Mid-air collision over Brasil
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I will also be against removing all posts, because it would be depriving us of the opportunity to discuss with persons like Attlaw or Sdruvss, and of the information they give us : the attitude of the judiciary and perhaps of the public in Brazil.
It is for me interesting to see how prosecutors , judges and lawyers are making up their minds on sometimes rubbish information they received from local " experts" , Some are ready to start a trial ( like this judge in Mato Grosso last week , see below a newswire extract ) and this BEFORE the official technical investigation is even completed and published.
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MATTO GROSSO STATE, Brazil - A Brazilian air traffic controller accused of making errors that led to that country's most deadly plane crash last fall refused to answer questions about the crash during his criminal trial Tuesday.
"I will use my right to stay quiet," he said repeatedly during more than 20 minutes of inquiry in front of federal Judge Murilo Mendes in Sinop court.
He is the only one of the four controllers on trial charged with intentionally exposing an aircraft to danger, which has a sentence of 34 years in prison.
The other three, were charged with unintentionally exposing an aircraft to danger, which carries a sentence of 1 to 3 years in prison. They are all officials with Brazilian Aeronautic, the military unit that runs the country's air traffic control system.
Testimony began around midafternoon yesterday and continued late last night
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It is for me interesting to see how prosecutors , judges and lawyers are making up their minds on sometimes rubbish information they received from local " experts" , Some are ready to start a trial ( like this judge in Mato Grosso last week , see below a newswire extract ) and this BEFORE the official technical investigation is even completed and published.
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MATTO GROSSO STATE, Brazil - A Brazilian air traffic controller accused of making errors that led to that country's most deadly plane crash last fall refused to answer questions about the crash during his criminal trial Tuesday.
"I will use my right to stay quiet," he said repeatedly during more than 20 minutes of inquiry in front of federal Judge Murilo Mendes in Sinop court.
He is the only one of the four controllers on trial charged with intentionally exposing an aircraft to danger, which has a sentence of 34 years in prison.
The other three, were charged with unintentionally exposing an aircraft to danger, which carries a sentence of 1 to 3 years in prison. They are all officials with Brazilian Aeronautic, the military unit that runs the country's air traffic control system.
Testimony began around midafternoon yesterday and continued late last night
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Yet another classic example of why I have no patience with people who demand that this or that persons/countries' laws/customs/beliefs deserve 'respect'.... repect is not just given, it has to be earned and the proceedings following this tragic event are doing little except bringing shame and derision on Brazil and its mlitary and civil institutions.
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Marcio,
thanks for the news reports. Have you found the original CPI reports anywhere?
Our Brazilian lawyer/lawyer spouse colleagues have apparently gone back and deleted *all* their posts, including the contentful ones, including especially the one from Sdruvss which cited the CPI report, which I held to be important.
If anybody needed more evidence that more things were going on here than meet the eye, this provides it.
I recommend to everybody who posts here in future to cite carefully and fully the statements to which you respond. Then the posts which remain will show the development of the discussion through the citations.
PBL
thanks for the news reports. Have you found the original CPI reports anywhere?
Our Brazilian lawyer/lawyer spouse colleagues have apparently gone back and deleted *all* their posts, including the contentful ones, including especially the one from Sdruvss which cited the CPI report, which I held to be important.
If anybody needed more evidence that more things were going on here than meet the eye, this provides it.
I recommend to everybody who posts here in future to cite carefully and fully the statements to which you respond. Then the posts which remain will show the development of the discussion through the citations.
PBL
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There seems to a be assumption from the non-pilot Brazilians in the forum that an altitude clearance applies to only a segment of a flight. i.e. until Brazilia. I'm not sure that this incorrect assumption has been clearly debunked.
Unless specific qualifiers are added, i.e. "Cross Brazilia at FL370, then descend and maintain FL360.", then an altitude assignment is in force until amended. It is completely normal to have a situation where your altitude assignment is planned, and expected, to change later in the flight. The flight, however, DOES NOT change altitude until told by ATC to do so.
It is also not unusual for non-standard altitude assignments to be used. They are used when factors such as traffic conflicts, aircraft performance limitations or weather conditions prevent using the standard altitude or make using it undesirable (i.e. turbulence). There are also areas of airspace where non-standard altitude assignments are, in fact, standard. The majority of the state of Florida in the US is one such example where they segregate altitudes based on North vs. South instead of East vs. West due to the geography of the state. A pilot who is not familiar with the area will not necessarily be aware of the local differences.
The bottom line is, you don't change altitude until told to do so by ATC.
Unless specific qualifiers are added, i.e. "Cross Brazilia at FL370, then descend and maintain FL360.", then an altitude assignment is in force until amended. It is completely normal to have a situation where your altitude assignment is planned, and expected, to change later in the flight. The flight, however, DOES NOT change altitude until told by ATC to do so.
It is also not unusual for non-standard altitude assignments to be used. They are used when factors such as traffic conflicts, aircraft performance limitations or weather conditions prevent using the standard altitude or make using it undesirable (i.e. turbulence). There are also areas of airspace where non-standard altitude assignments are, in fact, standard. The majority of the state of Florida in the US is one such example where they segregate altitudes based on North vs. South instead of East vs. West due to the geography of the state. A pilot who is not familiar with the area will not necessarily be aware of the local differences.
The bottom line is, you don't change altitude until told to do so by ATC.
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The Brazilian non-pilot position I think is slightly different.
to paraphrase their position:
1 - In Brazil the rules/expectation are that the flight will move to its flight planned altitude without communicating with ATC - contrary to what everyone else in the world seems to do.
2 - ATC are so ingrained in this expectation that even though the flight checks in at FL370 with a planned descent in the next few minutes, ATC wouldn't mention the expected descent while confirming current cleared level.
3 - ATC wouldn't look (or would expect a 'casual' descent) so the fact that 7 minutes after Brasilia the plane is still showing level at FL370 wouldn't cause ATC to contact the plane or to note anything on their strip.
4 - Compliance with this expectation is such that it is reasonable for the computer to updated the display of planned/(cleared?) level without any controller action or data from the transponder
While this may look like an absurd interpretation of how flights operate in real life (from my North American and European perspective) it might be possible that Brazil operates way outside ICAO norms in terms of ATC/Pilot interaction
If so this would clearly be a big factor. If its just a bo**cks view of the non-professional, it just brings us back to the question of what was going on in the ATC processes that let this happen.
to paraphrase their position:
1 - In Brazil the rules/expectation are that the flight will move to its flight planned altitude without communicating with ATC - contrary to what everyone else in the world seems to do.
2 - ATC are so ingrained in this expectation that even though the flight checks in at FL370 with a planned descent in the next few minutes, ATC wouldn't mention the expected descent while confirming current cleared level.
3 - ATC wouldn't look (or would expect a 'casual' descent) so the fact that 7 minutes after Brasilia the plane is still showing level at FL370 wouldn't cause ATC to contact the plane or to note anything on their strip.
4 - Compliance with this expectation is such that it is reasonable for the computer to updated the display of planned/(cleared?) level without any controller action or data from the transponder
While this may look like an absurd interpretation of how flights operate in real life (from my North American and European perspective) it might be possible that Brazil operates way outside ICAO norms in terms of ATC/Pilot interaction
If so this would clearly be a big factor. If its just a bo**cks view of the non-professional, it just brings us back to the question of what was going on in the ATC processes that let this happen.
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Unless specific qualifiers are added, i.e. "Cross Brazilia at FL370, then descend and maintain FL360.", then an altitude assignment is in force until amended. It is completely normal to have a situation where your altitude assignment is planned, and expected, to change later in the flight. The flight, however, DOES NOT change altitude until told by ATC to do so.
(This is just a question ... I am not sure what the right answer would be)
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Note - The flight plan looks like it correctly reflects the Legacy's changing track across Magnetic North. However, it would be reasonably common not to make all of these planned 1000 ft changes in real life.
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If the Legacy crew had some reason they really wanted to change altitude then they would have asked. They flight planned at standard altitudes and would have had a view ATC would move them around to suit ATCs plans. This might or might not have included ATC descending them at Brasilia.
And Then ATC would not just have to give clearance but would have to ORDER the descent and try to contact the pilots.
So ATC really plays a significant role in this case. They have to monitor whether or not all flight plans are being followed accordingly. It is their sole responsability.
So if you are right I would have to agree that the pilots are not to blame for not seeking ATC clearance (if they didn´t try that)
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As far as I know the Legacy pilots had originally a written plan for the flight from Sao Jose to Manaus. Sao Jose-Brasilia 370, Brasilia to somewhere on the way to Manaus 360, then climb to 380 to end the trip in Manaus. But after leaving Sao Jose the controller there said to them to go to Manaus at 370. Of course they changed their plan.
Do you any document citing it ? I would like to take a look.
Probably the ATC told then to go at FL370 UNTIL MANAUS. If that really happened than we have ATC again having an important role in this accident
For the non-pilots
There are a large number of instructional books out there on obtaining an Instrument Rating in many languages and you need to do some serious reading on IFR flight plans and clearances.
- Go to your local pilot shop usually located at an airport with private airplanes or ask a local flight instructor to recommend a book.
- Read the chapters on filing flight plans, obtaining clearances, adhering to clearances and lost communications procedures.
- A flight plan proposes a route with requested altitudes at a requested speed at a requested time
- A clearance is ATC's best effort to accommodate your proposal without conflicting with other traffic.
- You DO NOT deviate from your clearance without permission from ATC except in an emergency.
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There are a large number of instructional books out there on obtaining an Instrument Rating in many languages and you need to do some serious reading on IFR flight plans and clearances.
- Go to your local pilot shop usually located at an airport with private airplanes or ask a local flight instructor to recommend a book.
- Read the chapters on filing flight plans, obtaining clearances, adhering to clearances and lost communications procedures.
- A flight plan proposes a route with requested altitudes at a requested speed at a requested time
- A clearance is ATC's best effort to accommodate your proposal without conflicting with other traffic.
- You DO NOT deviate from your clearance without permission from ATC except in an emergency.
Is there any online source available (aviation organization rules, etc) or book you could recommend ?
From what I was told my conclusion is that the ATC is responsible for Flight Level setting as the flight plan is filed with them and therefore they know it.
The pilot is not supposed to check the plan and ask for clearance when he changes to an airway for which there is another assigned flight level by the flight plan. Instead, ATC has always to contact him and order a FL change.
It seems that in the Legacy case there was a contact with Brasilia but I don't know whether it was long before the Legacy hit the point where in the flight plan it was supposed to descend.
But in this contact ATC said something about the transp. identification and about mantaining FL370. I suppose that even if this contact happened a long time before the Legacy changed airway it proves that ATC brought the Legacy crew into error. As I said, the crew wasn't supposed to ask for confirmation of FL370 after changing airway.
And it seems there was another contact prior to this back in the start of the flight where the Sao Jose dos Campos ATC apparently told the Legacy to maintain FL370 until Manaus.
Again, it seems the pilots weren't supposed to confront this with their flight plan and ask clearance after passing by Brasilia.
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Call it paranoia, but I really wonder just how much information that many professional pilots and Air Traffic Controllers that have posted on this thread, and Pprune itself, will be used in the trial.
The sudden removal of some the posts from some legal sounding people from Brazil makes me very curious.
However, there is hope in the fact that no matter how many time they asked the same question they always received the correct answer, not the answers they were wishing for.
Therefore, I believe that the professional pilots and professional Air Traffic Controllers all whom remained true to the Laws of the Air, ICAO and the world standard rules of Air Traffic Control deserves a pat on the back.
Well done all.
(Now all we have to do is wait for the trial.)
The sudden removal of some the posts from some legal sounding people from Brazil makes me very curious.
However, there is hope in the fact that no matter how many time they asked the same question they always received the correct answer, not the answers they were wishing for.
Therefore, I believe that the professional pilots and professional Air Traffic Controllers all whom remained true to the Laws of the Air, ICAO and the world standard rules of Air Traffic Control deserves a pat on the back.
Well done all.
(Now all we have to do is wait for the trial.)
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As I have said previously, the Legacy pilots should only agree to return to Brazil if granted immunity. We have already seen on this board that apparently intelligent individuals approach this case with a "confirmation bias" that will likely prevent truly fair proceedings.
To paraphrase Jack Nicholson in A Few Good Men, they can't stand the truth.
To paraphrase Jack Nicholson in A Few Good Men, they can't stand the truth.
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Repeating myself...
Yes, before leaving São José the Legacy pilots had a written flight plan: 370 till Brasilia, then 360 till Teres, then 380 to Manaus. This was written and it can be seen.
After leaving São José the pilots were told by São José ATC to fly 370 to Manaus. Well, here is the controversy. Some say that they were not told
this. Some say they misunderstood. Some say that in Brazil clearance is given only to the next point, not for the whole flight as in other countries. Well there is a recorded tape of the conversation between the pilots and ATC in São José. I heard it one in a TV station and I think it was clear that the ATC said 370 to Manaus. But I would love to listen to that tape again. I don´t hear it around for a good while. I hope they still have it. The pilots said that they were cleared to Manaus by São José ATC.
Approaching Brasilia the pilots said to ATC here we are, at 370. ATC said OK, "have a good trip". Nobody said anything about changing altitude.
The radar screen in Brasilia showed for seven minutes after the Legacy passed Brasilia that the transponder was OK showing 370 but the software from Brasilia was showing 360. Software in Brasilia entered the original written flight plan not requiring that ATC talked and confirmed 360 with the pilots. The icon was showing 370:360. A discrepancy.
Then transponder OFF. There was clear indication in the radar screen in Brasilia that the transponder was off. A military primary radar entered the picture and sent information 360. The written original flight plan also was there. So 360Z360 (Z means unreliable). Also transponder OFF. For about one hour. No communication between ATC and pilots even the radio was working. The pilots also did not see the Transponder OFF sign, in small letter, in yellow in their screen.
Then the lack of communication, one trying to call the other more that a dozen times. When ATC was able to say something to the pilots it was nothing about altitude, and there was no concern. It was to tell them the frequency of Manaus.
Then the disaster.
It seems that both ATC and the pilots felt that everything was OK... until the disaster. Sad...
After leaving São José the pilots were told by São José ATC to fly 370 to Manaus. Well, here is the controversy. Some say that they were not told
this. Some say they misunderstood. Some say that in Brazil clearance is given only to the next point, not for the whole flight as in other countries. Well there is a recorded tape of the conversation between the pilots and ATC in São José. I heard it one in a TV station and I think it was clear that the ATC said 370 to Manaus. But I would love to listen to that tape again. I don´t hear it around for a good while. I hope they still have it. The pilots said that they were cleared to Manaus by São José ATC.
Approaching Brasilia the pilots said to ATC here we are, at 370. ATC said OK, "have a good trip". Nobody said anything about changing altitude.
The radar screen in Brasilia showed for seven minutes after the Legacy passed Brasilia that the transponder was OK showing 370 but the software from Brasilia was showing 360. Software in Brasilia entered the original written flight plan not requiring that ATC talked and confirmed 360 with the pilots. The icon was showing 370:360. A discrepancy.
Then transponder OFF. There was clear indication in the radar screen in Brasilia that the transponder was off. A military primary radar entered the picture and sent information 360. The written original flight plan also was there. So 360Z360 (Z means unreliable). Also transponder OFF. For about one hour. No communication between ATC and pilots even the radio was working. The pilots also did not see the Transponder OFF sign, in small letter, in yellow in their screen.
Then the lack of communication, one trying to call the other more that a dozen times. When ATC was able to say something to the pilots it was nothing about altitude, and there was no concern. It was to tell them the frequency of Manaus.
Then the disaster.
It seems that both ATC and the pilots felt that everything was OK... until the disaster. Sad...
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Marcio,
I was not concentrating in this issue but in the TAM 3054.
After reading all information about the GOL 1907 accident I really reach the conclusion that the pilots blame in this case was minimal and their arrest (not their retention here for a reasonable time) was very unfair. A serious judicial abuse that nevertheless cannot be used to generally prevent any legal action in case of air accidents.
The brazilian media played an irresponsible role in all this (as usual).
The Brazilian ATC system had a key relevance in the accident. It seems that almost the entire "blame" should be put in the lack of adequate equipment and the "black holes" in the Amazon Region, although the ATC at Sao Jose dos Campos made a great mistake when it IFR cleared the Legacy at FL370 until Manaus as I was able to confirm.
There are new technologies coming (GPS, etc) in order to make AT more secure. We hope our dear government & airlines seek to upgrade ATC system accordingly. Brazilian pilots should demand it.
In the meanwhile, relatively to the unsufficient number of ATC personnel, the number of flights in Brazil should be reduced (at least the domestic ones).
We have to admit we have a deeply flawed ATC system indeed.
As to Lepore and Palladino I think they really should be declared not guilty before the facts I have now. Moreover after confirming that they tried to contact Brasilia ATC several times before the accident took place.
I was not concentrating in this issue but in the TAM 3054.
After reading all information about the GOL 1907 accident I really reach the conclusion that the pilots blame in this case was minimal and their arrest (not their retention here for a reasonable time) was very unfair. A serious judicial abuse that nevertheless cannot be used to generally prevent any legal action in case of air accidents.
The brazilian media played an irresponsible role in all this (as usual).
The Brazilian ATC system had a key relevance in the accident. It seems that almost the entire "blame" should be put in the lack of adequate equipment and the "black holes" in the Amazon Region, although the ATC at Sao Jose dos Campos made a great mistake when it IFR cleared the Legacy at FL370 until Manaus as I was able to confirm.
There are new technologies coming (GPS, etc) in order to make AT more secure. We hope our dear government & airlines seek to upgrade ATC system accordingly. Brazilian pilots should demand it.
In the meanwhile, relatively to the unsufficient number of ATC personnel, the number of flights in Brazil should be reduced (at least the domestic ones).
We have to admit we have a deeply flawed ATC system indeed.
As to Lepore and Palladino I think they really should be declared not guilty before the facts I have now. Moreover after confirming that they tried to contact Brasilia ATC several times before the accident took place.
Last edited by flyingnewbie10; 5th Sep 2007 at 03:16. Reason: adding paragraph
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Not so
Not at all true. both were trying to contact the other but to no avail.
From NTSB:
At 3:51 pm, an air traffic controller in the Brasilia ACC (CINDACTA 1) instructed N600XL to change frequencies to the next controller's sector. The crew of N600XL reported in on the assigned frequency that the flight was level at FL370. ATC acknowledged and instructed the crew to "ident"
(flash their transponder). Radar indicates that the ident was observed.
(flash their transponder). Radar indicates that the ident was observed.
This was the last two-way communication between N600XL and ATC. At this time the airplane was approximately 40 nautical miles south of BRS.
At 3:56pm the Legacy N600XL passed BRS level at FL370. There is no record of a request from N600XL to the control agencies to conduct a change of altitude, after reaching flight level 370. The crew
made calls, but there is no communication in which they requested a change of flight level. There is also no record of any instruction from air traffic controllers at Brasilia Center to the aircraft, directing a change of altitude.
made calls, but there is no communication in which they requested a change of flight level. There is also no record of any instruction from air traffic controllers at Brasilia Center to the aircraft, directing a change of altitude.
When the airplane was about 30 miles north-northwest of BRS, at 4:02 pm, the transponder of N600XL was no longer being received by ATC radar. A transponder reports a unique code, aiding radar
identification, and provides an accurate indication of the airplane's altitude. Additionally, the transponder is a required component for the operation of Traffic Collision Avoidance System equipment, commonly called the TCAS system.
identification, and provides an accurate indication of the airplane's altitude. Additionally, the transponder is a required component for the operation of Traffic Collision Avoidance System equipment, commonly called the TCAS system.
Between 3:51 pm and 4:26 pm, there were no attempts to establish radio communications from either the crew of N600XL or ATC. At 4:26 pm the CINDACTA 1 controller made a "blind call" to N600XL. Subsequently until 4:53 pm, the controller made an additional 6 radio calls attempting to establish contact. The 4:53 call instructed the crew to change to frequencies 123.32 or 126.45. No replies were received.
There is no indication that the crew of N600XL performed any abnormal maneuvers during the flight. Flight Data Recorder information indicates that the airplane was level at FL370, on course along UZ6, and at a steady speed, until the collision. Primary (non-transponder) radar returns were received corresponding to the estimated position of N600XL until about 4:30 pm. For 2 minutes, no returns were received, then returns reappeared until 4:38 pm. After that time, radar returns were
sporadic.
sporadic.
Beginning at 4:48 pm, the crew of N600XL made a series of 12 radio calls to ATC attempting to make contact. At 4:53, the crew heard the call instructing them to change frequencies, but the pilot did
not understand all of the digits, and requested a repeat. No reply from ATC was received. The pilot made 7 more attempts to establish contact.
not understand all of the digits, and requested a repeat. No reply from ATC was received. The pilot made 7 more attempts to establish contact.
At 4:56:54 pm the collision occurred at FL370, at a point about 460 nautical miles north-northwest of BRS, on airway UZ6.
Last edited by marciovp; 5th Sep 2007 at 03:27. Reason: to complete
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Originally Posted by mm flynn
The Brazilian non-pilot position I think is slightly different.
to paraphrase their position:
1 - ........
2 - ........
3 - ........
4 - ........
to paraphrase their position:
1 - ........
2 - ........
3 - ........
4 - ........
You are also correct to observe that these principles violate ICAO ATC procedural norms.
I wish that those supporting these principles would address this issue of conformance and let us know what they think. For many non-Brazilians who fly there, whether ATC intends to adhere to ICAO norms or not is a question of the utmost importance for safety of flight.
PBL
Not at all true. both were trying to contact the other but to no avail.
Not so, this attempts were made later. The Legacy flew at 370 with the ATC radar showing 360Z360 for a good while and one did not try to contact the other. It was later that they tried to contact