "Emergency Descent" and actions this via MCP (Autopilot selections)
This will involve essentially a random lower Altitude and Pull to start the descent, turn & Pull Hdg to turn according to SOP (varies), select an appropriate speed
Ensure Idle thrust (autothrust, or manually if required), and select speedbrake as required by type of descent
Now refine the Autopilot settings - sensible Altitude, Hdg, Speed etc.
Now call for drill and check what you have done from ECAM drill, or QRH
In that drill will come R/T, Squawk
Some airlines / types may alter things here slightly, some pilots may shift priorities. It is not rigid.

It should not be difficult to see that if the "get on Oxy" goes wrong, life is not looking good (and not saying that happened here). It is far more important than starting the descent.

mickjoebill
24th Mar 2015, 19:41
There is no passport control flying between BCN and DUS.
Interflug is online now Report Post Reply


In reference to reports of lost/misplaced passport this is a good point, but is photo ID required on this route? And passport used as ID?

AirScotia
24th Mar 2015, 19:42
Probably not relevant, but this airframe sustained a bit of flap damage back in 2002.

http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/dvdfiles/GB/2002-07-09-UK.pdf

DjerbaDevil
24th Mar 2015, 19:48
An Australian journalist in London says that one of the school kids had lost/misplaced their passport and that at one point there was concern that they would not make the flight.

Potentially a cause of delay?

International Spanish TV news are saying that one German student had forgotten their travel documents (could be either ID or passport), which were brought to Barcelona airport by the student accommodation providor and that allowed the student group to board the aircraft.

txl
24th Mar 2015, 19:50
This is more of a sign how bad a magazine "Der Spiegel" has become. They just cannot imagine that such an accident and the loss of colleagues you possibly personally know can make you unfit to fly.

I have written to "Der Spiegel" and asked them to substantiate their claim or to drop this wild speculation.

This was probably me misinterpreting the news: It seems the crews were debating whether they were fit to fly, not the aircraft. Lost in translation. My bad.

aguadalte
24th Mar 2015, 19:53
An explosive decompression would be more in line with a lower ROD as well as with the theory of the crew being unconscious until impact.

Pure speculation, but I would incline to the theory of an uncontained structural damage leading to sudden decompression and to the crew to initiate an emergency descent (with a lower rate due to the need to not increase speed) having made the initial procedures, but failing to fine tune them, due to having lost consciousness.

Thence the lack of communication with ATC...

Blohm
24th Mar 2015, 19:57
GWI 18G

D-AIPX

ex-DLH airframe.

Well, what did you expect, it s all DLH in Germany, except Air Berlin.

Denti
24th Mar 2015, 20:03
Well, what did you expect, it s all DLH in Germany, except Air Berlin.

And TUI, Condor, Germania...

jugofpropwash
24th Mar 2015, 20:03
if you had a depressurisation, an engine failure, a cabin fire or
say a windscreen blown out (is that poss?) a high level birdstrike into the
windscreen (how likely could that be?) would you still stay on track and descend into the mountains?

Different type of aircraft, of course, and an unlikely scenario, but what about the British Airways flight that had a windscreen failure, leading the pilot to be sucked halfway out of the aircraft? Rapid depressurization, a very cold and presumably very busy co-pilot, and everything blowing around the cockpit. In such an event, it would seem that the co-pilot's O2 mask could easily become damaged or dislodged.

Airbanda
24th Mar 2015, 20:08
There is no passport control flying between BCN and DUS

So like a UK domestic flight? ID still needed which is likely to be a passport, national identity card or driving license.

In which case a pax with missing ID might be a problem, albeit solvable.

threemiles
24th Mar 2015, 20:17
So like a UK domestic flight? ID still needed which is likely to be a passport, national identity card or driving license.

In which case a pax with missing ID might be a problem, albeit solvable.

You need an ID or passport to enter the aircraft in Spain. You do not need it in Germany.

You can get past security and to the gate without ID everywhere in Europe, though, if your destination is in the Schengen area.

This combination makes it dangerous to miss your return flight just at the gate as one does not notice the missing ID on the flight ex Germany (happened to me in France and was resolved by my airline ID card after a lot of discussions only)

captplaystation
24th Mar 2015, 20:26
The (reported) total lack of communications from the crew for the entire duration of the descent is strongly suggestive of crew incapacitation.


It appears from what we know thus far that the crew have commanded the descent, and the average rate would appear to be consistent (I would imagine) with speed brakes out, or at least a speed of close to Mmo/Vmo.

I can only speak for the 737, and am led to believe A320 family is similar in the drills, so imagine (via the AFS) a random lower altitude would be initially set (just to start the descent ) with one of the follow up actions being to come back to it to set 10,000 or MSA (whichever higher) implying that, if you lost consciousness after commencing the descent, you may continue down to . . . . well, whatever altitude was set by default on the panel (could be as low as 0000)

I have heard reliable reports of a 737 flying around for a significant amount of time (lets say more than 1 day ) with the crew 02 turned off down at the bottle due to a maintenance error. It appears that the 02 expended during the mandated crew 02 tests done during this period, was not significant compared to what was left in the line between bottle/mask.

God knows how the crew(s) who flew it 2 ? 4 ? or however many sectors for however many days must have felt when they heard they operated it, with but a few seconds worth, of 02 available in the lines . . . personally, I think I would feel quite sick.

Very short odds indeed for an aircraft with a similar maintenance whoopsy to coincidentally have a decompression requiring the use of crew 02, but, that's what Murphy is for. . . . . . .

Winnerhofer
24th Mar 2015, 20:29
http://www.mediapart.fr/files/Emer_Descent.png

tubby linton
24th Mar 2015, 20:29
Nigel ,the double loop is meant to refine the original fcu selections once the aircraft is descending. The RoD achieved is half that quoted in the FCTM

Tankertrashnav
24th Mar 2015, 20:35
Apologies if this point has already been covered but do commercial pilots undergo training to experience the effects of depressurisation and hypoxia? I see from my logbook that in a seven year flying period in the RAF I underwent depressurisation training on four occasions, two by means of a simulated explosive decompression (quite dramatic) and two from the more insidious form of slow loss of oxygen. One thing that struck me was how quickly you recovered when oxygen was restored. I appreciate that loss of pressurisation drills are carried out in the Flight Sim, etc, but these dont give you the experience of what happens to your body in the event a real depressurisation

NigelOnDraft
24th Mar 2015, 20:36
The RoD achieved is half that quoted in the FCTMAgree - but that is with speedbrake, and as per FCTM is selected with care and after initial descent established. Need I say more ?

dicks-airbus
24th Mar 2015, 20:38
Germanwings-Crews in Düsseldorf und Stuttgart verweigern Start - SPIEGEL ONLINE (http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/germanwings-crews-in-duesseldorf-und-stuttgart-verweigern-start-a-1025378.html)

In it (about half way) there is mention that the aircraft was grounded in DUS in AOG mode due to a problem with the "Nose Landing Door". Surely did not cause the CFIT.

Interflug
24th Mar 2015, 20:41
http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2015/0324/TV-20150324-1827-1001.webm.h264.mp4

and in HD
http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2015/0324/TV-20150324-1827-1001.webxl.h264.mp4

Video of the crash site from helicopter.

macdo
24th Mar 2015, 20:44
Re decompression training.
This is all done in the course of a normal LPC/OPC as part of a three year training cycle. Often incorporated into a LOFt exercise. Not many civil pilots will have experienced the stuff that the military do, unless previously in the forces.

uncle_maxwell
24th Mar 2015, 20:52
I would speculate that decompression issue in the climb (with crew incapacitated) is inconsistent with the A/C going into descent shortly after reaching CRZ ALT.
It would have stayed in CRZ ALT or selected ALT until out of fuel if I am not mistaken (see Helios).

Somewhere in the press it mentioned that A/C had come out of maintenance on Monday. If this is not significant then it might at least be noteworthy.

FL380 is pretty close to FL390 which is the standard max. service ceiling for A320. What's the UTC? A few seconds?

log0008
24th Mar 2015, 20:53
Another tragedy in our sky's.

I think the strangest thing about all the major accidents over the last 13 months have occurred at cruise level, what has always been seen as the safest part of flight

RatherBeFlying
24th Mar 2015, 20:54
The condition of the remains will be a serious challenge and it's much harder when children are involved:(

Many of those involved in the recovery of SR111 needed counseling. I hope the French authorities will ensure help is made available to the recovery Crews.

Significant debris has collected in the drainage channels implying initial impact on the rock face above.

Interrogator
24th Mar 2015, 20:55
The maintenance on monday might have just been a daily check.... the C check maintenance has been disclosed already. I would not get caught up on the 'coming out of maintenance' scenario

Pontius Navigator
24th Mar 2015, 20:56
Having done drills, not in the chamber, fitting a mask to a headset it was not easy or particularly quick. One question would be how often and when such drills were practised.

Then the question of pre-flight checks. Do the pilots test for flow every leg?

ernst_mulder
24th Mar 2015, 20:58
Can anyone help me (non pilot, sorry) explain why the plane's (ground)speed didn't increase even though it was descending with almost 4000 fpm?

Interrogator
24th Mar 2015, 21:01
There is a test button on each of the masks where a yellow/white ball can be seen in the test window can be seen during the test..... coupled with this the oxygen pressure of the bottle can be seen on the ECAM

OFBSLF
24th Mar 2015, 21:05
Can anyone help me (non pilot, sorry) explain why the plane's (ground)speed didn't increase even though it was descending with almost 4000 fpm?

Airbrakes.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/3/39/Air_Brake_A320.JPG/1197px-Air_Brake_A320.JPG

uncle_maxwell
24th Mar 2015, 21:05
Mathematically speaking, with everything else being equal (IAS, wind etc.) the G/S should decrease when going into descent. As most descents are at a relatively small angle though (3-5 deg FPA?) the difference should be small.

Frosch
24th Mar 2015, 21:06
There were some references to the flight-crew oxygen system status in previous posts.

In my company we had incidents where the shutoff-valve of the replacement oxygen bottle was not fully opened by maintenance after installation - just enough to give a correct gauge readout.

And it took several crews / flights until the first correctly done system check detected that fault by observing the decreasing supply-pressure.

dicks-airbus
24th Mar 2015, 21:07
@MatrixMan: That incident was 4000fpm from FL31 to FL27. This is from FL38 to FL06 + CFIT. Why was the crew not able to recover during this decent phase?

Lufthansa mentioned all Airbus in service are latest software, procedures and AoA probes - according to latest safety bulletin.

aguadalte
24th Mar 2015, 21:08
An emergency descent following a decompression with structural damage must be done in speed mode, i.e., the pilot changes from Mach to speed in order not to accelerate the aircraft during descent.

The rate of descent is therefore much lesser than when done at MMO.

An emergency descent caused by a catastrophic event is a brutal event and exposes the pilots (and passengers) for a longer time to hipoxy especially if masks are not properly don.

We normally train the emergency descent to be done in two steps/loops: the first thing to do is to turn and pull the altitude selector to a lower altitude, then the heading, the speed knob and the speed-brakes.

This is done having in mind the need to start an immediate descent not loosing time with details (what altitude? What heading? What speed?)

Only on the next loop we fine-tune those parameters.

They may have failed to terminate the second loop, due to having lost consciousness.

ZeBedie
24th Mar 2015, 21:08
While the door in and of itself might not be in a pressurized area - if it were to come loose, could it have ripped the skin of the aircraft, and could that rip have extended into a pressurized area? Alternately, if the door came off entirely, could it have hit and damaged another part of the aircraft?

Yes, it could, but I'm not aware of any precedent, on any aircraft type. Also, top of climb is not when you'd expect it to happen - peak TAS was earlier, in the climb.

Interrogator
24th Mar 2015, 21:10
agree this could be possible.........we have a duplicate inspection in our company when we replace crew oxygen cylinders to ensure fully open isolation valve

captplaystation
24th Mar 2015, 21:11
Tankertrashnav, Post#310 (at this moment)

In response to your query, I know of no airline/aviation authority that offers or mandates that eye opening training for its flight crew. $ $ $ as usual.

GreyhoundMUC
24th Mar 2015, 21:13
What does surprises me is that so far, by following the thread, the possibility of incapacitation due to toxic fumes on the flight deck hasn't been considered or discussed.
I am -only- cabin crew, but as such flying the skies for two decades, so I do have some insight.

Fact is this:

http://avherald.com/h?article=434e753b/0019

was an A319 though, but nevertheless a very serious incident!

SLFplatine
24th Mar 2015, 21:14
Per French interior minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, the plane’s cockpit voice recorder has been recovered. The data recorder has yet to be recovered.

In the experience of one Olivier Ferrante, a former crash investigator for the French government who now advises the European Commission in Brussels the eight minute descent, if verified, would be inconsistent with a mid-air upset scenario (such as AF447).

While the crash occurred in a remote mountainous area unreachable by land the French had a helicopter overhead shortly after 11 a.m. (local time) and cable dropped onto the crash scene two officers from the specialized mountain police force and a doctor.

Avfloat
24th Mar 2015, 21:14
@Navcant, Lots of people have been on the ground at the site, lowered from helicopters. They certainly could have hauled up a recorder, just as they presumably hauled up the personnel on the ground.

Whether the orange box was the FDR or CVR is unclear, although some coverage has suggested it's the CVR.

LASJayhawk
24th Mar 2015, 21:19
Speed question
Can anyone help me (non pilot, sorry) explain why the plane's (ground)speed didn't increase even though it was descending with almost 4000 fpm?


If you are flying level you fly 4 miles to cover 4 miles of ground. In climb or descent you have to fly more than 4 miles to cover 4 miles of ground.

So if you ground speed is the same (ignoring wind) you have higher airspeed in the climb or descent to maintain the same ground speed

rafacub
24th Mar 2015, 21:21
I'm curious about the aircraft Take Off Weight. It seems to me that FL 380 is quite a high flight level for an initial climb.
Anybody knows the maximum altitude at ISA +20?

Pontius Navigator
24th Mar 2015, 21:25
CNN is reporting that helicopters have been unable to land at the crash site, yet they've recovered the FDR?

Sounds almost impossible to me.

Apart from winches, helicopters have been known to hover perhaps with one wheel touching, they are amazingly versatile.

DrPhillipa
24th Mar 2015, 21:25
No news or hints of ECAM or other relevant ACARS messages so far. Would decompression not scream some alarm?

mach411
24th Mar 2015, 21:27
I had another look at this data which was posted earlier:

http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2015/03/rapid%20descent.jpg

It shows that the descent phase started immediately after the completion of a heading change. Also, there is a vertical speed anomaly in the data that coincides with the start of the heading change.

I have read that this turn to 26 degrees heading was part of the flight plan, is that correct? Seems like quite a coincidence that the chain of events would start at the exact same time as the turn. Can anyone speculate how they might be connected?

CDG1
24th Mar 2015, 21:30
This is a paraglider video with an approach to Mt. Tromas (crash site) from South. Y

You may imagine the tragic last seconds of the flight and the cul-de-sac the aircraft entered too low.

from minute 3.35 on:

https://vimeo.com/32227267

busTRE
24th Mar 2015, 21:31
If you are flying level you fly 4 miles to cover 4 miles of ground. In climb or descent you have to fly more than 4 miles to cover 4 miles of ground.

So if you ground speed is the same (ignoring wind) you have higher airspeed in the climb or descent to maintain the same ground speed

Clearly from a non pilot.

Temperature, pressure and thus density altitude all have a big effect in the airspeed/groundspeed relationship. At typical flight angles (even quite large ones) the angular differential is negligible and the above answer does not accurately respond to the question.

ZeBedie
24th Mar 2015, 21:31
I'm curious about the aircraft Take Off Weight. It seems to me that FL 380 is quite a high flight level for an initial climb.
Anybody knows the maximum altitude at ISA +20?

As of 18:00 today, the temperature was ISA -4. With a short flying time and 30 empty seats FL380 doesn't seem unreasonable. And anyway, an upset due weight/alt/temp would not have lost more than, perhaps 10 000'.

jugofpropwash
24th Mar 2015, 21:34
For those who say that it should be possible for pilots to don their masks in less than 5 seconds... How about in the event of a windscreen failure? Now you're trying to get that mask on with a massive headwind hitting you, extreme cold, everything blowing around the cockpit, possibly things frosting up from the temperature change... Even assuming that the mask isn't ripped out of your hand by the decompression, I don't think that anyone is going to get one on in 5 seconds.

HeathrowAirport
24th Mar 2015, 21:34
(FPL-GWI18G-IS
-A320/M-SDE2E3FIRWXYZ/H
-LEBL0835
-N0426F300 DALIN UN870 DIBER/N0434F340 UN870 SOSUR/N0441F360 UN870 MAXIR UN853 BLONA/N0448F380 UN853 DIK/N0408F270 UN853 ARCKY UT853 IBESA T853 NOR T857 BIKMU BIKMU1G
-EDDL0140 EDDG
-EET/LECB0011 LFFF0100 LIMM0045 LSAS0056 EBUR0126 EDUU0125 EDVV0129 EDGG0132 REG/DAIPX PBN/B3B4C4D4O4 SEL/HLJK OPR/GWI DAT/VM DOF/150324 RVR/075 RMK/ACFT CERTIFIED NOISE STAGE 4 TCAS)

http://i60.tinypic.com/344p1cp.jpg

http://i57.tinypic.com/1ok6f7.jpg

silverstrata
24th Mar 2015, 21:35
Can anyone help me (non pilot, sorry) explain why the plane's (ground)speed didn't increase even though it was descending with almost 4000 fpm?
LAS jayhawk:

If you are flying level you fly 4 miles to cover 4 miles of ground. In climb or descent you have to fly more than 4 miles to cover 4 miles of ground.


Lasjayhawk. If you don't fly, please don't post.

In answer to the previous, once you are on an IAS descent (say from 30,000'), the TAS reduces with altitude.
At a steady 295 kt IAS, the TAS reduces from 460 kts at 30,000' down to 340 kts at 10,000'.
This reduction is (ground) speed is normal, and sort of indicates that the aircraft was following a normal Mach-then-IAS descent profile.

IAS .... indicated air speed
TAS ... true air speed (sort of a ground speed).

HamishMcBush
24th Mar 2015, 21:35
Surely ATC would be trying to contact the aircraft once they noticed the descent from FL380? If aviate/navigate/communicate was in play then travelling with no deviation from path, fairly steady ROD/Speed and no radio contact is pretty strange. I have not seen/heard any information about ATC trying to make contact. Very sad news and hopefully the investigating parties will release details from the CVR/FDR quickly to stop the more extreme speculation.

Reports that ATC had tried to make contact numerous times, and with no response had initiated the scrambling of a military jet to investigate

OzSync
24th Mar 2015, 21:36
Question for Airbus pilots:

In a Boeing, a single big spin of the altitude window to initiate a descent from cruise altitude would never spin anywhere near 10000, let alone below. You end up needing to wind it down once established in your emergency descent.

Is this same for Airbus?

(Just thinking of the incapacitation issue)

Aeromar27
24th Mar 2015, 21:44
You can select it to do 100ft per click or 1000ft per click.

Torque2
24th Mar 2015, 21:45
In the Boeing you only have selections in hundreds of feet on the altitude select?
On the Airbus you can have hundreds OR thousands selected so a quick spin can do just that.

Transsonic2000
24th Mar 2015, 21:46
Well, the first thing which came into to my mind when I heard that the Airbus crashed after a high rate of descend from cruising altitude, was the crash of Air France Flight 447 back 2009, due to frozen pitot tubes/sensors. This seems to be still an issue, a Lufthansa crew reported a similar issue with an Airbus a few month ago. However since the crew was able to recover the aircraft and prevent a crash it wasn't reported on the mainstream media/news.

Air France Flight 447 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447)

Narrow Runway
24th Mar 2015, 21:46
The A320 altitude selector has a toggle switch, that allows the pilot to select altitude in either 1000 feet or 100 feet amounts.

In most flight phases, it is positioned to 1000 foot selection mode.

aguadalte
24th Mar 2015, 21:46
GreyhoundMUC, you may have a point there. I agree that fumes intoxication could also be a cause for this crash, although with fumes and in a VHF environment, a mayday call would have been more probable.

Lonewolf_50
24th Mar 2015, 21:51
Transsonic2000, the profiles are significantly dissimilar.
The AF 447 descended in a stall while this flight displays a ground track and speed indicating descent in forward flight nowhere near a stall airspeed.

Founder
24th Mar 2015, 21:58
Normally the altitude selector is set for 1000 ft scale over FL100 so once you turn and pull it it'll initiate a descent. The aircraft will go into Open Descent mode which basically means it'll keep a fixed IAS/Mach and descend with engines in idle.

The procedure calls for increasing speed and thus creating a high rate of descent and also using spd brakes if needed and if possible.

If they for some reason selected FL90 or similar and then became incapacitated they would have descended with a fairly fixed ROD to that level and afterwards the aircraft would have leveled off keeping the same speed...

fastjet45
24th Mar 2015, 22:02
Originally Posted by jugofpropwash View Post
For those who say that it should be possible for pilots to don their masks in less than 5 seconds... How about in the event of a windscreen failure? Now you're trying to get that mask on with a massive headwind hitting you, extreme cold, everything blowing around the cockpit, possibly things frosting up from the temperature change... Even assuming that the mask isn't ripped out of your hand by the decompression, I don't think that anyone is going to get one on in 5 seconds.


PN
True, but if that were the case the aircraft would not have descended.


Is the Airbus fitted with ADM ? in which case a descent would have been initiated

RatherBeFlying
24th Mar 2015, 22:02
Let me correct my initial surmise that the initial impact was the rock face above. It looks more like the crest of the spur.

There seems little vegetation in large dark grey area where the spilled fuel was apparently consumed.

PassengerDan
24th Mar 2015, 22:05
German news tonight reported that several Germanwings flights later cancelled because the crews refused to fly. Apparently they were not happy with the state of the aircraft. The plane that went down today is said to have been delayed due to a technical reason (not reported which) yesterday.

anashimmy
24th Mar 2015, 22:12
I think the hypothesis of an explosive decompression in witch the pilots did the first steps and somehow didn't put the masks or the masks didn't work is the more plausible.

The first rough procedures in case of emergency descend, after putting the masks on is:
- ALT turn (descend) and PULL
- HDG turn and PULL
- SPD PULL
(followed by speedbreaks and refinement of the knobs)

It would justify the steady descend and speed. But why didn't the heading change? And while the PF did this, the PNF should be setting 7700 and calling Mayday. Something more must've happened...

SAMPUBLIUS
24th Mar 2015, 22:16
CNN is reporting that helicopters have been unable to land at the crash site, yet they've recovered the FDR?

Sounds almost impossible to me.

Uhhh ever hear of a harness and cable used for search and rescue ? works both ways :8

dicks-airbus
24th Mar 2015, 22:17
@Company_Man: see posts earlier. Just some minor issue it was grounded for. No need to speculate wildly.

neilki
24th Mar 2015, 22:18
Allow me a moments speculation with a purpose: Crew incapacitation after depressurization.
Airbus hypothesis of the late '70s was that machinery was able to provide 'protections' that would help avoid aerodynamic stalls and other 'edge of the envelope' flight conditions. These protections have undoubtedly contributed to the industry wide massive increase in safety we've enjoyed.
Today the Aircraft (a bunch of related, communicating systems) 'knows' the cabin is rapidly climbing, the crew hasn't touched anything on the MCP for many seconds, perhaps the Master Warning hasn't been acknowledged.
It also knows where the Terrain is, what the MSA is, and the direction to lower terrain. It's capable of maintaining a safe flying speed if thrust is set to idle (spoilers.. not yet in the FBW logic?)
My point is, extending the established protections this year we could create a "Hypoxia" protection where the aircraft could fly itself if necessary with an unconscious crew to a safe altitude, equalize the cabin and fly away from terrain conflicts. All without having to reach up and kill 2 ADIRUs..

PassengerDan
24th Mar 2015, 22:24
I have a question for those in the know;

Why with this accident, is the aircraft so destroyed, the debris so small? Yet other accidents, where the aircraft came down from crusing altitude (MH17, Lockerbie).. was the wreckage much larger and recognisable?

Although I am not in the know, the answer seems fairly obvious - it slammed into the mountain at high velocity, according to various graphs posted in this thread which show a severe drop in altitude but almost no drop in speed.

Lost in Saigon
24th Mar 2015, 22:25
I have a question for those in the know;

Why with this accident, is the aircraft so destroyed, the debris so small? Yet other accidents, where the aircraft came down from crusing altitude (MH17, Lockerbie).. was the wreckage much larger and recognisable?

Those aircraft broke up in flight which results in low speed impact with the ground. This aircraft impacted in one piece at high speed.

AlphaZuluRomeo
24th Mar 2015, 22:25
I think the strangest thing about all the major accidents over the last 13 months have occurred at cruise level, what has always been seen as the safest part of flight
Ahem... all of them, really?
16 crashes over the last 13 months as per AVH.
7 events initiated during cruise (including one A/C shot down)
9 events initiated during T/O, Climb, Approach or Landing

PassengerDan
24th Mar 2015, 22:26
Re crew unhappy with state of the aircraft - I heard this reported on the main news programme (Tagesschau), not Spiegel Online.

ACMS
24th Mar 2015, 22:27
I've said it on page 4 and I'll say it again:-

Normal electrical power appears to have been working as the transponder and associated ADSB was on
No emergency 7700 set
No Mayday call
374 kts GS at impact suggests around 330 Kts IAS
3,500 fpm descent indicates an open descent with speedbrakes.

So, a decompression event occurred at FL380, the crew started the Aircraft down but then somehow ( Oxy system failed, injured etc ) became incapacitated and the Aircraft continued until it flew into the ground.

INeedTheFull90
24th Mar 2015, 22:30
At a time when more flights are flown than ever before I don't see any increase in hypoxia related airline incidents. We've had Helios and Payne Stewart. That's about it. Kalitta had a near hit with a 747 a good few years back. Hypoxia is still the cause of very few accidents.

Squawk_ident
24th Mar 2015, 22:31
The FPL published by Heathrowairport is consistent with the track on FR24.
It is interesting to observe the track on FR24 when the aircraft reaches the French coast. At that time the traffic is not important and I believe that the ATC gave a direct course as a shortcut. A classical way of control. The plane was on the UN870 between ROTIS and MAXIR at 380 and has likely received a direct course to OKTET or IRMAR (44.80 6.79 ). This is the latest waypoint of the French FIR. The direct course is a 25 degree course. If you draw a line from the position where the aircraft initiated a left turn you can easily see that. This track is exactly the one that brought the aircraft to the crash site. Shortly after initiating this left turn the aircraft started to descent but kept its initial heading until the end of the flight.

neilki
24th Mar 2015, 22:33
@INeedTheFull90 in the US we've had several high profile GA accidents attributed to Hypoxia in the last 12 months. It's getting attention from the FAA. GA manufacturers are implementing Hypoxia/Auto Descent modes..

arc-en-ciel
24th Mar 2015, 22:36
A double AoA blocked probes ? OEB RED in place at the moment on this ...

par2005
24th Mar 2015, 22:38
I have not seen this mentioned before, so I'll just throw it out here

in 2010 there was an incident involving airbus 319, germanwings airlines.

On 19 December 2010 the Airbus A319 coming from Vienna, Austria, was on
approach to Köln/Bonn Airport, Germany. Turning on to the base leg the two pilots
noticed an abnormal smell. A short time later during intercept of the extended centre
line, both pilots noticed an adverse effect on their physical and cognitive
performance. They donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency. The Pilot in
Command (PIC) remained able to steer the airplane. The co-pilot felt he could no
longer perform his tasks in the cockpit without restrictions. After the landing and
having reached the parking position, both pilots sought medical treatment. Whereas
the PIC could resume his duties after four days, the co-pilot remained unfit to fly until
10 July 2011. The technical inspection of the aircraft did not reveal any indication of a
technical malfunction.

http://www.bfu-web.de/EN/Publications/Investigation%20Report/2010/Report_10_5X018_A319_Koeln-Bonn_Smell.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

ACMS
24th Mar 2015, 22:39
No, there is a work around fix for that problem if it happens.
The crew would have had ample opportunity to call ATC with the problem if it was AOA induced descent.
The fact that not one word was said for 8 mins of high speed descent or 7700 set clearly means the crew were incapacitated.

fastjet45
24th Mar 2015, 22:46
ACMS
The fact that not one word was said for 8 mins of high speed descent


Not quite true they may have transmitted, in that area at that altitude they would have been talking with an en-route freq, maybe Swiss or Bordeaux, if they had to descend quickly then once below approx. 20000" radio contact on that freq would have been lost.

ACMS
24th Mar 2015, 22:48
Really, ever heard of 121.5 not only that there would be a lot of other Aircraft on the same frequency that would hear and respond if required.

All Airbus crew are very very familiar with the proceedure to switch of 2 ADR's if the AOA problem occurs. They would have achieved this very quickly and regained control quickly, also the weather was ok and they climbed normally to FL380. So I can safely tell you that icing on a AOA probe WAS NOT THE CAUSE.

costalpilot
24th Mar 2015, 22:53
6 major cruise "events" including crashes in the last 13 months--not counting bombs or shoot downs?

you've got my attention.


.....7 events initiated during cruise (including one A/C shot down)
9 events initiated during T/O, Climb, Approach or Landing......acc to AZR......

marie paire
24th Mar 2015, 22:55
That's the scenario that would better fit the known sequence of events. But it is unthinkable.
Or is it?

AirScotia
24th Mar 2015, 23:01
The FPL published by Heathrowairport is consistent with the track on FR24.
It is interesting to observe the track on FR24 when the aircraft reaches the French coast. At that time the traffic is not important and I believe that the ATC gave a direct course as a shortcut. A classical way of control. The plane was on the UN870 between ROTIS and MAXIR at 380 and has likely received a direct course to OKTET or IRMAR (44.80 6.79 ). This is the latest waypoint of the French FIR. The direct course is a 25 degree course. If you draw a line from the position where the aircraft initiated a left turn you can easily see that. This track is exactly the one that brought the aircraft to the crash site. Shortly after initiating this left turn the aircraft started to descent but kept its initial heading until the end of the flight.

Squawk, I may be reading these numbers wrong, but from the data posted today: http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2015/03/rapid%20descent.jpg, it looks to me as if the plane changed heading from roughly 25 degrees to roughly 43, almost as soon as it reached FL380. As in, it turned right.

Am I interpreting these numbers wrongly?

fastjet45
24th Mar 2015, 23:06
The type I fly with ADM automatically turns the aircraft 90 degs left during an ADM not continuing in a straight line, in fact it does this.

The aircraft turns 90° left
Auto Throttle will auto-engage if required and reduce thrust to IDLE
Descend at a speed of 10 kts. less than Vmo/Mmo
15,000 ft. is placed in altitude preselect
“ADM” is annunciated in the center of the FMA panel
Upon reaching 15,000 ft., the aircraft maintains 250 kts.
ADM remains active until autopilot is disengaged

TripleBravo
24th Mar 2015, 23:06
I heard this reported on the main news programme (Tagesschau)
Copied that. Spiegel just had it first, I think. Yeah, and when journalists don't know any background... it's their job to say something, so they say / write / blurb.... "something"...

As well the coverage about some computer mishap of an A321 last year which was reported to have been recovered just seconds from desaster last year.... actually they had several MINUTES to go and stopped the event while still being above 20'000 feet.

The more you know about real facts in this business and compare it with the mainstream media - the more you mistrust the media. Happened to me.

HamishMcBush
24th Mar 2015, 23:06
Iced pitot tubes and similarity to AF447: that happened in the dark and bad weather, with suspicion of disorientation and those on flight deck not sure of AoA or AoD with respect to mother earth. This has happened in broad daylight, good weather and a nice range of mountains in clear view from the cockpit window. I can't believe that icing or incorrect pitot readings etc brought about the sad end of this flight

wes_wall
24th Mar 2015, 23:08
The USA news stations are reporting that the CVR was recovered. Others report the FDR recovered. Anyone know which is correct?
Thanks

MarkerInbound
24th Mar 2015, 23:09
Kalitta had a near hit with a 747 a good few years back.


It was a Lear. If it's "Kalitta" it's 135. "Connie" is the 121 operation.

AirScotia
24th Mar 2015, 23:12
Squawk, I may be reading these numbers wrong, but from the data posted today: http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/defau...%20descent.jpg, it looks to me as if the plane changed heading from roughly 25 degrees to roughly 43, almost as soon as it reached FL380. As in, it turned right.

Am I interpreting these numbers wrongly?

Although, now that I study the FR24 playback, it does suggest 42 degrees followed by 26. The numbers apparently came from planefinder.net. Can't both be right, can they?

training wheels
24th Mar 2015, 23:14
Looking at this VIDEO (https://youtu.be/0icN6OSMG2c) it seems more difficult to access the crew 02 masks than I was expecting, if crew only have seconds before blacking out at 38k - 40k ft might not be too good?

They're are designed to be donned with the one hand and it barely takes two seconds to put on if you're not wearing sun glasses. Removal of sunglasses first may add an extra second.

vapilot2004
24th Mar 2015, 23:15
If the data provided here (http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2015/03/rapid%20descent.jpg) is accurate, it suggests the aircraft was under manual control. The V/S and A/S fluctuations are not consistent with George's typical finesse.

Why no voice comms? If the quick don O2 masks were required, it could be the crew missed switching on the mikes - so while they may have been keying there would have been little or no voice transmitted, since their hot boom mikes would be hanging about or on the floor.

dmba
24th Mar 2015, 23:16
What is the significance of some crew not flying on later flights?
This, to me, sounds completely abnormal and against protocol...am I wrong?

Feathered
24th Mar 2015, 23:17
It was a Lear. If it's "Kalitta" it's 135. "Connie" is the 121 operation.


Kalitta Air (http://www.kalittaair.com/)is an FAR 121 Air Carrier and a leading provider of air cargo transportation, offering both scheduled and chartered transportation services worldwide. The company’s 22 Boeing 747 freighters have been used to transport cargo ranging from delicate medical equipment to heavy machinery to livestock to U.S. mail.

Des Dimona
24th Mar 2015, 23:19
What seems undisputed:

Aircraft stayed roughly on the same track until impact
Small impact footprint containing all of the aircraft = no in-flight breakup
FL 380 until impact about 8 minutes
No distress call or ATC 7700 from the flight crew
If the AP was not on, there would very probably have been noticeable heading and speed changes during the descent.
If the AP was ON, the aircraft was in NORMAL LAW.
I think that no crew contact is the most disturbing question.

TripleBravo
24th Mar 2015, 23:20
some crew not flying on later flights?
If you would mind to read a bit before... I already answered this with emotions. It's humans. To fly with an absent mind is a serious safety risk.

M.Mouse
24th Mar 2015, 23:21
If the quick don O2 masks were required, it could be the crew missed switching on the mikes - so while they may have been keying there would have been little or no voice transmitted, since their hot boom mikes would be hanging about or on the floor.

Your profile alleges you are an ATPL holder rated on the B737. In which case your speculation is odd in that you clearly have no idea how the oxygen mask microphone is activated.

BuzzBox
24th Mar 2015, 23:21
If the quick don O2 masks were required, it could be the crew missed switching on the mikes

Er, no....

The quick donning masks have an integral microphone that is 'switched on' automatically when the mask is removed from the storage box.

INeedTheFull90
24th Mar 2015, 23:24
All crew must be fit to fly to operate. They are obliged to ensure they are safe. If the are under emotion stress then the must call 'unfit' or similar. This is very different from 'refusing to fly' on a plane just because another example of the type has crashed. Some airlines may disallow crew from refusing to fly and details of this will be in their disaster handling procedures however crew calling unfit is completely different.

dmba
24th Mar 2015, 23:27
If you would mind to read a bit before... I already answered this with emotions. It's humans. To fly with an absent mind is a serious safety risk.


Sorry about that.

Well...does this usually happen, I don't remember seeing anything about it with Malaysia Airlines, TAM, Air France etc.

Edit:
OK, INeedTheFull90...good explanation

INeedTheFull90
24th Mar 2015, 23:31
That would be a significant development in events if a piece were found close to Marseille and would be coincident with the start of the descent. I can't see any tweets or news. May I ask where you heard this?

athonite
24th Mar 2015, 23:33
MIXTURE you have a point, perhaps PPRUNE should only allow professional pilots, engineers, air traffic controllers, and human factors specialists on here, I fall into two of these groups.

In previous post, oddly a captain from EXC (fireflybob) who I flew with many years ago with gave a very cogent explanation on the oxygen systems, for those who are pilots and PAX.

And various other pilots, have put forward good practice as to the pre flight procedures in relation checking equipment in relation to decompression and briefing to all occupants of the flight deck.

I say this, as a jump seat occupant, from my days with EXC, i was always encouraged to to check my mask and supply. About 14 airlines later on a flight from Accra to Lagos via Benin, DC9, I checked my emergency supply, preflight, and the pipe had completely perished, so I say thanks to fireflybob as he stressed the importance of checking emergency oxygen as SNY before flight.

DrPhillipa
24th Mar 2015, 23:38
A couple of eye witnesses saying that the engines didn't sound normal

Normal would be sailing by at FL380, a fast descent at 3-3500 fpm would sound different even to me.

NSEU
24th Mar 2015, 23:39
Your profile alleges you are an ATPL holder rated on the B737. In which case your speculation is odd in that you clearly have no idea how the oxygen mask microphone is activated.

@MMouse

Do the older 737s have auto switching? I only ask this because the classic 747 did not. Let's not jump to conclusions just yet, even though "VA" is a standard abbreviation for "Virtual Airlines" amongst flight simmers :E

INeedTheFull90
24th Mar 2015, 23:41
It is at this time that posts get a little crazy. As day one draws to a close with little facts known it will become awash with crazy ideas, notions and theories will become more sensational overnight. Who knows what I will wake upto tomorrow!

Let's keep it restrained and respectful and remember that the families and friends as well as the scaremongering press will be reading this page ready to take anything said out of context to feed their agenda.

Thoughts are with all of those involved. I can't imagine what they are gong through.

slip and turn
24th Mar 2015, 23:45
Slip and Turn. All very valid points that you makeApparently not valid enough as they seemed to have been culled almost instantaneously! :O

Incidentally, that incident report I linked to (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4688583/ao-2012-103_final.pdf) was about other A320 aircrew who overlooked the correct mode to adequately distance themselves and the machinery from terrain while they were busy ...

pythagoras
24th Mar 2015, 23:48
Pythagoras
That would be a significant development in events if a piece were found close to Marseille and would be coincident with the start of the descent. I can't see any tweets or news. May I ask where you heard this?


I was speaking hypothetically - I haven't heard anything to that effect. I should have said "I wonder if there will be a report of part of an aircraft found in a field east of Marseille..."

Apologies for confusion

Old Boeing Driver
24th Mar 2015, 23:48
Does anyone know if the masks in this airplane were full face masks with eye protection and if they are at 100% O2 when donned?

PrivtPilotRadarTech
25th Mar 2015, 00:02
Like many of you I'm interested in what experts have to say (why I read PPRUNE), but we rarely get that in the news. I like this guy. Some quotes:
"It's pure speculation at this point. Much of the early news reporting after an accident turns out not to be correct." Awesome!

"... even speculate on what caused the accident is very premature at this point." Mind blowing!

"Boeing pilots, like me, generally aren't particularly fond of Airbus. Airbus pilots generally like them." Telling it like it is!

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/pilot-flew-obama-weighs-airbus-a320-crash-article-1.2161077

Hippy
25th Mar 2015, 00:04
I may be reading these numbers wrong, but from the data posted today: http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2015/03/rapid%20descent.jpg, it looks to me as if the plane changed heading from roughly 25 degrees to roughly 43, almost as soon as it reached FL380. As in, it turned right.

Am I interpreting these numbers wrongly?

Yes, you're reading them back to front, try reading from the bottom up.

vapilot2004
25th Mar 2015, 00:04
Your profile alleges you are an ATPL holder rated on the B737. In which case your speculation is odd in that you clearly have no idea how the oxygen mask microphone is activated.

Given the age of the A320, I thought the aircraft would not have microphone auto select on their masks. Our older 37's did not. And M, no offence taken.

Do the older 737s have auto switching? I only ask this because the classic 747 did not. Let's not jump to conclusions just yet, even though "VA" is a standard abbreviation for "Virtual Airlines" amongst flight simmers

VA is also a standard abbreviation for an American state and former colony, NSEU, but I suppose with you being from another former colony far, far away, the thought hadn't occurred to you.

Old Boeing Driver
25th Mar 2015, 00:05
I was just asking a question.

Not all planes flying, even today, have the full face masks or 100% set when needed.

I just don't have an A/B experience and thought i would ask.

Pitot Heat
25th Mar 2015, 00:07
Wageslave - I think Helios 522 May have set some precedents on crew/pax incapacitation. If the GermanWings crew didn't manage to don their oxygen quickly enough, during a rapid de-compression event after starting their descent as an example - that could lead to the strange events leading up to the crash. Wild speculation of course - but seems to be the best fit at this present time.

Bleve
25th Mar 2015, 00:12
... what is the MSA for the crash site?

The Jepp Grid MORAs are:

Descent point: 6 100
Mid Descent: 10 600
Crash Site: 15 800
Highest on FP: 18 200

B-HKD
25th Mar 2015, 00:13
Lufthansa is big on monitoring the fleet real time via ACARS, as are many other operators these days. AF447 sent out quite a few messages regarding the individual failures.

AirScotia
25th Mar 2015, 00:13
Yes, you're reading them back to front, try reading from the bottom up.

Thanks, Hippy. That makes sense. In default of a timestamp, I should have looked at the latitude reading. Doh.

Run-and-break
25th Mar 2015, 00:30
Whilst doing a quick search on some previous Germanwings incidents, I came across this report summary, interesting read, different airframe and I hope not a related incident but my heart did sink a little whilst reading it:

The German BFU released their preliminary report in German stating, that both flight crew became partially incapacitated within seconds following a strong burning electrical smell on base leg and during intercept of the localizer. The captain's oxygen level in his blood fell substantially below 80%, the first officer's oxygen level below 80% (normal value 95-98%). The first officer was on sick leave for 6 months following the event.

The flight had been delayed due to heavy snowfall in Cologne. The aircraft finally departed Vienna with a delay of 3 hours, the flight was uneventful until the aircraft turned onto the left base leg for Cologne's runway 14L when both flight crew smelled a strong electrical burning odour. Upon query the purser reported no smell in the cabin. The odour seemed to subside after a brief moment.

While the aircraft turned to intercept the localizer the first officer reported he felt seriously sick close to vomiting (German "kotzübel"), he smelled a strong electrical sweet odour and would don his oxygen mask. Alerted by that remark the captain noticed his legs and arms were tickling, his senses were literally vanishing and his sight abruptly reduced to a tunnel view. He too donned his oxygen mask. The first officer needed two attempts to don his oxygen masks. After both flight crew had donned their oxygen masks, the captain improved slightly, while the first officer's condition continued to deteriorate.

The captain (35, ATPL, 7,864 hours total, 3,107 on type) instructed the first officer (26, CPL, 720 hours total, 472 hours on type) to advise approach they would immediately contact tower and to declare Mayday on tower. While the first officer was communicating with tower declaring emergency and reporting strong smell in the cockpit the tower instructed an aircraft ahead of the A319 to go around, the aircraft established on the glide path, the captain, pilot flying, selected flaps 1 himself and disengaged the autopilot now flying manually. The aircraft was flying too fast (around 220 KIAS), the captain therefore deployed spoilers, instructed the first officer therefore to lower the gear and later to select flaps 2.

At that point the first officer felt overwhelmed, he could no longer overview the scenario, could no longer process the arriving information and had difficulty to focus on single aspects of the scenario. The captain felt that while manually flying the aircraft he was at the upper limit of what he was capable to do in his bad bodily shape.

After the crew managed to configure the aircraft for landing, the aircraft was still too fast, the captain decided that a go-around was not possible and thus cancelled the stability criteria (gate at 1000 feet), their only option was to put the aircraft down as quickly as possible.

The first officer described the time between 1800 feet and touchdown as an eternity, he was however able to recognize that the aircraft had reached and was maintaining correct approach speed and realized they had not worked the landing checklist. He thus processed the landing checklist which required all his efforts, it was difficult to process the checklist, it was difficult to concentrate and think.

Both pilots reported that just prior to landing they perceived their situation as surreal and like in a dream.

The aircraft touched down on the runway, the automatic brakes slowed the aircraft to about 40 knots, the captain subsequently applied manual brakes, the aircraft began to skid, the captain however managed to slow the aircraft to taxi speed and vacate the runway via taxiway A3. He then joined taxiway A and handed controls to the first officer to be able to talk to emergency services. The first officer totally focussed on steering the aircraft that he did not get anything that happened around him.

The captain in the meantime was talking to emergency services, tower did not want them taxi to the gate but to a remote stand away from the buildings, following that decision the captain took over again and taxied the aircraft to the stand. Shortly before arriving on stand the first officer noticed they had not yet run the after landing checklist, the checklist was now executed. After reaching the stand and applying park brake both crew realised the APU had not yet been started, the APU was started.

The first officer wanted to open his side window, but needed three attempts to do so. After the window was open he removed his oxygen masks, but immediately noticed the acrid smell again and donned his oxygen mask again.

Emergency services subsequently entered the cockpit, the first officer needed assistance to get off the aircraft, while the captain remained in the cockpit until all passengers had disembarked. Emergency services measured oxygen levels in the blood of both pilots and found the captain substantially below 80% (at about 70%) and the first officer below 80%, paramedics commented both pilots were close to faint.

The BFU stated the events in the cockpit remained unnoticed in the cabin until after landing.

Following landing the aircraft was checked by airline maintenance who identified de-icing fluid as source of the smell. The technicians reported that they could clearly detect the odour even 15 minutes after landing. Maintenance replaced cooling fans for cockpit instrumentation, no pollution was detected. The engines were checked, washed and ground run with no findings, the flight crew oxygen supply and masks replaced, and a 45 minutes test flight undertaken with no odours, the aircraft was thus returned to service on Dec 20th 2010.

A C-Check 13 months later also did not identify any possible causes of the smell.

The BFU reported that their initial information received from emergency services had been smoke in the cockpit, both pilots were treated in ambulances, it was suspected they were suffering from smoke poisoning. Subsequently the airline told the BFU, that there had been no smoke but only smell, maintenance had identified de-icing fluid as cause of the smell, the crew had been released from hospital, the crew did not suffer from any poisoning. Following that information the BFU decided to not open an investigation.

Only a year later the BFU received additional information which prompted the BFU to open an investigation.

The BFU reported that medical services at the airport already measured the blood oxygen levels of both pilots and found the values below and well below 80%. Both pilots were subsequently taken to a hospital for further diagnosis. During the drive to the hospital one pilot recovered to the point where he commented he could clearly think again. After two hours in the hospital both pilots were discharged without blood analysis.

The first officer went to the hospital again the following day for a detailed analysis of his health condition. A blood analysis detected two conspicuous values in the area of clinical chemistry, the first officer was not fit for duty for 6 months.

The BFU did not release any safety recommendations so far.

In a similiar event involving the very same Germanwings A319 the Irish AAIU concluded "The probable cause of the adverse symptoms reported by the aircraft crew and some passengers could not be determined", see Accident: Germanwings A319 at Dublin on May 27th 2008, pressurization problems.

Two more aircraft had similiar issues within 8 days prior to this accident, see Incident: Germanwings A319 at Cologne on Dec 11th 2010, smoke in cockpit and Incident: Germanwings A319 near Cologne on Dec 16th 2010, smell of smoke.

Full report is available on the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation - Here (http://www.bfu-web.de/EN/Publications/Investigation%20Report/2010/Report_10_5X018_A319_Koeln-Bonn_Smell.pdf?__blob=publicationFile)

LASJayhawk
25th Mar 2015, 00:36
As I remember the -200's that JANET flew did not have automatic switching. My NG737 school stuff from the mid 2000's all shows manual OXY/Boom switching as well, but a lot of the school was geared around BBJ1's.

So I would presume that it was either an option, or introduced after I went to the avionics school.

TheInquisitor
25th Mar 2015, 00:36
Were any means of communications available to 150 people over 8 minutes I suggest someone would have got a message through. Yet they did not.

That assumes they were aware of something seriously amiss that would warrant sending such a message. Although the descent was steeper than usual, (about 500-600 ft/nm?) it doesn't appear to have exactly been a screaming dive - and the onset appeared to be quite smooth.

(Caveat the above with the fact that I'm using the FR24 data which may contain inaccuracies)

Having had cause to don an oxy mask in anger in the distant past, I found that it could be done well within the oft-quoted TUC figures, even when taken by surprise.

skyhighfallguy
25th Mar 2015, 00:38
Dear OLD BOEING DRIVER:

Your question was valid. The response by the one poster was horrid. It seems to be deleted by now. Another post by PORTVALE was polite and answered the question.

I would not expect someone who flys for one airline to know what is used at another airline. BUT I DO EXPECT REASONABLE QUESTIONS asked nicely to be answered and not shot down.

IF someone has flown 4 different types of jets, and not happened to fly an airbus 320 owned by germanwings, it is a fine question.

We have fleets of planes, some have FULL FACE MASK, others have oxygen masks and goggles. ( I prefer the masks and goggles).

IF one pilot left the flight deck for any reason and the OTHER pilot was not on oxygen and something happened, OOOPS, BAM.

It is easier to go on oxygen with just a mask. What are the european regulations about oxygen and one pilot leaving cockpit?

Old Boeing Driver
25th Mar 2015, 00:43
Thanks for your response. We can all learn something from each other.

And, thanks to Portvale too.

TheInquisitor
25th Mar 2015, 01:03
Is it possible that, for some reason, they didn't know they were descending?

Possible? Maybe... distraction / pre-occupation with an unrelated problem is not unheard of, and well documented (Everglades) - but one would think unlikely in this day and age - especially with modern bells 'n whistles.

But both pilots simply overcome by hypoxia so quickly also seems unlikely, on the face of it.

M100S2
25th Mar 2015, 01:04
"In default of a timestamp, I should have looked at the latitude reading" @AirScotia - the 'mtime' column in that graphic is the time stamp (unix format seconds since 00:00:00 1st Jan 1970) converters are available online

Yaw String
25th Mar 2015, 01:06
Regarding the discourse on crew oxygen....My preflight oxygen system check was given more time and attention,after an experience,in Havana.
The crew oxygen had been changed,at European base,before previous transatlantic flight. The valve on the crew oxygen bottle,not accessible to crew in flight,had not been reopened!
Needless to say,had there been a decompression on the previous flight,the pilots would have been rendered unconscious...

Old Boeing Driver
25th Mar 2015, 01:07
The reason behind my question about the full face masks was relating to pilot incapacitation due to smoke or fumes in the cockpit, causing eye irritation or temporary blindness.

They may have been on O2, but unable to see anything and trying to get to a lower altitude. Maybe pretty busy along that time, as well.

I think someone a few pages back touched on this concept

EDML
25th Mar 2015, 01:44
When looking at the V/S values derived from the FR24 data we will need to take into account that this data is not recorded in a way that allows to have accurate data to derive a precise sink rate from the recorded Mode-S data.


Neither the time stamps / intervals nor the resolution is up to that task. Therefore you can see a fluctuation on the V/S data that might not be there.


The track on the other hand clearly shows that the plane was on A/P.

Turbine D
25th Mar 2015, 01:53
skyhighfallguy,

I would like to know which model engine is on this bus. But gee, because I have never been employed by germanwings, I would look dumb asking, right?

No, not really, the engines on this A-320 are CFM56-5…

freespeed2
25th Mar 2015, 02:01
Having done the hyperbaric chamber training previously I have a few observations that we were told during the course.

Many are using the term "explosive decompression". We were advised that this term is incorrect; if you have had an explosion then that is a totally different problem. The term used is "rapid decompression" (note the title of the training video in post #224). This is defined as a total loss of pressure in less than approx. 14 seconds. The time used in the definition is based on the length of time it takes for oxygenated blood to circulate around the body and return to the lungs for replenishment with oxygen.

Secondly, most O2 masks are set by default to diluter demand. If the masks are donned in an unpressurised aircraft at FL380 they will not provide sufficient O2 for the crew as there is insufficient partial pressure to breathe. The mask must be switched to the emergency setting (unless A320 has a different system) to provide ram air O2 to enable breathing. If this was not known or done by the crew then the mask would be of little use.

While useful consciousness at FL380 is 12-14 seconds these figures are based on being aclimatised at that altitude. In a rapid decompression that time can be reduced to as little as 4-5 seconds due to the effects of numerous physiological effects such as 'The bends'.

Not speculating on the cause, just observations on others' speculation.

Bleve
25th Mar 2015, 02:11
A question for the A320 drivers: When descending through the Transition Level does the altimeter sub-scale setting automatically change from QNE to QNH or do you have to manually change it?

The reason I ask is that The Aviation Herald is reporting that: 'Radar data suggest the aircraft ... appeared to have leveled off at FL068 for one minute [prior to impact]'. The Grid Mora at the point the aircraft commenced descent is 6100. This suggests to me that the crew had set 7000 as a level off altitude for an emergency descent. 7000 is the Grid Mora at the descent point rounded up to the nearest 1000 and the difference between FL068/7000 could be due to the QNE/QNH difference.

This is consistent with the Rapid Depressurisation / Pilot Incapacitation scenario. The crew had enough time to wind down the altitude selector to 7000 and establish a descent, but subsequently became incapacitated before completing the rest of their emergency procedures. The aircraft descended on autopilot to 7000.

I can anticipate someone asking why didn't they set a higher altitude given that they were flying towards high terrain? Well at the point they descended they were very near the coast so high terrain was not an immediate issue. If depressurisation was the problem, then the immediate priorities are get on oxygen, establish comms with the other pilot and initiate an emergency descent. Setting the current MSA (6100 rounded up to 7000) is conceivable. I know, I know ... a lot of you will say just spin it down to anything, or anything but not below 10 000. But maybe in the stress of the moment 7000 was what was in their minds and that's what they first set. After the descent is established then you carry out the rest of the emergency descent procedures (declaring an emergency to ATC, adjusting the descent altitude, turning away from high terrain etc). Since none of these second phase procedures were performed, it would appear they've become incapacitated after the descent was initiated.

log0008
25th Mar 2015, 02:28
I was just wondering, for those that understand the A320, is there anyway a rapid decompression could prevent the aircraft's radios from working?

freespeed2
25th Mar 2015, 02:32
Your second point is not relevant in regards to A320 and most modern jet crew crew oxy masks, whereby the mask regulator supplies the appropriate oxy dilution or 100% automatically (NORMAL position).

It is relevant since 100% O2 still will not supply the O2 at sufficient pressure to assist breathing. 'Normal' is a mix of O2 and cabin air, '100%' is all O2, 'EMER' is O2 forced out of the mask under pressure to inflate the lungs at high altitude.

It is not a matter of the percentage quantity of O2 being delivered. It is the fact that the lungs cannot inflate to inhale the O2 with the reduced partial pressure at that altitude. I've flown GIV for 10 years. It has the standard 'modern jet' crew mask.

Your comment highlights my point about the masks that was pointed out to us during the course; most pilots think 100% will prevent hypoxia at high altitude. It won't.

JSmithDTV
25th Mar 2015, 02:39
@daz211

I can't understand how an aircraft can descend so dramatically over 8 minutes with out ATC asking why or the pilot contacting ATC stating why.

ATC tried to contact them when they noticed the unauthorised altitude change... they didn't respond so an emergency was declared.

The pilots were likely unconscious and/or incapacitated by this stage...

"We have obtained copies of the contact between the control tower and the pilots of the plane. These show there was no contact with the plane after it started losing altitude and when the air traffic controllers tried to contact it there was no response."

http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/mar/24/germanwings-airbus-a320-crashes-in-french-alps-live-updates

Homebrew1
25th Mar 2015, 02:58
Freespeed2,

I've never heard of 100% being an issue for well executed emergency descent. If sustained unpressurezed flight at those levels, then yes 100% may not provide sufficient O2 for life.

You would hope that once you'd recognised the ECAM, donned mask, established comm, announced emergency descent, flicked the seatbelt sign on, and initiated the descent, the aircraft would be approaching the mid 20's within 2 1/2 mins and the 100% would have been enough to get you there without hypoxia setting in.

The primary function of the 'Emergency' setting as far as I know is for keeping the mask free of smoke. I'm certainly open to others opinions on this? Do I need to use 'Emergency' O2 at FL380???

physicus
25th Mar 2015, 02:59
@freespeed2, your comment regarding marginal O2 partial pressure at FL380 is entirely correct. I think the official limit is FL400 for positive pressure breathing apparatus requirements. However, the TUC comment isn't: the 12-15 seconds at FL380 is not for an "acclimatised" body. If it was acclimatised, decompression wouldn't be a problem... get it? ;-)

It rather depends on what it is you're doing (physical activity), and on your physical predisposition. Oddly enough whether you're fat or lean makes no difference, there are other factors at play, many not well known to aviation/mountaineering medicine.

The point is, 15 seconds is a very short time if you're caught by surprise, and there's no time to debug a problem if there is one, e.g. an insufficiently opened O2 bottle valve (not that pilots could do anything about that anyway), or flow regulators in the wrong position etc. You simply don't get a second chance.

RatherBeFlying
25th Mar 2015, 03:12
What the flight path shows is consistent with the O2 bottle being shut off leaving enough O2 to initiate descent, then the pilots go incapacitated.

The high altitude chamber films show pilots recovering to a walking, talking state quickly after getting the mask back on - - after maybe half a minute without.

After several minutes of high altitude hypoxia, you will not suddenly regain your piloting ability when below 14,000.

Case in point: An Argentinian glider pilot woke up in a field with the glider missing the wing outer panels after being sucked up into a CB. He had no memory between the time he pulled the dive brakes and when he woke back up.

My O2 system will run down sharpish if I forget to open the bottle, but it will show up on the flowmeter before I get very high.

Before the quick donning masks, one pilot was required to be wearing a mask and breathing with it above 30,000 or so . A closed bottle would be quickly apparent and an RTB would be initiated if it could not be turned on in the air.

Today crews are betting their lives and those of the pax that mx has opened the bottle if there's a depressurisation.

Helios lost that bet and we may be looking at a repeat.

skyhighfallguy
25th Mar 2015, 03:12
turbine d, thanks, cfm 56

old boeing...I understand exactly what you are getting at.


another poster, yaw string, indicated he checked his oxygen in havana after the inbound crew HAD NOT and found the valve OFF.

I've seen this too, esp after servicing. I am of the habit to make DARN SURE the oxygen system will work at 100 percent EMERGENCY and blow my lungs up and sound like the movie 2001 space odyssey .

this might have been part of the problem and I hope the oxygen service records will be released soon.

freespeed2
25th Mar 2015, 03:17
...However, the TUC comment isn't: the 12-15 seconds at FL380 is not for an "acclimatised" body. If it was acclimatised, decompression wouldn't be a problem... get it? ;-)

Fair point. Acclimatized is probably the wrong term. What I was trying (poorly) to explain is that the 12-14 seconds UC is a notional figure based on the circulatory period of O2 around the body. However the lecturers on the high altitude course were adamant that it is a lot less during rapid decompression. Nitrogen in the blood turns to a gas (the bends) which causes blockages of the blood supply thereby reducing the length of UC. They listed multiple other unpleasant physiological effects that are best not recounted here.

SteveB1
25th Mar 2015, 03:56
Just curious, are European pilots taught to know the MSA and to put it in the Alt window for an emergency descent? Or just spin and get it down?

vapilot2004
25th Mar 2015, 03:59
When looking at the V/S values derived from the FR24 data we will need to take into account that this data is not recorded in a way that allows to have accurate data to derive a precise sink rate from the recorded Mode-S data.



While I agree the reported figures are subject to variation, in my experience, Mode-S V/S data varies not by the thousands, but hundreds in a steady climb or descent.

The track on the other hand clearly shows that the plane was on A/P.

Possibly, considering the difficulties our guys apparently had in maintaining a steady ROD as per LR's suggestion:

Yes, and with very distressed flight-deck crew continuing on what had looked like a reasonable forced landing site. Okay to keep descending.


Could have been the MCP mode they were in, VNAV or even HDG if the winds were constant through the descending layers. I know these are B terms, apologies if I'm not up on my Airbus autoflight vernacular.



I guess we can all make mistakes, but from an aircraft maintenance point of view, I've been told regularly that Lufthansa Technik is top notch.

Is it possible that, for some reason, they didn't know they were descending?


I seriously doubt it. Too many cues to miss. Aside from the instruments - at very least they should have had the standby horizon and altimeter - there is an obvious attitude change, pressure changes along the way, and sound. Then again, with masks on, it could be missed if they were task saturated.

andrasz
25th Mar 2015, 04:25
Then again, with masks on, it could be missed if they were task saturated

Nothing is impossible at this stage, but considering an 8 minute stable descent in daylight VMC, very, very unlikely. From what we know so far, crew incapacitation best fits the scenario.

I have not yet seen any discussion from bus pilots out there whether any possible scenario exists that could initiate a controlled descent from cruise while maintaining a constant heading without crew intervention ? (I would assume no...)

mcdude
25th Mar 2015, 04:31
Bear in mind it could be one pilot at the controls with the other in or waiting for the bathroom. Just speculatin...

bob1vt
25th Mar 2015, 04:31
AC 61-107A from the FAA has the most authoritative data I can find.

The table below indicates the time of useful consciousness from a rapid decompression at 40,000 ft is 7 to 10 seconds. If the pilots chose to initiate the descent before they donned their oxygen masks, it may have been too late.



TABLE 1-1. TIMES OF USEFUL CONSCIOUSNESS AT VARIOUS ALTITUDES

........................Standard Ascent Rate........After Rapid Decompression
Altitude (Feet).............Time..............................Time
18,000.................20 to 30 minutes............10 to 15 minutes
22,000.................10 minutes.....................5 minutes
25,000..................3 to 5 minutes...............1.5 to 3.5 minutes
28,000..................2.5 to 3 minutes............1.25 to 1.5 minutes
30,000..................1 to 2 minutes...............30 to 60 seconds
35,000..................30 to 60 seconds............15 to 30 seconds
40,000..................15 to 20 seconds............7 to 10 seconds
43,000..................9 to 12 seconds..............5 seconds

kenish
25th Mar 2015, 04:58
I was just wondering, for those that understand the A320, is there anyway a rapid decompression could prevent the aircraft's radios from working?

I do avionics design, which includes certification. All electronics must undergo a rapid decompression test. Equipment in the pressurized section of most airliners must be tested to (IIRC) 45,000 feet. A com is a critical item and must remain fully functional during and after the decompression test. Non-critical items such as IFE and galley equipment can stop working, but cannot create a safety issue (overheat, emit smoke/sparks, etc).

An actual production radio could have a defect and fail during a rapid decompression, but keep in mind there are at least 2 VHF coms. There are other ways to communicate a problem, but so far it seems these were never used. I don't have A32x knowledge but if the electrical system is typical of Transport category aircraft, there are multiple sources of power to the radios.

Some pilots carry a handheld com radio in their personal kit for true "belt and suspenders" redundancy.

Bleve
25th Mar 2015, 05:10
As the Yanks would say, here's a 'primer' on how a Diluter/Demand oxygen system works.

As the name suggests it has two functions (and settings): Diluter and Demand.

Firstly the Diluter function. The switch has two settings: Normal and 100%.

In the Normal setting the system mixes O2 with cabin air to try and maintain the pressure of O2 in the lungs that equates to sea level (ie 'Dilutes' O2 with cabin air). As cabin altitude increase, the proportion of cabin air decreases until 34 000' where the mix is 100% O2 / 0% cabin air. As cabin altitude increases above 34 000' the mix remains 100% O2, but the pressure of O2 in the lungs decreases. At 40 000' the O2 pressure in the lungs is equivalent to an altitude of 10 000'. To remain conscious above a cabin altitude of 40 000' requires 100% O2 to be delivered under pressure - this is the realm of the Pressure/Demand systems fitted to fighter aircraft and not the Diluter/Demand systems fitted to commercial aircraft.

The 100% setting on the Diluter function will deliver 100% O2 at all altitudes. It's purpose is to be used when there is smoke / fumes in the cabin so that you do not breathe any contaminated air.

Now the Demand function. The switch has two settings: Normal and Emergency.

In the Normal setting gas will only flow into the mask when you inhale (ie 'On Demand').

The Emergency setting will deliver gas to the mask continuously under positive pressure. It also, is to be used when there is smoke/fumes in the cabin. The continuous flow of 100% O2 under positive pressure ensures that if there is a poor seal between the mask and the face, O2 leaks out and not contaminated air in. Whilst the Emergency Demand setting does deliver continuous gas under a small positive pressure, it is NOT a Pressure/Demand system. There is no requirement for one and is not it's design purpose.

SE210
25th Mar 2015, 05:13
News report, that the aircraft hit the ground with 700 km/h.

If that is true, it must be above the VNO at that altitude. I do not fly the Airbus, but I know, that it has overspeed protection, if it is operated normally (normal law or something).

I find it very weird and to rule out "deliberate act" at this point is too early - remember the Embraer in Namibia.

TriStar_drvr
25th Mar 2015, 05:53
News report, that the aircraft hit the ground with 700 km/h.

If that is true, it must be above the VNO at that altitude. I do not fly the Airbus, but I know, that it has overspeed protection, if it is operated normally (normal law or something).

700 km/hr is 377 knots. At 6000 feet that would be about 335 Knots indicated. I don't know the Airbus, but the Boeing 737 Vmo is 340. I'm guessing the Airbus is similar.

Denti
25th Mar 2015, 05:56
350kias on the A320. So yes, very possible. And the high speed protection comes on a few knots past the VMO.

Homebrew1
25th Mar 2015, 06:01
Question for Bus guys, when we check the crew oxy bottle pressure during the cockpit prep checklist, if the engineers had turned the oxy bottle off, would we still see pressure being indicated? Ie is the pressure sensor in the line or the bottle?

If we turn the overhead crew oxy rocker switch to off, that oxy indication goes Red or Amber by memory (different from the half boxed Amber presentation we often see). If oxy bottle was turned off but there was residual pressure in the line, we might still be able to carry out a positive oxy mask test and think all is well and if the sensor is in the bottle, the indicated pressure will also look good. Hopefully Air Bus have a safety feature to prevent this situation.

mcdude
25th Mar 2015, 06:13
ukankedi

"There is an electronic list of instructions presented in a central panel (ECAM), telling the pilots what to do step by step"

Crew perform the Emergency Descent procedure by memory. ECAM actions are only called for when established in the descent.

andrasz
25th Mar 2015, 06:32
...ACARS data has not been leaked yet!

Safety and quality depend on adhering to standards and procedures. There is a good reason why the LH group is respected on both, despite this sad event.

However I'm not sure ACARS data exist. The prime purpose of ACARS is to provide maintenance data so engineering may prepare to rectify a fault when the plane lands. This makes sense on longhaul flights, but makes little difference with stage lengths under 2 hours. As ACARS costs money to install and operate, its benefits must outweigh the costs. 4U works on the low cost model, I'd be very surprised if they would have ACARS. In the outfit I used to be with, we only had it for the longhaul fleet for above reason.

fireflybob
25th Mar 2015, 06:42
I recall that the quick donning oxygen masks which sit in those little boxes adjacent to crew positions came on the scene in the 1989s.

Before that the oxygen masks would be hanging from a hook and you would physically put them on and adjust the straps for good fit and actually breathe oxygen at 100% and NORMAL to check all was serviceable.

Also from time to time one would breathe oxygen usually to wake oneself up on arduous duties about ten minutes or so prior to too of descent. I also recall on the B707 that if a pilot left the flight deck for a comfort break it was mandatory for the other pilot to be breathing oxygen with mask fully fitted when above a certain Flight Level which I think was FL370.

With the modern systems crew don oxygen masks only when there is an emergency either in the simulator or the aircraft.

The practice of fitting the mask prior to every flight was a useful way to remind pilots about the importance of this vital life support system should the pressurisation fail and also gave extra confidence that the crew oxygen system was fully serviceable.

bille1319
25th Mar 2015, 06:46
This is all very well in training but what of the likely realistic scenario where visibility in cockpit is zero, with loose items flying around and the wind noise is deafening because a side window has blown and the partial vacuum has wrecked your ears.

mickjoebill
25th Mar 2015, 06:49
When asked what potential causes there could be, an Oz aviation specialist interviewed on Channel Seven TV Australia tonight says accident investigators will focus on the sensors and went on to detail the recent sensors issue with the A321.

He spoke of no other potential causes.

ucankedi
25th Mar 2015, 06:56
donpizmeov2 Well ... the majority of the airbus driver recognize the complexity of actions in emergency! possibly leading to loss of SA!

Airbus (and SOPs, for that matter) recommends one head always be up, flying the plane. It is actually one of the Airbus Golden Rules.

However, I understand what you mean. Even if you are PF, you wonder what is happening and keep looking at the system displays, especially during low workload periods, i.e. cruise. If the PNF is not communicating efficiently or keeping you in the loop you want to look inside even more (at least I do).

That being said, it is not the manufacturer procedures nor company SOPs at fault for loss of situational awareness, it is bad CRM practices and human curiosity.

RexBanner
25th Mar 2015, 06:58
@ Mickjoebill

Except that there is an OEB out to deal with just this particular scenario and has been drummed into every single Airbus pilot repeatedly for the last few months. In just such a situation the memory item is simply to switch off two ADR's. I find it highly unlikely that this crew were not aware of something so obvious.

Plus this in no way explains the lack of comms from the crew.

I don't know why a lot of people are so desperate to pin this on the AoA vanes and erroneous alpha prot activation. Perhaps it is the cause but, for the reason stated, plus the aircraft being in the cruise and outside any weather I'd be very surprised indeed.

Captain Wonderful
25th Mar 2015, 07:08
When I trained with Lufthansa many years ago, the first check was,Oxygen and masks,-Checked one hundred. The flow was checked and the setting was one hundred percent O2

Jonzarno
25th Mar 2015, 07:11
In an earlier post, I showed a table of Time of Useful Consciousness vs altitude.

Does anyone have an equivalent table of recovery times in a descent from altitude assuming a hypoxia induced loss of consciousness after a descent had been initiated?

Aldente
25th Mar 2015, 07:24
Bear in mind it could be one pilot at the controls with the other in or waiting for the bathroom. Just speculatin...


I had the same thought. Just after TOC not an unreasonable time for one pilot to visit the toilet (especially if you'd meant to go on a busy turnaround but didn't). Just one pilot and cabin crew member in flight deck? (Well SOP in my airline anyway), rapid decompression and neither of the flight deck occupants get mask on in time. Other pilot incapacitated before gaining access to flight deck?

Sheep Guts
25th Mar 2015, 07:43
Ok in an A320 there is pax oxygen system outlet in the toilet (drop down masks as in the cabin)and the cockpit door auto unlocks during during a decompression. So possible but not likely.

fox niner
25th Mar 2015, 07:50
Let's hope that it turns out to be a lack of O2 for some reason. That would be a straightforwaed explanation. Because if it turns out to be HAL over Human, then Airbus is in for a seriously rough ride.

DaveReidUK
25th Mar 2015, 07:53
A question for the A320 drivers: When descending through the Transition Level does the altimeter sub-scale setting automatically change from QNE to QNH or do you have to manually change it?The altitude data sent by the transponder, which is what we're talking about here, isn't affected by the subscale setting - in other words it's always Pressure Altitude (QNE), so not necessarily what the pilot sees if below the TA.

The reason I ask is that The Aviation Herald is reporting that: 'Radar data suggest the aircraft ... appeared to have leveled off at FL068 for one minute [prior to impact]'. The Grid Mora at the point the aircraft commenced descent is 6100. This suggests to me that the crew had set 7000 as a level off altitude for an emergency descent. 7000 is the Grid Mora at the descent point rounded up to the nearest 1000 and the difference between FL068/7000 could be due to the QNE/QNH difference.
See above. In addition, I haven't seen any data so far that actually supports Avherald's assertion that the aircraft levelled off at any stage during the descent.

In default of a timestamp, I should have looked at the latitude reading. Doh.

That data does in fact contain timestamps - those are the 10-digit values labelled "mtime". Those appear to be in the form of Unix timestamps (with a 1-second precision), which would make the final value of 1427189963 equivalent to 09:39:23Z yesterday. They will, of course, only be as accurate as the time set on the PC that recorded the data.

MartinM
25th Mar 2015, 07:55
I'ld love to mention something her about any speculation mention with regards to an autopilot commanded emergency decent.

This A320, with MSN lower than 5000 is still equipped with the EXPED button on the FCU. EXPED DES mode is available on this aircraft, while disabled on most A320 with higher MSN.

EXPED DES mode triggers a 4000-5000 fpm decent rate which would match the readout of FLR24, more or less.

For me this was commanded decent to 6800 ft and EXPED button pushed. Autopilot is on ATHR, AP1 on. There was never a deviation of its original flightplan. It follows the route constantly and very precise. Too precise for manual flight.

Unfortunatly at 6800ft impossible to surpass the mountains, reason why they hit ground at full speed.

The bis question is, was the initiation of the emergency decent the last activity of crew in cockpit?

Why no squawk 7700?

framer
25th Mar 2015, 07:57
Today crews are betting their lives and those of the pax that mx has opened the bottle if there's a depressurisation.

Helios lost that bet and we may be looking at a repeat.

No. That is not what happened in Helios. It was nothing to do with mx opening a bottle.
I won't discuss Helios anymore on this thread for fear of thread drift but you may mislead people with that statement so it needs correcting. If anyone wants to know about Helios there is plenty of info online, none of it will mention mx not turning on an oxygen bottle.

DaveReidUK
25th Mar 2015, 07:59
4U works on the low cost model, I'd be very surprised if they would have ACARS.

Germanwings do make (sparing) use of ACARS, and the aircraft in question was certainly equipped.

ucankedi
25th Mar 2015, 08:06
MartinM This A320, with MSN lower than 5000 is still equipped with the EXPED button on the FCU. EXPED DES mode is available on this aircraft, while disabled on most A320 with higher MSN.

Just out of curiosity, why was it disabled? Is it possible to program an expedited descent through the MCDU or is the function removed with the button?

Wrist Watch
25th Mar 2015, 08:07
Since we're discussing hypoxia so much, here are a few short clips showcasing just how deadly it is. If you're not acquainted with the condition, I'd highly suggest watching them.

The worst part is that when it hits, the sufferer is aware of nothing, even if trained. If not recognised at its earliest stages, the game is over.

And by the way hypoxia is just briefly mentioned in ATPL books...

WTNX6mr753wUN3W4d-5RPo_IqWal_EmBg

Julian Hensey
25th Mar 2015, 08:07
Is it part of the process that a cabin crew member with portable oxygen MUST check the flight deck after decompression to ensure pilots are breathing and ok? I assume if the door is automatically unlocked (is that the same on Boeing?) it will not actually come open and if the door is closed and aircraft seems to be descending rapidly not out of control would cabin crew ensure pilots are "in control" ?

andrasz
25th Mar 2015, 08:10
Germanwings do make (sparing) use of ACARS, and the aircraft in question was certainly equipped.

Sorry, my imprecise answer. ACARS has several modules, each coming at a different price tag. The basic Ops module only sends automated operational status messages for movement control. The health monitoring system, which is used for maintenance purposes, requires a much broader bandwidth and is costlier by magnitudes. I would assume (but may be wrong) that 4U would use the former, but not the latter, though as it was an ex LH bird it may have full capability.

wiggy
25th Mar 2015, 08:16
Julian

You probably don't want cabin crew moving around during an emergency descent unless they absolutely have to. "Where I work" in the event of a decompression the Cabin Crew are trained initially to grab a mask and find something to hang onto/sit down... They would only attempt to access the flight deck if there was no signs of a descent being commenced after a suitable period of time.

I can't possibly comment on Flight Deck doors for obvious reason.

Propellerhead
25th Mar 2015, 08:18
For an emergency descent you would expect the pilot to select 10000ft in the window, or MSA if higher before initiating descent. Although some airlines train spinning something lower, getting it going down and then refining it. It would be unusual to set something below 10000ft. The cabin crew would only check on the flight crew if the aircraft didn't descend after a decompression.

But obviously the first action is to always don the oxygen mask and it would be strange not to.

MD80rookie
25th Mar 2015, 08:21
Swedish media reports that flight data recorder might be partly destroyed or damaged in the impact.
Source: AP

speedbird_481_papa
25th Mar 2015, 08:21
Watching those 3 videos is scary stuff actually, and how you can be un-aware of anything happening to you! I was trying to work out in the last video of ATC comms was the 2nd pilot as refered the actual 2nd pilot or another flight re-laying the message?

Isydoro
25th Mar 2015, 08:30
According to Airbus FCOM:
ATC XPDR 7700 CONSIDER

It is NOT mandatory

steve611
25th Mar 2015, 08:31
Ie is the pressure sensor in the line or the bottle?

Oxygen cylinders never have pressure sensors in them. All monitoring is downstream of the isolation valve that allows you to change the cylinder. There must be a bit of line between the cylinder and the on/off valve, so it is totally possible for that bit of line to be pressurised and then the cylinder turned off.

DOI PPL, not big jets, but working every day with oxygen (and other gases) supply systems.

mcdude
25th Mar 2015, 08:31
For me this was commanded decent to 6800 ft and EXPED button pushed

A flight deck photo of D-AIPX on airliners.net shows the EXPED pushbutton is deactivated.

Denti
25th Mar 2015, 08:32
German media reports that so far only the CVR has be recovered and that it is damaged. Apparently it has been taken to Paris to try and get as much information as possible out of it.

Pace
25th Mar 2015, 08:33
I am not an airline pilot but a corporate jet pilot and know with some of the older autopilot systems that they won't capture from a very high descent rate and we normally monitor the capture under normal circumstances.

One of the jets i fly is 1992 vintage while this Airbus appears to be 1990.

How reliable are the autopilots on these older aircraft? they are old Girls and the Airbus would hav flown far far more hours than the corporate jet of that vintage

Is it possible that the aircraft was programmed to level at 10K but didn't and continued down?

busTRE
25th Mar 2015, 08:36
In 20 years I have never seen an A320 AP fail to capture an altitude. I've seen it overshoot by 200 feet, then recover, when speedbrake was stowed during capture but never seen it just miss. So highly unlikely.

training wheels
25th Mar 2015, 08:36
I don't know how accurate this data is or where they got it from, but if the data is indeed correct, then wouldn't the decrease in rate of descent at the lower altitudes suggest an effort to recover from the descent?

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CA3jLc1VEAEgtI9.jpg:small

Source: Twitter

Pontius Navigator
25th Mar 2015, 08:37
The worst part is that when it hits, the sufferer is aware of nothing, even if trained. If not recognised at its earliest stages, the game is over.

The clue is "if not recognised"

I know I feel sick when in a low oxygen environment. I recognise a problem and go into oxygen; I am lucky. Many others don t because they haven't experienced chamber drills.

mcdude
25th Mar 2015, 08:38
I have flown both very old and brand new Airbus and autopilot performance is identical.

The key to this accident is lack of communication...

ExXB
25th Mar 2015, 08:40
Does anyone know if the FDR of this aircraft will have monitored the O2 systems. i.e. Will it tell if the masks were deployed and in which mode?

bsieker
25th Mar 2015, 08:40
MD80rookie,

Swedish media reports that flight data recorder might be partly destroyed or damaged in the impact.
Source: AP

Oh, I'm sure the recorder as such is severely damaged after such a high-speed impact. The only thing that is really protected is the recording medium. I'm confident that will be fine, or at least readable with specialised equipment. These containers are made to withstand just such a crash, and since they're in the tail, they effectively use the entire aircraft as a crumple zone.

Squawk_ident
25th Mar 2015, 08:44
Accident to the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX, flight GWI18G, on 24 March 2015 (http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.gwi18g/info24mars2015.en.php)

INFORMATION ON 24 MARCH 2015

In accordance with the provisions of European Regulation 996/2010 the BEA has initiated a Safety Investigation after having been informed, at the end of the morning, that an Airbus A320-211 crashed near the commune of Prads-Haute-Bléone (Alpes de Haute-Provence, France).

The aeroplane, registered D-AIPX, operated by Germanwings, flight GWI18G, was flying the route from Barcelona (Spain) to Düsseldorf (Germany). According to information from the airline, there were 144 passengers and 6 crew members on board.

Seven investigators from the BEA, accompanied by technical advisers from Airbus and CFM International, are travelling to the accident site. They will be joined by a team of three investigators from the BFU (Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung) the BEA’s German counterpart.

A press conference will be organised at the BEA tomorrow, Wednesday 25 March, from 16h to 16h45. Journalists who wish to attend are asked to confirm their presence with Sonia Festou, [email protected]

Usually broadcast live by these two media

Le direct ? iTELE (http://www.itele.fr/direct) (initial ad.)



BFMTV en Direct: regarder la chaine info en live - BFMTV (http://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/live-video/) (initial ad.)

busTRE
25th Mar 2015, 08:45
It is relevant since 100% O2 still will not supply the O2 at sufficient pressure to assist breathing. 'Normal' is a mix of O2 and cabin air, '100%' is all O2, 'EMER' is O2 forced out of the mask under pressure to inflate the lungs at high altitude.

It is not a matter of the percentage quantity of O2 being delivered. It is the fact that the lungs cannot inflate to inhale the O2 with the reduced partial pressure at that altitude. I've flown GIV for 10 years. It has the standard 'modern jet' crew mask.

Your comment highlights my point about the masks that was pointed out to us during the course; most pilots think 100% will prevent hypoxia at high altitude. It won't.


It will at airline/GA altitudes.

100% O2 will supply sufficient pressure for a fit human to remain usefully conscious at high commercial levels as explained from a tech point of view elsewhere. Positive pressure breathing is only used on military high alt aircraft (and Concorde). The continuous pressure system on a commercial jet is NOT a positive pressure breathing system which also requires specialist training to use. If you are under the impression that your biz jet system is a positive pressure set then please consult your tech manual. Urgently.

ECAM_Actions
25th Mar 2015, 08:48
Quote:
... what is the MSA for the crash site?

The Jepp Grid MORAs are:

Descent point: 6 100
Mid Descent: 10 600
Crash Site: 15 800
Highest on FP: 18 200

Someone further up asked if the crew would select 7000 - this is unlikely. The general rule is to set MSA or 10000 ft, whichever is higher.

There is no sense descending below 10000 ft - you only burn more fuel.

NigelOnDraft
25th Mar 2015, 08:51
then wouldn't the decrease in rate of descent at the lower altitudes suggest an effort to recover from the descent? Not IMO - the descent is "unremarkable" - an earlier poster referred to the FCTM and the descent rate is about half that of an Emergency Descent using Speedbrake.

The variations in V/S, including the reduction, I suspect are characteristic of IAS v M v AP mode, and the wind profile of the day. The corresponding fall in GSpd is a clue - Potential v Kinetic energy.

The data comes from FR24, or similar, using ADS-B. Of more interest would be adding the Mode S data downlinked to ATC e.g. IAS, Sel Alt etc. I would think that is available - just not in the public domain.

Bus Driver Man
25th Mar 2015, 08:57
Ok in an A320 there is pax oxygen system outlet in the toilet (drop down masks as in the cabin)and the cockpit door auto unlocks during during a decompression. So possible but not likely.

Regards
Sheep
Why not likely?

What if one of the pilots is in the bathroom during a decompression and the other pilot in the flight deck is unable to don the oxygen mask (technical issue with the system, startle effect, reduced visibility, noise, panic, ...), but he is able to turn and pull the altitude selector to start the decent just before he passes out?
A random altitude, below minimum grid altitude, has been set and there is no conscious person in the flight deck to adjust the altitude to a safe altitude.
The pilot in the bathroom has donned his oxygen mask, and waits until the aircraft levels off and a PA from his colleague in the flight deck is made that the aircraft is at a safe altitude to breathe, since he doesn't have portable oxygen to leave the bathroom.

He would never expect that the aircraft will never level off and that his colleague is incapacitated.

Ares
25th Mar 2015, 08:58
Regarding the initial hold up on ground - Germanwings-Crews in Düsseldorf und Stuttgart verweigern Start - SPIEGEL ONLINE (http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/germanwings-crews-in-duesseldorf-und-stuttgart-verweigern-start-a-1025378.html) quotes Lufthansa saying that there were problems with the "nose landing door". All rectified before departure.

ChickenHouse
25th Mar 2015, 09:06
This "nose landing door" problem was broadcasted as an issue with the latch resulting in sounds generated, so I assume nothing serious and I can not imagine a connection to such an incident, yet.

Aldente
25th Mar 2015, 09:07
Originally Posted by Aldente View Post
I had the same thought. Just after TOC not an unreasonable time for one pilot to visit the toilet (especially if you'd meant to go on a busy turnaround but didn't). Just one pilot and cabin crew member in flight deck? (Well SOP in my airline anyway), rapid decompression and neither of the flight deck occupants get mask on in time. Other pilot incapacitated before gaining access to flight deck?

Sheep:-
Ok in an A320 there is pax oxygen system outlet in the toilet (drop down masks as in the cabin)and the cockpit door auto unlocks during during a decompression. So possible but not likely.

As in mine (Boeing) - just wondered how long the trip from toilet to being usefully back in your seat (with mask on and O2 flowing) would take, with maybe only 20 secs useful consciousness? The initial shock and subsequent adrenaline rush would boost heart rate dramatically thereby increasing the body's demand for O2. May have collapsed in flight deck. Other pilot may have failed to get mask on in time and cabin crew member unable to help or get their own on properly. It's all very well doing it in the relaxed confines of a safety day but ASFAIK they don't practice donning a mask themselves that often....

aflyer100
25th Mar 2015, 09:11
In the US, hypoxia training is encouraged but is optional. There is a program to provide civil pilots access to Air Force physiological training including an altitude chamber. I did a one day training that included lecture, learning various O2 systems, and experiencing hypoxia at cruise and as a rapid decompression. I still have a worksheet that they had us do at FL290 after removing O2. It has simple math problems and other simple tasks such as signing your name and connecting the dots. It is very instructive to see how your ability even to sign your name deteriorates over a few minutes time. The idea is fir each person to experience their symptoms. Very valuable and while it was part of my college program, it is not required by the FAA.

FE Hoppy
25th Mar 2015, 09:13
Crew Oxy regulators.

There are different classes of regulators. A to E. Types c,d and e provide pressure breathing. The EMERG setting does not provide pressure breathing despite what a 10 year GIV pilot on this thread claims. The emerge setting is for smoke removal.


EROS mask operating manuals are available from the manufacturers web site and anyone more interested can find TSO-C78, TSO-C89 and TSO-C99 on line too.

Educated yourselves rather than relying on hearsay.

dicks-airbus
25th Mar 2015, 09:14
From an anonymous comment on avherald:

CVR data has been read. It seems structural failure (windshield? not determined yet)..It was quick... sound of cracks,but crew initiated emergency descent by autopilot and then they weren't heard anymore. Autopilot was on during whole descent, but disconnected automatically shortly before impact when GPWS alerts appeared.

atakacs
25th Mar 2015, 09:23
Structural failure fits the accident scenario quite well but I would be really surprised by both crew being incapacitated to this extreme.

Evanelpus
25th Mar 2015, 09:27
I think it's safe to assume? that the flight crew were incapacitated in some way. If you have a problem, surely as a pilot, you would decend towards a blooming great mountain range.

A question if I may. Looking at a previous post which listed the decent rate of the aircraft. It started out decending at 2300ft/min, then it went to 3050ft/min all the way down to 4225ft/min and then back up the scale to the point of impact. Is this normal if the aircraft was on autopilot? I would have thought that if you set a rate of decent on the panel, it will maintain that number until altered by further inputs.

By the way, I'm not a pilot but am a fully trained aircraft engineer.

RexBanner
25th Mar 2015, 09:31
Evanelpus you initiate the descent in Open Descent not V/S. The autothrust will maintain thrust idle and the autopilot will pitch for the speed. Variations in wind etc will cause the variations in speed and thus ROD. So all the data fits and is completely normal in my opinion.

Current Airbus A320/319 pilot.

ACMS
25th Mar 2015, 09:32
You don't set a rate of descent. You basically close thrust ( open descent on the Bus ) and then the Elevators control the speed that you have selected. Therefore the rate of descent will vary.

log0008
25th Mar 2015, 09:33
From an anonymous comment on avherald:

Quote:
CVR data has been read. It seems structural failure (windshield? not determined yet)..It was quick... sound of cracks,but crew initiated emergency descent by autopilot and then they weren't heard anymore. Autopilot was on during whole descent, but disconnected automatically shortly before impact when GPWS alerts appeared.

Would love to know right now if any windows in the cockpit had been replaced

dicks-airbus
25th Mar 2015, 09:33
Structural failure fits the accident scenario quite well but I would be really surprised by both crew being incapacitated to this extreme.

We will see what role O2 played once the FDR is found and readable - should be today. Perhaps the holes in the cheese did line up: Structural failure and insufficient/no O2 supply.

Bleve
25th Mar 2015, 09:37
It started out decending at 2300ft/min, then it went to 3050ft/min all the way down to 4225ft/min and then back up the scale to the point of impact. Is this normal if the aircraft was on autopilot?

Yes if the descent mode (OP DES) was pitching the nose up/down to maintain a selected MN/IAS. As the head/tail winds change during the descent the pitch attitude (and vertical speed) will change to maintain the selected speed.

log0008
25th Mar 2015, 09:38
If it is structural failure of some sort, could the noise that was assumed to come from the nose wheel door actually have been a symptom of something else, some distortion?

I was thinking the same thing, i was also thinking that maybe the decompression occurred in/near the cockpit leading to other reasons why the pilots were incapacitated

LiveryMan
25th Mar 2015, 09:52
All these decompression/pressurisation ideas are all well and good.
However, they do not explain why an experienced flight crew would then go and select a FL below 10,000ft when they know they are over the Alps and make no course alteration whatsoever before then becoming incapacitated.

This makes no sense to me.

WingNut60
25th Mar 2015, 09:56
This seems a suitable occasion to re-float a question that I tabled about one month ago (and subsequently modded out) - Garuda domestic are currently issuing instructions in their safety briefings that in-toilet O2 systems have been removed from their aircraft (738) and "in the event of cabin depressurisation, please return to your seat and use the overhead O2 mask".
These systems were removed apparently as the result of an NTSB(?) directive a couple of years ago, that directive since reversed - but not by Garuda.
I wonder how many other operators removed those systems world-wide?

As for the concept of the crew member in the toilet at the time of de-compression returning to the flight deck with the O2 bottle and mask, I doubt that would be possible even if the aircraft does still have the system installed.
Not unless he has oven gloves available.


However, back to my unanswered question. What is the likelihood that a person could actually make it back to their seat (or back to the flight deck) from a lavatory with or without O2 system installed.
We will presume that said crew member was in a fully-clothed condition when the de-pressurisation occurred.

cirr737
25th Mar 2015, 10:01
However, back to my unanswered question. What is the likelihood that a person could actually make it back to their seat (or back to the flight deck) from a lavatory with or without O2 system installed.

The answer is: zero likelihood - you stay there with the mask on until at a reasonable altitude...

A330ETOPS
25th Mar 2015, 10:03
However, they do not explain why an experienced flight crew would then go and select a FL below 10,000ft when they know they are over the Alps and make no course alteration whatsoever before then becoming incapacitated

Maybe the Alt selector was in the 1000's range, wound it down to get the descent going but incapacitated before being able to fine tune them on the second loop

FE Hoppy
25th Mar 2015, 10:03
@Liveryman

The AB procedure is to initiate the descent first and then when established in the descent set the appropriate altitude.

If on oxygen this should work but if not.......

abdunbar
25th Mar 2015, 10:09
last a/c I flew was b767. before starting engines ck list we always checked emer o2 set 100 per cent and push to test while watching bottle pressure. first flight of day, don and restow.

o2 is a very important emergency system and very much respected by professional pilots.

many rules re o2.

abdunbar
25th Mar 2015, 10:18
far 121 requires single pilot on oxygen if other pilot leaves crew position above fl250. europe similar.

Denti
25th Mar 2015, 10:19
Nope, not similar in europe. There is no such rule since JAR OPS came around, up to FL410 nobody needs to sniff oxygen if the other leaves the flightdeck.

BusyB
25th Mar 2015, 10:21
I would not be surprised to hear that a recommendation would be made for one flight crew member to be on Oxygen at all times above 10000". Following the AirAsia and MH370 it wouldn't be just airbus a/c.
Pretty uncomfortable for LH and I guess more O2 required.:sad:

Plastic787
25th Mar 2015, 10:24
Never understood why you wouldn't just set FL100/MEA in the window straight away instead of setting something to come back and fine tune later. A few extra clicks is adding fractions of a second and by that time you should be on oxygen having completed the most vital and time critical memory actions anyway.

busTRE
25th Mar 2015, 10:25
I would not be surprised to hear that a recommendation would be made for one flight crew member to be on Oxygen at all times above 10000". Following the AirAsia and MH370 it wouldn't be just airbus a/c.
Pretty uncomfortable for LH and I guess more O2 required.:sad:

Unlikely, I would venture, since the everyday impact on SA and crew comms would create more issues than it would resolve.

HubertWilkins
25th Mar 2015, 10:29
Nope, not similar in europe. There is no such rule since JAR OPS came around, up to FL410 nobody needs to sniff oxygen if the other leaves the flightdeck.

Well that is just wrong. Unsafe and illogical.

cirr737
25th Mar 2015, 10:35
Never understood why you wouldn't just set FL100/MEA in the window straight away instead of setting something to come back and fine tune later. A few extra clicks is adding fractions of a second and by that time you should be on oxygen having completed the most vital and time critical memory actions anyway.

Yep - I my daily work I decided for myself to discard that piece of the procedure and always set a safe target on the first loop for exactly the reason, that there is a risk of becoming incapacitated. Usually its FL100 but before entering higher terrain I will brief my "first target" to the chap next to me...

I regard the current procedure as dangerous...

LiveryMan
25th Mar 2015, 10:39
Yep - I my daily work I decided for myself to discard that piece of the procedure and always set a safe target on the first loop for exactly the same reason. Usually its FL100 but before entering higher terrain I will brief my "first target" to the chap next to me...

That seems the most reasonable thing to do to me. Any other way seems to invite mistakes and possibly less healthy results!

fizz57
25th Mar 2015, 10:41
Can anyone with Airbus experience let us know how many "clicks" the alt knob gives you in say half a turn - a quick flip? Even on 1000ft/click, I find it strange that you'd get 30 or more, as some seem to be implying. How on earth would you be able to set an accurate altitude?

dicks-airbus
25th Mar 2015, 10:41
On the "Window replacement" speculation: Windows are plug-fit - so unlikely they are lost suddenly.

Leaves NWD speculation re. structural damage... Hope facts surface soon (and specifically the FDR in readable shape).

threemiles
25th Mar 2015, 10:41
At the high rate of descent and with the many mountains around it is likely that the GPWS alarm went off around FL100.
What would it do?
Disengage autopilot?
Pullup?