AF 447 Thread No. 8
Clandestino;
With regard to "missing a basic aerodynamic fact", no, I don't think either of us are missing that point. It should be quite obvious that both procedures keep the airplane flying - that is the entire point of the discussion and doesn't need re-stating.
The FCTM is a guide and an expansion upon the AOM. That fact is made abundantly clear and it should be abundantly clear to operating crews that the AOM is the legal document as specified in a carrier's OC.
The reference to the FCTM is made because, first the FCTM expands on many operating and abnormal matters and is available, and second because it explains how the UAS drill and the ADR Disagree checklists are to be done, which has proven a point of contention and confusion.
There is some value in such information given the fact that almost everyone including the BEA in their press conference was of the opinion that initially setting 5deg was the correct way to perform the memory items. It is not. But setting 5deg does no harm unless it is kept for an extended period of time - clearly, both keep the airplane flying.
Regarding theories of why the PF pitched the aircraft up, I have stated that there are a number of plausible theories and this is one. We will see what the BEA has to say and even then that likely will not be conclusive. We simply do not know why.
CONF iture, thanks for the link to the video - I'll view when able - back on the road. Clearly however, Airbus thinks that it isn't useful otherwise they would enhance it, not remove it.
With regard to "missing a basic aerodynamic fact", no, I don't think either of us are missing that point. It should be quite obvious that both procedures keep the airplane flying - that is the entire point of the discussion and doesn't need re-stating.
The FCTM is a guide and an expansion upon the AOM. That fact is made abundantly clear and it should be abundantly clear to operating crews that the AOM is the legal document as specified in a carrier's OC.
The reference to the FCTM is made because, first the FCTM expands on many operating and abnormal matters and is available, and second because it explains how the UAS drill and the ADR Disagree checklists are to be done, which has proven a point of contention and confusion.
There is some value in such information given the fact that almost everyone including the BEA in their press conference was of the opinion that initially setting 5deg was the correct way to perform the memory items. It is not. But setting 5deg does no harm unless it is kept for an extended period of time - clearly, both keep the airplane flying.
Regarding theories of why the PF pitched the aircraft up, I have stated that there are a number of plausible theories and this is one. We will see what the BEA has to say and even then that likely will not be conclusive. We simply do not know why.
CONF iture, thanks for the link to the video - I'll view when able - back on the road. Clearly however, Airbus thinks that it isn't useful otherwise they would enhance it, not remove it.
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CONF, with all due respect that's a narrow way of looking at things.
Beginning with the "iron cross" indicator, an alternative to your "don't want the PNF to see what the PF is doing" could be expressed as a desire to avoid visual distractions from the primary instruments during a crucial phase of flight. As many have pointed out, the ADI is perfectly capable of showing the aircraft's response to inputs.
I'd imagine in fact, that before changing the sidestick indicator removal from 100ft RA to weight-on-wheels, they canvassed pilots to find out how many of them were using the indicator after rotation and found most weren't. The indicator itself was only ever intended to be a method for cross-checking control movement during pre-flight and taxi as far as I know.
We've done this dance for years, you and I - I'm aware of your position and understand it, although I've never been 100% sure of your motives or agenda. As I said to Lyman, I'm not advocating sidestick over yoke - both have pros and cons, even for pilots. There are hypotheticals which favour yokes (which you've already pointed out), and there are hypotheticals which favour non-connected sidesticks (including artificial feel unit failure and incapacitation scenarios in which the incapacitated pilot is restricting yoke movement - how do you get their yoke free in a two-pilot aircraft without leaving your seat and letting go of your yoke?).
Aviation will progress one way or the other, and some aviators will be resistant to change - the Wright Brothers considered aileron panels inferior to their wing-warping technique, many pilots resisted the introduction of the autopilot and CVR and many were concerned about the introduction of widebodies which relied entirely on hydraulics with no cable backup (notwithstanding the fact that cable backup was impossible with flight surfaces the size of those on the 747, L-1011 and DC-10).
Airbus's electronic sidestick design was no different in that respect, however over the years its reliability has been proven and the chorus of dissent has lessened. The simple truth is that preference for one over the other is personal and subjective, just as I said to Lyman.
Sidestick aside, some target Airbus because they feel that the introduction of advanced computer technology and advance of automation has led to the atrophy of manual handling skills - maybe it has, but Airbus aren't the only ones following that path. In fact there was a greater advance in computer control and automation technology between the 727 and 757 than there was between the 757 and A320. I suspect Boeing would have done away with the cable backup in the 737NG but for the fact that it would put the "grandfathering" certification clause in jeopardy.
Things move on. Both Airbus and Boeing have proven their designs as successful, reliable and safe - the fact that they've both stuck to their guns means that pilots have a choice. One thing that's always puzzled me is that despite your distrust for the Airbus design, you still fly the type. I don't know who you fly for, but I feel sure that they or others you're well-qualified for have yoke-equipped types. If you feel the design is a detriment to safety, why do you go to work in it every day?
Beginning with the "iron cross" indicator, an alternative to your "don't want the PNF to see what the PF is doing" could be expressed as a desire to avoid visual distractions from the primary instruments during a crucial phase of flight. As many have pointed out, the ADI is perfectly capable of showing the aircraft's response to inputs.
I'd imagine in fact, that before changing the sidestick indicator removal from 100ft RA to weight-on-wheels, they canvassed pilots to find out how many of them were using the indicator after rotation and found most weren't. The indicator itself was only ever intended to be a method for cross-checking control movement during pre-flight and taxi as far as I know.
We've done this dance for years, you and I - I'm aware of your position and understand it, although I've never been 100% sure of your motives or agenda. As I said to Lyman, I'm not advocating sidestick over yoke - both have pros and cons, even for pilots. There are hypotheticals which favour yokes (which you've already pointed out), and there are hypotheticals which favour non-connected sidesticks (including artificial feel unit failure and incapacitation scenarios in which the incapacitated pilot is restricting yoke movement - how do you get their yoke free in a two-pilot aircraft without leaving your seat and letting go of your yoke?).
Aviation will progress one way or the other, and some aviators will be resistant to change - the Wright Brothers considered aileron panels inferior to their wing-warping technique, many pilots resisted the introduction of the autopilot and CVR and many were concerned about the introduction of widebodies which relied entirely on hydraulics with no cable backup (notwithstanding the fact that cable backup was impossible with flight surfaces the size of those on the 747, L-1011 and DC-10).
Airbus's electronic sidestick design was no different in that respect, however over the years its reliability has been proven and the chorus of dissent has lessened. The simple truth is that preference for one over the other is personal and subjective, just as I said to Lyman.
Sidestick aside, some target Airbus because they feel that the introduction of advanced computer technology and advance of automation has led to the atrophy of manual handling skills - maybe it has, but Airbus aren't the only ones following that path. In fact there was a greater advance in computer control and automation technology between the 727 and 757 than there was between the 757 and A320. I suspect Boeing would have done away with the cable backup in the 737NG but for the fact that it would put the "grandfathering" certification clause in jeopardy.
Things move on. Both Airbus and Boeing have proven their designs as successful, reliable and safe - the fact that they've both stuck to their guns means that pilots have a choice. One thing that's always puzzled me is that despite your distrust for the Airbus design, you still fly the type. I don't know who you fly for, but I feel sure that they or others you're well-qualified for have yoke-equipped types. If you feel the design is a detriment to safety, why do you go to work in it every day?
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@Dozy
While I do favor real yokes as a little extra safety insurance, notwithstanding those Boeing crashes where they didn't save the day, I find myself defending "joy sticks" in the case of your example. In answer to your rhetorical question above, I have to say, just push the override button! You prolly just forgot for a moment. 
Why do you insist that CONF has "motives" or an "agenda?" My take is that he's truly concerned with safety above defending any one system; not such a bad thing, is it? Subtle imputation, dear me, that's not so nice.....
We've done this dance for years, you and I - I'm aware of your position and understand it, although I've never been 100% sure of your motives or agenda. As I said to Lyman, I'm not advocating sidestick over yoke - both have pros and cons, even for pilots. There are hypotheticals which favour yokes (which you've already pointed out), and there are hypotheticals which favour non-connected sidesticks (including artificial feel unit failure and incapacitation scenarios in which the incapacitated pilot is restricting yoke movement - how do you get their yoke free in a two-pilot aircraft without leaving your seat and letting go of your yoke?).
Why do you insist that CONF has "motives" or an "agenda?" My take is that he's truly concerned with safety above defending any one system; not such a bad thing, is it? Subtle imputation, dear me, that's not so nice.....
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Addendumb
P.S. The sidestick's only good reason for being is that it saves money (reduced weight), plus the benefit of having a clear dashboard. The industry has always maintained that cost vs./safety is an equation that needs to be balanced. I, for one, feel that's just wrong. Cost should never trump safety. 
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As many have pointed out, the ADI is perfectly capable of showing the aircraft's response to inputs.
The problem is to see the position of the stick
The ADI may well show an attitude of descent while the stick is in position to climb
The ADI don't show the stick position
You will (suppose) know his position after the aircraft response on the command (visually on the ADI)
Sometime (if wrong command by the stick) it's too late for counter command
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Let's be specific. 447 shows us some very pertinent data. The SS is the heart of the life and death of this flight, agree? For three years, this thread has made abundantly clear that the two pilots were not a team, and PF tells, "I have been pulling back for some while"....
Inarguable. So let's look a bit further. The very device that could have saved the flight, did it in.
Moving the controls apart in the cockpit, from the front to the side, ISOLATED each stick from the other. (See Lufthansa, Tip Strike), To the extent that the Stick cannot be recognized by the partner/Pilot, sufficient to show the command, the aircraft is operating SINGLE PILOT. This is unacceptable. As jcjeant and CONFiture show, a belated display to show controls results is not best practice.
Explain, apologize, distract, insult, the truth cannot be hidden. Part of the direct cause of the crash involved a lack of proper brief of the Captain. When told to "Climb", PF says "I have been...." A critical and obvious 'brief' is the position of the controls, stop. It also requires no time to discuss, if visible to others.
I submit and suggest that the confusion that developed in the cockpit had more to do with the lack of visibility of the SS's than any other factor. And Confusion in the teeth of surprise is, obviously, in this case, Fatal......
Inarguable. So let's look a bit further. The very device that could have saved the flight, did it in.
Moving the controls apart in the cockpit, from the front to the side, ISOLATED each stick from the other. (See Lufthansa, Tip Strike), To the extent that the Stick cannot be recognized by the partner/Pilot, sufficient to show the command, the aircraft is operating SINGLE PILOT. This is unacceptable. As jcjeant and CONFiture show, a belated display to show controls results is not best practice.
Explain, apologize, distract, insult, the truth cannot be hidden. Part of the direct cause of the crash involved a lack of proper brief of the Captain. When told to "Climb", PF says "I have been...." A critical and obvious 'brief' is the position of the controls, stop. It also requires no time to discuss, if visible to others.
I submit and suggest that the confusion that developed in the cockpit had more to do with the lack of visibility of the SS's than any other factor. And Confusion in the teeth of surprise is, obviously, in this case, Fatal......
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Lyman said:
From Flight Global re:LH044:
I sez: This is scary stuff. I'm not going.
Moving the controls apart in the cockpit, from the front to the side, ISOLATED each stick from the other. (See Lufthansa, Tip Strike)
From Flight Global re:LH044:
Flight-data recorder information shows that, in the final moments of the approach, both pilots were applying sidestick input. A320 aircraft are able to accept dual input the inputs from the two sidesticks are numerically summed.
At a height of 75ft (25m) the aircraft began to drift to the left, and the co-pilot moved the sidestick 10e_SDgr right, while at 50ft the sidestick was moved left accompanied by a 28e_SDgr left-rudder input. The captain gave 4.5e_SDgr right-hand input to his sidestick at 15ft, and the co-pilot also moved her sidestick from left to right.
The aircraft banked 4e_SDgr left, touching down briefly with the left main landing-gear, before the roll angle increased to 23e_SDgr left and the wing-tip struck the runway.
At a height of 75ft (25m) the aircraft began to drift to the left, and the co-pilot moved the sidestick 10e_SDgr right, while at 50ft the sidestick was moved left accompanied by a 28e_SDgr left-rudder input. The captain gave 4.5e_SDgr right-hand input to his sidestick at 15ft, and the co-pilot also moved her sidestick from left to right.
The aircraft banked 4e_SDgr left, touching down briefly with the left main landing-gear, before the roll angle increased to 23e_SDgr left and the wing-tip struck the runway.
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There may be one on the T7's software-driven yokes, but I don't know.
My take is that he's truly concerned with safety above defending any one system; not such a bad thing, is it? Subtle imputation, dear me, that's not so nice.....
How often is that really necessary though? To my mind there's only one incident where it might have helped (the aforementioned LH incident). In that incident, the landing conditions were marginal and the F/O should not really have been attempting the landing. The Captain broke procedure by snatching the stick without first overriding it.
The ADI may well show an attitude of descent while the stick is in position to climb
Sometime (if wrong command by the stick) it's too late for counter command
Again, benefits and drawbacks to both approaches.
No, it's standard airline practice. One pilot in control, the other monitoring - switching roles as and when necessary. The only time you need two pilots pulling is in the case of a cable-driven flight control system to get extra force on the surfaces - no modern airliner bar the 737 has cable connection to the yoke.
The problem with 447 was not confusion over the sidesticks, it was because on the two occasions the PNF took control, the PF continued making inputs on the sidestick, despite having acknowledged handing control over. The PNF should have seen the "DUAL INPUT" warning and could have held the override down to lock the PF out, but he did not.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 4th May 2012 at 16:55.
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@DW:
I apologize for misunderstanding your example. I read it as a point against SS. Rereading, I see that you were talking about yokes. Never mind, I'll be quiet now.
As far as I know, there's no override button on a mechanically-connected yoke, otherwise EgyptAir 990 would have had a happier ending.
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@Dozy....Quote:
Originally Posted by jcjeant
"The problem is to see the position of the stick......."
How often is that really necessary though? To my mind there's only one incident where it might have helped (the aforementioned LH incident). In that incident, the landing conditions were marginal and the F/O should not really have been attempting the landing. The Captain broke procedure by snatching the stick without first overriding it.
It is not acceptable to ignore an unsafe condition by asking a rhetorical question? "How often is that really necessary, though?"
I submit the Captain in Lufthansa incident was responding to a result of input, not a controls condition...ipso facto, your argument does not apply. Had he seen her 'wheel' command a bank radically to the right, he would have had a time advantage, and been able to avoid a 200kEuro repair.....
Throughout the CVR, and I mean no disrespect to the unfortunate souls on board, well, I'd post Abbott and Costello's "Who's on first?". Substantially, if not wholly, the confusion re: "climb, not climb, down not down, UP, no down, ok not down," was exacerbated by the lack of understanding v/v the SS, either/or or both. The 'handoffs' problem was collateral, and after the fact.....
Originally Posted by jcjeant
"The problem is to see the position of the stick......."
How often is that really necessary though? To my mind there's only one incident where it might have helped (the aforementioned LH incident). In that incident, the landing conditions were marginal and the F/O should not really have been attempting the landing. The Captain broke procedure by snatching the stick without first overriding it.
It is not acceptable to ignore an unsafe condition by asking a rhetorical question? "How often is that really necessary, though?"
I submit the Captain in Lufthansa incident was responding to a result of input, not a controls condition...ipso facto, your argument does not apply. Had he seen her 'wheel' command a bank radically to the right, he would have had a time advantage, and been able to avoid a 200kEuro repair.....
Throughout the CVR, and I mean no disrespect to the unfortunate souls on board, well, I'd post Abbott and Costello's "Who's on first?". Substantially, if not wholly, the confusion re: "climb, not climb, down not down, UP, no down, ok not down," was exacerbated by the lack of understanding v/v the SS, either/or or both. The 'handoffs' problem was collateral, and after the fact.....
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Lyman, there are myriad potential unsafe conditions arising from connected yokes (e.g. EgyptAir 990), as well as several accidents where yoke position was not noted.
I'm not saying one is better or worse than the other, I'm saying that they are *both* valid designs.
The LH incident was a failure of procedure. The Captain should have been performing the landing in crosswinds of that magnitude in the first place. The Captain allowing the F/O to continue was a questionable command decision (as was AF447's CDB placing F/O Bonin in charge with doubtful weather ahead and a known icing problem on that type, but I digress), and he then compounded it by mishandling taking control.
With a yoke, the LH Captain would have had to fight the control forces his F/O was making, to which her reaction could have been to pull harder in the opposite direction. On top of that, dual yoke input may not do what you think. There's a school of thought on EgyptAir 990 which has the forward yoke command of the F/O and the rearward yoke command of the Captain causing the elevators to split (one up, one down), causing instant loss of control.
Again, the PNF on AF447 had the tools right in front of him to not only take control, but to lock the PF out for a period if necessary - tools put there by Airbus specifically to ensure safe operation of the aircraft if one of the pilots is not performing correctly. He did not use these tools - why?
I'm not saying one is better or worse than the other, I'm saying that they are *both* valid designs.
The LH incident was a failure of procedure. The Captain should have been performing the landing in crosswinds of that magnitude in the first place. The Captain allowing the F/O to continue was a questionable command decision (as was AF447's CDB placing F/O Bonin in charge with doubtful weather ahead and a known icing problem on that type, but I digress), and he then compounded it by mishandling taking control.
With a yoke, the LH Captain would have had to fight the control forces his F/O was making, to which her reaction could have been to pull harder in the opposite direction. On top of that, dual yoke input may not do what you think. There's a school of thought on EgyptAir 990 which has the forward yoke command of the F/O and the rearward yoke command of the Captain causing the elevators to split (one up, one down), causing instant loss of control.
Again, the PNF on AF447 had the tools right in front of him to not only take control, but to lock the PF out for a period if necessary - tools put there by Airbus specifically to ensure safe operation of the aircraft if one of the pilots is not performing correctly. He did not use these tools - why?
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 4th May 2012 at 17:25.
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"The LH incident was a failure of procedure. The Captain should have been performing the landing in crosswinds of that magnitude in the first place. The Captain allowing the F/O to continue was a questionable command decision (as was AF447's CDB placing F/O Bonin in charge with doubtful weather ahead and a known icing problem on that type, but I digress), and he then compounded it by mishandling taking control."
Erm....no.
1. But the F/O was landing, and not subject to your approval.
"With a yoke, the LH Captain would have had to fight the control forces his F/O was making, to which her reaction could have been to pull harder in the opposite direction. On top of that, dual yoke input may not do what you think. There's a school of thought on EgyptAir 990 which has the forward yoke command of the F/O and the rearward yoke command of the Captain causing the elevators to split (one up, one down), causing instant loss of control."
2. Fight? NO. The F/O removes her hands immediately when the Captain even touches his wheel. She won't even wait for "My aircraft".
3. It was the additive controls due to lack of command isolation that caused Lufthansa to strike the concrete with her sharklet. Again, Captain says... and takes, she drops. (With yokes). No cross command possible.
@Dozy..."Again, the PNF on AF447 had the tools right in front of him to not only take control, but to lock the PF out for a period if necessary - tools put there by Airbus specifically to ensure safe operation of the aircraft if one of the pilots is not performing correctly. He did not use these tools - why?
The BEA will tell us why... but let me anticipate. Command confusion due to one or more of several causes. PNF does not assuredly trust his displays, so to take command, he felt his evidence for doing so was questionable. Culture in Air France puts pressure on ego, and shame, just like Korea. It is very stressful for both people to change the command. Did we hear the Captain attempting to apportion command (control)? NO, and he is the Commander de vol. So Captain himself does not see a problem with PF's performance beyond some obvious corrections, Rudder Bar coming to mind. Captain notes PF "I have no VS..." and says, get this...."Ok"... "He's pulling UP...." "Well someone should, we're at 4000 feet"......Remember, the Captain enters and says "What the Hell are you doing?.....
Erm....no.
1. But the F/O was landing, and not subject to your approval.
"With a yoke, the LH Captain would have had to fight the control forces his F/O was making, to which her reaction could have been to pull harder in the opposite direction. On top of that, dual yoke input may not do what you think. There's a school of thought on EgyptAir 990 which has the forward yoke command of the F/O and the rearward yoke command of the Captain causing the elevators to split (one up, one down), causing instant loss of control."
2. Fight? NO. The F/O removes her hands immediately when the Captain even touches his wheel. She won't even wait for "My aircraft".
3. It was the additive controls due to lack of command isolation that caused Lufthansa to strike the concrete with her sharklet. Again, Captain says... and takes, she drops. (With yokes). No cross command possible.
@Dozy..."Again, the PNF on AF447 had the tools right in front of him to not only take control, but to lock the PF out for a period if necessary - tools put there by Airbus specifically to ensure safe operation of the aircraft if one of the pilots is not performing correctly. He did not use these tools - why?
The BEA will tell us why... but let me anticipate. Command confusion due to one or more of several causes. PNF does not assuredly trust his displays, so to take command, he felt his evidence for doing so was questionable. Culture in Air France puts pressure on ego, and shame, just like Korea. It is very stressful for both people to change the command. Did we hear the Captain attempting to apportion command (control)? NO, and he is the Commander de vol. So Captain himself does not see a problem with PF's performance beyond some obvious corrections, Rudder Bar coming to mind. Captain notes PF "I have no VS..." and says, get this...."Ok"... "He's pulling UP...." "Well someone should, we're at 4000 feet"......Remember, the Captain enters and says "What the Hell are you doing?.....
Last edited by Lyman; 4th May 2012 at 17:53.
Ah, I see - no worries. I hope bubbers44' neighbour is open-minded and willing to learn a bit.
I'm interested in your note regarding the FCTM.
First, I know that each airline determines for itself, within applicable limits, how it will operate a manufacturer's aircraft. A few decades ago, we used to re-write the manuals entirely and heaven help someone who transitioned from one airline to another. Today, most airlines adopt the Boeing and/or Airbus ramp-to-ramp SOPs with type-specific modifications.
The FCTM is, as you say, more a resource than a manual and any disagreement between the AOM and other manuals is resolved in favour of the AOM. First such manual I saw was for the B727 around 1983. We've used a type of FCTM for years - the present Airbus one is a very helpful document. As you would know, it can be supplied by the manufacturer, earlier, moreso from Airbus than Boeing, and then modified to accommodate airline-specific procedures. The ones I've seen are very close in their presentations and procedures. The present response to the UAS showed up in about 2007, with the flow-schematic which included the 'do not do the memory items' qualification. IIRC I posted an image of the flow-chart.
I'm interested in your note regarding the FCTM.
First, I know that each airline determines for itself, within applicable limits, how it will operate a manufacturer's aircraft. A few decades ago, we used to re-write the manuals entirely and heaven help someone who transitioned from one airline to another. Today, most airlines adopt the Boeing and/or Airbus ramp-to-ramp SOPs with type-specific modifications.
The FCTM is, as you say, more a resource than a manual and any disagreement between the AOM and other manuals is resolved in favour of the AOM. First such manual I saw was for the B727 around 1983. We've used a type of FCTM for years - the present Airbus one is a very helpful document. As you would know, it can be supplied by the manufacturer, earlier, moreso from Airbus than Boeing, and then modified to accommodate airline-specific procedures. The ones I've seen are very close in their presentations and procedures. The present response to the UAS showed up in about 2007, with the flow-schematic which included the 'do not do the memory items' qualification. IIRC I posted an image of the flow-chart.
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3. It was the additive controls due to lack of command isolation that caused Lufthansa to strike the concrete with her sharklet. Again, Captain says... and takes, she drops. (With yokes). No cross command possible.
Come on Lyman, this is whataboutery and prejudice - I expect better.
O.F.;
No, it shouldn't.
But it does, mainly because most of the time such a decision is made (commercial versus safety priorities) the circumstances are complex, there are many factors pulling the decision-makers in both directions and on any one day, it is possible, given history, experience, competency, either decision could be, in the moment, the correct one.
I know of at least three A320 heavy landings which exceeded the certification limits in which the airplane flew again, right away. I know at least one was a commercial decision until Airbus got hold of the data and grounded the airplane. Often it isn't nearly as clear-cut and airlines have significant challenges today with horribly low fares and therefore precious little money with which to "do the right thing". The industry is so far retaining its enviable safety record and that says something about successful decision-making and cost-cutting. But the phrase, "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks", was the title of a paper written by William Starbuck on the Challenger accident. Great title, great point. And Diane Vaughn has written a superb book entitled, "The Challenger Launch Decision" - an excellent examination of the organizational culture and the "normalization of deviance" at NASA which led to the first, and many agree, the second shuttle.
I think the same thing applies today and it takes awareness of these factors and strong leadership to cut costs at an airline and remain as safe as possible. It isn't black-and-white.
Cost should never trump safety.
But it does, mainly because most of the time such a decision is made (commercial versus safety priorities) the circumstances are complex, there are many factors pulling the decision-makers in both directions and on any one day, it is possible, given history, experience, competency, either decision could be, in the moment, the correct one.
I know of at least three A320 heavy landings which exceeded the certification limits in which the airplane flew again, right away. I know at least one was a commercial decision until Airbus got hold of the data and grounded the airplane. Often it isn't nearly as clear-cut and airlines have significant challenges today with horribly low fares and therefore precious little money with which to "do the right thing". The industry is so far retaining its enviable safety record and that says something about successful decision-making and cost-cutting. But the phrase, "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks", was the title of a paper written by William Starbuck on the Challenger accident. Great title, great point. And Diane Vaughn has written a superb book entitled, "The Challenger Launch Decision" - an excellent examination of the organizational culture and the "normalization of deviance" at NASA which led to the first, and many agree, the second shuttle.
I think the same thing applies today and it takes awareness of these factors and strong leadership to cut costs at an airline and remain as safe as possible. It isn't black-and-white.
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Dozy, you are the whatabouteryiste here. What I describe is the procedure with yokes at all times, without exception. "My aircraft" is based on many things, but always includes a peep at the controls.
You have ignored the time advantage in visible controls, if the PF is maneuvering incorrectly, the Captain (Lufthansa) does exactly what I describe, if in an a/c with visisble controls. I don't have to guess, and you saying that Captain would have a tug 'o War with F/O in a yoked airplane is absurd.
You have ignored the time advantage in visible controls, if the PF is maneuvering incorrectly, the Captain (Lufthansa) does exactly what I describe, if in an a/c with visisble controls. I don't have to guess, and you saying that Captain would have a tug 'o War with F/O in a yoked airplane is absurd.
Lyman - yep, that, and a whole lot of other things I personally witnessed during my flight data work. Thing is, I never understood why they perceived flight data as "just an opinion" that could be dismissed when inconvenient.
Further to the point and further off-topic, this came out today:
Further to the point and further off-topic, this came out today:
WASHINGTON (AP) - Federal officials are seeking $655,125 in fines against Alaska Airlines and its Horizon Air affiliate for alleged safety violations, including failing to inspect a plane for cracks.
Sponsored LinksThe Federal Aviation Administration said Thursday that Horizon operated a Bombardier Dash-8-400 aircraft on 45 flights, while it failed to follow a safety order to check for cracked or corroded fittings on the engine housing.
A 2011 order required airlines to inspect the fittings every 300 hours of flight time and make repairs as needed. The FAA said Horizon used the plane on at least 45 passenger flights in March 2011 after it had passed the 300-hour mark.
The FAA proposed a civil penalty of $445,125 against Horizon.
The FAA also said it would seek a $210,000 civil penalty against Alaska Airlines, charging that the airline failed to properly tag turned-off equipment before making repairs to Boeing 737 jets. It said the violations of worker-safety rules occurred 10 times in 2010 and 2011.
Both airlines are owned by Seattle-based Alaska Air Group Inc.
Company spokeswoman Bobbie Egan said Horizon performed the required inspection of the fitting over the engine covering, "however, we did not properly document our maintenance due to a misunderstanding over wording on the work order." She said the plane was pulled from service the next day after the documentation mistake was spotted, was inspected again and passed.
Egan added that Horizon is replacing the fittings with ones that don't require such frequent inspections.
On the Alaska planes, she said, the maintenance work was done to Boeing's specifications but not properly documented. She said passengers were never in danger.
The airlines have 30 days to respond to the FAA
Sponsored LinksThe Federal Aviation Administration said Thursday that Horizon operated a Bombardier Dash-8-400 aircraft on 45 flights, while it failed to follow a safety order to check for cracked or corroded fittings on the engine housing.
A 2011 order required airlines to inspect the fittings every 300 hours of flight time and make repairs as needed. The FAA said Horizon used the plane on at least 45 passenger flights in March 2011 after it had passed the 300-hour mark.
The FAA proposed a civil penalty of $445,125 against Horizon.
The FAA also said it would seek a $210,000 civil penalty against Alaska Airlines, charging that the airline failed to properly tag turned-off equipment before making repairs to Boeing 737 jets. It said the violations of worker-safety rules occurred 10 times in 2010 and 2011.
Both airlines are owned by Seattle-based Alaska Air Group Inc.
Company spokeswoman Bobbie Egan said Horizon performed the required inspection of the fitting over the engine covering, "however, we did not properly document our maintenance due to a misunderstanding over wording on the work order." She said the plane was pulled from service the next day after the documentation mistake was spotted, was inspected again and passed.
Egan added that Horizon is replacing the fittings with ones that don't require such frequent inspections.
On the Alaska planes, she said, the maintenance work was done to Boeing's specifications but not properly documented. She said passengers were never in danger.
The airlines have 30 days to respond to the FAA
Last edited by PJ2; 4th May 2012 at 18:52.
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You have ignored the time advantage in visible controls
I don't have to guess, and you saying that Captain would have a tug 'o War with F/O in a yoked airplane is absurd.
@PJ2 :
Flippin' 'eck! You'd have thought Alaska would be the last airline to let those kind of shenanigans happen again after the drubbing they got over Alaska 261...