Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
From the Letters page in today's Daily Telegraph:
Cost of Libya operation
SIR – Why is Britain waging war in such an expensive manner (Comment, May 30) when others – especially the French – have shown more efficiency in their operations?
The answer is that Britain has turned its back on the sustainability and strategic mobility of maritime forces – particularly naval air power – by scrapping aircraft carriers and all the Harrier aircraft that could operate from them. Our partners – again notably the French – have not, and as BBC reports from the French carrier Charles de Gaulle show, are providing a level of leadership by example that Britain can no longer emulate.
Well before the Strategic Defence Review cuts were announced, it was pointed out in this paper that Britain’s maritime forces were the means to ensure our voice would be heard internationally. Instead, we cut them and poured good money after bad trying to prove the utility of land-based air power.
As Libyan operations are demonstrating, using land-based aircraft is far more expensive than using those based on carriers. Indeed, fuel and aircraft running costs to date for operations over Libya by a small number of RAF aircraft is far greater than the stated operating costs of an Invincible-class carrier and an air group of 12 Harrier aircraft for an entire year.
Can things be changed for the better? Only by a huge act of political will. But our global interests won’t go away and there will be more calls for interventions like the one in Libya. To meet such needs Britain must stop turning its back on opportunities presented by our ability to exploit the sea.
Dr Duncan Redford
Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Modern Naval History
University of Portsmouth, Hampshire
SIR – Why is Britain waging war in such an expensive manner (Comment, May 30) when others – especially the French – have shown more efficiency in their operations?
The answer is that Britain has turned its back on the sustainability and strategic mobility of maritime forces – particularly naval air power – by scrapping aircraft carriers and all the Harrier aircraft that could operate from them. Our partners – again notably the French – have not, and as BBC reports from the French carrier Charles de Gaulle show, are providing a level of leadership by example that Britain can no longer emulate.
Well before the Strategic Defence Review cuts were announced, it was pointed out in this paper that Britain’s maritime forces were the means to ensure our voice would be heard internationally. Instead, we cut them and poured good money after bad trying to prove the utility of land-based air power.
As Libyan operations are demonstrating, using land-based aircraft is far more expensive than using those based on carriers. Indeed, fuel and aircraft running costs to date for operations over Libya by a small number of RAF aircraft is far greater than the stated operating costs of an Invincible-class carrier and an air group of 12 Harrier aircraft for an entire year.
Can things be changed for the better? Only by a huge act of political will. But our global interests won’t go away and there will be more calls for interventions like the one in Libya. To meet such needs Britain must stop turning its back on opportunities presented by our ability to exploit the sea.
Dr Duncan Redford
Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Modern Naval History
University of Portsmouth, Hampshire
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FODplod
You know what the biggest wedge in all of this is.
The constant shouting from navalists that land based air is unless when compared to the all conquering maritime based air.
Which is bobbins.
You know what the biggest wedge in all of this is.
The constant shouting from navalists that land based air is unless when compared to the all conquering maritime based air.
Which is bobbins.
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TTH
I think you need to have a look again at some of the postings since the SDSR especially after the Libyan Ops started. As far as I can see, we in the UK all are busy trying to prove the former was right and sensible given our financial state or wrong and dangerous in view of it's defence impact.
In the meantime France, free of such inter-service bickering just rolls happily on with an aircraft that seems to do "what it says on the tin" from land or from a carrier.
I think you need to have a look again at some of the postings since the SDSR especially after the Libyan Ops started. As far as I can see, we in the UK all are busy trying to prove the former was right and sensible given our financial state or wrong and dangerous in view of it's defence impact.
In the meantime France, free of such inter-service bickering just rolls happily on with an aircraft that seems to do "what it says on the tin" from land or from a carrier.
FODPlod
That article suggests that our allies were not consulted before the idea of axing fixed wing naval aviation for a decade was made policy. Interestingly, Admiral Forissier also mentions a period of ten years being needed for building up skills - the very skills we are losing post SDSR:
“To run a carrier to its full capacity you need 10 years [of training]. The challenge is to prepare ourselves during this 10 years so that when the Queen Elizabeth [the first 60,000-ton carrier] is ready it can be operable in a very short time.”
To quote myself yet again:
If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
And....I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Have these issues been picked up by the media? Somehow I don't think so, mind you they don't seem to have picked up on the deployment of the Cougar task group to Libya. Are there any journalists looking at this thread?
Air Forces Monthly have produced a special publication, UK Airpower 2011, which shows the Sea Harriers sent to the SFDO Dummy Deck at Culdrose as the only RN fast jets, it comments that they are still in service although no longer flying, and are the only way that aircraft handlers will have any experience of working with jet aircraft this decade, and provide the means to embark US, Italian, or Spanish Harriers this decade. What a shocking state of affairs!
Back to the topic of Libyan operations. This report suggests that the Apaches from Ocean have been fired upon on their first mission. Elsewhere, Dr Fox says that the use of Apache is not plan B - Liam Fox denies Apache strikes are a change of tactics:
The use of the attack helicopters is a logical extension of we have already been doing. We already have fast jets in action, this gives us a chance to target new targets in a way we weren't able to do.
What does that mean? That Apache is better suited to dealing wih the current target set than Tornado/Typhoon? Or that a slower aircraft based close to the action is more responsive than a faster one based 600 nautical miles away?
What will NATO do when Charles de Gaulle has to leave the area of operations?
I wonder if our politicians are able to learn..... Maybe there is something in my suggestion of leasing a dozen or so AV8Bs in exchange for (most of if not all) our now disused (still with support costs) Harriers (plus continued USMC embarkations aboard Lusty/QE - which would be useful to us too). Someone please suggest this to Their Lordships and to the Government - it would solve both problems (lack of carrier aviation in a crisis AND skill loss pre CVF) and could be legitimately viewed as a positive outcome. It would also be cheaper than bringing the previous Joint Force Harrier set up back into service, and mean that we are no longer paying for disused Harriers under the RAB system.
That article suggests that our allies were not consulted before the idea of axing fixed wing naval aviation for a decade was made policy. Interestingly, Admiral Forissier also mentions a period of ten years being needed for building up skills - the very skills we are losing post SDSR:
“To run a carrier to its full capacity you need 10 years [of training]. The challenge is to prepare ourselves during this 10 years so that when the Queen Elizabeth [the first 60,000-ton carrier] is ready it can be operable in a very short time.”
To quote myself yet again:
If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
And....I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Have these issues been picked up by the media? Somehow I don't think so, mind you they don't seem to have picked up on the deployment of the Cougar task group to Libya. Are there any journalists looking at this thread?
Air Forces Monthly have produced a special publication, UK Airpower 2011, which shows the Sea Harriers sent to the SFDO Dummy Deck at Culdrose as the only RN fast jets, it comments that they are still in service although no longer flying, and are the only way that aircraft handlers will have any experience of working with jet aircraft this decade, and provide the means to embark US, Italian, or Spanish Harriers this decade. What a shocking state of affairs!
Back to the topic of Libyan operations. This report suggests that the Apaches from Ocean have been fired upon on their first mission. Elsewhere, Dr Fox says that the use of Apache is not plan B - Liam Fox denies Apache strikes are a change of tactics:
The use of the attack helicopters is a logical extension of we have already been doing. We already have fast jets in action, this gives us a chance to target new targets in a way we weren't able to do.
What does that mean? That Apache is better suited to dealing wih the current target set than Tornado/Typhoon? Or that a slower aircraft based close to the action is more responsive than a faster one based 600 nautical miles away?
What will NATO do when Charles de Gaulle has to leave the area of operations?
I wonder if our politicians are able to learn..... Maybe there is something in my suggestion of leasing a dozen or so AV8Bs in exchange for (most of if not all) our now disused (still with support costs) Harriers (plus continued USMC embarkations aboard Lusty/QE - which would be useful to us too). Someone please suggest this to Their Lordships and to the Government - it would solve both problems (lack of carrier aviation in a crisis AND skill loss pre CVF) and could be legitimately viewed as a positive outcome. It would also be cheaper than bringing the previous Joint Force Harrier set up back into service, and mean that we are no longer paying for disused Harriers under the RAB system.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 4th Nov 2012 at 11:06.
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WEBF, please let this die because neither you nor anybody else are not going to change the decisions that have been made. I wish it was different, but denial is not an effective course of action.
And suggesting things like renting AV8s is just a nonsense (we don’t have any training on the aircraft’s systems, the UK doesn’t have any of the weapons that those systems are optimised to employ and don’t forget that we have a bunch of mothballed GR9s already lying around: so why pay a 3rd party the money to borrow extra aircraft?).
We could certainly benefit from having fixed wing assets closer to Libya than where they are, but the boys and girls are coping and in a cash-starved military that’s no bad thing. Justifying the flying of fixed wing aircraft from one or more carriers just to train a few deckhands is a false economy – that would be the most outrageously wasteful means to give fixed wing carrier experience to those few who would be in service when we (hopefully) get the F35 in 9 years’ time.
And suggesting things like renting AV8s is just a nonsense (we don’t have any training on the aircraft’s systems, the UK doesn’t have any of the weapons that those systems are optimised to employ and don’t forget that we have a bunch of mothballed GR9s already lying around: so why pay a 3rd party the money to borrow extra aircraft?).
We could certainly benefit from having fixed wing assets closer to Libya than where they are, but the boys and girls are coping and in a cash-starved military that’s no bad thing. Justifying the flying of fixed wing aircraft from one or more carriers just to train a few deckhands is a false economy – that would be the most outrageously wasteful means to give fixed wing carrier experience to those few who would be in service when we (hopefully) get the F35 in 9 years’ time.
Suspicion breeds confidence
There is still a strong desire in the RN to retain a fixed wing capability pre QE. I can't see our Harriers flying again but USMC and other foreign Harrier deployments are very much on the cards. I would expect these to become more frequent.
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Of course there is a strong desire within the RN to maintain FW capability; the 1st Sea Lord knows now this too and that without other countries letting our FAA Harrier pilots fly their toys for 8 years that its future is very uncertain. The arguments have mostly always been about maintaining carrier experience but the flying experience that 99% of the RN and RAF Harrier boys and girls have today is almost completely different to that required for conventional carrier ops. In fact, the most current conventional carrier pilots the UK has are likely equally split amongst the RAF and RN 'few' on US F-18 exchange tours. For FAA survival that proportion needs to swell in the RN's favour in order to back up 1SL's case in MoD; to be told that the RAF have just as many qualified wouldn't cut it, would it. So the RN have begun putting their pilots into any carrier flying job they can get - wise move too if you want to survive the many reviews and PR11 options that will come over then next few years.
The pilots will only need a rigorous work up some months prior to their first embarkation on HM PoW with F-35C; indeed that's how one usually approaches doing anything for the first time. Experience will be quick to come in so far as flying on/off is concerned which is probably why the RAF aren't making the same argument. Getting pilots flying off carriers now is not about keeping conventional carrier experience or even maintaining it, it's about the survival of the FAA FW tradition and nothing else.
The pilots will only need a rigorous work up some months prior to their first embarkation on HM PoW with F-35C; indeed that's how one usually approaches doing anything for the first time. Experience will be quick to come in so far as flying on/off is concerned which is probably why the RAF aren't making the same argument. Getting pilots flying off carriers now is not about keeping conventional carrier experience or even maintaining it, it's about the survival of the FAA FW tradition and nothing else.
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it's about the survival of the FAA FW tradition and nothing else.
You are right and you are wrong at the same time. Right that it is about survival of the FAA (not just FW) against a predatory RAF. Despite CAS's assurances at the HCDC the RAF have an active campaign to remove the RN FAA from the orbat and it is being led by the same bald irishman as ever.
Wrong that it is nothing else. It is also about the survival of an attitude and state of mind that wants retain the understanding and will to operate from the sea. The RAF has no history at all of wanting to do this and will consequently always seek to minimise its interaction....the argument will be the same, and as you have implied, "its simple stupid". Well it isn't as has been proven over many many years.
To paraphrase a song "When the sea gets rough, the tough get going" i.e. it is when the weather gets rough that the innate understanding of the sea borne in an aviator who has the will to go to sea in his inner belief that the envelope is explored. We know from years of experience that the psychology of the RAF (as opposed to individual pilot willingness) is to restrict operations from the sea when conditions become marginal.
And if we end up with a non-RN FAA then where will the leadership come from to train and inculcate aviation into the myriad of deck crews and ship's companies that all contribute to the thing we call flying from the sea? It is the one question the RAF have consistently refused to answer.
Next time you meet the Irish 3* MAA ask him.
DITYIWAHP
Would it be posible for you to use a smaller font? I've had a bit of trouble reading your post. Having said that, it appears that you did not read mine either.
And suggesting things like renting AV8s is just a nonsense (we don’t have any training on the aircraft’s systems, the UK doesn’t have any of the weapons that those systems are optimised to employ and don’t forget that we have a bunch of mothballed GR9s already lying around: so why pay a 3rd party the money to borrow extra aircraft?).
The suggestion was to get rid of a larger number of aircraft in exchange for a smaller number of aircraft. Oh, and to make politicians think.
We could certainly benefit from having fixed wing assets closer to Libya than where they are, but the boys and girls are coping and in a cash-starved military that’s no bad thing.
Not too sure what you are saying is no bad thing. Anyway, more on Libya later.
Justifying the flying of fixed wing aircraft from one or more carriers just to train a few deckhands is a false economy – that would be the most outrageously wasteful means to give fixed wing carrier experience to those few who would be in service when we (hopefully) get the F35 in 9 years’ time.
CAN you read? You do not seem to have read, and certainly not understood, the points I made above and elsewhere on this thread (and others). Firstly it is not just "deckhands" (sic) by which I assume you mean aircraft handlers, it is lots of sailors throughout the carrier, from the flight deck to the ship control centre, from the bridge to the operations room. Surely the whole point would be to give experience to those who are serving when F35 arrives? Your point seems to be that there is no point in training tommorow as today's personnel may not be serving in future - which makes no sense.
Navaleye
You said it. Only the deluded or ignorant would think that not embarking fixed wing aircraft pre CVF could represent a good thing.
ICBM
Don't take this the wrong way - but you have proved my last point. The RAF isn't making the same arguments as the RAF does not run carriers, it may fly from them, but the skills I have mentioned belong to the carrier and her company, not the embarked squadrons (of whatever shade of blue). You are looking at this in a very pilot centric way, and ignoring what the ship has to do and the skills her people need. Virtually every book you read about carrier operations (written by naval aviators of whatever nationality) talks about the contribution made by the deck crews and others throughout the ship.
Bismark
I think that your points are similar to mine.
Anyway - this morning's Western Morning News as a front page story about the participation of Ocean and Albion in hitting Libyan targets. Not only did the Apaches fly from Ocean, but also Jungly Lynx from 847 NAS and ASaCs Sea Kings. The website does not appear to be working so no link (yet), however the story quotes an Apache pilot, with Afghan experience, who says "Launching from the sea is much more difficult...". The story once again comments on the fact that the force deployed from the UK a lot sooner than planned previously.
Eleswhere, the Telegraph noted yesterday that we and being drawn deeper and deeper into Libya.
“Boots on the ground” may have been ruled out, but Britain’s military operation is undeniably moving closer to Libyan soil.
If sending four Apaches is meant to scare Gaddaffi and his ilk into submission, sending Illustrious and some reprieved Harriers later this year (possibly when Charles de Gaulle has to return to France) would not only show resolve (we are so determined we altered our defence policy) but would make Gaddaffi's ilk foul their trousers.
From Sky News:
The Attack Helicopter (AH) has served with distinction and flair in Afghanistan, earning itself the nickname Mosquito amongst the Taliban (it has a distinctive buzz, and an almighty bite). And the engineers of the Army Air Corps have modified, adapted and (dare I say it) boshed an anti-tank land warfare helicopter into one capable of launching strikes from the sea. That itself draws attention to the aircraft-carrier-sized hole in Britain's fleet. During my time on board HMS Ocean, many have pondered aloud as to what Ark Royal and her complement of Harrier jets would have achieved from a berth in the Mediterranean. [Page 1 of the MoD press office handbook - avoid any reference to the strategic defence and security review at all costs].
Would it be posible for you to use a smaller font? I've had a bit of trouble reading your post. Having said that, it appears that you did not read mine either.
And suggesting things like renting AV8s is just a nonsense (we don’t have any training on the aircraft’s systems, the UK doesn’t have any of the weapons that those systems are optimised to employ and don’t forget that we have a bunch of mothballed GR9s already lying around: so why pay a 3rd party the money to borrow extra aircraft?).
The suggestion was to get rid of a larger number of aircraft in exchange for a smaller number of aircraft. Oh, and to make politicians think.
We could certainly benefit from having fixed wing assets closer to Libya than where they are, but the boys and girls are coping and in a cash-starved military that’s no bad thing.
Not too sure what you are saying is no bad thing. Anyway, more on Libya later.
Justifying the flying of fixed wing aircraft from one or more carriers just to train a few deckhands is a false economy – that would be the most outrageously wasteful means to give fixed wing carrier experience to those few who would be in service when we (hopefully) get the F35 in 9 years’ time.
CAN you read? You do not seem to have read, and certainly not understood, the points I made above and elsewhere on this thread (and others). Firstly it is not just "deckhands" (sic) by which I assume you mean aircraft handlers, it is lots of sailors throughout the carrier, from the flight deck to the ship control centre, from the bridge to the operations room. Surely the whole point would be to give experience to those who are serving when F35 arrives? Your point seems to be that there is no point in training tommorow as today's personnel may not be serving in future - which makes no sense.
Navaleye
You said it. Only the deluded or ignorant would think that not embarking fixed wing aircraft pre CVF could represent a good thing.
ICBM
Don't take this the wrong way - but you have proved my last point. The RAF isn't making the same arguments as the RAF does not run carriers, it may fly from them, but the skills I have mentioned belong to the carrier and her company, not the embarked squadrons (of whatever shade of blue). You are looking at this in a very pilot centric way, and ignoring what the ship has to do and the skills her people need. Virtually every book you read about carrier operations (written by naval aviators of whatever nationality) talks about the contribution made by the deck crews and others throughout the ship.
Bismark
I think that your points are similar to mine.
Anyway - this morning's Western Morning News as a front page story about the participation of Ocean and Albion in hitting Libyan targets. Not only did the Apaches fly from Ocean, but also Jungly Lynx from 847 NAS and ASaCs Sea Kings. The website does not appear to be working so no link (yet), however the story quotes an Apache pilot, with Afghan experience, who says "Launching from the sea is much more difficult...". The story once again comments on the fact that the force deployed from the UK a lot sooner than planned previously.
Eleswhere, the Telegraph noted yesterday that we and being drawn deeper and deeper into Libya.
“Boots on the ground” may have been ruled out, but Britain’s military operation is undeniably moving closer to Libyan soil.
If sending four Apaches is meant to scare Gaddaffi and his ilk into submission, sending Illustrious and some reprieved Harriers later this year (possibly when Charles de Gaulle has to return to France) would not only show resolve (we are so determined we altered our defence policy) but would make Gaddaffi's ilk foul their trousers.
From Sky News:
The Attack Helicopter (AH) has served with distinction and flair in Afghanistan, earning itself the nickname Mosquito amongst the Taliban (it has a distinctive buzz, and an almighty bite). And the engineers of the Army Air Corps have modified, adapted and (dare I say it) boshed an anti-tank land warfare helicopter into one capable of launching strikes from the sea. That itself draws attention to the aircraft-carrier-sized hole in Britain's fleet. During my time on board HMS Ocean, many have pondered aloud as to what Ark Royal and her complement of Harrier jets would have achieved from a berth in the Mediterranean. [Page 1 of the MoD press office handbook - avoid any reference to the strategic defence and security review at all costs].
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 8th Jun 2011 at 23:28.
Keep it coming WEBF. Someone has to educate those who don't yet understand why a capability as complex as carrier operations cannot just be allowed to lie 'fallow' for several years. The knowledge and expertise being gained by FAA personnel serving with other navies is already being fed into the project to inform 'whole ship' system design and enhancement, tactical development, establishing shipboard drills and procedures, planning upkeep and maintenance, authoring technical and operational documentation, training design, etc, etc. It's not simply a case of training pilots to fly aircraft from a moving deck.
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WEBF - thank you for your rant, I must confess to losing interest during some of your longer posts. Font changed to smaller so you can read it better - no offence was intended by its size.
FB - I think the shade was light blue.
FB - I think the shade was light blue.
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
"No British troops to set foot in Libya".
It's been a while, but I think I'm still reasonably au fait about the type and capabilities, but watching and reading the media coverage, what is the role of the 'semi-slick' Lynx 7 on a ship off the coast of Libya?
The Independent
http://www.mirror.co.uk/
http://www.smh.com.au/
http://news.xinhuanet.com/
http://www.guardian.co.uk
Archbishop Sid of Silsoe
First casualty of war is the truth...on both sides!
The Independent
David Cameron insists no British boots are on the ground in Libya.
Mr Hague also said for the first time that British ground troops could be sent to Libya if and when the regime falls.
WASHINGTON, June 6 (Xinhua) -- NATO will not send in troops on the ground although it has added Apache attack helicopters to its arsenal in the air raids on Libya, the military alliance's chief said on Monday.
"Let me stress that we have no intention whatsoever to put boots on the ground," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told the CBS TV network in an interview, saying that the military bloc will continue its air operations "with the aim to fully implement the UN mandate and protect the civilian population in Libya."
"Let me stress that we have no intention whatsoever to put boots on the ground," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told the CBS TV network in an interview, saying that the military bloc will continue its air operations "with the aim to fully implement the UN mandate and protect the civilian population in Libya."
Juppé said the helicopters would not be used to deploy ground forces in Libya and that the decision to send them was fully in line with the UN security council resolution mandating attacks in Libya.
The French newspaper Le Figaro said the helicopters would be assisted by target identification from French special forces who have been on the ground in Libya since the start of the allied operation there. The Ministry of Defence does not comment on special forces' operations.
The French newspaper Le Figaro said the helicopters would be assisted by target identification from French special forces who have been on the ground in Libya since the start of the allied operation there. The Ministry of Defence does not comment on special forces' operations.
Archbishop Sid of Silsoe
First casualty of war is the truth...on both sides!
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
At a guess, the 'Jungly' Lynx Mk7/9 belonging to 847 Naval Air Squadron was tasked for CSAR (Combat Search & Rescue).
Ahaah! CSAR, I remember that;
DITYIWAHP
Not offended, but your small font was hard to read. Some of us need glasses, don't you know!
Foghorn Leghorn
My comment about Harriers causing the Libyan regime to foul themselves was an ironic (or perhaps sarcastic would be a better description) reflection on all the (MOD produced) hype over the use of Apaches from Ocean.
FODPlod
My worry is more about basic things such as having enough chockheads with experience of working with jets at sea, and all the other sailors and parts of ship mentioned many times over, including here.
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Most of my comments, incidentally, are what I saw or was told personally. The responsibility for flying operations lies with the entire ship, not just the embarked squadrons. We ought to try not to lose all these skills.
Not offended, but your small font was hard to read. Some of us need glasses, don't you know!
Foghorn Leghorn
My comment about Harriers causing the Libyan regime to foul themselves was an ironic (or perhaps sarcastic would be a better description) reflection on all the (MOD produced) hype over the use of Apaches from Ocean.
FODPlod
My worry is more about basic things such as having enough chockheads with experience of working with jets at sea, and all the other sailors and parts of ship mentioned many times over, including here.
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Most of my comments, incidentally, are what I saw or was told personally. The responsibility for flying operations lies with the entire ship, not just the embarked squadrons. We ought to try not to lose all these skills.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 9th Jun 2011 at 10:20.
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At the risk of going over old ground, when the mission task became "Carrier Strike" not Air Defence, Fleet or otherwise, the SHAR was chopped. It would clearly have been desirable to run on both Harrier platforms but money was not available for SHAR improvements and the upgrades of the GR's within the JFH Fleet.
So we ended up with a Harrier GR9 Fleet that reflected the Defence requirements of a few short years ago but after a further cost driven review and despite the funds spent, chopped it and in doing so also removed the UK's Carrier Strike capability until later in the decade (ish). The Carrier Strike requirement remains but we thought we could get by without for the time being.
If HMG had then cut back on our involvement overseas we might not be having a debate over the non-availability of the Harrier and its ability to operate from our current carrier as and when needed.
At the risk of going over old ground, when the mission task became "Carrier Strike" not Air Defence, Fleet or otherwise, the SHAR was chopped. It would clearly have been desirable to run on both Harrier platforms but money was not available for SHAR improvements and the upgrades of the GR's within the JFH Fleet.
So we ended up with a Harrier GR9 Fleet that reflected the Defence requirements of a few short years ago but after a further cost driven review and despite the funds spent, chopped it and in doing so also removed the UK's Carrier Strike capability until later in the decade (ish). The Carrier Strike requirement remains but we thought we could get by without for the time being.
If HMG had then cut back on our involvement overseas we might not be having a debate over the non-availability of the Harrier and its ability to operate from our current carrier as and when needed.
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speaking as some one who is not in the armed forces, I just wondered if it would physically be possible to reverse this, should the need arise?
I think I read somewhere that the aircraft are in hangars, if say for example it ID become neccasary to return them to service, could it be done, and if so how quickly?
I think I read somewhere that the aircraft are in hangars, if say for example it ID become neccasary to return them to service, could it be done, and if so how quickly?
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Which rather begs the question ! Why do anti-det runs on the aircraft when they could have engines removed from a number and inhibited which means thye dont have to be ground run. It all seems a little strange when I am sure a quick sale could have been carried out on a number.