Mid-air collision over Brasil
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I am a little embarassed with the way Brazil is handling air disasters. Letīs start from the beginning... in both the GOL and the TAM disasters we donīt have any evidence of criminal action coming from anybody. Of course if there were such an evidence, by all means, letīs criminalize the investigation.
Then there is the case that Brazil has an agency ran by experts in aviation that is investigating the disasters. They did not publish their final report. Should the criminal agencies wait for this report before deciding to sue someone?
Now, please tell me what do federal judges, federal police, members of the senate and house of representatives know about aviation? What expertise do they have to decide whose fault caused the disasters? I have read incredible conclusions from these people in deciding whom to bleme. It is a shame! They translated the tapes wrongly, took wrong conclusions, etc, etc. In the beginning the Minister of Defense used to say that the US Pilots put themselves the transponder off because they wanted to do stunts to test the new plane. What a crazy statement ,yet it was in all papers and TV.
Then there is the question that in the moment there us a criminal investigation the process is justly what we donīt want: people will shoot their mouths, of course, for fear of being prosecuted. There goes prevention out...
To make this short. The tendency all over the world when there is a disaster, unless there is a clear indication of criminal behavior (drunkness, the New York Towers, etc) ie to allow the proper agency to investigate the disaster aiming at learning what happened and proposing ways to prevent other disasters like the one being studied, Of course if in the course of this investigation it becomes clear that anyone showed a criminal behavior, I guess a criminal investigation is in order.
In the case of TAM and GOL so far I donīt see any evidence of criminal behavior on the part of anyone. Of course in the case of GOL, everyone knows that the Excel Air that bought the Legacy has a big insurance in case of being sued and of course the lawyers will go where the money is. Did you know that a judge already confiscated the Legacy at the Cachimbo Air Force Base and the plane is there idle, not being fixed, ready to be sold to pay for indenizations? The lawyers donīt want to go to an endless battle with the Brazilian government (Air Force) or the flight controlers (Air Force too). So it seems important to blame the pilots of the Legacy because there is were the money seem to be.
Well these are thoughts from someone who has been following these things very closely ,and have been appaled how totally ignorant people have come to decisions on who to blame way before the experts, the people from aviation, came to any conclusions on what happened. I doubt if this goes on around the world like is happening in Brazil.
And, I am not sure what would happen to a Brazilian crew if this disaster had hapened in the US. We are assuming that they would be blamed without due judgement, would be arrested? I really am not sure. But I am sure that there wouldnīt be so many investigative agencies with people who knows nothing about aviation deciding that they were at fault.
I got carried way... Sorry. Let me go back to my Cherokees...
Then there is the case that Brazil has an agency ran by experts in aviation that is investigating the disasters. They did not publish their final report. Should the criminal agencies wait for this report before deciding to sue someone?
Now, please tell me what do federal judges, federal police, members of the senate and house of representatives know about aviation? What expertise do they have to decide whose fault caused the disasters? I have read incredible conclusions from these people in deciding whom to bleme. It is a shame! They translated the tapes wrongly, took wrong conclusions, etc, etc. In the beginning the Minister of Defense used to say that the US Pilots put themselves the transponder off because they wanted to do stunts to test the new plane. What a crazy statement ,yet it was in all papers and TV.
Then there is the question that in the moment there us a criminal investigation the process is justly what we donīt want: people will shoot their mouths, of course, for fear of being prosecuted. There goes prevention out...
To make this short. The tendency all over the world when there is a disaster, unless there is a clear indication of criminal behavior (drunkness, the New York Towers, etc) ie to allow the proper agency to investigate the disaster aiming at learning what happened and proposing ways to prevent other disasters like the one being studied, Of course if in the course of this investigation it becomes clear that anyone showed a criminal behavior, I guess a criminal investigation is in order.
In the case of TAM and GOL so far I donīt see any evidence of criminal behavior on the part of anyone. Of course in the case of GOL, everyone knows that the Excel Air that bought the Legacy has a big insurance in case of being sued and of course the lawyers will go where the money is. Did you know that a judge already confiscated the Legacy at the Cachimbo Air Force Base and the plane is there idle, not being fixed, ready to be sold to pay for indenizations? The lawyers donīt want to go to an endless battle with the Brazilian government (Air Force) or the flight controlers (Air Force too). So it seems important to blame the pilots of the Legacy because there is were the money seem to be.
Well these are thoughts from someone who has been following these things very closely ,and have been appaled how totally ignorant people have come to decisions on who to blame way before the experts, the people from aviation, came to any conclusions on what happened. I doubt if this goes on around the world like is happening in Brazil.
And, I am not sure what would happen to a Brazilian crew if this disaster had hapened in the US. We are assuming that they would be blamed without due judgement, would be arrested? I really am not sure. But I am sure that there wouldnīt be so many investigative agencies with people who knows nothing about aviation deciding that they were at fault.
I got carried way... Sorry. Let me go back to my Cherokees...
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"Why so much international care with the american pilots in the Gol 1907 accident and all this jump-to-conclusions with the TAM 3054 crew ?"
I believe you will find jump to conclusions in the case of the "American pilots". Remember all the aerobatic type manouvers they did with the intentionally turned off transponder? I suspect you are letting nationalism obscure your impartialness which is a great threat to aviation safety.
I believe you will find jump to conclusions in the case of the "American pilots". Remember all the aerobatic type manouvers they did with the intentionally turned off transponder? I suspect you are letting nationalism obscure your impartialness which is a great threat to aviation safety.
Last edited by punkalouver; 17th Sep 2007 at 08:01.
If you want to discuss that subject then do it in the proper thread - don't try to stir up unrest in threads that are unrelated.
For me it is the criminalization aspect rather than the jump to conclusions within the press and discussion boards.
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Agreed.
But flyingnewbie10's modus operandi seems to be pushing the idea that the big, bad multinational corporations are trying to blame Brazilian pilots for something that may be down to their faulty equipment, against most of the (admittedly circumstantial) evidence that has come to light so far. I'm not disputing it's possible that he may be right, but it seems to me unlikely.
The problem with nationalised (or in the case of Brazilian ATC, militarised) institutions is that things tend to become political very quickly. It's hard to say what other countries may have done in the same situation, because there haven't been many situations like this in recent memory (JAL123 had a similar problem where the Japanese authorities were very sceptical of Boeing's involvement - and the net result of that was Boeing taking full responsibility for the faulty repair that brought the aircraft down).
Air safety isn't a question of powerful countries and their corporations strong-arming less-powerful nations. Tenerife proved that the most senior, experienced pilots of the oldest, most respected airlines are still capable of making mistakes that lead to tragedy. To err is human and there's no shame in admitting to making a mistake. All we can do is work to the best of our abilities to make sure that these mistakes are rectified.
But flyingnewbie10's modus operandi seems to be pushing the idea that the big, bad multinational corporations are trying to blame Brazilian pilots for something that may be down to their faulty equipment, against most of the (admittedly circumstantial) evidence that has come to light so far. I'm not disputing it's possible that he may be right, but it seems to me unlikely.
The problem with nationalised (or in the case of Brazilian ATC, militarised) institutions is that things tend to become political very quickly. It's hard to say what other countries may have done in the same situation, because there haven't been many situations like this in recent memory (JAL123 had a similar problem where the Japanese authorities were very sceptical of Boeing's involvement - and the net result of that was Boeing taking full responsibility for the faulty repair that brought the aircraft down).
Air safety isn't a question of powerful countries and their corporations strong-arming less-powerful nations. Tenerife proved that the most senior, experienced pilots of the oldest, most respected airlines are still capable of making mistakes that lead to tragedy. To err is human and there's no shame in admitting to making a mistake. All we can do is work to the best of our abilities to make sure that these mistakes are rectified.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 29th Aug 2007 at 22:22.
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Letīs try to be cool...
I don't disagree with you on the fact that in the GOL and TAM cases there is no evidence of criminal behaviour. But you can't generically forbid hipothetical lawsuits just because investigators think (or simply say) it would make their job more complicated.
Contrary to all prejudices I see in Brazil (there are in the US also about south americans...) I have a lot of respect for the USA.
It seems that you did not quite understand how different it is a criminal investigation from a expert investigation trying to know what went wrong in a disaster and above all what can be done to prevent it. Once the investigative agency publishes the final report, of course anyone is free to sue anyone else in a free country.
But when you have criminal investigation running ahead of the proper investigation by people who know about aviation you can imagine that this will make it very difficult for collecting data that could help in the understanding of the disaster.
I doubt if you will agree with what Brazil has done: start immediately several criminal investigations by local police, federal police, house of representatives, senate (people who have no expertise on aviation matters). Not to speak of the Defense Minister who knows nothing about aviation making declarations in TV on who should be blamed.
This indeed complicated for CENIPA to investigate the disaster.
Of course CENIPA also has a problem. It belongs to the Air Force and it is ackward to have it investigating a disaster where the Air Force could have played a part (Air Traffic Control).
About the US pilots and the Brazilian pilots from TAM. The ideal situation would be for everyone to wait the final reports from CENIPA (NTSB is also involved). But no...everyone gets into the act and I do feel that the US pilots could easily be scapegoated not only in terms of prejudice but also because they represent Excel Air that has a big insurance and an expensive Legacy that has been confiscated at the Cachimbo Air Base. Insofar as the TAM pilots there are some evidences that show that perhaps they indeed made a mistake but this has not been decided as far as I know the way it was decided by the local, federal police and house committee that the Legacy pilots were the cause of the GOL disaster.
Letīs try to be fair and just. I appreciate your participation and views.
Finally I really am not sure if Brazilian pilots would be held in the USA in a similar disaster. This is a conjecture.
My greetings and best wishes.
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Originally Posted by Sdruvss
1. Does anyone here believes ATC put them on FL 370 in UZ6?
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
2. Did the pilot engage in appropriate pre-flight planning?
They filed a flight plan, and followed their clearances until communication was lost. Any issues that have arisen concern what they or others should have done in those circumstances.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
3. Did the pilots commit gross negligence for a criminal prosecution not engaging appropriate pre-flight planning?
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
We never know because they will never come back to Brazil to say it.
modulo our understanding of the appropriate IFR for question 1.
PBL
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Sdruvss,
No problem. I'm glad we seem to have sorted out our communications. We seem both to be interested at getting at the heart of this matter.
You want to discuss it in detail. OK, let's try.
The Legacy joined UZ6 at a waypoint. I would assume the pilots knew what the usual westbound/eastbound flight levels on UZ6 are, because they are worldwide the same.
And, as you correctly surmise, they filed an appropriate FL in the flight plan.
Communications were lost.
That's what I understand, but I haven't specifically checked the time.
Now, here begins a problem. Why would ATC assume that?
There has to be a two-sided understanding of how an aircraft is going to behave under lost communications.
According to the IFR of many countries in the world, including the U.S. (whose rules I know best), but also including Germany and the U.K., then when you are cleared by ATC for a particular FL or altitude, you remain at that cleared altitude until you receive and acknowledge an amended clearance.
Cleared altitudes by ATC always take priority over what is in the flight plan. I don't think I have ever flown my filed flight plan under IFR. ATC always says something different at some time, and then it's for them to direct the flight through further clearances (they may also say "proceed as filed" but that itself is a further clearance).
So, what are the Brazilian IFR under lost communications?
*Yes they do* need to be cleared. Every minute of the time they are flying IFR they need to be cleared.
It occurs to me that you may not understand what a clearance is.
A clearance is a two-sided contract between ATC and pilot, in which ATC undertakes to keep a particular block of airspace free of other (IFR) traffic, and the pilot accepts this undertaking or rejects it. If heshe accepts, heshe undertakes to fly within that block of cleared airspace until it terminates, or until another clearance is received and accepted.
This is all pretty routine until one no longer has two-way communications. Then one needs conventions, understood by both sides, as to what the pilot is going to do, and the controller will then keep other traffic out of the way of the airspace that the pilot is anticipated to be using.
These conventions exist in most jurisdictions (including those with which I am familiar).
What is the "correct level" depends in this case on convention. Legacy was last cleared to FL 370. He was not flying his flight plan, but following ATC clearances. This should be on the flight strip that the new controller took over.
Exactly what here does a transponder check consist in?
Are you aware of how often pilot-controller communications fit the precise standards, and how often they do not?
I don't buy your suggestion of how the communications "should" have proceeded. There is too much there that is not ICAO-standard terminology.
Well, now, that is the crucial point, isn't it. If you are a U.S., or British, or German pilot and you are flying under ATC clearances, you fly your last cleared level, unless ATC clears you to "proceed as filed", in which case you then follow your flight plan.
And if it is so simple as that the Legacy pilots failed to follow Brazilian procedures, why are four controllers being charged with manslaughter (including "voluntary manslaughter" in one case)?
PBL
No problem. I'm glad we seem to have sorted out our communications. We seem both to be interested at getting at the heart of this matter.
You want to discuss it in detail. OK, let's try.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
1. Legacy was leaving a point-to-point section -- I don't know the english word for that -- (S.José to Brasilia) to enter a RVSM airspace in UZ6. No one RVSM authorized aircraft flies from Brasilia to Manaus at FL 370. All pilots know that. If they were engaged in appropriate pre-flight planning, Legacy pilots would have known that. That is why their original flight plan informs to descend to FL360 at Brasilia.
And, as you correctly surmise, they filed an appropriate FL in the flight plan.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
2. [
] before communications were lost From 15:51, last contact, until 16:26, there was no contact attempt, when Brasilia begins trying to contact them.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
3. 16:02 Brasilia looses Legacy transponder signal.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
4. Brasília assumed they were at right level FL 360,
There has to be a two-sided understanding of how an aircraft is going to behave under lost communications.
According to the IFR of many countries in the world, including the U.S. (whose rules I know best), but also including Germany and the U.K., then when you are cleared by ATC for a particular FL or altitude, you remain at that cleared altitude until you receive and acknowledge an amended clearance.
Cleared altitudes by ATC always take priority over what is in the flight plan. I don't think I have ever flown my filed flight plan under IFR. ATC always says something different at some time, and then it's for them to direct the flight through further clearances (they may also say "proceed as filed" but that itself is a further clearance).
So, what are the Brazilian IFR under lost communications?
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
all pilots knows what authorized levels from Brasilia to Manaus are. They dont need to be cleared and, if they want to fly another authorized level, they dont need clearance because they are under radar surveillance.
It occurs to me that you may not understand what a clearance is.
A clearance is a two-sided contract between ATC and pilot, in which ATC undertakes to keep a particular block of airspace free of other (IFR) traffic, and the pilot accepts this undertaking or rejects it. If heshe accepts, heshe undertakes to fly within that block of cleared airspace until it terminates, or until another clearance is received and accepted.
This is all pretty routine until one no longer has two-way communications. Then one needs conventions, understood by both sides, as to what the pilot is going to do, and the controller will then keep other traffic out of the way of the airspace that the pilot is anticipated to be using.
These conventions exist in most jurisdictions (including those with which I am familiar).
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
5. There was a turn shift meanwhile. New operator isnt alerted by this issue, but is not a big issue for him, the pilots should be at correct level.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
6. Pilots should check transponder before entering RVSM airspace. If fails they should tell ATC RVSM NEGATIVE. ATC would take care of them.
7. Last Legacy/Brasília dialog upsets me. It should be (but it isnt):....
I don't buy your suggestion of how the communications "should" have proceeded. There is too much there that is not ICAO-standard terminology.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
It is expected that they should descend!!! They shouldnt confirm that.
And if it is so simple as that the Legacy pilots failed to follow Brazilian procedures, why are four controllers being charged with manslaughter (including "voluntary manslaughter" in one case)?
PBL
Pegase Driver
Sdruvss, what you say , or at least what I understand from your previous post, is not correct.
This might be due to , as you say, you "English lack of proficiency." but
Let me correct a few points, from a European ATC view of course .
FL370 is a normal RVSM level. Under radar controlled airspace , it is up to ATC to assign FLs , regardless of Flight Plan REQUESTED FLs , and of Level allocation scheme ( direction )
Again , under positive radar control, ATC overrides Flight Plan.
Changing headings without clearance is not authorized, ATC always clear an aircraft to fly A to B either via heading, track , point to go, etc.. or via Flight plan route. Therefore the turns that subsequently follow along the cleared route are authorized. In the vertical plane, the last FL cleared is the one to follow, regardless of Requested FLs , UNLESS IN RADIO FAILURE.
In radio failure a relatively new ICAO procedure applies ( see among the first pages of this thread for the details, no time to check for you ) in which after a certain time the pilot in command should disregard previous clearances and follow strictly the filed flight plan.
Now the big discussion and heavy debate we had a year ago, is : were they in radio failure , and if yes , which procedure did they follow, or were they intending to follow ? There was apparently a large discrepancy between the USA FAA "NORDO procedures" and the ICAO recommended ones. Which ones Brazil had published in their AIP at the time of the accident would be interesting to have. We had no reply on that question. But I am sure CENIPA , will look into this.
Your invented " ideal" R/T exchange that should have taken place makes no sense to me at all.
Finally , back to a previous post of yours : while lecturing Prof Ladkin, you said that the Brazilian RVSM bible ,called NABR-2, is only in Portuguese. I doubt this very much.
If , as i suspect, NABR-2 is only a translation of the ICAO RVSM introduction book, then RVSM as no bearing whatsoever in this accident.
This might be due to , as you say, you "English lack of proficiency." but
Let me correct a few points, from a European ATC view of course .
FL370 is a normal RVSM level. Under radar controlled airspace , it is up to ATC to assign FLs , regardless of Flight Plan REQUESTED FLs , and of Level allocation scheme ( direction )
Again , under positive radar control, ATC overrides Flight Plan.
Changing headings without clearance is not authorized, ATC always clear an aircraft to fly A to B either via heading, track , point to go, etc.. or via Flight plan route. Therefore the turns that subsequently follow along the cleared route are authorized. In the vertical plane, the last FL cleared is the one to follow, regardless of Requested FLs , UNLESS IN RADIO FAILURE.
In radio failure a relatively new ICAO procedure applies ( see among the first pages of this thread for the details, no time to check for you ) in which after a certain time the pilot in command should disregard previous clearances and follow strictly the filed flight plan.
Now the big discussion and heavy debate we had a year ago, is : were they in radio failure , and if yes , which procedure did they follow, or were they intending to follow ? There was apparently a large discrepancy between the USA FAA "NORDO procedures" and the ICAO recommended ones. Which ones Brazil had published in their AIP at the time of the accident would be interesting to have. We had no reply on that question. But I am sure CENIPA , will look into this.
Your invented " ideal" R/T exchange that should have taken place makes no sense to me at all.
Finally , back to a previous post of yours : while lecturing Prof Ladkin, you said that the Brazilian RVSM bible ,called NABR-2, is only in Portuguese. I doubt this very much.
If , as i suspect, NABR-2 is only a translation of the ICAO RVSM introduction book, then RVSM as no bearing whatsoever in this accident.
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The way I understand...
I am not a pro. Just love aviation and have been following closely this GOL X Legacy disaster. Used to fly Tripacers and Cherokees...Small guy. I also like justice and hate scapegoating and prejudices.
The two Legacy pilots did have an initial written flight plan. Go to Brasilia 370, descend to 360 and somewhare along the line back to 380 (kind of funny plan...but this is besides the point). After leaving São Jose the ATC changed the plan for them to fly 370 to Manaus (it is recorded, no way to deny it). Of course the last ATC plan is always what counts.
Arriving in Brasilia the pilots told ATC in Brasilia they were at 370. ATC greetd them, wished a good trip and nothing else was said.
They passed Brasilia and for seven minutes the screen at ATC showed 370:360 and + inside a circle (that is the transponder was ON). Why the 370? Came from the Legacy transponder. The 360? From a software in Cyndacta que was just spelling out the original flight plan (without expecting that ATC and the Pilots to confirm this. For seven minutes ATC did not question the discrepancy with the Legacy pilots.
Then the transponder went OFF. This showed in the screen. The + was not circled by a circle. As there was no imput from the transponder a primary radar from the Air Force framed the Legacy but this radar was not turstworthy for altitude. It read 360. Then in the screen at traffic control
there was 360Z360 (The Z means not reliable, not coming from the transponder). For almost one hour or so this showed up and ATC did not try to get in touch with the Legacy to ask or tell that the transponder was off.
In the Legacy the transponder went into stand by or so, probrably because the pilots rested their feet in the feet rest below the dash.
The warning sign that the transponder was OFF was a small sign in yellow letters easily not seen. (See FAA and NTSB)
The pilots thought they were in the right place and the ATC control the same way without realizing that the data they were getting were not reliable.
Yes, at one point they tried to talk with each other many times but I doubt if either side was concerned about altitude.
Then the disaster. When it happened the radar showed up in Manaus but the ATC was done by Brasilia...
Now, I will listen...
The two Legacy pilots did have an initial written flight plan. Go to Brasilia 370, descend to 360 and somewhare along the line back to 380 (kind of funny plan...but this is besides the point). After leaving São Jose the ATC changed the plan for them to fly 370 to Manaus (it is recorded, no way to deny it). Of course the last ATC plan is always what counts.
Arriving in Brasilia the pilots told ATC in Brasilia they were at 370. ATC greetd them, wished a good trip and nothing else was said.
They passed Brasilia and for seven minutes the screen at ATC showed 370:360 and + inside a circle (that is the transponder was ON). Why the 370? Came from the Legacy transponder. The 360? From a software in Cyndacta que was just spelling out the original flight plan (without expecting that ATC and the Pilots to confirm this. For seven minutes ATC did not question the discrepancy with the Legacy pilots.
Then the transponder went OFF. This showed in the screen. The + was not circled by a circle. As there was no imput from the transponder a primary radar from the Air Force framed the Legacy but this radar was not turstworthy for altitude. It read 360. Then in the screen at traffic control
there was 360Z360 (The Z means not reliable, not coming from the transponder). For almost one hour or so this showed up and ATC did not try to get in touch with the Legacy to ask or tell that the transponder was off.
In the Legacy the transponder went into stand by or so, probrably because the pilots rested their feet in the feet rest below the dash.
The warning sign that the transponder was OFF was a small sign in yellow letters easily not seen. (See FAA and NTSB)
The pilots thought they were in the right place and the ATC control the same way without realizing that the data they were getting were not reliable.
Yes, at one point they tried to talk with each other many times but I doubt if either side was concerned about altitude.
Then the disaster. When it happened the radar showed up in Manaus but the ATC was done by Brasilia...
Now, I will listen...
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marciovp
It's not an ATC "plan"....it's an ATC CLEARANCE and, yes, you are correct.. it's what counts.
The legacy pilots were proceeding as CLEARED and the flight plan has no significance other than they were also cleared via the route they had filed(planned). The altitude listed in a flight plan is a request; the altitude/level to be flown is the one assigned in a clearance.
The legacy pilots were proceeding as CLEARED and the flight plan has no significance other than they were also cleared via the route they had filed(planned). The altitude listed in a flight plan is a request; the altitude/level to be flown is the one assigned in a clearance.
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Sdruvss,
The posts by ATC Watcher, marciovp and A310driver say a lot of what I would have said in reply. I will not repeat here points they have made; I supplement them.
It seems to me that your concern has a number of components. Firstly, if I may say so, you don't seem to understand the contract between airspace users (pilots) and air traffic control under Instrument Flight Rules: what a clearance is and means, what a flight plan is and means, what takes priority over what and when. This is not trivial stuff. And, for example, it forms a large part of training for instrument flight. But it is stuff that IFR-rated pilots and controllers deal with every day, so if you are new to all this, please bear in mind that you are discussing with people with considerable expertise, and please don't take it badly if people flatly contradict you on some matters.
But it is also unfortunately not unambiguous. International misunderstandings over the roles and abilities of pilots and controllers have arguably contributed to two recent crashes: the 2002 Überlingen midair collision, and the 2006 Sochi CFIT, so international agreements play a role also. The Überlingen report in particular went into great detail over the differing guidance that may or may not have been in force or have played a role in that midair. That section of the report makes very sobering reading. I recommend it.
Furthermore, even in cases in which guidance is not unambiguous, it may be obscure. I give examples of three jurisdictions.
In the U.S., the Federal Aviation Regulations are published and readable. Indeed, you can get them on the WWW, and they are in a widely-used international language, namely English.
Move to the U.K. The corresponding law is called the Air Order; it will fill an entire bookshelf; it is written in language, some of which has a precise meaning which is only understood by professionals conversant with English law. The CAA provides some readable guidance booklets, called CAPs, and what is in the CAPs is used as a basis for what a pilot should know about the U.K. aviation law and rules. Now, suppose you wanted to fly to the U.K. in your bizjet, and you wanted to know about the rules. What would you do? Try to order a CAP? Which? Where do you find the list? How do you find out which CAP has the information you want?
Move to Germany. You can get the law on the WWW, It is called the LBO. But reading and interpreting legal German is something that most Germans cannot do, let alone people who do not speak or read German. It has taken me years of being here, and participating in legal proceedings, to gain an understanding of what specific meaning certain legal phraseology has. The LBO is no different. And I can assure you that there are plenty of German pilots who do not understand quite what the LBO says. So if you consider an incident in which some Russian under control of a Swiss hits a Belgian plane in German airspace, it is a fair bet that none of the participants actually understood the law governing their unfortunate interaction.
With this rather long-winded discursion, I simply hope to have indicated that it is simply not humanly reasonable to expect foreign pilots to understand all aspects of local aviation law, in most places except possibly the U.S.
That is why ICAO, and ICAO procedures, play such an important role. But in some cases (Überlingen), having ICAO procedures could be seen, not as cutting through the darkness with light, but as adding *yet another* layer of mutually partially contradictory guidance.
So how might this apply to the Amazonas midair collision?
If ATC Watcher and his organisation are unable to get an answer from the Brazilian authorities after nearly a year as to which procedures for lost communications actually applied at the time of the accident, how can anyone reasonably have expected two pilots on a delivery flight to know what those regulations may have been, other than those to which they were accustomed? And until that is determined, how could one even begin any kind of legal categorisation of the actions of the pilots or controllers? Yet, as I understand it, one criminal trial has formally begun already.
Second, you appear to be under the impression that when the Legacy pilots joined UZ6, they should have communicated with controllers about the heading change but didn't. I take it that marciovp's comment suffices to answer that.
Third, you ask me to define "lost communications". Communications are taken to be lost by one participant when they (repeatedly) attempt to communicate over the mutually established or conventional channel and do not succeed. A state of lost communications can only be established, as you say, when attempted but failed. The important point to note here, and which must be taken into account by IFR procedures for lost communications, is that one party will likely establish that communications are lost before the other.
Fourth, you say, concerning the FL at which the Legacy pilots flew UZ6, that
as if they "know" what is "right" and the Legacy pilots did it "wrong". Do you realise that you are conversing with some of these "hundreds" of pilots of established airlines in this forum? And that none of those whom I know personally have any idea at this point what it is that the Legacy crew are supposed to have done "wrong"?
As to your suggestion why the controllers are facing military tribunals,
you are, please, aware of the fact that the only people who seem to be taking a genuine interest and making a genuine effort to ensure that the inquiry into the behavior of these controllers proceeds appropriately are "a lot of foreigners", specifically, Swiss, French and Portuguese? With some of whom you are now conversing.
PBL
The posts by ATC Watcher, marciovp and A310driver say a lot of what I would have said in reply. I will not repeat here points they have made; I supplement them.
It seems to me that your concern has a number of components. Firstly, if I may say so, you don't seem to understand the contract between airspace users (pilots) and air traffic control under Instrument Flight Rules: what a clearance is and means, what a flight plan is and means, what takes priority over what and when. This is not trivial stuff. And, for example, it forms a large part of training for instrument flight. But it is stuff that IFR-rated pilots and controllers deal with every day, so if you are new to all this, please bear in mind that you are discussing with people with considerable expertise, and please don't take it badly if people flatly contradict you on some matters.
But it is also unfortunately not unambiguous. International misunderstandings over the roles and abilities of pilots and controllers have arguably contributed to two recent crashes: the 2002 Überlingen midair collision, and the 2006 Sochi CFIT, so international agreements play a role also. The Überlingen report in particular went into great detail over the differing guidance that may or may not have been in force or have played a role in that midair. That section of the report makes very sobering reading. I recommend it.
Furthermore, even in cases in which guidance is not unambiguous, it may be obscure. I give examples of three jurisdictions.
In the U.S., the Federal Aviation Regulations are published and readable. Indeed, you can get them on the WWW, and they are in a widely-used international language, namely English.
Move to the U.K. The corresponding law is called the Air Order; it will fill an entire bookshelf; it is written in language, some of which has a precise meaning which is only understood by professionals conversant with English law. The CAA provides some readable guidance booklets, called CAPs, and what is in the CAPs is used as a basis for what a pilot should know about the U.K. aviation law and rules. Now, suppose you wanted to fly to the U.K. in your bizjet, and you wanted to know about the rules. What would you do? Try to order a CAP? Which? Where do you find the list? How do you find out which CAP has the information you want?
Move to Germany. You can get the law on the WWW, It is called the LBO. But reading and interpreting legal German is something that most Germans cannot do, let alone people who do not speak or read German. It has taken me years of being here, and participating in legal proceedings, to gain an understanding of what specific meaning certain legal phraseology has. The LBO is no different. And I can assure you that there are plenty of German pilots who do not understand quite what the LBO says. So if you consider an incident in which some Russian under control of a Swiss hits a Belgian plane in German airspace, it is a fair bet that none of the participants actually understood the law governing their unfortunate interaction.
With this rather long-winded discursion, I simply hope to have indicated that it is simply not humanly reasonable to expect foreign pilots to understand all aspects of local aviation law, in most places except possibly the U.S.
That is why ICAO, and ICAO procedures, play such an important role. But in some cases (Überlingen), having ICAO procedures could be seen, not as cutting through the darkness with light, but as adding *yet another* layer of mutually partially contradictory guidance.
So how might this apply to the Amazonas midair collision?
If ATC Watcher and his organisation are unable to get an answer from the Brazilian authorities after nearly a year as to which procedures for lost communications actually applied at the time of the accident, how can anyone reasonably have expected two pilots on a delivery flight to know what those regulations may have been, other than those to which they were accustomed? And until that is determined, how could one even begin any kind of legal categorisation of the actions of the pilots or controllers? Yet, as I understand it, one criminal trial has formally begun already.
Second, you appear to be under the impression that when the Legacy pilots joined UZ6, they should have communicated with controllers about the heading change but didn't. I take it that marciovp's comment suffices to answer that.
Third, you ask me to define "lost communications". Communications are taken to be lost by one participant when they (repeatedly) attempt to communicate over the mutually established or conventional channel and do not succeed. A state of lost communications can only be established, as you say, when attempted but failed. The important point to note here, and which must be taken into account by IFR procedures for lost communications, is that one party will likely establish that communications are lost before the other.
Fourth, you say, concerning the FL at which the Legacy pilots flew UZ6, that
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
if you are in Brazil, as hundreds of pilots of Delta, AA, Fedex, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Air Portugal, Iberia, Alitalia, British Airways,
, its what they do each day
As to your suggestion why the controllers are facing military tribunals,
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
Because Joe Lepore, Joe Sharkey, a lot of Brazilians and, a lot of foreigners are accusing them
PBL
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Iīd like to contribute to this thread if possible.
Iīd like to know if a german, spanish, usa flight enters brazilian airspace, just to cross it...Do they have a filed flight plan that is approved by brazilians, or they simply enter the airspace and take contact with ATCīs ?
I think the answer of this question would clarify a lot.
Iīd like to know if a german, spanish, usa flight enters brazilian airspace, just to cross it...Do they have a filed flight plan that is approved by brazilians, or they simply enter the airspace and take contact with ATCīs ?
I think the answer of this question would clarify a lot.
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We are making progress
OK, we are doing this for the love of aviation. I am hoping that CENIPA will clarify all these questions.
.
ATC from São Jose, did clear the Legacy to fly 370 until Manaus. This is recorded. I have listened to it. Of course - and it couldnīt be otherwise - pilots must follow the last clearance from ATC. And this frequently happens as you can imagine. The ATC in Sao Jose could have said what the original flight plan said. But he didnīt.
The ATC in Brasilia saw in the screen that the Legacy icon was showing 370:360 and of course could have asked the pilots about this discrepancy. The transponder was ON and this lasted for 7 minutes. Why there was that secong 360? Because the original flight plan was entered in the system and called for 360. The International Association of Air Traffic Controllers questioned the software that entered 360 WITHOUT REQUIRING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN PILOTS AND ATC (automatically). They claim that this doesnīt work like that in the rest of the word and that for that 360 to be there PILOTS AND ATC should have talked and agreed. Not in Brazil. (The Air Force denies that and defends the software)
ATC could not think that it was just a transponder issue. There was clearly in the screen that the transponder was not working and the 360Z360 reading was not reliable (that is what th Z means). The first 360 was coming from a military radar that ATC new was not reliable in terms of altitude, and the second was entered automatically by the software without requiring that ATC and PILOTS talk. So by looking at the scree for almost one hour ATC saw that the transponder was not working, that the 360Z360 was not reliable and, as you said, felt that this was the altitude... Couldnīt they have -way before communication was impaired- talked to the pilots and ask why the transponder was off and in what altitude they were flying?...
As for the pilots, yes they could have seen in their screen in small letters that the transponder was off. But they were small letters in yellow, not even red. The NTSB has issued directives for this to be changed and for the pilots to have more clear warnings when the transponder goes off. And the FAA has said that in the Legacy, placing the feet on the feet rests altered the transponder to stand-by and altered the radio frequency.
This is how I see, but of course waiting for the final report from CENIPA (the only problem with CENIPA is that it belongs to the Air Force who administers Traffic Control in Brazil in terms of softwares and equipments).
Sarava!
ATC never wanted to clear Legacy, or any other plane, to FL 370 at UZ6 from Brasilia to Manaus. They never want to do that with any plane. What was ATC mistake? What was their exact word that was misunderstood? When? What makes Legacy understood to keep FL 370 after Brasilia VOR until Manaus? I suppose that was their last words to Legacy, right? What they said, we know, but what they should have said them? There is not any value judgment in this question. It is only a simple question.
My point-of-view is that communications lost was a minor issue in this case. Why? My answer: Last two-way contact was 15:51, 40 miles far from Brasilia. ATC should have said something, which I dont know what, but I would like that you tell me, that when they have reached Brasilia VOR they would have descended to FL 360.
Then 16:02, at same time, Legacy dont descend, and transponder has no signal. ATC thinks it is only a transponder issue and assume they are at FL 360. This (16:02) is the beginning of the incident
My point-of-view is that communications lost was a minor issue in this case. Why? My answer: Last two-way contact was 15:51, 40 miles far from Brasilia. ATC should have said something, which I dont know what, but I would like that you tell me, that when they have reached Brasilia VOR they would have descended to FL 360.
Then 16:02, at same time, Legacy dont descend, and transponder has no signal. ATC thinks it is only a transponder issue and assume they are at FL 360. This (16:02) is the beginning of the incident
ATC from São Jose, did clear the Legacy to fly 370 until Manaus. This is recorded. I have listened to it. Of course - and it couldnīt be otherwise - pilots must follow the last clearance from ATC. And this frequently happens as you can imagine. The ATC in Sao Jose could have said what the original flight plan said. But he didnīt.
The ATC in Brasilia saw in the screen that the Legacy icon was showing 370:360 and of course could have asked the pilots about this discrepancy. The transponder was ON and this lasted for 7 minutes. Why there was that secong 360? Because the original flight plan was entered in the system and called for 360. The International Association of Air Traffic Controllers questioned the software that entered 360 WITHOUT REQUIRING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN PILOTS AND ATC (automatically). They claim that this doesnīt work like that in the rest of the word and that for that 360 to be there PILOTS AND ATC should have talked and agreed. Not in Brazil. (The Air Force denies that and defends the software)
ATC could not think that it was just a transponder issue. There was clearly in the screen that the transponder was not working and the 360Z360 reading was not reliable (that is what th Z means). The first 360 was coming from a military radar that ATC new was not reliable in terms of altitude, and the second was entered automatically by the software without requiring that ATC and PILOTS talk. So by looking at the scree for almost one hour ATC saw that the transponder was not working, that the 360Z360 was not reliable and, as you said, felt that this was the altitude... Couldnīt they have -way before communication was impaired- talked to the pilots and ask why the transponder was off and in what altitude they were flying?...
As for the pilots, yes they could have seen in their screen in small letters that the transponder was off. But they were small letters in yellow, not even red. The NTSB has issued directives for this to be changed and for the pilots to have more clear warnings when the transponder goes off. And the FAA has said that in the Legacy, placing the feet on the feet rests altered the transponder to stand-by and altered the radio frequency.
This is how I see, but of course waiting for the final report from CENIPA (the only problem with CENIPA is that it belongs to the Air Force who administers Traffic Control in Brazil in terms of softwares and equipments).
Sarava!
Pegase Driver
marciovp : You make a lot of unverified assumptions in your reasoning . Just to take one :
The " clearly" is what is most probably lacking in this ATC system. . How often a normal lack of Mode C interrogation return will provide a Z ? 10 times a day ? 100 times a day ? Is it a bright flashing letter coming on the screen if the Z remains for more than let's say , 3 returns , or 3 minutes...?
Is the radar coverage over Brasilia 100% ? , how does the ATC system behaves when the aircraft enters a zone of bad radar detection ?, puts another Z ?
Replacing Mode C/S altitude by the average altitude of a Military height finder is also something unheard of . All these are contributing factors.
The Brazilian ATC system has unique features that no one else in the world is using .Some are softly saying they are , " prone to Human errors" , some other are bluntly saying they are " dangerous" .If you combine this to poorly trained and poorly paid operators, ( compared to the rest of the world gain ) you might have a different perspective .
On the cockpit side, the same reasoning can apply.For instance a small difficult to spot TCAS OFF in white on a corner of a display while keeping the TCAS map/display unchanged is not what you would normally expect from a modern avionic suite .
ATC could not think that it was just a transponder issue. There was clearly in the screen that the transponder was not working and the 360Z360 reading was not reliable (that is what th Z means).
Is the radar coverage over Brasilia 100% ? , how does the ATC system behaves when the aircraft enters a zone of bad radar detection ?, puts another Z ?
Replacing Mode C/S altitude by the average altitude of a Military height finder is also something unheard of . All these are contributing factors.
The Brazilian ATC system has unique features that no one else in the world is using .Some are softly saying they are , " prone to Human errors" , some other are bluntly saying they are " dangerous" .If you combine this to poorly trained and poorly paid operators, ( compared to the rest of the world gain ) you might have a different perspective .
On the cockpit side, the same reasoning can apply.For instance a small difficult to spot TCAS OFF in white on a corner of a display while keeping the TCAS map/display unchanged is not what you would normally expect from a modern avionic suite .
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Sdruvss,
I think we are getting somewhere with this discussion. It is important to reach agreement on known facts. It is important to know what is known, and also to know what is unknown.
In any jurisdiction with which I am familiar, ATC has the authority to clear any aircraft to any flight level they wish in any airspace they control. They may be limited in their offers by their own internal procedures, but that is not apparent to their contract partners (the pilots of aircraft using their airspace under IFR).
You keep bringing up this issue of RVSM. I don't think either ATC Watcher or marciovp think it is relevant, and I
certainly don't. Why do *you* think it is relevant?
PBL
I think we are getting somewhere with this discussion. It is important to reach agreement on known facts. It is important to know what is known, and also to know what is unknown.
Originally Posted by Sdruvss
S.José to Brasilia, but is not from Brasilia to Manaus, since they would be entering a RSVM airspace, right?
You keep bringing up this issue of RVSM. I don't think either ATC Watcher or marciovp think it is relevant, and I
certainly don't. Why do *you* think it is relevant?
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Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
For instance a small difficult to spot TCAS OFF in white on a corner of a display while keeping the TCAS map/display unchanged is not what you would normally expect from a modern avionic suite
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ATC Watcher to agusaleale : this forum and its discussions are possibly not the right place for you.
Quick answer nevertheless: A flight plan submitted in advance is necessary for every international border crossing , not only for Brazil.
Quick answer nevertheless: A flight plan submitted in advance is necessary for every international border crossing , not only for Brazil.
Just one more thing and thanks for clarifying, specially me.
I donīt find in this post many comments made by the great majority of pilots here present, many of them who surely fly across Brasil.
I think it would be very helpful to hear their past experiencies in situations like what is being discussed in this forum, i.e pilots who follow ICAO or not, FL, etc.
Iīm afraid that if these situation happen regularly, it surelyīd be more accidents, as all Iīve read in this forum is a continuous confusion between those who pretend to fly and those who controll the airspace. It should be simply; if not, why donīt accidents happen regularly in Brasil, given the discordance in procedures seen here?
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Originally Posted by Sdruvss
Clearable levels are 300, 320, 340, 360, 380, 400. Right?
I think I just said this, didn't I?
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I think we covered this all at the top of the thread...ATC can give you an altitude not consistent with the above hemispheric rules.
they are called, "WAFDOFS" for wrong altitude/direction of flight
sometimes it just works out that way...sharp pilots usually verify it with atc...at least in america.
they are called, "WAFDOFS" for wrong altitude/direction of flight
sometimes it just works out that way...sharp pilots usually verify it with atc...at least in america.
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Maybe I am misunderstanding NABR-2. It says:
"RUMO MAGNETICO (what is english word for that?):
000š A 179š - FL290, FL310, FL330, FL350, FL370, FL390, FL410
180š A 359š - FL300, FL320, FL340, FL360, FL380, FL400
Brasilia to Manaus is NW, aprox. 300š, i guess. So only even levels, correct?
Remember, S.José to Brasilia is not RSVM.
"RUMO MAGNETICO (what is english word for that?):
000š A 179š - FL290, FL310, FL330, FL350, FL370, FL390, FL410
180š A 359š - FL300, FL320, FL340, FL360, FL380, FL400
Brasilia to Manaus is NW, aprox. 300š, i guess. So only even levels, correct?
Remember, S.José to Brasilia is not RSVM.
ATC can assign any Flight Level in its airspace regardless of magnetic heading for various reasons.
This happens all over the world everyday.
I hope this helps you.