AF447 wreckage found
An excellent comment from Flight Safety Foundation.
Myths and Training
By William R. Voss, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation
This is not a column I like writing, and I know I am going to upset some people, but I have to comment on the recent release of more preliminary information regarding the crash of Air France 447, the Airbus A330 that fell into the Atlantic Ocean two years ago. The investigators have given us a clear idea of what likely happened and the sort of recommendations they will make when the final report is issued. The difficult part now is to understand why this tragedy happened and do something about it.
I spent two days with Airbus test pilots, accompanied by Foundation Executive VP Kevin Hiatt, trying to understand the nuances of envelope protection and failure modes. We spent some time going over the accident timeline and then flew the accident scenario in a simulator. I came away with a number of impressions.
First, I was amazed at how benign the initial failure really was. Some electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) messages, an autopilot disconnect and some bad speed indications. All of this happened in light turbulence, and lasted for less than a minute. The only response needed was to manually fly the same attitude the autopilot had been flying for hours. It should have ended with a logbook entry.
Instead, there was an aggressive pitch up resulting in a 7,000-fpm climb, followed by a series of pitch-up commands that eventually resulted in a stall. These were not small or inadvertent commands. When airspeed numbers came back they were so low they looked erroneous. In fact, the airspeed dropped so low the stall warning was disabled. This had to be confusing. When stick backpressure was released, the aircraft accelerated a little bit and the warning came on again. This kept up all the way to the ocean.
So now we have to try to understand why all of this happened. We can never know what the accident pilots were thinking, so we are stuck making some guesses to help others avoid the same mistake.
Did they think they were at risk of a high-speed stall? Was this a real risk, or was it mythology? Test pilots will tell you it is very hard to get into a high-speed stall in a modern aircraft. Do crews understand this, or do they get their high-altitude aerodynamics lessons from dog-fighting shows on the Discovery Channel, or old textbooks written about the Boeing 707?
Perhaps the AF447 crew was trying to fly the stall scenarios they practiced at low altitudes. Stall training historically has focused on minimum altitude loss. Some pilots will even tell you they rely on the envelope protection to fly them out. Just go to TOGA (take off/go around power) and pull back. Let the airplane do the rest.
The manufacturer will tell you that this is not the right procedure to use at altitude. Instead, pilots are encouraged to trade altitude for speed by reducing the angle of attack. Has this philosophy made it into simulator training, and more importantly, has it become the new norm on the line?
This tragedy compels us to ask some tough questions about training. Do we spend so much time driving simulators around at low altitudes with one engine out that the real risks are only discussed in the break room? This issue extends far beyond Air France and Airbus; it is about an industry that has let training get so far out of date that it is irrelevant, and people are left filling in the blanks with folklore.
By William R. Voss, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation
This is not a column I like writing, and I know I am going to upset some people, but I have to comment on the recent release of more preliminary information regarding the crash of Air France 447, the Airbus A330 that fell into the Atlantic Ocean two years ago. The investigators have given us a clear idea of what likely happened and the sort of recommendations they will make when the final report is issued. The difficult part now is to understand why this tragedy happened and do something about it.
I spent two days with Airbus test pilots, accompanied by Foundation Executive VP Kevin Hiatt, trying to understand the nuances of envelope protection and failure modes. We spent some time going over the accident timeline and then flew the accident scenario in a simulator. I came away with a number of impressions.
First, I was amazed at how benign the initial failure really was. Some electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) messages, an autopilot disconnect and some bad speed indications. All of this happened in light turbulence, and lasted for less than a minute. The only response needed was to manually fly the same attitude the autopilot had been flying for hours. It should have ended with a logbook entry.
Instead, there was an aggressive pitch up resulting in a 7,000-fpm climb, followed by a series of pitch-up commands that eventually resulted in a stall. These were not small or inadvertent commands. When airspeed numbers came back they were so low they looked erroneous. In fact, the airspeed dropped so low the stall warning was disabled. This had to be confusing. When stick backpressure was released, the aircraft accelerated a little bit and the warning came on again. This kept up all the way to the ocean.
So now we have to try to understand why all of this happened. We can never know what the accident pilots were thinking, so we are stuck making some guesses to help others avoid the same mistake.
Did they think they were at risk of a high-speed stall? Was this a real risk, or was it mythology? Test pilots will tell you it is very hard to get into a high-speed stall in a modern aircraft. Do crews understand this, or do they get their high-altitude aerodynamics lessons from dog-fighting shows on the Discovery Channel, or old textbooks written about the Boeing 707?
Perhaps the AF447 crew was trying to fly the stall scenarios they practiced at low altitudes. Stall training historically has focused on minimum altitude loss. Some pilots will even tell you they rely on the envelope protection to fly them out. Just go to TOGA (take off/go around power) and pull back. Let the airplane do the rest.
The manufacturer will tell you that this is not the right procedure to use at altitude. Instead, pilots are encouraged to trade altitude for speed by reducing the angle of attack. Has this philosophy made it into simulator training, and more importantly, has it become the new norm on the line?
This tragedy compels us to ask some tough questions about training. Do we spend so much time driving simulators around at low altitudes with one engine out that the real risks are only discussed in the break room? This issue extends far beyond Air France and Airbus; it is about an industry that has let training get so far out of date that it is irrelevant, and people are left filling in the blanks with folklore.
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we are going in circles.
your opinion but I would quote mountainsnake as my reply as I consider you still miss the point
Once again if we compare amount of fatalities and accidents from the 60's and 70's with now, what are we discussing here?
I do not want to undo anything but it would seem the flight safety foundation align with my arguments. This is not and should not be about technology.
It is about training.
You still miss the point.
History is full of CFIT's with yokes equipped aircrafts, you know, even with that feedback and position sight thing.
I do not want to undo anything but it would seem the flight safety foundation align with my arguments. This is not and should not be about technology.
It is about training.
Was the SS position for the PNF really the problem?
While there may be a wrist rest in SOME airplanes, and SOME sidesticks use no arm movement, that is definitely NOT a universal truth! A brace for the forearm or elbow may well replace a wrist rest. I doubt you could fly a Cobra without arm movement, though it may be possible in an F-16 or A3xx (I've flown neither of the last 2).
I still think you are missing the point regarding center "sticks" and the different muscle sets used to move them - if a center stick provides roll control, then it pivots at the stick head (I presume you mean yoke type control, a pic or reference to aircraft type would help), your entire arm moves to effect the movement, pivoting at the ball socket of your shoulder. With a joystick this is never so.
Again, I think that AB spent many, many hours looking into the human factors aspect of the cockpit design (along with Porsche I recall) and I'm confident that this is not the root of all evil related to the AF447 accident.
I will give you the lack of positional feedback for the PNF, does, on the surface, seem to be an issue worth inspection - when the original Airbus sidestick driven aircraft were introduced, the technology to *reliably* drive the non-active stick was likely considered a significant risk. Since basically all AB cockpits are a simple derivative of the previous, the SS arrangement has been retained A320 through A380, probably not without good thought.
But, really, were not all the required indications available to both PNF and Captain - surely the ADI and altitude readout alone should have been the only two instruments necessary to figure out the situation, along with the fact the engines were working:
1) I'm pitched up (What was it? 15 degrees or thereabouts?)
2) I'm falling at 10K/min
3) I have engine power
Hmmm, what could be wrong....
Did the PNF or Captain ever state - "The aircraft is stalled, pitch-down! Lower the nose!"
Was it because the PF had the SS nailed to the rear stop? Would that have been the vital clue to all in that cockpit? Or was the problem well past that?
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It's hard to escape the impression that being selective in reading, and answering on this thread - an example seems to be the ignoring (so far) of RetiredF4's post# 2969, and airtren post# 2971 - is helping to come back to the same conclusion, in a self created circle.
The stick's shortcoming(s), along with those of some other elements were pointed out throughout the AF 447 threads, and they are easy to see or understand for a technologist, engineer, or system architect, and as I said, I am quite sure they are well known by those that should know.
Originally Posted by RetiredF4;Post#2969
- tactile feedback from the second set of control input, being it SS or yoke.
Those feedbacks … are missing when things start to get wrong in more way…. [and more]
Those feedbacks … are missing when things start to get wrong in more way…. [and more]
Originally Posted by airtren, Post#2971
... The failure of the indirection and translation/conversion of information, as it is shown by the AF 447 - night time, and instrument information malfunction - is a clear instance for anyone who is objective enough to see the system in which the chain of indirection and translation/conversion of information was/got broken due to its weakness….
During the roughly 1/2 a century of electronic computers, generation, after generation, problems/bugs in the software and/or hardware were cause of operational problems, smaller, or bigger, and got fixed from one version to the next of the OS/applications, or of the hardware, regardless of the particulars of the software, or hardware technology used. In the same time, new versions brought new sets of problems/bugs. And the cycles are continuing, it's not different today, than it was 10, or 20, or more years ago, and it's not different than it is in other industries.
Last edited by airtren; 17th Aug 2011 at 14:15.
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Post Voss, the circle closes. From ACARS alone, the initial impression in public view was of an a/c in deepess, One can probably conclude that for at least one of the flightcrew present it appeared that way.
So it is. Not a training issue, for the training was on the money; it's in the book. Not A Stall (training) issue, the correct technique was not applied.
Not a "Mysterious quirk of hitherto unknown Physics" (BA038).
A system has shown quirks in the aftermath of the initial blunder. The SS actually can be improved! The STALL warning system might need a tweak. The THS system can benefit from some critiique.
For two years, a few posters have been trying to point out the meat of the matter was in and around 2:10:05.
The 'pinch' in the pipe. As above, accidents lately seem organized around some very elementary concepts.
For the Wrights, they had an excuse. After all the Press, all the pats on the back, and all the airshows and corporate intrigue, A perfectly good Airplane went in with all her people.
As a Pilot, I find that embarrassing.
So it is. Not a training issue, for the training was on the money; it's in the book. Not A Stall (training) issue, the correct technique was not applied.
Not a "Mysterious quirk of hitherto unknown Physics" (BA038).
A system has shown quirks in the aftermath of the initial blunder. The SS actually can be improved! The STALL warning system might need a tweak. The THS system can benefit from some critiique.
For two years, a few posters have been trying to point out the meat of the matter was in and around 2:10:05.
The 'pinch' in the pipe. As above, accidents lately seem organized around some very elementary concepts.
For the Wrights, they had an excuse. After all the Press, all the pats on the back, and all the airshows and corporate intrigue, A perfectly good Airplane went in with all her people.
As a Pilot, I find that embarrassing.
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....
I will give you the lack of positional feedback for the PNF, does, on the surface, seem to be an issue worth inspection ....
But, really, were not all the required indications available to both PNF and Captain - surely the ADI and altitude readout alone should have been the only two instruments necessary to figure out the situation, along with the fact the engines were working:
I will give you the lack of positional feedback for the PNF, does, on the surface, seem to be an issue worth inspection ....
But, really, were not all the required indications available to both PNF and Captain - surely the ADI and altitude readout alone should have been the only two instruments necessary to figure out the situation, along with the fact the engines were working:
Seeing, or perceiving directly the handling of the active stick would have been the very easy, unambiguous way, and the very fundamental direct information needed.
The instruments are ONLY AN INDIRECT indicator of the actions on the stick, and are in the same time indicators of other causal elements, and therefore can be ambiguous, and even hide the very cause of a certain behavior.
From a system architecture perspective, the instruments are at one end in "a chain of elements" that among other things do a transfer of information. The "chain" includes further, the "state of the a/c" in space, then the status of the "control surfaces", etc..... The "position/handling of the stick" is at the other end in the chain, the very opposite one.
This "chain" in its function of transferring information, represents from an abstract system architecture perspective several levels of indirection, and translation/conversion of information, which can ambiguate or hide from one end to the other, the information that is really needed, as the AF 447 clearly has shown.
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Yes, embarrassing. Forest/Trees (pun intended). The problem is a bit basic, and should have been entertained and mitigated perhaps back in the thirties (It was).
Step back, let's. Going back to the drafting table is what got us here. The solution was in the elementaries, and long ago.
Making a simple endeavour complicated is arse about?
As per JDEE, the hardware is archaic, simplistic, and dependable.
Archaic, simplistic, and dependable = PILOT.
Ziegler was a lunatic. False idols and all that. Making the ship complex, for the sake of its complexity, was a fools errand.
See, ECAM. What a load of "Les bolloisie". The warnings can be cleared by the system presenting them to the PILOT.
Right, in the midst of what was a challenging flight theme, let's make everything dependent on the one resource ill-equipped to handle the system. And then, when he fails, light him up, and get everyone started on why the system is Excellent/Bulless.
Time release homicide. I blame Bernard.
"The silly Pilot couldn't cope". That's the expletive of those complicit in this cruel joke.
Pilots need to stop pretending they are GOD's gift, and Techies need to
stop acting like the Gift's GOD.
juct a tuppence, eh?
Step back, let's. Going back to the drafting table is what got us here. The solution was in the elementaries, and long ago.
Making a simple endeavour complicated is arse about?
As per JDEE, the hardware is archaic, simplistic, and dependable.
Archaic, simplistic, and dependable = PILOT.
Ziegler was a lunatic. False idols and all that. Making the ship complex, for the sake of its complexity, was a fools errand.
See, ECAM. What a load of "Les bolloisie". The warnings can be cleared by the system presenting them to the PILOT.
Right, in the midst of what was a challenging flight theme, let's make everything dependent on the one resource ill-equipped to handle the system. And then, when he fails, light him up, and get everyone started on why the system is Excellent/Bulless.
Time release homicide. I blame Bernard.
"The silly Pilot couldn't cope". That's the expletive of those complicit in this cruel joke.
Pilots need to stop pretending they are GOD's gift, and Techies need to
stop acting like the Gift's GOD.
juct a tuppence, eh?
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I'm sure that after 150-odd pages of opinions, there will be more than enough available to decry this excellent article, but the author, Peter Garrison--an occasional poster here--has, I think, done a splendid job of explaining AF447 within the limits of a newspaper op-ed article's space and the fact that it was written for a general audience.
Air France 447: Super-smart planes still vulnerable to human error - latimes.com
Air France 447: Super-smart planes still vulnerable to human error - latimes.com
Originally Posted by J.O., quoting Bill Voss, FSF President
"First, I was amazed at how benign the initial failure really was. Some electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) messages, an autopilot disconnect and some bad speed indications. All of this happened in light turbulence, and lasted for less than a minute. The only response needed was to manually fly the same attitude the autopilot had been flying for hours. It should have ended with a logbook entry."
I have been making this point for a very long time now. But I see in the Tech thread there are still those who believe, like Alain Bouillard of the BEA that pitching the aircraft to 5° at cruise altitude is the correct response. It isn't.
The UAS drill is badly written and can mis-direct the crew into an incorrect response if the Memory Items, intended for when the safety of the aircraft is immediately impacted such as the takeoff phase, are executed at cruise altitudes. The training they had would have been at low altitude, right after takeoff, where the UAS Drill's Memory Items are appropriate until the aircraft is above the MSA or circuit altitude. The "If above FL100....5° of pitch" qualification is misleading and wrong.
In cruise flight the initia UAS Memory Items should not be followed step-by-step - the aircraft is to be leveled-off for troubleshooting yet there is no evidence that any new thinking on the UAS Memory drill has been introduced.
Bill Voss is right - this should have been a log-entry. He is also right about how benign the initial failure was. It is almost a non-event...take over and hand fly, "do nothing", which means maintain level flight, while the system sorts itself out. The even certainly didn't threaten the safety of the aircraft.
Last edited by PJ2; 27th Aug 2011 at 05:43.
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So the Computers turned over the flying to the human, and he got it wrong?
So pat, so concise, so off target. If anyone could temporarily turn off the knee jerk "judgment", we may make some actual progress.
Implicit in Mr. Garrison's conclusion is the source of the very problem that caused this accident. It is here on this and other threads, and is not being addressed.
It is mouse trap thinking at its worst, and dare I say, most deadly.
Until we can improve the technology, these events are acceptable?
Until we can improve the training, these events are acceptable?
No, and NO. Ziegler set the tone with his supercilious and smarmy conceit.
The AB fbw system is OLD. The pilot's were experienced. Yet, in an event that is (should have been) mundane, 228 souls DIED.
So long as simplistic judgment is perpetuated, people will continue to die.
Groundhog day is unacceptable. Look a little deeper, seek the AHA moment.
Stop pushing our Peas to the side. Eat your Peas. Stop with the shoulder shrugging, the winks and the nods.
Someone put "Dumb" in the cockpit, and I don't mean pilots. Get the dumb out. Then I'll book a flight on an airbus. I can fly for free anywhere. I choose to pay, and fly other than AIRBUS.
So pat, so concise, so off target. If anyone could temporarily turn off the knee jerk "judgment", we may make some actual progress.
Implicit in Mr. Garrison's conclusion is the source of the very problem that caused this accident. It is here on this and other threads, and is not being addressed.
It is mouse trap thinking at its worst, and dare I say, most deadly.
Until we can improve the technology, these events are acceptable?
Until we can improve the training, these events are acceptable?
No, and NO. Ziegler set the tone with his supercilious and smarmy conceit.
The AB fbw system is OLD. The pilot's were experienced. Yet, in an event that is (should have been) mundane, 228 souls DIED.
So long as simplistic judgment is perpetuated, people will continue to die.
Groundhog day is unacceptable. Look a little deeper, seek the AHA moment.
Stop pushing our Peas to the side. Eat your Peas. Stop with the shoulder shrugging, the winks and the nods.
Someone put "Dumb" in the cockpit, and I don't mean pilots. Get the dumb out. Then I'll book a flight on an airbus. I can fly for free anywhere. I choose to pay, and fly other than AIRBUS.
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Dear oh dear oh dear. Lymon I get the feeling you want some startling statement to take to the AF447 court case.
Well here it is PILOT ERROR.
For all those claiming unsafe, come back with proof, an accident statistic, something other than emotive pleas for the good ol days of yoke's and feedback.
Till then EASA has just published a document highlighting no fatal accidents in 2010 involving a European airline. Accidents globally are at their lowest level ever.
Bill Voss The FSF president stated
Sadly one need go no further because as mountainsnake stated
Well here it is PILOT ERROR.
For all those claiming unsafe, come back with proof, an accident statistic, something other than emotive pleas for the good ol days of yoke's and feedback.
Till then EASA has just published a document highlighting no fatal accidents in 2010 involving a European airline. Accidents globally are at their lowest level ever.
Bill Voss The FSF president stated
"First, I was amazed at how benign the initial failure really was. Some electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) messages, an autopilot disconnect and some bad speed indications. All of this happened in light turbulence, and lasted for less than a minute. The only response needed was to manually fly the same attitude the autopilot had been flying for hours. It should have ended with a logbook entry."
History is full of CFIT's with yokes equipped aircrafts, you know, even with that feedback and position sight thing.
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Hi safety
None so blind.... Look, PILOT ERROR implies HUMAN PILOT, is that fair?
You do mean Human, yes? Because the AUTO is also a PILOT. Any integral discrete computing system can fly an aircraft. ANY.
Why did the AUTO PILOT DISCONNECT? THAT IS 'FAIL', and before the PF could clear his throat. It also qualifies as an UPSET, in the REGULATIONS.
THE PF was, and must be considered, a back up system. You gloss over this, and for some bias, I assume.
You have, implicit in your tone and delivery, a childish bias for facts that are not present.
For once, can someone make a statement, and not end it as if he were channeling MOSES? That, for reason of implicit wisdom, the finding is the end of discussion?
See, I disagree with you, strongly. Do not take that personally, consider it an invitation to continue. If you wish not to discuss, stop addressing your commentary to me. If you comment, I may respond, that you will have to accept, I think.
None so blind.... Look, PILOT ERROR implies HUMAN PILOT, is that fair?
You do mean Human, yes? Because the AUTO is also a PILOT. Any integral discrete computing system can fly an aircraft. ANY.
Why did the AUTO PILOT DISCONNECT? THAT IS 'FAIL', and before the PF could clear his throat. It also qualifies as an UPSET, in the REGULATIONS.
THE PF was, and must be considered, a back up system. You gloss over this, and for some bias, I assume.
You have, implicit in your tone and delivery, a childish bias for facts that are not present.
For once, can someone make a statement, and not end it as if he were channeling MOSES? That, for reason of implicit wisdom, the finding is the end of discussion?
See, I disagree with you, strongly. Do not take that personally, consider it an invitation to continue. If you wish not to discuss, stop addressing your commentary to me. If you comment, I may respond, that you will have to accept, I think.
Safety Concerns:
the science of ergonomics and human factors was just beginning in the 60's and 70's. I find your appeal (a refrain often made by numbers people) to that era of air mishasp disingenuous.
The numbers actually show me that air travel is quite safe right now, with all of those manned aircraft flying all over the globe daily in their thousands.
We are in the digits to the right of the decimal in terms if incidents, and beyond that in accidents, per flight hour.
Each crash can almost be treated as a special cause, if you are running the numbers as you would in a production environment, even if one bows down at the altar of six sigma.
Enough on the numbers.
Your pilotless personnel transport aircraft is a poor idea for anyone other than a lab rat.
Given the number of Predators that have crashed (an example I am famililar with from personal experiences and knowledge, I am pretty sure there were others), I find your proponency for unmanned personnel transport aircraft baffling.
If you take those Predator crashes and put 228 people in each of them, you'd find a groundswell of opinion against your industry bias proposing unpiloted passenger aircraft.
That human error is a common element of a human undertaking (powered flight) should not come as a surprise.
What surprises me is anyone who will profess by their argument a belief in the culmination of aircraft development into a zero defects, automated personnel transport system*. Those pilotless aircraft will crash too, if you build them, and what is unknown is how often. We'll only know after we count those body bags, won't we?
* = That is the between the lines read I am getting from you.(And some of our other non-pilot participants). It is a proposal that only appears attractive from an idealized bottom line discussion on a spreadsheet.
I have concerns for safety as well, being mostly a passenger these days, and only when I have to be.
I know, having worked with mechanical and electromechanical things since I first repaired a bicycle at age eight, that things manufactured by humans often break, sometimes predictably and sometimes unexpectedly.
You can take your pilotless airliner and park it on the ramp in Hell. I won't pay the fare to travel in one -- ever. (Hell, I barely fly now). Nor will I travel in a bus without a driver.
I don't trust robots.
Why?
I don't trust the people who make them to be free from human error.
See how that works? The machine does what someone tells it to do ... remember our old friend General Protection Fault from Windows 3.11?
Too many dead friends, for reasons both mechanical and human, as well as the ultimate cause in aviation: gravity.
I am not interested in trusting someone with no skin in the game.
the science of ergonomics and human factors was just beginning in the 60's and 70's. I find your appeal (a refrain often made by numbers people) to that era of air mishasp disingenuous.
The numbers actually show me that air travel is quite safe right now, with all of those manned aircraft flying all over the globe daily in their thousands.
We are in the digits to the right of the decimal in terms if incidents, and beyond that in accidents, per flight hour.
Each crash can almost be treated as a special cause, if you are running the numbers as you would in a production environment, even if one bows down at the altar of six sigma.
Enough on the numbers.
Your pilotless personnel transport aircraft is a poor idea for anyone other than a lab rat.
Given the number of Predators that have crashed (an example I am famililar with from personal experiences and knowledge, I am pretty sure there were others), I find your proponency for unmanned personnel transport aircraft baffling.
If you take those Predator crashes and put 228 people in each of them, you'd find a groundswell of opinion against your industry bias proposing unpiloted passenger aircraft.
That human error is a common element of a human undertaking (powered flight) should not come as a surprise.
What surprises me is anyone who will profess by their argument a belief in the culmination of aircraft development into a zero defects, automated personnel transport system*. Those pilotless aircraft will crash too, if you build them, and what is unknown is how often. We'll only know after we count those body bags, won't we?
* = That is the between the lines read I am getting from you.(And some of our other non-pilot participants). It is a proposal that only appears attractive from an idealized bottom line discussion on a spreadsheet.
I have concerns for safety as well, being mostly a passenger these days, and only when I have to be.
I know, having worked with mechanical and electromechanical things since I first repaired a bicycle at age eight, that things manufactured by humans often break, sometimes predictably and sometimes unexpectedly.
You can take your pilotless airliner and park it on the ramp in Hell. I won't pay the fare to travel in one -- ever. (Hell, I barely fly now). Nor will I travel in a bus without a driver.
I don't trust robots.
Why?
I don't trust the people who make them to be free from human error.
See how that works? The machine does what someone tells it to do ... remember our old friend General Protection Fault from Windows 3.11?
Too many dead friends, for reasons both mechanical and human, as well as the ultimate cause in aviation: gravity.
I am not interested in trusting someone with no skin in the game.
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Wonder how an unmanned A320 would have fared landing in a x-wind in Hamburg ?
The fact that the aileron authority is reduced if a main wheel touches down during the whoopsy/ go-around would no doubt have been fed into it's electronic brain. Shame no-one had previously thought to tell the human robots about it.
What other little foibles/glitches are still hidden in there , just waiting for the required circumstances to rear their ugly heads.
My 20 yr old 737 Classics occasionaly throw electronic wobblies that I have never seen in 20 odd years of flying them.
How will Airbii perform when they get a little older ?
Some interesting accident investigation in store in Africa etc in a few years when they end up with their 3rd/4th , no doubt loving/caring /technically superb, owners.
The fact that the aileron authority is reduced if a main wheel touches down during the whoopsy/ go-around would no doubt have been fed into it's electronic brain. Shame no-one had previously thought to tell the human robots about it.
What other little foibles/glitches are still hidden in there , just waiting for the required circumstances to rear their ugly heads.
My 20 yr old 737 Classics occasionaly throw electronic wobblies that I have never seen in 20 odd years of flying them.
How will Airbii perform when they get a little older ?
Some interesting accident investigation in store in Africa etc in a few years when they end up with their 3rd/4th , no doubt loving/caring /technically superb, owners.
Lyman:
Through hook or by crook you continue (and have done under previous user names) to incite, infer and apportion blame, either explicitly or otherwise, in all directions, other than in the lap of the fella with his hand on the controls. Or do I misunderstand you?
At one point you were campaigning vigorously that the V/S had snapped off in mid-air... despite a lot of evidence to the contrary. You got quite animated.... but were quite wrong. In fact that has been your operating mode since pretty much day 1.
This was not the first UAS instance affecting an Airbus - but unless I am mistaken, it is the first that ended up in the Ocean. So, were the prior successful UAS occurrences luck? The aircraft systems were the same. The same cockpit displays, controls, warning tones, etc. What was different? The fella charged with flying the aircraft... yep, that is one identifiable difference.
Yes, the human got it wrong. Why can't you accept that? It seems as if that simple concept is somehow entirely implausible. It MUST be the planes fault.
Can the plane be improved? Yes, I suspect so - better support information for the human, perhaps MORE automation/protections.... better pitots in the first place, etc. But ultimately the PF is sitting up front because there ARE failures, things drop off, or break, and since autonomous flight is not (yet) desired, "we" (collectively, as a flight community) believe that the best outcome will come with a trained crew in the front seats. In this case, the crew lined up the holes in many slices of cheese in a particularly unfortunate order.
As has been more eloquently put by others, what should have been a log-book entry, became a disaster. Deal with it.
Through hook or by crook you continue (and have done under previous user names) to incite, infer and apportion blame, either explicitly or otherwise, in all directions, other than in the lap of the fella with his hand on the controls. Or do I misunderstand you?
At one point you were campaigning vigorously that the V/S had snapped off in mid-air... despite a lot of evidence to the contrary. You got quite animated.... but were quite wrong. In fact that has been your operating mode since pretty much day 1.
This was not the first UAS instance affecting an Airbus - but unless I am mistaken, it is the first that ended up in the Ocean. So, were the prior successful UAS occurrences luck? The aircraft systems were the same. The same cockpit displays, controls, warning tones, etc. What was different? The fella charged with flying the aircraft... yep, that is one identifiable difference.
Yes, the human got it wrong. Why can't you accept that? It seems as if that simple concept is somehow entirely implausible. It MUST be the planes fault.
Can the plane be improved? Yes, I suspect so - better support information for the human, perhaps MORE automation/protections.... better pitots in the first place, etc. But ultimately the PF is sitting up front because there ARE failures, things drop off, or break, and since autonomous flight is not (yet) desired, "we" (collectively, as a flight community) believe that the best outcome will come with a trained crew in the front seats. In this case, the crew lined up the holes in many slices of cheese in a particularly unfortunate order.
As has been more eloquently put by others, what should have been a log-book entry, became a disaster. Deal with it.
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UAS
A lot of good reading here lately ... Thanks guys !
2.5 deg + N1 at one o'clock ... I'm all for it too.
My question to you, PJ2 :
Why the BEA still 'believe' in the 5 degrees ?
Originally Posted by PJ2
I have been making this point for a very long time now. But I see in the Tech thread there are still those who believe, like Alain Bouillard of the BEA that pitching the aircraft to 5° at cruise altitude is the correct response. It isn't.
My question to you, PJ2 :
Why the BEA still 'believe' in the 5 degrees ?
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Moses hath spake.
Yes the other UAS incidents were luck. You put 32 successful against the One fatal, and can't notice that makes 33, instead of 32:1?
What emanated from the VS discussion was a lot of interesting discussion, and an understanding, an informal one, of how the VS and the Rudder operate.
You appear to believe that focusing blame in one (accepted) direction closes the subject. Yet you criticise me for being narrow? Pot/Black.
Making this personal is useless, immature, and a waste of energy.
You think I am up to some form of harm? Evidently you do, or you value your passion so little you take time to get upset into the wind?
relax
Yes the other UAS incidents were luck. You put 32 successful against the One fatal, and can't notice that makes 33, instead of 32:1?
What emanated from the VS discussion was a lot of interesting discussion, and an understanding, an informal one, of how the VS and the Rudder operate.
You appear to believe that focusing blame in one (accepted) direction closes the subject. Yet you criticise me for being narrow? Pot/Black.
Making this personal is useless, immature, and a waste of energy.
You think I am up to some form of harm? Evidently you do, or you value your passion so little you take time to get upset into the wind?
relax
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lonewolf you should read my posts.
I made it quite clear early on I do not agree with removing pilots from the cockpit. I am merely highlighting the industry wish and the fact that some pilots do not help themselves on this issue by continuously referring to perceived safety issues that aren't there.
I accept it must be difficult and I respect the loyalty shown to colleagues no longer with us.
Safety is driven by statistics. You have no chance of getting stick feedback on a bus until accidents occur where without any shadow of any doubt lack of feedback was an issue.
You have seen the NASA results of A v B and the A320 over 20 years into service is doing just fine and is safer (statistically) than a 737.
Therefore my point was merely that if as a group of professionals you are hell bent on the return of stick feedback, you need to find a different argument because going on about perceived automatics issues with AF447 or Habsheim or anywhere else won't help your cause.
I made it quite clear early on I do not agree with removing pilots from the cockpit. I am merely highlighting the industry wish and the fact that some pilots do not help themselves on this issue by continuously referring to perceived safety issues that aren't there.
I accept it must be difficult and I respect the loyalty shown to colleagues no longer with us.
Safety is driven by statistics. You have no chance of getting stick feedback on a bus until accidents occur where without any shadow of any doubt lack of feedback was an issue.
You have seen the NASA results of A v B and the A320 over 20 years into service is doing just fine and is safer (statistically) than a 737.
Therefore my point was merely that if as a group of professionals you are hell bent on the return of stick feedback, you need to find a different argument because going on about perceived automatics issues with AF447 or Habsheim or anywhere else won't help your cause.
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Let me stand in agreement with you, then, safety concerns. Feedback is not an issue. It is vestigial.
Feedback is a form of SA, and a tactile one. Cockpits have been non tactile for a generation. (commercial).
I made note before, that allowing one's body to sense and decide a course of recovery of control is a very bad thing. One is stuck with, works from, instruments, and indications.
Is it possible PF was trying to utilize his 'feel'. Could be, he certainly chased NOSE UP until 1.65 'g'. If he was flying 'g', he was in the weeds.
I don't reject Pilot blunders, and yes, it is difficult. But there are a thousand pilots like the one caught out here. Is that comforting?
My bottom line. The Big Picture. Salivating and ranting about the "ONE" UAS incident that was fatal, and how safe fbw truly is, is dangerous.
In jumping on this pilot, one is entering a dangerous State.
The State of DENIAL. Reliance on automatic flight is routine. How is all of a sudden a shift to Human flight uncomfortable? Pilotage should be a given, a default to be yearned for, not feared.
This time it was "his" fault? That is shortsighted, and dangerous.
Feedback is a form of SA, and a tactile one. Cockpits have been non tactile for a generation. (commercial).
I made note before, that allowing one's body to sense and decide a course of recovery of control is a very bad thing. One is stuck with, works from, instruments, and indications.
Is it possible PF was trying to utilize his 'feel'. Could be, he certainly chased NOSE UP until 1.65 'g'. If he was flying 'g', he was in the weeds.
I don't reject Pilot blunders, and yes, it is difficult. But there are a thousand pilots like the one caught out here. Is that comforting?
My bottom line. The Big Picture. Salivating and ranting about the "ONE" UAS incident that was fatal, and how safe fbw truly is, is dangerous.
In jumping on this pilot, one is entering a dangerous State.
The State of DENIAL. Reliance on automatic flight is routine. How is all of a sudden a shift to Human flight uncomfortable? Pilotage should be a given, a default to be yearned for, not feared.
This time it was "his" fault? That is shortsighted, and dangerous.
