ROTORSPEED thanks for the detail and the time you took to explain the rational. I see you recognise that the demands of the immediate environment often drive the sensible minima to achieve a safe departure.
I think what SAS, and to a degree myself, are saying is that when deciding what minima is acceptable, is left totally up to the pilot, only his skill and experience will dictate if the departure is or is not safe to complete.
If this were the case at an aerodrome amongst commercial operations total chaos would ensue.
Defining minima must come first. Thereafter, experience and training requirements can be defined to minimise risks when operating at that minima.
I have a great deal of respect for Corporate pilots having never done it myself. But I can imagine being required to go somewhere unfamiliar with minimum notice must be tough compared to Offshore for example, where for the most part, at least one pilot is fully familiar with the route etc.
I have always believed that reading the RofA at face value will provide a sensible pragmatic minima and height requirements that would naturally drive the experience and training requirements to make for a safe operating protocol.
I still cannot accept that climbing vertically and rotating to Vmin in fog, over an adhoc field site, is at all sensible and IS inherently unsafe. The perception that this is "necessary" to get the job done is just that....a perception. You guys hold the keys to your own destiny. Do you want a sensible safe margin or are you prepared to push the limits until very little or no margin for error is left.
Even in HEMS/SAR there is a great paradox when life is in danger! The more critical the patient, the lesser their chances of survival! How much risk is warranted to the crew in this case? Somewhere the line has to be drawn to prevent perception of urgency from eroding the very necessary safety breaks in place. Safety breaks which are the fundamental bedrock of aviating.
I feel blaming the crews actions/training etc is too one dimensional especially when it supports the continuance of departures in similar conditions by those of us who believe we could have done a better job.
If that night, sufficient external visual cues were present to achieve safe height/speed combination before IMC, there is a more than strong chance this accident would not have occurred.
Finally, I have spent a fair bit of time IMC, out of radio comms, beyond or below radar range. It's not very comfortable and does not feel safe especially with 19 pax down the back. Just because it happens does not make it OK.
Just my two bobs worth