AF 447 Thread No. 8
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Per graph, post 1310, by Hazelnuts39...
Howdy. I do not understand why SS angle associated with Climb is shown on the graph as in the negative (below Zero). It feels counter intuitive to relate "Positive climb" to a negative (opposite) descriptor. ?
Thanks HN
Howdy. I do not understand why SS angle associated with Climb is shown on the graph as in the negative (below Zero). It feels counter intuitive to relate "Positive climb" to a negative (opposite) descriptor. ?
Thanks HN
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Which direction do you move the SS to increase pitch angle and induce a climb (if airspeed is sufficient and the aircraft is shiny-side up)?
*re-lurk*
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 18th Jun 2012 at 12:35.
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Lyman,
How about the sign convention for elevator and THS position? The ATSB uses the same sign convention, but plots it upside down:
How about the sign convention for elevator and THS position? The ATSB uses the same sign convention, but plots it upside down:
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 18th Jun 2012 at 12:55.
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The tail works opposite the wings. Its Pitch Up makes the aircraft Descend, lowering the nose, hence it is understandable for elevator movement to be described contra wing....
Presenting the two in the same way is misleading. ?
Dozy, one pulls to raise the nose, I have always associated Nose Up as a positive, an INCREASE, and a push (descent) as negative. AOA the same, an increase is a plus move, so why associate the control movement as the opposite of its result?
Presenting the two in the same way is misleading. ?
Dozy, one pulls to raise the nose, I have always associated Nose Up as a positive, an INCREASE, and a push (descent) as negative. AOA the same, an increase is a plus move, so why associate the control movement as the opposite of its result?
Last edited by Lyman; 18th Jun 2012 at 14:30.
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Presenting the two in the same way is misleading. ?
Owain Glyndwr;
Interestingly, for the takeoff setting, one does not see a negative THS indication on the A330 & A340 but one sees slightly negative THS settings on the A320 all the time. IIRC, typical settings for the A330/A343 would be 3.0deg while the A320/A319 would be -1.5deg...etc.
What HN39 has described is standard aerodynamic convention - TE down on the elevator (or THS) is a positive deflection.
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aerodynamicists usually are not pilots so of coarse grassy valley thought you had it backwards, I did too. We all know how the horizontal stabilizer and elevator works. It has a down thrust to make the aircraft stable. Speed up and the down thrust increases and brings the nose up. I think it makes it confusing when talking to pilots in your aerodyamicist way of looking at it. We need to keep it simple so even we know what you are talking about. Just a suggestion to keep us simple pilot guys in the loop.
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The most interesting part of the Rosay interview was this:
I read this as: When one loses the speed indications in cruise do nothing (except keep the aircraft trucking on down the line.) It doesn't mean sit on your hands however.
English translation [& notes] by AZR:
The kind of situation that was encountered [loss of speed indication] is a situation that has nothing ... exceptional.
Besides ... when one loses the speed indications, in cruise eh, I think this is the simplest procedure to apply: one must do nothing. And it [the plane] will continue to fly like this for much longer.
The kind of situation that was encountered [loss of speed indication] is a situation that has nothing ... exceptional.
Besides ... when one loses the speed indications, in cruise eh, I think this is the simplest procedure to apply: one must do nothing. And it [the plane] will continue to fly like this for much longer.
At last for Mr Rosay, it seems clear that there was no need to set 5°/CLB.
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I agree with AZR, if it was flying fine on autopilot just keep the same attitude and power and maintain altitude, don't do anything stupid like some airlines and go to climb power and 5 degrees nose up and bust through everybody elses altitude with a stupid checklist.
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I need some help. Somewhere in string 6 or 7, someone posted a link to an airbus document that gave expanded actions for UAS. I initially downloaded the document but lost it (thanks microsoft) and now can't find it again. What I look for isn't in the normal manuals. i.e., AOM, COM, etc
Thanks in advance.
Thanks in advance.
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TTex600
I wonder if it was the Airbus 2010 Upset Recovery document that you are thinking of?
There are 2 documents included in the above ZIP file.
... someone posted a link to an airbus document that gave expanded actions for UAS.
There are 2 documents included in the above ZIP file.
Last edited by mm43; 19th Jun 2012 at 05:11.
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AZR, Machinbird;
Yep! But will everyone remember that, and do the right thing? The "startle factor" seems to have an ability to cause a "memory crash" and a strange reversion to the "pull up" as the BEA noted in the Tarom incident.
The F-GLZU incident on 22 July 2011 was even stranger ... not only did the PNF not remember his NU on the SS, but neither pilot noticed the FD bars on the PFD, nor the AH, the ALT and +5700 fpm VS until after going through FL364. Then busting FL380 before getting things sorted.
As Rosay has said, and PJ2 has been saying here for 3 years, the "do nothing" really means "recover" from any initial A/P hand-off condition and set CRZ pitch and power.
At last for Mr Rosay, it seems clear that there was no need to set 5°/CLB.
The F-GLZU incident on 22 July 2011 was even stranger ... not only did the PNF not remember his NU on the SS, but neither pilot noticed the FD bars on the PFD, nor the AH, the ALT and +5700 fpm VS until after going through FL364. Then busting FL380 before getting things sorted.
As Rosay has said, and PJ2 has been saying here for 3 years, the "do nothing" really means "recover" from any initial A/P hand-off condition and set CRZ pitch and power.
Last edited by mm43; 19th Jun 2012 at 05:39. Reason: added link to F-GLZU BEA Report / English
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Hi,
mm43
The chief pilot of Airbus Mr Rosay can maybe be expected to show prudence when he made statements to the press .. for if we make an extreme assumption
Mr Rosay seems to be sure the response to the event AF447 was "do nothing"
If he knew this before the tragic event of AF447 (and consequently his employer Airbus) .. this is a problem because no instructions of Airbus or AF before the accident do not offer clearly this procedure (do nothing)
This Rosay "do nothing" can be used in a court trial by some parties
If he deduced this procedure after the accident AF447 ... it has no more merit than others
mm43
As Rosay has said, and PJ2 has been saying here for 3 years, the "do nothing"
Mr Rosay seems to be sure the response to the event AF447 was "do nothing"
If he knew this before the tragic event of AF447 (and consequently his employer Airbus) .. this is a problem because no instructions of Airbus or AF before the accident do not offer clearly this procedure (do nothing)
This Rosay "do nothing" can be used in a court trial by some parties
If he deduced this procedure after the accident AF447 ... it has no more merit than others
Last edited by jcjeant; 19th Jun 2012 at 06:55.
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What's really scary is to see that the crews don't know how to work together. Each one goes to do something the other one is completely unaware of it. Have they heard about CRM? Altitude, Speed and Attitude, do they think they went out of fashion, style or something? Complete madness. 
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mm43, rest assured I didn't forget the startle factor. In fact, I believe its the key to the "why", but that's a personal opinion, that I didn't want to mix with the translation of Mr Rosay's ITW.
jcjeant, please, I know you can read & write french, I assume you understand it well. Listen carefully to Mr Rosay. He didn't say "they should have done that". He said "I think this is the simplest procedure to apply".
I read that as a reference to an existing (at the time, at last) published procedure. You can (rightly IMO) argue about the clarity of the said procedure
but not on its existence 
jcjeant, please, I know you can read & write french, I assume you understand it well. Listen carefully to Mr Rosay. He didn't say "they should have done that". He said "I think this is the simplest procedure to apply".
I read that as a reference to an existing (at the time, at last) published procedure. You can (rightly IMO) argue about the clarity of the said procedure
but not on its existence
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Hi AlphaZuluRomeo.
You say...."I read that as a reference to an existing (at the time, at last) published procedure...."
You well may read it that way. If you could provide the link to this "procedure"?
PJ2's long standing comments are the standard....the only discussion I see around his wise words are that the aircraft (447) needed correction, this is explained in the attitudes reported by the DFDR.
The only "experience" PF had in this sort of airmanship was.....none. Airmanship transcends the book, no volume can encompass all airwork, much is assumed to have been acquired to have been given the certificate. Even with Sim training for this result at high altitude, the responses by the handling pilot would have been a part of some "syllabus", which did not exist.
"Do Nothing Stupid" can be easily written down, and some version of it may have been a "procedure", if anyone at the airline or at Airbus had exercised the foresight necessary to write and disseminate it...But they didn't.
"Doing Nothing" is doing something. It is a decision, same as doing anything else, and is instructed by whatever mental process the pilots had at their service.
Clearly we have been discussing what's missing from the responses PF made, and lack of training, or lack of a published procedure are in the front..... When such a profoundly poor response to a life threatening occurrence is made, the cause is there. We will not ever know the nuances, the pressures, the void of help available to the crew, nor their desperation. Repeating a thousand times "Why so much climb?" ignores the plainly obvious conclusion, and BEA will not miss that. The harridans who harp on the obvious, and blame, miss the point.
You say...."I read that as a reference to an existing (at the time, at last) published procedure...."
You well may read it that way. If you could provide the link to this "procedure"?
PJ2's long standing comments are the standard....the only discussion I see around his wise words are that the aircraft (447) needed correction, this is explained in the attitudes reported by the DFDR.
The only "experience" PF had in this sort of airmanship was.....none. Airmanship transcends the book, no volume can encompass all airwork, much is assumed to have been acquired to have been given the certificate. Even with Sim training for this result at high altitude, the responses by the handling pilot would have been a part of some "syllabus", which did not exist.
"Do Nothing Stupid" can be easily written down, and some version of it may have been a "procedure", if anyone at the airline or at Airbus had exercised the foresight necessary to write and disseminate it...But they didn't.
"Doing Nothing" is doing something. It is a decision, same as doing anything else, and is instructed by whatever mental process the pilots had at their service.
Clearly we have been discussing what's missing from the responses PF made, and lack of training, or lack of a published procedure are in the front..... When such a profoundly poor response to a life threatening occurrence is made, the cause is there. We will not ever know the nuances, the pressures, the void of help available to the crew, nor their desperation. Repeating a thousand times "Why so much climb?" ignores the plainly obvious conclusion, and BEA will not miss that. The harridans who harp on the obvious, and blame, miss the point.
Last edited by Lyman; 19th Jun 2012 at 14:04.
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The procedure is on page 70 of BEA#1:
1.18.4 Procedures to be applied in case an unreliable speed indication is detected
On the date of the accident, the operator’s procedures mention that the following actions must be carried out from memory by the crew when they have any doubt concerning the reliability of a speed indication and when control of the flight is “affected dangerously”:
(...)
If conduct of the flight does not seem to be affected dangerously, the crew must apply the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION / ADR CHECK procedure (see appendix 9).
On the date of the accident, the operator’s procedures mention that the following actions must be carried out from memory by the crew when they have any doubt concerning the reliability of a speed indication and when control of the flight is “affected dangerously”:
(...)
If conduct of the flight does not seem to be affected dangerously, the crew must apply the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION / ADR CHECK procedure (see appendix 9).
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Hi,
And in the appendix N°9 (Page 121 BEA*1)
My translation from french
and this is the case of AF447 (my addition)
And so .. do NOT "do nothing"
And in the appendix N°9 (Page 121 BEA*1)
My translation from french
If conduct of the flight is affected ...all speed indications are false .. (and this is the case of AF447) apply this procedure:
Apply the emergency procedure
Apply the emergency procedure
And so .. do NOT "do nothing"
Last edited by jcjeant; 19th Jun 2012 at 15:45.