Mid-air collision over Brasil
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well, the feeling and meaning is odd in the above interview.
IF the radios were working "just fine" then why couldn't they talk to anyone? even if given the wrong frequency, you go back to the good one, or look at your chart and find the nearest ATC facility and call them and when in doubt, 121.5mhz.
and according to the US AIM, check out sections 6-4-1 (2,3), : if an aircraft with a coded radar beacon transponder experiences a loss of two-way radio capability, the pilot should adjust the transponder to reply on Mode A/3 , Code 7600.
this does not say: equipment faliure.
it goes on to encourge use of 121.5mhz and ARINC and listening on VOR's.
IF the radios were working "just fine" then why couldn't they talk to anyone? even if given the wrong frequency, you go back to the good one, or look at your chart and find the nearest ATC facility and call them and when in doubt, 121.5mhz.
and according to the US AIM, check out sections 6-4-1 (2,3), : if an aircraft with a coded radar beacon transponder experiences a loss of two-way radio capability, the pilot should adjust the transponder to reply on Mode A/3 , Code 7600.
this does not say: equipment faliure.
it goes on to encourge use of 121.5mhz and ARINC and listening on VOR's.
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as I mentioned in previous post, I chose the domestic usa and canada as my routes of choice after reading about the swissair/athens thing along time ago.
if legacy could hear brazilia (airport and not the plane type) and didn't try calling them, I would be concerned, wouldn't you?
if legacy could hear brazilia (airport and not the plane type) and didn't try calling them, I would be concerned, wouldn't you?
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A similiar Legacy for sale has the following equipment. Does anyone know if the mid air Legacy had the following?
j
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AirCell ST 3100 (Satellite Only)
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Why do you need it?
The ST 3100 is designed and built by AirCell, the leading provider of airborne telecommunication equipment, network service and customer support. Ideal for virtually all types of corporate, airline or government aircraft, including helicopters, the ST 3100 provides passengers and crew worldwide airborne voice and data communications. Passengers can utilize the system for their business communication needs during flight - telephone, Internet/Internet e-mail and data capabilities. The aircraft crew can use the system for operational communications and information. AirCell’s ST 3100 system can also provide the communication link for in-flight information systems that provide two-way data link messaging and text/graphical weather for the crew. In addition, the system can access in-flight medical emergency services on the ground. For maximum installation flexibility, AirCell offers a variety of antenna and handset configurations including rechargeable cordless and bulkhead-mounted handset options, in a variety of colors, as well as the capability to mount the transceiver outside the pressure vesse
j
IRIDIUM - PRODUCTS IRIDIUM SATELLITE SOLUTIONS
AirCell ST 3100 (Satellite Only)
AirCell’s ST 3100 is an airborne telecommunications system that offers cost-effective voice and data communications for your aircraft’s passengers and crew. Part of AirCell’s full line of airborne telecommunications solutions, the ST 3100 is an all-in-one Satcom solution that supports a range of operational missions for either fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft.
Why do you need it?
The ST 3100 is designed and built by AirCell, the leading provider of airborne telecommunication equipment, network service and customer support. Ideal for virtually all types of corporate, airline or government aircraft, including helicopters, the ST 3100 provides passengers and crew worldwide airborne voice and data communications. Passengers can utilize the system for their business communication needs during flight - telephone, Internet/Internet e-mail and data capabilities. The aircraft crew can use the system for operational communications and information. AirCell’s ST 3100 system can also provide the communication link for in-flight information systems that provide two-way data link messaging and text/graphical weather for the crew. In addition, the system can access in-flight medical emergency services on the ground. For maximum installation flexibility, AirCell offers a variety of antenna and handset configurations including rechargeable cordless and bulkhead-mounted handset options, in a variety of colors, as well as the capability to mount the transceiver outside the pressure vesse
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RVSM
Hi, I'm new to this forum and I read MOST of this thread.
I'm personally still missing some informations about this accident, or better more fundamental information about the accident's region and RVSM...
I NEVER read anything about the fact (not in this forum, neither in Press or elsewhere), that the Brazilian controller should have assured a 2.000ft separation between the GOL B737 and the Legacy.
The only thing I always read and hear is that the Legacy should have been at FL360 and the Boeing at FL370. But since the Legacy had no transponder readout (for whatever reason), this appeared as a clear fact that the RVSM ability of the aircraft was not assured (since the transponder is an mandatory for RVSM).
In such a case, the aircraft is either denied to enter RVSM airspace (since was impossible due to R/T failure), or has to treated as a non-RVSM aircraft in none RVSM airspace.
So logically the ATC should have provided a 2.000ft separation at these levels. This means that even if the Legacy would have been at FL360, the 2.000ft level separation should have been the minimum, so that the GOL would have had to climb to FL380 in any case (at least, FL390 would have been better since FL380 is a pair level) or descend to FL340 or FL330.
The controller said in his interviews that he considered the Legacy at FL360 and did not see any conflict with the Boeing at FL370.
So I consider this as a clear fact of a lack in training in Brazilian ATC.
Another question arrises to me: How can an airspace that has a clear lack in Radar surveillance over its territory, and 'maybe' even an important lack in its computer software (due to the erroneous altitude readouts the controllers had), be authorized in establishing an RVSM airspace??
Have the RVSM operations been canceled in Brazilian airspace or not after the accident? Maybe is this the reason for the delays in Brazil? And if not, why doesn't the ICAO react? Or they reacted without informing the press?
I'm personally still missing some informations about this accident, or better more fundamental information about the accident's region and RVSM...
I NEVER read anything about the fact (not in this forum, neither in Press or elsewhere), that the Brazilian controller should have assured a 2.000ft separation between the GOL B737 and the Legacy.
The only thing I always read and hear is that the Legacy should have been at FL360 and the Boeing at FL370. But since the Legacy had no transponder readout (for whatever reason), this appeared as a clear fact that the RVSM ability of the aircraft was not assured (since the transponder is an mandatory for RVSM).
In such a case, the aircraft is either denied to enter RVSM airspace (since was impossible due to R/T failure), or has to treated as a non-RVSM aircraft in none RVSM airspace.
So logically the ATC should have provided a 2.000ft separation at these levels. This means that even if the Legacy would have been at FL360, the 2.000ft level separation should have been the minimum, so that the GOL would have had to climb to FL380 in any case (at least, FL390 would have been better since FL380 is a pair level) or descend to FL340 or FL330.
The controller said in his interviews that he considered the Legacy at FL360 and did not see any conflict with the Boeing at FL370.
So I consider this as a clear fact of a lack in training in Brazilian ATC.
Another question arrises to me: How can an airspace that has a clear lack in Radar surveillance over its territory, and 'maybe' even an important lack in its computer software (due to the erroneous altitude readouts the controllers had), be authorized in establishing an RVSM airspace??
Have the RVSM operations been canceled in Brazilian airspace or not after the accident? Maybe is this the reason for the delays in Brazil? And if not, why doesn't the ICAO react? Or they reacted without informing the press?
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Not wishing to be gouhlish, but have any of the readers seen the two digital photos making the rounds on the web, purpoted to have been taken by one of the pax inside the GOL B737 immediately after the midair? Quite amazing if they are for real! According to the story attached to the photo's, the owner of the digital camera has been identified as a pax on the aircraft. It doesn't surprise me that this has come about as everyone, everywhere are snapping digital pics, hardly an event goes by that isn't captured either on video or digital camera and the memory sticks must be pretty hardy, able to survive just about anything but fire.
Best,
Pegase Driver
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.....since the Legacy had no transponder readout (for whatever reason), this appeared as a clear fact that the RVSM ability of the aircraft was not assured (since the transponder is an mandatory for RVSM).
In such a case, the aircraft .........has to treated as a non-RVSM aircraft in none RVSM airspace.
In such a case, the aircraft .........has to treated as a non-RVSM aircraft in none RVSM airspace.
The RVSM training the controllers received is of course the key issue.And that will come out (I hope) . I also think this " blind area" existed before RVSM was introduced.
The other way to alert the controller was for the pilot to report the failure of one of the RVSM MEL component, but there also the pilots declared to the press that for them everything was working well. Perceptions as opposed to facts perhaps , but perceptions are more important as you know.
Lack of adequate radar coverage and foremost bad VHF communications complicated the issue
Which brings us to your second remark :
Another question arrises to me: How can an airspace that has a clear lack in Radar surveillance over its territory, and 'maybe' even an important lack in its computer software (due to the erroneous altitude readouts the controllers had), be authorized in establishing an RVSM airspace??
Delays in Brazil
As predicted by many but denied by Defense Ministry, ANAC, Lula, FAB, the holiday delays are building up. Jornal Nacional, the leading evening news channel, today showed check-in queues at CGH snaking outside the terminal, 40% of flights delayed country-wide. ANAC blaming it on yesterday's weather. It's rumoured elsewhere that controllers intend to apply 10-minute separation between takeoffs/landings at BSB on 31 Dec and 1 Jan to disrupt the presidential inauguration ceremonies.
ATC Watcher, how long do you reckon, off the top of your hat and, that it might take to reorganise/integrate ATC in Brazil? Assuming that financial and administrative control were to pass from 100% airforce to a civilian organisation (but probably govt owned as are the airports). When and if you reply, consider whether it might not be worthwhile starting a separate thread.
ATC Watcher, how long do you reckon, off the top of your hat and, that it might take to reorganise/integrate ATC in Brazil? Assuming that financial and administrative control were to pass from 100% airforce to a civilian organisation (but probably govt owned as are the airports). When and if you reply, consider whether it might not be worthwhile starting a separate thread.
Pegase Driver
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ATC in Brazil
Quote from Broadreach :
Out of my hat as you say, I woud guess 3 to 5 years if done properly.
Of course if one wants to change the names and the uniforms and keep the same people/structures/procedures it can be done faster : For instance the DFS in Germany integrated their military controllers into the civil structure in roughly one year , but the civil strucure already existed and the prime body was civil and only about 15% military were to be integrated.
But I do not think that is the aim.
In Brazil the whole en-route ATC is military and I understand that no civil entity (e.g Airports ) has en-route ATC experience, which is quite a different business.
What is happening in Argentina , who has pledge to do the same would be interesting to watch.
ATC Watcher, how long do you reckon, off the top of your hat and, that it might take to reorganise/integrate ATC in Brazil? Assuming that financial and administrative control were to pass from 100% airforce to a civilian organisation (but probably govt owned as are the airports). When and if you reply, consider whether it might not be worthwhile starting a separate thread.
Of course if one wants to change the names and the uniforms and keep the same people/structures/procedures it can be done faster : For instance the DFS in Germany integrated their military controllers into the civil structure in roughly one year , but the civil strucure already existed and the prime body was civil and only about 15% military were to be integrated.
But I do not think that is the aim.
In Brazil the whole en-route ATC is military and I understand that no civil entity (e.g Airports ) has en-route ATC experience, which is quite a different business.
What is happening in Argentina , who has pledge to do the same would be interesting to watch.
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but thinking about 7600 on the transponder MIGHT, key word MIGHT, have made the legacy pilots look at the transponder and see if there was a reply light illuminating at regular intervals.
Airliner transponders don't have a reply light. (Not the ones that I fly)
Can anyone confirm whether or not the Legacy would have a reply light on their transponder?
Airliner transponders don't have a reply light. (Not the ones that I fly)
Can anyone confirm whether or not the Legacy would have a reply light on their transponder?
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Reply Lights
Reply lights were eliminated in the design of Mode S, in about 1987.
Regarding the old ATCRBS transponders, the lack of a reply light is not the best in human factors to draw attention.
GB
Regarding the old ATCRBS transponders, the lack of a reply light is not the best in human factors to draw attention.
GB
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but thinking about 7600 on the transponder MIGHT, key word MIGHT, have made the legacy pilots look at the transponder and see if there was a reply light illuminating at regular intervals.
Airliner transponders don't have a reply light. (Not the ones that I fly)
Can anyone confirm whether or not the Legacy would have a reply light on their transponder?
Airliner transponders don't have a reply light. (Not the ones that I fly)
Can anyone confirm whether or not the Legacy would have a reply light on their transponder?
7. The Embraer Legacy cockpit can be a dangerous trap for pilots. The Legacy with its Honeywell custom-built avionics panel can be a hazard in the air. To inadvertently switch off the safety-essential transponder (or to put it on stand-by) in this aircraft is very easy. This, despite the fact that doing so in any aircraft in flight is a most unlikely and an exceptional
event. There may be moments where there is a wrong altitude indication (Mode C), requiring a de-activation of certain parts of the transponder (altitude for instance), but to de-activate it completely, or to put it on stand-by (switch it off and let it heat up) is not at all common practice. Incredibly IFATCA has learned that with one accidental or wrong touch of a button on the panel, a pilot can actually inhibit all transponder transmissions in a Legacy cockpit! This would mean it is possible, even probable, that pilots (in particular pilots that are not very experienced Legacy pilots) could accidentally switch off the transponder in flight, not “on purpose”, but accidentally. This vital piece of equipment that permits aircraft to be “seen” by ATC, and which forms the basis of anti-collision systems such as TCAS (a last-ditch anticollision system) could be rendered completely useless by an accidental and involuntary action.
event. There may be moments where there is a wrong altitude indication (Mode C), requiring a de-activation of certain parts of the transponder (altitude for instance), but to de-activate it completely, or to put it on stand-by (switch it off and let it heat up) is not at all common practice. Incredibly IFATCA has learned that with one accidental or wrong touch of a button on the panel, a pilot can actually inhibit all transponder transmissions in a Legacy cockpit! This would mean it is possible, even probable, that pilots (in particular pilots that are not very experienced Legacy pilots) could accidentally switch off the transponder in flight, not “on purpose”, but accidentally. This vital piece of equipment that permits aircraft to be “seen” by ATC, and which forms the basis of anti-collision systems such as TCAS (a last-ditch anticollision system) could be rendered completely useless by an accidental and involuntary action.
What is even worse is that the indications on the panels after an accidental transponder (and TCAS) switch-off are not very prominent and cannot be clearly seen by the pilots. Examples are:
- TCAS OFF is written in small white letters on the Primary Flight Display (PFD), and not in red warning colours!
- a similar white message is put on the Navigation display (very small)
- on the transponder display where the 4 numbers are set, a small yellow message appears saying STAND BY
- the TCAS needle, displaying vertical escape movements to the crew when a TCAS Resolution Advisory is triggered, remains green despite the fact that the equipment is turned off and not functioning (in aviation green means on and functioning!!) "
Source: http://www.ifatca.org/press/251106.pdf
- a similar white message is put on the Navigation display (very small)
- on the transponder display where the 4 numbers are set, a small yellow message appears saying STAND BY
- the TCAS needle, displaying vertical escape movements to the crew when a TCAS Resolution Advisory is triggered, remains green despite the fact that the equipment is turned off and not functioning (in aviation green means on and functioning!!) "
Source: http://www.ifatca.org/press/251106.pdf
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Where's the point?
If a conventional transponders is accidentally turned to standby on the single turn of a button there is no sign at all but "TCAS off" somewhere.
ATC taking up the mike and saying "recycle transponder" is the usual thing to follow.
Where's the point?
If a conventional transponders is accidentally turned to standby on the single turn of a button there is no sign at all but "TCAS off" somewhere.
ATC taking up the mike and saying "recycle transponder" is the usual thing to follow.
Where's the point?
The point seems to be the xpdr went to standby and the ATC radar displays showed that, but nobody in ATC caught the obscure symbology and let the Legacy pilots know that their xpdr was not replying
According to the pilots' interview, they were hearing ATC talking to everybody else in Portugese; so, had no reason to suspect ATC had a problem with them.
According to the pilots' interview, they were hearing ATC talking to everybody else in Portugese; so, had no reason to suspect ATC had a problem with them.
Last edited by RatherBeFlying; 23rd Dec 2006 at 01:23. Reason: more info
Thanks for your thoughts. Any decision in Brazil regarding a changeover from military to civil control is likely to take a very long time. Unless of course the process is accelerated politically in reaction to the present chaos.
Current Brazilian air traffic difficulties pale in comparison to those in the UK and US. But at least ATC in England and Colorado can point out the window at the fog and snow.
Here there have been a few instances this week of closing CGH due to wind and rain but nothing to justify the countrywide delays of over 40% of flights - yesterday it was 44% not counting cancellations. Queues this morning reported at over 1km.
ANAC have blamed the weather. FAB are blaming TAM who apparently had six of their fleet go tech yesterday. Unimaginable confusion. In Brasilia, politicians enter and leave the boarding lounges via side doors so they don't have to face the public; congressmen have had the audacity to request the airforce for transport home for Christmas so they can avoid the delays.
Current Brazilian air traffic difficulties pale in comparison to those in the UK and US. But at least ATC in England and Colorado can point out the window at the fog and snow.
Here there have been a few instances this week of closing CGH due to wind and rain but nothing to justify the countrywide delays of over 40% of flights - yesterday it was 44% not counting cancellations. Queues this morning reported at over 1km.
ANAC have blamed the weather. FAB are blaming TAM who apparently had six of their fleet go tech yesterday. Unimaginable confusion. In Brasilia, politicians enter and leave the boarding lounges via side doors so they don't have to face the public; congressmen have had the audacity to request the airforce for transport home for Christmas so they can avoid the delays.
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Hi,
I read quite a lot of this this tread (ok, I admit not everything), and I'm missing some important facts...
In RVSM airspace, every aircraft that has a failure of one of its mandatory RSVM equipments, has to be considered as a NON-RVSM aircraft.
The transponder is without any doubt a mandatory equipment, so the Legacy should have been treated as a non-RVSM aircraft in RSVM airspace.
This means that the vertical separation with all other aircraft has to be 2000ft (!) and not 1000 like if it was RVSM approved.
Consequently the controller should have taken every action to assure a 2000ft separation with the GOL. So in any case (Legacy at FL360 or FL370), the GOL should have been cleared to FL390 or FL330 (FL350 in case the controller supposed the Legacy at FL370, which was not the case)!
Could this not be a big lack of training in Brazilian ATC, since the controller did not even seem to be aware of this?
In case it is, I want just to be clear that the responsability for training is not the worker, but the boss!
And a more general question..
Overhead the ocean the airspace is not RVSM because there is no Radar coverage and bad radio transmission. And in the same way that every aircraft need special equipment to enter RVSM airpace, every center also needs special equipment to operate as RVSM airspace.
So how is it possible, that the Amazon region, that was well known to have problems with the radar coverage, can be approved nationally and internationally (by ICAO) to operate as RVSM airspace?
And in case it was not known, why was operation as RVSM not immediately stopped after this fact got clear???
I read quite a lot of this this tread (ok, I admit not everything), and I'm missing some important facts...
In RVSM airspace, every aircraft that has a failure of one of its mandatory RSVM equipments, has to be considered as a NON-RVSM aircraft.
The transponder is without any doubt a mandatory equipment, so the Legacy should have been treated as a non-RVSM aircraft in RSVM airspace.
This means that the vertical separation with all other aircraft has to be 2000ft (!) and not 1000 like if it was RVSM approved.
Consequently the controller should have taken every action to assure a 2000ft separation with the GOL. So in any case (Legacy at FL360 or FL370), the GOL should have been cleared to FL390 or FL330 (FL350 in case the controller supposed the Legacy at FL370, which was not the case)!
Could this not be a big lack of training in Brazilian ATC, since the controller did not even seem to be aware of this?
In case it is, I want just to be clear that the responsability for training is not the worker, but the boss!
And a more general question..
Overhead the ocean the airspace is not RVSM because there is no Radar coverage and bad radio transmission. And in the same way that every aircraft need special equipment to enter RVSM airpace, every center also needs special equipment to operate as RVSM airspace.
So how is it possible, that the Amazon region, that was well known to have problems with the radar coverage, can be approved nationally and internationally (by ICAO) to operate as RVSM airspace?
And in case it was not known, why was operation as RVSM not immediately stopped after this fact got clear???
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In Argentina air traffic controllers are civilians, but they operate under the management of Air Force.
This year, the Argentine Government decided to retire to the Air Force this competence over the air traffic.
It was required to ICAO to assist in preparing the transference of competence, missions and functions of civil aviation.
In Argentina, since 2003, there is a system interconecting 6 radars, 5 in Argentina and 1 in Uruguay (Carrasco). The system has been provided by Lockheed Martin, Rhode & Schwarz and Frequentis. The system is able to follow an airplane entering Argentina from the North bound. This system, named Skyline, processes the information received from the 6 radars and integrates it in a platform.
This year, the Argentine Government decided to retire to the Air Force this competence over the air traffic.
It was required to ICAO to assist in preparing the transference of competence, missions and functions of civil aviation.
In Argentina, since 2003, there is a system interconecting 6 radars, 5 in Argentina and 1 in Uruguay (Carrasco). The system has been provided by Lockheed Martin, Rhode & Schwarz and Frequentis. The system is able to follow an airplane entering Argentina from the North bound. This system, named Skyline, processes the information received from the 6 radars and integrates it in a platform.