Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
jamesdevice,
Nice Try:
"If you think about it, the "bonkers" decision was made years ago, when the RAF were given the original Harriers. Some of you may remember that the original tasking of the UK-based GR1/GR3 fleet was to act as CAS / flying artillery for the Royal Marines in the event of a Soviet push into Norway (as was 3CBAS and elements of 845/846) Would have made more sense to have handed them to Navy control, maybe under a joint manning agreement like 3CBAS used. Then all this interservice conflict would never have happened".
The UK Harrier GR1s/3s which I flew in the 70s and 80s were assigned to the ACE Mobile Force of NATO. As such, Northern Norway was just one of our many options. Others included Denmark, reinforcement of the RAFG Harrier Force, and other options further South, plus operational commitments to places such as Gib, for example. Not all of these options were exercised in peacetime. As a matter of interest our usual Taceval deployment destination was either Denmark or RAFG, not Norway.
Are you related to WEBF by the way?
Nice Try:
"If you think about it, the "bonkers" decision was made years ago, when the RAF were given the original Harriers. Some of you may remember that the original tasking of the UK-based GR1/GR3 fleet was to act as CAS / flying artillery for the Royal Marines in the event of a Soviet push into Norway (as was 3CBAS and elements of 845/846) Would have made more sense to have handed them to Navy control, maybe under a joint manning agreement like 3CBAS used. Then all this interservice conflict would never have happened".
The UK Harrier GR1s/3s which I flew in the 70s and 80s were assigned to the ACE Mobile Force of NATO. As such, Northern Norway was just one of our many options. Others included Denmark, reinforcement of the RAFG Harrier Force, and other options further South, plus operational commitments to places such as Gib, for example. Not all of these options were exercised in peacetime. As a matter of interest our usual Taceval deployment destination was either Denmark or RAFG, not Norway.
Are you related to WEBF by the way?
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Torquay, England
Posts: 838
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Decision to axe Harriers is "bonkers"
Originally Posted by Jimlad1
However, you have to understand that the decision has been taken, and its not going to be reversed. There is no money out there to reverse the decision, there is no will on the part of the politicians to make yet another U turn, and its not going to happen.
I can fully understand and agree with the RAF stance of opting for the Tornado option rather than the harrier...
The RAF have the luxury of thirty miles long strips of concrete with nice football pitches, volley ball courts, McDonalds, and countless other take away outlets, plus sports facilities and other home comforts to while away their off duty periods.
The Harrier is not an aircraft that was designed to fly from these conventional resorts,
they were designed for a different role where short take off, vertical landings where the order of the day. This was at the expense perhaps of not having the range, speed or carrying capacity of other fixed wing, fast jets. If I were in the RAF and I had to make this decision then it is a no brainer. The no brainer however is this is a short sighted decision that comes with a huge cost... It is 'bonkers' to suggest that aircraft operating from the UK or Italy can respond or react as quickly as any aircraft stationed just 50 miles from the required scenes of the current action. (which was a known event when this decision was made) It is 'bonkers' to try to suggest otherwise, it is bonkers to have an expensive aircraft carrier that is fully functional, fully operational and not have any aircraft to operate from it. It is 'bonkers' to suggest that this one single carrier could not get supplied and remain on station for its tour of duty.
Sadly and finally I guess it is 'bonkers' to think for one millisecond that our politicians will do another U-turn. They were advised to scrap the harrier and that advice was given with the best of motives but my position is that as the cold war evaporated, the harrier should have been handed over to the Royal Navy lock, stock and smoking barrel and that force should have been then used to its full potential.
I am no fan of the through deck carrier and not really a big fan of the harrier but we were where we were and could only play with the toys we were given and if we still have a Royal Navy when the F-35C is purchased then we will be back to becoming a proper deep water navy.
By Jimlad:
"I still maintain that having looked at the size and capability RN CAGS since the war, the combined FA2 / GR7 airwings we put out in the late 90s, along with ASACs, Merlin, new escorts and good AORs were probably the single most capable carrier airwing the UK has ever operated".
Given the time, the technology available to us & the technology of the potential opposition, I'd suggest that the (old) Ark's CAG of Buccanneer, Phantom, Gannet & Sea King was probably the most capable air wing the UK has ever operated. But it's just an opinion!
"I still maintain that having looked at the size and capability RN CAGS since the war, the combined FA2 / GR7 airwings we put out in the late 90s, along with ASACs, Merlin, new escorts and good AORs were probably the single most capable carrier airwing the UK has ever operated".
Given the time, the technology available to us & the technology of the potential opposition, I'd suggest that the (old) Ark's CAG of Buccanneer, Phantom, Gannet & Sea King was probably the most capable air wing the UK has ever operated. But it's just an opinion!
I think the 'what carrier group was best' is a whole fantasy fleets thread best left unpopulated!
However, on a more serious note, it is quite interesting to do some research into RN carrier groups since WW2 - from what I've found, the largest group we had was rarely above 30 aircraft (plus a small number of helos) and in reality a lot lower, particularly for the post war light fleets, which by the early 60s were so constrained by jet growth that they struggled to embark 17-20 jets.
When you consider that the RN in the late 1990s was putting out 16 Harriers (both GR7/FA2) with an excellent AD capability in the form of Blue Fox / AMRAAM, plus a good strike ability with GR7, backed up by excellent ASW pinglies, and a reasonable AEW presence, I would argue that the RN had been able to deliver a consistent level of carrier strike capability and availability since the 1950s. More importantly, given this consistency, the desire to obtain CVF to get a 'grown up carrier' seems ever more foolish - we're safeguarding the carrier to get a capability to deploy jets in numbers not seen at sea for over 60 years by the time the carrier is worked up. If the RN had been more pragmatic and settled on a smaller carrier, one cant help but wonder if the fleet would look a little more balanced today?
While the RN likes to make out that the entire world came to an end in 1966, the reality is that RN carrier aviation has since WW2 operated at roughly similar levels of hull availability (broadly 2 carriers plus an LPH, plus others in refit) and similar levels of airgroup capability. The RN at its utter zenith of post war carrier air power in roughly late 59/60 only had 3 light fleet carriers actually active, capable of embarking around 60 jets, but in reality given refits and work up patterns, its likely that only 1 or 2 was actually worked up.
Good account of RN carrier groups size can be found here - Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers Part 3
However, on a more serious note, it is quite interesting to do some research into RN carrier groups since WW2 - from what I've found, the largest group we had was rarely above 30 aircraft (plus a small number of helos) and in reality a lot lower, particularly for the post war light fleets, which by the early 60s were so constrained by jet growth that they struggled to embark 17-20 jets.
When you consider that the RN in the late 1990s was putting out 16 Harriers (both GR7/FA2) with an excellent AD capability in the form of Blue Fox / AMRAAM, plus a good strike ability with GR7, backed up by excellent ASW pinglies, and a reasonable AEW presence, I would argue that the RN had been able to deliver a consistent level of carrier strike capability and availability since the 1950s. More importantly, given this consistency, the desire to obtain CVF to get a 'grown up carrier' seems ever more foolish - we're safeguarding the carrier to get a capability to deploy jets in numbers not seen at sea for over 60 years by the time the carrier is worked up. If the RN had been more pragmatic and settled on a smaller carrier, one cant help but wonder if the fleet would look a little more balanced today?
While the RN likes to make out that the entire world came to an end in 1966, the reality is that RN carrier aviation has since WW2 operated at roughly similar levels of hull availability (broadly 2 carriers plus an LPH, plus others in refit) and similar levels of airgroup capability. The RN at its utter zenith of post war carrier air power in roughly late 59/60 only had 3 light fleet carriers actually active, capable of embarking around 60 jets, but in reality given refits and work up patterns, its likely that only 1 or 2 was actually worked up.
Good account of RN carrier groups size can be found here - Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers Part 3
Must disagree there Jim. If you work where I think you work, you'll be aware that "useful" doesn't cut it when it comes to requirements (as we're finding out).
It is a complete and utter fallacy that the size of QEC is solely driving its cost and that a "smaller" carrier would have been significantly cheaper or more cost-effective. However, the perception that the size of the ship would make it vastly more expensive than a smaller ship is something that has continuously dogged the project from inception. This was compounded by the failure to uplift the LTC lines for the project between 1998 and 2001, when it became clear that the 40000te "concept" produced for the initial costings would not be able to generate the sortie requirement (since walked back on, but still well in excess of that which a CVS could deliver), which required a somewhat larger ship of 60000 te. Note that the funding difference at that point was ~£500m (£2.9M original budget, vs £3.4M price submitted in 2002). Subsequent cost growth is not related to the size of the vessel, but to the endless b8ggering about with the programme and associated risk - delaying the programme has incurred by far the majority of cost escalation.
A "smaller" carrier (non-CTOL) would also by definition have been locked into the Dave-B programme, which if it went t1ts would render the ship irrelevant.
Your points regarding the size of RN CAG are unfortunately all coloured by the fact that those carriers were war-designed and built for piston-engined a/c and subject to the huge growth in a/c size and weight between 1945 and 1970 - a factor which no longer applies. The "zenith" you refer to was arguably in the mid 60s, when Eagle, Vic, Centaur and Hermes (none of which were "Light Fleet") were all operating with Ark in refit and CVA01 projected. All the original light fleets had gone by then, with Bulwark & Albion as Commando carriers.
As for the CVS CAG - as I understand it, with 16 f/w aboard, there was only room for the baggers and maybe a Lynx or HU5 for HDS etc - the Merlins were elsewhere. If you wanted pingers, then FW dropped to a dozen at best.
It is a complete and utter fallacy that the size of QEC is solely driving its cost and that a "smaller" carrier would have been significantly cheaper or more cost-effective. However, the perception that the size of the ship would make it vastly more expensive than a smaller ship is something that has continuously dogged the project from inception. This was compounded by the failure to uplift the LTC lines for the project between 1998 and 2001, when it became clear that the 40000te "concept" produced for the initial costings would not be able to generate the sortie requirement (since walked back on, but still well in excess of that which a CVS could deliver), which required a somewhat larger ship of 60000 te. Note that the funding difference at that point was ~£500m (£2.9M original budget, vs £3.4M price submitted in 2002). Subsequent cost growth is not related to the size of the vessel, but to the endless b8ggering about with the programme and associated risk - delaying the programme has incurred by far the majority of cost escalation.
A "smaller" carrier (non-CTOL) would also by definition have been locked into the Dave-B programme, which if it went t1ts would render the ship irrelevant.
Your points regarding the size of RN CAG are unfortunately all coloured by the fact that those carriers were war-designed and built for piston-engined a/c and subject to the huge growth in a/c size and weight between 1945 and 1970 - a factor which no longer applies. The "zenith" you refer to was arguably in the mid 60s, when Eagle, Vic, Centaur and Hermes (none of which were "Light Fleet") were all operating with Ark in refit and CVA01 projected. All the original light fleets had gone by then, with Bulwark & Albion as Commando carriers.
As for the CVS CAG - as I understand it, with 16 f/w aboard, there was only room for the baggers and maybe a Lynx or HU5 for HDS etc - the Merlins were elsewhere. If you wanted pingers, then FW dropped to a dozen at best.
Nota - very fair points, and ones which I need to mull over ahead of responding. I totally agree about the cost increase being due to needing to solve the Yr3 problem and not due to the needs of the project itself!
In terms of the RN carrier strength in the 60s, yes the mid 60s was a good time to be in the RN in theory, and I would personally regard it as the time when the RN was at its most effective. We'd cleaned out most of the war time ships, got some great RFAs into service, were seeing some first rate escorts and SSKs (and a few SSNs) come into play, and still had a hugely credible global influence. In my mind, the period up until the decision to go west of suez will be the time that the RN was at its post war peak.
That said, if you look at it, Eagle wasnt back in service till 64 (carrying 30 Jets), by which point Centaur was down to just Sea Vixens (9 of them) and Hermes was carriyng about 20 jets. I cant find figures for Vic. Even so, we're still only looking at a full on seagoing force of about 60 jets, with at least one CV in Singapore, and the rest in the UK or elsewhere. Some great aircraft were embarked, but things like Sea Hawks and Scimitars were not great designs, with no radars and limited capability, even compared to their peers.
As for the Invincible CAG - my understanding was that when she was running 16 FW jets, they moved the pingers onto the escorting RFA, usually one of the AORs, who were designed to run them. Essentially spreading the airwing over 2 hulls - not perfect, but still representing a very capable package of assets. This meant we were looking at usually a 24-26 strong airwing over the 2 hulls (16 harriers, 4-6 Merlins, 3 Baggers and a lynx or old SK). Compared to any post war UK carrier air group this is just as capable, if not far more so when you consider what the airfames could do. I still maintain that the late 90s carriers were just as, if not far more, capable than their predecessors of the early 60s.
In terms of the RN carrier strength in the 60s, yes the mid 60s was a good time to be in the RN in theory, and I would personally regard it as the time when the RN was at its most effective. We'd cleaned out most of the war time ships, got some great RFAs into service, were seeing some first rate escorts and SSKs (and a few SSNs) come into play, and still had a hugely credible global influence. In my mind, the period up until the decision to go west of suez will be the time that the RN was at its post war peak.
That said, if you look at it, Eagle wasnt back in service till 64 (carrying 30 Jets), by which point Centaur was down to just Sea Vixens (9 of them) and Hermes was carriyng about 20 jets. I cant find figures for Vic. Even so, we're still only looking at a full on seagoing force of about 60 jets, with at least one CV in Singapore, and the rest in the UK or elsewhere. Some great aircraft were embarked, but things like Sea Hawks and Scimitars were not great designs, with no radars and limited capability, even compared to their peers.
As for the Invincible CAG - my understanding was that when she was running 16 FW jets, they moved the pingers onto the escorting RFA, usually one of the AORs, who were designed to run them. Essentially spreading the airwing over 2 hulls - not perfect, but still representing a very capable package of assets. This meant we were looking at usually a 24-26 strong airwing over the 2 hulls (16 harriers, 4-6 Merlins, 3 Baggers and a lynx or old SK). Compared to any post war UK carrier air group this is just as capable, if not far more so when you consider what the airfames could do. I still maintain that the late 90s carriers were just as, if not far more, capable than their predecessors of the early 60s.
Originally Posted by glojo
....It is 'bonkers' to suggest that aircraft operating from the UK or Italy can respond or react as quickly as any aircraft stationed just 50 miles from the required scenes of the current action. (which was a known event when this decision was made) It is 'bonkers' to try to suggest otherwise....
The UK-based ac are not on quick-reaction missions either. So again, respond and react don't apply here.
I think the analogy Glojo is trying to draw is actually between scheduling sorties to be on task for CAS (ie as per the ATO) or holding them on a deck alert (with a similar response time).
This is not so much a question of response time, but efficiency and depends to a degree on whether those cabs on ATO CAS tasks are fragged for alternate targets as they approach Charlie time if no CAS requirement arises on the sortie, or whether they take their munitions home. If there are enough worthwhile targets for the for the former, then fair enough. If not, then a deck alert CAS task on the ATO might be a more efficient way of doing things, rather than keeping a two or four ship airborne from GdC, however long their time on task with AAR.
Nothing like Herrick as we "don't have" UK TIC, or JTAC on the end of the radio, so I assume the sorties being flown are more like BAI, rather than CAS.
In any case, as far as UK is concerned at the minute it's irrelevant until 2020 or so.
This is not so much a question of response time, but efficiency and depends to a degree on whether those cabs on ATO CAS tasks are fragged for alternate targets as they approach Charlie time if no CAS requirement arises on the sortie, or whether they take their munitions home. If there are enough worthwhile targets for the for the former, then fair enough. If not, then a deck alert CAS task on the ATO might be a more efficient way of doing things, rather than keeping a two or four ship airborne from GdC, however long their time on task with AAR.
Nothing like Herrick as we "don't have" UK TIC, or JTAC on the end of the radio, so I assume the sorties being flown are more like BAI, rather than CAS.
In any case, as far as UK is concerned at the minute it's irrelevant until 2020 or so.
Join Date: Sep 2004
Location: oxford
Posts: 469
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JAJ
But there is a dependance on another aircraft type to achieve the mission. Tanker's u/s, mission cancelled or divert. Plus you get the choice of weapons system you want to use that is not dictated by your host nation. You know what I am talking about.
But there is a dependance on another aircraft type to achieve the mission. Tanker's u/s, mission cancelled or divert. Plus you get the choice of weapons system you want to use that is not dictated by your host nation. You know what I am talking about.
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Torquay, England
Posts: 838
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thank you Not a Boffin for clarifying my post
Bottom Line
I would guess that is being very optimistic and a fully operational force may well not be on the high seas until late the 2020's, or perish the thought the beginning of the decade after 
Bottom Line
Originally Posted by Not a Boffin
In any case, as far as UK is concerned at the minute it's irrelevant until 2020 or so.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Southampton
Age: 54
Posts: 144
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jimlad1 said:
"That said, if you look at it, Eagle wasnt back in service till 64 (carrying 30 Jets), by which point Centaur was down to just Sea Vixens (9 of them) and Hermes was carriyng about 20 jets. I cant find figures for Vic. Even so, we're still only looking at a full on seagoing force of about 60 jets, with at least one CV in Singapore, and the rest in the UK or elsewhere. Some great aircraft were embarked, but things like Sea Hawks and Scimitars were not great designs, with no radars and limited capability, even compared to their peers. "
Just as well there were no Sea Hawks in frontline RN service after december 1960, and for the period in question (mid 60s) the Scimitar was already transitioning to second line duties, four airframes serving as buddy tankers aboard Eagle with 800B flight and another sixteen with 803 NAS aboard Ark Royal as the last (as well as first back in 58) frontline Scimitar strike sqn. 764 NAS was in the process of training up civvy pilots to fly some scimitars for FRU (later known as FRADU), taking over from some of the few remaining Sea Hawks. So the FAA frontline sqns were at this time mostly flying with radar equipped Sea Vixens in the AD role and radar equipped Buccaneers, the latter aircraft surpassing most of their peers (land based or otherwise!). 30 or so jets might not seem a lot, but they are always preferrable to none. The range of tasks covered was quite respectable too. Eagle operated between 1964 and 1972 an air group of 12 Sea Vixens for AD (secondary ground attack capability), 14 Bucaneers (10 strike, 2 recce and 2 tankers), 5 Gannets (4 AEW, 1 COD) six Wessex (later Sea Kings for ASW) and two more Wessex for SAR. Ark's air group was basically similar substituting Phantoms for Sea Vixens. Victorious and Hermes had air groups of the same composition but fewer numbers (mainly deficient in Buccaneers compared to Eagle) and Centaur was kept on to fill in for the carrier in long term refit in the period. None of these carriers and their air groups could compare to the USN CVs then or now, but they were very capable in their own right and could make a real difference when they turned up off a hostile shore.
Then as now, the Carrier was and is an integrated weapons system, not a floating airfield. The latter term denigrates it's potential, as it implies the ship is just there to launch and recover aircraft, refuelling and rearming them ready for the next sortie. That's only part of what carriers do despite appearances. It may be stating the obvious but it has to be said, retaining the corporate skills at all levels from the deck handlers, chockheads, fighter controllers, and all other trades will be essential for regenerating carrier capability. Sending personnel through the USN pipeline is a given but has to go hand in hand with retaining an active RN carrier (Lusty and Ocean) for the next few years. Periodic embarkation of allied nations Harriers will provide the necessary realistic practical experience. Something I a sure the RN will be pushing for in the next few years
"That said, if you look at it, Eagle wasnt back in service till 64 (carrying 30 Jets), by which point Centaur was down to just Sea Vixens (9 of them) and Hermes was carriyng about 20 jets. I cant find figures for Vic. Even so, we're still only looking at a full on seagoing force of about 60 jets, with at least one CV in Singapore, and the rest in the UK or elsewhere. Some great aircraft were embarked, but things like Sea Hawks and Scimitars were not great designs, with no radars and limited capability, even compared to their peers. "
Just as well there were no Sea Hawks in frontline RN service after december 1960, and for the period in question (mid 60s) the Scimitar was already transitioning to second line duties, four airframes serving as buddy tankers aboard Eagle with 800B flight and another sixteen with 803 NAS aboard Ark Royal as the last (as well as first back in 58) frontline Scimitar strike sqn. 764 NAS was in the process of training up civvy pilots to fly some scimitars for FRU (later known as FRADU), taking over from some of the few remaining Sea Hawks. So the FAA frontline sqns were at this time mostly flying with radar equipped Sea Vixens in the AD role and radar equipped Buccaneers, the latter aircraft surpassing most of their peers (land based or otherwise!). 30 or so jets might not seem a lot, but they are always preferrable to none. The range of tasks covered was quite respectable too. Eagle operated between 1964 and 1972 an air group of 12 Sea Vixens for AD (secondary ground attack capability), 14 Bucaneers (10 strike, 2 recce and 2 tankers), 5 Gannets (4 AEW, 1 COD) six Wessex (later Sea Kings for ASW) and two more Wessex for SAR. Ark's air group was basically similar substituting Phantoms for Sea Vixens. Victorious and Hermes had air groups of the same composition but fewer numbers (mainly deficient in Buccaneers compared to Eagle) and Centaur was kept on to fill in for the carrier in long term refit in the period. None of these carriers and their air groups could compare to the USN CVs then or now, but they were very capable in their own right and could make a real difference when they turned up off a hostile shore.
Then as now, the Carrier was and is an integrated weapons system, not a floating airfield. The latter term denigrates it's potential, as it implies the ship is just there to launch and recover aircraft, refuelling and rearming them ready for the next sortie. That's only part of what carriers do despite appearances. It may be stating the obvious but it has to be said, retaining the corporate skills at all levels from the deck handlers, chockheads, fighter controllers, and all other trades will be essential for regenerating carrier capability. Sending personnel through the USN pipeline is a given but has to go hand in hand with retaining an active RN carrier (Lusty and Ocean) for the next few years. Periodic embarkation of allied nations Harriers will provide the necessary realistic practical experience. Something I a sure the RN will be pushing for in the next few years
Obi,
You've peaked my interest - so in a warfighting sense (as opposed to a floating cocktail party sense), what contribution to the battle does an 'integrated weapons system' carrier make that an airfield does not? Happy to show my ignorance, but to me a carrier is exactly the same as a 'floating airfield'.
You've peaked my interest - so in a warfighting sense (as opposed to a floating cocktail party sense), what contribution to the battle does an 'integrated weapons system' carrier make that an airfield does not? Happy to show my ignorance, but to me a carrier is exactly the same as a 'floating airfield'.
Originally Posted by Red Line Entry
Obi,
You've peaked my interest - so in a warfighting sense (as opposed to a floating cocktail party sense), what contribution to the battle does an 'integrated weapons system' carrier make that an airfield does not? Happy to show my ignorance, but to me a carrier is exactly the same as a 'floating airfield'.
Like a ship/task group's guns, missiles, torpedoes, radar, sonar, EW suite and other weapons and sensors, an embarked air group is an integral part of a mobile weapons system, all inextricably interlinked. It requires the inputs, awareness, knowledge and training of everyone on board from the CO to the most junior logistician or stoker for its effective operation and safety. After all, they are literally 'all in the same boat(s)'.
The case for the prosecution rests.
FODPlod,
Nope, not gonna let you get away with that misrepresentation. Read my post, I specifically said:
"what contribution to the battle does an 'integrated weapons system' carrier make that an airfield does not?"
An airfield also provides a range of services other than its runway. It too is equipped with radar, comms, barracks, hosppital facilities etc). My point is, what specifically does a carrier bring to the party THAT MAKES IT UNIQUE FROM A FLOATING AIRFIELD?" This was in specific reply to Obi's quote that "the Carrier was and is an integrated weapons system, not a floating airfield"
My underlying point is this: if we are going to spend a shedload of money on some new ships, then the reason we are buying carriers, rather than any other naval vessel, it is specifically because they launch aircraft. Otherwise we should be buying another type of ship.
Besides which, once you strip away all the guff that essentially says how clever you are because you understand the integrated nature of warfare, and how stupid I am 'cos I don't, (because of course, airfields aren't at all integrated in how they produce their output, nor in the way they contribute to the overall battle) you still haven't answered my question, so I ask you again:
What exactly does carrier offer that is different from a 'floating airfield'?
Edited to add:
Note that if Obi had written, "the Carrier was and is an integrated weapons system, not a floating RUNWAY", then I would have agreed with him. So maybe this was a Naval specialist not understanding the integrated nature of an airfield...
Nope, not gonna let you get away with that misrepresentation. Read my post, I specifically said:
"what contribution to the battle does an 'integrated weapons system' carrier make that an airfield does not?"
An airfield also provides a range of services other than its runway. It too is equipped with radar, comms, barracks, hosppital facilities etc). My point is, what specifically does a carrier bring to the party THAT MAKES IT UNIQUE FROM A FLOATING AIRFIELD?" This was in specific reply to Obi's quote that "the Carrier was and is an integrated weapons system, not a floating airfield"
My underlying point is this: if we are going to spend a shedload of money on some new ships, then the reason we are buying carriers, rather than any other naval vessel, it is specifically because they launch aircraft. Otherwise we should be buying another type of ship.
Besides which, once you strip away all the guff that essentially says how clever you are because you understand the integrated nature of warfare, and how stupid I am 'cos I don't, (because of course, airfields aren't at all integrated in how they produce their output, nor in the way they contribute to the overall battle) you still haven't answered my question, so I ask you again:
What exactly does carrier offer that is different from a 'floating airfield'?
Edited to add:
Note that if Obi had written, "the Carrier was and is an integrated weapons system, not a floating RUNWAY", then I would have agreed with him. So maybe this was a Naval specialist not understanding the integrated nature of an airfield...
RLE - If you can't see the difference between, say, RAF Marham fitted with outsize water wings and plonked in the middle of the oggin and an aircraft carrier forming the nucleus of a self-supporting naval task group, possibly including amphibious forces, able to roam the oceans of the world then you're beyond any help I can offer.
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Torquay, England
Posts: 838
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ooops!!
I fear I might be partly responsible for the use of the wording, 'floating airport'!!
I guess I was attempting to simplify things and try to get folks to appreciate that a 'floating airfield' 50 miles away from the operational area is much better than having a fixed 50 mile length of concrete
some 500 miles away.
An aircraft carrier is clearly far, far, far more than just an airfield and will usually be carrying a flag officer who is the senior on station representative of Her Majesty's Government. The ship will have the very latest command and control suites with secure communications with every type of unit in theatre plus a direct link with Northwood.
In the days of my shipmate Able Seaman Nelson.... The capital ship dictated policy, could fight the war, alter the strategy of the war and win the war without outside interference. The flag officer not only controls the carrier, the aircraft, but every single resource within the task group whether ashore, above the sea, on the sea or under the sea. The carrier is but one part of this projection of power.
Apologies for any confusion
I fear I might be partly responsible for the use of the wording, 'floating airport'!!
I guess I was attempting to simplify things and try to get folks to appreciate that a 'floating airfield' 50 miles away from the operational area is much better than having a fixed 50 mile length of concrete
some 500 miles away.An aircraft carrier is clearly far, far, far more than just an airfield and will usually be carrying a flag officer who is the senior on station representative of Her Majesty's Government. The ship will have the very latest command and control suites with secure communications with every type of unit in theatre plus a direct link with Northwood.
In the days of my shipmate Able Seaman Nelson.... The capital ship dictated policy, could fight the war, alter the strategy of the war and win the war without outside interference. The flag officer not only controls the carrier, the aircraft, but every single resource within the task group whether ashore, above the sea, on the sea or under the sea. The carrier is but one part of this projection of power.
Apologies for any confusion
Actually, my fault for contributing to a thread that is long past its sell-by and needs to die.
Bugger, this sends it back to the top! Last time...sorry!
Bugger, this sends it back to the top! Last time...sorry!
Mr Boffin is right as usual.
The cost of a carrier over its lifetime is dominated by people, and most of those people are operating and maintaining its air wing.
The cost of a carrier over its lifetime is dominated by people, and most of those people are operating and maintaining its air wing.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Can we now accept that the title of this thread is completely out of date. It is incorrect to state that it "is bonkers" when the fate of the Harrier is already being implemented. There will be no "U-Turn" - and there is no likelihood of a "Stay of Execution."
In the future it may be possible to state (with the benefit of hindsight) that the decision was "Bonkers" - that moment however has not yet arrived.
In the future it may be possible to state (with the benefit of hindsight) that the decision was "Bonkers" - that moment however has not yet arrived.
Obi Wan Russell you said:
That is what I have tried to say in my comments regarding skills. Surely regardless of whether a carrier is STOVL or CTOL, jets have to be moved around on deck around the clock in all weathers, and fuelled, armed and worked on whilst on deck, the Navigator and OOW have to put the ship in the right place (and understand how flying operations restrict ship movement and vice versa), on the right bearing, and at the right speed, ATC and FC types will still have to manage the airspace around the carriers, the Cdr(Air) and Air department will still have to run, manage, and deconflict fixed wing launches and recoveries, whilst rotary wing operations continue, and many others throughout the ship will be involved?
The United States has promised to assist the RN in every possible way to prepare for CVF. Will this include AV8B embarkations?
cazatou
Whether or not the aircraft are being scrapped does not change the opinion that people have. Why should it?
As for decisions being changed - see this from Pompey News:Ministers reconsider mothballing carrier
I thought that it was Prince of Wales that was meant to enter service in 2016, but was now going to be fitted with catapults, and angled deck, and arrestor gear - hence a three year delay and a new entry into service date of 2019. Queen Elizabeth will not (initially) be so fitted (entry into service 2014?) so if they want to regenerate a carrier capability before 2019, then the UK needs Harriers of one kind or another - and if the GR9s are being destroyed, a lease of US ones (not unlike this suggestion) seems to be the only option.
It may be stating the obvious but it has to be said, retaining the corporate skills at all levels from the deck handlers, chockheads, fighter controllers, and all other trades will be essential for regenerating carrier capability. Sending personnel through the USN pipeline is a given but has to go hand in hand with retaining an active RN carrier (Lusty and Ocean) for the next few years. Periodic embarkation of allied nations Harriers will provide the necessary realistic practical experience. Something I a sure the RN will be pushing for in the next few years
The United States has promised to assist the RN in every possible way to prepare for CVF. Will this include AV8B embarkations?
cazatou
Can we now accept that the title of this thread is completely out of date. It is incorrect to state that it "is bonkers" when the fate of the Harrier is already being implemented. There will be no "U-Turn" - and there is no likelihood of a "Stay of Execution."
As for decisions being changed - see this from Pompey News:Ministers reconsider mothballing carrier
I thought that it was Prince of Wales that was meant to enter service in 2016, but was now going to be fitted with catapults, and angled deck, and arrestor gear - hence a three year delay and a new entry into service date of 2019. Queen Elizabeth will not (initially) be so fitted (entry into service 2014?) so if they want to regenerate a carrier capability before 2019, then the UK needs Harriers of one kind or another - and if the GR9s are being destroyed, a lease of US ones (not unlike this suggestion) seems to be the only option.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 27th Aug 2011 at 09:31. Reason: Typo - not even the MOD can delay a ship by 900 years, I hop!