AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
26500
I don't know why I'm bothering to respond to you 26500 but my annual reports always said 'this officer doesn't suffer fools gladly' so here goes:
true, we didn't fly 600 hours per annum, of hands off straight lines to a rig. Nor did I ever fly less than '200 hours a year' or 300 for that matter. What I did fly, on top of six years SH was 22 years of SAR - and yes, the Seaking AFCS saw lots of use. If you regard a 2-300 cloud base and 2.8k's vis as poor weather then you have never been where I've been. Lets hope that you don't ever try for the CivSar contract too. Nor have you read what I have been trying to say in my posts on here - but, carry on, you're all doing very well!
Al-Bert you memory is clearly fading and the rose tinted glasses are getting steamy! You know as well as I that the RAF has had more than its fair share of CFIT. Go further and compare the number of flying hours flown in the NS vs the RAF per year and the CFIT stats are relatively low in the NS. I knew several RAF CFIT stats personally. Your glorious career of under 200 hrs per year is all well and good,
true, we didn't fly 600 hours per annum, of hands off straight lines to a rig. Nor did I ever fly less than '200 hours a year' or 300 for that matter. What I did fly, on top of six years SH was 22 years of SAR - and yes, the Seaking AFCS saw lots of use. If you regard a 2-300 cloud base and 2.8k's vis as poor weather then you have never been where I've been. Lets hope that you don't ever try for the CivSar contract too. Nor have you read what I have been trying to say in my posts on here - but, carry on, you're all doing very well!
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Lonewolf,
At least one operator does (2 now I've seen Bristow do as well), I would imagine they all do. HC's points are very valid though, very few crews will sit in almost complete silence for the 15 mins or so it takes to come down from from a flight level, or at the Holding Point at 0715 when ATC tell you you're number 10 in the queue!
26500lbs,
Please remember when comparing military to civil CFIT per fg hour figures that the vast majority of the military fg hours will have been done within a few hundred feet of the surface, as opposed to a few thousand feet in the cruise in the NS. Not disputing your overall point, but in this context NS hours vs mil hrs are vastly different beasts.
Question for NS operators: is there a "sterile cockpit" period in NS pax flights similar to the "sterile cockpit" standards for fixed wing airline flying?
26500lbs,
Please remember when comparing military to civil CFIT per fg hour figures that the vast majority of the military fg hours will have been done within a few hundred feet of the surface, as opposed to a few thousand feet in the cruise in the NS. Not disputing your overall point, but in this context NS hours vs mil hrs are vastly different beasts.
A question for the NS operators:
How thorough is your AP training? Do you cover such things as AP degredations (of which there are many and not always obvious) and practise them? Do you show your pilots the gotchas?
I am sure many of your new hires will have come through the standard PPL/CPL/IR route of training. None of those courses teaches use of autopilot, or didn't when I did my IR - do any "simple" twins used for initial IR's (AS355, A109, EC135) have 4 axis autopilots?
Many other new hires will be coming out of the military - again, do they come from a background familiar with sophisticated autopilots?
All of those above will have considerable training of single engine rejects and hand flown approaches, but little to no autopilot handling experience.
Where is the emphasis during conversion training with Bristow, Bond and CHC (+ NHV, Dancopter etc)?
My knowledge of the autopilot on my primary aircraft type was picked up "on the hoof" with no formal training that I can recall at all - despite type rating training with a very well regarded 3rd party provider (in level D sim). The "on the hoof" training was not done by the Company TRI/E but provided by other company line pilots while flying the line and each had a slightly different way of doing things (such as AS vs VS hold on 3 axis approaches)
Incidentally, use of the nav system was also only touched upon - basically the training generally went over the stuff that was the same or very similar to every other helicopter I'd ever flown, and barely touched on the bits which were genuinely new to me! I'm not suggesting that NS training is like that, but would be interested to hear.
How thorough is your AP training? Do you cover such things as AP degredations (of which there are many and not always obvious) and practise them? Do you show your pilots the gotchas?
I am sure many of your new hires will have come through the standard PPL/CPL/IR route of training. None of those courses teaches use of autopilot, or didn't when I did my IR - do any "simple" twins used for initial IR's (AS355, A109, EC135) have 4 axis autopilots?
Many other new hires will be coming out of the military - again, do they come from a background familiar with sophisticated autopilots?
All of those above will have considerable training of single engine rejects and hand flown approaches, but little to no autopilot handling experience.
Where is the emphasis during conversion training with Bristow, Bond and CHC (+ NHV, Dancopter etc)?
My knowledge of the autopilot on my primary aircraft type was picked up "on the hoof" with no formal training that I can recall at all - despite type rating training with a very well regarded 3rd party provider (in level D sim). The "on the hoof" training was not done by the Company TRI/E but provided by other company line pilots while flying the line and each had a slightly different way of doing things (such as AS vs VS hold on 3 axis approaches)
Incidentally, use of the nav system was also only touched upon - basically the training generally went over the stuff that was the same or very similar to every other helicopter I'd ever flown, and barely touched on the bits which were genuinely new to me! I'm not suggesting that NS training is like that, but would be interested to hear.
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OBF you make your point well, military flying is a vastly different beast to Offshore Crew Change Flights. However, it does not stop the sanctimonious SAR fraternity from believing they understand our job.
I welcome any ideas from anyone. However, being told we should fix the problem by "More Hand Flying" is a bit like dunking a witch.
Albert - please explain how you managed to "hand fly" SAR missions in weather less than 300 feet and 1800m. If you can then please explain how you would feel about me doing the same, leaving the DAFCS coupled functions in their box, with your family sat behind me in the PAX seats. Or how about you behind me!!
You talk two languages Sir, "Utter Sh*te" and "Total Boll*cks"
26500 lbs. Great post!!
DB
I welcome any ideas from anyone. However, being told we should fix the problem by "More Hand Flying" is a bit like dunking a witch.
Albert - please explain how you managed to "hand fly" SAR missions in weather less than 300 feet and 1800m. If you can then please explain how you would feel about me doing the same, leaving the DAFCS coupled functions in their box, with your family sat behind me in the PAX seats. Or how about you behind me!!
You talk two languages Sir, "Utter Sh*te" and "Total Boll*cks"
26500 lbs. Great post!!
DB
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I don't know why I'm bothering to respond to you 26500 but my annual reports always said 'this officer doesn't suffer fools gladly' :
true, we didn't fly 600 hours per annum, of hands off straight lines to a rig. Nor did I ever fly less than '200 hours a year' or 300 for that matter. What I did fly, on top of six years SH was 22 years of SAR - and yes, the Seaking AFCS saw lots of use. If you regard a 2-300 cloud base and 2.8k's vis as poor weather then you have never been where I've been. Lets hope that you don't ever try for the CivSar contract too. Nor have you read what I have been trying to say in my posts on here - but, carry on, you're all doing very well!
It is just no good trying to fly a modern day operation in the NS with modern tech in the same way we ran a JHC operation. The people are different. They have different backgrounds. The culture is different. The operation is a different challenge. The challenge of routine is one in itself I never really understood until I did it. These days my challenge is keeping pilots motivated and engaged. The routine all too often creates a complacency in a different way to what we used to see when flying complex military tasks in NI or Iraq or Bosnia or Afghan or any number of other demanding theatres. The NS is no less demanding, despite what some may believe. The demands are different and often not always so obvious.
Routine operations are inherently linked to human error. Why do we have robots building cars? We make mistakes all the time, but the latent errors in routine often go unchecked until its too late.
All a bit longwinded I know, but we have to take a fresh approach to how we tackle very routine operations. The proper and appropriate use of autopilot is key to this, and development of appropriate SOP’s will lead to a reduction and management of latent error. Better training in the sim and classroom will help us when it is not routine. This is being done in some places already, so nothng new. It does not need to cost any more either, just needs to be better planned and controlled. Better selection of crews and management by companies will also go a long way. However the recent lack of pilots meant very low time pilots being hired, who have effectively no experience outside the circuit. This is just a fact, and has already happened. Do we kick them all out and hire a bunch of experienced pilots? A little facetious, I know, but of course we have to use them. We can train them, but companies must take this into consideration when they hire. The problem of the inexperienced pilot will not be seen for 10 years, until he is a captain.
What we cannot do is the halfway house approach we are sitting in right now.
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Having moved from the SAR rotary world into the highly automated world of the airline industry I, perhaps, see this problem a little differently.
Hand flying and practice is, IMHO, essential. Given the correct weather conditions and prior briefing it is a crucial part of any pilots 'ability arsenal'.
Good use and knowledge of the automation systems, their purpose and limitations and their fallback and failsafe modes is also essential. With weather conditions marginal then the correct use of automation and the careful monitoring of the systems and aircraft position will, ultimately, add to a reduction in workload and an increase in SA.
Where these things start to fall over is when we, as the seat to stick interface, start to lose track of 'what is doing what' or place too much reliance either on the ability of the automatics to pull us out of trouble or our own 'god like' seat of the pants flying ability to be able to operate in marginal to dangerous weather without the automatics assistance.
Every pilot is different and will place emphasis on either side of the coin of 'automatics/manual'. The trick I have learnt over the years is to know when to switch from one to the other and in what circumstances.
The biggest problem with highly automated cockpits (like the one I now fly) is that the avionics and automatics are very closely interwoven. A 'minor' failure of a sensor can have ripple effects through the systems resulting in the loss of multiple automation aids. A major failure will see the crew dumped, irrespective of the weather, into a potentially 'manual flight' regime where that 'hands on' flying practice will be invaluable. There must be a balance of training that emphasises that total reliance on automation is potentially dangerous but also lack of knowledge of downgrade paths and letting your core piloting skills reduce is equally as dangerous.
I flew many SAR missions in extremely difficult weather, all hand flying because we had no autopilot, just a rudimentary stability system and RadAlt and Baro height holds. I wouldn't say that makes me a better pilot, far from it I feel we 'got away with it' many times. We, as a crew, achieved what we had to do with the equipment we had at the time. No more, no less.
NS crews fly multiple flights in difficult weather to tricky destinations where, again IMHO, the full use of automatics is a godsend to reduce the fatigue encountered in a long days helicopter flying. When it is prudent and safe to do so then perhaps reverting to manual flight for the next approach might well reap benefits on the day the systems all fall over.
Just my ramblings.
Hand flying and practice is, IMHO, essential. Given the correct weather conditions and prior briefing it is a crucial part of any pilots 'ability arsenal'.
Good use and knowledge of the automation systems, their purpose and limitations and their fallback and failsafe modes is also essential. With weather conditions marginal then the correct use of automation and the careful monitoring of the systems and aircraft position will, ultimately, add to a reduction in workload and an increase in SA.
Where these things start to fall over is when we, as the seat to stick interface, start to lose track of 'what is doing what' or place too much reliance either on the ability of the automatics to pull us out of trouble or our own 'god like' seat of the pants flying ability to be able to operate in marginal to dangerous weather without the automatics assistance.
Every pilot is different and will place emphasis on either side of the coin of 'automatics/manual'. The trick I have learnt over the years is to know when to switch from one to the other and in what circumstances.
The biggest problem with highly automated cockpits (like the one I now fly) is that the avionics and automatics are very closely interwoven. A 'minor' failure of a sensor can have ripple effects through the systems resulting in the loss of multiple automation aids. A major failure will see the crew dumped, irrespective of the weather, into a potentially 'manual flight' regime where that 'hands on' flying practice will be invaluable. There must be a balance of training that emphasises that total reliance on automation is potentially dangerous but also lack of knowledge of downgrade paths and letting your core piloting skills reduce is equally as dangerous.
I flew many SAR missions in extremely difficult weather, all hand flying because we had no autopilot, just a rudimentary stability system and RadAlt and Baro height holds. I wouldn't say that makes me a better pilot, far from it I feel we 'got away with it' many times. We, as a crew, achieved what we had to do with the equipment we had at the time. No more, no less.
NS crews fly multiple flights in difficult weather to tricky destinations where, again IMHO, the full use of automatics is a godsend to reduce the fatigue encountered in a long days helicopter flying. When it is prudent and safe to do so then perhaps reverting to manual flight for the next approach might well reap benefits on the day the systems all fall over.
Just my ramblings.
Last edited by Wirbelsturm; 11th Sep 2013 at 15:42.
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I am surprised that in this on-going forum no-one seems to have mentioned that with reference to the pictures of the floating wreckage no jettison escape windows have been punched out on the port side and the entry door on the starboard side has been opened so blocking off two escape windows including one primary escape panel. From more than thirty years on type I can confirm that once the sliding door is opened and not jettisoned it blocks these exits and cannot be jettisoned if the jettison control is then selected. The result of this situation is that everyone has to leave by this exit and the two windows aft of it if they have been activated. There were 16 passengers in this situation,3 less than normal. May I suggest that the actions of the passengers at the sliding doors be reviewed and the depth of training looked into. From a conversation I heard the old principal of "woman and children first" seems to have been ignored.
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DOUBLE BOGEY
The weather limits you quote (300' 1800m) would not stand in the way of a manually flown Search and Rescue operation. Or a day training sortie for that matter. Different worlds. Don't get wound up.
The weather limits you quote (300' 1800m) would not stand in the way of a manually flown Search and Rescue operation. Or a day training sortie for that matter. Different worlds. Don't get wound up.
Double Bogey - the weather ref came from rotorspeed, I beg your pardon, thought it was you
however, glad to explain how we all did it (and still do) - either we flew lower than the cloudbase at a speed commensurate with visibilty, if at night we would be on NVG. I don't think I'd be too happy sitting behind you doing the same, I was not always happy doing it myself but it was the job. I have no problem with the use of AFCS, AP's, or whatever the current kit is called and if you'd read my posts properly you would know that.
I entered this discussion because I could not understand why two pilots would permit a serviceable helicoter to crash into the sea in conditions that were not especially marginal (according to the metar). I initially thought that they must have run out of fuel, I didn't know that AP's might be to blame. Keep dunking that witch!
And absolutely, use autopilot whenever wx poor, as it was here with 2800m vis and 200/300ft cloudbase, but with two pilots
I entered this discussion because I could not understand why two pilots would permit a serviceable helicoter to crash into the sea in conditions that were not especially marginal (according to the metar). I initially thought that they must have run out of fuel, I didn't know that AP's might be to blame. Keep dunking that witch!
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2800m vis and 200/300ft cloudbase
That's not degraded conditions in the helicopter world these days is it?
26500lbs
sorry (I've already apologised to DB) it was rotorspeed wot said it!
But, you and I are in grave danger of agreeing here!
I have never advocated a 'manual is best' approach. I believe that manual flying skills are required as well as, despite even, the automatics - only then will a pilot know when it is going tits up and do something about it? Isn't that what went wrong at Sumburgh (from all we know via Pprune)?
I have never done the NS line job but I do understand the commercial pressures and constraints. I have spent a 'bit of time' with 'you guys' over the years but your reference to
means that I must be quite a bit older than you, or you are very senior!
I can imagine that boredom is indeed a great problem as is complacency. If companies are reluctant to fund extra training time then I'm not sure how you address your deficiencies but extra automation doesn't seem to be going too well just now. Read what I've already said, you might discover that we're on the same side after all
I am not quite sure what your weather reference and CivSar references
But, you and I are in grave danger of agreeing here!
I have never advocated a 'manual is best' approach. I believe that manual flying skills are required as well as, despite even, the automatics - only then will a pilot know when it is going tits up and do something about it? Isn't that what went wrong at Sumburgh (from all we know via Pprune)?
I have never done the NS line job but I do understand the commercial pressures and constraints. I have spent a 'bit of time' with 'you guys' over the years but your reference to
It is just no good trying to fly a modern day operation in the NS with modern tech in the same way we ran a JHC operation
I can imagine that boredom is indeed a great problem as is complacency. If companies are reluctant to fund extra training time then I'm not sure how you address your deficiencies but extra automation doesn't seem to be going too well just now. Read what I've already said, you might discover that we're on the same side after all
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Al-Bert thanks for your reply. We would benefit from any help and advice that experienced hands like yours obviously have.
We do not know either the prime causes of incidents like these. We are trying to reduce the risk with technology.
One of the recurrent themes to majority of these events is the crew fails to hear the final bug backstop height at 100 feet. I am wondering if we have this backstop too low in that the state of arousal by then is so high it is simply not processed. Just a thought.
DB
We do not know either the prime causes of incidents like these. We are trying to reduce the risk with technology.
One of the recurrent themes to majority of these events is the crew fails to hear the final bug backstop height at 100 feet. I am wondering if we have this backstop too low in that the state of arousal by then is so high it is simply not processed. Just a thought.
DB
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VSF
The WX report is an actual from EGPB. Local knowledge has that a SE wind at EGPB is a "Foggy" wind. The actual conditions downwind of Sumburgh head as the crew approached the threshold of 09 to within a couple of miles may have been very different.
The WX report is an actual from EGPB. Local knowledge has that a SE wind at EGPB is a "Foggy" wind. The actual conditions downwind of Sumburgh head as the crew approached the threshold of 09 to within a couple of miles may have been very different.
26500lbs
surely this is the real elephant in the room and unless such cost cutting is addressed, anything else is simply rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.
DB - is that 100' warning a selectable one or is it, as you imply, a final and automatic warning that chimes on every single approach regardless? If it is the latter, then there is no surprise that crews become de-sensitised to it.
Training is far more limited due to the nature of budgets and how much the customer is willing to pay. There is always a competitor who will try and do it cheaper, driving competition and stretching budgets ever further. My point is that we have what we have and have to work with that and within some of the constraints we have upon us
DB - is that 100' warning a selectable one or is it, as you imply, a final and automatic warning that chimes on every single approach regardless? If it is the latter, then there is no surprise that crews become de-sensitised to it.
One of the recurrent themes to majority of these events is the crew fails to hear the final bug backstop height at 100 feet. I am wondering if we have this backstop too low in that the state of arousal by then is so high it is simply not processed. Just a thought.
Last edited by 212man; 11th Sep 2013 at 17:11.
DB and I thank you for your gracious reply!
I think you do set the bug too low. ISTR that in the SK we would bug 20ft lower than our routine radalt height of 200ft when manouvering IMC or night over water and at DH on a precision approach. Perhaps Crab could help (my memory aint what it was). MDA/H might be appropriate?
I see I'm slow on't keys! I can't see how 100ft bug is at all useful to your guys though.
I think you do set the bug too low. ISTR that in the SK we would bug 20ft lower than our routine radalt height of 200ft when manouvering IMC or night over water and at DH on a precision approach. Perhaps Crab could help (my memory aint what it was). MDA/H might be appropriate?
I see I'm slow on't keys! I can't see how 100ft bug is at all useful to your guys though.
Last edited by Al-bert; 11th Sep 2013 at 17:14.
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willy waving....."stop"
The AAIB have stated that this accident was of a non-technical nature. What exactly is their definition of non-technical? Unless you know (different from think or have a theory) don’t answer that.
The cause of this accident is still undetermined. Assumptions are being made as to the serviceability of the aircraft in question. However my aircraft is deemed serviceable with elements of systems unserviceable; including AFCS functions. Which in turn will dictate the method of autopilot utilisation. As an example……collective trim u/s.
In the spirit of speculation this accident (my theory) isn’t because of a lack of handling skills. Possibly compounded by method of autopilot function, but more likely due to a failure to detect the aircrafts departure from the desired element of the flight envelope early, and that’s the last time I’m gonna bother saying so.
willy waving......"carry on"
The AAIB have stated that this accident was of a non-technical nature. What exactly is their definition of non-technical? Unless you know (different from think or have a theory) don’t answer that.
The cause of this accident is still undetermined. Assumptions are being made as to the serviceability of the aircraft in question. However my aircraft is deemed serviceable with elements of systems unserviceable; including AFCS functions. Which in turn will dictate the method of autopilot utilisation. As an example……collective trim u/s.
In the spirit of speculation this accident (my theory) isn’t because of a lack of handling skills. Possibly compounded by method of autopilot function, but more likely due to a failure to detect the aircrafts departure from the desired element of the flight envelope early, and that’s the last time I’m gonna bother saying so.
willy waving......"carry on"
The 100 ft call is not bugged - it's fixed. the bug is separate and is typically set 50-100 ft below the MDH, depending on the operator policy.
method of autopilot function, but more likely due to a failure to detect the aircrafts departure from the desired element of the flight envelope early, and that’s the last time I’m gonna bother saying so.
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IFR Piggy, that was a quality rant!!
Unfortunately you lost the plot as, despite telling us not to speculate in para 1, you then do it yourself in the last para.
Still a great rant though! How long was the build up of steam.
Do we have a Rotorheads "Wooden Spoon" cos I think Piggy just brought home the bacon!!
DB
Unfortunately you lost the plot as, despite telling us not to speculate in para 1, you then do it yourself in the last para.
Still a great rant though! How long was the build up of steam.
Do we have a Rotorheads "Wooden Spoon" cos I think Piggy just brought home the bacon!!
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 11th Sep 2013 at 17:33.