Machinbird

Lyman
Still pushing an agenda I see. Practicing the lawyer's art are you?

At least your factual arguments are getting more factual. It is just your IMHOs that we have to be careful of. What effect do you suppose the extinguishing of the stall warning had on the captain when he re-entered the flight deck? In his shoes, wouldn't you normally think that the guys in the seats had reduced AOA? That affected his mental starting point, and the bunnies in the seats then didn't help with their minimal brief.

Organfreak

Machinbird, agreed. While we have every right to expect fully-trained personel on deck, this airplane needs much more work on idiot-proofing.

TTex600

At the very least, I would change the UAS drill to require cross cockpit crew communication.

Either pilot should be allowed/required to challenge air speed reliability and there should be a SOP in the manual for exact phraseology to be used in such an event. The challenge should be required and the response exact. i.e., "UAS suspected, Left side indicates xxx. What is your airspeed?" followed by "Right side indicates xxx, Stdby indicates xxx" . Or something to that effect.

We take our time dealing with engine failures at V1, why not take our time dealing with UAS?

As written, the UAS procedure is "immediate action" and it appears that the rote response to immediate action could have been incorrect in this AF447 case. (at the very least

OK465

Be willing to pay more for a ticket (or e-ticket as the case may be).

Machinbird

This particular recommendation would have had a positive influence on the outcomes of at least 3 accidents that I can immediately think of. Is there any down side to this type procedure? Are there any limitations on when to apply it?

mm43

Thanks for posting the B787 method of using "synthetic" airspeed and GPS altitude when discrepancies with the Pitot/Baro system are detected. I've placed the details of the image you posted in quotes above, mainly so that it will be found when searching the thread.

So my answer to Machinbird's challenge is for Airbus to implement a similar system as described above and alluded to by me as early as July 2009 in post #3999 in the AF447 Thread and recently in post #616 in AF447 No.4 Thread.

Now I haven't heard of any B787 pilots objecting to not having to deal with UAS - has anyone else??

Machinbird

and as suggested by Machinbird in July 2009 in the same thread http://www.pprune.org/5093224-post3981.html and probably by a number of others as well.

Boeing is one upping Airbus in the technical wars of how to design a better airliner. Now we can have competitive pressures to add to pressures from regulators to improve the existing Airbus design.

infrequentflyer789

Airbus already has backup speed scale - BUSS - which is effectively a synthetic airspeed from same source parameters as the Boeing one.

How many types is Boeing implementing this on ? I think BUSS is available on everything later than 320, and mandatory on 380 onwards ?

Machinbird

BUSS is really an AOA indicator gussied up to look like the PFD airspeed indication as best they could. Very different principle compared to Boeing's synthetic airspeed (from what we can learn from A33Zab's post).

Organfreak

...And as long as BUSS is optional there are thousands more lives it can't save.

bubbers44

A competent pilot would not pull up into a stall ignoring his altitude and pitching far above any attitude that would provide any hope of recovery. These new guys needed the captain to help them because they were lost as far as flying properly and not prepared to fly the plane properly. Copilots should be able to handle these situations if properly experienced. These two were not obviously. I just wonder if they have improved the FO standards since this happened. Most US FO's have over 10.000 hrs before they fly the long hauls over the Atlantic. Much more before they can be a captain. We can do it so why can't they?

CONF iture

Interesting, you are pretty well informed here.
I note the one on the non availability of the FD … part of the reason I am very much interested in the AP/FD vertical mode trace.
Some seem to be a consequence from Perpignan, some others maybe already from AF447 …

NAV IAS DISCREPANCY ECAM MSG became standard on our fleet sometimes between 2008 – 2009 but I could not tell precisely which month. I would have thought AF447 was equipped, but I’ve been wrong on the electrical rudder already so …

CONF iture

The real link between Habsheim and AF447 is that the BEA is investigating an Airbus accident.

Habsheim – 2 pilots decided to present the brand new 320 at very low speed very low altitude with minimum preparation. To perform such maneuver with just the front crew onboard would have been questionable already, but to perform it with a pax loaded cabin was a total lack of judgment. Obviously the crew decision is the reason for the crash and must be remembered as such.

But did it absolve the BEA to tell the all story ?
Is it the BEA mission to cover up the truth ?

The truth had to be told – The crew would not have been considered less responsible.

1. When the pilot applied the thrust, one engine stalled, and the other one responded much slowly than expected. As the captain had that very bad idea to fly below the trees line ... happened what happened.
2. When the pilot applied full back stick, the airplane refused to deliver alpha max. That characteristic will be documented 20 years later by the NTSB following the Hudson ditching. Maybe at the end that would not have done any difference, but it was the role of the BEA to detail that flight control behavior below 50 feet.

It is not called a conspiracy Dozy, it is called damage control.

DozyWannabe

Funny - I've seen the footage lord alone knows how many times and not once did I hear anything indicating a compressor stall. The engines were *spooled down*, because that's what had been ordered to try and fudge the rushed approach.

The aircraft *did* gave him alpha max, but alpha max was *limited* by the airspeed. To have increased the AoA much further would have induced a stall and probably would have killed most of the people on board.

Now - AF447 please.

Lyman

"Funny - I've seen the footage lord alone knows how many times and not once did I hear anything indicating a compressor stall."

Funny, instead of listening, LOOK, it is VISIBLE........

Could the crew have survived if they had lit the APU? (447, Doze. Oh for some alpha prot above the Atlantic....).

rudderrudderrat

Hi CONF iture

The only similarity between the accident reports for Habsheim http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1988/f-kc...f-kc880626.pdf and AF744 is that both have the CVR transcript & Flight Data.

Page 35.
The aircraft is at 30 radio,
At 12:46:34 the CVR picks up the sound of the TLs going through 3 clicks to TOGA.
At 12:46:37 the Co-pilot reads the FMA "TOGA SRS"
At 12:46:39 the sound of impact with the trees.
At 12:46:39 the Captain says "M....!" (code for merde?)
At 12:46:41 Fin.

I believe the agreed display was a fly past at a height of 500 ft.
At 30 ft radio, with thrust at flight idle, speed back to Alpha Protect and below, don't you think the application of power just 5 seconds before impact with the trees is leaving it just a tad too late?

DozyWannabe

No it isn't.

Turbine D

Hi CONF iture,
Relative to Habsheim:

I don't believe there was a compressor stall in one engine at all. indeed the engines did not spool up in 1 or 2 seconds. This comes from the a pilot error of setting the engines at minimum flight idle. In this case, engines may take 5 seconds to increase from complete idle to good power (80% of continuous max). The lack of power was made worse with the slowing down and the extremely low speed in such a way that the tail was lower than the undercarriage. It can be pointed out that those conditions never happen during a normal landing, that is why pilots have been baffled with the airplane's poor reactions. Air France had been informed by CFMI of the 5 second delay in spool up from minimum flight idle, but the word was never passed to the Habsheim crew before the flight. Subsequently the delay in spool up was fixed by CFMI, probably by changes made to the engine control electronic management system.

DozyWannabe

I'm not so sure. The much-referenced delay in spooling up (and the reference to earlier problems in the A320 testing regimen) referred to slow spool up at medium to cruise altitude, and thus a completely different area of the flight envelope compared to the position of the Habsheim jet.

The consensus as I understand it was that allowing high-bypass jet engines of any type and on any airliner to spool down at any point of the approach was a big no-no, and pilots of the calibre and experience of those in command on the day should have been well aware of that fact.

Lyman

#2, about 200 meters short of the trees, keep looking. And he did not say 'compressor'.

Now I had to go look. It is #1, looks more surgy than stally. sheesh.

Of all the posters, Turbine D is one I never even bother to check/question. His posts are impeccable. There was a bulletin (OEB) sent to Air France prior, and the Engines were modified as a result of Habsheims folly. So from Habsheim comes progress. Had Asseline been less stupid, would the initial crash/failedGA of a 320 loaded with pax been inevitable? Life is strange.

Dozy, CONFiture has a pov, one that involves BEA doing some questionable things re: reporting. I happen to agree with him. You have the advantage of being so sure of yourself, it is clear you buy their perfection. I am merely sceptical, and worship at no altars involving the technical work of mere humans.

I am agnostic.