AF447 wreckage found
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AF apparently couldn't be bothered to train pilots to manually fly in cruise at all (A/P goes off - learn to fly a new a/c, fast) - what makes you think they would have trained AOA ?
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At any point after the initial upset and once the initial period of pitot-iced UAS ended, did the systems on board AF447 have sufficient information about the aircraft's attitude/altitude/speed(s) to ascertain and deliver the appropriate recovery inputs? (i.e. would the kind of Hail Mary recovery systems on Cirrus and some other aircraft have worked if the big red button was pushed?)
As for the "Hail Mary" system, it would depend on what input that system used. The combination of AOA and pitch attitude may have allowed an automatic correction even without airspeed, but any system that depended on airspeed might have failed.
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I still think you are missing the point regarding center "sticks" and the different muscle sets used to move them - if a center stick provides roll control, then it pivots at the stick head (I presume you mean yoke type control, a pic or reference to aircraft type would help), your entire arm moves to effect the movement, pivoting at the ball socket of your shoulder. With a joystick this is never so.
. . .
But, really, were not all the required indications available to both PNF and Captain - surely the ADI and altitude readout alone should have been the only two instruments necessary to figure out the situation, along with the fact the engines were working:
1) I'm pitched up (What was it? 15 degrees or thereabouts?)
2) I'm falling at 10K/min
3) I have engine power
Hmmm, what could be wrong....
Did the PNF or Captain ever state - "The aircraft is stalled, pitch-down! Lower the nose!"
Was it because the PF had the SS nailed to the rear stop? Would that have been the vital clue to all in that cockpit? Or was the problem well past that?
. . .
But, really, were not all the required indications available to both PNF and Captain - surely the ADI and altitude readout alone should have been the only two instruments necessary to figure out the situation, along with the fact the engines were working:
1) I'm pitched up (What was it? 15 degrees or thereabouts?)
2) I'm falling at 10K/min
3) I have engine power
Hmmm, what could be wrong....
Did the PNF or Captain ever state - "The aircraft is stalled, pitch-down! Lower the nose!"
Was it because the PF had the SS nailed to the rear stop? Would that have been the vital clue to all in that cockpit? Or was the problem well past that?
In the A-6, for example, the pitch pivot on the stick was at the floor, but the roll pivot was half way up the stick, with another pushrod going through the floor from that pivot point. That allowed knee clearance at full roll deflections. When flying in cruise at altitude, the upper arm was normally at rest against the body, and again no shoulder movement was required.
Even in the 747, I rest my elbows on the armrests to manipulate the yoke in most flying regimes. During takeoff and crosswind landings I might use deliberate shoulder movements, but most of my flying is still done with fingers, wrist, and forearm. At times the armrest becomes a fulcrum for the forearm for larger-amplitude movements.
Though I have not flown with a left-hand sidestick, I still fly in both the right and left seats with a yoke. The stick and throttle motions transfer freely between hands when the controls are anchored.
With all that said, I have made NO judgement or statement regarding the setup of the Airbus cockpit and the lack of motion on the stick -- that was from others. I see that as a tertiary (or lower) issue. As you pointed out at the end of your post, it was a simple (at least after the first 30 seconds) matter of looking at attitude, altitude, and (possibly) vertical speed to analyze the situation and recover from the obvious stall. Tragically, that never happened. I might note here that I have flown in that regime in the past, because flying the A-4 in a stalled condition, with significant sink rate, at altitude was a great exercise in control discipline, and it recovered readily with the simple easing of the backstick.
Safety, my apologies, I read into that a bit, and I thank you for correcting me. 
I don't have a dog in that fight, actually (what was that about reading posts? 
) though some others do. Given that any number of pros fly the sidestick on a daily basis and are content with it I'll let the fur fly on that one and learn what I can. My concern is in the trend of taking the man out of the loop ... so you could say ... that my dog in the fight, such as it is, applies to A & B, and T, and whomever else is making passenger planes.
The machine should serve the man, and the man/woman I have in mind is in it, not in a board room.
Therefore my point was merely that if as a group of professionals you are hell bent on the return of stick feedback, you need to find a different argument because going on about perceived automatics issues with AF447 or Habsheim or anywhere else won't help your cause.
) though some others do. Given that any number of pros fly the sidestick on a daily basis and are content with it I'll let the fur fly on that one and learn what I can. My concern is in the trend of taking the man out of the loop ... so you could say ... that my dog in the fight, such as it is, applies to A & B, and T, and whomever else is making passenger planes. The machine should serve the man, and the man/woman I have in mind is in it, not in a board room.
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This was not the first UAS instance affecting an Airbus - but unless I am mistaken, it is the first that ended up in the Ocean. So, were the prior successful UAS occurrences luck? The aircraft systems were the same. The same cockpit displays, controls, warning tones, etc. What was different? The fella charged with flying the aircraft... yep, that is one identifiable difference.
They are still alive (if, arguably, undisciplined).
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Hi,
captplaystation
Well at least we have already a small statistic about the Thales Pitot tube causing UAS ...
On 37 events .. one only was fatal
So .. seem's this statistic shown that the pilots are on the good side of the coin
captplaystation
jcjeant,
This one you probably can't find, as most who achieved it are probably keeping quiet, as in many instances the "save" will have been a response to a prior cock-up on their part
This one you probably can't find, as most who achieved it are probably keeping quiet, as in many instances the "save" will have been a response to a prior cock-up on their part
On 37 events .. one only was fatal
So .. seem's this statistic shown that the pilots are on the good side of the coin
Safety Concerns
[quote]Safety Concerns
Lonewolf you should read my posts.
Do you have a reference for this? That looks like everybody who intends to improve his working conditions and the efficiency and safety of his work should loose his job.
That is a wrong assesment, the issue is for those who still live and work.
Safety is not driven by statistics, that is the engineering point of view. Safety is the condition of being safe; freedom from danger, risk, or injury. You might use statistics to compare two items and clarify the relative safety against each other. According your point of view in continuosly comparing A v. B or past v. present you use the better one as reference.
So it would satify, if f.e. A would loose 1 frame per year and B 2 frames per year, then safety under your point would be high enough, because A is double as good as B. The truth would be, that there are 3 losses to much each year.
Dealing with safety you improve whatever is improvable, regardless of statistics.
That is your opinion, others may have another one.
In between your sentence i read, that you think that this group of professionals see the problem AF447 only in the mentioned SS and throttle issue. This group sees training deficiencies since a long time, especially in the younger groups of pilots. It has been adressed in this thread and in a lot of others in this community. Go back and read them, you might find a lot of helpful information about flying. Problem being, that due to the statistically high rate of reliability handflying is not deemed necessary any more.
When however problems arise and the pilot has to handfly the system, he is not only missing the practice to do so, he must rapidly tune into a malfunctioning system and and must bring his knowledge and expierience (if there is one) flawless to work. For that he has to use a system, that was designed for 90% monitoring and 10% flying, in normal everything functional conditions. Therefore it is legit to think about improving these systems to assist the crew in those few occasions in a better way, like some of us described. If manufacturers and engineers are unable to do it and if the industrie is not willing to pay for it, then it might be that way and the pilots will have to cope with it. But not saying anything might be tolerable from your position in a practical kind of way, but not from the flying side in relation to safety matters.
Finally the manufacturers will makeup their mind, and either replace the pilot at all or improve the workingplace. Wether the initial cause for that will be Habsheim or Paris-Rio or any other happening in the future, we will see. And when the change takes place with a later design, then it will be ok as well.
The pilots and people advocating a change are not defiant children (which i have the impression you see them), but professionals in their world of responsibility and thus have a right and a duty to adress those matters.
Lonewolf you should read my posts.
I made it quite clear early on I do not agree with removing pilots from the cockpit. I am merely highlighting the industry wish and the fact that some pilots do not help themselves on this issue by continuously referring to perceived safety issues that aren't there.
I accept it must be difficult and I respect the loyalty shown to colleagues no longer with us.
Safety is driven by statistics. You have no chance of getting stick feedback on a bus until accidents occur where without any shadow of any doubt lack of feedback was an issue.
You have seen the NASA results of A v B and the A320 over 20 years into service is doing just fine and is safer (statistically) than a 737.
You have seen the NASA results of A v B and the A320 over 20 years into service is doing just fine and is safer (statistically) than a 737.
So it would satify, if f.e. A would loose 1 frame per year and B 2 frames per year, then safety under your point would be high enough, because A is double as good as B. The truth would be, that there are 3 losses to much each year.
Dealing with safety you improve whatever is improvable, regardless of statistics.
Therefore my point was merely that if as a group of professionals you are hell bent on the return of stick feedback, you need to find a different argument because going on about perceived automatics issues with AF447 or Habsheim or anywhere else won't help your cause.
In between your sentence i read, that you think that this group of professionals see the problem AF447 only in the mentioned SS and throttle issue. This group sees training deficiencies since a long time, especially in the younger groups of pilots. It has been adressed in this thread and in a lot of others in this community. Go back and read them, you might find a lot of helpful information about flying. Problem being, that due to the statistically high rate of reliability handflying is not deemed necessary any more.
When however problems arise and the pilot has to handfly the system, he is not only missing the practice to do so, he must rapidly tune into a malfunctioning system and and must bring his knowledge and expierience (if there is one) flawless to work. For that he has to use a system, that was designed for 90% monitoring and 10% flying, in normal everything functional conditions. Therefore it is legit to think about improving these systems to assist the crew in those few occasions in a better way, like some of us described. If manufacturers and engineers are unable to do it and if the industrie is not willing to pay for it, then it might be that way and the pilots will have to cope with it. But not saying anything might be tolerable from your position in a practical kind of way, but not from the flying side in relation to safety matters.
Finally the manufacturers will makeup their mind, and either replace the pilot at all or improve the workingplace. Wether the initial cause for that will be Habsheim or Paris-Rio or any other happening in the future, we will see. And when the change takes place with a later design, then it will be ok as well.
The pilots and people advocating a change are not defiant children (which i have the impression you see them), but professionals in their world of responsibility and thus have a right and a duty to adress those matters.
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@JenCluse - that was a very well-written and emotive post. I want to make it clear to everyone here that I do accept that there is a valid argument for force-feedback. However I also believe that there are valid arguments against, especially when the Airbus control philosophy as a whole - including human factors and training - is taken into account. See my previous post on CRM and handling discipline if you like.
"Might"? Yes. "Would have"? I don't know, but possibly not. If we accept the possibility that it might have made a difference, we must also be prepared to accept the possibility that it wouldn't - based on previous accidents where aircraft with conventional control layout met similar fates, as well as the human factors in this incident - the Captain having been summoned to the flight deck from his rest period, for example.
Of course, and I've never disputed that. Convincing me isn't the issue - convincing the industry *is*, and the ones in the best position to do it are yourselves. But (and this is my opinion only, for all that's worth), you have to convince them with focused and well-reasoned arguments. Going off into tangents about sidesticks, yokes and force-feedback won't do you any favours in the eyes of the hard-nosed financiers who for better or worse call the shots in most of our industries in this day and age.
Because you're undoubtedly good at your job (all other things being equal, it's hard to end up in the LHS of an airliner if you're not), and more than that you are legally expected to carry the can for everything that goes on on board your aircraft. It's a rare case in aviation where a design flaw is so egregious that an engineer will be expected to take responsibility in a legal sense (though a good engineer in my book will take personal and emotional responsibility for everything he or she was worked on).
But "to serve man" (...and the sci-fi lovers on here will know how hard I'm fighting the urge to yell "It's a cookbook!") and "doing it the way we've always done it" is not the same thing. MountainSnake makes a very good point that yokes and force-feedback are not "must-haves" on a FBW aircraft. The argument for and against has effectively split the piloting community into two camps - I'm not a pilot, but I know that the "pro-feedback" argument is not unanimous no matter how some may try to portray it thus.
Not meaning to be facetious, but do you have any evidence that the number is growing? I haven't seen any as yet - the Tech Log thread in particular demonstrates that the divide is as clear and as balanced as it ever was.
It's not just "the lobby" - many pilots who have as much skin in the game as yourself do not see the lack of force feedback as a big deal, and as I said before, you have only to look at the various threads on this subject for proof. Just as I do not have the right to label all Airbus FBW sceptics as, say, stubborn old-timers (nor would I!), what right do you or anyone else on your side of the fence have to dismiss their opinions as irrelevant?
SC:
That is a useful and well-reasoned argument.
That is unhelpful and unsubstantiated rot, and on a piloting forum I would say it is also borderline inflammatory and/or inciteful.
As a techie - one who tries to understand the logic behind the systems and knows well the calibre of the average person that designs and puts those systems together, I still fervently hope that there'll be at least one Mk.1 human brain at the controls of any aircraft I fly until I shuffle off this mortal coil - and I see no evidence that any less than two at any one time would be safe, given the present state-of-the-art. Yes, human error has led to accidents, crashes and the inevitable deaths - but human ingenuity has equally saved lives when the situation has appeared completely hopeless based on layman's logic alone (UA232, BA038, the DHL A300 in Iraq to name but a few).
Er, the AF447 PF very clearly states (according to my learned Francophone fellow posters on this board) that he believed he was in an overspeed "crazy speed" situation, as did the Birgenair 757 Captain (who also believed that all ASI's were unreliable when in fact it was only his own).
Anyways, apologies to all for the long post, but I've been building up thoughts for the last 48 hours that I wanted to get off my chest - before I sign off for a bit I want to quote a section from a PM that I sent to a pilot I recently disagreed with, but respect a great deal nonetheless.
Re your point 1. yep, having a yoke didn't save them. Perhaps these two F/Os might have been saved by the intervention of their Captain though, if he could have quickly grasped what was occurring?
He would have grasped it more clearly if he could have SEEN what inputs PF was making. Agree?
He would have grasped it more clearly if he could have SEEN what inputs PF was making. Agree?
Surely 'piloting skills' ought to be valued in an aircraft pilot?
Sometimes, as I'm driving to work, I think...'why am I flying this thing? what makes me the pilot instead of, say, an engineer- or that guy who taught me 'flat-panel'?
What right do I have to call myself the 'grand fromage' pilot?
What right do I have to call myself the 'grand fromage' pilot?
But "to serve man" (...and the sci-fi lovers on here will know how hard I'm fighting the urge to yell "It's a cookbook!") and "doing it the way we've always done it" is not the same thing. MountainSnake makes a very good point that yokes and force-feedback are not "must-haves" on a FBW aircraft. The argument for and against has effectively split the piloting community into two camps - I'm not a pilot, but I know that the "pro-feedback" argument is not unanimous no matter how some may try to portray it thus.
Or what it does not and what the consequences are in terms of safety, stubborn denial from the lobby or not.
SC:
Designers will be continuously monitoring operation and performance for improvements including of course accident causes. The aircraft are different, the way flying is conducted today is different yet there really is a valid argument about training and time "hands on". Is it sufficient?
There isn't however, yet at least, a valid argument about the technology. The industry remains driven by cost and safety. Until you can present a case that meets one of those criteria nothing will change.
There isn't however, yet at least, a valid argument about the technology. The industry remains driven by cost and safety. Until you can present a case that meets one of those criteria nothing will change.
Someone has finally grasped the direction design is moving in (bold text).
The technology is in tune with humans but the ultimate or primary goal may not be to serve pilots interests. We are in a transition phase to pilotless aircraft. The significant influence which will determine how quick or how slow this is implemented will be public perception
The technology is in tune with humans but the ultimate or primary goal may not be to serve pilots interests. We are in a transition phase to pilotless aircraft. The significant influence which will determine how quick or how slow this is implemented will be public perception
As a techie - one who tries to understand the logic behind the systems and knows well the calibre of the average person that designs and puts those systems together, I still fervently hope that there'll be at least one Mk.1 human brain at the controls of any aircraft I fly until I shuffle off this mortal coil - and I see no evidence that any less than two at any one time would be safe, given the present state-of-the-art. Yes, human error has led to accidents, crashes and the inevitable deaths - but human ingenuity has equally saved lives when the situation has appeared completely hopeless based on layman's logic alone (UA232, BA038, the DHL A300 in Iraq to name but a few).
@Dozzy i think you are missing the point or deliberately trying to push peoples buttons, it had been earlier explained very clearly that the NWA 727 crew didnt push nose down though they had a yoke, simply because they both believed that their actions were correct trying to recover from a percieved overspeed as opposed to the AF PF who had no clue what he was doing and his PM had no way of seeing his control column inputs.
Anyways, apologies to all for the long post, but I've been building up thoughts for the last 48 hours that I wanted to get off my chest - before I sign off for a bit I want to quote a section from a PM that I sent to a pilot I recently disagreed with, but respect a great deal nonetheless.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I'm not saying there isn't a safety case for backdrive - but I can tell you that retrofitting it to the Airbus systems would not be a simple or cheap task. Look at it from a systems perspective - first they would have to develop it, then get it certified, and then they would have to physically modify thousands of aircraft in service (costing billions). They would also have to completely reconsider and rework their training programme and ground most of their aircraft while these processes happen. The result would mean many airlines facing bankruptcy and in all likelihood would bankrupt Airbus as well - thousands of pilots and engineers (among others) would lose their jobs and the airline industry would take the largest hit it has ever experienced. Would it be worth risking that for a design change that hasn't even been proven to make things safer?
Some people argue that if the PNF or Captain of AF447 had seen or felt the PF's inputs then "maybe" they could have resolved the situation - in fact some argue that it's a certainty, but the history of LOC incidents due to stall doesn't bear this out (e.g. NWA, BEA548, Birgenair - all of them had yokes, none of them recognised and/or corrected the situation - in fact all of them had at least one flight crew member who was convinced that their stall warning and protection systems were in error). I'm happy to accept that it *might* have helped to have backdrive, but I'm not convinced that it *would*. I'm certainly not convinced that it's worth risking the future of European civil aviation over that "might" or "maybe".
In the end I leave it to you to choose how seriously to take what I'm saying, as I do with everyone, but don't think for a second that I haven't done my homework and don't respect the opinions of those who disagree with me - I do, and I especially respect those who provide statistical or anecdotal evidence to back up their arguments. But you'll have to cut me some slack if I don't accept "no pilot would do xxx" or "I just don't like the idea of non-moving thrust levers and passive sidesticks" as more than an opinion as opposed to a proven fact. We're human beings and we adapt to our changes in environment pretty well - but change is something that we have to work to accept psychologically, bringing with it as it does reminders of age, obsolescence and eventual death.
Some people argue that if the PNF or Captain of AF447 had seen or felt the PF's inputs then "maybe" they could have resolved the situation - in fact some argue that it's a certainty, but the history of LOC incidents due to stall doesn't bear this out (e.g. NWA, BEA548, Birgenair - all of them had yokes, none of them recognised and/or corrected the situation - in fact all of them had at least one flight crew member who was convinced that their stall warning and protection systems were in error). I'm happy to accept that it *might* have helped to have backdrive, but I'm not convinced that it *would*. I'm certainly not convinced that it's worth risking the future of European civil aviation over that "might" or "maybe".
In the end I leave it to you to choose how seriously to take what I'm saying, as I do with everyone, but don't think for a second that I haven't done my homework and don't respect the opinions of those who disagree with me - I do, and I especially respect those who provide statistical or anecdotal evidence to back up their arguments. But you'll have to cut me some slack if I don't accept "no pilot would do xxx" or "I just don't like the idea of non-moving thrust levers and passive sidesticks" as more than an opinion as opposed to a proven fact. We're human beings and we adapt to our changes in environment pretty well - but change is something that we have to work to accept psychologically, bringing with it as it does reminders of age, obsolescence and eventual death.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 17th Aug 2011 at 22:08.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50 
To serve man ... that is the purpose of the machine.
Please don't serve up a straw man, dozy, since we are not cooking scarecrow stew.
Serving man is NOT the same as "doing as we've always done," and you will NOT find me foolishly equating the two.
My takeaway from aquadalte's concise point is that adding features can frequently be counterproductive. Cockpit functions intended to serve those flying, with their flesh on the butcher's block, have to account for a holistic approach to a pilot, as do the wetware policies in how to apply those features.
If your features (and policies, which are RULES just as a computer rule is a rule) erode proficiency and currency, then a malfunction has ample opportunity to turn into something worse.
AF 447 isn't the only example of that.
To serve man ... that is the purpose of the machine.
But "to serve man" (...and the sci-fi lovers on here will know how hard I'm fighting the urge to yell "It's a cookbook!") and "doing it the way we've always done it" is not the same thing.
Serving man is NOT the same as "doing as we've always done," and you will NOT find me foolishly equating the two.
My takeaway from aquadalte's concise point is that adding features can frequently be counterproductive. Cockpit functions intended to serve those flying, with their flesh on the butcher's block, have to account for a holistic approach to a pilot, as do the wetware policies in how to apply those features.
If your features (and policies, which are RULES just as a computer rule is a rule) erode proficiency and currency, then a malfunction has ample opportunity to turn into something worse.
AF 447 isn't the only example of that.
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@LW_50:
Gaaah - I'm supposed to be taking a breather!
OK - I'll answer your point and then I'm done for a bit. I'm not putting forward a straw man (though, on the subject of scarecrows, admittedly my head has hurt so much turning these issues over that bursting into a chorus of "If I Only Had A Brain" has been a distinct worry ). That point was a response to the suggestions put forward in the support of force-feedback that the past has many lessons to teach us, and that the march towards technology runs the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, so to speak. It's a fair point and one I'm happy to concede.
However I've seen no evidence, either statistical or anecdotal, that the decision to simplify the control logic and reflect the modern state of airliner control systems (i.e. they ain't connected to the sticks and haven't been for nearly 40 years) by not implementing it on the current Airbus stable has had any effect on safety. All I've seen on this thread (and others) are people who have already made their minds up on the subject deciding that this was so. For what it's worth (as a non-pilot who does his homework before spouting off because he loves aviation and hopes that his forum handle makes that clear), I don't think there's enough evidence to support an unequivocal argument either way, and certainly not enough evidence to support a unilateral design change to what is a very successful and unprecedentedly safe airliner series and the knock-on effect that would undoubtedly ensue in practice.
I hope that people will also note that I don't see technological solutions as the be-all and end-all, and remain firmly in the "airliners need pilots" camp. I agree that overuse and misuse of automation, largely at the behest of airline executives whose qualifications consist of a trust fund, an MBA and precious little else, has had a negative impact on safety - especially when the automatics decide it is no longer safe for them to continue. However it is this aspect of the airline industry that needs to be tackled, and making automation itself (which as I've said is merely a tool) out to be the bad guy in all of this is, I believe, not only short-sighted but harming the debate that really does need to happen on the subject of hand-flying currency.
Gaaah - I'm supposed to be taking a breather!
OK - I'll answer your point and then I'm done for a bit. I'm not putting forward a straw man (though, on the subject of scarecrows, admittedly my head has hurt so much turning these issues over that bursting into a chorus of "If I Only Had A Brain" has been a distinct worry
). That point was a response to the suggestions put forward in the support of force-feedback that the past has many lessons to teach us, and that the march towards technology runs the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, so to speak. It's a fair point and one I'm happy to concede. However I've seen no evidence, either statistical or anecdotal, that the decision to simplify the control logic and reflect the modern state of airliner control systems (i.e. they ain't connected to the sticks and haven't been for nearly 40 years) by not implementing it on the current Airbus stable has had any effect on safety. All I've seen on this thread (and others) are people who have already made their minds up on the subject deciding that this was so. For what it's worth (as a non-pilot who does his homework before spouting off because he loves aviation and hopes that his forum handle makes that clear), I don't think there's enough evidence to support an unequivocal argument either way, and certainly not enough evidence to support a unilateral design change to what is a very successful and unprecedentedly safe airliner series and the knock-on effect that would undoubtedly ensue in practice.
I hope that people will also note that I don't see technological solutions as the be-all and end-all, and remain firmly in the "airliners need pilots" camp. I agree that overuse and misuse of automation, largely at the behest of airline executives whose qualifications consist of a trust fund, an MBA and precious little else, has had a negative impact on safety - especially when the automatics decide it is no longer safe for them to continue. However it is this aspect of the airline industry that needs to be tackled, and making automation itself (which as I've said is merely a tool) out to be the bad guy in all of this is, I believe, not only short-sighted but harming the debate that really does need to happen on the subject of hand-flying currency.
If you read carefuly BEA's reports you will notice that most (if not ALL) affected crews wisely decided NOT to apply the 5° up/TOGA drill
They are still alive (if, arguably, undisciplined).
They are still alive (if, arguably, undisciplined).
The various reports of these events are sparse on details and we don't know why the crews actually kept level flight with the pitch and power in place at the time of the incident, (given room for minor variations due turbulence, etc), but we know none of them pitched the aircraft up.
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I'll declare myself as SLF up front, so apologies if this is way off, but I've been following this thread since Day 1 and was wondering if my understanding of the developing explanation for the crash is correct...
Essentially, flying into a storm meant the pitots froze, and the UAS meant the Autopilot disconnected, and instead of flying roughly level, they used a drill meant for the take-off phase which meant nose-up attitude. This in turned led to speed decay, and then a stall. Because of the UAS and the flood of ECAM messages, they didn't really know what was going on and so kept the nose-up which meant that the plane eventually was going about 60kt and dropping I'm guessing almost vertically? They didn't notice that they were losing altitude because there were no outside visual cues until they started scanning instruments, but by that point it was too late to pull out of the stall and they couldn't recover.
So I guess my point is this. Is this a typical 'swiss cheese' affair where a combination of bad decisions, bad luck and some below par flying skills resulted in an avoidable crash?
Essentially, flying into a storm meant the pitots froze, and the UAS meant the Autopilot disconnected, and instead of flying roughly level, they used a drill meant for the take-off phase which meant nose-up attitude. This in turned led to speed decay, and then a stall. Because of the UAS and the flood of ECAM messages, they didn't really know what was going on and so kept the nose-up which meant that the plane eventually was going about 60kt and dropping I'm guessing almost vertically? They didn't notice that they were losing altitude because there were no outside visual cues until they started scanning instruments, but by that point it was too late to pull out of the stall and they couldn't recover.
So I guess my point is this. Is this a typical 'swiss cheese' affair where a combination of bad decisions, bad luck and some below par flying skills resulted in an avoidable crash?
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Just a thought...
I'm not a pilot, but what I get from this thread is that the only guy in the cockpit who knew what control inputs were being made was the guy making them. The problem wasn't that HE had insufficient feedback, it was that he was pulling back on his stick, and the other pilot and the captain when he got back to the cockpit couldn't see that he was doing so, but possibly assumed that he was doing the opposite.
Clearly one solution would have been for the pilot who was flying the thing to tell everybody else on the cockpit what he was doing so that they had a chance to tell him he was doing it wrong. In the absence of that, rather than a force feedback joystick, would the simple solution to this be a telltale on one of the displays? Anybody who has ever flown a computer game with a keyboard will surely be familiar with one of those little 'stick position' indicators that shows you where the joystick would be now if you had one... so, would a small circular display with a glowing 'stick position' display in the middle of the glass cockpit, showing the stick was 'being pulled back' have made it obvious to everybody else on the flight deck what control inputs the pilot flying was making? A lot easier to do (in software) than retrofitting force feedback, all the information is obviously available... presumably you'd only need/want it in certain circumstances, but would it have prevented this crash assuming one of the other humans in the cockpit had known the right thing to do but didn't realise that the pilot flying was doing the wrong thing?
Clearly one solution would have been for the pilot who was flying the thing to tell everybody else on the cockpit what he was doing so that they had a chance to tell him he was doing it wrong. In the absence of that, rather than a force feedback joystick, would the simple solution to this be a telltale on one of the displays? Anybody who has ever flown a computer game with a keyboard will surely be familiar with one of those little 'stick position' indicators that shows you where the joystick would be now if you had one... so, would a small circular display with a glowing 'stick position' display in the middle of the glass cockpit, showing the stick was 'being pulled back' have made it obvious to everybody else on the flight deck what control inputs the pilot flying was making? A lot easier to do (in software) than retrofitting force feedback, all the information is obviously available... presumably you'd only need/want it in certain circumstances, but would it have prevented this crash assuming one of the other humans in the cockpit had known the right thing to do but didn't realise that the pilot flying was doing the wrong thing?
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PNF knew what PF was doing, there was no mystery. It is a fairytale. He was constantly scolding the PF to descend. And probably not from looking at the ss. He also could see, feel, and understand the results of the "inputs" made in the other seat. (Not so much lateral, eh?). What is mysterious is the lack of a decision to take over. Only occasionally, did PNF input with his ss, (a very bad idea). Then, after relinquishing the controls to PNF, PF took them back. Thus far, no orders do we hear from the COMMANDER.
Sadly, with the informations to hand, the arguments will not stop.
Sadly, with the informations to hand, the arguments will not stop.
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Yes, he was telling him, but based on the transcript, it appears that either he had no idea that he was being ignored, or he lacked the courage of his convictions and thought the pilot flying might be doing the right thing after all... but in that case, was the situation saveable when the captain came through the cockpit door if he had seen a stick position indicator hard back against the stop and yelled "Nose down, NOW!!!"?
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It is worth a discussion, but not a conclusion. We will likely not hear the actual voices, nor the complete recording. We will be given "transcribed" pieces in support of what will be a "Point of View". Most will be happy with that, fearing criticism for being conspiracist. Go figures. but witholding data is not dishonest? Such sheep.
The tone and Pitch of each voice tells perhaps more than the words themselves. It will be dexcided that it is too painful, or some excuse.
What we see is what we are intended to see, and cannot refute, due the sparse data. As intended.
Captain knew nothing more than the others, we think. WHY? radical descent, and intense noise from the slipstream. Either could describe Nose UP, OR Nose Down. Pick em.
The tone and Pitch of each voice tells perhaps more than the words themselves. It will be dexcided that it is too painful, or some excuse.
What we see is what we are intended to see, and cannot refute, due the sparse data. As intended.
Captain knew nothing more than the others, we think. WHY? radical descent, and intense noise from the slipstream. Either could describe Nose UP, OR Nose Down. Pick em.
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Ah, yes the posters who have never, ever been on a flight deck can tell us what it sounds like, what it feels like, what it looks like, how flightcrew member interact...incredibly helpful! Thank you for your insights!
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To the 'automated' pilot, ie those who always use the automatics to fly, quite minor upsets, like capturing the GS from above can be major hurdles.
Indeed, as I myself become one (and I am, sadly) such simple tasks are becoming more and more stressful.
A major upset, like the AF447 will likely leave an automated pilot completely stunned.
ie, unable to think or act.
What experience has he to fall back on?
Can he remember his stall/spin training all those years ago?
Might he remember his Airbus 'recover at the first sign of the stall-and go full aft on the sidesick' training?
Or, is he a PILOT. The man who guides the aircraft using his many years of FLYING experience to save his own ass (and his/ her pax) because he knows what TF is going on?
I cannot state this MORE EMPHATICALLY!
These guys were OUT OF THEIR DEPTH immediately! STRAIGHTAWAY!!
They had LITTLE or NO experience TO FALL BACK ON.
They had BUGGER ALL experience HAND FLYING their own aircraft.
They had NO FUGGIN IDEA THAT THEY'D STALLED. Would that be permitted in a 152 on lesson 3?
They had 20 , 000 Hours of Sweet Fu"K All in piloting terms.
20,000 hours of reading the papers, chewing food and jerking off.
I plead guilty.
I'm ashamed to say so, but it could happen to me too.
We must teach pilots to fly.
The fact that it even needs saying, jars!
Indeed, as I myself become one (and I am, sadly) such simple tasks are becoming more and more stressful.
A major upset, like the AF447 will likely leave an automated pilot completely stunned.
ie, unable to think or act.
What experience has he to fall back on?
Can he remember his stall/spin training all those years ago?
Might he remember his Airbus 'recover at the first sign of the stall-and go full aft on the sidesick' training?
Or, is he a PILOT. The man who guides the aircraft using his many years of FLYING experience to save his own ass (and his/ her pax) because he knows what TF is going on?
I cannot state this MORE EMPHATICALLY!
These guys were OUT OF THEIR DEPTH immediately! STRAIGHTAWAY!!
They had LITTLE or NO experience TO FALL BACK ON.
They had BUGGER ALL experience HAND FLYING their own aircraft.
They had NO FUGGIN IDEA THAT THEY'D STALLED. Would that be permitted in a 152 on lesson 3?
They had 20 , 000 Hours of Sweet Fu"K All in piloting terms.
20,000 hours of reading the papers, chewing food and jerking off.
I plead guilty.
I'm ashamed to say so, but it could happen to me too.
We must teach pilots to fly.
The fact that it even needs saying, jars!
Last edited by BarbiesBoyfriend; 18th Aug 2011 at 01:05.
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Hi,
DW
You are not a pilot .. exactly like me .. but dreamer (or idealist ?) .. I am not a dreamer
Airlines (that is, banks and other investors and states) have nothing to do with security as primary matter
Their primary purpose is to make a profit and as much as possible .. no matter what.
They have very good analysts who calculate risk ..
They are not adventurers ..
There is too much money at stake (even the governments economy are involved)
As long as return is positive (taking into account the accidents already planned in advance "statistics" .. .. ..insurances premiums an extra charges .. etc. ..) companies will invest no more in security if the balance is good
More .. regulators and legislators of aviation safety make it the least possible disruption to the business of these companies because these regulators are often associated with the states .. must promote civil aviation .. and must protect the country's assets
A few hundred lives per year and some insurance premiums and an extra charge are nothing compared to the financial and political stakes.
A good trial to satisfy the families .. a maximum dilution of responsibility .. and after a few months nobody talks about and the business can continue as usual .
This is the reality we see when awake .. at the end of the dream
DW
I hope that people will also note that I don't see technological solutions as the be-all and end-all, and remain firmly in the "airliners need pilots" camp. I agree that overuse and misuse of automation, largely at the behest of airline executives whose qualifications consist of a trust fund, an MBA and precious little else, has had a negative impact on safety - especially when the automatics decide it is no longer safe for them to continue. However it is this aspect of the airline industry that needs to be tackled, and making automation itself (which as I've said is merely a tool) out to be the bad guy in all of this is, I believe, not only short-sighted but harming the debate that really does need to happen on the subject of hand-flying currency.
Airlines (that is, banks and other investors and states) have nothing to do with security as primary matter
Their primary purpose is to make a profit and as much as possible .. no matter what.
They have very good analysts who calculate risk ..
They are not adventurers ..
There is too much money at stake (even the governments economy are involved)
As long as return is positive (taking into account the accidents already planned in advance "statistics" .. .. ..insurances premiums an extra charges .. etc. ..) companies will invest no more in security if the balance is good
More .. regulators and legislators of aviation safety make it the least possible disruption to the business of these companies because these regulators are often associated with the states .. must promote civil aviation .. and must protect the country's assets
A few hundred lives per year and some insurance premiums and an extra charge are nothing compared to the financial and political stakes.
A good trial to satisfy the families .. a maximum dilution of responsibility .. and after a few months nobody talks about and the business can continue as usual .
This is the reality we see when awake .. at the end of the dream
Last edited by jcjeant; 18th Aug 2011 at 01:14.
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BB
We both understand how easy it is to lose skills you once had. I saw my IFR skills deteriorate when I retired from the military. You are apparently seeing your skills wilt in your hands because you aren't getting opportunity to actually fly the aircraft enough.
My experience was that it took almost 5 years before I began to scare myself a bit flying IFR approaches.
What do you think is the "time constant" for significant loss of ability.
Is recurrent training every 6 months sufficient to maintain a skill assuming you exercise that skill during recurrent training?
I plead guilty.
I'm ashamed to say so, but it could happen to me too.
We must teach pilots to fly.
I'm ashamed to say so, but it could happen to me too.
We must teach pilots to fly.
My experience was that it took almost 5 years before I began to scare myself a bit flying IFR approaches.
What do you think is the "time constant" for significant loss of ability.
Is recurrent training every 6 months sufficient to maintain a skill assuming you exercise that skill during recurrent training?