There does seem to have been a lot of smoke and mirrors over this issue, including:
- The materiel state of the Harriers (the view that they are knackered has been disputed by several posters - such as
here and
here.
- The number of carrier qualified pilots in the Harrier force (disputed
here - SammySu also discusses the state of the aircraft).
- The level of escorting needed for a CVS (1100 men? Really? How many Type 42s (complement: 287), Type 45s (complement: 190), or Type 23s (complement: 185) does that equal?
Ocean seems to have a single escort (
Liverpool - also doing NGS and boardings) at the moment - so why would a CVS need more? If
Illustrious relieves
Ocean, will she need more? Why?)
- The importance of the Carrier Strike capability and the issues that relate to skills needed for the future, which the First Sea Lord
flagged up to the Defence Committee in the Commons (thinking of the skills needed aboard the carrier perhaps - including those
parts of ship where there will be no or very few exchanges), or more recently to RUSI.
Two of our European allies, Italy and Spain, operate a small number of AV8B+s purely for carrier operations, aided by a Memorandum Of Understanding with the US. If only we could do the same (as suggested
here), it would solve so many problems (including reducing the strain being placed on the RAF).
Will there be lessons learnt after this campaign - with changes to SDSR? Not just about Harriers, or friagate/destroyer numbers, but also Tornado numbers, ISTAR assets such as ASTOR (and indeed Sea King ASaCs), or even the issue of do we need to marinise more Apaches, and prepare for longer periods of Apaches being embarked aboard
Ocean or
Illustrious for attacking targets ashore?
Perhaps the biggest lesson is that unexpected things happen - unexpectedly?