Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
Originally Posted by WEBF
If NATO now has to hunt for Scud launchers, then this capability gap can only cause more problems.
If NATO now has to hunt for Scud launchers, then this capability (carrier strike) gap
I also seem to recall that the GR4 force were bought in at a very late stage when it dawned on the 'planners' that they may need an aircraft capable of operating at night, at very low level, in very poor weather. Good job we haven't got a capability gap there then .... which we would if we had canned the TGRF
So we (i.e UK and NATO) still have an exceptionally good 'scud hunting' capability (if it is needed). Without having to spend any further money on "new" capabilities. Or "borrow" carrier capable aircraft. Or bring any assets out of retirement.
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To put the Harrier debate in perspective - the first production Harrier flew for the first time at Dunsfold on 28 December 1967 at which time I was aged 21.
I now receive my State Old Age Pension each month.
I now receive my State Old Age Pension each month.
just a shame it has to be based so far from the potential targets that it can only spend one hour out of six or seven airborne actually hunting for them
As ever it's all about "servicing the ATO" (in old speak). With the "scuds" being extremely mobile (and employing "shoot and scoot" tactics) you have to have aircraft airborne and on task ready to respond as soon as a launch has been identified. Without AAR off the coast (or over "enemy" territory as was the case in TELIC) then the only thing that matters is the size of your fuel tanks (and thus your endurance on task) and not where you took off from. Ground alert and deck alert aren't a player here as they are too slow to respond (!) so, IMHO, as long as you have ATO coverage it doesn't matter how long the transit time is.
Off course you chose not to comment on the lesson identified during the early stages of TELIC planning - the need for an all-weather (at night) option. But that doesn't fit the "UK carrier is the answer to everything" argument either.
The carrier with F35 will be a fantastic capability in the future. Until then the current UK ground attack assets available to NATO are more than capable of fulfilling all that is asked of them (and have proven themselves time and time again having been deployed on operations, in one theatre or another, for the last 19 or 20 years). We do not need, nor can we afford, anything else. If NATO require carrier aviation then, for the time being, they must look elsewhere. We do not, and haven't for a very long time, have the resources to fulfil every single capability. Time to move on and look to the future.......
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Doesn't really put it into perspective.
When did the first C130 fly, First CH53, 47. B52?
Also The Harrier from back then is a very differnet beast to the present generation machine. If anything it proves what a durable and adaptable original design it was.
Dan.
When did the first C130 fly, First CH53, 47. B52?
Also The Harrier from back then is a very differnet beast to the present generation machine. If anything it proves what a durable and adaptable original design it was.
Dan.
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"then the only thing that matters is the size of your fuel tanks (and thus your endurance on task) and not where you took off from"
But that presupposes an unlimited surplus of aircraft and aircrew so that there are always enough in the air at all times to respond immediately. But thats not the case is it? You have a limited number of aircraft, of which at any point a significant proportion have to be in transit to/from the area. And the further the basing site from the area, the higher proportion have to be in transit. Now, assuming equal numbers of aircraft, which is going to give you more aircraft over area awaiting tasking? A basing site one hour (or less) from target or a basing site three hours (or more) from target? Even if you have twice or even three times the number of aircraft at the remote basing site the numbers still don't match
And we all now how flush the RAF is with working aircraft...
But that presupposes an unlimited surplus of aircraft and aircrew so that there are always enough in the air at all times to respond immediately. But thats not the case is it? You have a limited number of aircraft, of which at any point a significant proportion have to be in transit to/from the area. And the further the basing site from the area, the higher proportion have to be in transit. Now, assuming equal numbers of aircraft, which is going to give you more aircraft over area awaiting tasking? A basing site one hour (or less) from target or a basing site three hours (or more) from target? Even if you have twice or even three times the number of aircraft at the remote basing site the numbers still don't match
And we all now how flush the RAF is with working aircraft...
Last edited by jamesdevice; 16th Aug 2011 at 14:18.
You have a limited number of aircraft
And we all now how flush the RAF is with working aircraft...
Earlier in the conflict the Nato-led coalition targeted rocket launchers and Scud missile containers near Sirte, saying the weapons could be used against civilians or on areas beyond Col Gaddafi's control.
But to drag it back to a good old RAF v RN bitch fest .....
You have a limited number of aircraft
assuming equal numbers of aircraft
I can't believe I've been sucked back into this pointless discussion. Should we have fleets of carriers, squadrons of F18 / GR9 / AV8B / Prowlers / carrier capable AAR, oodles of long range bombers for the Falklands scenario, dozens of AD squadrons to protect UK shores as well as a fleet of ships and boats befitting an island nation and an army suitably sized to retake the Empire? Of course we should. But back in the real world we don't have the cash. So we had to make cutbacks.
To bring this right back to the thread title - was the decision to axe Harriers bonkers? With hindsight I would suggest to cut the GR9 force rather than the GR4 force was actually a fantastic idea (it was an all or nothing option - no salami slicing despite the fact that 2 squadrons of GR4s were later removed....) - we could not have been conducting an on-going enduring operation in Libya, as well as providing CAS in AFG, with just JFH. However, I am really looking forward to the day when QEII or PoW steams over the horizon, with its gazzillions of F35s onboard, to save the day. But like cazetou I will sadly by then probably be drawing my military pension, if not my state pension!
Until then - make do and mend!
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tyne
The first RAF Hercules entered RAF Service in August 1967 - but the Hercules is not utilised for CAS or Fighter combat sorties involving high "G" manouvres.
The first RAF Hercules entered RAF Service in August 1967 - but the Hercules is not utilised for CAS or Fighter combat sorties involving high "G" manouvres.
Wrath
In terms of carrier capabilites pre SDSR, I suspect we'd be looking at about 6 airframes as a sustainable effort, and maybe 12-14 for a very short burst. To do this would have utterly knackered the GR9 force, which was down to 10 FE@R and had no funding to do more than this.
Meanwhile we'd have also run out of AORs, support ships and so on, and by now we'd have had to have replaced the carriers on station without any supporting dedicated stores ship, which in turn means that the carrier would have been really rather limited in what it could do.
6 sustainable airframes for an investment of 1100 personnel on the carrier, plus roughly 1000 more in the escorts, plus you'd still need an air/land bridge to get top ups of munitions, fuel and supplies to the RFA to in turn replenish the tanker. Unfortunately some people still cling to the fantasy idea that our RFAs have a dimensional portal in them which gave them unlimited supplies, and get upset when reminded that the carrier is ultimately reliant on land / air support to keep it floating.
In terms of carrier capabilites pre SDSR, I suspect we'd be looking at about 6 airframes as a sustainable effort, and maybe 12-14 for a very short burst. To do this would have utterly knackered the GR9 force, which was down to 10 FE@R and had no funding to do more than this.
Meanwhile we'd have also run out of AORs, support ships and so on, and by now we'd have had to have replaced the carriers on station without any supporting dedicated stores ship, which in turn means that the carrier would have been really rather limited in what it could do.
6 sustainable airframes for an investment of 1100 personnel on the carrier, plus roughly 1000 more in the escorts, plus you'd still need an air/land bridge to get top ups of munitions, fuel and supplies to the RFA to in turn replenish the tanker. Unfortunately some people still cling to the fantasy idea that our RFAs have a dimensional portal in them which gave them unlimited supplies, and get upset when reminded that the carrier is ultimately reliant on land / air support to keep it floating.
Thanks jimlad - sort of figures I remember from my last tour in the Monastry! But be warned - expect some serious flaming from the usual suspects for allowing the truth to get in the way of a good
fantasy idea
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so Jimlad
You're saying that the 50-strong (or whatever it was ) fleet of Harriers was down to a a dozen or so of combat airworthy examples BEFORE the SDSR?
Or have I misunderstood?
Is that due to lack of funding? Or a managerial f'up? Or deliberate attrition by the management to prevent maritime air?
I can just see the discussion with the PM "Well you may as well scrap the Harrier fleet 'cos we've made them all unserviceable anyway"
You're saying that the 50-strong (or whatever it was ) fleet of Harriers was down to a a dozen or so of combat airworthy examples BEFORE the SDSR?
Or have I misunderstood?
Is that due to lack of funding? Or a managerial f'up? Or deliberate attrition by the management to prevent maritime air?
I can just see the discussion with the PM "Well you may as well scrap the Harrier fleet 'cos we've made them all unserviceable anyway"
James
The Harrier force did a sterling job on HERRICK, but at the cost of massively reducing available assets for carrier ops. The decision was taken in one of the pre SDSR planning rounds to reduce the number of GR9s available for deployment (colloquially known as FE@R) to around 10-12 (can’t remember which). This was, as I recall, designed to ensure that the RAF / RN had available a small force to continue carrier seedcorn capability when the assumption was that we’d be transitioning to STOVL JSF.
So, accordingly the GR9 fleet was reduced in terms of funding to ensure that it could deliver when required 10-12 operational airframes, plus sufficient spares / training / other in the system. I know that people that worked on the frames felt that more could have been available if required, but in practise, the planning assumption for the GR9 post HERRICK was that it existed solely to keep the RN /RAF in the carrier capability business.
This was a recognition that the GR4 provided a far better overall level of capability, and that the GR9 / CVS combination was getting older, with reduced availability in the last few years of its life, and that the money didn’t exist for a proper level of funding to keep it going at previous levels. In an ideal world we’d have kept it, but the money wasn’t there. Or rather, the money pot existed and the defence board, acting on the guidance of the service officers who drew up the planning round options, chose to take the option to reduce GR9 FE@R funding, in order to prioritise more important issues. There was no ‘carriers are bad’ rubbish that the Carrier Fanatics on the internet like to come up with – I should know – I’m dark blue and I also saw many of the options (and the costings). GR9 was saved when we still planned on doing STOVL ops.
The problem that GR9 had was that having taken the decision to move to CTOL, and having protected it through justifying it for STOVL seedcorn capability, the GR9 became too exposed when SDSR gave ever bigger cuts. Essentially it went from being a ‘need to have’ to a ‘nice to have’ as we can make arrangements for carrier flying in other ways. Yes it hurts, and I don’t like capability gaps, but all the services have taken massive pain recently, and unfortunately the RN/RAF lost this as a capability.
You could make a reasonable argument that the shift to CTOL has killed the RNs fast jet maritime air presence as it rapidly became clear that to do so meant we could take risk on GR9. Had we kept STOVL I can’t help but wonder whether GR9 may well still be in some form of limited service.
However, in total pre SDSR, we could have put 10 airframes to sea as a best effort, and to do so would have effectively taken our entire carrier qualified strength of pilots.
The Harrier force did a sterling job on HERRICK, but at the cost of massively reducing available assets for carrier ops. The decision was taken in one of the pre SDSR planning rounds to reduce the number of GR9s available for deployment (colloquially known as FE@R) to around 10-12 (can’t remember which). This was, as I recall, designed to ensure that the RAF / RN had available a small force to continue carrier seedcorn capability when the assumption was that we’d be transitioning to STOVL JSF.
So, accordingly the GR9 fleet was reduced in terms of funding to ensure that it could deliver when required 10-12 operational airframes, plus sufficient spares / training / other in the system. I know that people that worked on the frames felt that more could have been available if required, but in practise, the planning assumption for the GR9 post HERRICK was that it existed solely to keep the RN /RAF in the carrier capability business.
This was a recognition that the GR4 provided a far better overall level of capability, and that the GR9 / CVS combination was getting older, with reduced availability in the last few years of its life, and that the money didn’t exist for a proper level of funding to keep it going at previous levels. In an ideal world we’d have kept it, but the money wasn’t there. Or rather, the money pot existed and the defence board, acting on the guidance of the service officers who drew up the planning round options, chose to take the option to reduce GR9 FE@R funding, in order to prioritise more important issues. There was no ‘carriers are bad’ rubbish that the Carrier Fanatics on the internet like to come up with – I should know – I’m dark blue and I also saw many of the options (and the costings). GR9 was saved when we still planned on doing STOVL ops.
The problem that GR9 had was that having taken the decision to move to CTOL, and having protected it through justifying it for STOVL seedcorn capability, the GR9 became too exposed when SDSR gave ever bigger cuts. Essentially it went from being a ‘need to have’ to a ‘nice to have’ as we can make arrangements for carrier flying in other ways. Yes it hurts, and I don’t like capability gaps, but all the services have taken massive pain recently, and unfortunately the RN/RAF lost this as a capability.
You could make a reasonable argument that the shift to CTOL has killed the RNs fast jet maritime air presence as it rapidly became clear that to do so meant we could take risk on GR9. Had we kept STOVL I can’t help but wonder whether GR9 may well still be in some form of limited service.
However, in total pre SDSR, we could have put 10 airframes to sea as a best effort, and to do so would have effectively taken our entire carrier qualified strength of pilots.
Jimlad
Very nicely put
! Shame yours was not the second post on this thread ....!
Which also begs the question whether the original decision to go STOVL was based on capability or sentiment. But perhaps that's for another thread!
Very nicely put
! Shame yours was not the second post on this thread ....!
Had we kept STOVL I can’t help but wonder whether GR9 may well still be in some form of limited service
Good, practicable, unbiased comments from Wrathmonk and Jimlad1, especially the comments about RFA limitations by Jimlad1.
But no doubt the debate will continue to rage, fuelled by airchair experts with no inside knowledge of the subject.......
But no doubt the debate will continue to rage, fuelled by airchair experts with no inside knowledge of the subject.......
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Jimlad
Thanks for posting that, very interesting.
But -again if I understand correctly - that means you had the two RAF squadrons plus the Naval Wing (notionally two squadrons but...) with a total of 10-12 available airframes? Definitely an easy target for SDSR - the Treasury must have though someone was talking the p*** something rotten!
Thanks for posting that, very interesting.
But -again if I understand correctly - that means you had the two RAF squadrons plus the Naval Wing (notionally two squadrons but...) with a total of 10-12 available airframes? Definitely an easy target for SDSR - the Treasury must have though someone was talking the p*** something rotten!
James,
You are confusing the following (my definitions):
Total airframes - those still in Sqn use, deep maintenance, long term storage, etc...
Serviceable aircraft - those currently on front line Sqns, OCU, etc that are fit to fly.
FE@R - Force Elements at Readiness. I don't have the exact definition to hand, but it refers to the number planned to be deployable on a long term sustainable basis, i.e. the number deployed that could be sustained for months/years if necessary (obviously with rotations of crews and individual airframes)
When you consider that for any military force (Army, Navy or RAF) they say you need at least 3x the deployable numbers, one set deployed, one set working up, the other set recovering after just getting back, then the FE@R figure is unlikely to be more than a third of your total available assets.
Thus they were saying that for the Harrier fleet the FE@R figure was 10. However, the total number of airframes, either serviceable or unserviceable, would be considerably more.
Hope that clarifies things a bit.....
You are confusing the following (my definitions):
Total airframes - those still in Sqn use, deep maintenance, long term storage, etc...
Serviceable aircraft - those currently on front line Sqns, OCU, etc that are fit to fly.
FE@R - Force Elements at Readiness. I don't have the exact definition to hand, but it refers to the number planned to be deployable on a long term sustainable basis, i.e. the number deployed that could be sustained for months/years if necessary (obviously with rotations of crews and individual airframes)
When you consider that for any military force (Army, Navy or RAF) they say you need at least 3x the deployable numbers, one set deployed, one set working up, the other set recovering after just getting back, then the FE@R figure is unlikely to be more than a third of your total available assets.
Thus they were saying that for the Harrier fleet the FE@R figure was 10. However, the total number of airframes, either serviceable or unserviceable, would be considerably more.
Hope that clarifies things a bit.....
When you consider that for any military force (Army, Navy or RAF) they say you need at least 3x the deployable numbers, one set deployed, one set working up, the other set recovering after just getting back, then the FE@R figure is unlikely to be more than a third of your total available assets.
"
OK, thanks Biggus thats clear now. Still a shocking indictment of our planing system "
Not really, every military in the world uses a similar system. Fundamentally you can only operate roughly one third of your force operationally at any one time short of the 'maximum effort'. The moment you do that, you then spend several years in most cases recovering.
One reason why SDSR makes so much sense in using 2020 as a planning date is because the armed forces and their equipment are so broken from years of back to back HERRICKs that 2020 is the earliest that the planning / training / maintenance cycles will be realigned to where they should be. The Forces have made clear that they need about 5 years to rebuild post HERRICK and get ready to go again. Thats one political reason why losing harrier became a lot more palatable - the planning assumptions are that outside of the odd 'bashing the natives with sharp fruit as we get our boys out' type extraction, we won't be doing any real tasks in that period beyond normal jogging. Why do you think the future amphib force is only configured to deliver 1800 pax - because thats what you need for an extraction mission.
OK, thanks Biggus thats clear now. Still a shocking indictment of our planing system "
Not really, every military in the world uses a similar system. Fundamentally you can only operate roughly one third of your force operationally at any one time short of the 'maximum effort'. The moment you do that, you then spend several years in most cases recovering.
One reason why SDSR makes so much sense in using 2020 as a planning date is because the armed forces and their equipment are so broken from years of back to back HERRICKs that 2020 is the earliest that the planning / training / maintenance cycles will be realigned to where they should be. The Forces have made clear that they need about 5 years to rebuild post HERRICK and get ready to go again. Thats one political reason why losing harrier became a lot more palatable - the planning assumptions are that outside of the odd 'bashing the natives with sharp fruit as we get our boys out' type extraction, we won't be doing any real tasks in that period beyond normal jogging. Why do you think the future amphib force is only configured to deliver 1800 pax - because thats what you need for an extraction mission.