AF447 wreckage found
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from Safety Concerns
A lot of pilots criticising Airbus are quite used to digital flying. They operate EFIS and FBW aircraft as well, simply from other manufacturers. So your first point is polemics.
Second, such an aircraft is actually the safest, the T7, therefore the whole discussion about the Airbus layout has a point, as there is just as modern an aircraft flying that is, at least at the moment, even safer. So your second point is none.
Here are a few comment and questions from a recent meeting:
The biggest problem here is analogue pilots flying digital a/c. And by that I do not mean remove the pilot from the cockpit but after more than 40 years of digital a/c that have more than proven their safety capabilities it is about time pilots stopped harping on about "old" a/c and moved into the 21st century.
The a/c are sound, the technology is sound, room for improvement yes. The A320 for example is actually one of the safest commercial airliners flying despite all the doom and gloom and the first lightning strike will send it spinning to the ground out of control crap that is often brought into the same sentence.
The a/c are sound, the technology is sound, room for improvement yes. The A320 for example is actually one of the safest commercial airliners flying despite all the doom and gloom and the first lightning strike will send it spinning to the ground out of control crap that is often brought into the same sentence.
A lot of pilots criticising Airbus are quite used to digital flying. They operate EFIS and FBW aircraft as well, simply from other manufacturers. So your first point is polemics.
Second, such an aircraft is actually the safest, the T7, therefore the whole discussion about the Airbus layout has a point, as there is just as modern an aircraft flying that is, at least at the moment, even safer. So your second point is none.
Here are a few comment and questions from a recent meeting:
Some traps in the Airbus philosophy:
The dead stick on the PNF side (or on both with AP on).
If a PF starts losing it, be it a simple PIO or as here with stress-motivated and effectless swinging around the stick, the PNF, in order to realize, must look over and observe the PF.
This is a waste of concentration, he should be monitoring the instruments. With a moving stick (or yoke), he could continue to monitor instruments and simultaneously would be realizing the PFs error, through his second, tactile input channel. Additionally if he wanted to intervene, he could exerce force on the stick and by that raise attention of the PF, again through the second channel. The first one is quite often absorbed by the situation and trying to talk to a stressed PF is futile, the audio channel is the first to leave us under stress.
Why no feedback?
The fixed Autothrust Lever
The Airbus lever is set in a detent, this applies as well when the AT disconnects. When this happens, the AB pilot needs to realize the ECAM warning. With a moving lever, the disconnected, stuck and no more moving AT sort of warns the pilot additionally through the tactile channel. Furthermore the lever will be in the exact position of the thrust. Not so in an Airbus. The lever is still in the detent and the thrust where it was last. The Airbus philosophy tells us, that when the AT is disconnected, the lever acts like a conventional one, position equal thrust, but in the bad case of an automatic disconnect, this is not true. The pilot has to un-detent the lever to get the correct position vs. thrust ratio. This is an unnecessary additional step in a high stress situation.
Why fixed levers, what is their advantage (pls don’t come up with the weight issue)
THS
As I understand, the THS was following the PFs inputs right up to full aft, even though the stall warning was active. On Boeings the stabilizer is inhibited to move further aft when stall speed is reached.
Why can an Airbus THS?
Stick shaker
Where is it on Airbus? One of the most direct warnings, going directly through the hands right into the spine and brain seems to be missing. A whole channel missing.
Why?
The dead stick on the PNF side (or on both with AP on).
If a PF starts losing it, be it a simple PIO or as here with stress-motivated and effectless swinging around the stick, the PNF, in order to realize, must look over and observe the PF.
This is a waste of concentration, he should be monitoring the instruments. With a moving stick (or yoke), he could continue to monitor instruments and simultaneously would be realizing the PFs error, through his second, tactile input channel. Additionally if he wanted to intervene, he could exerce force on the stick and by that raise attention of the PF, again through the second channel. The first one is quite often absorbed by the situation and trying to talk to a stressed PF is futile, the audio channel is the first to leave us under stress.
Why no feedback?
The fixed Autothrust Lever
The Airbus lever is set in a detent, this applies as well when the AT disconnects. When this happens, the AB pilot needs to realize the ECAM warning. With a moving lever, the disconnected, stuck and no more moving AT sort of warns the pilot additionally through the tactile channel. Furthermore the lever will be in the exact position of the thrust. Not so in an Airbus. The lever is still in the detent and the thrust where it was last. The Airbus philosophy tells us, that when the AT is disconnected, the lever acts like a conventional one, position equal thrust, but in the bad case of an automatic disconnect, this is not true. The pilot has to un-detent the lever to get the correct position vs. thrust ratio. This is an unnecessary additional step in a high stress situation.
Why fixed levers, what is their advantage (pls don’t come up with the weight issue)
THS
As I understand, the THS was following the PFs inputs right up to full aft, even though the stall warning was active. On Boeings the stabilizer is inhibited to move further aft when stall speed is reached.
Why can an Airbus THS?
Stick shaker
Where is it on Airbus? One of the most direct warnings, going directly through the hands right into the spine and brain seems to be missing. A whole channel missing.
Why?
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All in all an avoidable accident.
Had they flown "pitch attitude and thrust" as in normal flight , as in "unreliable airspeed" it wouldn't have come so far.
Boeing vs Airbus , FBW , sidesticks , THS , normal/alternate/direct law don't matter , it is Attitude and Thrust that counts.
Had they flown "pitch attitude and thrust" as in normal flight , as in "unreliable airspeed" it wouldn't have come so far.
Boeing vs Airbus , FBW , sidesticks , THS , normal/alternate/direct law don't matter , it is Attitude and Thrust that counts.
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Gretchen what are implying that a/c with stick shakers never stall?
Your last post confirmed everything I said about analogue pilots and digital a/c
A lot of pilots criticising Airbus are still in analogue mode and wishing for a return to stick shakers and throttle movement. The safety case to go backwards isn't there.
Despite your analogue post please correct me if I am wrong. The Lufthansa Frankfurt incident of reverse stick input saw a PNF take control without witnessing any stick feedback or looking over to see what PF was doing. He was digitally minded and in tune with the aircraft.
It is time you tuned in as well. And if you are referring to the Japanese T7, pathetic response.
The sad fact in most of these accidents but not all is that the pilots are not in tune with the a/c. There may well be a case for a different training approach but there is NOT a safety case to change the technology.
Your last post confirmed everything I said about analogue pilots and digital a/c
A lot of pilots criticising Airbus are still in analogue mode and wishing for a return to stick shakers and throttle movement. The safety case to go backwards isn't there.
Despite your analogue post please correct me if I am wrong. The Lufthansa Frankfurt incident of reverse stick input saw a PNF take control without witnessing any stick feedback or looking over to see what PF was doing. He was digitally minded and in tune with the aircraft.
It is time you tuned in as well. And if you are referring to the Japanese T7, pathetic response.
The sad fact in most of these accidents but not all is that the pilots are not in tune with the a/c. There may well be a case for a different training approach but there is NOT a safety case to change the technology.
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Actually, Safety, I have to agree with your post.
I simply would like to remind you, with your steadfast and slightly arrogant statements, of this:
The nuclear lobby was reasoning with the same steadfast arguments, even after Tschernobyl.
Then came Fukushima.
Think it over.
(I'm out)
I simply would like to remind you, with your steadfast and slightly arrogant statements, of this:
The nuclear lobby was reasoning with the same steadfast arguments, even after Tschernobyl.
Then came Fukushima.
The safety case to go backwards isn't there.
(I'm out)
Safety Concerns
The sad fact in most of these accidents but not all is that the pilots are not in tune with the a/c. There may well be a case for a different training approach but there is NOT a safety case to change the technology.
Do we believe that people, in this case pilots, can be trained sufficiently to follow all technological evolutions without limits (under the present training budget)? Isn´t it necessary to develop the evolution of technology in accordance with the capabilities of the operator and under recognition of the available training?
To be in tune with the aircraft is not only a training issue, its also a design issue.
If design would disregard the human factor (and it does in case of the missing tactile feedback, in case of the intermittent stall warning, which by the way was already a known issue years ago, in case of documentation like in LH at Hamburg) then only a small number of top notch pilots would be eligable to be trained and hired for the job (causing higher costs for training and salary).
.........but there is NOT a safety case to change the technology
The human race has gone lots of different streets, and lots of errors and the recognition and avoidance of those in the future brought us to the point we are standing now. It´s not at all bad to accept error also in technical matters, because also designers and engineers are humans and not gods.
Sorry to say that here, but sometimes some technical people here seem to be unfailable.
No need to change anything, it worked as designed...............
There are lot of sound recomendations of the pilot community in this forum how some changes would improve the handling of advanced designed aircraft
(AOA indicator, tactile feedback, different law degradation, other trim logic to name a few), why not start working on the implementation of it?
The training side probably changed UAS training and approach to stall training already, lots of pilots sure as hell are busy in improving their knowledge database concerning UAS, flightlaws, stalls, trim..., but the engineering side is occupied by defending .........what???
It might be time to side with the people in the pointy end and make those beautiful air machines safer, close some holes in the swiss cheese in a unified effort.
Together we are strong, arguing against each other will not help much but disqualify it as saving his own a**.
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The sad fact in most of these accidents but not all is that the pilots are not in tune with the a/c. There may well be a case for a different training approach but there is NOT a safety case to change the technology.
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some good points F4Retired but...
human nature has been taken care of to a certain degree but not completely. We must move away from this "I must have ultimate control" flawed logic.
In the early days of military FBW there were a number of relevant events.
One in particular comes to mind. One FBW fighter had an onboard system which prevented spins and stalls. One particular fighter pilot felt this system limited his dog fighting abilities and so disabled it. "I must have ultimate control". He promptly crashed overcooking it.
Yet that itself doesn't really indicate anything. Had he been shot down with the system enabled that was wrong too. So we need other indicators of a working safe system.
The A320 is one of the safest commercial airliners out there. So it has proven both its safety and design features. This is a fundamentally safe aircraft minus stick feedback and throttle feedback. Tells us a lot.
I do not advocate engineers have it 100% right and one of my earlier posts called for more forward thinking pilots in order to improve on what we have. Fundamentally safe technology.
I could agree more with your points if we were talking about unsafe technology. We are however in the safest period of commercial flying ever. The overwhelming majority of a/c are new technology. This is no coincidence.
Analogue Boeings have stalled and crashed, Boeing pilots have been confused by blocked pitot and static ports and crashed. None of your AOA indications, stick shakers, yoke feedback helped in any way at all. Its pure nonsense, sorry but it is.
Where I totally agree with you is on the together bit. But that requires many of you letting go of the past.
human nature has been taken care of to a certain degree but not completely. We must move away from this "I must have ultimate control" flawed logic.
In the early days of military FBW there were a number of relevant events.
One in particular comes to mind. One FBW fighter had an onboard system which prevented spins and stalls. One particular fighter pilot felt this system limited his dog fighting abilities and so disabled it. "I must have ultimate control". He promptly crashed overcooking it.
Yet that itself doesn't really indicate anything. Had he been shot down with the system enabled that was wrong too. So we need other indicators of a working safe system.
The A320 is one of the safest commercial airliners out there. So it has proven both its safety and design features. This is a fundamentally safe aircraft minus stick feedback and throttle feedback. Tells us a lot.
I do not advocate engineers have it 100% right and one of my earlier posts called for more forward thinking pilots in order to improve on what we have. Fundamentally safe technology.
I could agree more with your points if we were talking about unsafe technology. We are however in the safest period of commercial flying ever. The overwhelming majority of a/c are new technology. This is no coincidence.
Analogue Boeings have stalled and crashed, Boeing pilots have been confused by blocked pitot and static ports and crashed. None of your AOA indications, stick shakers, yoke feedback helped in any way at all. Its pure nonsense, sorry but it is.
Where I totally agree with you is on the together bit. But that requires many of you letting go of the past.
Last edited by Safety Concerns; 16th Aug 2011 at 11:26.
Ut Sementem Feeceris
The Airbus philosophy tells us, that when the AT is disconnected, the lever acts like a conventional one, position equal thrust, but in the bad case of an automatic disconnect, this is not true. The pilot has to un-detent the lever to get the correct position vs. thrust ratio. This is an unnecessary additional step in a high stress situation.
ENG - ENGINE THRUST LOCKED
THR LEVERS.............................MOVE
Additionally the FMA will be flashing THR LCKD. This will be repeated every 5 seconds, with a single chime, until the levers are moved to match actual thrust setting - simply match the "doughnuts" (small circles above N1 gauge arc) to the indicated N1. So if the A/THR falls over - DON'T PANIC!!! the thrust setting has not changed. Assess what's going on and then move the levers - you now have control of the thrust.
Not having motorised levers has never presented me with any problems. I don't deny that the tactile feedback is lost but you just learn/retrain to utilise the visual feedback from the N1 gauges we're humans and adapting is what we are quite good at. The sidestick issue is different and, as a trainer on the bus, I acknowledge that the lack of feedback from the PF to the PNF is less than ideal.
In the case of AF 447 perhaps a requirement for the unreliable speed procedure should be the selection of the FLIGHT CONTROLS page on the systems display (lower centre screen). It would certainly enable the PNF and any other observer to see what inputs the PF was making - especially in a dark cockpit.
Good discussion guys,
A4
Safety Concerns
some good points F4Retired but...
human nature has been taken care of to a certain degree but not completely. We must move away from this "I must have ultimate control" flawed logic.
In the early days of military FBW there were a number of relevant events.
One in particular comes to mind. One FBW fighter had an onboard system which prevented spins and stalls. One particular fighter pilot felt this system limited his dog fighting abilities and so disabled it. "I must have ultimate control". He promptly crashed overcooking it.
Yet that itself doesn't really indicate anything. Had he been shot down with the system enabled that was wrong too.
human nature has been taken care of to a certain degree but not completely. We must move away from this "I must have ultimate control" flawed logic.
In the early days of military FBW there were a number of relevant events.
One in particular comes to mind. One FBW fighter had an onboard system which prevented spins and stalls. One particular fighter pilot felt this system limited his dog fighting abilities and so disabled it. "I must have ultimate control". He promptly crashed overcooking it.
Yet that itself doesn't really indicate anything. Had he been shot down with the system enabled that was wrong too.
So we need other indicators of a working safe system.
The A320 is one of the safest commercial airliners out there. So it has proven both its safety and design features. This is a fundamentally safe aircraft minus stick feedback and throttle feedback. Tells us a lot.
I do not advocate engineers have it 100% right and one of my earlier posts called for more forward thinking pilots in order to improve on what we have. Fundamentally safe technology.
I could agree more with your points if we were talking about unsafe technology. We are however in the safest period of commercial flying ever. The overwhelming majority of a/c are new technology. This is no coincidence.
I could agree more with your points if we were talking about unsafe technology. We are however in the safest period of commercial flying ever. The overwhelming majority of a/c are new technology. This is no coincidence.
By the way, its not A vs. B, its make things safer when you know how.
Analogue Boeings have stalled and crashed, Boeing pilots have been confused by blocked pitot and static ports and crashed. None of your AOA indications, stick shakers, yoke feedback helped in any way at all. Its pure nonsense, sorry but it is.
Cars continue to crash despite antiskid and other gimmicks, but nobody would come to the idea to remove those systems or to build a new car without them. Aircraft with or without FBW and with or without all obove mentioned systems and helpers will crash, human race will not be able to produce and operate a failsafe system of any kind. Its just a matter of time and circumstances until anything fails. But it is necessary to improve systems and training out of expierience, develop it further and make it safer.
To deprive the ultimate responsible instance in the cockpit (the pilot, if you forgot) a very important information by disabling the feedback channel (tactile feedback to the hand, which executes the inputs) and saturating other channels with the information (like eyes or ears) does not make things safer.
Where I totally agree with you is on the together bit. But that requires many of you letting go of the past.
The expierienced pilots from the past having flown with tactile feedback may be the least affected by the absence of this channel, they can work around with their expierience in flying (and handflying) in the past. The young kids like that one in the right seat have no fall back pposition available when the sh++t hits the fan, when they are saturated by alarms, whistles, bells, different coloured displays in the absence of otherwise present navigation and aviation helpers. Then a simple UAS event with a AP+AThr dropout, a slight (pitot induced) altitude deviation coupled with some roll tendency leads to a breakdown of situational awareness.
That is not a training issue alone, it is a problem to tune in the pilot into the system and to keep him in the loop from normal operation to the biggest f****up possible.
And this is also an engineering task, wether you like it or not.
franzl
Last edited by RetiredF4; 16th Aug 2011 at 12:27.
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Unsaid, after the part about pilots entering the present, how old is the AB format? Perhaps together then into the present, to embrace the future.
Because right now, there is some seriously qaulified commentating wasting time on defending and indicting?
Sky King had wing levelers and ATT hold on his B18. Penny's 310 had a Strikefinder. 1950's-ish.
Traveling a long way is not a guarantee of "getting There". Tech wise.
Because right now, there is some seriously qaulified commentating wasting time on defending and indicting?
Sky King had wing levelers and ATT hold on his B18. Penny's 310 had a Strikefinder. 1950's-ish.
Traveling a long way is not a guarantee of "getting There". Tech wise.
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I'm not going to be your monkey and go dig documents up, because I don't have the time.
Initially you state it is :
"all in the CVR traces - down there in black and white (along with red, blue and green in this case)"
but when caught out it is suddenly only :
"pulled from memory" ?
"all in the CVR traces - down there in black and white (along with red, blue and green in this case)"
but when caught out it is suddenly only :
"pulled from memory" ?
But the point is, whatever your CVR quotes are, they show one thing :
2 PNF had no idea what PF was doing with its sidestick, at best they were guessing.
2 PNF had no idea what PF was doing with its sidestick, at best they were guessing.
And it is dishonnest from you to substitute :
"Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh"
by :
"Above all, don't make lateral inputs so large"
Very different meaning !
"Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh"
by :
"Above all, don't make lateral inputs so large"
Very different meaning !
The problem is that, like Gretchenfrage, you're coming at this from the preconceived decision that the Airbus control philosophy is bad and less safe than the old yoke, then you try to fit the circumstances of this accident to fit the narrative that you've already arrived at.
No he did not.
Or quote the report reference … ?
There is no such thing as :
"partially disabling the alpha-floor protection".
Or quote the report reference … ?
There is no such thing as :
"partially disabling the alpha-floor protection".
That said...
Originally Posted by AF296 accident report
"2.2.3 Flight preparation by the crew ... The training given to the pilots emphasized all the protections from which the A320 benefits with respect to its lift which could have given them the feeling, which indeed is justified, of increased safety. In particular, the demonstration of the activation of the safety features and protection of this aircraft may lead one to consider flight approaching one of the limitations (especially the one related to angle of attack) as a foreseeable flight condition since lift is guaranteed. ... The choice to inhibit the automatic go-around protection (Alpha Floor) resulted from the need to eliminate this protection if flight at 100 feet or above is planned at an angle of attack higher than the one activating this protection. The inhibition in this case can only be achieved in practice by pressing and holding the two switches placed on the throttles. After 30 seconds, inhibition becomes permanent for the rest of the flight. This decision is compatible with the objectives expressed by the Captain to maintain a height of 100 feet and seems to confirm that the incursion below 100 feet was not considered by him at this stage. In effect, below 100 feet, this protection is not active." (page 18, French version)
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Penny's 310 had a Strikefinder.
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Hi,
DW .. you know like me that those two stances translated in french have a very different meaning
Dans le rapport du BEA
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF (préventif)
Surtout essaye de toucher le moins possible les commandes en latéral
DW
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF après avoir constaté une action
Surtout ne donne pas de commandes latérales de si grande amplitudes
And it is dishonnest from you to substitute :
"Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh"
by :
"Above all, don't make lateral inputs so large"
Very different meaning ! How so? I can't see how there's a major difference other than a slightly different use of the English idiom. What other lateral controls were in the flight deck that were being moved in an excessive manner at that point in time? None - only the PF's sidestick.
"Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh"
by :
"Above all, don't make lateral inputs so large"
Very different meaning ! How so? I can't see how there's a major difference other than a slightly different use of the English idiom. What other lateral controls were in the flight deck that were being moved in an excessive manner at that point in time? None - only the PF's sidestick.
Dans le rapport du BEA
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF (préventif)
Surtout essaye de toucher le moins possible les commandes en latéral
DW
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF après avoir constaté une action
Surtout ne donne pas de commandes latérales de si grande amplitudes
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About the sidestick thing, I'll put an idea on here in case it eventually achieves results where they count........
I mainly flew stuff that had the traditional 'stick between the knees' - only occasionally (when I could afford it) did I fly anything with a yoke. But it just occurred to me that, because of the layout of the other controls, even though I'm left-handed, I worked the stick almost exclusively with my right hand. Using my left hand would have put me on quite a steep learning curve -and it would have been even more difficult for right-handers......
It was even simpler with a yoke. Most of us will have travelled and rented cars in other countries - sure, you can get things like the wipers and the signals mixed up, but at least the steering-wheel and the pedals are arranged the same way whether the car is lefthand or righthand drive......
Occurs to me that Airbus' adoption of the 'sidestick' calls for pilots to learn to fly equally-effectively with either hand. Beyond that, 'first officers' must find themselves doing most, if not all, of their 'learning' flying from the righthand seat. In this case, the PNF was in the seat that he was accustomed to, but the PF was in the one he very possibly hadn't got much experience of at all.........
Add to that the 'visibility' problem. Had the sticks been in the traditional 'between the knees' position, the PNF would have had no difficulty at all in 'reading' the PF's inputs.
Years back, when sidestick Airbuses were 'just coming in,' I had an airline captain as a neighbour and he was 'all for' the sidesticks. Mainly because, for the first time in his career, he reckoned that he was able to eat his meals in a 'civilised' manner, without the yoke getting in the way!
So a suggestion for Airbus. Try putting the sticks back in the central, 'between the knees' position that pilots have been used to for (literally, nowadays) a century or so. I won't even argue for 'feedback' - I know that would cost a lot of money and weight.
But at LEAST it would mean that every hour of hand-flying that pilots can accumulate - not much anyway these days - would count as 'solid' experience, and they wouldn't have to adjust to 'using the other hand' just because they happened one day to find themselves sitting on the other side of the cockpit?
Just MIGHT help?
I mainly flew stuff that had the traditional 'stick between the knees' - only occasionally (when I could afford it) did I fly anything with a yoke. But it just occurred to me that, because of the layout of the other controls, even though I'm left-handed, I worked the stick almost exclusively with my right hand. Using my left hand would have put me on quite a steep learning curve -and it would have been even more difficult for right-handers......
It was even simpler with a yoke. Most of us will have travelled and rented cars in other countries - sure, you can get things like the wipers and the signals mixed up, but at least the steering-wheel and the pedals are arranged the same way whether the car is lefthand or righthand drive......
Occurs to me that Airbus' adoption of the 'sidestick' calls for pilots to learn to fly equally-effectively with either hand. Beyond that, 'first officers' must find themselves doing most, if not all, of their 'learning' flying from the righthand seat. In this case, the PNF was in the seat that he was accustomed to, but the PF was in the one he very possibly hadn't got much experience of at all.........
Add to that the 'visibility' problem. Had the sticks been in the traditional 'between the knees' position, the PNF would have had no difficulty at all in 'reading' the PF's inputs.
Years back, when sidestick Airbuses were 'just coming in,' I had an airline captain as a neighbour and he was 'all for' the sidesticks. Mainly because, for the first time in his career, he reckoned that he was able to eat his meals in a 'civilised' manner, without the yoke getting in the way!
So a suggestion for Airbus. Try putting the sticks back in the central, 'between the knees' position that pilots have been used to for (literally, nowadays) a century or so. I won't even argue for 'feedback' - I know that would cost a lot of money and weight.
But at LEAST it would mean that every hour of hand-flying that pilots can accumulate - not much anyway these days - would count as 'solid' experience, and they wouldn't have to adjust to 'using the other hand' just because they happened one day to find themselves sitting on the other side of the cockpit?
Just MIGHT help?
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If you could elaborate on what you see as the difference, I'd be grateful - however I'm still convinced that the PNF knew that the PF was overcontrolling, why would he make a reference to lateral controls otherwise?
@RWA - wrong way round. The PF was the one in the RHS - so experience with either hand should not have been an issue. Over and above that, looking at the traces from the PNF's inputs (who was not in his normal seat), his inputs appear to be much more gingerly applied - focused and concise.
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RWA
When you move to the left seat in a Boeing 737/747/757/767/777 you have to mainly fly the aircraft using your LEFT hand, the right covers the thrust levers, so it is NO different to an Airbus!!Putting it between your knees would not solve anything on having to use your LEFT hand. Are we now to have a major design change because 1 guy could not "fly" the aircraft properly.
When you move to the left seat in a Boeing 737/747/757/767/777 you have to mainly fly the aircraft using your LEFT hand, the right covers the thrust levers, so it is NO different to an Airbus!!
Putting it between your knees would not solve anything on having to use your LEFT hand. Are we now to have a major design change because 1 guy could not "fly" the aircraft properly.
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Quoting DW:-
@RWA - wrong way round. The PF was the one in the RHS...."
Apologies, DozyWannabe, but not so, as far as I can see from the BEA Report.
If you look at the FDR/CVR transcript (Page 111 yet again) you'll find that the PF's inputs are listed under 'Captain' - meaning that he was on the left.
Quoting iceman50:-
"Are we now to have a major design change because 1 guy could not "fly" the aircraft properly."
Well - just maybe because a few hundred OTHER people got killed......?
But I suppose I broke the first rule of websites - "At your peril, never say anything that may appear to be 'outside the box'........"
@RWA - wrong way round. The PF was the one in the RHS...."
Apologies, DozyWannabe, but not so, as far as I can see from the BEA Report.
If you look at the FDR/CVR transcript (Page 111 yet again
) you'll find that the PF's inputs are listed under 'Captain' - meaning that he was on the left.Quoting iceman50:-
"Are we now to have a major design change because 1 guy could not "fly" the aircraft properly."
Well - just maybe because a few hundred OTHER people got killed......?
But I suppose I broke the first rule of websites - "At your peril, never say anything that may appear to be 'outside the box'........"
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Hi,
The BEA stance mean the PNF give a preventive advise to PF
Your stance is that the PNF had seen the stick movements of the PF .. and so the PNF ask PF to don't do large stick lateral inputs
And ...
What he maybe seen on the ADI can't be not related to the stick inputs of PF ... the aircraft can roll by itself ...
Hope all this made sens ...
Out for shopping
DW .. you know like me that those two stances translated in french have a very different meaning
Dans le rapport du BEA
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF (préventif)
Surtout essaye de toucher le moins possible les commandes en latéral
DW
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF après avoir constaté une action
Surtout ne donne pas de commandes latérales de si grande amplitudes
Dans le rapport du BEA
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF (préventif)
Surtout essaye de toucher le moins possible les commandes en latéral
DW
Ceci est un conseil donné au PF après avoir constaté une action
Surtout ne donne pas de commandes latérales de si grande amplitudes
Your stance is that the PNF had seen the stick movements of the PF .. and so the PNF ask PF to don't do large stick lateral inputs
And ...
Or he could have been looking at his ADI and seeing the path the aircraft was taking (he may even have had FPV enabled prior to Alternate Law).
Hope all this made sens ...
Out for shopping