AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
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SAS quite possibly your last post is the most clear, common sense, obvious and safe statement on this thread. Well done Sir!
I disagree simply because in the real world it would result in scud running in marginal conditions, which is precisely why many other accidents have occurred. Take, for example, the poor safety record of the EMS role in USA....
I disagree simply because in the real world it would result in scud running in marginal conditions, which is precisely why many other accidents have occurred. Take, for example, the poor safety record of the EMS role in USA....
Shy,
What part of "Maintain VMC" did you not understand?
In my Country....One must have an ATC Clearance to operate IMC in Controlled Airspace.
We are also required to maintain a listening watch (and respond if called) to the assigned ATC Frequency issued in the IFR Clearance as well as making required Reports to ATC.
We do not do IMC in Controlled Airspace without both an ATC Clearance and the Ability to talk to ATC itself.
There is very little Uncontrolled Airspace in this Country during IFR Weather Conditions.
I refer you to our FAA FAR Part 91 and Airman's Information Manual (AIM).
You can even take a gander at our Terminal Enroute Procedures (TERPS) if you are interested.
Please do not confuse the way you do things in the UK to anywhere else in the World. The UK is but a very small place and far too often has a unique way of doing things.
What part of "Maintain VMC" did you not understand?
In my Country....One must have an ATC Clearance to operate IMC in Controlled Airspace.
We are also required to maintain a listening watch (and respond if called) to the assigned ATC Frequency issued in the IFR Clearance as well as making required Reports to ATC.
We do not do IMC in Controlled Airspace without both an ATC Clearance and the Ability to talk to ATC itself.
There is very little Uncontrolled Airspace in this Country during IFR Weather Conditions.
I refer you to our FAA FAR Part 91 and Airman's Information Manual (AIM).
You can even take a gander at our Terminal Enroute Procedures (TERPS) if you are interested.
Please do not confuse the way you do things in the UK to anywhere else in the World. The UK is but a very small place and far too often has a unique way of doing things.
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SASLess - your post above sounds close to the definition of Performance Class 2 to me - the bit where you start off as Performance Class 3 with a minimum cloudbase of 600 feet and minimum visibility of 800 m. Somehow that seems to have been forgotten along the way. What's the point of us teaching this stuff if it gets ignored anyway? 
Phil
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Shy, I presume you approve of punching into cloud from a near hover, climbing out on an un surveyed flight path, effectively blind and deaf to any other traffic you could be climbing into.
Scud running is not possible if you adhere to the VFR minima and minimum height rules as clearly as the are prescribed. Bending those rules and convincing oneself that what we are doing is acceptable just erodes those safety margins designed to reduce the risks.
What possible degree of urgency on a private flight warrants such risks?
Scud running is not possible if you adhere to the VFR minima and minimum height rules as clearly as the are prescribed. Bending those rules and convincing oneself that what we are doing is acceptable just erodes those safety margins designed to reduce the risks.
What possible degree of urgency on a private flight warrants such risks?
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SASless, firstly, I see you have lost none of your charm; really no need to become aggressive.
I understand every bit of the term VMC, perhaps you are forgetting that it is my everyday job to know the difference, even though I operate a SPIFR machine in precisely the same role that G-LBAL was operated.
We are on a thread discussing an accident that took place in UK, outside controlled airspace, without ATC cover.
But disregarding that for one moment, please explain how you think that having ATC cover and an IFR clearance would have prevented this accident.
What is needed is a clear set weather limits pertaining to non PT, private site operations. The rules haven't been made "clear enough" in the past; as you might recall, there has been much discussion on this forum before about what weather limits do actually apply to this type of operation.
However, rules and regulations make absolutely no difference if a pilot (or both pilots, as in this particular situation) puts himself in a situation beyond his capabilities. Once away from the controlled airfield environment, it remains the sole responsibility of the captain to comply because any rule is otherwise unenforceable. Attempting to depart or land a helicopter in extremely poor visibility often simply doesn't work for the average pilot, especially if he hasn't been trained in that respect.
I understand every bit of the term VMC, perhaps you are forgetting that it is my everyday job to know the difference, even though I operate a SPIFR machine in precisely the same role that G-LBAL was operated.
We are on a thread discussing an accident that took place in UK, outside controlled airspace, without ATC cover.
But disregarding that for one moment, please explain how you think that having ATC cover and an IFR clearance would have prevented this accident.
What is needed is a clear set weather limits pertaining to non PT, private site operations. The rules haven't been made "clear enough" in the past; as you might recall, there has been much discussion on this forum before about what weather limits do actually apply to this type of operation.
However, rules and regulations make absolutely no difference if a pilot (or both pilots, as in this particular situation) puts himself in a situation beyond his capabilities. Once away from the controlled airfield environment, it remains the sole responsibility of the captain to comply because any rule is otherwise unenforceable. Attempting to depart or land a helicopter in extremely poor visibility often simply doesn't work for the average pilot, especially if he hasn't been trained in that respect.
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DB,
No sir, I do not!
I refer you back to my previous post. I've highlighted the relevant part:
By the term "takeoff area is clear" I mean just that; i.e. you have determined yourself, on the day, that it is clear! If you are about to pick up pax and depart from a private site, by definition, you will have already flown in and are able to assess the best departure path.
Would you prefer instead "Scud running", i.e. where a pilot departs under low cloud and flies just clear of it whilst trying to maintain the 500 ft and 1,000ft rules for long distances? In these days of a huge increase in the numbers of very tall obstructions, springing up everywhere (many wind turbines are just below 500 feet in height)? I have tried both and I don't! Ideally, I get above MSA asap.
VFR traffic operating under cloud below 1,000 feet becomes "letterboxed in", in that it cannot climb because of low cloud above.
By doing so, you are likely to meet an obstruction or someone else doing a similar low level "VFR" transit, possibly with no transponder, or at best, with Mode A only. In marginal conditions, all VFR only traffic will be operating in the same shallow piece of airspace. At low level (below 1,000 feet), it's quite possible that neither of you have practical ATC coverage, certainly not under a radar service.
Unfortunately, much of the corporate role involves flying under IFR in Class G, often for part of it without good ATC radar coverage (because it simply isn't available, or is limited for ATC reasons, of which these days there are many). But at least IFR equipped aircraft are mandated to have Mode C which can be picked up by TCAS, and VFR only traffic won't be up there in IMC.
Shy, I presume you approve of punching into cloud from a near hover, climbing out on an un surveyed flight path, effectively blind and deaf to any other traffic you could be climbing into.
I refer you back to my previous post. I've highlighted the relevant part:
What is needed is sufficient forward visibility and sufficiently high cloudbase for a safe transition to a climb clear of obstacles to be made, followed by a safe transfer onto instruments whilst climbing to MSA for the IFR/IMC transit. Provided the takeoff area is clear, with sufficient visual cues for a safe initial departure, it matters not that the aircraft isn't actually at an airport.
Would you prefer instead "Scud running", i.e. where a pilot departs under low cloud and flies just clear of it whilst trying to maintain the 500 ft and 1,000ft rules for long distances? In these days of a huge increase in the numbers of very tall obstructions, springing up everywhere (many wind turbines are just below 500 feet in height)? I have tried both and I don't! Ideally, I get above MSA asap.
VFR traffic operating under cloud below 1,000 feet becomes "letterboxed in", in that it cannot climb because of low cloud above.
By doing so, you are likely to meet an obstruction or someone else doing a similar low level "VFR" transit, possibly with no transponder, or at best, with Mode A only. In marginal conditions, all VFR only traffic will be operating in the same shallow piece of airspace. At low level (below 1,000 feet), it's quite possible that neither of you have practical ATC coverage, certainly not under a radar service.
Unfortunately, much of the corporate role involves flying under IFR in Class G, often for part of it without good ATC radar coverage (because it simply isn't available, or is limited for ATC reasons, of which these days there are many). But at least IFR equipped aircraft are mandated to have Mode C which can be picked up by TCAS, and VFR only traffic won't be up there in IMC.
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There was a King Air crash near Stapleford the other week. That aircraft also launched into poor weather and the jury is still out regarding cause.
We all know the risks involved punching into IMC, regardless of ground obstacle issues. I'll speculate that had GLBAL launched into the same conditions but trying to follow a specified IFR departure profile (i.e. SID), the outcome may well have been the same.
As previously said, they didn't break the (European) law and the aircraft they were operating was quite capable of a zero-vis departure. This argument is actually about decision making (TEM) and handling skills.
PS, like Shy, I spend much of my life SP IFR aerial work (albeit fixed wing) and in this environment you've got to be on your game because there is little else to protect you.
We all know the risks involved punching into IMC, regardless of ground obstacle issues. I'll speculate that had GLBAL launched into the same conditions but trying to follow a specified IFR departure profile (i.e. SID), the outcome may well have been the same.
As previously said, they didn't break the (European) law and the aircraft they were operating was quite capable of a zero-vis departure. This argument is actually about decision making (TEM) and handling skills.
PS, like Shy, I spend much of my life SP IFR aerial work (albeit fixed wing) and in this environment you've got to be on your game because there is little else to protect you.
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As previously said, they didn't break the (European) law and the aircraft they were operating was quite capable of a zero-vis departure. This argument is actually about decision making (TEM) and handling skills.
These days, in this role, my discretion is more averse to taking undue risks because the only lives on the line are in, and around, my aircraft.
Shy,
You worried about "Scud Running" which is not "Maintain VMC".
This whole tragedy is not about Rules, Regulations, following Profiles, or requirements of RFM's, the AIP, or Who buys the first Round.
It is about a Crew's Decision to depart in the Dark from an unimproved site, in exceedingly poor weather and impacting the ground killing themselves and others.
Aviation has proved it cannot Legislate Pilot Judgement.
Your comment about my simple post shows that to be true even here at Rotorheads.
The thought of operating IMC at Night in Uncontrolled Airspace without any way to ensure Traffic Separation, talking to no ATC Facility, making a departure from a pasture in the dark with no surface lighting or means to see obstacles due to a dense fog......well I just see the totality of circumstances surrounding all that to be something that just defies much mitigation.
I guess i got to be old and cranky by refusing to take on such endeavors no matter how much the Boss Fellah wanted to get somewhere.
When you wanted to start throwing out comments about Scud Running and the like.....then you should very well know you are going to get a response. If you don't care for the ones you get that is something you will have to grapple with yourself.
We do things a bit differently here in the USA than you do in the UK.
That was settled a long time ago.
Accept that not everyone agrees with you on everything and you will not have to suffer so.
You worried about "Scud Running" which is not "Maintain VMC".
This whole tragedy is not about Rules, Regulations, following Profiles, or requirements of RFM's, the AIP, or Who buys the first Round.
It is about a Crew's Decision to depart in the Dark from an unimproved site, in exceedingly poor weather and impacting the ground killing themselves and others.
Aviation has proved it cannot Legislate Pilot Judgement.
Your comment about my simple post shows that to be true even here at Rotorheads.
The thought of operating IMC at Night in Uncontrolled Airspace without any way to ensure Traffic Separation, talking to no ATC Facility, making a departure from a pasture in the dark with no surface lighting or means to see obstacles due to a dense fog......well I just see the totality of circumstances surrounding all that to be something that just defies much mitigation.
I guess i got to be old and cranky by refusing to take on such endeavors no matter how much the Boss Fellah wanted to get somewhere.
When you wanted to start throwing out comments about Scud Running and the like.....then you should very well know you are going to get a response. If you don't care for the ones you get that is something you will have to grapple with yourself.
We do things a bit differently here in the USA than you do in the UK.
That was settled a long time ago.
Accept that not everyone agrees with you on everything and you will not have to suffer so.
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SASless, I sometimes wonder if you actually read other contributor's posts before launching your ship..
Look again at my post at #719, last paragraph. In your last post you are restating almost exactly what I said, yet arguing against me as if I'd said something completely different and as if I have no regard for my personal safety. We both agree on the cause of this tragic accident; I've stated my view more than once here, i.e. that it had little to do with rules and regulations. The only way this accident could have been prevented was for the aircraft to stay on the ground. I would not personally have attempted this flight in those met. conditions; there have been quite a number of occasions where I have refused to depart in a similar situation.
Btw, I'm not "suffering". I've been doing the job for far too long. If you want to stay alive in UK, and keep your licence intact, you do not try to maintain VFR when you should be IFR, or keeping the aircraft on the ground.
Look again at my post at #719, last paragraph. In your last post you are restating almost exactly what I said, yet arguing against me as if I'd said something completely different and as if I have no regard for my personal safety. We both agree on the cause of this tragic accident; I've stated my view more than once here, i.e. that it had little to do with rules and regulations. The only way this accident could have been prevented was for the aircraft to stay on the ground. I would not personally have attempted this flight in those met. conditions; there have been quite a number of occasions where I have refused to depart in a similar situation.
Btw, I'm not "suffering". I've been doing the job for far too long. If you want to stay alive in UK, and keep your licence intact, you do not try to maintain VFR when you should be IFR, or keeping the aircraft on the ground.
Originally Posted by Double Boogey
Are you saying on this particular occasion what they did was safe but just poorly executed or were the conditions inherently unsafe?
Any competent and current IF pilot would have been able to get the take-off right. As we know from the CVR, the pilots were (despite having current IF ratings on paper) neither competent nor confident to do the required IF take-off profile. Instead they behaved like a low time PPL who when inadvertently entering IMC still relies on limited visual clues and doesn't trust his/her instruments.
This one is not about the difficulty of standing up to your boss refusing to do a specific flight that is not safe. This one is about pilots who should not have taken the job in the first place.
Shy....VFR and VMC are too different things just as IMC and IFR are as well.
For sure mixing VFR and IMC together is a recipe for disaster.
For sure mixing VFR and IMC together is a recipe for disaster.
I can't believe Shy is getting so much stick when he is the one talking total sense !! Some of the stuff about ATC and going VFR until you get to an airport are just nonsense and if you operated like that here you would firstly lose your licence ( for scud running ) and also lose your customers!!! There
are so many parts of UK with no ATC and no low level radio . If you have surveyed the site , which you will have done during your landing , it is unrealistic to say you cannot take off with enough viz to transition into a climb VFR .
I always thought our rules in UK were over demanding but you Yanks take it to another level if you really cannot lift into IFR outside a control zone without ATC !!!
are so many parts of UK with no ATC and no low level radio . If you have surveyed the site , which you will have done during your landing , it is unrealistic to say you cannot take off with enough viz to transition into a climb VFR .
I always thought our rules in UK were over demanding but you Yanks take it to another level if you really cannot lift into IFR outside a control zone without ATC !!!
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DB
Just catching up I'm afraid! You ask if I think the conditions were unsafe or just poorly executed. I suspect the conditions were pretty much as safe as they are for a dark rig departure with no visual references - when, as has been discussed before, the crew climb vertically on instruments before pitching down to generate translation lift to achieve VMini and climb away. G-LBAL's crew poorly executed their departure because they did not have the skills to do it I'm afraid, as Hot and Hi says. It is challenging mind you, and they should ever have attempted it.
I'm amazed you agree with SAS - I'm afraid on this issue he just has no idea of the reality of IMC flying - safely - in the UK. The notion of needing to be VMC until getting an IFR clearance from ATC is farcical - barely any IMC heli operations would take place if so and it is total overkill of caution. SAS - most airspace in the UK is uncontrolled at low level and radar coverage is often not available. I guess traffic density may be far less than in the US though.
It seems even amongst the many quite knowledgable posters here there is no clear agreement what the rules regarding private site VMC to IMC departures are - or should be. Shy has by far the most realistic understanding of practical IMC corporate flying - though I disagree that what is required is a clear set of regulations for private site operations.
Many of us in corporate IFR ops often depart into IMC conditions, particularly in winter. By far the best way of doing so is to achieve VMini+ in VMC then climb into IMC on instruments at VMini+ to MSA. What the cloud base and visibility needs to be to achieve this depends on so many things though. Local obstructions obviously, but particularly also aircraft performance. A heavy AS355F or EC155 will need a lot more distance to achieve Vmini than a light A109. Is the acceleration in ground effect or out, as above scattered trees for example? All of this means that in one case a 200ft cloud base with 300m vis will be fine, and in others 500ft and 600m will be required. And then there is the issue that there is no measure of cloud base or visibility at private sites.
And once on instruments and climbing, the idea of it being hazardous because of no ATC does not make sense - given that any other IFR traffic should be at least 1000ft above, the only other traffic might be other acft similarly climbing out. And the chances of that are virtually nil - unless multiple ops, which would be known.
All of the above means that the key thing required is not more rules but intelligent judgement of the conditions and circumstances. This is the extra challenge of this type of helicopter flying, and it may well be that more qualification of pilots seeking to perform this sort of flying, from aptitude, training, competence and frequency, is required.
Just catching up I'm afraid! You ask if I think the conditions were unsafe or just poorly executed. I suspect the conditions were pretty much as safe as they are for a dark rig departure with no visual references - when, as has been discussed before, the crew climb vertically on instruments before pitching down to generate translation lift to achieve VMini and climb away. G-LBAL's crew poorly executed their departure because they did not have the skills to do it I'm afraid, as Hot and Hi says. It is challenging mind you, and they should ever have attempted it.
I'm amazed you agree with SAS - I'm afraid on this issue he just has no idea of the reality of IMC flying - safely - in the UK. The notion of needing to be VMC until getting an IFR clearance from ATC is farcical - barely any IMC heli operations would take place if so and it is total overkill of caution. SAS - most airspace in the UK is uncontrolled at low level and radar coverage is often not available. I guess traffic density may be far less than in the US though.
It seems even amongst the many quite knowledgable posters here there is no clear agreement what the rules regarding private site VMC to IMC departures are - or should be. Shy has by far the most realistic understanding of practical IMC corporate flying - though I disagree that what is required is a clear set of regulations for private site operations.
Many of us in corporate IFR ops often depart into IMC conditions, particularly in winter. By far the best way of doing so is to achieve VMini+ in VMC then climb into IMC on instruments at VMini+ to MSA. What the cloud base and visibility needs to be to achieve this depends on so many things though. Local obstructions obviously, but particularly also aircraft performance. A heavy AS355F or EC155 will need a lot more distance to achieve Vmini than a light A109. Is the acceleration in ground effect or out, as above scattered trees for example? All of this means that in one case a 200ft cloud base with 300m vis will be fine, and in others 500ft and 600m will be required. And then there is the issue that there is no measure of cloud base or visibility at private sites.
And once on instruments and climbing, the idea of it being hazardous because of no ATC does not make sense - given that any other IFR traffic should be at least 1000ft above, the only other traffic might be other acft similarly climbing out. And the chances of that are virtually nil - unless multiple ops, which would be known.
All of the above means that the key thing required is not more rules but intelligent judgement of the conditions and circumstances. This is the extra challenge of this type of helicopter flying, and it may well be that more qualification of pilots seeking to perform this sort of flying, from aptitude, training, competence and frequency, is required.
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ROTORSPEED thanks for the detail and the time you took to explain the rational. I see you recognise that the demands of the immediate environment often drive the sensible minima to achieve a safe departure.
I think what SAS, and to a degree myself, are saying is that when deciding what minima is acceptable, is left totally up to the pilot, only his skill and experience will dictate if the departure is or is not safe to complete.
If this were the case at an aerodrome amongst commercial operations total chaos would ensue.
Defining minima must come first. Thereafter, experience and training requirements can be defined to minimise risks when operating at that minima.
I have a great deal of respect for Corporate pilots having never done it myself. But I can imagine being required to go somewhere unfamiliar with minimum notice must be tough compared to Offshore for example, where for the most part, at least one pilot is fully familiar with the route etc.
I have always believed that reading the RofA at face value will provide a sensible pragmatic minima and height requirements that would naturally drive the experience and training requirements to make for a safe operating protocol.
I still cannot accept that climbing vertically and rotating to Vmin in fog, over an adhoc field site, is at all sensible and IS inherently unsafe. The perception that this is "necessary" to get the job done is just that....a perception. You guys hold the keys to your own destiny. Do you want a sensible safe margin or are you prepared to push the limits until very little or no margin for error is left.
Even in HEMS/SAR there is a great paradox when life is in danger! The more critical the patient, the lesser their chances of survival! How much risk is warranted to the crew in this case? Somewhere the line has to be drawn to prevent perception of urgency from eroding the very necessary safety breaks in place. Safety breaks which are the fundamental bedrock of aviating.
I feel blaming the crews actions/training etc is too one dimensional especially when it supports the continuance of departures in similar conditions by those of us who believe we could have done a better job.
If that night, sufficient external visual cues were present to achieve safe height/speed combination before IMC, there is a more than strong chance this accident would not have occurred.
Finally, I have spent a fair bit of time IMC, out of radio comms, beyond or below radar range. It's not very comfortable and does not feel safe especially with 19 pax down the back. Just because it happens does not make it OK.
Just my two bobs worth
I think what SAS, and to a degree myself, are saying is that when deciding what minima is acceptable, is left totally up to the pilot, only his skill and experience will dictate if the departure is or is not safe to complete.
If this were the case at an aerodrome amongst commercial operations total chaos would ensue.
Defining minima must come first. Thereafter, experience and training requirements can be defined to minimise risks when operating at that minima.
I have a great deal of respect for Corporate pilots having never done it myself. But I can imagine being required to go somewhere unfamiliar with minimum notice must be tough compared to Offshore for example, where for the most part, at least one pilot is fully familiar with the route etc.
I have always believed that reading the RofA at face value will provide a sensible pragmatic minima and height requirements that would naturally drive the experience and training requirements to make for a safe operating protocol.
I still cannot accept that climbing vertically and rotating to Vmin in fog, over an adhoc field site, is at all sensible and IS inherently unsafe. The perception that this is "necessary" to get the job done is just that....a perception. You guys hold the keys to your own destiny. Do you want a sensible safe margin or are you prepared to push the limits until very little or no margin for error is left.
Even in HEMS/SAR there is a great paradox when life is in danger! The more critical the patient, the lesser their chances of survival! How much risk is warranted to the crew in this case? Somewhere the line has to be drawn to prevent perception of urgency from eroding the very necessary safety breaks in place. Safety breaks which are the fundamental bedrock of aviating.
I feel blaming the crews actions/training etc is too one dimensional especially when it supports the continuance of departures in similar conditions by those of us who believe we could have done a better job.
If that night, sufficient external visual cues were present to achieve safe height/speed combination before IMC, there is a more than strong chance this accident would not have occurred.
Finally, I have spent a fair bit of time IMC, out of radio comms, beyond or below radar range. It's not very comfortable and does not feel safe especially with 19 pax down the back. Just because it happens does not make it OK.
Just my two bobs worth
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I think what SAS, and to a degree myself, are saying is that when deciding what minima is acceptable, is left totally up to the pilot, only his skill and experience will dictate if the departure is or is not safe to complete.
Nigel,
I have flown in the UK and am familiar with the situation there.
I also qualified my views after the initial post so there was (or should have been) no confusion I based my comment upon the way we operate in the USA.
Our Rules are different than the UK which I also pointed out by referencing the FAR's, AIM, and TERPS.
The original Maintain VMC and a height sufficient to clear all obstacles (here it is within four miles of Track) and contact ATC Post is based upon the fact that we have very little Uncontrolled Airspace during IFR Operations resulting from IMC Weather being present.
Yes, the UK and USA are very different in the application of Controlled and Un-Controlled Airspace thus it is not an Apples to Apples comparison.
However, the decision making process is the same no matter where you operate.
If you elect to use a takeoff profile that requires Visual Reference until a specified set of Minima (IAS and Height Above Ground) then my insistence upon maintaining VMC applies. One aspect is a requirement for a Minimum Airspeed before engaging the AutoPilot System to fly the machine which is a consideration for the 139 unless I am mistaken.
If as some suggest the Take Off is done without using Outside References then there is no need for VMC to be maintained but you would still have to maintain clearance from all obstacles in your Take Off Path. How one does a "Vertical Take Off without Visual References" and still comply with the few Rules imposed upon you by the Authority is the trick to be accomplished.
How does one do that in the UK in a AW-139?
I have flown in the UK and am familiar with the situation there.
I also qualified my views after the initial post so there was (or should have been) no confusion I based my comment upon the way we operate in the USA.
Our Rules are different than the UK which I also pointed out by referencing the FAR's, AIM, and TERPS.
The original Maintain VMC and a height sufficient to clear all obstacles (here it is within four miles of Track) and contact ATC Post is based upon the fact that we have very little Uncontrolled Airspace during IFR Operations resulting from IMC Weather being present.
Yes, the UK and USA are very different in the application of Controlled and Un-Controlled Airspace thus it is not an Apples to Apples comparison.
However, the decision making process is the same no matter where you operate.
If you elect to use a takeoff profile that requires Visual Reference until a specified set of Minima (IAS and Height Above Ground) then my insistence upon maintaining VMC applies. One aspect is a requirement for a Minimum Airspeed before engaging the AutoPilot System to fly the machine which is a consideration for the 139 unless I am mistaken.
If as some suggest the Take Off is done without using Outside References then there is no need for VMC to be maintained but you would still have to maintain clearance from all obstacles in your Take Off Path. How one does a "Vertical Take Off without Visual References" and still comply with the few Rules imposed upon you by the Authority is the trick to be accomplished.
How does one do that in the UK in a AW-139?
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Some sensible comments here from DB and Shy.
But Shy, what sort of actual weather minima might you suggest for VMC to IMC departures for private ops? I think there is a danger that some might think it's safe to depart if the weather is within the regulation limits - when it may not be. And if they are too conservative, with no evidence of what the weather actually is, the reality is they will probably be breached in circumstances when it's perfectly safe to do so.
But is this problem really big enough to warrant yet another regulation? How many helo ops are relevant? In the US it's all ATC cleared IFR departures, France doesn't have any corporate ops, in Germany they all take off from airfields, in Oz the weather is always sunny and in Italy..... 😉 So it's mainly UK - with how many IFR twin corporate flying? 100 aircraft? And how many such departure accidents have there been? Accidents on approach or transit in poor weather, yes. But even then the reasons need careful analysis. I really think emphasis should be on training, practice and safety discussion to promote safer flying. And I bet Pprune actually plays a useful role here too!
But Shy, what sort of actual weather minima might you suggest for VMC to IMC departures for private ops? I think there is a danger that some might think it's safe to depart if the weather is within the regulation limits - when it may not be. And if they are too conservative, with no evidence of what the weather actually is, the reality is they will probably be breached in circumstances when it's perfectly safe to do so.
But is this problem really big enough to warrant yet another regulation? How many helo ops are relevant? In the US it's all ATC cleared IFR departures, France doesn't have any corporate ops, in Germany they all take off from airfields, in Oz the weather is always sunny and in Italy..... 😉 So it's mainly UK - with how many IFR twin corporate flying? 100 aircraft? And how many such departure accidents have there been? Accidents on approach or transit in poor weather, yes. But even then the reasons need careful analysis. I really think emphasis should be on training, practice and safety discussion to promote safer flying. And I bet Pprune actually plays a useful role here too!
Solid commonsense approach to the problem it sounds like Rotorspeed.
Judgement, Training, Experience, and Currency are the keys....more words on paper alone is not the answer.
PHI lost an S-76 EMS machine a few Years back in very much the same manner as this 139 Accident and they were at an Airport when it happened (as I seem to recall).
Did not ORNGE in Canada lose a 76 as well to similar issues?
It is not just the UK or just the Corporate Sector where theses things happen.
Perhaps the UK Corporate helicopter folks need to take a hard look at how they do things but perhaps an over all review of the System itself needs looking at too.
Did not the UK Offshore Helicopter Industry not take a look at itself in the Recent Past and decide it needed to make some improvements?
Judgement, Training, Experience, and Currency are the keys....more words on paper alone is not the answer.
PHI lost an S-76 EMS machine a few Years back in very much the same manner as this 139 Accident and they were at an Airport when it happened (as I seem to recall).
Did not ORNGE in Canada lose a 76 as well to similar issues?
It is not just the UK or just the Corporate Sector where theses things happen.
Perhaps the UK Corporate helicopter folks need to take a hard look at how they do things but perhaps an over all review of the System itself needs looking at too.
Did not the UK Offshore Helicopter Industry not take a look at itself in the Recent Past and decide it needed to make some improvements?