Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
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the comment was really aimed more at manning and infrastructure than aircraft levels. Four (notional) squadrons plus two airfields is a lot to provide 10 deployable aircraft. If the lot had been consolidated to one station, one squadron maybe the financials could have worked. Sorry, I'm just cogitating but it seems the RN used to do it with less overhead
james
Have the Royal Navy never undertaken a 'relief in place' (I know they have because WEBF usually posts a link when one T23/T25/T42 is replaced bya nother
). In reality this is all that the RAF and Army are doing as well by having 'x' number of personal and equipment to meet 'y' task. You've got to remember that once the RAF / Army have deployed then routine training for those crews/assets (i.e equipment) stops. Deploy these crews for too long and they suffer skill fade (amongst other things) and at some point the aircraft will generally require some form of depth maintenance.
Even when the SHAR was about they required a land base (Yeovilton) to train and a carrier or two from which to train/fight. IIRC it was three squadrons (801, 802 and 899). So still two locations and two sets of manning (RNAS Yeovilton still had manpower that was not part of the carrier). Granted there were other assets at Yeovilton but the RN still had the same problem. Even the F35 will have a land base (or two). The big difference between the two services is how harmony is calculated (again, another thread all on its own!). And for family life I'd rather have the RAF policy than the RN! But that, as ever, is just my opinion!
Have the Royal Navy never undertaken a 'relief in place' (I know they have because WEBF usually posts a link when one T23/T25/T42 is replaced bya nother
). In reality this is all that the RAF and Army are doing as well by having 'x' number of personal and equipment to meet 'y' task. You've got to remember that once the RAF / Army have deployed then routine training for those crews/assets (i.e equipment) stops. Deploy these crews for too long and they suffer skill fade (amongst other things) and at some point the aircraft will generally require some form of depth maintenance.
the comment was really aimed more at manning and infrastructure than aircraft levels
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thats a slightly disingenuous argument The four squadrons of the GR9 fleet were split over two bases with no other co-located assets - except while at sea or on Ops. The whole of the SHAR fleet was in one location (except when at sea) on a base which had numerous other units co-located
From what I can remember, 800 and 801 could and did deploy to sea for extended periods with a total of around 18 aircraft (more in the early days) leaving the rest shorebased with 899. They only started with 34 airframes (though there was a later attrition batch) so their deployable fleet was around 50%. And of course in a push they could - and did - deploy the whole lot except for the ones retained at Boscombe. Obviously they were helped by having the four Blue Fox Hunters
It still seems to me that the way the GR9 fleet was oorganised would make the arrangements seem very bad value for money in comparison to the Treasury
From what I can remember, 800 and 801 could and did deploy to sea for extended periods with a total of around 18 aircraft (more in the early days) leaving the rest shorebased with 899. They only started with 34 airframes (though there was a later attrition batch) so their deployable fleet was around 50%. And of course in a push they could - and did - deploy the whole lot except for the ones retained at Boscombe. Obviously they were helped by having the four Blue Fox Hunters
It still seems to me that the way the GR9 fleet was oorganised would make the arrangements seem very bad value for money in comparison to the Treasury
If I remember correctly, the initial plan for the CVS was to carry 9 ASW Sea Kings, as it was primarily an ASW asset, and 5 Sea Harriers to "hack the shad", i.e. knock down the Russian Bear aircraft that was shadowing the CVS.
To put 5 to sea, Sea Harrier Sqns had about 8 or 9 airframes. So originally 16/18 Sqn frames from a buy of 34, and 5-10 at sea at any one time from 34......
Falklands war deployment was not using long term sustainable numbers, but everything including the kitchen sink.
But I'm working from memory, am not, and never have been, in the RN, and only had a passing relationship with the CVS empire......
Oh yes, by the way, the RN have 4 SSBNs to be able to ensure 100% of the time that one is at sea.....!!!
To put 5 to sea, Sea Harrier Sqns had about 8 or 9 airframes. So originally 16/18 Sqn frames from a buy of 34, and 5-10 at sea at any one time from 34......
Falklands war deployment was not using long term sustainable numbers, but everything including the kitchen sink.
But I'm working from memory, am not, and never have been, in the RN, and only had a passing relationship with the CVS empire......
Oh yes, by the way, the RN have 4 SSBNs to be able to ensure 100% of the time that one is at sea.....!!!
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Jimlad, your post on the last page was so good that it deserves to be posted at the top of every page from now on (am I WEBF in disguise?)
In one fell, balanced swoop you have encapsulated the true nature of the thinking behind the decision.
So, to summarise, not bonkers but pragmatic. The challenge to regenerate is on, but it is one that both Services must work together to achieve. This thread should be allowed to move on just as both the RN and RAF must do if this is to be made to work.
The Harrier force did a sterling job on HERRICK, but at the cost of massively reducing available assets for carrier ops. The decision was taken in one of the pre SDSR planning rounds to reduce the number of GR9s available for deployment (colloquially known as FE@R) to around 10-12 (can’t remember which). This was, as I recall, designed to ensure that the RAF / RN had available a small force to continue carrier seedcorn capability when the assumption was that we’d be transitioning to STOVL JSF.
So, accordingly the GR9 fleet was reduced in terms of funding to ensure that it could deliver when required 10-12 operational airframes, plus sufficient spares / training / other in the system. I know that people that worked on the frames felt that more could have been available if required, but in practise, the planning assumption for the GR9 post HERRICK was that it existed solely to keep the RN /RAF in the carrier capability business.
This was a recognition that the GR4 provided a far better overall level of capability, and that the GR9 / CVS combination was getting older, with reduced availability in the last few years of its life, and that the money didn’t exist for a proper level of funding to keep it going at previous levels. In an ideal world we’d have kept it, but the money wasn’t there. Or rather, the money pot existed and the defence board, acting on the guidance of the service officers who drew up the planning round options, chose to take the option to reduce GR9 FE@R funding, in order to prioritise more important issues. There was no ‘carriers are bad’ rubbish that the Carrier Fanatics on the internet like to come up with – I should know – I’m dark blue and I also saw many of the options (and the costings). GR9 was saved when we still planned on doing STOVL ops.
The problem that GR9 had was that having taken the decision to move to CTOL, and having protected it through justifying it for STOVL seedcorn capability, the GR9 became too exposed when SDSR gave ever bigger cuts. Essentially it went from being a ‘need to have’ to a ‘nice to have’ as we can make arrangements for carrier flying in other ways. Yes it hurts, and I don’t like capability gaps, but all the services have taken massive pain recently, and unfortunately the RN/RAF lost this as a capability.
You could make a reasonable argument that the shift to CTOL has killed the RNs fast jet maritime air presence as it rapidly became clear that to do so meant we could take risk on GR9. Had we kept STOVL I can’t help but wonder whether GR9 may well still be in some form of limited service.
However, in total pre SDSR, we could have put 10 airframes to sea as a best effort, and to do so would have effectively taken our entire carrier qualified strength of pilots.
So, accordingly the GR9 fleet was reduced in terms of funding to ensure that it could deliver when required 10-12 operational airframes, plus sufficient spares / training / other in the system. I know that people that worked on the frames felt that more could have been available if required, but in practise, the planning assumption for the GR9 post HERRICK was that it existed solely to keep the RN /RAF in the carrier capability business.
This was a recognition that the GR4 provided a far better overall level of capability, and that the GR9 / CVS combination was getting older, with reduced availability in the last few years of its life, and that the money didn’t exist for a proper level of funding to keep it going at previous levels. In an ideal world we’d have kept it, but the money wasn’t there. Or rather, the money pot existed and the defence board, acting on the guidance of the service officers who drew up the planning round options, chose to take the option to reduce GR9 FE@R funding, in order to prioritise more important issues. There was no ‘carriers are bad’ rubbish that the Carrier Fanatics on the internet like to come up with – I should know – I’m dark blue and I also saw many of the options (and the costings). GR9 was saved when we still planned on doing STOVL ops.
The problem that GR9 had was that having taken the decision to move to CTOL, and having protected it through justifying it for STOVL seedcorn capability, the GR9 became too exposed when SDSR gave ever bigger cuts. Essentially it went from being a ‘need to have’ to a ‘nice to have’ as we can make arrangements for carrier flying in other ways. Yes it hurts, and I don’t like capability gaps, but all the services have taken massive pain recently, and unfortunately the RN/RAF lost this as a capability.
You could make a reasonable argument that the shift to CTOL has killed the RNs fast jet maritime air presence as it rapidly became clear that to do so meant we could take risk on GR9. Had we kept STOVL I can’t help but wonder whether GR9 may well still be in some form of limited service.
However, in total pre SDSR, we could have put 10 airframes to sea as a best effort, and to do so would have effectively taken our entire carrier qualified strength of pilots.
So, to summarise, not bonkers but pragmatic. The challenge to regenerate is on, but it is one that both Services must work together to achieve. This thread should be allowed to move on just as both the RN and RAF must do if this is to be made to work.
This thread should be allowed to move on just as both the RN and RAF must do if this is to be made to work
There does seem to have been a lot of smoke and mirrors over this issue, including:
- The materiel state of the Harriers (the view that they are knackered has been disputed by several posters - such as here and here.
- The number of carrier qualified pilots in the Harrier force (disputed here - SammySu also discusses the state of the aircraft).
- The level of escorting needed for a CVS (1100 men? Really? How many Type 42s (complement: 287), Type 45s (complement: 190), or Type 23s (complement: 185) does that equal? Ocean seems to have a single escort (Liverpool - also doing NGS and boardings) at the moment - so why would a CVS need more? If Illustrious relieves Ocean, will she need more? Why?)
- The importance of the Carrier Strike capability and the issues that relate to skills needed for the future, which the First Sea Lord flagged up to the Defence Committee in the Commons (thinking of the skills needed aboard the carrier perhaps - including those parts of ship where there will be no or very few exchanges), or more recently to RUSI.
Two of our European allies, Italy and Spain, operate a small number of AV8B+s purely for carrier operations, aided by a Memorandum Of Understanding with the US. If only we could do the same (as suggested here), it would solve so many problems (including reducing the strain being placed on the RAF).
Will there be lessons learnt after this campaign - with changes to SDSR? Not just about Harriers, or friagate/destroyer numbers, but also Tornado numbers, ISTAR assets such as ASTOR (and indeed Sea King ASaCs), or even the issue of do we need to marinise more Apaches, and prepare for longer periods of Apaches being embarked aboard Ocean or Illustrious for attacking targets ashore?
Perhaps the biggest lesson is that unexpected things happen - unexpectedly?
- The materiel state of the Harriers (the view that they are knackered has been disputed by several posters - such as here and here.
- The number of carrier qualified pilots in the Harrier force (disputed here - SammySu also discusses the state of the aircraft).
- The level of escorting needed for a CVS (1100 men? Really? How many Type 42s (complement: 287), Type 45s (complement: 190), or Type 23s (complement: 185) does that equal? Ocean seems to have a single escort (Liverpool - also doing NGS and boardings) at the moment - so why would a CVS need more? If Illustrious relieves Ocean, will she need more? Why?)
- The importance of the Carrier Strike capability and the issues that relate to skills needed for the future, which the First Sea Lord flagged up to the Defence Committee in the Commons (thinking of the skills needed aboard the carrier perhaps - including those parts of ship where there will be no or very few exchanges), or more recently to RUSI.
Two of our European allies, Italy and Spain, operate a small number of AV8B+s purely for carrier operations, aided by a Memorandum Of Understanding with the US. If only we could do the same (as suggested here), it would solve so many problems (including reducing the strain being placed on the RAF).
Will there be lessons learnt after this campaign - with changes to SDSR? Not just about Harriers, or friagate/destroyer numbers, but also Tornado numbers, ISTAR assets such as ASTOR (and indeed Sea King ASaCs), or even the issue of do we need to marinise more Apaches, and prepare for longer periods of Apaches being embarked aboard Ocean or Illustrious for attacking targets ashore?
Perhaps the biggest lesson is that unexpected things happen - unexpectedly?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 19th Aug 2011 at 10:42.
Please WEBF, for the love of all things sacred, let it go. It seems to me that you have some kind of Aspergers issues (and I say this with good intent) and as such I can understand to a point why you have difficulties in trying to move on from things.
However, you have to understand that the decision has been taken, and its not going to be reversed. There is no money out there to reverse the decision, there is no will on the part of the politicians to make yet another U turn, and its not going to happen.
Clutching at tiny straws, and writing letters as a one man band won't achieve anything. I admire your efforts in not letting go, but you've now become a standing joke on this and other fora. When people start rolling their eyes and groaning because they know that the merest mention of a harrier is going to get you turning up and spamming the thread with endless links, you know its time to give up the game.
Please, step back now, and try to think about what your nearly 10 years of campaigning on this issue have acheived. Absolutely nothing.
However, you have to understand that the decision has been taken, and its not going to be reversed. There is no money out there to reverse the decision, there is no will on the part of the politicians to make yet another U turn, and its not going to happen.
Clutching at tiny straws, and writing letters as a one man band won't achieve anything. I admire your efforts in not letting go, but you've now become a standing joke on this and other fora. When people start rolling their eyes and groaning because they know that the merest mention of a harrier is going to get you turning up and spamming the thread with endless links, you know its time to give up the game.
Please, step back now, and try to think about what your nearly 10 years of campaigning on this issue have acheived. Absolutely nothing.
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The Harrier force did a sterling job on HERRICK, but at the cost of massively reducing available assets for carrier ops. The decision was taken in one of the pre SDSR planning rounds to reduce the number of GR9s available for deployment (colloquially known as FE@R) to around 10-12 (can’t remember which). This was, as I recall, designed to ensure that the RAF / RN had available a small force to continue carrier seedcorn capability when the assumption was that we’d be transitioning to STOVL JSF.
and that the GR9 / CVS combination was getting older, with reduced availability in the last few years of its life
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So still two locations and two sets of manning (RNAS Yeovilton still had manpower that was not part of the carrier). Granted there were other assets at Yeovilton
Kevlar on!
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I've worked it out, WEBF isn't Lord W or Sharkey he's Vickie Pollard... yeah but no but.......
Only joking, life would be dull without him and his links here and here and here and everywhere
Ps I hear there was some RN fixed wing flying at WITT last week. Shame they needed help getting airborne!!
Inter-Services Regional Competition
Only joking, life would be dull without him and his links here and here and here and everywhere
Ps I hear there was some RN fixed wing flying at WITT last week. Shame they needed help getting airborne!!
Inter-Services Regional Competition
Just
I'm not saying that the RN didnt do carrier ops during HERRICK - it did. What happened though was that the RN wasn't doing anywhere near as much as it used to do. This had an impact on the ability to generate meaningful dets - if you take a look at what the RN put to sea in this period, we went from 14- 18 airframe detachments, which did occur ocassionally during the late 90s, early 2000s to an average of 4-6 aircraft at best, and the RN was heavily reliant on foreign nations to keep its carrier skills alive even then. This is in no way a slur on the Harrier force who were working incredibly hard on HERRICK and elsewhere to maintain the skills needed. The reality is though that once HERRICK began, the RN ceased to have the ability to sustain carrier operations except for short bursts, and even then in reduced numbers. Despite what the RN tries to portray, the reality is that we've not done a sustained carrier deployment with reasonable sized airwing (i.e. more than just a token presence to keep skills alive) for the best part of a decade.
As soon as the Harrier came off HERRICK, it immediately saw planning round options being raised that took it to 10 FE@R, which was designed to keep basic carrier capability only. In the planners eyes, as soon as GR9 was off HERRICK it was clear that it was never going to be deployed again operationally - the fleet was just too small. Having suffered in an area which scrutinised said options during this time , I am happy in saying that while all round generation may have been an aspiration, the thing that saved GR9 was the need to keep carrier STOVL seedcorn capability.
I'm not saying that the RN didnt do carrier ops during HERRICK - it did. What happened though was that the RN wasn't doing anywhere near as much as it used to do. This had an impact on the ability to generate meaningful dets - if you take a look at what the RN put to sea in this period, we went from 14- 18 airframe detachments, which did occur ocassionally during the late 90s, early 2000s to an average of 4-6 aircraft at best, and the RN was heavily reliant on foreign nations to keep its carrier skills alive even then. This is in no way a slur on the Harrier force who were working incredibly hard on HERRICK and elsewhere to maintain the skills needed. The reality is though that once HERRICK began, the RN ceased to have the ability to sustain carrier operations except for short bursts, and even then in reduced numbers. Despite what the RN tries to portray, the reality is that we've not done a sustained carrier deployment with reasonable sized airwing (i.e. more than just a token presence to keep skills alive) for the best part of a decade.
As soon as the Harrier came off HERRICK, it immediately saw planning round options being raised that took it to 10 FE@R, which was designed to keep basic carrier capability only. In the planners eyes, as soon as GR9 was off HERRICK it was clear that it was never going to be deployed again operationally - the fleet was just too small. Having suffered in an area which scrutinised said options during this time , I am happy in saying that while all round generation may have been an aspiration, the thing that saved GR9 was the need to keep carrier STOVL seedcorn capability.
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we went from 14- 18 airframe detachments, which did occur ocassionally during the late 90s, early 2000s to an average of 4-6 aircraft at best
Despite what the RN tries to portray, the reality is that we've not done a sustained carrier deployment with reasonable sized airwing (i.e. more than just a token presence to keep skills alive) for the best part of a decade.
In the planners eyes, as soon as GR9 was off HERRICK it was clear that it was never going to be deployed again operationally - the fleet was just too small
Just
I'm not saying you didnt deploy - but a 7 week short embarkation is very different from a sustained work up, deployment that the RN used to do. I'm probably not far off the mark if I said that your 7 week deployment was the sole 2007 GR9 embarkation of any size? Thats the problem with the size of the available fleet once we went from SHAR to GR9 (a move which made a lot of sense to me) - a reduced FE@R meant we couldnt do both.
I still maintain that having looked at the size and capability RN CAGS since the war, the combined FA2 / GR7 airwings we put out in the late 90s, along with ASACs, Merlin, new escorts and good AORs were probably the single most capable carrier airwing the UK has ever operated.
I'm not saying you didnt deploy - but a 7 week short embarkation is very different from a sustained work up, deployment that the RN used to do. I'm probably not far off the mark if I said that your 7 week deployment was the sole 2007 GR9 embarkation of any size? Thats the problem with the size of the available fleet once we went from SHAR to GR9 (a move which made a lot of sense to me) - a reduced FE@R meant we couldnt do both.
I still maintain that having looked at the size and capability RN CAGS since the war, the combined FA2 / GR7 airwings we put out in the late 90s, along with ASACs, Merlin, new escorts and good AORs were probably the single most capable carrier airwing the UK has ever operated.
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a 7 week short embarkation is very different from a sustained work up, deployment that the RN used to do. I'm probably not far off the mark if I said that your 7 week deployment was the sole 2007 GR9 embarkation of any size?
This is incorrect.
You then said that the GR force didn't deploy like the SHAR. As stated, that was because it was never planned to. The point is that during HERRICK the Harrier was still able to deploy to sea at a Sqn sized level and undertake full size exercises.
Thats the problem with the size of the available fleet once we went from SHAR to GR9 (a move which made a lot of sense to me) - a reduced FE@R meant we couldnt do both.
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If you think about it, the "bonkers" decision was made yeas ago, when the RAF were given the original Harriers. Some of you may remember that the original tasking of the UK-based GR1/GR3 fleet was to act as CAS / flying artillery for the Royal Marines in the event of a Soviet push into Norway (as was 3CBAS and elements of 845/846) Would have made more sense to have handed them to Navy control, maybe under a joint manning agreement like 3CBAS used. Then all this interservice conflict would never have happened
James,
Given that the RAF were operating Harriers in Germany at that time, your suggestion would probably just have started interservice conflict over Harriers even earlier - or are you also suggesting, in the spirit of your UK based Harriers going to the RN concept, that the Germany based Harriers should have been given to the AAC to operate?
Nice try....
Given that the RAF were operating Harriers in Germany at that time, your suggestion would probably just have started interservice conflict over Harriers even earlier - or are you also suggesting, in the spirit of your UK based Harriers going to the RN concept, that the Germany based Harriers should have been given to the AAC to operate?
Nice try....