AF 447 Thread No. 8
Forget Boyd
Salute!
Thanks Okie, that about nails it. Biggest thing Boyd sold was energy management in the new jets. OTOH, I think Yeager and others way back had already cracked the code.
WRT to AF 447, the swept wing jets share many aero characteristics going all the way back to 1950. So Boyd and others figured out that you could pull real hard and not get the classic stall warnings and such that the previous planes had. What you got was a lotta drag, and a need to use rudder versus aileron for directional control. Buffet and burbling and such depended on your jet. A-7 and F-101 that I flew let you know real early. F-102 and F-16 were smooth as silk. First clue you had 'stalled" was vertical velocity of 10,000 per minute and speed below 150 knots. Sound familiar?
Biggest thing about the OODA concept for AF447 is the the "O" and "O". The big jets have lottsa inertia and momentum and such. They are not gonna snap roll in a second. They are not gonna overspeed in 10 or 15 seconds. You don't have Mig at close 6 o'clock or a SAM headed your way. So a few seconds observing, then orienting can really pay off.
later from this old man.
Thanks Okie, that about nails it. Biggest thing Boyd sold was energy management in the new jets. OTOH, I think Yeager and others way back had already cracked the code.
WRT to AF 447, the swept wing jets share many aero characteristics going all the way back to 1950. So Boyd and others figured out that you could pull real hard and not get the classic stall warnings and such that the previous planes had. What you got was a lotta drag, and a need to use rudder versus aileron for directional control. Buffet and burbling and such depended on your jet. A-7 and F-101 that I flew let you know real early. F-102 and F-16 were smooth as silk. First clue you had 'stalled" was vertical velocity of 10,000 per minute and speed below 150 knots. Sound familiar?
Biggest thing about the OODA concept for AF447 is the the "O" and "O". The big jets have lottsa inertia and momentum and such. They are not gonna snap roll in a second. They are not gonna overspeed in 10 or 15 seconds. You don't have Mig at close 6 o'clock or a SAM headed your way. So a few seconds observing, then orienting can really pay off.
later from this old man.
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Dozy, it was one of the experts who I thought said they got the initial roll under control – in a part of a thread about PIO or whatever it is called nowadays.
But it is not particularly relevant to the main point, which is that PF’s initial pitch inputs seemed to many to be incidental, even accidental, to his roll over-corrections. The full stick back came later.
Regards – Chris
But it is not particularly relevant to the main point, which is that PF’s initial pitch inputs seemed to many to be incidental, even accidental, to his roll over-corrections. The full stick back came later.
Regards – Chris
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@ Doze.... "Only once the evidence came back that suggested pretty conclusively that neither had occurred. Prior to that the most accurate thing anyone could say was that it was unlikely, and attempt to explain why it was unlikely with the facts at their disposal (as I did)."
I agree, Doze. I think it is unlikely, but it is possible. For a suspicion, I think the roll rate out of AutoFlight was pretty impressive, and Direct involves the outers, no? Damaged Right aileron, stuck a little, UP? A chronic right roll,then. Even after Roll was 'sorted', the a/c kept turnong to the right (Skidding?). Bent actuators? Who knows.
gums, don't short sell Boyd, he was a genius. O, and O were not new, they are nothing more than situational awareness. Boyd put S/A together with Decide and Act to close the circle, but there is more. Four parts OODA is four too many, to be triumphant requires instantaneous decisioning. Boyd's point was to make O,O into OO, then into ODA, then DA, then A.
No soldier who pauses to think will live, let alone prevail. Practicing OODA was prelude, if you are still in OODA, you should not be engaging the enemy. OODA teaches competence, and with competence come experience, and with experience and knowledge,wisdom. With wisdom, one can try for Intuition.
Boyd's philosophy hadn't to do with partitioning the process of thought/action, but in developing the means to enter the enemy's mind, and baffle him by pre-empting his best work.
Until one masters OODA, one cannot get to ODA, or DA. And the Goal is ACT.
For if you think, you die. Anyone who wants to get a glimpse of Boyd's genius must read this: Creation, and Destruction. He was way ahead of his time, and could have kept Einstein guessing, and in awe.
Any pilot at 35000 in ITCZ and on autopilot who doesn't know instantly where to put the nose and the throttles should OTTO dump, should not be at 35000 in the ITCZ at the controls of a beast. Keeping up is not enough, one must get to, and remain, in front.
I agree, Doze. I think it is unlikely, but it is possible. For a suspicion, I think the roll rate out of AutoFlight was pretty impressive, and Direct involves the outers, no? Damaged Right aileron, stuck a little, UP? A chronic right roll,then. Even after Roll was 'sorted', the a/c kept turnong to the right (Skidding?). Bent actuators? Who knows.
gums, don't short sell Boyd, he was a genius. O, and O were not new, they are nothing more than situational awareness. Boyd put S/A together with Decide and Act to close the circle, but there is more. Four parts OODA is four too many, to be triumphant requires instantaneous decisioning. Boyd's point was to make O,O into OO, then into ODA, then DA, then A.
No soldier who pauses to think will live, let alone prevail. Practicing OODA was prelude, if you are still in OODA, you should not be engaging the enemy. OODA teaches competence, and with competence come experience, and with experience and knowledge,wisdom. With wisdom, one can try for Intuition.
Boyd's philosophy hadn't to do with partitioning the process of thought/action, but in developing the means to enter the enemy's mind, and baffle him by pre-empting his best work.
Until one masters OODA, one cannot get to ODA, or DA. And the Goal is ACT.
For if you think, you die. Anyone who wants to get a glimpse of Boyd's genius must read this: Creation, and Destruction. He was way ahead of his time, and could have kept Einstein guessing, and in awe.
Any pilot at 35000 in ITCZ and on autopilot who doesn't know instantly where to put the nose and the throttles should OTTO dump, should not be at 35000 in the ITCZ at the controls of a beast. Keeping up is not enough, one must get to, and remain, in front.
Last edited by Lyman; 2nd May 2012 at 20:31.
For PJ2
My answer to the quiz was "B" without looking anything up.
For OODA loop:
If your instrument scan has broken down, how are we talking about OODA?
Observe and orient seem to me to require actually seeing something, knowing what it is you are seeing, and using what you know to set up some choices for a decision.
The PF seemed to be going to D without effective OO, hence the A's were not suited to his dogfight, a 1 v 1 with an A330 when he had a wingman there to assist ... too much analogy, sorry.
Cheers.
My answer to the quiz was "B" without looking anything up.
For OODA loop:
If your instrument scan has broken down, how are we talking about OODA?
Observe and orient seem to me to require actually seeing something, knowing what it is you are seeing, and using what you know to set up some choices for a decision.
The PF seemed to be going to D without effective OO, hence the A's were not suited to his dogfight, a 1 v 1 with an A330 when he had a wingman there to assist ... too much analogy, sorry.
Cheers.
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) that the initial roll was turbulence-induced, and that the initial overcorrection by the PF led to PIO in roll. The reason I'm fairly confident about the latter is that we know for certain that neither of the F/Os in the flight deck had ever done any high-altitude manual handling training, and the low-level manual handling they had done requires considerably greater stick deflection than required or desired at cruise level.
But it is not particularly relevant to the main point, which is that PF’s initial pitch inputs seemed to many to be incidental, even accidental, to his roll over-corrections. The full stick back came later.
Everything about this looks to me (as a relatively well-read layman) like a textbook startle response, followed by breakdown of instrument scan and intra-cockpit communication. It may be fair to censure the crew for not following UAS procedure, but it is not fair to censure the crew for attempting to improvise and fumbling the recovery, because the institution to which they belonged had never provided the training required to do so effectively.
@Lyman - I know a few disagree with me, but I don't think the roll was induced by positive autoflight intervention or mechanical failure. Everything I see is consistent with the autopilot disconnecting in the middle of a turbulence event, from which it was trying to correct. Rudderrudderrat's mention of rudder trim is an interesting one because if autoflight had been using it, it may have left them with a slight roll tendency until corrected, but even then nothing that would require inputs as aggressive as those made by the PF.
@gums - See above. Nothing in the traces indicates aileron damage. I'd need to get the books out, but I think the outer ailerons are centred and locked when manual control is taken at high altitude, which is why the outer aileron traces centre at A/P disconnect. The take-away from the aileron traces for me is comparing the significant difference in magnitude between the corrections made by autoflight (indicating the required amount of deflection for positive correction at high altitude) and those made by the PF (considerably larger and way in excess of that required). OK, so with outer ailerons locked the inner ailerons would have to work a little harder - but not that much harder!
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Wolf.
The pilot seems to have skipped the D as well, all we see are seemingly random "A's"....... Taking action whilst unsure of what to do was not in the instructions. At least when I learnt. It would be interesting to read his..... Don't just do something, sit there!
The pilot seems to have skipped the D as well, all we see are seemingly random "A's"....... Taking action whilst unsure of what to do was not in the instructions. At least when I learnt. It would be interesting to read his..... Don't just do something, sit there!
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Originally Posted by Lyman
A chronic right roll,then. Even after Roll was 'sorted', the a/c kept turnong to the right (Skidding?). Bent actuators?
The results obtained reveal that before approximately 2 h 10 min 40, i.e. the time when the aircraft was climbing at about 37,000 ft, the parameters recorded (angle of attack, normal load factor, and attitude) fluctuated around the simulated parameters, indicating the presence of turbulence. After this time, this turbulence appears to disappear and the parameters simulated and recorded are highly consistent.
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 2nd May 2012 at 21:57.
Lonewolf_50;
Yes, it is, but of course determining the correct response is not the reason I posted the slide from a 1998 CBT on the A340/A330, ;-)
This is not as complicated as "OODA" and Boyd. The appropriate and correct responses are already there in the SOPs etc and do not require sophisticated techniques to address and correct.
If the instantaneous and then sustained pull-up had not occurred as in the other thirty-odd UAS events there would be nothing to discuss here.
The details of roll, yaw and subsequent confusions when stall warnings "quit" and then began again are all post-facto of the initial response. The devolution of aircraft stability and control are a direct consequence of loss of energy, entry into and sustaining of the stall. Why such sustained back-pressure occurred should be the subject of the Report.
Dozy, contrary to your observation, the data shows that the initial L>R>L etc roll was very quickly contained and controlled.
I cannot accept that a sustained pitch-up was the result of inadvertent stick-handling, not, at least, without also accepting that the most basic principles of high-altitude, swept-wing flight and the resultant attempts at manual control were for some reason not understood.
In my view the pitch up was intentional but the results were not anticipated and therefore not intuitively understood.
This is a matter for the Report to handle and somehow explain.
Lyman;
I said that more than a year ago..."do nothing". The observation was completely mis-interpreted. I've done this in the sim enough to know that "doing nothing" was the safest response in the moment, then collect one's thoughts, call the abnormal and take command of the airplane while the PM gets out the QRH to fine-tune the already-nominal pitch and power settings. That is what "do nothing" meant then, as now.
PJ2
My answer to the quiz was "B" without looking anything up.
This is not as complicated as "OODA" and Boyd. The appropriate and correct responses are already there in the SOPs etc and do not require sophisticated techniques to address and correct.
If the instantaneous and then sustained pull-up had not occurred as in the other thirty-odd UAS events there would be nothing to discuss here.
The details of roll, yaw and subsequent confusions when stall warnings "quit" and then began again are all post-facto of the initial response. The devolution of aircraft stability and control are a direct consequence of loss of energy, entry into and sustaining of the stall. Why such sustained back-pressure occurred should be the subject of the Report.
Dozy, contrary to your observation, the data shows that the initial L>R>L etc roll was very quickly contained and controlled.
I cannot accept that a sustained pitch-up was the result of inadvertent stick-handling, not, at least, without also accepting that the most basic principles of high-altitude, swept-wing flight and the resultant attempts at manual control were for some reason not understood.
In my view the pitch up was intentional but the results were not anticipated and therefore not intuitively understood.
This is a matter for the Report to handle and somehow explain.
Lyman;
Don't just do something, sit there!
PJ2
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@PJ2....I cannot accept that a sustained pitch-up was the result of inadvertent stick-handling, not, at least, without also accepting that the most basic principles of high-altitude, swept-wing flight and the resultant attempts at manual control were for some reason not understood.
Let's be more careful. There was no "Sustained Pitch UP" (Re: STICK). There was an overall average of NOSE UP, as seen from the results, but the inputs were not without interruption, and to claim so must be by mistake, yes? Many Nose Down inputs, changes in PITCH UP and DOWN, etc. The initial input was NU, followed by several Nose Down inputs. It can be inferred from such language that the PF set and maintained a climb, only. NO. What can be concluded, at least by me, is that there was handling that took different iterations. The climb was not monolithic, it was more haphazard, and resulted imo from a lack of awareness of VS, PITCH, and A/S, all of which were at different times, wrong, accurate and/or NCD. Or BLANK.
Yes, I meant to attribute "do nothing" to you, but had forgotten who posted it, my bad.... I was one who knew precisely what you meant, and regret that others made such a deliberate misunderstanding of your words. Clearly, with an a/c rolling at 4.5 degrees/second and nose down, Input was required, as evidenced by the work of the handling pilot. My previous comment re: a/ploss and the PF needing to be instantly prepared stands, but to me does not conflict with your counsel for patience, and calm......
with respect always
Let's be more careful. There was no "Sustained Pitch UP" (Re: STICK). There was an overall average of NOSE UP, as seen from the results, but the inputs were not without interruption, and to claim so must be by mistake, yes? Many Nose Down inputs, changes in PITCH UP and DOWN, etc. The initial input was NU, followed by several Nose Down inputs. It can be inferred from such language that the PF set and maintained a climb, only. NO. What can be concluded, at least by me, is that there was handling that took different iterations. The climb was not monolithic, it was more haphazard, and resulted imo from a lack of awareness of VS, PITCH, and A/S, all of which were at different times, wrong, accurate and/or NCD. Or BLANK.
Yes, I meant to attribute "do nothing" to you, but had forgotten who posted it, my bad.... I was one who knew precisely what you meant, and regret that others made such a deliberate misunderstanding of your words. Clearly, with an a/c rolling at 4.5 degrees/second and nose down, Input was required, as evidenced by the work of the handling pilot. My previous comment re: a/ploss and the PF needing to be instantly prepared stands, but to me does not conflict with your counsel for patience, and calm......
with respect always
Last edited by Lyman; 2nd May 2012 at 22:19.
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@Lyman,
Between 02:10:07 and 02:10:17 the pitch attitude steadily increased to 11 degrees NU. The side stick position fluctuated between 1/4 and 3/4 NU, never went to ND.
Between 02:10:07 and 02:10:17 the pitch attitude steadily increased to 11 degrees NU. The side stick position fluctuated between 1/4 and 3/4 NU, never went to ND.
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Yes, and the a/c attitude needed this input, for in the words of BEA: "Until the Pitch reached 10 degrees Nose UP, and the aircraft began to climb." It is a big plane, and the Pilot seemingly was behind in the a/c lag, and momentum, once moving... Here, in PITCH, as we also see in ROLL. His PITCH excursive inputs mimicked the ROLL, he had a mix of Impatience, "Catch-Up" and Adrenaline, all three rsponsible, perhaps in toto for this crash......
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Standby...PAGE NINE
The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, dropped to 700 ft/min and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The speed displayed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees.
The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, dropped to 700 ft/min and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The speed displayed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees.
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Help me read the traces, because what I see is a considerable amount of roll oscillation for about 30 seconds immediately after disconnect, which dovetails nicely with the near-full deflection of the inner ailerons (timecode approx. 2:10:05-2:10:35). Immediately after this the inputs reduce in magnitude and roll starts to stabilise (consistent with getting a feel for the aircraft), but shortly thereafter the aircraft enters the approach to stall regime and control seems to run away from the PF.
As a non-pilot I don't have the subjective knowledge to say how long it should take to contain, but 30 seconds seems like a fairly long time to me.
Please correct me if I'm barking up the wrong tree.
@HN39 - I don't think he's misquoting - at least not dramatically. What he's doing is interpreting the phrase as meaning things happened sequentially rather than concurrently. Whether due to translation issues or problems with wording, it's difficult to say one way or the other when taken out of context. Put in context with the rest of the report though, it's clear they mean that the aircraft climbed concurrently ("at the same time" - for non-native English speakers) with the increase in pitch attitude.
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Dozy. Yes. Sequentially. Can one read it another way? "As the Pitch increased beyond ten degrees NOSE UP, the a/c continued its climb?" Would this example be more accurate to describe what it is you think happened?
As written, it explains the pilot's sensed need for Nose Up, the a/c was not climbing until it reached ten degrees NOSE UP.....
The language is quite critical, and HazelNuts39 can help with the actuals, for as written, it describes an a/c caught in a massive downdraft. And/or a pilot believing there was such a thing happening.
French or English, writers get paid by the word, so long as sense can be made. Why does BEA mention the PITCH and the Climb? Because they need to associate the two. And ordinarily, since it would not be necessary to link PITCH UP with climb, what is it they are trying to explain? I think their meaning is that the a/c was reluctant, sluggish even, in acquiring climb.....
As written, it explains the pilot's sensed need for Nose Up, the a/c was not climbing until it reached ten degrees NOSE UP.....
The language is quite critical, and HazelNuts39 can help with the actuals, for as written, it describes an a/c caught in a massive downdraft. And/or a pilot believing there was such a thing happening.
French or English, writers get paid by the word, so long as sense can be made. Why does BEA mention the PITCH and the Climb? Because they need to associate the two. And ordinarily, since it would not be necessary to link PITCH UP with climb, what is it they are trying to explain? I think their meaning is that the a/c was reluctant, sluggish even, in acquiring climb.....
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Lyman - I don't think so.
The important word there is and. If the climb did not begin until 10 degrees nose-up had been reached, the correct word would be "then". "And" simply states that two things happened, whereas "then" would imply one thing happened after the other.
All this means is that nothing has changed in terms of general aircraft response. The pitch angle increases beyond +10deg, and the aircraft continues the climb it began as soon as the aircraft began to pitch up past the cruise trim pitch.
The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb.
"As the Pitch increased beyond ten degrees NOSE UP, the a/c continued its climb?"
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I think you may be correct. You may also be wrong.... I would like some clarity before I claim to be right or wrong. As I say, the language here, is critical....
Humor me. Pause, and do not go immediately to the FDR, the traces. More important here, is not what actually was recorded in the FDR, but what the pilot determined the response (of the a/c) to be.
I can ask again, the Pilots had no access, nor did they care, re: DFDR. What was the a/c saying, doing? If you were looking at a ND on the display, and had held aft stick for ten seconds, would you be confused? I would be, I might even puke... Why? because if I am worried about Overspeed, and she won't climb, we are all dead, painfully. There is an explanation for us in the actions of the pilots, and hauling out the traces can be distracting. They will not morph, they will be there forever. The crash happened once....... To gain an understanding, one must not start with an opinion of the pilot's skill level, but what his actions are saying to us...
"Started to climb". When, exactly? at what PITCH?
The PITCH was in transit, UP. Increasing to and through ten degrees. Not Eight? Not Nine?
By the way, the original text stated "..and the a/c began to climb.."
When was the text altered? Anyone?
Humor me. Pause, and do not go immediately to the FDR, the traces. More important here, is not what actually was recorded in the FDR, but what the pilot determined the response (of the a/c) to be.
I can ask again, the Pilots had no access, nor did they care, re: DFDR. What was the a/c saying, doing? If you were looking at a ND on the display, and had held aft stick for ten seconds, would you be confused? I would be, I might even puke... Why? because if I am worried about Overspeed, and she won't climb, we are all dead, painfully. There is an explanation for us in the actions of the pilots, and hauling out the traces can be distracting. They will not morph, they will be there forever. The crash happened once....... To gain an understanding, one must not start with an opinion of the pilot's skill level, but what his actions are saying to us...
"Started to climb". When, exactly? at what PITCH?
The PITCH was in transit, UP. Increasing to and through ten degrees. Not Eight? Not Nine?
By the way, the original text stated "..and the a/c began to climb.."
When was the text altered? Anyone?
Last edited by Lyman; 2nd May 2012 at 23:07.
OODA and instrument cross check
Salute!
Gotta go with PJ
Seems to me that the OODA concept is the basic instrument crosscheck, or am I way off base? I am not talking about air-to-air combat, but basic IFR flying.
Some aircraft, such as the lites I flew, had a very short "time constant". So 1 or 2 seconds without action could be bad ( think 300 degrees per second roll rate or higher, and 5 or 6 gees within a half a second). The bigger and heavier planes are much more forgiving in this regard. So 5 or 10 seconds to figure out that initial actions weren't working does not sound unreasonable.
When we all meet in that hootch bar in the sky, we can ask the guy what the hell he was thinking. I have a feeling that he would do the drill differently now that he has also had the chance to see the traces and such. Ya think?
Gotta go with PJ
If the instantaneous and then sustained pull-up had not occurred as in the other thirty-odd UAS events there would be nothing to discuss here.
The details of roll, yaw and subsequent confusions when stall warnings "quit" and then began again are all post-facto of the initial response. The devolution of aircraft stability and control are a direct consequence of loss of energy, entry into and sustaining of the stall. Why such sustained back-pressure occurred should be the subject of the Report.
The details of roll, yaw and subsequent confusions when stall warnings "quit" and then began again are all post-facto of the initial response. The devolution of aircraft stability and control are a direct consequence of loss of energy, entry into and sustaining of the stall. Why such sustained back-pressure occurred should be the subject of the Report.
Some aircraft, such as the lites I flew, had a very short "time constant". So 1 or 2 seconds without action could be bad ( think 300 degrees per second roll rate or higher, and 5 or 6 gees within a half a second). The bigger and heavier planes are much more forgiving in this regard. So 5 or 10 seconds to figure out that initial actions weren't working does not sound unreasonable.
When we all meet in that hootch bar in the sky, we can ask the guy what the hell he was thinking. I have a feeling that he would do the drill differently now that he has also had the chance to see the traces and such. Ya think?
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Lyman, neither you nor I can even begin to assume what the pilots were thinking or trying to do. In this case you have provided a phrase which out of context appears to be ambiguous as to the sequence of events. I have suggested that elsewhere in the report it is fairly clear as to what they mean (I'm not going to dig it out now - jetlagged to buggery).
The acid test is to look at the DFDR trace - the nearest to raw data we have, and see what was going on with the data. By telling me that I can't do that not only have you shut off the most effective avenue for resolving the ambiguity, but you've made it look like you have some reason for not wishing to do so.
So, for your benefit I'll use the fact that in the "1.1. History Of Flight" section, the BEA have placed events which happened either concurrently or in very quick succession into small, concise paragraphs, each of which starts with a timecode. The extract you provided is contained within one of these paragraphs. I put it to you that if there was significant lag between the aircraft pitching towards +10deg and the aircraft only starting to climb once +10degrees was reached, then this would have necessitated separate paragraphs for each event.
For the rest of us, let's look at the trace. The aircraft reaches +10deg nose up at approx. 02:10:16. At this point vertical speed is already approx. +3000fpm.
The climb begins in earnest (i.e more than +1500fpm) with the pitch attitude between 4 and 5 degrees.
As an aside, in my business it is vital to understand when events are happening sequentially versus concurrently, because the consequences to design philosophy and problem-solving are very different depending on which method is used. In the best-case scenario, the documentation is very explicit as to this, but I've read my fair share of lousy documentation from which it has to be inferred. Not to blow my own trumpet, but I'm pretty good at distinguishing these inferences based on context these days...
The acid test is to look at the DFDR trace - the nearest to raw data we have, and see what was going on with the data. By telling me that I can't do that not only have you shut off the most effective avenue for resolving the ambiguity, but you've made it look like you have some reason for not wishing to do so.
So, for your benefit I'll use the fact that in the "1.1. History Of Flight" section, the BEA have placed events which happened either concurrently or in very quick succession into small, concise paragraphs, each of which starts with a timecode. The extract you provided is contained within one of these paragraphs. I put it to you that if there was significant lag between the aircraft pitching towards +10deg and the aircraft only starting to climb once +10degrees was reached, then this would have necessitated separate paragraphs for each event.
For the rest of us, let's look at the trace. The aircraft reaches +10deg nose up at approx. 02:10:16. At this point vertical speed is already approx. +3000fpm.
The climb begins in earnest (i.e more than +1500fpm) with the pitch attitude between 4 and 5 degrees.
As an aside, in my business it is vital to understand when events are happening sequentially versus concurrently, because the consequences to design philosophy and problem-solving are very different depending on which method is used. In the best-case scenario, the documentation is very explicit as to this, but I've read my fair share of lousy documentation from which it has to be inferred. Not to blow my own trumpet, but I'm pretty good at distinguishing these inferences based on context these days...