Lyman

@ChrisN Nobody knows what he thought or why, but one possibility is that after getting roll sorted, and the nose had started rising, with whatever alert noises were going off, he became confused; could not believe speeds, started to disbelieve some or all other indications, talked about crazy speeds, ended up stalled but ignoring the stall warning, had huge cockpit noise, (noted by somebody who has heard the CVR, it was reported) and thought, at least at times, that he had overspeed. So maybe he was pulling the nose up to try to slow down. Remember, at one stage he tried to use the airbrakes too, until PNF stopped him.

He actually deployed the airbrakes, at 2:12:04. Three seconds later, PNF said,
at 2:12:07 "No, above all do not extend...." the rest of the sentence is not quoted, if it exists. Spoilers are deployed, not extended. Was PF reaching for FLAP? The "crazy speed" comment comes in conjunction with the spoilers deployed.....PNF has the most time in the 330, and my guess is he would not 'extend' the spoilers, he would "deploy" them.

At 2:10:10.4,
"STALL/STALL". just six tenths of a second later (2:10:11) the PNF: "What is that?" I propose PNF is not rhetorically commenting re: "STALL", he certainly knows what it is, but may be remarking on what caused the AoA to provoke the Warning, the extreme airstream noise that filled the cockpit. A robust turbulence that jiggered the vanes, and caused the Vanes to read correctly, but transiently....STALL/STALL.

bubbers44

stall, stall to 99.9 percent of the pilots on the earth would mean stick forward.

Lyman

Not at 2:10:10.4, bubbers. Not at M.80, and five seconds after autopilot quits.

And not with the nose down already, and he still had the AoA bug on the speed tape, it was nowhere near the bug. What do you make of the PNF saying, "What was that?" ? Recheck the stick trace. The Stall Warn triggers at the beginning of the climb? Then doesn't return til top of climb? For the Stall Warn to be authentic at the handoff, would have meant sufficient g to break something?

Wait a minute.......

PJ2

infrequentflyer789;
Re Post #299...I don't know why this aspect of the initial phase keeps returning to the thread either but there it is. Some accidents develop a mystique about them.

It's a big task to read through all nine or so threads I suppose but this has been discussed thoroughly and the results are consistent: - there are only a few reasonable theories which can explain why a rational, trained airline pilot would pull back half the available stick deflection and, with back-and-forth variations, keep it mostly in the NU position, even in spite of the fact that a minute later, pulling back does not arrest the rate of descent and the stall warning sounding almost constantly.

So far as training goes regarding Alternate Law, it is done in practically every simulator session as a result of some other scripted abnormality and the fact that the airplane is in Alternate Law, (1 or 2, doesn't matter...), should be instantly recognized and it should be thoroughly understood that one has an "ordinary airplane" on one's hands and must fly as a non-protected airplane. Memorized drills, QRH Procedures, SOPs and CRM are equally intended to provide quick and accurate ways to secure a compromised airplane AND to provide familiar "territory", guidance and therefore control in the face of "something wrong", to establish and maintain cockpit discipline, including the psychological and emotional responses such as perceptions, sense-making and fear which naturally accompany such events.

I posted the following graphic between a year and two years ago to show that far from unfamiliar, strange territory, flying in Alternate Law is fundamental knowledge of the airplane. This graphic is from an old CBT (Computer Based Training) module, ca. 1998.

If someone believes he is flying a computer platform which one "manages" (as we are told we are doing when using the autoflight system), and not an airplane which one flies, and expects the software design engineer and not an airline pilot of reasonable ability to retain the aircraft's innate stability and maintain control in all reasonable circumstances, then, to start, there is a major disconnect somewhere in the process of standards, training and checking and a major philosophical flaw in the approach to automation and its uses, benefits and HF problems.

I hope that the BEA Report addresses this question, among many reasonably and logically asked here.

jcjeant

Hi,

Lyman
Again .. a translation difficulty
In french he tell:
"non surtout ne ne les sors pas"
In french you can use "sors" for the action of extend flaps or deploy spoilers or extend gear or pulling a rabbit out a hat or take a walk
Je sors les flaps
Je sors les aérofreins (spoilers)
Je sors le train d'atterrissage (I extend the landing gear)
The word (verb) "sortir" can be used for various actions and its meaning depends on the context in which it is used
Finesse de la langue française
Finesse of the French language

Lyman

Hi jcjeant.

I learned at school that 'sortir' meant to 'leave, or depart'. Hence, "Sortie". "He flew three sorties today"......

"Je sors l'ecole". English is the language of aviation, by treaty, but I can understand the stress, so French is not unusual in this instance, so I don't get how 'depart' attaches to the cockpit conversation? (or that my take is 'wack'?)

Are you saying that their conversation was sloppy, or that the translation by BEA is sloppy?

merci

A33Zab

Since english is not my native tongue, I have to use:

SIMPLIFIED TECHNICAL ENGLISH
Specification ASD-STE100
European Community Trade Mark No. 004901195
International specification
for the preparation of maintenance documentation in a controlled language.



EXTENSION (n): 1. The “action” when something extends

Approved Example: MAKE SURE THAT THE EXTENSION OF THE AIRBRAKES IS SMOOTH.


DEPLOY (v),
DEPLOYS,
DEPLOYED,
DEPLOYED: To move into a position of operation from a position of storage
NOTE: Use for thrust reverser or drogue chute operations only.
For other meanings, USE: EXTEND, RELEASE

Approved example: KEEP PERSONNEL AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT WHEN THE THRUST REVERSER DEPLOYS.


Evidence is in the FDR spoiler traces!

Lyman

Thank you sir. In BEA #3 the chronology shows that the spoilers were deployed; three seconds later, the PNF states: "Do not extend" etc. In this case extend is not a noun, it is a verb?

Can you find where the spoilers were later "stowed"? I haven't found it yet.

(will post pp and exact quote, looking)

Do you have opinion on 'sortir'?

thank you

addend: For purposes of discussion, I am relating the events only to the verbal record, not the FDR. The DFDR was not a part of the problem, essentially, only a witness to it. Blending the FDR traces with a discussion amongst (the three) pilots (actual) is in a way a bias.

Lyman

@ PJ2 ....."There are only a few reasonable theories which can explain why a rational, trained airline pilot would pull back half the available stick deflection and, with back-and-forth variations, keep it mostly in the NU position, even in spite of the fact that a minute later, pulling back does not arrest the rate of descent and the stall warning sounding almost constantly."

I think I agree, but would suggest the insertion of an alternate to 'reasonable'. Can we try 'obvious'? Many possibilities have been mentioned, and rejected, in some cases, without objectivity. Bias is a subjective species of opinion, and should play no part in a detached investigation. "Reasonable" is a matter of opinion, and led in some cases to the repetitive presentation of fatal accidents, simply because the cause was not 'reasonable'.

Mention airframe damage, and the gallery frowns and stomps its feet, likewise computer failure of massive nature. In this regard, I have great respect for BEA, they do not make conclusions, only supposition. The final report will be similar. I expect an objective and thorough document. Throughout each report, the authority is careful to not make dramatic conclusion. The downside is that by exclusion, readers of the reports "conclude" fact. Damage, for instance, is possible, but not seriously addressed; therefore the popular conclusion is "Intact at Impact". A serious sceptic would respond: "Define Intact"........

jcjeant

Hi,

Indeed....
FDR traces did not reflect what the pilots see on the panel (instruments)
The FDR is the only witnesses of their actions
In flight .. the pilots did not real-time access to the FDR
They do not have a printer showing a graph (similar to those of BEA) of the FDR data recorded (and same for the ACARS)

Lyman

jcjeant. tres bien.

I can't remember how long ago it was, but I asked a question re: FDR and real time flight management.

The FDR is a resource. It is in fact a pilot with a phenomenal memory. The downside is that this resource is wasted on Court filings, arguing lawyers, and biased professionals, with an agenda.

What in God's name prevents the acquisition, analysis, and exploitation of the FDR in real time? Inertial records become flight path cues, etc.? It is a crime, to waste resources. Lives are at stake.

merci, rant fin

gums

@ Lyman.....

The relatively intact impact and wreckage pics was what prompted me to postulate the "deep stall" theory. Then I had good inputs from others here and got to see some FCOM documents and so forth. It became obvious that you could fly the 'bus into a very deep stall and have reasonable lateral control and even pitch control. But sooner or later ya gotta relax the back pressure or even push the stick forward and see what happens.

Gotta tellya that the HUD I had in the Viper and Sluf used real time inertial data for the flight path marker and AoA and vertical velocity and alt and speed and heading........ When you see the AoA bracket at the top of the HUD and speed is slow......duhhhhhh.

I am having my LEF failure video digitized so all can see how neat the HUD was when you are making the first landing attempt with serious stuff not working like it's programmed to do.

Lyman

gums

howdy. Since you're USAF, you may be familiar with John Boyd and his thirty second challenge at Nellis. Col. Boyd was not well liked by Brass, he had no time for pyramid types.

If you know about Boyd's flat plating trick, you may know how stable the HUN was in totally departed flat aspect, all drag, no lift, an object of diminishing energy, giving it up for the 'cause'. It won for Boyd his deserved rep, and cred.

How different is 447's 330? Not much, I think. The a/c derived its 'stability' in deep Stall from spill, not flow.

The HUD, inertial cueing and other military benchmarks are expensive. Very expensive. If Joe Q. Public knew how safe he would be if the beanies spent some dough, he would revolt, as did the Air France pilots, when they finally realized how they had been waltzed by the company v/v PITOT THALES.

It is way important to keep the real deal on the down low, lest profits fall with fewer and fewer fatalities, as equipment is brought (at great expense) into the NOW, out of the THEN.

447 remained stable because she had her airmass controlled. She wasn't "directing" the flow, she was not in flow. She was in "spill". One can fly drag, as well as lift; ask a sailor, or read Boyd's "ACM" white papers.

You speak 'boydese'?

cheers, see you at the bar.

wings of tin

gums

Salute!

@Lyman

Don't get into Boyd other than the OODA. The guy may have helped get the Viper and Eagle and Hornet into the inventory, but his A2A claims are grossly embellished, and I know folks of his vintage.

As RR and others have posted, the OODA loop was in play for AF447. The thing I see is the "d" and the "a". Ya gotta give the jet a few seconds to respond to whatever you or Hal is commanding. Then you decide and act.

I shall still ascribe most of the tragedy to pilot actions, but I'll also add some human factors, crew coordination and design philosophy/implementation factors.

This will be a landmark accident report.

G

A33Zab

Sorry to correct you again:



STOWED:

Lyman

What's left after correction is what is correct, the Truth. It's all good.....

thank you Captain.

PJ2

Lyman;
No, that loses/reinterprets my intended meaning. The notion of "plausible", associated with "reasonable", isn't the same as "obvious".

PJ2

OK465

Momentary off topic:

Boyd's 'trick' worked for one and only one reason...

He positioned his 'victim' close enough behind him that, keeping in mind the slight delay in reacting, there were actually only two outcomes possible if the 'victim' attempted to 'follow' him,

the 'victim' either accepted the overshoot or...the 'victim' was willing to HIT him.

Boyd did not depart the F-100, he simply used max instantaneous turn capability with some thrust modulation and a loaded rudder reversal, all at speeds & AOA above the stall.

If the A330 simulation is near accurate, the A330 is quite a bit more stable approaching and entering a stall than an F-100 for which...the word 'squirrel' comes to mind.

Back to the game...

Lyman

Yes, exactly, I was trying to point out the difference in our respective povs.

I did not mean to "correct" your post, only a temporry mod, to frame the difference between "Plausible", and "apparent".

Implausible, unreasonable: "It doesn't make sense".

Obvious, apparent: "Sense or not, there it is." Some things that don't make sense can kill people, and judging something by how much logic it contains can mislead. Just my opinion. As a matter of fact, the less sense evidence makes, the more one should be open to "Implausible". A parenthetic to Occam?

cheers

DozyWannabe

Only once the evidence came back that suggested pretty conclusively that neither had occurred. Prior to that the most accurate thing anyone could say was that it was unlikely, and attempt to explain why it was unlikely with the facts at their disposal (as I did).

It's one thing to think outside the box in an open-minded fashion - but what tends to be the case in any incident or accident involving Airbus is that some people - usually the same people each time - will approach the problem with a pre-conceived conclusion in mind to support a personal agenda which pre-dates that particular incident.

@chrisN - I don't think they ever got roll under control in any meaningful sense, because the PF was trying to use fistfuls of aileron throughout the sequence. Prior to the stall gentle aileron may have been effective, but post-stall the only thing that can effectively control roll is rudder.