AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
Crab and SND.....Exactly!
I just started a Thread about In-Cockpit Video Cameras.....imagine if there had been such a set up while this tragedy happened and we had both Video and Audio.
We would know far more about what happened than we do now.
AAIB only gives us a Narrative and not an account that would have as much impact (sorry...poor choice of wording I know) as some Reality Television.
Would that kind of information be more effective than what we get now?
I just started a Thread about In-Cockpit Video Cameras.....imagine if there had been such a set up while this tragedy happened and we had both Video and Audio.
We would know far more about what happened than we do now.
AAIB only gives us a Narrative and not an account that would have as much impact (sorry...poor choice of wording I know) as some Reality Television.
Would that kind of information be more effective than what we get now?
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Gouli
Certainly there was inadequate briefing here between the pilots. I think the AAIB were probably being a bit generous in suggesting there might have been more briefing before the flight that was not picked up by the CVR - even if so, a departure in these conditions should have had a recap just before lifting off running through particularly how high the HP would climb before pitching X degrees nose down or whatever, and who was on instruments and who if anyone was attempting visual references. Though to my mind both sets of eyes should have been on instruments in these conditions anyway. But then of course many private/corporate flights are SP anyway, though a mental brief by the pilot should then have happened.
But I'm afraid the truth is the fundemental cause of this accident was the pilots' inability to safely climb vertically solely with reference to instruments. As Crab says it is not a hard technique, but it does require familiarity and justifiable confidence. Once on the way up there is no way out if it goes wrong, and I strongly suspect the captain started to get disorientated early in the climb, panicked a bit, and then started to pitch down to get forward speed and increased stability too soon. He then got ever more disoriented with the big pitch changes and couldn't register the big picture from whatever scan he was doing.
Training on this technique is vital, but the skill can be practiced anytime, by climbing vertically, looking only at the instruments, in day VMC conditions. It's actually not that hard, providing, as with all hand instrument flying, control inputs are small and even small deviations from target pitch and roll are corrected early.
Certainly there was inadequate briefing here between the pilots. I think the AAIB were probably being a bit generous in suggesting there might have been more briefing before the flight that was not picked up by the CVR - even if so, a departure in these conditions should have had a recap just before lifting off running through particularly how high the HP would climb before pitching X degrees nose down or whatever, and who was on instruments and who if anyone was attempting visual references. Though to my mind both sets of eyes should have been on instruments in these conditions anyway. But then of course many private/corporate flights are SP anyway, though a mental brief by the pilot should then have happened.
But I'm afraid the truth is the fundemental cause of this accident was the pilots' inability to safely climb vertically solely with reference to instruments. As Crab says it is not a hard technique, but it does require familiarity and justifiable confidence. Once on the way up there is no way out if it goes wrong, and I strongly suspect the captain started to get disorientated early in the climb, panicked a bit, and then started to pitch down to get forward speed and increased stability too soon. He then got ever more disoriented with the big pitch changes and couldn't register the big picture from whatever scan he was doing.
Training on this technique is vital, but the skill can be practiced anytime, by climbing vertically, looking only at the instruments, in day VMC conditions. It's actually not that hard, providing, as with all hand instrument flying, control inputs are small and even small deviations from target pitch and roll are corrected early.
Avoid imitations
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It's not totally out of the question that the HP was given some assistance on the cyclic, judging by the CVR. But we'll never know.
However, irrespective of how the departure was flown, as opposed to how it could or should have been flown, the accident would not have happened if a captaincy no-go decision had been made.
However, irrespective of how the departure was flown, as opposed to how it could or should have been flown, the accident would not have happened if a captaincy no-go decision had been made.
Ironically the 'private operations' does seem to circumvent some of the rules which are in place to avoid such accidents.
Aircraft on AOC operations can have a proviso that the aircraft is flown IAW the Operations Manual. Should it be operated outwith that then it is not insured.
Punching vertically up through the fog may be OK but if somethings happens which may be or may not be the crews fault the Insurance Company will be looking very hard at how the aircraft was operated.
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Aircraft on AOC operations can have a proviso that the aircraft is flown IAW the Operations Manual. Should it be operated outwith that then it is not insured.
But operators of smaller/lighter aircraft will not be required to have one. I see a loophole in that smaller helicopters are often flown by less experienced pilots, who arguably need one more.
MG, I took a Sabbatical from these parts and was asked by some to return.
As I hold them in high regard....I have agreed to respond to the Invites.
As I hold them in high regard....I have agreed to respond to the Invites.
I'm a very novice PPL, but that heli had a FLIR! Wouldn't that device, if activated, have given the crew an approximate "view" of the terrain, kind of seeing through the fog, at least as long as they'd be low above ground?
No, FLIR doesn't see through fog and cloud.
The high moisture content of the foggy air acts like a blanket and attenuates thermal energy as well as visible light so everything looks grey to the naked eye and appears to have the same thermal signature to the FLIR.
Without thermal contrast (different temperatures of different surfaces) the FLIR can see nothing.
The thermal signature of any body is the sum of a. what the body is radiating, b. what is reflected by the body and c. what is transmitted through the body from other sources.
You can't see through double glazed windows with FLIR because nearly all the thermal energy from inside the room is reflected back into it and so doesn't escape to the outside world.
The high moisture content of the foggy air acts like a blanket and attenuates thermal energy as well as visible light so everything looks grey to the naked eye and appears to have the same thermal signature to the FLIR.
Without thermal contrast (different temperatures of different surfaces) the FLIR can see nothing.
The thermal signature of any body is the sum of a. what the body is radiating, b. what is reflected by the body and c. what is transmitted through the body from other sources.
You can't see through double glazed windows with FLIR because nearly all the thermal energy from inside the room is reflected back into it and so doesn't escape to the outside world.
Yes, it's thread drift but ....training and/or commercial pressure .... perhaps nothing is going to change in the onshore helicopter industry until pilots have some sort of agreement/union and back each other up in order to maintain good airmanship, good captaincy and flight safety. I once regarded the CAA with respect but I lost that respect when I saw how ineffective the Flight Ops Inspectorate was in its paper oriented inspections of a company which had a mix of public transport and private operations, single or two crew operations as required by the passenger(s), and often crewed non-type rated pilots as P2 to satisfy a passenger request thereby in some ways further increasing the workload of the captain. Forget any training or testing, it was a recipe for breaking regulations whether flying a public transport or private flight, there were no company "standard operating procedures" for ad hoc sites, and so there was an open field for oneupmanship by an individual intending to satisfy the customer whatever that customer wanted; subsequent pilots would of course be expected to do the same. The "gifting" of civil licences to ex military pilots without the need to sit the many CAA ground examinations, as happened in the late 70's, did nothing to help or change any press-on military mindset of some pilots/companies. If the CAA were unable or unwilling to control that sort of operation how could they possibly do anything about totally private operations?
Apologies if this question is naive but I'm struggling to understand how this type of operation is classed as a private flight.
The definition if a private flight is "In private flight the pilot is not paid, and all aircraft operating expenses are generally paid by the pilot."
In this case the aircraft was owned by a limited company, not a person.
So the pilots are employed by the company to fly an individual from one residence to another.
If these locations are also registered company offices then perhaps they could 'need' to make a trip from one to the other for 'business' purposes the locations also being private residences being purely fortunate. Fine that's a company matter transporting an employee or director on business.
If it was a trip for an individual from one home to another how is that accounted for on the company books?
Is every journey in these aircraft purely for private business needs?
The definition if a private flight is "In private flight the pilot is not paid, and all aircraft operating expenses are generally paid by the pilot."
In this case the aircraft was owned by a limited company, not a person.
So the pilots are employed by the company to fly an individual from one residence to another.
If these locations are also registered company offices then perhaps they could 'need' to make a trip from one to the other for 'business' purposes the locations also being private residences being purely fortunate. Fine that's a company matter transporting an employee or director on business.
If it was a trip for an individual from one home to another how is that accounted for on the company books?
Is every journey in these aircraft purely for private business needs?
EESDL,
Unfortunately not true. Offshore probably a big company, regular landing sites, base airfield aids, no personal contact with customers, SOP's, BALPA (?), company cannot afford accidents. Onshore in the UK undoubtedly a small company, ad hoc sites/fields, pilot to customer/owner telephone calls especially regarding weather, virtually every flight different, easy to blame the pilot if things go wrong or the customer is dissatisfied, likely to be eased out if you don't fit in with company ways.
From experience of both I would say onshore "all weather" helicopter operations are far more demanding than offshore except for the obvious over water consideration, I have certainly seen the loss of more colleagues in onshore accidents than offshore.
Unfortunately not true. Offshore probably a big company, regular landing sites, base airfield aids, no personal contact with customers, SOP's, BALPA (?), company cannot afford accidents. Onshore in the UK undoubtedly a small company, ad hoc sites/fields, pilot to customer/owner telephone calls especially regarding weather, virtually every flight different, easy to blame the pilot if things go wrong or the customer is dissatisfied, likely to be eased out if you don't fit in with company ways.
From experience of both I would say onshore "all weather" helicopter operations are far more demanding than offshore except for the obvious over water consideration, I have certainly seen the loss of more colleagues in onshore accidents than offshore.
MG, I took a Sabbatical from these parts and was asked by some to return.
As I hold them in high regard....I have agreed to respond to the Invites.
As I hold them in high regard....I have agreed to respond to the Invites.
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Any news of the UK CAA review mentioned here?
Fatal Night-time UK AW139 Accident Highlights Business Aviation Safety Lessons
Fatal Night-time UK AW139 Accident Highlights Business Aviation Safety Lessons
It's been said before. This whole debacle stinks of everything that is wrong with some aspects of GA.
Non existent CRM, the blurring of lines between public transport and private work. Poor training little or no currency. Poor monitoring (legislation and regulation) by the CAA.
The CVR said it all. The owner had an alleged reputation for handling his employees. All ending in tears.
How mnay of these does it take to tighten up the rules?
Non existent CRM, the blurring of lines between public transport and private work. Poor training little or no currency. Poor monitoring (legislation and regulation) by the CAA.
The CVR said it all. The owner had an alleged reputation for handling his employees. All ending in tears.
How mnay of these does it take to tighten up the rules?