Lonewolf_50;
My answer to the quiz was "B" without looking anything up.
Yes, it is, but of course determining the correct response is not the reason I posted the slide from a 1998 CBT on the A340/A330, ;-)
This is not as complicated as "OODA" and Boyd. The appropriate and correct responses are already there in the SOPs etc and do not require sophisticated techniques to address and correct.
If the instantaneous and then sustained pull-up had not occurred as in the other thirty-odd UAS events there would be nothing to discuss here.
The details of roll, yaw and subsequent confusions when stall warnings "quit" and then began again are all
post-facto of the initial response. The devolution of aircraft stability and control are a direct consequence of loss of energy, entry into and sustaining of the stall. Why such sustained back-pressure occurred should be the subject of the Report.
Dozy, contrary to your observation, the data shows that the initial L>R>L etc roll was very quickly contained and controlled.
I cannot accept that a sustained pitch-up was the result of inadvertent stick-handling, not, at least, without also accepting that the most basic principles of high-altitude, swept-wing flight and the resultant attempts at manual control were for some reason not understood.
In my view the pitch up was intentional but the results were not anticipated and therefore not intuitively understood.
This is a matter for the Report to handle and somehow explain.
Lyman;
Don't just do something, sit there!
I said that more than a year ago..."do nothing". The observation was completely mis-interpreted. I've done this in the sim enough to know that "doing nothing" was the safest response in the moment, then collect one's thoughts, call the abnormal and take command of the airplane while the PM gets out the QRH to fine-tune the already-nominal pitch and power settings. That is what "do nothing" meant then, as now.
PJ2