Jimlad, your post on the last page was so good that it deserves to be posted at the top of every page from now on (am I WEBF in disguise?)
The Harrier force did a sterling job on HERRICK, but at the cost of massively reducing available assets for carrier ops. The decision was taken in one of the pre SDSR planning rounds to reduce the number of GR9s available for deployment (colloquially known as FE@R) to around 10-12 (can’t remember which). This was, as I recall, designed to ensure that the RAF / RN had available a small force to continue carrier seedcorn capability when the assumption was that we’d be transitioning to STOVL JSF.
So, accordingly the GR9 fleet was reduced in terms of funding to ensure that it could deliver when required 10-12 operational airframes, plus sufficient spares / training / other in the system. I know that people that worked on the frames felt that more could have been available if required, but in practise, the planning assumption for the GR9 post HERRICK was that it existed solely to keep the RN /RAF in the carrier capability business.
This was a recognition that the GR4 provided a far better overall level of capability, and that the GR9 / CVS combination was getting older, with reduced availability in the last few years of its life, and that the money didn’t exist for a proper level of funding to keep it going at previous levels. In an ideal world we’d have kept it, but the money wasn’t there. Or rather, the money pot existed and the defence board, acting on the guidance of the service officers who drew up the planning round options, chose to take the option to reduce GR9 FE@R funding, in order to prioritise more important issues. There was no ‘carriers are bad’ rubbish that the Carrier Fanatics on the internet like to come up with – I should know – I’m dark blue and I also saw many of the options (and the costings). GR9 was saved when we still planned on doing STOVL ops.
The problem that GR9 had was that having taken the decision to move to CTOL, and having protected it through justifying it for STOVL seedcorn capability, the GR9 became too exposed when SDSR gave ever bigger cuts. Essentially it went from being a ‘need to have’ to a ‘nice to have’ as we can make arrangements for carrier flying in other ways. Yes it hurts, and I don’t like capability gaps, but all the services have taken massive pain recently, and unfortunately the RN/RAF lost this as a capability.
You could make a reasonable argument that the shift to CTOL has killed the RNs fast jet maritime air presence as it rapidly became clear that to do so meant we could take risk on GR9. Had we kept STOVL I can’t help but wonder whether GR9 may well still be in some form of limited service.
However, in total pre SDSR, we could have put 10 airframes to sea as a best effort, and to do so would have effectively taken our entire carrier qualified strength of pilots.
In one fell, balanced swoop you have encapsulated the true nature of the thinking behind the decision.
So, to summarise, not bonkers but pragmatic. The challenge to regenerate is on, but it is one that both Services must work together to achieve. This thread should be allowed to move on just as both the RN and RAF must do if this is to be made to work.