AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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Al-Bert, fair enough. Sky god you are. The criteria you set for same is probably equalled, doubled and trebled by many offshore mere mortal pilots.
After 15k, Army, Police, HEMs, SAR and Offshore I have also faired well.
However, unlike you I recognise if it can happen to others it can happen to me. Some very experienced, well respected pilots who are much better than me have come to grief. The pilot of this accident aircraft was very experienced and highly regarded by his peers.
They were not "flying manually" in the traditional sense. The skills needed to fly a modern DAFCS helicopter with a comprehensive suite of SA tools, are numerous and diverse. It is a very different kind of flying than what you are used to.
I have done your job, in your kit but you have not done ours. So please go easy on the "Skygod Hands-on Hero" stuff here. It's not relevant., hard or trendy.
After 15k, Army, Police, HEMs, SAR and Offshore I have also faired well.
However, unlike you I recognise if it can happen to others it can happen to me. Some very experienced, well respected pilots who are much better than me have come to grief. The pilot of this accident aircraft was very experienced and highly regarded by his peers.
They were not "flying manually" in the traditional sense. The skills needed to fly a modern DAFCS helicopter with a comprehensive suite of SA tools, are numerous and diverse. It is a very different kind of flying than what you are used to.
I have done your job, in your kit but you have not done ours. So please go easy on the "Skygod Hands-on Hero" stuff here. It's not relevant., hard or trendy.
LW in general I agree with a good bit of your post, however I don't think you have quite grasped that this accident happened to and L2, not a 225. On the latter, the protections are not overrated (the former has none). To decry them is to deny the benefits of technological progress.
For example (on the 225), if you engage VS alone but have too little collective, the airspeed reduces until about 65 kts, then IAS automatically engages and stabilizes the speed at 65 kts (actual speed varies slightly according to dv/dt). That's fairly easy, but what if the collective channel is not working for some reason?
As I am not familiar enough with each model and its AFCS modes, I apologize for any gross errors.
( its an MEL allowable defect, although I've never known it to be inop). Well then you have VS engaged on the cyclic with insufficient power to meet the needs. This time the IAS cannot engage automatically because the collective channel is inop. So what happens?
Well, what would you want to happen? You wouldn't want the IAS to go much below Vy, and that's exactly what happens.
The VS mode starts to soft-limit the IAS to around 65 kts. So even though VS is still engaged according to the AFCS status zone, nothing engaged on the (inoperative) collective, the protections prevent the IAS getting too low.
So if, after that brief explanation of some of the protections, you still think they are over-rated, then perhaps you would tell us what sort of protections you think should be incorporated?
Thanks so much for your insights.
Also, thanks for recaging the gyro in this thread with your post on the four elements of what is being discussed in types of helo flying.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 10th Sep 2013 at 16:31.
Double Bogey - sense of humour caption failure? I was being ironic but irony seems to be lost on quite a few here. I was merely pointing out that despite the most modern and complicated kit that money can buy certain pilots (even the most qualified and experienced) seem to Fcuk up. Why is that?
Does hands off flying in straight lines not get a little boring - ever? Do pilots ever get a chance to 'do GH'? Maybe they should? If you're satisfied with your status quo carry on - you've all done very well
Does hands off flying in straight lines not get a little boring - ever? Do pilots ever get a chance to 'do GH'? Maybe they should? If you're satisfied with your status quo carry on - you've all done very well
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AB
You really are talking out of your rear end.
I was in the military too and, as I recall, the vast majority of flying was overland VFR. On a lot of days I regularly go flying now, I would be sitting in the crew room while I was in the military watching the weather outside.
As to superior handling skills, give me a break. I enjoyed watching those up close: our standards guy hitting the fence at Dungannon twice, because he was flying like a tw*t, watching one guy fly me through a tree after I pointed it out to him, losing three colleagues in a fire when one helicopter taxied into into airway stand, grabbing the lever on a boss because he was flying so low I thought he was going to hit wires and getting a dirty look -- the next week he, and a trainer, did a wing over into the ground while doing that general handling you seem so proud of, a fast jet colleague who pulled up into a wing over after takeoff, went IMC and came out of the cloud pointing downwards into a fireball, the guy who ran out of fuel in a puma and had to autorotate into a landing site breaking the tail off. And that's only the stuff I can remember off the top of my head. You seem to forget the crash mags that littered the crew room tables like leaves in autumn.
Once you have done some time in the North Sea I might be interested in your opinions but until then you just sound like a troll to me.
I was in the military too and, as I recall, the vast majority of flying was overland VFR. On a lot of days I regularly go flying now, I would be sitting in the crew room while I was in the military watching the weather outside.
As to superior handling skills, give me a break. I enjoyed watching those up close: our standards guy hitting the fence at Dungannon twice, because he was flying like a tw*t, watching one guy fly me through a tree after I pointed it out to him, losing three colleagues in a fire when one helicopter taxied into into airway stand, grabbing the lever on a boss because he was flying so low I thought he was going to hit wires and getting a dirty look -- the next week he, and a trainer, did a wing over into the ground while doing that general handling you seem so proud of, a fast jet colleague who pulled up into a wing over after takeoff, went IMC and came out of the cloud pointing downwards into a fireball, the guy who ran out of fuel in a puma and had to autorotate into a landing site breaking the tail off. And that's only the stuff I can remember off the top of my head. You seem to forget the crash mags that littered the crew room tables like leaves in autumn.
Once you have done some time in the North Sea I might be interested in your opinions but until then you just sound like a troll to me.
the vast majority of flying was overland VFR
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There is a definite over reliance on automated flight in the North Sea, much to the detriment of the competence of newer less experienced pilots operating in the degraded visual environment. During conversation mid CRM course about this very subject one high time pilot insisted "the aircraft was designed to fly by autopilot so that's the way we should always be flying it...." This was not too many years ago. I disagreed firmly (crm moment mid crm course!!!)
It should be noted that one North Sea operator recently recommenced SAR operations with this mantra and openly trains pilots to use autopilot functions more than flying skill in the low level environment even when not required therefore negating the opportunity to maintain appropriate skill levels....
It should be noted that one North Sea operator recently recommenced SAR operations with this mantra and openly trains pilots to use autopilot functions more than flying skill in the low level environment even when not required therefore negating the opportunity to maintain appropriate skill levels....
That's what you get for flying Pumas!
The Puma Force took itself far too seriously with far too little supervision and it had a very torrid time as a result - most other forces in the mil learned valuable lessons about how not to do it from the Puma force, especially with regard to culture.
Albert did, and I currently do, spend the majority of our time overwater, often at night and very often in ****ty weather - don't confuse SH with SAR no matter how much you may look down your nose at it.
The limited (compared to modern helos) autopilot functions we have get us into and out of some unpleasant situations so don't assume our opinions on levels of automation aren't valid.
The Puma Force took itself far too seriously with far too little supervision and it had a very torrid time as a result - most other forces in the mil learned valuable lessons about how not to do it from the Puma force, especially with regard to culture.
Albert did, and I currently do, spend the majority of our time overwater, often at night and very often in ****ty weather - don't confuse SH with SAR no matter how much you may look down your nose at it.
The limited (compared to modern helos) autopilot functions we have get us into and out of some unpleasant situations so don't assume our opinions on levels of automation aren't valid.
Hedski - I'm relieved that at least one current NS pilot seems to get what I'm trying to say! This was never intended to be a mil v civ willy contest (on my part) - I had my chance to go civ NS, I decided against it. Having encountered some of the egos out there I'm glad now that I did. Safe flying, however you achieve it 
Oops, thanks for the correction.
Use your hand on the collective?
As I am not familiar enough with each model and its AFCS modes, I apologize for any gross errors.
You use your hand on collective to get the power you want?
I am with you so far.
We get back to my paleolithic remark from above.
Use your hand on the collective?
As I am not familiar enough with each model and its AFCS modes, I apologize for any gross errors.
You use your hand on collective to get the power you want?
I am with you so far.
We get back to my paleolithic remark from above.
So (and we are rather starting to assume we know why the L2 crashed, when we don't) if the crew did exactly what they did, and assuming that for some reason raising the collective evaded them, had they been in a 225 the protections would have kicked in and stabilised the speed at 65kts with the rate of descent as set on the vertical speed bug (presumably somewhere around 500'/min). So that is the point of the protections - pointless, until the crew make mistakes that put the aircraft towards an undesirable flight path, like low speed low power flight.
212 Man
That was the Cormorant A accident where an "experienced" Commander made the classic mistake of linking ground speed to airspeed. If I recall the wind was of the order of 60-70KTs. He therefore ended up at low airspeed and descended into the sea.
The Commander had 5000 NS hrs so as I have alluded before, even in our steam driven 332L, he had about 200hrs manual flying experience on the 332L plus what ever he gained during his training.
My argument is not that the problem of degradation of hand flying skills is not knew - it has been with us for many years.
I just don't agree with the present policy of using the autopilot at every opportunity. I agree that in poor weather one would be negligent not using the autopilot. What I can't understand is what seems to be a policy of not allowing manual flying at any time.
When it all goes pear shaped the ability to recognise the problem and perhaps making large control inputs, beyond the authority of an autopilot, may save the day!
HF
I distinctly remember an SP being flown into the sea on the 14th March 1992
The Commander had 5000 NS hrs so as I have alluded before, even in our steam driven 332L, he had about 200hrs manual flying experience on the 332L plus what ever he gained during his training.
My argument is not that the problem of degradation of hand flying skills is not knew - it has been with us for many years.
I just don't agree with the present policy of using the autopilot at every opportunity. I agree that in poor weather one would be negligent not using the autopilot. What I can't understand is what seems to be a policy of not allowing manual flying at any time.
When it all goes pear shaped the ability to recognise the problem and perhaps making large control inputs, beyond the authority of an autopilot, may save the day!
HF
HF
you might just be a youngster in comparison to me HF but surely GCE English was required for the RAF, if not NSea? 
My argument is not that the problem of degradation of hand flying skills is not knew - it has been with us for many years.
HF, I really don't know where you get the "no manual flying allowed" thing from. Well certainly not in Bristow anyway, where there is concern about how the new guys will develop their manual flying skills. There may be a few captains (I can recall one when I was a copilot) who are so lazy and selfish that they don't want the co. to fly manually, preferring the comfort and relaxation of the automation, but I am certain they are very much in the minority.
Personally I think its a great shame that we are no longer allowed to fly AP out on line flights, or practice other minor degradations. That is the fault of the regulator. But I suspect in the absence of such a regulation, the oil companies would no longer tolerate it because they are too short sighted to see the big and long term picture.
Personally I think its a great shame that we are no longer allowed to fly AP out on line flights, or practice other minor degradations. That is the fault of the regulator. But I suspect in the absence of such a regulation, the oil companies would no longer tolerate it because they are too short sighted to see the big and long term picture.
HF, sure - I wasn't having a pop at you (although I see others have!) But I think my post still stands when I look at the general subtext in many comments.
Last edited by 212man; 10th Sep 2013 at 18:15.
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There are now a few posters, Al-Bert amongst others, extolling the virtues of hand flying over water. If you fit in this nostalgic group, consider the following:
CASE-01. An S61, being hand flown on a clear day, by a highly experienced crew, hit the sea between Penzance and Isle of Scilly resulting in considerable loss of life. The helicopter had no height hold or RADALT equipment.
CASE-02 An AS332, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander, crashes while attempting to manoeuvre visually at night in a snowstorm close to Cormorant Alpha, resulting in consirable loss of life.
CASE-03 An AS365, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander after a go-around induced unusual attitude recovery, hit the sea at high speed killing all occupants
CASE-04. An EC225, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander, in a degraded visual environment, hit the sea at low speed. By inshallah, all occupants survive.
CASE-05 taking the AAIB report at face value, an AS332, being operated in Mixed Mode (collective being hand flown), crashes off the Sumburgh coast while attempting to land off an NPA to minima, resulting in considerable loss of life.
We can talk all night with nostalgia about the role we believe hand flying should play in the task off offshore passenger transport. However it seems to me we have tried it already and from the perspective of the passenger, it seems to suck, a lot!!
THERE IS NO DOUBT that automation, driving a correctly defined flight path for the task, is the key factor that would have expressly prevented every one of these accidents, That's a lot of lives that could have been saved if automation was available at the time or used properly or indeed, used at all.
I have detailed 5 above. I have a further 27 case studies of aircraft seemingly flown serviceable into the sea ( I did not do land CFITs), that I used to support the Night Stabilised Approach concept.
Amazingly one incident, in our own patch, where an S76 touched the sea and miraculously got airborne again, was put down to the Commander having had "a hard session at the gym" - (slight over oversimplification on my part for dramatic effect).
Shields down. We are basically **** at flying manually over the ocean without a really, and I mean A REALLY good picture of the surface outside the cockpit window.
I cannot accept, that there is a single pilot flying over the sea that does recognise the safety provisions of a modern DAFCS. For the experienced SAR posters, CRAB and ALBERT, surely you must also recognise this.
However, providing the crew with an autopilot is just one small part of the fix.
If we are to move forward we need to recognise that we are failing to properly prepare the crews for use of automation at almost every level. As a consequence we have failed to not only to ensure it is issued correctly, appropriatly and safely, we have above all failed to mandate its use such that the maximum safety benefits provided by automation, are delivered at the right moment!
The moment before impact!!!
DB
CASE-01. An S61, being hand flown on a clear day, by a highly experienced crew, hit the sea between Penzance and Isle of Scilly resulting in considerable loss of life. The helicopter had no height hold or RADALT equipment.
CASE-02 An AS332, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander, crashes while attempting to manoeuvre visually at night in a snowstorm close to Cormorant Alpha, resulting in consirable loss of life.
CASE-03 An AS365, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander after a go-around induced unusual attitude recovery, hit the sea at high speed killing all occupants
CASE-04. An EC225, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander, in a degraded visual environment, hit the sea at low speed. By inshallah, all occupants survive.
CASE-05 taking the AAIB report at face value, an AS332, being operated in Mixed Mode (collective being hand flown), crashes off the Sumburgh coast while attempting to land off an NPA to minima, resulting in considerable loss of life.
We can talk all night with nostalgia about the role we believe hand flying should play in the task off offshore passenger transport. However it seems to me we have tried it already and from the perspective of the passenger, it seems to suck, a lot!!
THERE IS NO DOUBT that automation, driving a correctly defined flight path for the task, is the key factor that would have expressly prevented every one of these accidents, That's a lot of lives that could have been saved if automation was available at the time or used properly or indeed, used at all.
I have detailed 5 above. I have a further 27 case studies of aircraft seemingly flown serviceable into the sea ( I did not do land CFITs), that I used to support the Night Stabilised Approach concept.
Amazingly one incident, in our own patch, where an S76 touched the sea and miraculously got airborne again, was put down to the Commander having had "a hard session at the gym" - (slight over oversimplification on my part for dramatic effect).
Shields down. We are basically **** at flying manually over the ocean without a really, and I mean A REALLY good picture of the surface outside the cockpit window.
I cannot accept, that there is a single pilot flying over the sea that does recognise the safety provisions of a modern DAFCS. For the experienced SAR posters, CRAB and ALBERT, surely you must also recognise this.
However, providing the crew with an autopilot is just one small part of the fix.
If we are to move forward we need to recognise that we are failing to properly prepare the crews for use of automation at almost every level. As a consequence we have failed to not only to ensure it is issued correctly, appropriatly and safely, we have above all failed to mandate its use such that the maximum safety benefits provided by automation, are delivered at the right moment!
The moment before impact!!!
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 10th Sep 2013 at 20:26.
HC
I have it second hand from the SP company on the same side of the airfield as you - engage autopilot modes as you pass Vy disengage as late as possible on rig approach. They may have changed their SOPs but that was the way they did it!!
It seems that all 3 companies at Aberdeen need a TRI/E meeting to try and get the best practice from each company - will it ever happen?
HF
HF, I really don't know where you get the "no manual flying allowed" thing from.
It seems that all 3 companies at Aberdeen need a TRI/E meeting to try and get the best practice from each company - will it ever happen?
HF
We are basically **** at flying manually over the ocean without a really, and I mean A REALLY good picture of the surface outside the cockpit window.
I cannot accept, that there is a single pilot flying over the sea that does recognise the safety provisions of a modern DAFCS. For the experienced SAR posters, CRAB and ALBERT, surely you must also recognise this.
However, providing the crew with an autopilot is just one small part of the fix.
If we are to move forward we need to recognise that we are failing to properly prepare the crews for use of automation at almost every level. As a consequence we have failed to not only to ensure it is issued correctly, appropriatly and safely, we have above all failed to mandate its use such that the maximum safety benefits provided by automation, are delivered at the right moment!
I cannot accept, that there is a single pilot flying over the sea that does recognise the safety provisions of a modern DAFCS. For the experienced SAR posters, CRAB and ALBERT, surely you must also recognise this.
However, providing the crew with an autopilot is just one small part of the fix.
If we are to move forward we need to recognise that we are failing to properly prepare the crews for use of automation at almost every level. As a consequence we have failed to not only to ensure it is issued correctly, appropriatly and safely, we have above all failed to mandate its use such that the maximum safety benefits provided by automation, are delivered at the right moment!
) pilots. Knowing which bits of the FCS to use, and when, was what made our job possible.I fear also that just heaping more rules and sop's onto pilots isn't going to prevent similar FU's - just my opinion of course.
Last edited by Al-bert; 10th Sep 2013 at 21:00.
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HF - in an EC225, in DVE conditions why would the crew not make full and complete use of the AP.
Are you seriously suggesting we practice hand flying approaches so we will be able to hand fly them in bad WX. OR are you suggesting that the only time we should use the AP is when the WX is bad??
I try to follow one mantra. Train hard to Fight easy!!
Take the worse environment the law allows you to operate in. Work out the safest way to do it......and do it........and do it......time and time again. One concept, one procedure, one outcome....every time.
I often see procedures that allow the Pilot Fying, during an ILS in good VMC, to look up early and complete the landing. Accepting that to crash, we have to actually hit the ground, to terminate a practice ILS without practicing the bit that generally kills you, the bit at the bottom, is a wasted opportunity.
Do not waste a single opportinity during operations to practice hard in favourable conditions so that when real thing is required it is second nature. This includes the briefing, deployment and use of automation whenever it ensures the safety of the flight path being flown.
.
Are you seriously suggesting we practice hand flying approaches so we will be able to hand fly them in bad WX. OR are you suggesting that the only time we should use the AP is when the WX is bad??
I try to follow one mantra. Train hard to Fight easy!!
Take the worse environment the law allows you to operate in. Work out the safest way to do it......and do it........and do it......time and time again. One concept, one procedure, one outcome....every time.
I often see procedures that allow the Pilot Fying, during an ILS in good VMC, to look up early and complete the landing. Accepting that to crash, we have to actually hit the ground, to terminate a practice ILS without practicing the bit that generally kills you, the bit at the bottom, is a wasted opportunity.
Do not waste a single opportinity during operations to practice hard in favourable conditions so that when real thing is required it is second nature. This includes the briefing, deployment and use of automation whenever it ensures the safety of the flight path being flown.
.
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 10th Sep 2013 at 20:56.
I try to follow one mantra. Train hard to Fight easy!!
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Given the fact that the wreckage and flight recorder have been recovered and analysed and statements that there was no mechanical problem we have to assume it was a flight deck/crew issue.
Not a peep from the two pilots says it all.
Pilot error.
Not a peep from the two pilots says it all.
Pilot error.
No, I think the answer is a mixture of both - train them to use the autopilot properly and monitor it diligently but ensure that sufficient hand-flying skills are practised and retained so that the ability is there to take over if the AP biffs it.
There is train hard fight easy and there is doing the enemy's job for them by taking training too far - I know some would advocate manually flying (cyclic and collective) our SAR transition profiles but that goes against what the automatics are there for - to make things safer in the DVE.
We don't have to be able to do the APs job for it, just recover to a safe flying condition when it gets it wrong.
There is train hard fight easy and there is doing the enemy's job for them by taking training too far - I know some would advocate manually flying (cyclic and collective) our SAR transition profiles but that goes against what the automatics are there for - to make things safer in the DVE.
We don't have to be able to do the APs job for it, just recover to a safe flying condition when it gets it wrong.