AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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CRAB I hear you but....you have failed to correlate the 5 cases cited above where lack of familiarity, lack of procedure and failure to mandate the use of automatics in DVE (Degraded Visual Environment) killed over 30 people.
In all but one case (the S61), the events leading up to the impact started with a low speed/low height loss of control.
We should never, ever, ever, ever practice or do this in the real helicopter with without the use of a 4 axis autopilot. All of these events have arisen from attempted VMC in a DVE. That has nothing to do with hand flying on Instruments which is the confusion you keep bringing to ths thread.
The association of VMC flight not requiring the use of Coupled modes sits right at the heart of the matter here! Make no mistake about this.
Your repeated posting in support of flying by hand in such conditions tells me, that despite your obvious SAR talents, you do not understand the prime causal factors in these events. I will propose that you do not understand BECAUSE you, and the crews you fly with, do not hand fly in DVE beyond the boundaries of acceptable and practical VMC and when you do, you have have your automatics deployed by mandate or as your airmanship dictates.
CRAB you are important to this thread because, unwittingly, I suspect you actually practise what I preach. However, I need you to open your mind beyond the one dimensional view that more hand flying will solve this problem.
Before you reach for the keyboard ask yourself this one Q. Can the best pilot in the world assure a safe flight path flying visually in a DVE in which insufficient visual references exist?
Now tell me that good hand flying would have saved these lives.
DB
In all but one case (the S61), the events leading up to the impact started with a low speed/low height loss of control.
We should never, ever, ever, ever practice or do this in the real helicopter with without the use of a 4 axis autopilot. All of these events have arisen from attempted VMC in a DVE. That has nothing to do with hand flying on Instruments which is the confusion you keep bringing to ths thread.
The association of VMC flight not requiring the use of Coupled modes sits right at the heart of the matter here! Make no mistake about this.
Your repeated posting in support of flying by hand in such conditions tells me, that despite your obvious SAR talents, you do not understand the prime causal factors in these events. I will propose that you do not understand BECAUSE you, and the crews you fly with, do not hand fly in DVE beyond the boundaries of acceptable and practical VMC and when you do, you have have your automatics deployed by mandate or as your airmanship dictates.
CRAB you are important to this thread because, unwittingly, I suspect you actually practise what I preach. However, I need you to open your mind beyond the one dimensional view that more hand flying will solve this problem.
Before you reach for the keyboard ask yourself this one Q. Can the best pilot in the world assure a safe flight path flying visually in a DVE in which insufficient visual references exist?
Now tell me that good hand flying would have saved these lives.
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 10th Sep 2013 at 21:57.
DB
The trouble is - and this is what this thread is all about you are NOT getting the last part of your mantra every time. Otherwise we wouldn't be discussing a possible CFIT.
We all agree that using the autopilot in bad weather is the best method to use. Are you really argueing that NS pilot's don't have the skill set or ability to also use manual flying techniques in good weather - just to keep that side of their professional ability.
I explained before about the difference between getting into an an aircraft and putting an aircraft on, where you feel at one with the a/c rather than just sitting it.
Through my flying of RAF Tutors I meet many fixed wing pilots who are worried that new generation pilots are becoming disconnected from reality as the use of autopilots is nearly mandatory in the FW environment. You only have to read their accident reports to see that basic flying skills seem to have evaporated - especially when the autopilot misbehaves due to icing/leaving tape over static ports - there seems to be an inability to set an attitude and power that you know gives a certain speed in a level attitude.
If the pilot flying had recognised he was entering a UP which was beyond the authority of the autopilot and used the correct hand flying skills to recover from the UP then yes. I presume you don't teach recovery from UPs using the autopilot?
I look forward to the recommendations set out when we see the AIB report.
HF
Take the worse environment the law allows you to operate in. Work out the safest way to do it......and do it........and do it......time and time again. One concept, one procedure, one outcome....every time.
The trouble is - and this is what this thread is all about you are NOT getting the last part of your mantra every time. Otherwise we wouldn't be discussing a possible CFIT.
We all agree that using the autopilot in bad weather is the best method to use. Are you really argueing that NS pilot's don't have the skill set or ability to also use manual flying techniques in good weather - just to keep that side of their professional ability.
I explained before about the difference between getting into an an aircraft and putting an aircraft on, where you feel at one with the a/c rather than just sitting it.
Through my flying of RAF Tutors I meet many fixed wing pilots who are worried that new generation pilots are becoming disconnected from reality as the use of autopilots is nearly mandatory in the FW environment. You only have to read their accident reports to see that basic flying skills seem to have evaporated - especially when the autopilot misbehaves due to icing/leaving tape over static ports - there seems to be an inability to set an attitude and power that you know gives a certain speed in a level attitude.
Now tell me that good hand flying would have saved these lives.
I look forward to the recommendations set out when we see the AIB report.
HF
Last edited by Hummingfrog; 10th Sep 2013 at 22:19.
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Apologise if this has already been posted. From Aviation International News
AAIB report http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...2%20G-WNSB.pdf
In the UK AAIB’s second update on the investigation into the August 23 Eurocopter AS332L2 Super Puma fatal accident, it appears the helicopter was “intact,” with “both engines delivering power,” when it struck the sea. The attitude was near level pitch with a slight right bank. The recorded data shows a deviation from the expected course from about 2 nm from the runway threshold. There, the aircraft was approximately 240 feet below the vertical approach profile, with a rate of descent of approximately 500 fpm and an airspeed of 68 knots. According to a North Sea-based pilot, this amount of vertical deviation is considered major and the aircraft was too slow for such a descent rate. The airspeed continued to reduce speed to below 30 knots, and as it did so the helicopter pitched increasingly nose-up. Flight data shows that the descent rate remained constant for a period, before increasing rapidly. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter struck the sea. The autopilot localizer and vertical speed modes were engaged for the approach, the AAIB noted. The investigation continues.
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 10th Sep 2013 at 23:25.
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How about we train the SLF to watch those standby VSI and iAS dials over the monitoring pilots shoulders in case they have become too absorbed in pressing buttons and not actually flying the aircraft ?
We could then extend our "Intervention culture " from the rig or platform and hopefully prevent an inadvertent coming together of machine and terra firma ?
We could even give them a check ride in the sim every 6 months to keep them current. ....
BG
We could then extend our "Intervention culture " from the rig or platform and hopefully prevent an inadvertent coming together of machine and terra firma ?
We could even give them a check ride in the sim every 6 months to keep them current. ....
BG
I don't expect you to do my job offshore, therefore you shouldn't expect me to be doing yours.
A mutual appreciation of the complexity of each person's role in our industry can only be beneficial, as well as understanding that our industry needs both bus drivers and SLF to function.
If your comment is meant to be humourous, sorry, once you've lost colleagues in this industry that type of humour is IMO inappropriate, especially on this thread where others are trying hard to make a change for the better.
Geeze guys- In the last few pages this thread seems to have developed a high rate of descent itself towards a sea of acrimonious BS.
Let's get back to a civil discussion please. We were doing so well!
Remember that for the last few years a lot of non-pilot / non-engineers / non- helicopter at all folks have started looking at our comments on these threads and in some cases what, amongst us is just ordinary crew room banter, may look like a serious lack of professionalism.
It is distressing to see that that old Mil. VS Civ. attitude is still regrettably alive and well. I think the Turkey / Eagle , genius / idiot and everything in between ratio is about the same on both sides of that trench-line.
Some good may come out of this discussion of the tragedy but not if it degrades into a unsupervised kindergarden recess.
Let's get back to a civil discussion please. We were doing so well!
Remember that for the last few years a lot of non-pilot / non-engineers / non- helicopter at all folks have started looking at our comments on these threads and in some cases what, amongst us is just ordinary crew room banter, may look like a serious lack of professionalism.
It is distressing to see that that old Mil. VS Civ. attitude is still regrettably alive and well. I think the Turkey / Eagle , genius / idiot and everything in between ratio is about the same on both sides of that trench-line.
Some good may come out of this discussion of the tragedy but not if it degrades into a unsupervised kindergarden recess.
Last edited by albatross; 11th Sep 2013 at 03:57.
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HF, in the EC225 pressing the go-around early will recover the aircraft from an onset UP.
Visit the AAIB website and read the report on the Blackpool Accident. These crews were flying mostly by hand in VMC conditions with a very high number of landings. The Commander was vastly experienced in doing this. Yet still they managed to get into trouble in a DVE. You re labouring under the illusion that it could not/would not happen to you if your hand skills are good enough. History proves categorically, time and time again this is a flawed argument.
Good use of automation is a very specific skill set that requires practice and procedure to increase safety and not degrade it. Given what we know of this latest accident I will be bold and say had the crew flown fully coupled it would never have happened. It is that simple.
There has never been an accident caused by loss of AP coupler or Autopilot stabilisation. Flying uncoupled is not the answer here. Flying more coupled is. If all of the above helicopters were flown fully coupled, the accidents would never have happened.
Crews fly uncoupled in DVE because they can. Do you think this option should be removed???
Visit the AAIB website and read the report on the Blackpool Accident. These crews were flying mostly by hand in VMC conditions with a very high number of landings. The Commander was vastly experienced in doing this. Yet still they managed to get into trouble in a DVE. You re labouring under the illusion that it could not/would not happen to you if your hand skills are good enough. History proves categorically, time and time again this is a flawed argument.
Good use of automation is a very specific skill set that requires practice and procedure to increase safety and not degrade it. Given what we know of this latest accident I will be bold and say had the crew flown fully coupled it would never have happened. It is that simple.
There has never been an accident caused by loss of AP coupler or Autopilot stabilisation. Flying uncoupled is not the answer here. Flying more coupled is. If all of the above helicopters were flown fully coupled, the accidents would never have happened.
Crews fly uncoupled in DVE because they can. Do you think this option should be removed???
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 11th Sep 2013 at 02:20.
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YOP if you really are an Olde Pilot then you would know that the term "Pilot Error" is no longer an acceptable closure to any respected AAIB report.
A lot of Swiss cheese holes have already aligned before the pilot presents his own hole to complete the chain. To prevent the accident you must break the chain. The pilot is usually just the last one in the chain.
DB
A lot of Swiss cheese holes have already aligned before the pilot presents his own hole to complete the chain. To prevent the accident you must break the chain. The pilot is usually just the last one in the chain.
DB
Is this not the crux of the problem? Risk management rule #1, accept no unnecessary risk.
4 of the 5 accidents highlighted by DB had weather as a factor. Just because you can fly in crap weather doesn't mean you should; is it appropriate to operate to a deck that only the co-pilot can make the landing? Or fly when TS are forecast because your SOP says the weather forecast is in limits? On the latest accident, where was the alternate if they couldn't get into Sumburgh?
4 of the 5 accidents highlighted by DB had weather as a factor. Just because you can fly in crap weather doesn't mean you should; is it appropriate to operate to a deck that only the co-pilot can make the landing? Or fly when TS are forecast because your SOP says the weather forecast is in limits? On the latest accident, where was the alternate if they couldn't get into Sumburgh?
A lot of Swiss cheese holes have already aligned before the pilot presents his own hole to complete the chain. To prevent the accident you must break the chain. The pilot is usually just the last one in the chain.
I was in the military too and, as I recall, the vast majority of flying was overland VFR. On a lot of days I regularly go flying now, I would be sitting in the crew room while I was in the military watching the weather outside.
Last edited by serf; 11th Sep 2013 at 05:08.
DB, I think you have me wrong here - I am agreeing totally with you that training to use the autopilot in DVE is essential - that is exactly what we do.
But, I am also advocating that sufficient additional training is given to ensure that hand flying skills are kept polished.
We want to avoid the pilot becoming a slave to the AP; he should be confident enough to over-ride it if it malfunctions rather than letting it crash the aircraft because SOPs mandate its use at all times.
The crashes you catalogue could probably have been avoided with better use of AP modes but ultimately their hand flying techniques and skills (or lack thereof) got them into a situation where those skills ran out (the old cliff-edge of ability and task saturation).
Oh SERF - you'll find some areas of the military are required to fly in weather conditions (day or night) when no-one else is
But, I am also advocating that sufficient additional training is given to ensure that hand flying skills are kept polished.
We want to avoid the pilot becoming a slave to the AP; he should be confident enough to over-ride it if it malfunctions rather than letting it crash the aircraft because SOPs mandate its use at all times.
The crashes you catalogue could probably have been avoided with better use of AP modes but ultimately their hand flying techniques and skills (or lack thereof) got them into a situation where those skills ran out (the old cliff-edge of ability and task saturation).
Oh SERF - you'll find some areas of the military are required to fly in weather conditions (day or night) when no-one else is
Albatross
That quote is a load of b----cks. This is nothing to do with civ-mil it is to do with different philosophies. One is use the autopilot all the time and the other is to use the autopilot the majority of the time, especially in poor weather, but on nice VFR days have the opportunity to fly approaches manually to keep up one's manual flying skill set.
DB
You are truely wedded to your idea of always using the autopilot - fair enough but my point is when it all goes past the point of the autopilot being able to recover the a/c, as in this case, what happens?
Is there any form of electrical failure that would knock the autopilot out or degrade its functions?
In the Blackpool accident I believe the Commander was the NHP - the inexperienced (377 hours were on type) copilot was HP.
HF
It is distressing to see that that old Mil. VS Civ. attitude is still regrettably alive and well.
DB
HF, in the EC225 pressing the go-around early will recover the aircraft from an onset UP.
Is there any form of electrical failure that would knock the autopilot out or degrade its functions?
In the Blackpool accident I believe the Commander was the NHP - the inexperienced (377 hours were on type) copilot was HP.
HF
No, the co was flying initially but the capt took over when he lost the plot. However, the capt failed to get the nose above the horizon and flew into the sea many seconds later, seeming more concerned with how the co was feeling than in the flight path. That suggests that all the manual flying he was used to doing gave him a feeling of great confidence which was unfortunately misplaced.
Don't these helicopters have an assigned altitude indicator that you set the MDA/DH at TOD and it barks at you when you reach that altitude, and don't they have a RADALT that you can bug that also barks at you when you arrive at the set height? I don't understand how you can descend below the minima without getting barked out, either by the instrumentation or by the NFP. And somebody must be looking outside when these things start barking at you to check if visual or not....do we know if the crew actually saw anything outside before impacting the water? Unless: I could sort-of understand if they inadvertently lost speed awareness just above the MDA and that caused things to go pear shaped very quickly with insufficient height/time to initiate recovery action.
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Also for ye olde pilot, I'm not sure what world you are living in if you think that 2 pilots involved in an accident resulting in 4 fatalities, with the inquiries and court cases that is going to involve, are going to come on an Internet forum and say what happened, just to keep you happy!
Maxwelg2
I don't expect you to do my job offshore, therefore you shouldn't expect me to be doing yours.
If I knew what your job was I could perhaps comment appropriately, you perhaps assume that I am a pilot which I am not in the sense of this forum however I do fly helicopters.
A mutual appreciation of the complexity of each person's role in our industry can only be beneficial, as well as understanding that our industry needs both bus drivers and SLF to function.
Couldn't agree more and this thread has been a fantastic exchange of ideas from both aviators and offshore workers and it would be a great outcome if they are all considered when the proposed review of NS flying procedures takes place.
If your comment is meant to be humourous, sorry, once you've lost colleagues in this industry that type of humour is IMO inappropriate, especially on this thread where others are trying hard to make a change for the better.
Humorous nope, I have lost colleagues in a similar accident and can only wish,pray and work hard to ensure we all learn the lessons from them ensuring they never happen again on our watch.
I don't expect you to do my job offshore, therefore you shouldn't expect me to be doing yours.
If I knew what your job was I could perhaps comment appropriately, you perhaps assume that I am a pilot which I am not in the sense of this forum however I do fly helicopters.
A mutual appreciation of the complexity of each person's role in our industry can only be beneficial, as well as understanding that our industry needs both bus drivers and SLF to function.
Couldn't agree more and this thread has been a fantastic exchange of ideas from both aviators and offshore workers and it would be a great outcome if they are all considered when the proposed review of NS flying procedures takes place.
If your comment is meant to be humourous, sorry, once you've lost colleagues in this industry that type of humour is IMO inappropriate, especially on this thread where others are trying hard to make a change for the better.
Humorous nope, I have lost colleagues in a similar accident and can only wish,pray and work hard to ensure we all learn the lessons from them ensuring they never happen again on our watch.
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I've just "googled" the abbreviation DVE - another new one since I hung up my headset! How degraded must the conditions be they officially become a "degraded visual environment?"
However, to return to the subjects on the thread: my thoughts are, if there is any doubt about "getting in", do a coupled approach. Over the sea, on a "gloupy night" qualifies, in my view, for using all the help you can get. However, if it's a few km of vis and say 500' ceiling on an ILS/localiser approach, why not hand fly whenever the conditions are reasonable.
Otherwise, how DO you keep in practice, either for a proficiency check, where I presume you still need to demonstrate hand-flying ability, or when some or all of the autopilot functions are no longer available? Crab gets it right when he says that flying is a degradable skill - use it or you will lose it!
I appreciate that this sad event off Sumburgh - to judge by the contents of this forum - seems to have been due management of the autopilot functions, rather than manual flying skills. However, it worries me that we may have a generation of pilots who are out of their "comfort zone" when manually flying.
However, to return to the subjects on the thread: my thoughts are, if there is any doubt about "getting in", do a coupled approach. Over the sea, on a "gloupy night" qualifies, in my view, for using all the help you can get. However, if it's a few km of vis and say 500' ceiling on an ILS/localiser approach, why not hand fly whenever the conditions are reasonable.
Otherwise, how DO you keep in practice, either for a proficiency check, where I presume you still need to demonstrate hand-flying ability, or when some or all of the autopilot functions are no longer available? Crab gets it right when he says that flying is a degradable skill - use it or you will lose it!
I appreciate that this sad event off Sumburgh - to judge by the contents of this forum - seems to have been due management of the autopilot functions, rather than manual flying skills. However, it worries me that we may have a generation of pilots who are out of their "comfort zone" when manually flying.
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It is a disgrace that there is not a full ILS available on runway 09 at Sumburgh, given the lousy weather factor for that airport. Also, I've just managed to find the AIP pages for Scatsta. No ILS there either.
Perhaps it would be better had Shetland remained part of Norway!!
Perhaps it would be better had Shetland remained part of Norway!!
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Lingo Dan's comments reminded me - just why has the term become the more verbose "degraded visual environment" rather than just "poor visibility"? 25 letters to 14 - and that's without calling it "poor vis" as most of us use!
And absolutely, use autopilot whenever wx poor, as it was here with 2800m vis and 200/300ft cloudbase, but with two pilots, as LD says, why not one practice hand flying (some of the time) if confident cloudbase is 500ft with say 5ks + vis, with the other monitoring of course? Maybe it does happen in the NS - does it? Is is permitted even?
And absolutely, use autopilot whenever wx poor, as it was here with 2800m vis and 200/300ft cloudbase, but with two pilots, as LD says, why not one practice hand flying (some of the time) if confident cloudbase is 500ft with say 5ks + vis, with the other monitoring of course? Maybe it does happen in the NS - does it? Is is permitted even?
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HF, in the EC225 pressing the go-around early will recover the aircraft from an onset UP.
Visit the AAIB website and read the report on the Blackpool Accident. These crews were flying mostly by hand in VMC conditions with a very high number of landings. The Commander was vastly experienced in doing this. Yet still they managed to get into trouble in a DVE. You re labouring under the illusion that it could not/would not happen to you if your hand skills are good enough. History proves categorically, time and time again this is a flawed argument.
Good use of automation is a very specific skill set that requires practice and procedure to increase safety and not degrade it. Given what we know of this latest accident I will be bold and say had the crew flown fully coupled it would never have happened. It is that simple.
There has never been an accident caused by loss of AP coupler or Autopilot stabilisation. Flying uncoupled is not the answer here. Flying more coupled is. If all of the above helicopters were flown fully coupled, the accidents would never have happened.
Crews fly uncoupled in DVE because they can. Do you think this option should be removed???
Visit the AAIB website and read the report on the Blackpool Accident. These crews were flying mostly by hand in VMC conditions with a very high number of landings. The Commander was vastly experienced in doing this. Yet still they managed to get into trouble in a DVE. You re labouring under the illusion that it could not/would not happen to you if your hand skills are good enough. History proves categorically, time and time again this is a flawed argument.
Good use of automation is a very specific skill set that requires practice and procedure to increase safety and not degrade it. Given what we know of this latest accident I will be bold and say had the crew flown fully coupled it would never have happened. It is that simple.
There has never been an accident caused by loss of AP coupler or Autopilot stabilisation. Flying uncoupled is not the answer here. Flying more coupled is. If all of the above helicopters were flown fully coupled, the accidents would never have happened.
Crews fly uncoupled in DVE because they can. Do you think this option should be removed???
The modern day automation is a fantastic step forward and undoubtedly the greatest aid to safety in the offshore environment. The problem is those who insist on not using it properly and fail to embrace it fully.
I too remember my days of flying without any autopilot at all and only basic AFCS in all sorts of ****tiness, and it was occasionally bloody scary. No need for it these days. The AP and AFCS is a “no-go” item for a reason.
DB - you beat me to it with the stats! Al-Bert you memory is clearly fading and the rose tinted glasses are getting steamy! You know as well as I that the RAF has had more than its fair share of CFIT. Go further and compare the number of flying hours flown in the NS vs the RAF per year and the CFIT stats are relatively low in the NS. I knew several RAF CFIT stats personally. Your glorious career of under 200 hrs per year is all well and good, but i know people who have flown an average of over 600 hrs per year for over 30 years amassing over 20,000hrs in the NS and they have never ended up in the water either!
The reality is that we need to go further with automation and develop better SOPs and software modes and embrace it fully. We can and do still maintain hand flying skills, but we should not do that to the detriment of using the safety devices we are being provided with.
Last edited by 26500lbs; 11th Sep 2013 at 12:27.
Brian Abraham:
From the excerpt you posted from AAIB issued information, one will ask one's self:
were the pilots flying the aircraft or was the aircraft flying the pilots? (See the points on "over reliance on automation" rather than YOP's vague "pilot error" depending upon the answer to that question.
IF, and this is a big IF, the crew were doing a form of automatic approach, at what point did the crew realize "it's gone wrong" and try to salvage it? Hopefully, a more complete report will clear that up, or show that this supposition is incorrect.
crab:
Will management listen to such talk?
26500
This is not a new problem. I'll set aside the issue of "using the systems properly" as that is its own subject. I'll address the distraction piece.
Anecdote: some gents I knew, a bit over 20 years ago, skipped an SH-60B off of the surface of the ocean (fractions of a second away from a crash when one of the crew bellowed for power) as they settled toward the water, coupled at night during a low approach (SAR training exercise, IIRC) both a bit too interested in the tactical display and the PF not quite attentive to the bottom falling out from under the aircraft. The aircraft was damaged, and often referred to afterwards as "Skippy" by people in the know. It did not end up at the bottom of the sea, but could have easily enough.
A few other crews over the years did something similar, but didn't catch it in time and put aircraft into the water due to distraction from the flying task. Clear roles in PF duties and priority, and PNF duties and priority, were a topic of a lot of squadron briefings and sim period emphasis, yet still stuff like that happened. In our wing, one of the better intitiatives was the empowerment of the aircrew in the back (systems/radar operators, SAR swimmers when demanded) too more actively yell for power or call altitude during particular evolutions. Saved no few cockpit crews from a cock up, that did, over the years.
Question for NS operators: is there a "sterile cockpit" period in NS pax flights similar to the "sterile cockpit" standards for fixed wing airline flying?
From the excerpt you posted from AAIB issued information, one will ask one's self:
were the pilots flying the aircraft or was the aircraft flying the pilots? (See the points on "over reliance on automation" rather than YOP's vague "pilot error" depending upon the answer to that question.
IF, and this is a big IF, the crew were doing a form of automatic approach, at what point did the crew realize "it's gone wrong" and try to salvage it? Hopefully, a more complete report will clear that up, or show that this supposition is incorrect.
crab:
We want to avoid the pilot becoming a slave to the AP; he should be confident enough to over-ride it if it malfunctions rather than letting it crash the aircraft because SOPs mandate its use at all times
26500
We have to get back to reality here. Assuming this was another CFIT (which seems most likely) it is another clear case not of poor hand flying skills but of poor use of automation. All of the CFIT accidents in the NS in the last few years would have been avoided completely if the automation had been used properly.
We MUST be teaching people to fly the coupler and use the automation better. My experience from sitting in the back of the sim is that very often people are just not using the automation properly and to its full potential, resulting in the worst form of flying - neither fully coupled nor fully manual. I find that almost all pilots fly without problem when fully decoupled. We train all to fly AFCS off precision and non precision approaches, (usually OEI or with other malfunctions.) It is very rare that they cannot do this and almost always fly without problem to minima, very often with a missed approach as well! We train this in every OPC/LPC. Where we almost always see problems is when people get coupler confusion. This is invariably due to partial coupling followed by distraction and stress. Lack of good and thorough understanding of the coupler/AP increases their stress. Those who suffer this are invariably those who blindly refuse to use it properly or practice using it properly during normal line flying.
We MUST be teaching people to fly the coupler and use the automation better. My experience from sitting in the back of the sim is that very often people are just not using the automation properly and to its full potential, resulting in the worst form of flying - neither fully coupled nor fully manual. I find that almost all pilots fly without problem when fully decoupled. We train all to fly AFCS off precision and non precision approaches, (usually OEI or with other malfunctions.) It is very rare that they cannot do this and almost always fly without problem to minima, very often with a missed approach as well! We train this in every OPC/LPC. Where we almost always see problems is when people get coupler confusion. This is invariably due to partial coupling followed by distraction and stress. Lack of good and thorough understanding of the coupler/AP increases their stress. Those who suffer this are invariably those who blindly refuse to use it properly or practice using it properly during normal line flying.
Anecdote: some gents I knew, a bit over 20 years ago, skipped an SH-60B off of the surface of the ocean (fractions of a second away from a crash when one of the crew bellowed for power) as they settled toward the water, coupled at night during a low approach (SAR training exercise, IIRC) both a bit too interested in the tactical display and the PF not quite attentive to the bottom falling out from under the aircraft. The aircraft was damaged, and often referred to afterwards as "Skippy" by people in the know. It did not end up at the bottom of the sea, but could have easily enough.
A few other crews over the years did something similar, but didn't catch it in time and put aircraft into the water due to distraction from the flying task. Clear roles in PF duties and priority, and PNF duties and priority, were a topic of a lot of squadron briefings and sim period emphasis, yet still stuff like that happened. In our wing, one of the better intitiatives was the empowerment of the aircrew in the back (systems/radar operators, SAR swimmers when demanded) too more actively yell for power or call altitude during particular evolutions. Saved no few cockpit crews from a cock up, that did, over the years.
Question for NS operators: is there a "sterile cockpit" period in NS pax flights similar to the "sterile cockpit" standards for fixed wing airline flying?
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 11th Sep 2013 at 13:05.
Sterile cockpit
Yes, certainly in Bristow anyway. However one has to be careful with such concepts. The Ops Man A has had the concept for sterile cockpit for a while. It started out as being in place for takeoff, approach and landing. Then there were some issues with misunderstood departure clearances, so the whole taxi phase was included which in Aberdeen can last 20 mins or so. Then as a result of ATC's fatuous obsession with alt busts being the most evil thing in aviation, the whole climb to cruising level, and descent from cruising level, was included. Thus on a 225 which might be cruising at say FL70, that means the first perhaps 30 mins, and the last say 30 mins (descend from FL70 at 500'/min, an instrument approach, taxy back), plus somewhat less for the offshore arrival and departure, and you end up with a good chunk of the flight sterile cockpit - supposedly! So by overdoing it, the whole thing becomes devalued.
Unfortunately these sort of creeping changes are often done in response to external pressure, rather than as part of any joined-up thinking.
Unfortunately these sort of creeping changes are often done in response to external pressure, rather than as part of any joined-up thinking.